'Ai> 


BOTCHT  FROM 


I 


ii  ..  --- 


^^ 


LIBRARY 


\ 


PSYCHOLOGY. 


Reviews  of  the  First  Edition. 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

"  We  regard  Father  Maher's  book  on  Psychology  as  one  of  the 
most  important  contributions  to  philosophical  literature  published 
in  this  country  for  a  long  time.  .  .  .  What  renders  his  work  especially 
valuable  is  the  breadth  of  his  modern  reading,  and  the  skill  with 
which  he  presses  things  new,  no  less  than  old,  into  the  service  of 
his  argument.  His  dialectical  skill  is  as  remarkable  as  his  wealth 
of  learning,  and  not  less  notable  is  his  spirit  of  fairness.  .  .  .  W' hether 
the  reader  agrees  or  disagrees  with  the  author's  views,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  deny  the  ability,  fulness,  and  cogency  of  the  argument." — 
St.  James's  Gazette,  July  8,  1892. 

"...  The  author  has  proved  himself  a  thoroughly  competent  guide 
and  teacher  on  the  subject  of  his  work.  Almost  every  page  of  his 
book  bears  the  mark  of  careful  thought  and  wide  reading.  .  .  Taken 
for  what  it  professes  to  be,  this  is  an  e.Kcellent  manual.  It  deserves 
and  will  repay  study," — The  Scotsman,  August  4,  1890. 

"  This  book,  by  the  Professor  of  Mental  Philosophy  at  Stony- 
hurst  College,  is  a  sober,  scholarly,  and  important  work.  .  .  .  The 
author's  treatment  of  Psychology  is  simple,  logical,  and  .graceful. 
His  definitions  are  clear  and  precise,  his  style  is  crisp  and  nervous, 
and  his  knowledge  of  the  literature  of  his  subject  is  very  consider- 
able."— Educational  Review,  June,  1S91. 

"This  Manual  is  an  able  and  well-considered  effort  to  reconcile 
mediaeval  and  modern  philosophy.  The  author  bases  his  argument 
mainly  on  the  works  of  Aquinas  and  the  schoolmen,  but  he  gives 
fair  recognition  to  modern  philosophers  and  to  modern  science.  .  .  . 
We  can  commend  the  book  to  students  of  Natural  Theology  and 
Psychology." — The  Church  Review,  September  26,  1890. 

"Father  Maher's  joining  of  old  with  new  in  his  Psychology  is 
very  skilful ;  and  sometimes  the  highly  systematized  character  of 
the  scholastic  doctrine  gives  him  a  certain  advantage  in  the  face 
of  modern  psychological  classifications  with  their  more  tentative 
character.  .  .  .  The  historical  and  controversial  parts  all  through 
the  volume  are  in  general  very  careful  and  well  managed." — Mind. 

"  The  author  is  always  lucid,  cogent,  and  learned.  His  know- 
ledge of  the  works  of  writers  on  Psychology  is  thorough  and  sound, 
and  results  in  a  most  valuable  aid  to  the  student :  particularly  good 
examples  of  this  are  his  historical  sketches  of  the  Theories  of 
External  Perception,  General  Cognition,  and  the  Moral  Sense, 
whilst  the  historical  references  and  notes  on  almost  every  point 
should  prove  extremely  helpful."— T//^  University  Correspondent, 
November,  1890. 

"This  work  cannot  be  too  highly  recommended." — The  Tablet^ 
November  i,  1890. 

".  .  .  The  book  is  a  distinct  gain  to  psychological  science,  and 
places  its  author  in  the  front  rank  of  the  clear,  deep  thinkers  of  our 
time.  It  is  a  thoroughly  scientific  work,  evincing  on  the  part  of  its 
author  great  powers  of  analysis  and  discrimination,  with  the  most 
profound  and  varied  knowledge  of  philosophical  literature." — The 
Irish  Ecclesiastical  Record,  January,  1891. 


STONYHURST    PHILOSOPHICAL    SERIES. 


^PSYCHOLOGY: 


EMPIRICAL  AND  RATIONAL. 


}^^  %.^^^ 


BY 


p. 


MICHAEL     MAKER,     S.J., 

I      ; 

D.  LIT.,   M.A.  LOXD. 

PROFESSOR    OF    MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    AT    STONYHURST    COLLEGE, 

EXAMINER    FOR    THE     DIPLOMA     IN    TEACHING    OF    THE     ROYAL     UNIVERSl'lY 

OF    IRELAND. 


FIFTH   EDITION. 
(eleventh  to  thirteenth  thousand.) 


LONGMANS,     GREEN,     &     CO 

39    PATERNOSTER    ROW,    LONDON, 
NEW    YORK    AND    BOMBAY 

igo2 


Fir? 


ROEHAMPTOX  '. 
PRINTED   BY  JOHN   GRIFFIN. 


C/  1>^    ^ 


EDUC. 

PSYCH. 

LI8RARy 


PREFACE    TO    FOURTH    EDITION. 


The  unhoped  for  success  which  met  the  present 
Avork  in  the  form  in  which  it  was  printed  in  i8go 
induced  me  to  abstain  from  making  more  than  a 
few  verbal  changes  in  the  second  or  third  editions. 
But  by  the  time  the  fourth  edition  of  the  book  was 
called  for  the  large  quantity  of  fresh  psychological 
literature  which  had  appeared,  especially  from 
America,  in  the  entire  interval,  had  rendered  sundry 
additions  and  alterations  desirable.  The  process  of 
emendation  once  begun  it  was  not  easy  to  draw  the 
line,  and  the  result  is  that  the  present  volume  is 
practically  a  new  work  containing  a  considerably 
larger  quantity  of  matter  than  the  former.  The 
limitations  of  the  series  have  forced  me  to  squeeze 
many  topics  into  small  type,  as  I  was  unwilling  to 
omit  them  altogether.  The  unexpectedly  extended 
circulation  has,  however,  made  publication  possible 
without  a  corresponding  augmentation  of  the  price. 
The  modifications  up  to  the  ninth  chapter  are, 
with  the  exception  of  the  enlarged  treatment  of 
physiology,  psycho-physics,  and  psychometry  com- 
paratively slight ;  but  thenceforward  the  book 
has  been  virtually  re-written.      Chapters  xiv.,  xvi., 

1()931() 


vi  PREFACE. 


xvii.,  xviii.,  xix.,  xxii.,  xxiv.,  are,  minus  occasional 
sections,  new  :  the  Supplement  on  Hypnotism  and 
the  criticisms  of  the  theories  of  Professors  James 
and  Hoffding  entire!}'  so.  The  historical  sketches — 
which  I  believe  have  proved  helpful  to  various  classes- 
of  students — have  also  been  substantially  increased, 
and  I  trust  considerably  improved.  I  have  alsa 
introduced  a  number  of  diagrams  which  illustrate 
the  brain  and  nervous  system. 

My  aim  here,  as  in  the  previous  editions,  has 
been  not  to  construct  a  new  original  S3'Stem  of  my 
own,  but  to  resuscitate  and  make  better  known  to 
English  readers  a  Psychology  that  has  already  sur- 
vived four  and  twenty  centuries,  that  has  had  more 
influence  on  human  thought  and  human  language 
than  all  other  psychologies  together,  and  that  still 
conmiands  a  far  larger  number  of  adherents  than 
any  rival  doctrine.  My  desire,  however,  has  beert 
not  merely  to  expound  but  to  expand  this  old 
system ;  not  merely  to  defend  its  assured  truths^ 
but  to  test  its  principles,  to  develop  them,  to  apply 
them  to  the  solution  of  modern  problems ;  and  to- 
re-interpret its  generalizations  in  the  light  of  the 
most  recent  researches.  I  have  striven  to  make 
clear  to  the  student  of  modern  thought  that  this 
ancient  psychology  is  not  quite  so  absurd,  nor  these 
old  thinkers  quite  so  foolish,  as  the  current  carica- 
tures of  their  teaching  would  lead  one  to  imagine  ; 
and  I  believe  I  have  shown  that  not  a  little  of  what 
is  supposed  to  be  new  has  been  anticipated,  and 
that  most  of  what  is  true  can  be  assimilated  without 
much  difficulty  by  the  old  system.     On  the  other 


PREFACE.  vn 


hand,  I  have  sought  to  bring  the  scholastic  student 
into  closer  contact  with  modern  questions ;  and  to 
acquaint  him  better  with  some  of  the  merits  of 
modern  psychological  analysis  and  explanation. 

There  is  at  least  one  phase  of  current  psycho- 
logical literature  to  which  my  opposition  is  in 
no  way  diminished — the  prevalent  view  that  the 
science  of  psychology  and  ihe  philosophy  of  the  human 
mind  can  be  shut  up  in  water-tight  compartments 
and  rendered  completely  independent  of  each  other. 
Indeed,  the  now  customary  vehement  protestations 
of  psychologists  that  their  works  are  innocent  of 
all  philosophical  beliefs — if  not  also  devoid  of  all 
metaphysical  foundations — and  the  austere  gravity 
with  which  they  are  wont  to  apologize  whenever 
they  make  mention  of  the  soul,  or  allude  to  such 
irrelevant  matters  as  the  possibility  of  a  future  life, 
the  origin  of  the  human  mind,  or  its  connection 
with  the  body,  have  often  appeared  to  me  liable  to 
give  rise  to  the  suspicion  that  the  sense  of  humour 
is  incompatible  with  psychological  eminence.  For  it 
is  now  taken  for  granted  by  the  most  distinguished  of 
these  writers  that  of  all  human  beings  the  student 
of  psychology  feels  least  interest  in  the  question  as 
to  whether  he  has  a  soul,  or  what  is  to  become  of 
it ;  and  that  of  all  branches  of  human  knowledge 
the  science  of  the  mind  has  least  to  say  on  such  a 
topic.  In  fact,  to  trespass  in  such  alien  matters  is 
universally  assumed  to  be  the  gravest  of  professional 
delinquencies. 

Notwithstanding  the  weight  of  authority  for  this 
view,  I  have  had  the  temerity  to  suggest  that  it  is 


viii  PREFACE. 


the  most  misleading  and  extravagant  idolon  of  the 
psychological  cave  at  the  present  day.  I  have  even 
ventured  to  maintain  throughout  this  work  that  to 
construct  such  a  water-tight  science  of  psychology, 
from  which  all  metaphysical  conceptions  and  beliefs 
have  been  effectually  bailed  out,  is  simply  impossible. 
Accordingly,  I  warn  my  readers  at  the  start  that 
the  analysis  of  mental  activities  which  commends 
itself  to  me  as  the  truest  and  most  thorough,  has 
resulted  in  the  conception  of  the  human  mind  as  an 
immaterial  being  endowed  with  free-will  and  rational 
activity  of  a  spiritual  order  ;  and  that  my  exposition 
and  interpretation  of  the  phenomena  lead  back  to 
this  conclusion. 

At  the  same  time  my  procedure  throughout  is 
purely  rationalistic,  in  the  sense  of  being  based 
solely  on  experience  and  reasoning.  There  seems 
to  have  arisen  in  some  minds  the  notion  that 
the  works  of  this  series  assume  or  imply  dogmatic 
beliefs  pertaining  exclusively  to  revealed  religion. 
Of  course  no  one  who  had  read  my  volume, 
or  who  was  at  all  familiar  with  the  series,  could 
have  fallen  into  such  an  error;  but  it  may  be 
as  well  to  repeat  formally  here  that  this  work  is 
purely  philosophical,  and  that  it  contains  nothing 
to  which,  not  merely  every  Christian,  but  every 
Theist  may  not  assent.  Indeed,  the  very  first  insti- 
tution to  adopt  this  work  as  a  text-book,  save  that  in 
which  I  am  engaged  in  teaching,  was  a  Protestant 
Theological  College  in  the  South  of  England. 

I  have  profited  much  by  the  various  criticisms 
and  reviews  of  the  first  edition,  which  were  uniformly 


PREFACE.  ix 


very  friendl}^  even  when  the  writers  were  widely 
opposed  to  my  philosophical  views.  But  in  spite 
of  the  very  large  alterations  and,  I  trust,  improve- 
inents  in  form  of  treatment,  there  is  no  change  of 
importance  in  doctrine  in  the  present  work. 

I  wish  here,  to  make  general  acknowledgment 
also  of  my  indebtedness  to  many  writers  of  various 
schools — foes  no  less  than  friends.  I  have  endea- 
voured throughout  the  volume  to  indicate  the 
particular  sources  from  which  I  have  derived  special 
assistance ;  and  I  have  been  all  the  more  careful  in 
this  matter,  as  I  have  observed  that  some  writers 
have  shown  a  very  practical  appreciation  of  my 
own  labours,  without  obtruding  the  fact  upon  their 
readers.  In  addition,  I  desire  to  express  my 
obligations  to  the  Rev.  H.  Irwin,  S.J.,  for  sundry 
valuable  suggestions,  and  also  for  having  corrected 
all  the  proofs. 

A  few  hints  on  judicious  skipping  may  be  useful. 
I  have  marked  with  special  headings  the  more 
scholastic  and  metaphysical  discussions.  The 
student,  unless  he  be  already  familiar  with  or 
specially  interested  in  the  philosophy  of  the  schools, 
had  better  omit  these  on  first  reading.  The 
beginner  will  similarly  find  a  flanking  movement 
preferable  to  a  frontal  attack  with  respect  to  the 
longer  historical  sketches.  For  the  general  reader 
perhaps  the  most  interesting  course  would  be  to 
start  with  chapter  xix.  on  Free-will,  then  to  read 
from  chapter  xxi.  to  the  end  of  the  volume,  after 
which  he  may  begin  the  book  and  follow  his  own 
tastes.      The     portions     of     Psychology    generally 


PREFACE. 


deemed  of  most  importance  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  theory  of  Education  are  dealt  with  in  the 
following  sections:  pp.  i — 21,  26 — 51,  59—92,  125 
— 152,    163 — 200,     208—241,    292 — 303,    314 — 326, 

344—367,  37^—?>9^,  424—448,  454— 45S.  The 
relevanc3%  however,  of  these  topics  to  the  art  of 
teaching  varies  much,  as  the  intelligent  reader  will 
perceive  for  himself. 

On  the  other  hand,  for  the  benefit  of  the  more 
advanced  or  more  earnest  student,  I  have  indicated 
a  considerable  quantity  of  useful  supplementary 
reading  on  very  many  questions  of  interest  which 
the  limits  of  my  space  have  compelled  me  to  treat 
more  briefly  than  I  desired.  All  the  French  works 
cited  can  be  obtained,  I  believe,  through  Alcan 
(Paris),  the  German  through  Herder  (Freiburg). 

Stonyhurst,  October,  1900. 


PREFACE   TO    FIFTH    EDITION. 

The  fourth  edition  of  the  present  work,  con- 
taining 3,000  copies,  having  been  exhausted  in  two 
years,  the  Fifth  Edition,  which  has  been  carefully 
revised,  is  now  issued.  Sundry  verbal  changes  and 
corrections  have  been  introduced,  and  the  section 
on  the  muscular  sense  has  been  re-written,  but  the 
chief  addition  is  a  Supplement  containing  a  reply 
to  Mr.  Mallock's  criticism. 

Stonyhurst,  October,  1902. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS, 


Illustrations Pp-  ^^^ — ^^^^ 

INTRODUCTION. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Definition  and  Scope  of  Psychology  .  .  .  Pp.  i— lo 
Definitions  of  Psychology,  Subjective  and  Objective,  i,  seq. 
—Scope,  2— Empirical  and  Rational  Psychology,  5— Psychology 
distinguished  from  Cosmology,  6— From  Logic,  7— From  Ethics,  8 
— Relations  with  Physiology,  9. 

CHAPTER   II. 

Method  of  Psychology Pp-  n — 25 

Psychology  a  Science,   11— Introspective  Method,   11 — Objec-  / 

tive  or  Supplementary  Methods,  13— These  Methods  not  new,  18  \^ 

—Rational  Psychology  deductive,  18— Attacks  on  Psychology,  19 
— Objections  to  Introspection  answered,  20 — Real  difticulties,  24. 

CHAPTER    III. 

Classification  of  Mental  Faculties     .         .         .     Pp.  26—41 
Consciousness,  26 — Subconscious  mental  activities,  27 — Mental 
Faculties  classified,   28— Subdivision,   32— Various  classifications  :  1/ 

Aristotle's,  33— St.  Thomas',  33— Scotch  school,  34— Hamilton's,  34 
Herbert  Spencer's,  35— Attacks  on  Mental  Faculties,  36— Mutual 
relations  of  the  Faculties,  39 — Feeling,  40. 

BOOK    I. 
Empirical  or  Phenomenal  Psychology. 

Part  I. — Sensuous  Life. 

CHAPTER   IV. 
Sensation      . •     Pp-  42 — ^^ 

Sensation,  Sense  and  Sense-organ  defined,  42— Excitation  of 
Sensation,  43— The  Nervous  System,  44— Properties  of  Sensation, 
Quality,  Intensity,  Duration,  46— Composite  stimuli,  47— Cognitive 
Character  of  Sensation,  48— Sensation  and  Perception,  49— Scho- 
lastic doctrine  of  sfccies,  51— Experimental  Psychology  ;  Psycho- 
physics,  54— Interpretations  of  the  Weber-Fechner  Law,  58 — 
Psychometry  :  Reaction-time,  59. 


xii  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   V. 

The  Senses Tp.  63—97 

How  many  External  Senses,  63 — Taste,  65 — Smell,  66 — Touch, 
68 — Organic  Sensations,  Common-sensibility,  Coenaesthesis,  or  the 
Vital  Sense,  69 — Sense  of  Temperature,  70— Contact  or  Passive 
Touch,  71 — Cognitional  value  of  Touch,  72 — Active  Touch,  Muscu- 
lar Sensations,  74 — Hearing,  79 — Sight,  83 — The  Senses  compared, 
58— The  "  Law  of  Relativity,"  90 — Scholastic  doctrine  of  the 
Internal  senses,  92 — Internal  sense,  95 — Common  sense,  96. 

CHAPTER   VI. 

Perception  of  the  Material  World  :  Critical 

Sketch  of  the  leading  theories  of 

External  Perception     ....     Pp.  98 — 124 

Psychology    and     Philosophy    of     Perception,    98— Sceptical 

Theories,  99 — Philosophical  proof  of  Realism,  100 — Psychology  of 

Perception,  loi — Ambiguity  of  Terms,  104 — Ego  and  Mind,  104 — 

Two  Questions,  105 — Historical  sketch  :  Descartes,  Locke,  Berkeley, 

108 — Hume,  Mill,  and  Bain,  no — Kant,  117 — Herbert  Spencer,  122. 

CHAPTER   VII. 

Development  of  Sense-Perception.     Education 

OF  THE  Senses Pp.  125 — 162 

Growth  of  Knowledge,  125 — Complexity  of  perceptional  process, 
126 — Development  of  Tactual  Perception,  127— Tactual  cognition 
of  the  Organism,  130 — Of  other  Objects,  132 — Cognition  of  other 
Minds,  133 — Secondary  acquisitions,  134 — Visual  Perception,  135 — 
Immediate  Perception  of  Surface  Extension,  137 — Mediate  Percep- 
tion of  Distance  and  Magnitude,  139 — Binocular  Vision,  142 — Erect 
Vision,  144 — Auditory  Perception,  145 — Gustatory  and  Olfactory 
Perception,  146 — Objections  solved,  147 — Co-operation  of  Faculties, 
147 — Intelligent  Cognition  not  mere  Instinctive  Belief,  149 — Mental 
nd  Cerebral  Development,  150 — Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities 
of  Matter,  152 — Views  of  Aristotle.  St.  Thomas,  153 — Descartes, 
Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume,  154 — Hamilton,  Spencer,  155 — The  Rela- 
tivity of  Knowledge,  157. 

CHAPTER   VIII. 
Imagination        ........     Pp.  163 — 178 

Imagination  compared  with  Perception,  1G3 — Productive  and 
Reproductive,  165 — yEsthetic,  166 — Scientific,  167 — Dangers  of,  170 
— Fancy,  Wit,  Humour,  170 — Illusions,  171 — Dreaming,  176. 

CHAPTER   IX. 

Memory.     Mental  Association      ....    Pp.  179 — 207 
Memory  defined,   179 — Reproduction  and  Recollection,   180 — 
Laws  of  Association,  181 —Reduction  of  those  laws,  1S4 — Physio- 
logical hypothesis,  18S — Co-operative  and  Contiicting  Associations, 


CONTENTS.  xiii 


i88  —  Secondary  Laws,  igo— Retention,  igi  —  Ultra-spiritualist 
theory,  192 — Purely  physical  theory,  194 — Recognition,  195 — Remi- 
niscence, ig6 — Intellectual  and  sensuous  memory,  197 — Scholastic 
controversy,  198 — Qualities  of  good  memory,  199 — Training  of 
Memory,  200 — Historical  sketch  of  the  doctrine  of  mental  associa^^ 
lion:  Aristotle,  St.  Thomas,  201 — Locke,  Hobbes,  Hume,  Hartley,/ 
203 — James  Mill,  204— J.  S.  Mill,  Bain,  Sully,  205 — Obliviscence,  206.J 

CHAPTER   X. 

Sensuous  Appetite  and  Movement  ....  208 — 220 
Sensuous  Appetency,  20S — Scholastic  doctrine  of  Appetency, 
208 — IMovement,  210 — Voluntary  movement  analyzed,  210 — Auto- 
matic, Reflex,  Impulsive,  211 — Origin  of  voluntary  movement: 
Theory  of  random  action,  212 — Theory  of  instinctive  action,  213 — 
Growth  of  control  of  movement :  Probable  theory,  214 — Movements 
classified:   Secondary-automatic  and  Ideo-motor  action,  218. 

CHAPTER   XI. 

Feelings  of  Pleasure  and  Pain  ....     Pp.  221 — 228 
Feeling  and  other  terms  defined,   221 — Aristotle's  Theory  of 
Feeling,  222 — Laws  of  Pleasure  and  Pain,  225 — Feeling  not  a  third 
Faculty,  226 — Theories  of  Pleasure  and  Pain,  226. 

BOOK    I.   {continued.) 

Part  II. — Rational  Life. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Intellect  and  Sense Pp.  229 — 251 

Erroneous  views,  229 — Sensationalism,  Materialism,  Pheno- 
menism, Positivism,  Associationism,  Evolutionism,  230 — Intellect 
essentially  difterent  from  Sense,  230 — Proved  by  Attention,  232 — 
Comparison  and  Judgment,  233 — Necessary  Judgments,  234 — 
Universal  and  Abstract  Concepts,  235 — Reflection  and  Self-con- 
sciousness, 238— Intellect  a  spiritual  faculty,  239 — Intellect  medi- 
ately dependent  on  the  Brain,  241 — Balmez  on  Sensationism,  242 — 
Lotze,  245 — Controversy  concerning  Universals  :  Extreme  Realism, 
247 — Nominalism,  Conceptualism,  248 — Moderate  Realism,  249. 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Conception.     Origin   of   Intellectual   Ideas. 

Erroneous   Theories Pp.  252 — 291 

Origin  of  Ideas,  252 — Theory  of  Innate  Ideas,  253 — Empiri- 
cism, 254— Historical  sketch  of  Theories  of  General  Knowledge  : 
Plato,  255— Descartes,  256— Geulincx,  Malebranche,  258— Spinoza, 
260— Leibnitz,  262 — Rosmini,  264 — Kant,  265 — J.  G.  Fichte,  270 — 
Locke,  270 — Bain,  272 — Sully,  275 — Comte,  279 — Origin  of  Neces- 
sary Truths:  Associationism,  281 — Evolutionist  Theory,  286— 
Intuitionalist  Doctrine,  289. 


xiv  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

•CoN'CEPTiON.     Origin   of   Intellectual   Ideas 

{continued) Pp.  292 — 313 

Thought  an  Activity,  292 — Thought  Universal,  293 — Concep- 
tion :  Two  questions,  293 — Elaboration  of  Universal  Concepts,  294 
— Intellectual  Apprehension,  297 — Comparative  Abstraction,  297 — 
•Comparison  and  Discrimination,  29S — Generalization,  299 — Thought 
and  Language,  302 — Second  Question  :  Origin  of  Ideas,  302 — Aristo- 
telico-scholastic  Theory  of  Abstraction,  305 — Doctrine  of  St. Thomas, 
312. 

CHAPTER   XV. 
Judgment  and  Reasoning        .....     Pp.  314 — 344 

Judgment  defined,  314 — Analysis  of  judicial  process,  315 — 
Assent  and  Consent,  318 — Reasoning  defined,  320 — Analysis  of 
Ratiocination,  320 — Deduction  and  Induction,  321 — Implicit  reason- 
ing, 322 — The  Logic  of  real  life  :  Newman's  Grammar  of  Assent,  324 
— Thought  viewed  differently  by  Psychology  and  Logic,  325 — 
Belief:  Historical  sketch,  326 — Three  questions:  (A)  Nature  of 
Belief,  328 — Belief  and  Knowledge,  329 — (B)  Causes  of  Belief,  331 
— (C)  Effects,  334 — Conscience,  334 — Scholastic  view,  335 — Other 
Theories  :  Moral  Sense,  336 — Associationist  theory,  337 — Origin 
and  Authority  of  moral  judgments,  339 — Evolutionist  hypothesis, 
340 — Intuitionalism,  342 — Kant,  342 — Conscience  a  Spring  of 
Action,  342 — Butler's  doctrine,  343. 

CHAPTER   XVI. 

Attention  and  Apperception  ....     Pp.  345 — 360 

Attention  and  Sensation,  345 — Attention  and  Volition,  346 — 
Attention  interrogative,  346 — Voluntary  and  non-Voluntary  Atten- 
tion, 347 — Laws  of  Attention,  348 — Effects,  349^Attention  and 
Genius,  351 — Physiological  conditions,  352 — Pleasure  and  Pain,  353 
— Education,  354 — -Unconscious  modifications  of  the  Mind,  355 — 
Apperception,  357 — Historical  sketch,  358— Nature  of  Apperception, 
359 — Apperception  and  Education,  360. 

CHAPTER    XVII. 
Development  of  intellectual  cognition  :  Self 

AND    other    important    IDEAS         .  .  .       Pp.   36I— 377 

Reflexion  :  Grades  of  Consciousness,  361 — Growth  of  the 
Knowledge  of  Self,  362 — ^The  developed  Mind's  consciousness  of 
itself,  363 — Abstract  Concept  of  Self,  365 — Unity,  Continuity,  Dis- 
continuity of  Consciousness,  366 — Genesis  of  other  Ideas,  367 — 
Substance,  Accident,  Cause,  368 — The  Infinite,  370— Space,  371 — 
Cognition  of  Time,  372— Development  of  this  Idea,  373— Subjective 
.and  Objective  Time,  374 — Relativity  of  our  appreciation  of  Time, 
375 — Localization  in  Time,  375— Expectation,  376. 


CONTENTS.  XV 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

Rational  Appetency Pp.  378—393 

Rational  Appetency:  Desire  defined  and  analyzed,  378 — Is 
Pleasure  the  only  object  of  Desire,  379— Motive,  3S0— Spontaneous 
action  and  Deliberation,  381— Choice  or  Decision,  382— Volition, 
Desire,  and  various  forms  of  conative  activity,  384 — Self-control, 
385— Order  of  development,  388— Habit :  Practical  rules,  388;  Moral 
discipline,  390— Character,  392— Temperaments,  393. 

CHAPTER   XIX. 

Free-Will  and  Determinism  ....     Pp.  394—424 

Free-Will :  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  394— Free-will  defined : 
Scholastic  terminology,  395 — Problem  stated,  396— Fatalism  and 
Determinism,  397 — Argument  from  Ethical  Notions:  Obligation, 
39S— Merit  and  Desert,  401— Responsibility,  402— Justice,  404— 
Free-will  and  Ethics,  405— Argument  from  Consciousness:  Atten- 
tion, 406— Dehberation,  408 — Decision  or  Choice,  409— Adhesion  to 
resolution,  411— Metaphysical  argument,  413— Objections  :  Psycho- 
logical, 415— Metaphysical,  419— From  Science,  420— Theological, 

CHAPTER   XX. 


The  Emotions.     Emotional  and  Rational 

Language '•        .Pp.  425—458 

Feeling  and  Emotions,  425— Scholastic  view,  426— Chief  forms 
of  Emotion,  427— Self-regarding,  427— Altruistic,  430— Attached  to 
intellectual  activity,  432— iEsthetic,  435— The  Moral  Sentiments, 
440— No  distinct  Faculty  of  feeling,  442— Genesis  of  Feelings  : 
James's  theory,  443— Classification  of  Emotions,  446— Expression  of 
Emotions,  449— Evolutionist  Theory,  450— Origin  of  Language,  454. 

BOOK   II. 
Rational  Psychology. 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

Substantiality,  Identity,  Simplicity,  and  Spiritu- 
ality OF  the  Human  Soul  .  .  .  Pp.  459—473 
Scope  of  Rational  Psychology,  459— Its  importance  :  Method, 
460— SubstantiaUty  of  the  Soul,  461— Validity  of  Notion  of  Sub- 
stance, 462— The  Mind  is  a  Substantial  Principle,  463— Abiding 
Identity  of  the  Mind,  464— Simplicity,  466— Spirituality,  469. 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

False  Theories  of  the  Ego  ....     Pp.  474 — 492 

Kant's  Theory,  474— Empiricist  theory:  Hume,  475— Mill,  476 
— W.  James's  theory,  477— James's  Attack  on  the  Soul.  4S1— Double 
Consciousness  and  "Alterations  of  Personality,"  487— Criticism, 
489. 


XVI  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 
Monistic  Theories  .        .         .        .        .        .        .    Pp.  493 — 524 

Dualism  and  Monism,  493 — Spiritualist  Monism  or  Idealism. 
494 — Materialism,  495 — Thought  is  not  a  secretion  of  the  Brain, 
^gg—Nor  a  function,  497 — Nor  a  resultant  of  material  forces,  497 — 
Dependence  of  Mind  on  Body,  499 — Shadworth  Hodgson's  "Con- 
scious Automaton,"  theory  503 — New-Spinozism,  Double-Aspect 
theory,  or  Identity-hypothesis,  505 — Mind-stuff:  Clifford,  506 — 
Bain,  507 — Spencer,  508 — Mental  States  not  composite,  510 — 
Incredible  consequences,  513 — Monism:  Conservation  of  Energy: 
Hoffding's  doctrine,  517— Criticism,  520— Law  of  Inertia,  523 — 
Agnosticism,  524.  """^     " 

CHAPTER   XXIV. 

Immortality  of  the  Soul  .....  Pp.  525—544 
Immortality  and  Psychology  :  Theism,  525 — Teleological  Argu- 
ment, 526— P:thical  Argument,  529— Formal  Theistic  proof,  533— 
Argument  from  Universal  belief,  533 — Scholastic  Ontological  Argu- 
ment, 5^^ — Objections  against  the  doctrine  of  a  Future  Life,  537. 

CHAPTER   XXV. 

Soul  and  Body Pp.  545—561 

Individuality  of  the  Human  Soul,  544 — Unicity  of  the  Soul  in 
man,  545 — Vitalism  and  Animism,  546— Organicism  :  Physico- 
chemical  theories  of  Life  inadequate,  547 — Definitions  of  Life,  551 
— Union  of  Soul  and  Body  :  Ultra-dualistic  theories,  553 — Aristo- 
telico-scholastic  doctrine,  555— Soul  and  Body  one  Nature  and 
Person,  558 — Aristotle's  definition  of  the  Soul,  560. 

CHAPTER   XXVI. 

Soul  and  Body  {continued).  Other  Problems  .  Pp.  562 — 578 
Locus  of  the  Soul,  562 — The  Soul  present  throughout  the  Body, 
^5^ — Phrenology,  564 — Localization  of  Cerebral  P^unctions,  565 — 
Methods  of  research,  566— D.  Ferrier,  Plechsig,  567 — Origin  of  the 
Soul,  572 — Traducianism  and  Creation,  574 — Time  of  its  Origin  : 
Scholastic  doctrine,  575 — Lotze  and  Ladd,  576 — Origin  of  the  first 
Human  Soul :  Evolution  Theory,  578. 

SUPPLEMENTS. 

A. — Animal  Psychology Pp.  579—594 

Comparative  Psychology,  579 — Difficulties  of  Animal  Psycho- 
logy, 580 — Cartesian  Theory  :  Animals  sentient,  582 — Animals 
irrational,  583— Instinct,  5S7 — Origin  of  Instinct :  Evolutionist 
Theories,  588— Animal  "  Souls,"  593. 

B. — Hypnotism Pp.  594 — 601 

Hypnotism  :  Historical  sketch,  594 — Induction  and  Character- 
istics of  hypnotic  state,  595 — Theories  concerning  Hypnotism, 598 
C.— Repj^y  to  Mr.  Mallock's  Criticism  .    Pp.  C03— Cio 


DIAGRAMS    ILLUSTRATING    THE 

STRUCTURE    OF 

THE    NERVOUS    SYSTEM    DESCRIBED' 

IN    THE    TEXT. 


For  the  subject-matter  of  Figures  I. — III.  see  pp.  44 — 46- 


Fig.  I. — Side  view  of  Brain  and  Spinal  Cord. 

(Barnet.) 


CEREBRUM 

MEDULLA 
OBLONGATA  J 

3EREBELLUM 


'INAL    CORD 


Fig.  II.— Spinal  Cord 
and  Nerves,  with 
Sympathetic  Chain 
on  one  side. 


SPINAL     COLUMK 


CUT      ENDS     OF 
SPINAL     NERVEa 


Fig.  III.— Roots  of  a  Spinal  Nerve  issuing  from 
the  Cord  :  viewed  (A)  from  before  ;  (B)  from 
the  side;  (C)  from  above;  (D)  the  ^  roots 
separated. 


s^^ 


^.^'* 


<>v 


alO 


■>>■% 


A\ 


\',  pons  varolii,  below 
which  is  the  medulla 
oblongata;  C  i  to  8,  the 
cervical  nerves  ;  a  to  x, 


,  anterior  fissure  ;  2,  posterior  fissure  ;  3  and  4,  lateral  the  sympathetic  chain 
grooves  of  cord  ;  5,  anterior,  efferent,  or  motor  root  ;  connected  with  spinal 
6,  posterior,  afferent,  or  sensory  root.  (Furneau.x. )  nerves.  (Furneau.x.) 


FRONT 


REAR 


Fig.  IV. — The   Human 
Brain. 


A,  cerebrum  ;    b,  cerebellum 
c,  pons  varolii  ;    D,  medulk 
oblongata  ;      e,     fissure     o 
Silvius. 


1 

1 

I 


Fig.V. — Under  surface  ct 
Brain,    showing    origi 
of  the  twelve   pairs  ( 
cranial  nerves. 


I,  great   longitudinal   fissur« 

2,  2'  2",  convolutions  of  ba 
of  cerebrum,  frontal  lobe; 

3,  base  of  fissure  of  Silviui 

4,  4',  4",  bases  of  cerebrur 
temporal  lobes  ;  5,  5',  oc< 
pital  lobes  ;  7,  8,  9,  10,  cat 
bellum  ;  6,  medulla  oblo 
gata;  I. — IX.  .cranial nerv« 
VI.  VII.  on  pons  varc 
indicate  roots  of  ocular  a: 
facial  nerves.  (Bastian.) 


(See  Text,  pp.  44—4'^)- 


Th 


1 


ig.  VI. — Upper  surface  of  Brain,  arachnoid  membrane  being-  removed.  (Gray.) 


LOWER 
FROMTAL 


FISSURE 
ROL.ANDO 


PARIETO-OCCIPITAL  FISSURE 


REAR 


This  illustration  shows  the  chief  convolutions  and  fissures  of  the  cerebrum  from  above. 
The  two  hemispheres  are  divided  by  the  great  longitudinal  or  median  fissure. 

(See  Text,  pp.  45,  567—570). 


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PSYCHOLOGY. 


>     >     >   I 


Introduction. 


CHAPTER   I. 

DEFINITION    AND    SCOPE    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

Definition. — Psychology  (r?}?  -^vxv^  X0709)  is  that 
branch  of  philosophy  which  studies  the  human  mind 
or  soul.  By  the  mind  or  soul  (yfruxv)  is  meant  the 
thinking  principle,  that  by  which  I  feel,  know,  and 
will,  and  by  which  my  body  is  animated.  The 
terms  Ego,  Self,  Spirit,  are  used  as  synonymous 
with  mind  and  soul,  and,  though  slight  differences 
attach  to  some  of  them,  it  will  be  convenient  for  us 
(except  where  we  specially  call  attention  to  diver- 
gencies of  meaning)  to  follow  common  usage  and 
employ  them  as  practically  equivalent. 

Subjective  and  Objective. — In  modern  philo- 
sophy the  mind  is  also  called  the  Subject,  especially 
when  set  in  contrast  with  the  external  world,  which 
is  characterized  as  the  Object.  The  adjective  sub- 
jective is  similarly  opposed  to  objective,  as  denoting 
mental  in  opposition  to  extra-mental  facts,  what 
pertains  to  the  knowing  mind  as  contrasted  with 
B 


PSYCHOLOGY. 


what  belongs  to  the  object  known.  Thus  a  train  of 
thought,  an  emotion,  and  a  dream  are  said  to  be 
subjective ;  whilst  a  horse,  an  election,  and  a  war 
are  objective  realities.  Such  are  the  primary  signi- 
fications of  these  terms,  but  the  meanings  vary  with 
different  writers.^ 

An  objection. — We  may  here  be  met  with  the 
objection  that  wc  are  unwarrantably  postulating  at 
the  very  commencement  of  our  work  the  most 
disputed  doctrine  in  the  whole  science  of  Ps3^cho- 
logy — the  existence  of  some  '*  inscrutable  entity," 
called  the  soul.  To  this  we  reply  that  for  the 
present  we  only  use  the  term  provisionally  to  indi- 
cate the  source  or  root  of  our  conscious  states.  We 
make  no  assumption  as  regards  the  nature  of  this 
principle.  Whether  it  be  the  brain,  the  nervous 
system,  the  whole  organism,  or  a  pure  spirit,  we  do 
not  yet  attempt  to  decide.  But  we  claim  to  be 
justified,  in  employing  the  familiar  terms  soul  and 
mind  to  designate  this  apparent  bond,  by  the  obvious 
fact  that  our  various  mental  states  manifest  them- 
selves as  bound  together  in  a  single  unity. 

Scope  of  Psychology. — The  subject-matter  of 
our  science  is,  then,  the  Soul  or  Mind.  The  psycho- 
logist investigates  those  phenomena  which  we  call 
sensations,  perceptions,  thoughts,  volitions,  and 
emotions;   he   analyzes  them,   classifies  them,   and 

^  In  strict  language  the  vv'ord  miud  designates  the  animating 
principle  as  the  subject  of  consciousness,  while  soul  refers  to  it  as  the 
root  of  all  forms  of  vital  activity.  Spirit  is  of  still  narrower  extension 
than  mind,  indicating  properly  a  being  capable  of  the  higher,  rational, 
or  intellectual  order  of  conscious  life.  E<^o  and  self  strictly  signify 
the  whole  person  constituted  of  soul  and  body. 


DEFINITION  AND  SCOPE. 


seeks  to  reduce  them  to  the  smallest  number  of 
fundamental  activities.  He  studies  the  nature  of 
their  exercise  and  the  laws  which  govern  their 
operations,  and  he  endeavours  to  enunciate  a  body 
of  general  truths  which  will  accurately  describe 
their  chief  and  most  characteristic  features.  But 
Psychology  cannot  rest  here.  Whether  it  wishes  it 
or  not,  Psychology  is  inevitably  a  branch  of  Philo- 
sophy.^ It  cannot  remain  satisfied  with  the  mere 
generalization  of  facts;  it  must  pass  on  to  inquire 
into  the  inner  nature  and  constitution  of  the  root 
and  subject  of  these  phenomena;  it  must  seek  to 
explain  the  effect  by  its  cause.  Consequently,  a 
work  which  does  nothing  more  than  describe  and 
classify  the  operations  of  the  mind,  omitting  all 
discussion  regarding  the  mind  itself,  is  but  an 
abortive  attempt  at  a  science  of  Psychology,^     La 


"  Etymologically,  Philosophy  {<piXo(To<pla)  is  equivalent  to  the 
love  of  ivisdom,  but  at  a  very  early  date  it  had  come  to  signify  the 
possession  of  the  highest  knowledge,  or  ivisdom  itself  Wisdom  or 
Philosophy,  thus  understood,  was  defined  as  the  science  of  things  in 
their  last  causes.  The  term,  Metaphysics,  was  also  employed  as  syno- 
nymous with  Philosophy,  to  denote  the  science  which  investigates 
^he  ultimate  principles  of  things.  Metaphysics  has  been  divided 
into  Ontology,  General  Metaphysics  or  Metaphysics  proper,  also  called 
General  Metaphysics,  which  studies  the  nature  and  attributes  of 
Being  in  general,  and  Special  Metaphysics,  including  Cosmology,  Rational 
Theology,  Sind  Psychology,  which  investigate  special  forms  of  Being. 
By  many  modern  writers,  the  terms  Philosophy  and  Metaphysics 
are  used  in  a  very  vague  and  indefinite  sense,  to  signify  the  investi- 
gation of  all  fundamental  problems  bearing  on  the  ultimate  origin, 
constitution,  or  end  of  things,  and  the  nature  of  knowledge. 

^  Yet  such  a  truncated  exposition  of  the  subject  is  almost 
unanimously  adopted  by  English  psychologists.  Confer.  A.  Bain, 
Mental  Science,  pp.  i — 3;  J  Sully,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  pp.  i,  2; 
J.  C  Murray,  Handbook  of  Psychology,  pp.  i,  2;  T.  Ribot,  Con- 
temporary English  Psychology,  pp.  15 — 20.  Similarly  William  James, 
Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  pp.  y.^-vi  and  H.  Hoffding,  Outlines 
of  Psychology,  p.  29. 


PSYCHOLOGY. 


Psychologic  sans  dme,  is  Hamlet  without  the  Prince 
of  Denmark.  What  is  the  meaning  and  value  of 
life  ?  What  are  we  ?  Whence  come  we  ?  W^hither 
go  we  ?  These  have  ever  been  questions  of  profound 
interest  to  the  human  race,  and  it  is  the  belief  that 
Psychology  can  throw  some  light  on  them  which 
has  always  vested  with  such  importance  this  branch 
of  Philosophy. 

Besides  the  fact  that  the  chief  interest  for 
mankind  in  Psychology  is  due  to  the  expectation 
that  some  information  as  regards  the  nature  of  the 
soul  itself  can  be  thence  derived,  there  is  another 
reason  for  the  explicit  treatment  of  these  meta- 
physical problems  here.  The  two  sets  of  questions 
are  incapable  of  isolation.  They  can  never  be  really 
separated.  Our  final  conclusions  as  regards  many 
vital  philosophical  problems  are  necessarily  deter- 
mined by  the  view  taken  of  the  nature  of  mental 
activity  in  the  empirical  part  of  the  science.  The 
sensationalist  doctrines,  for  instance,  on  perception, 
intellectual  cognition,  or  volition,  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  Hegelian  or  with  the  Intuitionalist 
conception  of  the  mind.  It  is,  consequently,  only 
fair  to  the  reader  that  the  philosophical  conclusions 
to  which  the  treatment  of  mental  phenomena  pre- 
sented to  him  logically  lead,  should  be  clearly 
pointed  out.* 

^  "  The  philosophic  implications  embedded  in  the  very  heart  of 
psychology  are  not  got  rid  of  when  they  are  kept  out  of  sight. 
Some  opinion  regarding  the  nature  of  the  mind  and  its  relations  to 
reality  will  show  itself  on  almost  every  page,  and  the  fact  that  this 
opinion  is  introduced  without  the  conscious  intention  of  the  writer 
may  serve  to  confuse  both  the  author  and  his  reader."  (J.  Dewey, 
Psychology,  p.  iv.)     Hoffding's  work  is  9  striking  illustration  of  this, 


DEFINITION  AND  SCOPE. 


Empirical    and    Rational    Psychology.  —  The 

discussion  of  the  former  questions — the  inquiry  into 
.  the  character  of  our  various  mental  states  and 
operations — is  called  by  different  writers  Phenomenal, 
Empirical^  or  Experimental  Psychology ;  whilst  the 
investigation  into  the  nature  of  the  mind  itself  is 
styled  Rational  Psychology.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  des- 
cribes this  second  part  as  Inferential  Psychology, 
or  the  Ontology  of  the  mind.^  The  term  Phenomenal 
is  applied  to  the  first  part  of  Psychology,  because 
it  investigates  the  various  phenomena  of  the  mind, 

I  the  facts  of  consciousness.  It  is  called  Empirical 
or  Experimental,  because  we  have  an  immediate 
experience  of  these  facts :  we  can  study  them  by 
immediate  observation.  The  second  part  of  our 
subject  is  marked  by  the  epithet  Rational,  becaus.!; 
the  truths  which  are  there  enunciated  are  reached, 
not  by  direct  experience,  but  by  reasoning  from  the 
conclusions  established  in  the  earlier  part.  In  the 
present  work  we  have  devoted  Book  I.  mainly  to 
I    Empirical  Psychology,  whilst  Book  II.  is  confined 

Before  the  end  of  chapter  ii.,  in  which  he  has  professed  to  treat 
Psychology  from  the  "  purely  empirical  or  phenomenal,  not  meta- 
physics! or  ontological  standpoint"  (p.  29),  he  makes  it  clear  that 
the  "identity  hypothesis"  which  makes  mind  and  matter  merely 
"  two  manifestations  of  one  and  the  same  being,"  is  the  only 
"scientific"  theory  as  to  their  relations,  cf.  pp.  54 — 70.  The 
outcome  of  Professor  Sully's  psychological  teaching  is  practically 
the  same.  Cf.  The  Human  Mind,  Vol.  II.  p.  369.  Professor  Ladd 
justly  insists  that  "  the  problems  oi philosophy  all  emerge  and  force 
themselves  upon  the  mind  in  the  attempt  to  thoroughly  comprehend 
and  satisfactorily  to  solve  the  problems  of  a  scientific  psychology." 
{Philosophy  of  Mind,  p.  73.  Chapters  i.  ii.  of  that  work  contain  some 
sound  criticism  of  "clandestine"  metaphysics  smuggled  into  what 
claim  to  be  purely  "scientific"  non-philosophical  expositions  oi 
psychology.) 

^  Metaphysics,  Vol.  I.  p.  125. 


PSYCHOLOGY. 


to  the  problems  of  Rational  Psychology.  We  have 
not,  however,  sought  to  make  the  division  rigid : 
in  fact,  our  chief  contention  is  that  a  complete 
and  accurate  separation  of  the  two  branches  of 
Psychology  is  impossible.  Thus  we  have  included 
in  our  First  Book  certain  questions  regarding 
external  perception,  memory,  the  origin  of  ideas, 
the  nature  of  intellectual  activity,  and  the  freedom 
of  the  wall  which  would  now-a-days  be  usually 
allotted  to  the  sphere  of  Rational  Psychology.  The 
two  branches  of  the  science  of  course  employ  both 
observation  and  inference  ;  but  while  frequent  appeal 
to  the  facts  of  consciousness  is  a  prominent  feature 
in  the  first  stage,  deductive  reasoning  prevails  in 
the  last.  Starting  from  the  knowledge  acquired  in 
Empirical  Psychology  regarding  the  character  of 
the  operations  and  activities  of  the  mind,  we  draw 
further  conclusions  as  to  the  nature  and  constitution 
of  the  root  or  subject  of  those  activities.  The 
knowledge  of  the  effect  leads  us  up  to  that  of  the 
cause ;  the  mode  of  action  indicates  the  nature  of 
the  agent.  We  may  thus  hope  by  a  judiciously 
combined  use  of  reasoning  and  observation  to  attain 
to  a  well  grounded  assurance  regarding  the  existence 
of  an  immaterial  soul,  its  relations  with  the  body, 
ii"s  origin,  and  its  future  destiny. 

Psychology  and  Cosmology. — The  scope  oi  Psycho- 
logy will  be  made  still  clearer  by  pointing  out  how  it  is 
connected  with  other  kindred  sciences,  and  how  it  is 
separated  from  them.  In  the  scheme  of  strictly  meta- 
physical branches  of  speculation  it  stands  opposed  to 
Cosmology,  as  the  Philosophy  of  spirit  to  that  of  nature. 
The  latter  science  seeks  to  investigate  the  inner  consti- 


DEFINITION  AND  SCOPE. 


tution  of  matter,  the  nature  of  space  and  time,  and  the 
ultimate  principles  or  laws  which  underlie  and  govern 
the  course  of  the  universe  ;  while  Psychology  confines 
itself  to  the  study  of  the  subjective  world,  the  mind 
of  man. 

Psychology  and  Logic— There  are,  however,  other 
departments  of  Philosophical  knowledge  of  a  subjective 
character ;  both  Logic  and  Ethics  deal  with  mental 
activities.  As  regards  Rational  Psychology,  which  inquires 
into  the  nature  of  the  mind  itself,  there  is  no  difficulty 
in  seeing  how  it  is  differentiated  from  these  sciences,  so 
we  need  only  keep  Empirical  Psychology  in  view  when 
comparing  them.  Both  Psychology  and  Logic  study 
mental  states,  but  whereas  the  former  embraces  within 
its  ken  sensations,  emotions,  volitions,  and  all  other 
classes  of  conscious  acts,  the  latter  is  limited  to  the 
consideration  of  cognitive  operations,  and  mainly  to 
that  of  reasoning.  Again,  the  points  of  view  from  which 
they  approach  their  subject-matter  is  different.  Psycho- 
logy looks  on  our  mental  processes  as  natural  events 
interesting  in  themselves.  It  seeks  to  describe  and  classify 
them,  to  explain  their  genesis,  and  to  discover  their 
laws  or  constant  modes  of  action.  It  may,  indeed, 
incidentally,  afford  useful  information  regarding  the 
acquisition  of  habits,  the  cultivation  of  the  memory, 
and  the  training  of  other  faculties ;  but  its  primary  aim 
is  speculative.  Logic,  on  the  other  hand,  is  interested  in 
mental  operations  as  representative  of  objective  fact.  It  is 
the  science,  not  of  thinking  in  general,  but  of  correct 
thinking.  It  is  less  purely  a  speculative  science,  and 
in  the  eyes  of  some  even  its  primary  aim  is  practical. 
Its  object  is  the  discovery  of  the  general  canons  of 
truth.  It  is,  in  the  words  of  St.  Thomas,  "  the  science 
which  teaches  man  how  to  order  aright  the  acts  of  the 
intellect  in  the  pursuit  and  attainment  of  truth."  In  a 
word,  while  Psychology  studies  thought  merely  as  a 
subject,  Logic  investigates  it  for  an  object.  The  researches 
of  the  psychologist  are  directed  towards  the  causal  con- 
nections between  mental  states,  and  lead  up  to  the 
apprehension  of  a  body  of  natural  laws — general  truths 
describing  uniformities  of  succession  and  co-existen^" 


8  PSYCHOLOGY 


among  siicii  states.  Those  of  the  logician  centre  upon 
the  vatioiial  coyrclations  of  intellectual  acts,  and  result  in  the 
formulation  of  a  code  of  nonual  laws — a  body  of  precepts 
— which  can  be  disobej'ed  but  under  the  penalty  of 
error.  In  addition  to  these  points  of  similarit}'  and 
contrast,  the  two  sciences  are  related  by  a  certain 
mutual  interdependence.  Psychology,  like  every  other 
science,  must  conform  to  the  rules  of  right  reasoning ; 
it  must  observe  the  canons  of  inductive  and  deductive 
inference,  and  it  must  carry  out  the  general  precepts  of 
Logical  Method.  On  the  other  hand,  the  validity  of 
thought  may  be  seriously  affected  by  its  genesis.  The 
materials  with  which  the  logician  works  are  products 
which  have  been  analyzed  by  the  psychologist,  and, 
consequentl}^  although  Logic  is  not  properly  based  on 
Psychology,  a  false  theory  of  the  nature  of  our  cognitive 
faculties  may  sap  the  very  foundations  of  knowledge, 
and  lead  to  a  disbelief  in  the  existence  of  all  real  truth. 
Logic  may  therefore  at  times  have  to  appeal  to  a  sound 
system  of  Ps3'chology  in  justification  of  its  fundamental 
assumptions. 

Psychology  and  Ethics. — Ethics  as  the  science  of 
morality  is  easily  distinguished  from  PsycJiology.  It 
investigates  the  right  end  of  human  action,  the  nature 
and  foundations  of  moral  distinctions,  the  grounds  of 
moral  obligation,  and  the  sanctions  of  morality.  It 
classifies  virtues,  vices,  and  duties,  and  promulgates 
the  rules  of  right  conduct.  Whereas  Psychology  con- 
siders our  mental  activities  in  iheir  causes.  Ethics  studies 
them  in  their  results  :  and  while  Logic  seeks  to  harmonize 
cognition  with  the  order  of  the  physical  v/orld — the  Real ; 
Ethics  would  conform  volition  to  the  order  of  the  moral 
world — the  IdealJ^  In  establishing,  however,  the  exist- 
ence of  'vioral  intuitions,  and  in  exhibiting  their 
character,  appeal  must  be  made  to  the  philosophy  of 
the  mind.     The   nature  of  the   mental   activity   called 

•  We  have  noticed  only  the  most  striking  points  of  contrast. 
Strictly  speaking,  Logic  is  concerned  for  all  truth — physical,  meta- 
physical, and  moral.  For  a  complete  account  of  the  province  of 
Logic,  cf.  Logi:,  by  R.  F.  Clarke,  S.J.  c.  i.  On  the  question  how 
far  Logic  is  to  have  allotted  to  it  a  piaciical  aim,  cf  id.  pp.  19—25. 


DEFINITION  AND   SCOPE. 


conscience,  tlie  genesis  of  moral  sentiments,  the  forma- 
tion of  moral  habits,  and  the  freedom  of  the  will,  a 
truth  on  the  proof  of  which  moral  responsibility  in  its 
universally  accepted  sense  is  absolutely  dependent ;  all 
these  questions — matters  of  the  highest  importance  to 
the  moral  philosopher — belong  to  the  sphere  of  Psycho- 
logy. 

Psychology  and  Physiology. — The  term  Biology 
is  sometimes  used  in  a  wide  sense  to  embrace  all 
the  branches  of  knowledge  which  treat  of  the  pheno- 
mena of  life.  More  properly,  it  comprehends  two 
co-ordinate  physical  sciences,''  MoypJioIog}',  which  investi- 
gates the  structure  of  living  organisms,  and  Physiology, 
which  investigates  their  functions.  The  latter  science 
stands  in  close  relations  to  Psychology,  both  Pheno- 
menal and  Rational.  The  physiologist  studies  the 
various  operations  of  our  vegetative  life,  he  examines 
into  the  action  of  digestion,  respiration,  growth,  nutri- 
tion, and  the  other  vital  processes  which  take  place 
within  us.  He  observes  the  working  of  our  several 
organs,  and  seeks  to  enunciate  laws  that  will  express 
the  general  uniformities  exhibited  in  the  aggregate  of 
operations  which  go  to  constitute  our  physical  life. 
These  events  are  perceived  by  the  external  senses,  and 
are  ultimatel}'  reducible  to  movements  in  matter.  y 

Physiology  is  thus  distinguished  from  Empirical 
Psychology,  both  by  the  phenomena  of  which  it  treats, 
and  by  the  faculty  through  which  these  phenomena  are 
apprehended.  It  is  marked  off  on  the  other  hand  from 
Rational  Psychology,  as  the  positive  science  of  the  physical 

^  The  term  positive  science  is  frequently  used  to  designate  those 
branches  of  knowledge  v.'hich  deal  with  the  laws  of  phenomena,  facts 
observable  by  immediate  experience.  Some  writers  would  confine  the 
term  science  exclusively  to  this  signification.  Such  usage  is,  however, 
illegitimate.  The  object  of  science  is  to  discover  causation  ;  con- 
sequently, the  inquiry  into  primary  causes,  which  are  properly  the 
real  causes,  has  a  fortiori  a  right  to  this  title.  For  the  sake  of 
precision,  however,  the  term  philosophical  science  may  be  con- 
veniently employed  to  denote  those  branches  of  knowledge  whic'.i 
deal  not  merely  with  secondary,  but  with  the  higher  or  primary 
causes.  Rational  Psychology  is  in  this  sense  a  philosophical 
science,  as  compared  with  the  phenomenalistic  or  so-called  positive 
sciences  of  Physiology  and  Empirical  Psychology 


lo  PSYCHOLOGY. 


manifestations  of  life  from  the  philosophical  science  which 
seeks  to  investigate  into  the  inney  natuve  of  the  subject  of 
vital  phenomena,  both  physical  and  psychical.  Again, 
the  vegetative  and  psychical  activities  proceeding  from 
the  same  root  reciprocally  influence  each  other.  Our 
sensations,  intellectual  operations,  emotions,  and  voli- 
tions, are  profoundly  affected  by  the  physical  condition 
of  the  organism  at  the  time,  and  in  turn  they  modiiy 
the  character  of  the  functions  of  physical  life.  Conse- 
quently, as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter,  Physiology 
forms  an  important  supplementary  source  of  knowledge 
in  building  up  our  science  of  Empirical  Psychology. 
But  Rational  Psychology  is  still  more  concerned 
witli  the  teaching  of  Physiolog}*  Its  scope  is  to 
investigate  the  inner  nature  of  the  subject  or  root  of 
both  psychical  and  vegetative  functions,  and  the  rela- 
tions subsisting  between  that  subject  and  the  body.  It 
is  alike  interested,  therefore,  in  the  sciences  of  conscious 
and  of  unconscious  life,  and  its  final  conclusions  must 
alike  harmonize  with  the  established  truths  of  Physio- 
logy and  of  Empirical  Psychology. 

Readings. — On  the  dignity,  utility,  and  scope  of  Psychology,  cf 
St.  Thomas,  Coniin.  de  Anima,  Lib.  I.  11.  i,  2  ;  Dr.  Stockl,  Lehrbuch 
der  Philosophie,  §^  i — 3;  Tilmann  Pesch,  S.] .,  Instituiioiws  Psychclogicj 
(Friburg,  1897),  §§  19—22.  28—30. 


CHAPTER    II. 

METHOD    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

Psychology  a  Science. — In  describing  Psycho- 
loery  as  the  science  of  the  human  mind  or  soul,  three 
conditions  are  implied — first,  that  Psychology  has  a 
definite  subject-matter,  the  nature  and  activities  of 
the  thinking  subject ;  secondly^  that  it  possesses  an 
efft'^ient  method ;  thirdly,  that  it  comprehends  a 
systematized  body  of  general  truths,  or,  in  other 
wcrds,  that  it  embraces  a  number  of  facts  in  their 
relations  to  their  universal  causes.  In  our  first 
chapter  we  sought  to  mark  out  clearly  the  field  of 
our  science ;  in  the  present  we  propose  to  describe 
its  method,  pointing  out  the  chief  instruments  of 
investigation  which  lie  open  to  us  ;  the  rest  of  the 
work  will  be  devoted  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  third 
essential  requirement. 

The  Subjective  or  Introspective  Method. — 
The  subject-matter  of  Empirical  Psychology  is  ccm- 
sctousness.  Now  states  of  consciousness  can  only  be 
observed  by  introspection— Xhdit  is,  by  the  turning  of 
the  mind  in  on  itself.  Consequently  this  faculty 
of  internal  observation  must  be  our  chief  instrument 
in  the  study  of  the  mind.  To  its  adjudication  must 
bathe  first  as  well  as  the  ultimate  appeal  in  every 


12  PSYCHOLOGY. 


psychological  problem.  Mental  states  can  only  be 
apprehended  by  each  man's  own  consciousness. 
Tlieir  reality  consists  in  this  apprehension — their 
esse  is  percipi.  Therefore  the  endeavour  to  decide 
as  to  their  nature  or  origin  by  information  gathered 
from  any  other  source  is  obviously  absurd.  The 
greatest  care  must,  however,  be  taken  to  notice 
accurately  all  the  aspects  of  the  phenomena  pre- 
sented to  us,  and  to  detect  those  numerous  un- 
obtrusive differences  in  the  character  of  mental 
phenomena  which  ma}'  indicate  profound  divergency 
in  the  nature  of  their  source.  The  injudicious 
observer,  impressed  by  the  greater  intensity  of 
sentient  states,  may  thus  easily  ignore  the  more 
subtle  activities  of  our  higher  rational  life,  and  so 
be  led  to  form  a  conception  of  mind  from  which  the 
most  important  features  are  absent.^ 

Still,  although  our  mental  states  are  of  an 
evanescent  character,  and  enjoy  but  a  transitory 
existence,  it  must  nevertheless  be  insisted  on  that 
they  are  facts  as  real  as  any  in  the  universe.  A 
sensation,  an  intellectual  judgment,  or  a  volition, 
possesses  as  much  reality  as  a  nervous  current,  a 
chemical  solution,  or  a  transit  of  Venus ;  and  whilst 
the  most  thorough-going  sceptic  cannot  question  the 

^  The  truth  of  this  remark  is  strikingly  illustrated  in  the  history 
of  Mental  Philosophy  in  this  country  by  the  manner  in  which  the 
relational  activity  of  the  mind — its  power  of  apprehending  universal 
relations — has  been  ignored  or  misconceived  by  the  entire  sen- 
sationalist school  from  Hartley  to  Dr  Bain.  The  writings  of 
Stirling,  Green,  Bradley,  and  other  thinkers  of  Hegelian  tendencies 
have  had  in  recent  years  the  good  effect  of  bringing  about  the 
re-discovery  of  this  intellectual  faculty,  which  occupied  such  a 
prominent  position  in  the  psychological  system  of  the  leading 
scholastic  philosophers. 


METHOD   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.  13 


existence  of  states  of  consciousness,  ingenious  and 
acute  thinkers  have  been  found  over  and  over  again 
to  deny  us  all  certainty  regarding  material  objects. 
This  mode  of  investigating  psychical  phenomena  by 
means  of  internal  observation  is  called  the  Subjective 
or  Introspective  Method. 

Objective  Method. -- Introspection  must  be 
supplemented,  however,  by  other  lines  of  research, 
if  we  wish  to  make  our  conclusions  as  trustworthy 
and  as  widely  applicable  as  possible.  Appeal  to 
these  additional  means  of  information  constitutes 
what  is  called  the  Objective  Method  of  inquiry,  since 
they  form  part  of  the  outside  world,  and  are 
apprehended  only  through  the  external  senses. 
But  evidence  gained  in  this  way  is  of  an  essentially 
secondary  or  supplementary  value,  its  chief  use 
being  that  of  suggestion  or  corroboration.  The 
principal  forms  of  objective  investigation  are  the 
following : 

1.  Other  minds. — The  results  of  other  men's 
observations  of  their  own  minds  as  far  as  these 
results  can  be  gathered  from  oral  description,  and 
compared  with  the  results  of  our  own  individual 
experience. 

2.  Language.—Tho,  products  of  the  human  mind 
as  embodied  in  language  may  afford  valuable  inform- 
ation. Comparative  philology  and  the  study  of 
various  literatures  are  here  our  chief  resources. 
Language  has  been  happily  styled  crystallized  or 
fossilized  thought,  and  under  skilful  handling  it  may 
be  made  to  unfold  many  interesting  secrets  of  past 
mental  history.  Thus  the  rich  and  varied  vocabulary 


14  •  PSYCHOLOGY 


of  the  Tagan  dialect,  which  contains  over  30,000 
words,  a  vast  inherited  wealth  far  beyond  the  needs 
of  the  present  generation,  is  maintained  by  Professor 
Max  Miiller  to  point  to  a  degradation  of  that  race 
from  a  previous  condition  of  considerable  mental 
development,  rather  than  to  a  gradual  evolution 
from  a  lower  and  less  intellectual  state.-  Similarly 
the  presence  in  various  languages  of  words  con- 
noting certain  moral  ideas  may  constitute  important 
testimony  in  disputed  interpretations  of  conscious- 
ness. 

3.  Hislorical  or  Genetic  Method.  —  A  diligent 
study  of  the  human  mind  as  manifested  at  different 
periods  of  life,  and  in  different  grades  of  civilization, 
may  throw  much  light  on  the  laws  which  govern 
the  development  of  the  mental  faculties,  and  on  the 
conditions  which  have  given  rise  to  various  customs, 
sentiments,  and  modes  of  thought.  Plistorical 
researches  into  the  manners,  religions,  and  social 
institutions  of  different  nations  may  here  prove  very 
fruitful. 

4.  Animal  Psychology,  —  The  study  of  the 
instincts,  habits,  and  other  psychical  activities  of 
the  lower  animals,  if  undertaken  in  a  sober  and 
judicious  spirit,  can  be  made  to  yield  considerable 
assistance  in  some  questions.  This  sphere  of  investi- 
gation, when  grouped  with  that  just  mentioned,  is 

-  Cf.  "The  Savage,"  Nineteenth  Century,  January,  1S85,  p.  120. 
Professor  Max  Miiller  there  argues  very  forcibly,  that  "  the  magni- 
ficent ruins  in  the  dialects,  whether  of  Fuegians,  Mohawks,  or 
Hottentots,  tell  us  of  mental  builders  whom  no  one  could  match  at 
present."  The  Tagan  language  is  that  spoken  by  the  natives  of 
Terra  del  Fuego,  the  race  which  Darwin  considered  to  be  the  lowest 
and  least  developed  family  of  human  beings  yet  found. 


METHOD   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.  15 


sometimes  rather  questionably  dignified  with  the 
title  of  Comparative  Psychology.  However,  the 
anthropomorphic  tendency  in  man  to  project  his 
own  thoughts  and  sentiments  into  other  beings 
renders  this  scientific  instrument  peculiarly  liable  to 
abuse.  Still  subject  to  proper  precautions  it  may 
assist  us  materially.  By  means  of  it  we  may 
advantageously  apply  the  great  inductive  methods  of 
difference  and  residues.  The  lower  animals  possess 
certain  faculties  in  common  with  man,  but  they 
are  deficient  in  others,  and  hence  by  a  diligent 
study  of  their  actions  we  are  enabled  to  distinguish 
how  much  of  man's  conduct  is  necessarily  due  to 
different  faculties. 

5.  Physiology. — The  science  of  Physiology  is  also 
a  source  of  valuable  mformation.  The  intimate 
nature  of  the  relations  between  the  mind  and  the 
organism,  so  strongly  emphasized  in  the  Aristotelian 
and  Scholastic  Philosophy  which  conceives  the  soul 
as  the  form  of  the  body,  receives  more  elucidation 
every  day  with  the  advance  of  biological  science. 
In  examining  into  the  operations  of  sense,  the 
development  of  imagination  and  memory,  the  forma- 
tion of  habits,  and  the  transmission  of  hereditary 
tendencies,  the  advantage  of  a  knowledge  of  the 
physical  basis  of  these  phenomena  is  obvious ;  but 
as  all  mental  processes,  even  the  most  purely 
spiritual  acts  of  intellect  and  volition,  are  probably 
accompanied  or  conditioned  by  cerebral  changes, 
too  much  labour  cannot  be  devoted  to  the  study  of 
the  constitution,  structure,  and  working  of  the 
organism.     At  the  same  time  care  must  b^-  taken 


i6  PSYCHOLOGY. 


to  distinf^uish  clearly  between  the  two  orders  of 
facts.  The  mental  state  and  its  physiological 
accompaniment  or  condition  are  separated,  as 
Professor  Tyndall  says,  by  an  "impassable  chasm." 
It  is  then  not  sufficient  to  explicitly  admit  once  or 
twice,  as  most  writers  of  the  Sensist  school  do 
admit,  that  the  neural  and  psychical  events  arc 
divided  by  a  difference  which  transcends  all  other 
differences,  and  then  to  forget,  or  lead  the  reader  to 
forget,  the  vital  character  of  this  difference.  The 
mental  states  must  be  treated  and  described 
throughout  in  such  a  way  that  no  confusion 
between  the  two  kinds  of  phenomena  is  caused  to 
arise  in  the  student's  mind,  and  he  must  not  be 
misled  into  supposing  that  a  conscious  process  has 
been  finally  explained  when  its  physical  correlate 
has  been  indicated,  or  when  the  whole  operation  has 
been  described  in  cloudy  physiological  language. 

6.  Pathology  :  Psychiatry, — Hand  in  hand  with 
Physiology  goes  Pathology,  the  complementary 
science  of  organic  disease ;  and  the  opportunities 
presented  in  the  investigations  connected  with  this 
branch  of  knowledge  for  the  observation  of  mental 
activities  in  an  isolated  or  abnormal  condition 
will  occasionally  throw  light  on  obscure  questions. 
Somnambulism,  illusions,  hallucinations,  and  various 
forms  of  insanity  exhibit  particular  mental  functions 
under  exceptional  conditions,  and  not  infrequently 
suggest  or  confirm  explanations  of  special  mental 
operations.  Similarly,  the  study  of  those  deprived 
of  different  senses  may  advance  the  scientific  analysis 
of  normal   perception    and    the    discovery   of    how 


METHOD   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.  17 


much  is  due  to  the  various  faculties.  But  here 
again  judgment  is  required,  and  we  must  be  on  our 
guard  against  assigning  too  much  weight  to  irregular 
and  exceptional  cases.  The  emotional  interest 
excited  by  abnormal  occurrences  may  easily  lead  us 
to  exaggerate  their  philosophical  importance,  and  to 
forget  that  after  all  the  proper  subject-matter  of  our 
science  is  the  uicns  saiia  in  corpore  sano.  The  reality 
of  this  danger  becomes  apparent  when  we  find 
writers  on  Psychology  founding  their  theories  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  soul,  or  of  its  cognitive  operations, 
not  on  the  observation  of  the  activities  of  the  normal 
healthy  mind,  but  on  dubious  conjectures  regarding 
some  obscure  ill-understood  forms  of  mental  aberra- 
tion that  appear  perhaps  once  among  a  hundred 
thousand  human  beings. 

7.  Experimental  Psychology :  Psycho -physics :  Psycho- 
mctry. — Closely  connected  with  physiological  psy- 
chology are  certain  methods  of  investigation  some- 
times styled  Experimental  Psychology,  Strictly 
speaking,  whenever  we  deliberately  exert  or  cause 
another  to  exert  any  form  of  mental  activity  in  order 
to  observe  it  we  perform  *'  a  psychological  experi- 
ment." But  the  term  Experimental  Psychology  is 
commonly  confined  to  the  more  elaborate  methods 
of  modifying  mental  operations  in  order  to  study 
them.  Various  ingenious  means  have  been  recently 
invented  for  estimating  the  power  and  accuracy  of 
imagination,  memory,  and  the  several  senses ;  and 
numerous  "psychological  laboratories"  have  been 
erected  for  carrying  on  these  investigations  in 
Germany,   America,    and    elsewhere.      The    terms 


i8  PSYCHOLOGY. 


psychonietry  and  psycho -physics  are  more  especially 
employed  to  denote  sundry  methods  employed  for 
measuring  the  duration  of  simple  mental  processes 
and  also  the  relation  between  the  intensity  of  sensa- 
tions and  their  stimuli.  We  shall  return  to  this 
subject  again. 

These  Methods  not  new.  —  We  have  here 
explicitly  enumerated  the  various  sources  from 
which  our  science  draws  its  materials,  but,  although 
it  has  only  in  recent  times  become  customary  thus 
to  classify  them  in  detail,  all  of  them  except  the 
last  have  been  made  use  of  by  writers  on  the  philo- 
sophy of  the  mind  since  the  days  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  Some  recent  authors  appear  at  times  to 
believe  that  these  methods  of  inductive  inquiry  are 
a  result  of  modern  discovery,  and  that  surprising 
advances  of  an  undefined  character  have  been,  or  in 
the  immediate  future  will  be,  effected  by  their 
means  in  our  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  mind. 
A  comparatively  brief  study,  however,  of  Aristotle's 
great  work  on  the  soul,  and  of  his  supplementary 
treatises  on  special  psychological  questions,  will 
show  how  fully  he  appreciated  the  value  of  these 
extended  fields  of  information.^ 

Rational  Psycholog-y  :  Method. — The  method 
pursued  in  Rational  Psychology  will  be  mainly 
inferential.  From  the  truths  established  in  the 
earlier  part  of  our  work  as  regards  the  life  of  the 
soul,  we  shall  draw  inferences  as  to  its  inner  consti- 

^  M.  St.  Hilaire  has  shown  clearly  how  accurate  were  the  vie;vs 
of  the  founder  of  the  Peripatetic  school  on  the  use  of  the  inductive 
methods  in  Psychology.  (CI.  Psychologic  d'Aristote,  pp.  lii. — Ixv.) 


METHOD   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.  19 

tution ;  from  the  character  of  the  activity  we  shall 
argue  to  the  nature  of  the  agent,  from  the  degree  of 
perfection  in  the  effect  we  shall  reason  up  to  that  of 
the  cause. 

Attacks  on  Psychology. — The  scope  just  assigned 
to  Psychology  is  objected  to  by  writers  of  widely  diffe- 
rent schools  in  this  country,  so  it  may  be  well  to  add 
a  few  supplementary  remarks  in  defence  of  our  position. 
Opponents  we  may  divide  into  three  classes.  Some 
deny  the  possibility  of  a  science  either  of  Rational 
or  Phenomenal  Psychology.  Others,  admitting  the 
existence  of  a  genuine  science  of  the  phenomena  of 
the  mind,  deny  the  possibility  of  any  real  knowledge 
regarding  the  nature  or  existence  of  the  soul.  Others, 
again,  whilst  allowing  with  this  second  class  the  value 
of  Empirical  Psychology,  exclude  from  its  treatment 
various  questions,  such  as  the  freedom  of  the  will,  and 
the  origin  of  intellectual  ideas,  on  the  ground  that  these 
are  metaphysical  or  philosophical  problems  to  be  treated 
of  elsewhere.  As  regards  this  last  view,  the  divergence 
from  us  may  b6  mainly  one  of  method  and  classification. 
Provided  these  questions  are  satisfactorily  discussed  in 
some  branch  of  Philosophy,  it  does  not  appear  vital 
what  department  be  selected.  We  may,  however,  point 
out  that  Psychology,  the  philosophy  of  the  mind,  seems 
to  be  under  more  distinct  obligations  to  face  these 
problems  than  any  other  science ;  and,  in  the  second 
place,  as  we  have  already  stated,  an}^  attempt  at 
adequate  treatment  of  mental  phenomena  will  inevit- 
ably involve  some  particular  philosophical  view  as  to 
the  nature  of  our  faculties. 

The  only  sufificient  answer  to  writers  of  the  second 
class — those  who  deny  the  possibility  of  a  rational 
science  of  the  soul — is  to  work  out  a  systematized 
body  of  certain  truths  regarding  its  nature,  and  the 
relations  subsisting  between  it  and  the  body.  This 
we  will  endeavour  to  accomplish  in  the  Second  Book 
of  the  present  volume.  That  a  work  claiming  to  be 
a  treatise  on  Psychology  ought  to  make   some    such 


20  PSYCHOLCGY. 


attempt  seems  so  manifest  that  it  is  difficult  to  under- 
stand why  the  duty  should  be  so  uniformly  ignored  in 
English  manuals.  '  Locke's  influence  and  the  national 
distaste  for  metaphysical  argument  has  had  much  to  do 
with  it,  but  probably  the  authority  of  the  Scotch  school 
has  had  still  more.  For  it  was  to  Reid  and  Stewart 
those  most  interested  in  a  satisfactory  exposition  of  the 
evidence  bearing  on  the  existence  and  character  of 
the  human  soul  naturally  looked  for  a  proper  vindi- 
cation of  the  subject.  Unfortunately,  idolatry  ^  of 
empirical  fact  and  contempt  for  deductive  reasoning 
reached  a  climax  in  the  common-sense  school.  As  a 
consequence,  the  worship  of  the  Baconian  method  in 
its  most  exaggeratedly  vicious  form  wTOught  that  evil 
in  the  science  of  the  mind  which  it  would  assuredly 
have  effected,  had  it  been  as  faithfully  followed,  in  the 
study  of  external  nature."^  Thus  we  find  that  whilst  in 
Germany  and  other  Continental  countries  mental  philo- 
sophy was  approached  with  a  view  to  the  solution  of 
the  most  interesting  and  important  problems  that  can 
occupy  the  human  spirit,  British  psychologists  have 
been  seeking  to  convert  their  science  into  a  mere  natural 
history  of  psychical  phenomena.  Any  attempt  at  a 
comprehensive  treatment  of  our  mental  activities  is 
stigmatized  as  an  illegitimate  introduction  of  philoso- 
phical problems,  and  we  have  finally  reached  a  stage  in 
which  even  such  a  clearly  psychological  question  as  the 
freedom  of  the  will  is  to  be  rigidly  boycotted  on  the 
grounds  of  its  connexion  with  the  discredited  science  of 
metaphysics. 

Objections  to  Introspection. — As  regards  the 
third  class  of  opponents — those  who  deny  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  genuine  science  even  of  phenomenal 
psychology  —  since  they  attack  the  foundations  on 
which  our  whole  work  rests,  we  will  here  state  and 
answer   briefly   their   chief    arguments.      The   leading 

"*  On  the  reaction  against  the  pure  Baconian  doctrine  of  method 
in  recent  times,  see  Jevons'  Principles  of  Science,  Vol.  II.  c.  xxiii.  He 
remarks  that  "its  value  may  be  estimated  historically  by  the  fact 
that  it  has  not  been  followed  by  any  of  the  great  masters  of  science." 
(p.  IM) 


METHOD   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.  21 


representatives  of  this  view  have  been  Comte  in  France, 
and  Dr.  Maudsley  at  home.  Botli  teach  that  Ps^xho- 
logy  is  merely  a  subsidiary  department  of  Biology,  and 
that  it  must  be  studied  exclusively  or  mainly  by  objec- 
tive methods.  Dr.  Maudsley  states  the  case  against 
Psychology  at  length  in  the  earlier  part  of  his  work, 
The  Physiology  of  Mind.  But  in  this,  as  indeed  in  other 
philosophical  questions,  that  vigorous  writer  does  not 
appear  to  hold  very  clear  or  consistent  opinions  even 
throughout  the  course  of  the  same  volume. 

I.  He  urges  that  Psychology,  as  a  distinct  inde- 
pendent science  built  up  by  introspection,  is  impossible, 
for  introspection  is  itself  impossible.  **  In  order  to 
observe  its  own  action  it  is  necessary  that  the  mind 
pause  from  activity,  yet  it  is  the  train  of  activity  that  is 
to  be  observed."  {The  Physiology  of  Mind,  p.  17.) 

This  assertion  we  must  meet  by  a  direct  denial, 
supported  by  an  appeal  to  each  man's  inner  experience. 
First,  as  regards  the  various  modes  of  our  sentient  life, 
sensations,  perceptions,  appetites,  pleasures,  and  pains, 
our  only  difficulty  is  to  understand  how  such  a  state- 
ment as  that  attention  to  them  causes  their  immediate 
annihilation  could  ever  have  been  penned.  Life  could  be 
made  happy  without  much  difficulty  if  our  disagreeable 
states  and  experiences  would  vanish  when  we  turned 
to  observe  them;  but  unfortunately  cold,  hunger,  thirst, 
and  disease,  the  pains  of  muscular  strain,  and  of  tooth- 
ache are  not  such  obliging  visitors.  The  activities  of 
sight,  hearing,  taste,  smell,  and  touch,  can  certainly  be 
studied  both  in  actual  operation  on  their  objects,  and 
as  reproduced  in  imagination.  Secondly,  that  we  can 
attend  to  and  examine  our  higher  forms  of  mental 
activity  is  equally  certain.  Emotions,  desires,  per- 
ceptions of  relations,  reasonings  can  be  both  con- 
comitantly studied  in  their  direct  course^  and  afterwards 

"  Mr.  Sully,  who  defends  the  introspective  method,  yet  seems  to 
hold  that  immediate  concomitant  consideration  of  present  mental 
states  is  impossible,  that  it  is  on\y  past  states  we  can  properly  be 
said  to  observe,  and  that  in  fact  "  all  introspection  is  retrospection." 
{Illusions,  p.  igo,  and  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  5.)  This  tenet  is  a 
necessary  deduction  from  the  sensationist  theory  of  mental  life,  but 
the  logical  position  for  the  disciple  of  that  school  is  that  assumed 


22  PSYCHOLOGY. 


recalled  by  memory.  This  is  due  equally  in  either  case 
to  the  self-conscious  power  of  the  mind,  and  implies  in 
us  a  higher  order  of  mental  activity  than  that  involved 
in  mere  sentient  affections.  Our  only  proof  of  this,  as 
well  as  of  every  other  psychological  fact,  must  be  an 
appeal  to  each  man's  own  consciousness. 

2.  Again,  it  is  a  maxim  of  *'  inductive  philosophy 
that  observation  should  begin  with  simple  instances, 
ascent  being  made  from  them  step  by  step  through 
appropriate  generalizations."  (Maudsley,  p.  19.)  More- 
over, science  being  universal,  the  psychologist  should 
be  able  to  contemplate  a  variety  of  specimens  which 
exhibit  the  object  of  his  investigations  in  its  various 
stages  of  development.  But  introspection  presents  only 
a  single  subject  for  examination,  and  that  a  most  rare 
and  exceptional  one,  *'  the  complex  self-consciousness 
of  an  educated  white  man."  Consequently,  even  were 
introspection  possible,  its  deliverances  would  be 
deprived  of  that  feature  of  universality  essential  to 
every  genuine  science.  To  this  we  may  reply  in  the 
first  place  that,  were  a  number  of  anatomists  limited 
each  to  the  study  of  a  single  human  organism,  they 
would  still  be  able  to  frame  a  collection  of  results  con- 
taining a  substantial  amount  of  agreement.  Secondly, 
comparison  of  observations  among  psychologists,  appeal 
to  general  experience,  and  the  several  objective  methods 
we  have  described,  and  which  have  been  in  use  from 


by  Dr.  Maudsley,  and  not  the  halting  inconsistent  doctrine  of 
Mr.  Sully.  To  the  mind  endowed  with  no  activity  essentially 
higher  than  that  of  the  sensuous  order,  both  introspection  and  retro- 
spection are  equally  impossible.  But  that  the  human  mind  is  capable 
of  concomitantly  observing  its  own  normal  states  becomes  clear  to 
any  one  making  the  attempt.  It  is  actually  the  converse  of  Mr. 
Sully's  dictum  which  expresses  the  truth,  "  All  retrospection  involves 
present  introspection,"  for,  it  is  the  present  representation  of  the 
past  state  which  is  examined,  and  only  n'liile  actually  present  to  the 
mind  can  it  be  the  subject  of  observation.  But  if  we  can  attend  to 
a  present  state  which  happens  to  be  an  image  of  a  past  state,  surely 
there  can  be  nothing  to  prevent  attention  to  a  state  which  is  not 
such  a  representation.  Consequently  we  can  concomitantly  study 
those  mental  processes  of  which  we  are  conscious.  In  a  word,  as 
Mill  urges  against  Comte,  "  Whatever  we  are  directly  aware  of  we 
can  directly  observe."  (Auguste  Comte  and  Positivism,  p.  64.) 


METHOD   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.  23 


the  very   birth  of  Psychology,  completely  destroy  the 
force  of  the  supposed  difficulty. 

3.  A  kindred  objection  is  urged  against  the  necessary 
limitation  of  introspective  observation  to  a  single  ob- 
server, "  a  witness  whose  evidence  can  be  taken  by  no 
one  but  himself,  and  whose  veracity,  therefore,  cannot 
be  tested.  .  .  .  The  observed  and  the  observer  are  one, 
and  the  observer  is  not  likely  in  such  a  case  to  be  un- 
biassed by  the  feelings  of  the  observed,  and  to  conform 
rigidly  to  the  rules  of  exact  observation."  (id.)  The 
answer  to  the  last  objection  will  apply  again  in  great 
part  here.  Further,  (a)  the  psychologist,  like  the  physio- 
logist and  every  other  scientific  inquirer,  must  seek  to 
lay  aside  prejudice  and  to  approach  his  subject  in  an 
impartial  spirit,  (b)  He  must,  like  them,  exercise  care 
and  diligence.  And  (c)  he  must  check  his  results  by 
comparison  with  those  of  other  observers,  and  by  the 
study  of  other  minds  through  the  various  supplementary 
methods. 

4.  Dr.  Maudsley  also  argues  that  tlie  range  of 
introspection  is  very  limited.  {a)  "  Consciousness 
which  does  not  even  tell  us  that  we  have  a  brain  is 
certainly  incompetent  to  give  any  account  of  the 
essential  material  conditions  of  our  mental  life."  (p.  21.) 
(b)  Mental  life  itself,  too,  is  largely  beyond  the  range 
of  introspection.  •'  It  is  a  truth  which  cannot  too 
distinctly  be  borne  in  mind,  that  consciousness  is  not 
co-extensive  with  mind."  (p.  25.)  As  regards  the  first 
part  of  the  difficulty  it  might,  perhaps,  be  not  unfairly 
retorted  against  the  physiologist  that  the  method  of 
external  observation  on  which  his  science  is  based  can 
tell  us  nothing  of  the  mental  conditions  which  pro- 
foundly influence  many  physical  processes.  Letting 
this  pass,  however,  it  is  sufficient  to  recall  to  mind 
that  conscious  states  and  mental  activities  are  real 
facts  differing  in  kind  from  all  physical  events,  in  order 
to  give  them  as  good  claim  to  form  adequate  matter 
for  an  independent  science  as  physiology  has  to  be 
separated  from  chemistry  or  mechanics.  Finally,  that 
the  study  of  the  physical  conditions  of  conscious  pro- 
cesses is  a  legitimate  source  of  useful  supplementary 


24  PSYCHOLOGY. 


information  has  been,  as  we  before  urged,  fully  admitted 
from  the  time  of  Aristotle ;  but  unfortunately^  owing 
to  the  hitherto  extremely  backward  condition  of  the 
science  of  Physiology  in  general,  and  especially  in  that 
department  which  deals  with  physical  basis  of  mental 
life,  it  can  afford  very  little  reliable  information  of  any 
importance. 

5.  Dr.  Maudsley  also  argues  that  the  illusions  and 
hallucinations  of  the  insane  seem  to  them  as  clear  and 
evident  affirmations  of  consciousness,  as  do  the  intro- 
spective observations  of  the  psychologist.  Therefore 
the  latter  are  untrustworthy.  This  objection  is  trivial. 
Insanity  is,  unhappily,  a  possible  contingency  among 
the  investigators  both  of  soul  and  body,  but  science 
will  not  be  ultimately  injured  by  such  casualties. 

6.  Finall3^  it  is  urged,  as  a  general  proof  of  the 
worthlessness  of  Subjective  Psychology,  that  "  there  is 
no  agreement  between  those  who  have  acquired  the 
power  of  introspection."  (id.)  This  objection  is  based 
on  a  confusion  of  two  very  distinct  questions — the 
character  of  the  mental  states  of  which  psychologists 
affirm  that  they  are  conscious,  and  the  hypotheses  or 
explanations  which  they  advance  to  account  for  these 
states.  As  regards  the  former,  that  there  is  a  very 
large  amount  of  general  agreement,  any  one  who  con- 
sults the  psychological  literature  even  of  schools  the 
most  opposed  will  discover.  On  the  other  hand,  wide 
and  manifold  divergence  in  the  theories  advanced  to 
explain  the  origin  and  nature  of  mental  life,  the  history 
of  Philosophy  since  the  great  scholastic  stream  of 
thought  was  abandoned  unequivocally  demonstrates. 
But  that  is  not  the  fault  of  introspection  any  more 
than  conflicting  views  as  to  the  source  of  the  sun's 
heat  are  a  reflection  on  the  trustworthiness  of  the 
telescope. 

Real  Difficulties. — We  have  treated  Dr.  Maudsley's 
objections  at  such  great  length,  not  on  account  of  any 
considerable  importance  we  assign  to  his  work,  but 
because  the  discussion  of  his  arguments  helps  to  make 
clear  to  the  student  the  actual  difficulties  and  limitations 
of  the  Introspective  Method.     For  it  must  be  admitted 


METHOD   OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


25 


that  internal  observation  is  often  not  easy.  Mental 
states,  unlike  the  objects  of  pliysical  science,  are 
unstable  and  ever  changing.  They  are  not  indepen- 
dent of  concomitant  states.  Even  though  it  be  untrue 
that  a// ■  introspection  must  be  retrospective,  yet  the 
more  vehement  forms  of  mental  excitement  can  be 
adequately  studied  only  by  means  of  recollection.  The 
limitation,  too,  of  direct  observation  to  a  single  specimen 
with  its  inevitable  peculiarities  may  be  attended  by 
serious  risks.  Bias  and  intellectual  prejudices  may 
unconsciously  interfere  with  the  correct  appreciation  of 
facts,  and  our  ver}^  familiarity  with  our  mental  states 
increases  the  labour  of  accurate  observation.  Still 
these  hindrances  to  introspection  can  be  overcome  by 
(a)  diligence  and  attention,  (b)  the  skill  acquired  by 
practice  of  reflection,  (c)  industr}^  in  repeating  our 
observations  under  varied  conditions  and  the  employ- 
ment of  recollection  in  studying  afterwards  states  which 
cannot  be  well  examined  whilst  actually  occurring, 
(d)  honest  effort  to  be  unprejudiced  and  impartial  in 
the  observation  of  facts  and  to  be  on  our  guard  against 
the  more  impressive  features  of  imagination  and  sensuous 
states ;  finally,  by  (e)  making  the  fullest  use  of  the 
various  supplementary  objective  methods  to  test  and 
confirm  the  results  of  direct  introspection. 

Readings. — On  the  opposition  in  nature  between  Psychology  and 
the  objective  sciences,  cf.  Dr.  Martineau's  Essays  Philosophical  and 
Theological,  "Cerebral  Psychology,"  pp.  245—253.  On  the  various 
methods,  cf.  Pesch,  Institutioncs  Psych.  §§  25—30  ;  Dr.  Gutberlet,  Die 
Psychologie  (Munster)  pp.  i — 15  ;  and  F.  Mark  Baldwin,  Sense  and 
Intellect,  pp.  20 — 32.  On  objections  to  the  possibility  of  Psychology, 
cf.  Pesch,  lb.  §§  31 — 34.  On  the  necessity  of  a  consistent  theory  cf 
Rational  Psychology,  even  for  a  complete  view  of  the  physiological 
conditions  of  mental  activity,  cf.  Professor  Ladd's  Physiological 
Psychology,  pp.  585,  586. 


CHAPTER    III. 

CLASSIFICATION    OF   THE    MENTAL    FACULTIES. 

Consciousness. — The  subject-matter  which  Em- 
pirical Psychology  investigates  is  Consciousness, 
but,  as  we  have  already  remarked,  the  chief  instru- 
ment by  which  our  investigations  are  to  be  carried 
on  is  also  Consciousness.  The  question  then  at  once 
arises  :  What  meaning  or  meanings  are  we  to  attach 
to  this  term  ?  The  word  has  been  employed  in  a 
variet}^  of  significations,  but  for  our  purpose  it  will 
be  necessary  to  distinguish  and  recognize  only  three.^ 
In  its  widest  sense  Consciousness  as  opposed  to 
unconsciousness  denotes  all  modes  of  mental  life. 
It  comprises  all  cognitive,  emotional,  and  appetitive 
states  which  are  capable  of  being  apprehended  ;  it 
is,  in  fact,  S3monymous  with  the  sum-total  of  our 
psychical  existence.  In  its  second  sense  it  signifies 
the  mind's  direct,  intuitive,  or  immediate  knowledge 
either  of  its  own  operations,  or  of  something  other 
than  itself  acting  upon  it.  This  usage,  which  is 
supported  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  and  some  of  those 
writers  who  maintain  that  we  have  in  certain  acts 

^  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  various  meanings  assigned  to 
the  term  consciousness  by  philosophers,  see  the  volume  of  the  present 
series  on  First  Principles  of  Knowledge,  by  John  Rickaby,  S.J. 
pp.  340—347. 


CLASSIFICATION  OF   THE   MENTAL   FACULTIES    27 


an  immediate  perception  of  a  reality  other  than 
ourselves,  makes  Consciousness  equivalent  to  imme- 
diate or  direct  knowledge.  Understood  in  this  way 
Consciousness  signifies  the  energy  of  the  cognitive 
act,  and  not  the  emotional  or  volitional  acts  as 
cognized.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  opposed  to 
mediate  and  to  reflex  knowledge.  In  its  third 
meaning  the  term  is  limited  to  that  deliberately 
reflex  operation  by  which  the  mind  attends  to  its 
states  and  recognizes  them  as  its  own.  Conscious- 
ness in  this  sense  is  no  longer  that  common 
constituent  of  all  subjective  phenomena,  whether 
intellectual,  emotional,  or  appetitive,  which  makes 
them  mental  realities  ;  nor  yet  is  it  the  simultaneous 
notice  which  the  mind  concomitantly  possesses  of 
such  acts.  It  is  a  supplementary  introspective 
activity  by  which  all  our  mental  states  are  studied, 
and  through  its  means  what  is  implicitly  appre- 
hended in  our  direct  consciousness  is  explicitly 
brought  under  review.  In  this  signification  the 
word  is  equivalent  to  Self -consciousness,  and  when- 
ever there  is  danger  of  ambiguity,  or  whenever  it  is 
of  importance  to  bring  out  the  distinction,  we  will 
employ  this  latter  term  with  its  adjective  self- 
conscious. 

Subconscious  Mental  Activities.— It  should  not  be  for- 
gotten, however,  that  besides  the  mental  operations  which 
reveal  themselves  in  consciousness,  there  is  much  evidence 
to  establish  the  existence  of  vital  activities  of  which  we  are 
not  at  the  time  aware.  Not  only  are  there  normally 
unconscious  functions  of  organic  life,  such  as  digestion, 
respiration,  circulation,  but  the  sensitive  faculties  of  the 
mind,  even  in  a  natural  healthy  state,  seem  at  times  to 
undergo  modifications  without  our  apprehending  these  latter. 
Thus,  very  faint  impressions  on  the  sense-organs  are  ordinarily 


28  PSYCHOLOGY. 


not  perceived,  and  when  the  attention  is  engrossed  by  some 
object  of  interest,  other  sensations  of  sound,  sight,  and  touch, 
although  perhaps  of  considerable  intensity,  may  escape 
unnoticed.  The  noise  in  the  playground  outside  my  open 
window,  the  sound  of  the  flames  rising  up  from  the  grate,  the 
resistance  of  the  table  on  which  I  have  been  leaning,  and  of 
the  pen  which  I  have  been  holding  between  my  fingers  were 
completely  unobserved  until  I  now  deliberately  adverted  to 
them.  In  the  estimation  of  distance,  in  the  recognition  of 
objects  and  in  the  normal  acts  of  perception  of  mature  life 
rapid  reasonings  are  frequently  made  with  so  little  cognizance 
of  the  operation  as  to  be  styled  "  unconscious  inferences." 
Memories,  acquired  tendencies,  habits  constantly  affect  the 
character  of  our  conscious  life,  whilst  not  themselves  present 
to  consciousness.  The  sleeper  and  the  man  in  deep  reverie 
respond  to  sensory  stimuli  by  appropriate  movement  .without 
having  any  knowledge  of  either  the  exciting  cause  or  the 
resulting  movement.  Cheerfulness  and  sadness,  love,  hate, 
and  fear  are  often  the  outcome  of  feelings  which  elude  our 
best  efforts  to  discover  them.  Such  undercurrents,  lying  as 
it  were  below  the  surface  of  mental  life,  have  been  called  by 
recent  psychologists  subconscious  states.  There  is  considerable 
dispute  as  to  their  exact  nature  and  how  their  relation  to  the 
mind  should  be  conceived.  For  the  present  it  is  sufficient  to 
call  attention  to  their  reality  and  to  remind  ourselves  that 
although  unsusceptible  of  introspective  observation,  some  ot 
these  activities  are  intimately  connected  with  our  conscious 
life. 

Mental  Faculties  :  Classification. — Our  primary 
duty  in  entering  upon  a  scientific  treatment  of  tlie 
facts  of  Consciousness  is  to  effect  a  proper  distribu- 
tion of  these  phenomena.  From  very  ancient  times 
it  has  been  customary  to  divide  our  mental  states 
into  a  small  number  of  general  groups  conceived  to 
be  the  outcome  of  separate  faculties  ov  powers  ^^  of  the 

~  The  exact  meanings  of  the  terms,  Faculty,  Power,  Capacity, 
Function,  and  the  like,  are  not  very  accurately  fixed  in  Psychology. - 
Power  { potent ia  )  may  be  conceived  as  either  active  or  passive,  tliat 
is  either  as  a  special  causality  of  the  mind  or  as  its  susceptibility 
for  a  particular  species  of  affections  or  changes.  Hamilton, 
following  Leibnitz,  would  confine  the  term  Faculty  {Facultas, 
Facilitas)  to  the  former  meaning  and  Capacity  to  the  latter.     The 


CLASSIFICATION  OF   THE   MENTAL   FACULTIES.    29 


mind.  By  a  faculty  is  meant  the  mind's  capability 
of  undergoing  a  particular  kind  of  activity;  thus, 
our  sensations  of  colour  are  due  to  the  faculty  of 
vision,  our  recollections  to  the  faculty  of  memory, 
and  our  volitions  to  the  faculty  of  will.  Such  a 
method  of  classification  is  justified  by  the  con- 
spicuous differences  found  both  in  the  quality  of 
the  several  kinds  of  mental  life,  and  in  the  manner 
in  which  the  latter  put  the  mind  in  relation  with  the 
object.^ 

Cognitive  and  Appetitive. — These  activities  assume 
either  of  two  generically  different  forms.  Every 
mental  act  or  energy  constitutes  a  relation  between 
the  mind  or  subject  and  the  object  or  terminus  of 
that   act.      Now   this   relation   we   find    always   to 


terms  Act,  Operation,  Energy,  on  the  contrary,  denote  the  present 
exertion  of  a  power.  The  last  of  the  three,  however,  is  also  used 
in  a  kindred  sense  to  the  previous  terms,  as  the  perfection  or 
special  ground  in  the  agent  from  whence  the  activity  proceeds. 
The  word  Function  may  signify  either  the  actual  exercise  or  the 
specific  character  of  a  power.  Faculty,  Power,  and  Capacity,  all  properly 
signify  natural  abilities.  Accordingly,  G.  H.  Lewes  inverts  the 
original  and  universally  accepted  meaning  when  he  would  make 
the  term  Faculty  connote  an  acquired  or  artificially  created 
aptitude.  Faculty  is  efficient  cause  of  Function,  not  vice  versa, 
though  the  latter  is  both/;/a/  and  formal  cause  of  the  former.  (Cf. 
Hamilton,  Metaph.  Lect.  x.  ;  Lewes,  A  Study  of  Psychology,  p.  27.)  _ 

'■^  "The  ground  for  the  division  of  the  mental  faculties  lies  in 
the  special  nature  of  the  psychical  activities."  (Cf.  Jungmann,  Das 
Geniilth  unddasGefiihlsverniogender  neueren Psychologic, p.  12.)  Scholastic 
philosophers  taught  that  the  faculties  of  the  soul  should  be  dis- 
tinguished per  actus  et  objecta,  that  is,  according  to  the  nature  of  each 
activity  and  the  object  towards  which  it  is  directed.  The  former 
principle,  however,  is  the  real  causal  ground  for  the  distinction,  the 
latter  being  valuable  mainly  as  an  indication  or  symptom  which 
helps  to  exhibit  more  clearly  diversities  in  the  quality  of  the 
energy.  "  Potentia,  secundum  illud,quod  est  potentia,  ordinatur 
ad  actum.  Unde  oportet  rationem  potentiae  accipi  ex  actu  ad 
quem  ordinatur;  et  per  consequens  oportet  quod  ratio  potentiae 
diversificetur,  ut  diversificatur  ratio  actus."  {Sum.  i.  q.  77.  a.  3.  c.) 


30  PSYCHOLOGY. 


consist  either  in  (a)  the  assumption  by  the  soul  of 
the  object  into  itself  after  a  psychical  manner 
{imagine  intentionali) ,  or  {h)  the  tendency  of  the  soul 
towards  or  from  the  object  as  the  latter  is  in  itself. 
In  the  previous  case  the  object  of  the  state  is 
presented  or  represented  in  the  mind  by  a  cognitive 
act,  in  the  latter  the  mind  is  inclined*  towards  or 
from  the  object  by  an  appetitive  act ;  and  the  aptitude 
for  the  one  class  of  operations  is  described  as  cogni- 
tive, percipient,  apprehensive,  and  the  like,  while 
the  root  of  the  other  has  been  styled  the  "  striving," 
"  orectic,"  '*  conative,"  or  "  affective  "  power.  Under 
the  faculty  of  cognition  or  knowledge  are  aggregated 
such  operations  as  those  of  sense-perception,  memory, 
imagination,  judgment,  and  reasoning;  under  the 
affective  or  appetitive  faculty  are  included  desires, 
aversions,  emotions,  volitions,  and  the  like. 

2.  Rational  and  Sensuous. — Besides  this  distribu- 
tion of  mental  energies  into  those  of  a  Cognitional 
and  those  of  an  Appetitive  character,  and  running  ' 
right  through  both  classes,  there  is  another  division 
of  still  more  vital  importance  from  a  philosophical 
standpoint ;  we  mean  that  based  on  the  distinction 
between  the  powers  of  a  higher ^  rational^  or  spiritual 
grade,  and  those  of  the  lower,  sensuous,  or  organic 
order.  Throughout  the  entire  history  of  Philosophy 
it  has  been  recognized  that  this  difference  is  of 
profound  significance.   Thinkers  upholding  so  multi- 

•*  There  is  indeed  a  certain  sense  in  which  the  apprehensive 
faculties  exhibit  a  tendency  towards  their  appropriate  objects.  This 
is  impUed  in  the  scholastic  term  intentionalis.  Still  the  distinction 
between  such  general  responsive  afiinity  and  the  special  "  striving" 
element  of  appetite  remains  evident. 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  MENTAL   FACULTIES.    31 

farious  and  divergent  philosophical  creeds  as  Plato, 
Aristotle,  the  Schoolmen,  Descartes,  Leibnitz,  Kant, 
and  Hegel,  all  agree  in  looking  on  this  difference  of 
nature  in  our  sensuous  and  intellectual  activity  as 
the  central  fact  in  the  whole  of  Philosophy.  Accord- 
ingly, in  addition  to  the  division  which  separates 
appetency  from  cognition,  and  intersecting  both 
these  departments  of  mental  life,  we  must  draw  a 
line  marking  off  sensuous  from  rational  or  spiritual 
phenomena.  These,  however,  must  not  be  conceived 
as  two  co-ordinate  classes  of  activities  standing  inde- 
pendently side  by  side ;  they  are  akin  rather  to 
superimposed  strata.  The  superior  faculty  pre- 
supposes and  supplements  the  action  of  the  lower, 
though  both  are  properties  of  the  same  soul. 

To  the  sensuous  order  belong  such  operations  as 
seeing,  hearing,  forming  concrete  pictures  by  the 
imagination,  and  conserving  sensible  experiences  in 
the  organic  memory.  Intellectual  consciousness 
comprises  the  processes  of  forming  universal 
concepts,  judgments,  and  inferences,  the  recollection 
of  rational  truths,  and  the  operation  of  reflecting  on 
our  own  mental  states.  In  the  sphere  of  orectic 
activity  or  conation  we  find  in  the  lower  grade 
organic  appetite  and  sensuous  desires,  in  the  higher 
spiritual  desires  and  rational  volition.  Affections, 
emotions,  and  passions  pertain  partly  to  one,  partly 
to  the  other  order.  It  is  true  of  course  that  in 
actual  concrete  experience  we  cannot  separate  the 
superior  from  the  inferior  activity.  The  sensation 
in  mature  life  is  rarely  given  without  some  faint 
accompanying    exercise    of    Intellect.      But    such 


32  PSYCIIOLOGY. 


dependence,  or  concomitance,  does  not  identify  the 
two  energies. 

Subdivision.  —  A  further  examination  of  our 
cognitive  power  of  the  sensuous  order  reveals  to  us 
certain  lesser  differences  which  afford  us  reason  for 
a  subdivision  of  this  generic  capability.  We  find  .! 
that  some  faculties  make  us  directly  cognizant  of 
material  phenomena  existing  without  the  mind. 
These  are  the  External  Senses.  Others  have  for 
their  objects  not  such  extra-mental  realities,  but 
conscious  representations  of  the  former.  These 
faculties  were  called  by  the  scholastic  philosophers 
the  Internal  Senses,  the  chief  of  which  are  Imagina- 
tion and  Memory.  The  first  forms  images  of  absent 
objects,  the  second  super-adds  to  such  representa- 
tions a  conviction  of  their  having  been  previously 
experienced.  The  principal  subdivisions,  therefore, 
of  the  lower  grade  of  cognitive  life  are  Imagination, 
Memory,  and  the  External  Senses.  In  the  sphere 
of  spiritual  knowledge  the  various  operations  of 
conception,  judgment,  inference,  and  reflection,  do 
not  present  sufficient  divergency  in  nature  to  warrant 
a  subdivision  of  Intellect  into  different  faculties. 
These  several  processes  are  merely  successive  func- 
tions of  the  same  power. 

Besides  the  general  partition  of  appetency,  or 
affective  consciousness,  into  rational  and  sensuous, 
no  further  subdivision  seems  obvious.  The  most 
imi~ortant  class  of  states  which  might  appear  to 
claim  as  their  root  another  special  property  of  the 
soul  are  the  Feelings  and  Emotions.  In  so  far, 
however,  as  they  are  not  identical  with  the  merely 


CLASSIFICATION   OF   THE   MENTAL   FACULTIES.    33 


pleasurable  or  painful  aspect  of  our  cognitive 
energies,  these  phenomena  may  be  traced  to  the 
affective  or  appetitive  disposition  of  the  mind  taken 
in  a  wide  sense  In  our  present  chapter  we  can  of 
course  merely  enunciate  the  principles  upon  which 
our  system  of  classification  is  based  ;  the  justification 
of  that  scheme  will  be  found  in  the  detailed  treat- 
ment of  these  various  mental  activities  throughout 
the  present  book. 

Various   classifications   of  Mental   Faculties* 

Aristotle's  Scheme.  —  Although  the  vast  majority  of 
psychologists  have  followed  the  method  of  referring  our 
psychical  phenomena  to  a  small  number  of  general 
faculties,  yet  there  has  been  a  good  deal  of  disagree- 
ment regarding  the  scheme  of  powers  to  be  assumed  as 
ultimate.  Aristotle,  rejecting  Plato's  allotment  of  three 
really  distinct  souls  to  man,  teaches  that  the  human 
being  is  possessed  of  one  vital  principle  which  informs 
and  animates  the  body.  This  soul  {ij/vxr})  is  endowed 
with  five  distinct  genera  of  faculties:  "Vegetative 
Power  {to  OpeTTTLKov),  on  which  the  maintenance  of  the 
corporeal  organism  depends ;  the  Appetitive  Faculty 
(to  opeKTLKov),  which  is  exerted  in  striving  after  what  is 
good  and  agreeable,  and  in  repelling  what  is  disagree- 
able (Siw^L^  Kal  4>vy^) ;  the  faculty  of  Sensuous  Percep- 
tion {to  aia9r)TLK6v),  by  which  the  objects  perceptible  by 
sense  are  represented  in  our  cognition,  the  Locomotive 
Faculty  {to  KLvrjTtKov),  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  move 
the  body  and  its  members,  and  make  use  of  them  for 
external  action;  and  lastly,  the  Reason  (to  Stavor^TiKoV). 
The  four  faculties  first-named  belong  to  brutes,  as  v\^ell 
as  to  man.  Reason,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  charac- 
teristic which  distinguishes  man  from  the  brutes."^ 

Scholastic  System.— St.  Thomas  follows  Aristotle,'^  but 

5  Stockl's  Handbook  of  the  History  of  Philosophy  (Translated  by 
Thomas  Finlay,  S.J.),  p.  119.  This  work  contains  an  excellent 
epitome  of  Aristotle's  Philosophy. 

^  Cf.  Sum.  i.  q.  7S.  a.  10. 

D 


34  PSYCHOLOGY. 


lays  greater  stress  than  the  Greek  philosopher  on  the 
distinction  between  mere  sensitive  appetite  (opcit? 
aXoyos),  for  which  we  are  not  responsible,  and  rational 
appetite  or  will."  Leaving  out  of  account,  then,  the 
physiological  or  extra  mental  powers  of  the  soul,  we 
have  cognitive  capabilities  of  the  sensuous  order ; 
intellect,  or  the  faculty  of  rational  knowledge;  and  the 
two  kinds  of  appetite.  This  is  the  scheme  which  we 
have  ourselves  adopted.  With  St.  Thomas,  as  with  us, 
emotional  states  are  either  complex  products  made  up 
of  cognitive  and  appetitive  activities,  or  mere  aspects 
of  such  energies. 

Scotch  School. — Among  modern  writers,  Reid  and 
Stewart  put  forward  the  distribution  into  Intellectual  and 
Active  Powers,  based  on  the  antithesis  maintained  by 
the  peripatetics  between  the  cognitive  and  appetitive 
faculties.  In  doing  so,  however,  they  overlooked  the 
equally  important  principle  of  division  into  Sensuous 
and  Rational  aptitudes,  all  forms  of  cognition  bemg 
alike  styled  intellectual.  In  addition  to  this  deficiency, 
their  classification  errs  b}'  opposing  intellectual  to  active, 
whereas  the  higher  order  of  cognitive  activity  is  as 
essentiallv  active  as  many  modes  of  appetency. 

Tripartite  Division. — Hamilton  adopts  the  three-fold 
distribution  of  the  facts  of  consciousness  into  pheno- 
mena of  Knowledge,  of  Feeling,  and  of  Conation.  This 
classification,  first  propounded  last  century  by  Tetens, 
a  German  philosopher,  was  popularized  by  Kant,  and 
probably  enjoys  most  general  favour  among  psycho- 
logists of  the  present  day.  It  bases  its  claims  on  the 
assumption  of  three  ultimate  radically  distinct  modes 
of  conscious  activity  to  one  or  other  of  which  all  forms 
of  mental  life  are  reducible,  while  none  of  these,  it  is 
asserted,  can  be  identified  with,  or  resolved  into,  either 
of  the  other  two.  Consciousness  assures  me,  it  is  urged, 
that  I  am  capable  of  Knowledge,  of  seeing,  hearing, 
imagining,  reasoning,  and  the  rest.  It  also  testifies  to 
the  fact  that  I  may  be  drawn  towards  or  repelled  from 
objects,  in  other  words,  that  I  am  endowed  with  the 
faculty   of   Desire.     Finally,  it   reveals   to   me   that    I 

'  Sum   i.  q.  80.  a.  2. 


CLASSIFICATION   OF  THE   MENTAL   FACULTIES.    35 

experience  pleasure  and  pain,  and  that  I  am  subject  to 
various  emotions,  such  as  curiosity,  pride,  anger,  and 
admiration,  which  are  not  acts  of  cognition,  nor  yet  of 
desire.  Accordingly  there  must  be  postulated  as  the 
basis  of  this  last  class  of  states  a  third  capability  in  the 
mind,  the  Faculty  of  Feeling.  Our  objection  to  this 
scheme  is  that  it  sins  both  by  excess  and  defect.  On 
the  one  hand  it  ignores  the  fundamental  distinction 
between  the  lower  and  higher  grades  of  mental  life,  and 
on  the  other  hand  it  asserts  without  sufficient  grounds 
the  existence  of  a  separate  third  faculty.  Hamilton, 
like  most  Kantians,  was  at  times  fully  aware  of  the 
divergence  in  kind  which  marks  off  rational  from 
sensuous  cognition.  Yet  this  all-important  difference 
receives  no  real  recognition  in  his  classification,  whilst 
the  phenomena  of  feeling,  for  which  he  demands  a  third 
compartment,  are  reducible  either  to  aspects  of  cogni- 
tive energies  or  modes  of  appetency. 

Spencer's  Bipartite  Division.  —  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer 
rejects  the  triple  division  of  mental  phenomena  for 
a  two-fold  one:  (i)  Feelings,  and  (2)  Relations  between 
Feelings  or  Cognitions.  In  his  view  volition  is  merely  a 
complex  form  of  feeling,  and  even  the  "  relations " 
between  feelings  he  speaks  of  as  being  merely  special 
feelings.  As  a  psychological  classification  this  division 
has  been  very  justly,  but  not  consistently,  rejected  by 
Dr.  Bain,  on  the  ground  that  what  is  required  is  not  a 
scheme  of  mental  products,  but  of  the  different  kinds 
of  powers  or  forces  of  the  mind  by  which  such 
products  are  attained.^  Looked  at,  however,  as  an 
ultimate  analysis  of  our  mental  operations,  it  must  be 
condemned  as  proceeding  from  a  false  conception  of 
mental  life.'\ 


^  The  Senses  and  Intellect,  p.  640.  (2nd  Edit.) 

9  H.  Spencer,  Bain,  Mr.  Sully,  and  all  empiricists,  since  they 
teach  that  the  mind  is  nothing  more  than  the  sum  of  our  conscious 
states,  mean  by  a  faculty  merely  a  group  of  like  mental  acts,  while 
Hamilton,  who  believes  that  the  mind  is  a  real  indivisible  energy, 
conceives  the  different  faculties,  not,  indeed,  as  independent 
agents,  but  as  special  forms  of  causahty  or  susceptibility  in  the 
soul. 


36  PSYCHOLOGY. 


Attacks  on  Mental  Faculties. — But  difference  of  view  on 
the  subject  of  the  mental  powers  has  not  been  confined  to  the 
problem  of  classification.  A  vigorous  crusade  has  been 
preached  by  several  psychologists  during  the  present  century 
against  the  "faculty  hypothesis"  in  any  form.  The  move- 
ment was  initiated  in  Germany  by  Herbart  in  opposition  to 
Kant,  and  has  been  sustained  there  by  Drobisch,  Beneke, 
Schleiermacher,  Vorliinder,  and  others.  In  France,  MM. 
Taine,  Kibot,  and  positivists  generally,  have  followed  in  the 
same  direction,  and  a  vast  amount  of  wit  and  rhetoric  has 
been  expended  in  the  demolition  of  these  "  metaphysical 
phantoms."  We  believe,  nevertheless,  that,  once  the  reality 
of  the  mind  as  a  permanent  indivisible  energy  is  admitted, 
the  assumption  of  faculties  when  properly  explained  is 
unassailable. 

Faculty  defined. — A  mental  faculty  or  power  is  not  of  the 
nature  of  a  particular  part  of  the  soul,  or  of  a  member 
different  from  it  as  a  limb  is  distinct  from  the  rest  of 
the  body.  It  is  not  an  independent  reality,  a  separate 
agent,  which  originates  conscious  states  out  of  itself  apart 
from  the  mind.  But  neither  is  it  merely  a  group  of  con- 
scious states  of  a  particular  kind.  It  is  simply  a  special 
mode  through  which  the  mind  itself  acts.  "  It  is  admitted  by 
all  that  a  faculty  is  not  a  force  distinct  from  and  independent 
of  the  essence  of  the  soul,  but  it  is  the  soul  itself,  which 
operates  in  and  through  the  faculty."  ^"^  A  faculty  is,  in  fact, 
the  proximate  ground  of  some  special  form  of  activity  of  which  the 
mind  is  capable.  That  we  are  justified  in  attributing  to  the 
soul  faculties  in  this  sense  is  abundantly  clear.  Careful  use 
of  our  power  of  introspection  reveals  to  us  a  number  of  modes 
of  psychical  energy  radically  distinct  from  each  other,  and 
incapable  of  further  analysis.  To  see,  to  hear,  to  remember, 
to  desire,  are  essentially  different  kinds  of  consciousness, 
though  all  proceed  from  the  same  source.  Sometimes  one  is 
in  action,  sometimes  another,  but  no  one  of  them  ever 
exhausts  the  total  energy  of  the  mind.  They  are  partial 
utterances  of  the  same  indivisible  subject.  But  this  is 
equivalent  to  the  establishment  of  certain  distinct  aptitudes 
in  the  mind.^^ 

^"  Cf  Die  PsycJioIogie,  von  Dr.  Constantin  Gutberlet,  p.  4. 

^'  "  The  proposition,  '  our  soul  possesses  different  faculties,' 
means  nothing  else  than  '  our  soul  is  a  substance  which  as  active 
principle  is  capable  of  exerting  different  species  of  energies.'  "  "  If 
the  soul  produces  within  itself  acts  of  perception,  then  must  it  also 
be  endowed  with  a  property  corresponding  to  this  effect,  and  this 
property  must  be  something  actual,  objectively  real  in  it;  other- 
wise a  stone  may  at  times  be  just  as  capable  of  percipient  acts.    To 


CLASSIFICATION   OF  THE  MENTAL   FACULTIES.    37 

Objections  examined. — In  England  the  chief  psycholojijist 
darini^  the  early  part  of  this  century  who  attacked  the  doctrine 
of  mental  faculties,  was  Brown.  As  the  right  view  was 
sufficiently  vindicated  then  by  Hamilton,^- we  need  not  return 
to  refute  the  former  writer  or  Bailey,  who  added  little  of  any 
value  on  the  same  side.  Mr.  Sully,  however,  may  be  taken 
as  a  representative  of  recent  attacks,  so  a  word  in  answer  to 
this  author  may  be  useful.  After  premising  that  the  discussion 
•of  the  ultimate  nature  of  the  "  so-called  faculties  "  belongs  to 
Rational  Psychology,  and  so  lies  outside  of  his  sphere,  he 
continues:  "The  hypothesis  of  faculties  can,  however,  be 
■criticized  from  the  point  of  view  of  Empirical  Psychology  in 
so  far  as  it  succeeds  or  does  not  succeed  in  giving  a  clear 
account  of  the  phenomena.  Looked  at  in  this  way,  it  must 
l)e  regarded  as  productive  of  much  error  in  Psychology,  It 
has  led  to  the  false  supposition  that  mental  activity,  instead  of 
■being  one  and  the  same  throughout  its  manifold  phases  is  a  juxta- 
position of  totally  distinct  activities  ansivering  to  a  bundle  of 
detached  powers,  somehow  standing  side  by  side,  and  exerting  no 
influence  on  one  anotJier.  Sometimes  this  absolute  separation 
■of  the  parts  of  mind  has  gone  so  far  as  to  personify  the 
several  faculties  as  though  they  were  distinct  entities.  This 
has  been  especially  the  case  with  the  faculty  or  power  of 
AvilUng."!^ 

One  or  two  observations  m.ay  be  urged  in  reply,  (i)  Mr. 
Sully,  in  asserting  that  all  mental  activity  is  one  and  the 
same,  cannot  seriously  intend  to  maintain  that  the  conscious 
activity  known  as  seeing  is  identical  with  that  of  hearing,  or 
•that  cognition  is  not  different  in  nature  from  desire.  But  if  he 
allows  these  energies  to  be  radically  distinct  modes  of  con- 
deny  that  property  whilst  we  admit  its  manifestations,  is  to  assert 
that  the  faculty  of  perception  is  nothing  else  than  the  sum  of  its 
acts,  and  is  equivalent  to  postulating  accidents  without  a  substance, 
•effects  without  a  cause,  and  to  discoursing  of  phenomena  and  opera- 
tions when  the  subject,  the  agent,  is  abolished."  {Das  Geviiith  unci 
das  Gefi'ihlsvermogen  dcr  neueren  Psychologie,  von  Jungmann,  p.  11.) 

12  Mctaph.  Ixx. 

13  Outlines,  p.  26.  Similarly,  Mr.  G.  F.  Stout,  Analytical  Psycho- 
logy, Vol.  1.  pp.  17 — 21.  Mr,  Sully  is  undoubtedly  right  when  he  says 
that  discussion  of  the  nature  of  the  faculties  pertains  to  Rational 
Psychology.  But  this  only  proves  the  evil  of  "  clandestine  "  Meta- 
physics. The  distinction  between  the  "criticism  from  the  Empirical 
point  of  view,"  which  rejects  faculties  as  properties  of  the  mind, 
putting  in  their  place  aggregates  of  mental  states,  and  the  discredited 
Metaphysics  is  not  very  obvious.  In  fact,  such  criticism  of  meta- 
physical conceptions  invariably  involves  a  counter  metaphysical 
^system  of  its  own.  (Cf.  Ladd,  Philosophy  of  the  Mind,  pp.  32,  33.) 


38  PSYCHOLOGY. 


scioiisness  under  the  vague  saving  clause  of  "  manifold 
phases,"  then  all  that  is  needed  for  the  establishment  of  a 
variety  of  mental  aptitudes  in  the  sense  for  which  we  contend 
is  admitted.  (2)  The  description  of  the  theory  as  involving 
the  absurd  view  that  the  faculties  form  "a  juxta-position  of 
totally  distinct  activities  answering  to  a  bundle  of  detached 
powers,  somehow  standing  side  by  side  and  exerting  no- 
influence  on  each  other,"  is  a  mere  travesty  of  the  doctrine. 
Indeed,  so  far  have  the  supporters  of  the  doctrine  been  from 
setting  "  the  faculties  side  by  side  exerting  no  influence  on 
one  another,"  that  a  great  part  of  the  modern  attack  is  based 
on  quite  an  opposite  representation  of  their  view.  They  are 
charged  in  Germany  with  making  the  mind  the  theatre  of  a 
perpetual  civil  war  among  the  faculties  ;  and  Vorlander  com- 
pared the  world  of  consciousness  in  their  system  to  the 
condition  of  the  Roman  Germanic  Empire,  when  the  vassals 
(the  faculties)  usurped  the  functions  of  the  regent  (the  soul), 
and  were  perpetually  intriguing  and  strugghng  with  each 
other;  whilst  Schleiermacher  styled  the  theory  a  "romance 
replete  with  public  outrages  and  secret  intrigues."  If  the 
faculties  are  to  be  annihilated  on  the  charge  of  being  ever- 
lastingl}'  involved  in  mutual  conflict,  it  is  rather  hard  that 
they  should  be  condemned  at  the  same  time  for  exerting  no 
influence  on  each  other.  The  truth  is,  no  such  ridiculous 
view  regarding  the  nature  of  our  mental  powers  has  ever  been 
held  by  any  psychologist  of  repute,  but  in  talking  of  the 
obvious  and  indisputable  fact  that  our  intellectual  operations,, 
emotions,  and  volitions,  interfere  with  and  condition  each 
other,  philosophers,  like  other  folk,  have  been  compelled  by 
the  exigencies  of  language  to  speak  as  if  the  faculties  were 
endowed  with  a  certain  independent  autonomy  of  their  own.. 
They  have,  however,  of  course,  from  the  days  of  St.  Augustine,. 
and  long  before,  been  aware  that  it  is  the  one  indivisible 
soul  which  remembers,  understands,  and  wills. ^•^  (3)  Even 
regarding  the  activities  of  sense  and  intellect,  which  we  hold,, 
and  shall  prove  to  be  essentially  different,  the  assertion  of 
an  imagined  and  real  independence  is  untrue.  The  second 
faculty  pre-supposes  as  a  necessary  condition  of  its  action  the 
exercise  of  the  first,  and  is  dependent  on  it  for  its  operation,, 
whilst  both  are  merely  diverse  energies  of  the  same  simple 
soul.  (4)  Finally,  the  Will  is  not  an  independent  member, 
an  entity  separate   from  the  mind ;    it  is  merely  that  per- 

^*  Cf.  St.  Aug.  De  TrinUate,  Lib.  X.  c.  xi.  "Potentia  est  nihil  aliud 

quam   quidam    ordo    ad    actum."    (Aquinas,    De   Anima,    Lib.    IL 

lect.  11.)     To  assign  a  mental  state  to  a  power  or  faculty  is  not  to 

explain  it, — except  in  so  far  as  classification  may  be  deemed  expla- 

atioD.     See  p.  587,  below. 


CLASSIFICATION   OF   THE   MENTAL    FACULTIES.    39 

fection  of  the  Ego  which  constitutes  it  capable  of  that 
special  form  of  energizing  called  willing ;  it  is  the  soul  itself 
which  wills. 

The  Mind  a  Real  Unity. — There  is,  however,  a  tenet  implied 
in  our  system  irreconcilably  opposed  to  the  phenomenalist 
view  of  Mr.  Sully  and  all  other  sensationist  writers.  We  hold 
as  a  fundamental  all-important  truth  that  there  exists  one  real 
indivisible  agent  called  the  Mind,  which  is  something  more 
than  the  series  of  events  known  as  conscious  states.  Those, 
on  the  contrary,  who  maintain  that  the  mind  is  nothing  but 
an  aggregate  or  series  of  separate  states  connected  by  no  real 
bond,  naturally  find  no  place  in  their  theory  ior  faculties. 

Mutual  Relations  of  the  Faculties.  —  There 
remains  another  question  related  to  our  present  subject : 
Which  is  to  be  conceived  as  the  most  fundamental  of 
our  activities?  To  answer  this  we  must  recall  our 
double  division  of  faculties,  on  the  one  hand,  into 
sensuous  and  rational,  and  on  the  other  hand  into 
cognitive  and  appetitive. 

Now  of  the  two  former  kinds  of  mental  life  that  of 
sense  is  primary.  The  faculty  of  sense  manifests  itself 
at  the  earliest  age,  it  extends  throughout  the  entire 
animal  kingdom,  and  its  exercise  is  always  pre-supposed 
in  order  to  furnish  materials  to  be  elaborated  by  the 
rational  powers  in  man.  Intellect,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  something  superadded  to  sense.  In  all  its  forms  it 
requires  as  the  condition  of  its  operation  the  previous 
excitation  of  the  lower  powers,  it  manifests  itself  later 
in  life  than  sense,  and  it  is  confined  to  the  human 
species.  Turning  now  to  the  other  division  :  Whether 
is  cognition  or  appetite  the  more  primordial  ?  But 
little  reflection  is  required,  we  think,  to  make  it  clear 
that  knowledge  is  naturally  prior  to  volition.  We 
desire  because  we  perceive  or  imagine  the  object  of  our 
desire  to  be  good.  W^e  are  drawn  or  repelled  by  the 
pleasurable  or  painful  character  of  the  cognitive  act. 
A  sensation  of  colour,  sound,  or  contact,  viewed  in  its 
proper  character,  is  a  rudimentary  act  of  apprehension, 
and  it  may  awaken  a  striving  either  for  its  continuance 
or  for  its  cessation ;  an  intellectual  judgment  may 
similarly  give  rise  to  a  volition.  It  is  true  that  some 
desires  manifest  themselves  in  an  obscure  way  without 


40  PSYCHOLOGY. 


any  antecedent  cognitive  representation  that  we  can 
clearly  realize.  Tliis  is  especially  the  case  with  the 
cravings  of  physical  appetite,  such  as  hunger  and  thirst. 
Purely  organic  states  which  give  rise  to  3earnings  of 
this  kind,  however,  are  rather  of  the  nature  of  physio- 
logical needs  than  properly  psychical  desires ;  and  in 
proportion  as  they  emerge  into  the  strata  of  mental 
acts  the  cognitive  element  comes  into  clearer  conscious- 
ness. We  may,  therefore,  lay  it  down  as  a  general 
truth  that  appetite  is  subsequent  to  knowledge  and 
dependent  on  it.  These  faculties  are  thus  to  be  viewed, 
not  so  mucli  in  the  light  of  two  co-ordinate  powers 
standing  side  by  side,  as  in  that  of  two  properties  of 
the  scul,  the  exertion  of  one  of  which  bears  to  that  of 
the  other  the  relation  of  antecedent  to  consequent. 

Feeling. — What  position  as  regards  the  two  powers 
just  mentioned  does  the  so-called  third  Faculty  of  Feeling 
hold  in  our  system  ?  Feelings  understood  as  a  group 
of  emotional  states  are  not,  we  have  already  remarked, 
the  offspring  of  a  third  ultimate  distinct  energy,  but 
complex  products  resulting  from  the  action  of  both 
cognitive  and  appetitive  faculties,  Feeling  viewed 
simply  as  pleasure  and  pain,  and  such  is  the  only  sense 
in  which  this  form  of  consciousness  has  even  an 
apparent  claim  to  the  position  of  a  separate  facult}', 
is  merely  an  aspect  of  our  cognitive  and  appetitive 
energies.  It  exhibits  itself  as  a  positive  or  negative 
colouring,  which  marks  the  operations  of  these  powers. 
As  a  (]uality  of  knowledge  it  must  be  conceived  to  be 
dependent  on  cognitive  activity  rather  than  vice  versa. 
But,  inasmuch  as  it  is  through  this  quality  that  cogni- 
tion determines  the  character  of  the  consequent  appetite, 
feeling,  or  rather  the  cognition  as  pleasurably  or  pain- 
fully coloured,  stands  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect 
to  the  subsequent  appetite.  Since,  liowever,  the  activity 
of  desire  may  also  be  more  or  less  agreeable,  and  since 
it  may  result  in  satisfaction  or  discontent,  feeling  here 
again  stands  in  the  relation  of  sequela  to  volitional 
energy.  Feeling  thus  considered  as  a  qualit}'  of 
conscious  acts  is  of  the  nature  of  a  variable  phase 
or  tone  of  both  cognitive  and   appetitive  activity  ;   but 


CLASSIFICATION  Of  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES.    4I 


when   in  the  position   of  a  dependent  accident  of  the 
former  it  may  be  a  causal  condition  of  the  latter. ^^ 

Readings  —Classification  of  the  Faculties,  of.  Sum.  i.  q.  78.  For 
a  very  able  treatment  of  the  whole  subject,  see  Jungmann'sDas  Gemi'ith 
itnd  das  Gefi'ihlsvermogen  der  neueren  PsycJiologie.  (Freiburg,  1885.)  See 
especially  §§  1—5  and  83—100.  The  attacks  on  the  Faculties  are 
also  exhaustively  dealt  with  by  Pesch,  Instit  Psych  §§  383—390. 
On  the  nature  of  Faculties,  cf.  Suarez,  De  Anima,  Lib.  II.  c.  i.  and 
Metaph.  Disp.  18,  sect.  3;  Gutberlet,.  D/^  PsycJiologie,  pp.  3—8; 
Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theories,  Vol.  II.  pp.  10—13;  Mercier, 
Psychologic,  pp.  490 — 494. 

1-5  This  account  of  the  relations  subsisting  between  cognition, 
feeling,  and  appetency,  which  we  believe  to  represent  the  view 
of  St.  Thomas,  embraces  the  elements  of  truth  possessed  by 
both  Hamilton  and  Dr.  Bain  in  the  controversy  on  the  subject. 
Hamilton  is  right  in  holding  that  the  cognitive  or  apprehensive 
form  of  consciousness  is  the  most  fundamental,  and  that  feeling, 
i  e.,  pleasure  or  pain,  is  dependent  on  the  former,  whilst  desire  is 
a  still  later  result.  There  is  thus  some  foundation  for  his  assertion 
that  consciousness  is  conceivable  as  cognitive  energy  void  of 
pleasure  and  pain,  whilst  the  latter  cannot  be  conceived  unless 
as  a  quality  of  the  former.  On  the  other  hand,  through  not 
recognizing  the  difference  between  sensuous  and  intellectual  cogni- 
tion, he  falls  into  the  error  of  supposing  that  the  latter,  and  some- 
times even  that  peculiarly  reflex  form  of  it  which  is  known  as 
self-consciousness,  is  necessarily  prior  to  sensuous  pleasure  and 
pain.  Dr  Bain  maintains  feeling  to  be  the  primordial  element,  but 
under  this  term  includes  both  the  pleasurable  and  painful  aspects^  of 
conscious  states,  and  certain  sensations.  He  is  right  in  holding 
sensuous  life  in  general  to  be  prior  to  rational  life,  but  wrong  in 
making  feeling  under  the  form  of  pleasure  or  pain  antecedent  to  or 
co-ordinate  with  cognitive  sensibility. 


PSYCHOLOGY. 


Book   I. 

Empirical  or  Phenomenal  Psyciiolo';y, 

Part  I. — Sensuous  Life. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

SENSATION. 

Sensation  :  Sense  and  Sense-organ. — The  most 
fundamental  and  primitive  form  of  conscious  life  is 
sensation.  Such  being  the  case,  sensation  cannot, 
properly  speaking,  be  defined.  It  may,  however,  be 
described  as  an  elementary  psychical  state  aroused 
in  the  animated  organism  by  some  exciting  cause. 
A  sensation  is  thus  a  modification,  not  of  the  mind 
alone,  nor  of  the  body  alone,  but  of  the  living 
being  composed  of  mind  and  body.  The  power  oi 
experiencing  sensations  in  general  is  termed  saisibi- 
lity,  while  the  capacity  of  the  living  being  for  a 
particular  species  of  sensations  is  called  a  sense. 
The  special  portions  of  the  organism  endowed  witli 
the  property  of  reacting  to  appropriate  stimuli  so  as 


SENSATION.  43 


to  evoke  these  particular  groups  of  sensations  are 
called  sense-organs.  A  being  capable  of  sensations  is 
described  as  sentient,  or  sensitive;  and  the  term 
sensuous  may  be  applied  to  all  those  mental^  states 
which  are  acts,  not  of  the  soul  alone,  but  of  the 
animated  organism. 

Excitation  of  Sensation. — The  excitation  of  a 
sensation  usually  comprises  three  stages.  First, 
there  is  an  action  of  the  physical  world  external  to 
the  organism.  This  action,  transmitted  in  some 
form  of  motion  to  the  sense-organ,  gives  rise  there 
to  the  second  stage.  This  consists  of  a  molecular 
disturbance  in  the  substance  of  the  nerves  which 
is  propagated  to  the  brain.  Thereupon,  a  com- 
pletely new  phenomenon,  the  conscious  sensation, 
is  awakened.  The  nature  of  the  external  agencies 
which  arouse  sensation  is  the  subject-matter  of  the 
science  of  Physics ;  the  character  of  the  process 
within  the  organism  which  precedes  or  accompanies 
the  psychical  state  is  studied  by  the  science  of 
Physiology  ;  while  the  investigation  of  the  conscious 
operation  itself  is  the  function  of  Psychology.  In 
describing  the  action  of  the  senses  later  on,  we  will 
say  a  brief  word  on  the  physical  and  physiological 
conditions  of  each  in  particular,  but  a  few  very 
general  remarks  on  the  nature  of  the  physical  basis 
of  conscious  life  as  a  whole  may  be  suitable  here. 


1  We  employ  the  word  mental,  as  equivalent  to  conscious.  In  this 
sense,  it  is  applicable  to  all  states  of  consciousness,  whether  cogni- 
tive or  appetitive,  sensuous  or  supra-sensuous.  The  usage  of  those 
scholastic  writers  who  would  make  this  adjective  synonymous  witli 
intellectual,  seems  to  us  inconveniently  narrow,  and  too  much  opposed 
to  common  language. 


44  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


The  Nervous  System. — The  nervous  apparatus  of  the 
animal  organism  is  two-fold — the  sympathetic  system,  and  the 
cerebrospinal  system.  Whilst  the  former  controls  organic  or 
vegetative  life,  the  latter  constitutes  the  bodily  machinery  of 
our  mental  states.  The  cerebrospinal  system  itself  is  also 
composed  of  two  parts  or  subdivisions,  the  central  mass, 
and  the  branches  which  ramify  throughout  the  body.  The 
central  mass,  called  the  cerebro-spinal  axis,  is  made  up  of 
the  brain  and  the  spinal  cord  passing  from  it  down  through 
the  backbone.  The  spinal  cord  consists  of  a  column  of  white, 
fibrous  matter,  enclosing  a  core  of  grey,  cellular  s  ibstance. 

From  the  spinal  cord,  between  every  two  vertebrae,  there 
issue  forth  two  pairs  of  nerves.  The  nerves  proceeding  from 
the  front  of  the  spinal  column  are  called  the  anterior,  efferent, 
or  motor  nerves,  inasmuch  as  they  are  the  channels  employed 
in  the  transmission  of  impulses  outwards,  and  are  thus  the 
instruments  of  muscular  movement.  The  nerves  coming  from 
the  back  of  the  spine  are  called  the  afferent,  or  sensory 
nerves,  because  by  their  means  the  molecular  movements 
which  give  rise  to  sensations,  are  conveyed  inwards  from 
the  various  organs  of  the  body.  The  strands  of  nerves 
dividing  and  sul)dividing  as  they  proceed  farther  from  the 
trunk  branch  out  into  the  finest  threads  through  all  parts 
of  the  skin,  so  that  it  is  practically  impossible  to  prick  any 
place  even  with  the  finest  needle  without  injury  to  some 
nerve.  The  entire  surface  of  the  body  is  thus  connected 
with  the  brain  through  the  spinal  cord  by  an  elaborate 
telegraph  system.  {See  illustrations  at  the  beginning  of  the  book.) 

The  Brain. — The  brain  itself  is  divided  into  several  portions 
or  organs,  the  functions  of  which  are,  however,  in  many  cases 
but  obscurely  apprehended.  Amongst  the  chief  are  the  following: 

1.  The  medulla  oblongata,  which  is  situated  at  the  root  of 
the  brain  where  the  spinal  cord  widens  out  on  entering  the 
skull.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  prolongation  of  the  spinal  cord.  From 
it  proceed  the  nerves  of  the  face  and  those  governing  the 
actions  of  the  heart  and  lungs.  Hence  the  fatal  nature  of 
injuries  in  this  quarter. 

2.  Higher  up  and  projecting  backwards  over  this  into  the 
lower  part  of  the  back  of  the  sknll  is  a  large,  laminated  mass, 
forming  the  cerebellum.  Its  precise  functions  are  still  much 
disputed,  but  it  seems  to  play  an  important  part  in  co- 
ordinating locomotive  action. 

3.  Above  and  in  front  of  the  medulla  oblongata  is  a  quantity 
of  fil^rous  matter  which  from  its  shape  and  position  has  been 
called  the  "  bridge  "  ov  pons  varolii. 

4.  Above  all  there  rises  the  cerebrum  or  large  brain, 
exceo:ling   in    size    all    the    other   contents   of  the   skull.     It 


SENSATION.  45 


includes  several  well-differentiated  parts  lying  at  its  basement, 
the  chief  of  which  are  the  corpus  striaiuni,  the  optic  thalamus, 
the  corpus  callosum,  and  the  corpora  qiiadrigemina.  The  cere- 
brum consists  mainly  of  a  soft,  pulpy  substance  of  mixed  grey 
and  white  matter,  the  former  being  composed  of  vesicles  or 
cells,  the  latter  of  fibres^  The  surface  has  a  very  convoluted 
or  crumpled  appearance,  caused  by  a  large  number  of  fissures. 
One  great  furrow,  called  the  median  fissure,  running  from  the 
front  to  the  back  of  the  head,  divides  the  cerebrum  into  two 
nearly  equal  corresponding  parts,  the  right  and  left  hemispheres. 
Lesser  clefts,  the  chief  amongst  which  are  the  Sylvian  fissure, 
and  ihe  fissure  of  Rolando,  subdivide  the  two  hemispheres  into 
lobes  or  districts,  each  containing  several  convolutions.  The 
nerve-cells  in  the  upper  cortical  surface  of  the  cerebrum 
seem  to  be  specially  instrumental  in  the  memory,  or  retention 
and  reproduction  of  sensory  and  motor  impressions. 

The  human  brain,  when  it  has  reached  maturity,  exceeds 
that  of  all  the  lower  animals  in  the  richness  of  its  convolutions. 
These  latter  seem  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  brain  as 
an  instrument  of  the  mind,  perhaps,  by  largely  augmenting 
its  superficial  area.  It  is  thickly  interlined  throughout  with 
small  blood-vessels,  and  though  ordinarily  less  than  one- 
fortieth  of  the  weight  of  the  body,  it  receives  nearly  one-fifth 
of  the  whole  circulating  blood.  Mental  operations,  as  is  well 
known,  exhaust  a  great  deal  of  nervous  energy,  and  vigorous 
intellectual  activity  requires  a  plentiful  supply  of  healthy 
blood  to  this  organ. 

Nerves  branching  mto  different  parts  of  the  head  are 
given  off  from  the  centre  of  the  base  of  the  brain  in  pairs. 
The  first  pair,  starting  from  beneath  the  corpus  callosuui  and 
proceeding  forward  form  the  olfactory  nerves.  The  next  pair, 
having  their  root  a  little  farther  back  in  the  optic  thalamus, 
supply  the  optic  nerves.  The  remaining  nerves  have  their 
source  in  the  medulla  oblongata.  The  fifth  pair  supplies  the 
nerves  which  control  the  skin  of  the  face  and  the  muscles  of 
the  tongue  and  jaws.  The  eighth  pair,  starting  still  farther 
back  in  the  medulla  oblongata,  constitute  the  auditory  nerve. 
The  ninth  pair  go  to  the  tongue  ;  and  the  various  nerves 
issuing  from  the  spinal  cord  lower  down  form  the  tactual 
and  motor  nerves  of  the  rest  of  the  body. 

Nerve-terminals. — The  external  nerve-ends  in  the  several 
sense-organs  are  modified  and  arranged  in  various  ways  so  as 
to  react  in  answer  to  their  appropriate  excitants.  13 ut  it  is 
not  yet  agreed  among  physiologists  how  far  specialization  in 
the  structure  of  the  different  parts  of  the  nerve-apparatus  is 
required  in  order  to  respond  to  the  different  forms  of  sensori- 
stimuli. 


46  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


Sensori-motor  action. — The  ordinary  process  of  movement 
in  response  to  sensations  then  is  of  this  kind.  An  impression, 
c.f^.,  tactual,  gustatory,  or  visual,  wrought  upon  the  end-organ 
of  an  afferent  nerve,  is  transmitted  in  some  form  of  motion  to 
a  centre  in  the  brain.  When  it  arrives  there  a  sensation  is 
awakened.  This  state  of  consciousness  now  produces  an 
impulse  which  flows  back  along  a  motor  nerve  and  causes 
some  movement.  Thus,  if  a  man  treads  on  my  foot,  I  pull  it 
awa}^  even  involuntarily. 

Reflex-action. — A  simpler  form  of  motor-reaction,  however, 
is  exhibited  in  reflex -movement.  Here  the  impression  is  reflected 
back  along  a  motor  nerve  from  the  spinal  cord  or  some 
inferior  centre  before  reaching  the  great  terminus  in  the 
brain,  and  there  is  an  appropriate  movement  in  response  to 
the  stimuli  without  the  intervening  conscious  sensation. 
Thus,  tickling  the  sole  of  the  foot  causes  convulsive  movement 
even  after  the  spine  has  been  broken  and  conscious  sensibility 
has  been  extinguished  in  the  lower  part  of  the  body. 

Properties  of  Sensation :  Quality,  Intensity, 
Duration. — The  most  prominent  feature  by  which 
sensations  of  the  same  or  different  senses  are  dis- 
tinguished from  each  other,  is  that  of  quality.  The 
sensations  of  sound  are  thus  of  a  generically  different 
quahty  from  those  of  smell,  while  the  feeling  of  blue 
is  of  a  specifically  distinct  quality  from  that  of  red. 
These  states  ma}^  also  vary  in  tone,  or  pleasurable- 
ness  and  painfulness. 

Besides  differing  in  quality,  sensations  may  also 
vary  in  intensity,  and  duration.  By  the  intensity  of 
a  sensation  is  understood  its  vividness,  its  greater 
or  less  strength  in  consciousness.  The  degree  of 
intensity  depends  partly  on  the  force  of  the  objective 
stimulus,  and  partly  on  the  vigour  of  attention. 
The  duration  of  a  sensation  means  obviously  the 
length  of  time  during  which  it  persists  in  existence. 
This  is  determined  mainly  by  the  continuance  of 
the  stimulus.     The  duration  of  the  sensation  is  not. 


SENSATION. 


47 


however,  always  either  equal  to  or  simultaneous 
with  that  of  the  stimulus.  A  certain  brief  interval 
is  always  required  between  the  irritation  of  the 
organ  and  the  birth  of  the  mental  state,  and  the 
latter  continues  for  a  shorter  or  longer  period  after 
the  cessation  of  the  former.  A  certain  lapse  of 
time  is  consequently  necessary  between  two  succes- 
sive excitations  in  order  that  there  be  two  distinct 
sensations.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  sight,  if  the  action 
of  the  stimulus  be  repeated  oftener  than  five  times 
in  the  second,  it  ceases  to  be  apprehended  as  a 
series  of  separate  events,  and  instead,  one  con- 
tinuous sensation  is  aroused.  The  ear  can  distin- 
guish as  many  as  fifteen  successive  vibrations  in  the 
second,  while  the  recuperative  power  of  taste  and 
smell,  after  each  excitation,  is  far  lower  than  that 
of  sight. 

Composite  stimuli. — It  is  erroneous,  however, 
to  speak  of  the  continuous  sensation  produced  by 
these  repeated  excitations  as  a  CGinpound  sensation 
arising  from  the  combination  of  a  number  of  simple 
sensations.  It  is  only  by  an  inaccurate  metaphor 
that  unextended  mental  states  can  be  described  as 
blending,  or  mixing,  after  the  manner  of  liquids  or 
gases ;  and  there  is,  moreover,  nothing  to  show  that 
the  supposed  constituent  elementary  states  ever 
came  into  existence.  The  simplest  and  briefest 
sensation  has  for  its  physical  condition  a  neural 
process,  divisible  into  parts ;  it  would,  however,  be 
absurd  to  speak  of  it  as  composite,  on  this  account. 
In  the  case  of  a  continuous  sensation  of  sound,  or 
colour,  arising  from  an  intermittent  stimulus,  the 


SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


physical  and  physiological  conditions  may  be  more 
complicated,  but  the  mental  state  felt  to  be  simple 
must  be  described  by  the  psychologist  as  such.^ 

Somewhat  similarly,  in  the  case  of  touch,  a 
certain  interval  of  space,  variable  in  different 
portions  of  the  body,  must  exist  between  the  parts 
of  the  organism  affected  by  two  stimuli,  m  order 
that  these  may  be  felt  as  distinct.  The  capacity  of 
sensation  for  variation  in  intensity  and  duration  has 
suggested  in  recent  times  the  attempt  to  secure 
exact  quantitative  measurement  of  mental  pheno- 
mena, and  the  title  of  Psycho  physics  has  been 
allotted  to  this  line  of  investigation. 

Cognitive  character  of  Sensation — The  features 
hitherto  described,  including  even  pleasantness  or 
painfulness,  are  merely  aspects  or  accidental  pro- 
perties of  sensation.  Its  essential  nature  lies  in  its 
cognitive  quality.  The  intensity,  duration,  and 
emotional  tone  of  a  sensation,  exist  only  as  they  are 
known.  They  are  of  a  variable  and  adjectival 
nature.     They  determine   and   modify,  but  they  do 

2  The  "objective  "  analysis  of  mental  states  by  Mr  Spencer  and 
M.Taine  is  thus  illusory.  If  states  which  consciousness— the  only 
possible  witness  concerning  such  facts — declares  to  be  simple,  are 
to  be  reduced  to  units  of  the  character  of  nervous  shocks,  because 
the  action  of  the  physical  agent  is  of  a  composite  character,  then  we 
certainly  cannot  stop  at  the  feeling  of  a  "  shock,"  as  the  unit.  The 
briefest  and  simplest  sensation  of  the  colour  of  violet,  which  involves 
between  six  and  seven  hundred  billions  of  vibrations  in  the  second, 
must  be  resolved  into  an  incredible  number  of  unconscious  units  of 
consciousness,  for  the  existence  of  none  of  which,  of  course,  is  there 
any  evidence  A  knowledge  of  the  physical  conditions  of  mental 
states  is  valuable,  but  conscious  elements  affirmed  to  be  simple  by 
introspection,  must  be  accepted  as  such  by  the  psychologist. 
"Mental  facts,"  as  Mr.  Mark  Baldwin  urges,  "are  simple  states, 
and  they  are  nothing  independently  of  the  mind  whose  states  they  are." 
(Cf.  Senses  and  Intellect,  pp.  gS— io6;  also  Dr.  Mivart,  Nature  and 
Thought,  2nd  Edit.,  pp.  89—92.)    See  also  pp.  510—512,  below. 


SENSATI0>^.  4q 


not  constitute  the  essence  of  a  sensation.  A  sensa- 
tion is  in  itself  an  elementary  mode  of  consciousness 
of  a  cognitional  character.  Knowledge,  however, 
may  have  reference  either  to  extra-organic,  or  to 
intra- organic  objects  and  events.  We  may  be 
cognizant  of  something  other  than  ourselves,  or  of 
the  states  of  our  own  sentient  organism,  and  different 
censes  stand  higher  and  lower  in  regard  to  these 
different  fields.  In  sight,  in  the  muscular  sense,^ 
and  in  the  tactual  sensations  of  pressure,  knowledge 
of  external  reality  is  the  prominent  feature ;  in 
hearing,  taste,  smell,  and  the  organic  feelings,  the 
sensation  is  a  cognition,  which  originally  bore  a 
subjective  character.  In  the  case  of  these  latter 
faculties,  the  pleasurable  or  painful  aspects  of  sensa- 
tions frequently  rise  to  great  importance ;  and  on 
some  occasions  the  sensation  becomes  mainly  a 
cognition  of  pain,  or,  more  rarel}^  of  pleasure. 

Sensation  and  Perception. — Tiiis  distinction  between  the 
objective  and  subjective  import  of  the  sentient  act  has  caused 
the  two  terms,  sensation  and  perception,  to  be  contrasted  witli 
each  other.  Sensation,  as  thus  opposed  to  perception,  is 
variously  defined  to  be,  tlie  modification  of  the  sense  viewed 
merely  as  a  subjective  state,  the  consciousness  of  an  affection 
of  the  organism,  or  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain  awakened 
by   the   stimulus.      Perception^  is    described   as   the  objective 

"  This  term  is  used  to  denote  the  power  of  experiencing  sensa- 
tions of  resistance  or  impeded  energy  and  movement.  Its  nature 
will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 

^  The  word  perception,  or  rather,  the  Latin  verb  percipere,  was 
originally  used  in  a  wide  sense  to  denote  any  form  of  apprehension 
or  comprehension,  whether  sensuous  or  intellectual.  Later  on.  it 
became  limited  to  sensuous  apprehension,  and  was  employed  by 
Reid,  in  contrast  to  the  term  sensation,  to  designate  the  sensuous 
cognition  of  something  as  external  to  us.  Sensation  originally  meant 
the  process  of  sensuous  apprehension  considered  as  revealing  to  us 
both  itself  as  a  subjective  state,  and  the  objective  quality  to  which 
it  corresponded.     By  Reid  it  was  confined  to  the  former  significa- 


50  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


knowledge,  the  apprehension  of  external  reality  given  in  the 
sentient  act ;  or,  as  the  act  by  which  we  locahze  or  project  a 
sensation  or  cluster  of  sensations,  actual  and  possible,  into 
the  external  world.  . 

This  separation  of  the  two  terms  is  convenient  for  bring- 
ing out  the  difference  between  the  developed  form  of  cognition 
exhibited  by  sense  in  mature  life,  and  the  vague  kind  of 
apprehension  afforded  in  the  earlier  acts  of  the  sentient 
powers  :  but  the  distinction  is  one  of  degree,  not  of  kind.  In 
the  most  rudimentary  sensations  of  pressure  and  of  colour, 
there  is  a  cognition  of  something  other  than  self,  and  though 
rude  and  indefinite  in  character,  this  is  still  an  act  of  objective 
kTiowledge.  Consequently,  there  is  already  here  perception, 
in  the  modern  signification  of  the  term.  This  vague  act 
receives  exacter  definition  as  we  advance,  and  in  later  years 
the  quality  perceived  by  the  sense  is  cognized  as  situated  in 
a  determinate  place,  and  accompanied  by  other  qualities. 
Such  further  determinations,  are,  however,  the  result  of  other 
sensations,  and  if  no  one  of  them  revealed  external  reality  to 
us,  the  aggregate  could  not  do  so.  This  subject  will  be  better 
understood  when  we  come  to  treat  of  the  nature  of  Perception. 
Some  writers  define  Sensation  as  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or 
pain  attached  to  an  act  of  sensuous  apprehension,  but  very 
few,  if  any,  adhere  consistently  to  this  interpretation.  When, 
for  instance,  the  sensations  of  the  different  senses  are  spoken 
of,  and  their  various  properties,  quality,  intensity,  tone,  dura- 
tion, and  the  rest,  are  described  by  psychologists,  sensation 
does  not  mean  the  pleasurable  or  painful  aspect  of  certain 
mental  states,  but  these  states  themselves.  It  is  only  when 
used  in  this  narrow  signification,  as  a  feeling  of  pleasure  or 
pain,  that  sensation  and  perception  can  be  held  within  certain 
limits  to  stand  in  an  inverse  relation  to  each  other.^ 

tion.and  thus  explained  :  "The  agreeable  odour  (of  a  rose)  which, 
I  feel,  considered  by  itself  without  relation  to  any  external  object, 
is  merely  a  sensation.  Perception  has  always  an  external  object, 
and  the  object  in  this  case  is  that  quality  in  the  rose  which  I  discern 
by  the  sense  of  smell."  The  later  sensationalists  {e.s;;.  Mr.  Sully, 
Outlines,  c.  vi.),  inverting  the  doctrine  of  Reid  and  Hamilton,  that 
perception  is  the  apprehension  of  a  real  external  quality,  describe 
this  act  as  an  ejection  or  projection  out  of  the  mind  of  a  sensation 
carrying  with  it  a  cluster  of  faint  representations  of  other  past 
sensations,  the  whole  being  "solidified"  or  "integrated"  in  the 
form  of  an  object.  On  the  terms  sensation  and  perception, 
cf.  Hamilton,  On  Reid,  Note  D,  also  Metapli.  Vol.  H.  93—97. 

5  Hamilton  explains  Reid  to  mean  by  perception.  "  the  objective 
knowledge  we  have  of  an  external  reality  through  the  senses  ;  by 
sensation,  the  subjective  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain  with  which  the 


SENSATION!.  51 

The  modification  of  a  sensuous  faculty  is  thus, 
in  its  simplest  form,  of  a  percipient  character,  and 
in  the  case  of  vision  and  touch,  the  sensation  from 
the  beginning  possesses  a  certain  objective  refer- 
ence. A  sensation  viewed  in  this  way  as  a  modifi- 
cation by  which  the  mind  is  made  cognizant  of  a 
material  quality  of  an  object,  was  called  by  the 
schoolmen  a  species  sensibilis. 

The  Scholastic  Doctrine  of  Species.— The  doctrine  of 
species  has  been  attacked  and  ridiculed  by  man}-  modern 
writers,  and  this  in  a  manner  which  sfiows  how  widespread 
and  profound,  even  amongst  students  of  philosophy,  is  the 
ignorance  regarding  the  most  familiar  terms  of  scholastic 
writers.  Democritus  and  Epicurus  formerly  taught  that  we 
know  objects  by  means  of  minute  representative  images  which 
stream  off  from  their  surface,  and  pass  into  our  soul  through 
the  channels  of  the  senses.  The  Latin  word  species,  meaning 
an  image,  was  used  by  their  Roman  disciples  to  signify  these 
volatile  images.  Aristotle  and  his  followers,  however,  rejected 
the  theory  of  a  physical  efflux  of  species,  and  taught  instead, 
that  objects  effected  modifications  in  the  mind  by  acting  on 
the  sense-organs  through  motions  in  the  intervening  media. 
The  term  species  was  later  on  employed  to  denote  these  modi- 
fications by  which  the  mind  is  made  to  apprehend  the  exterior 
object.  In  this  sense,  which  is  that  accepted  by  the  greatest 
philosophers  of  the  middle  ages,  such  as  St.  Thomas,  Albertus 

organic  operation  of  sense  is  accompanied,"  and  adopting  this  view 
he  enunciated  the  law  that  above  a  certain  point  the  stronger  the  sensa- 
tion the  iveakcr  the  perception,  and  vice  versa.  He  seeks  to  establish 
this  general  opposition  by  a  comparison  (a)  of  the  several  senses, 
and  {b)  of  different  impressions  within  the  same  sense.  Confined  to 
sensuous  apprehension,  the  formula  seems  to  be  approximately  true, 
although  it  is  pain  rather  than  pleasure  which  interferes  with 
cognition.  As  a  generalization  applicable  to  higher  intellectual 
forms  of  cognitive  activity,  it  does  not  hold.  Consciousness  is  not, 
as  Hamilton  seems  to  imply,  a  fi.xed  quantity  where  increase  in 
cognition  involves  decrease  in  feeling.  This  is  in  direct  opposition 
to  the  doctrine  adopted  by  Hamilton  himself  from  Aristotle,  that 
pleasure  is  a  reflex  of  mental  energy.  In  the  view  of  the  Greek 
philosopher,  keen  and  intense  pleasure  accompanies  vigorous 
intellectual  activity,  and  the  greatest  and  best  pleasure  is  the 
necessary  sequela  of  the  exercise  of  the  highest  form  of  cognitive 
energy.  (Cf.  Hamilton,  Metaph.  pp.  93 — 105.) 


52  ■  SENSUOUS    LIFE. 


Magnus,  and  Scotus,  the  species  is  not  an  entity  which  ha& 
immigrated  into  the  mind  from  the  object,  but  a  modification 
or  disposition  awakened  in  the  mind  by  the  action  of  the 
object.  They  teach,  moreover,  that  this  mental  modification 
is  not  what  is  primarily  perceived  in  the  act  of  simple  appre- 
hension. The  mind,  they  hold,  directly  tends  towards  the 
objective  reality;  and  only  by  a  reflex  or  concomitant  act  does 
it  cognize  the  mental  state  as  such.  With  them.  Species  non 
est  id  quod  primo  percipihir,  sed  id  quo  res  percipitur.  It  is  the 
medium  vel  principium  quo,  non  ex  quo,  res  cognoscitnr.  In  other 
words,  the  species  is  not  an  intermediate  representation  from 
which  the  mind  infers  the  object,  but  a  psychical  modification 
by  which  the  mind  is  lii^ened,  or  conformed,  to  the  object,  and 
thus  determined  to  cognize  it.° 

Intentionalis. — The  adjective  intentionalis  was  added  to  the 
term  species  to  signify  that  the  cognition,  though  truly  reflecting 
the  external  object,  does  not  resemble  it  in  nature.  The 
mental  modification  was  held  to  be  merely  a  psychical  or 
spiritual  expression  of  the  material  thing.  Resemblance  is  of 
many  kinds.  A  photograph,  or  a  statue,  is,  in  a  certain  sense, 
utteily  unlike  a  man  formed  of  flesh  and  blood;  the  blind 

^  If  the  primary  object  of  cognition  were  the  mind's  own  unex- 
tended  modification,  idealism  and  relativism  would  be  inevitable. 
"  Qnidam  posuerunt,  quod  vires,  quae  sunt  in  nobis  cognoscitivae 
nih  1  cognoscunt,  msx  proprias  passiones,  puta,  quod  sensus  non  sentit 
nisi  passionem  sui  organi,  et  secundum  hoc  intellectus  nihil  intel- 
ligit,  nisi  suam  passionem,  scilicet  speciem  intelligibilem  in  se 
receptam  ;  et  secundum  hoc  species  hujusmodi  est  ipsum  quod  intelli- 
gitur.  Sed  haec  opinio  manifeste  apparet  falsa  ex  duobus.  Primo 
quidem,  quia  eadem  sunt  quae  intelligimus,  et  de  quibus  sunt 
scientiae  ;  si  igitur  ea,  quoe  intelligimus  essent  solum  species  quae 
sunt  in  anima,  sequeretur  quod  scientiae  omnes  non  essent  de  rebus, 
quae  sunt,  extra  animam,  sed  solum  de  speciebus  inttlligibilibus  quae 
sunt  in  anima.  Secundo,  quia  sequeretur  error  antiquoruni  dicentium, 
omne  quod  videtur,  esse  verum  ;  et  similiter  quod  contradictoriae 
essent  simul  verae  ;  si  enim  potentia  non  cognoscit  ni^i  propriam 
passionem,  de  ea  solum  judicat  .  .  .  puta  si  gustus  non  sentit  nisi 
propriam  passionem,  cum  aliquis  habens  sanum  gustum  judicat  mel 
esse  dulce,  vere  judicabit;  et  similiter  si  ille,  qui  habet  gustum 
infectum,  judicet  mel  esse  amarum  vere  judicabit ;  uterque  enim 
judicabit  secundum  quod  gustus  ejus  aflicitur.  .  .  .  Et  ideo  dicen- 
dum  est  quod  species  intelligibilis  se  habet  ad  intellectum  ut  quo 
intelli£;it  intellectus.  .  .  . 

"  Sed  quia  intellectus  supra  seipsum  reflectitur,  secundum 
eandem  reflexionem  intelligit  et  suum  intelligere  et  speciem  qua 
intelligit.  Et  sic  species  intellecta  sccundario  est  id  quod  intelligitur. 
Sed  / J  ^7/oi  intelligitur /n/«c)  est  res  cujus  species  intelligibilis  est 
simiUtudo."  {Sum.  la.  q.  85.  a.  2.) 


SENSATION.  53 


man's  representation  of  a  circle  by  the  sense  of  touch,  is  very 
different  from  the  visual  image  of  the  same  figure  ;  the  intel- 
lectual ideas  aroused  by  the  words,  "equality,"  "colour,'^ 
"square,"  must  be  widely  divergent  from  both  the  image  and 
the  reality  to  which  they  correspond.  Yet,  in  spite  of  these 
unlikenesses,  there  exist  genuine  relations  of  similarity 
between  such  pairs  of  things  as  those  just  mentioned.  The 
scholastic  writers  adopting  this  view,  taught  that  our  know- 
ledge, although  in  itself,  as  a  mental  activity,  opposed  in 
nature  to  material  reality,  docs,  nevertheless,  truly  inirror  the 
surrounding  world.  They  held  that  though  neither  the  tactual 
nor  the  visual  image  resembles  in  nature  the  brass  circular 
substance  presented  to  the  sense,  yet  both  accurately  reflect 
and  are  truly  like  the  external  reality  ;  and  they  called  these 
mental  expressions  of  the  object  species  intcntioiuilcs. 

Species    sensibiles    et     intelligibiles. — Furthermore,    as    the 
schoolmen   held   the    human    mind    to   be   capable    of   two 
essentially  distinct  kinds  of  cognition,  sensuous  and  intellec- 
tual, they  termed  the  apprehensive  acts  of  the  former  species 
sensibiles,  of  the  latter  species  intelligibiles  vel  intellcctuales.     In   \ 
the  genesis  of  the  species  they  distinguished  two  moments  ci    1 
stages.     The  modification  of  the  sensuous  faculty,  viewed  as   1 
an  impression  wrought  in  the  mind    by  the  action  of   the 
object,  was  named  the  species  impvessa.     The  reaction  of  the 
mind    as    an    act    of    cognitive    consciousness    was    styled 
the  species  expressa.     The  latter  term  designated  the  sensation 
considered  as  a  completed  and  perfect  act  of  consciousness 
elicited  by  the  soul ;  the  former  indicated  the  earlier  stage  of    . 
the  process,  the  alteration  in  the  condition  of  the  mind  looked     \ 
at  as  an  effect  of  the  action  of  the  object."  The  species  proper,      ^ 
however,  whether  impvessa  or  expressa,  was  an  affection  of  the 
mind.     The  term    species  corporal  is  was    sometimes  used   to 
signify  the  physical  impression  or  movement  produced  by  the 
object  in  the  organism,  but  the  strict  meaning  of  the  word 
species,  and  the  only  meaning  of  the  term  species  intentionalis, 
was  the  mental  state.     Thus,  neither  the  image  of  the  object 
depicted  on  the  retina  of  the  eye,  nor  the  nervous  disturb- 
ance propagated  thence  to  the  brain,  but   the  conscious  act 
finally  awakened,  was  held  to  be  the  true  species  or  species 
intentionalis. 

True  doctrine. — Rejecting  the  interpretation  of  the  species 
as  roving  images,  and  every  theory  conceiving  them  as  repre- 
sentations mediating  between  the   object  and  the  cognitive 

"^  The  existence  of  the  species  impvessa  ]"  proved  by  the  fact  of 
memory.  That  the  alteration  or  modification  wrought  in  the  soul  by 
the  act  of  perception  must  persist  in  some  form,  is  established  by 
the  facility  of  representation  and  recognition 


54 


SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


faculty,  the  thought  embodied  in  the  doctrine  is  thoroughly 
sound.  Unless  we  are  prepared  to  maintain  that  our  soul 
is  born  with  all  its  future  knowledge  ready  made,  and  wrapped 
up  in  innate  ideas,  we  must  allow  that  the  physical  world 
does  somehow  or  ether  act  on  our  faculties,  and  that  our 
perceptions  are  due  to  the  influence  of  material  objects  upon 
us.  The  mind  does  not  determine  all  its  own  modifications, 
and  the  strongest  volition  is  unable  to  make  the  deaf  man 
hear  a  word,  or  the  blind  man  see  a  colour.  But  this  is  to 
admit  that  the  faculty  is  stirred  into  conscious  life  and 
informed  by  dispositions  wrought  in  it  by  the  perceived  object. 
Further,  unless  we  are  ready  to  adopt  the  position  of  absolute 
scepticism,  we  must  hold  that  knowledge  does  somehow 
correspond  to  reality.  There  is  not  a  merely  arbitrary  con- 
nexion between  the  object  and  its  apprehension.  The  latter 
is  a  true,  though  psychical  expression  of  the  former.  This 
subject  will  be  more  fully  dealt  with  hereafter,  but  we  have 
said  enough  to  justify  the  doctrine  of  species  iutentionales,  as 
understood  by  St.  Thomas,  and  the  leading  philosophers  of 
the  school.^  The  modern  writer  may  prefer  to  describe  the 
perception  of  a  triangle  as  a  modification  of  the  mind 
mirroring  or  reflecting  in  terms  of  consciousness  the  external 
object,  but  this  is  only  the  old  doctrine  in  other  phraseology. 

Experimental  Psychology.     Psycho-physics.— 

The  ineasuremcnt  of  mental  states. — If  one  ounce  be  added 
to  a  weight  of  three  ounces  placed  on  our  hand  resting 
upon  the  table,  \ve  can  just  distinguish  the  new  sensa- 
tion from  the  old.  A  single  voice  also  makes  a  per- 
ceptible increase  in  the  sound  when  added  to  a  musical 
trio.  If,  however,  we  add  a  single  unit  to  a  weight  of 
thirty  ounces  or  to  a  chorus  of  twenty  voices,  no 
difference  can  be  felt.  By  observing  and  comparing 
sensations  produced  by  stimuli  varying  in  intensit}',  a 
German  physiologist,  Weber  (1834),  showed  that  the 
incvemcnt  necessary  to  he  added  to  a  given  stimulus  in  order  to 
awaken  a  sensation  consciously  distinguishable  from  the  former 

^  Kven  Hamilton  confounds  the  maintenance  of  species  with  the 
doctrine  of  mediate  perception,  and  so  looks  on  St.  Thomas  and  the 
great  body  of  the  schoolmen  as  representationalists  or  hypothetical 
realists.  (Cf  On  Reid,  Note  M,  pp.  852 — 857.)  The  passage  cited 
from  St.  Thomas,  p.  52,  refutes  the  charge.  For  a  full  treatment  of 
the  subject,  see  Sanseverino,D)';/</;»i7o^'^w,  pp.  390 — 400;  Pesch,  Instit. 
Psych.  %  472;  Boedder,  Psych.  Rationalis,  H  255 — 260;  Schiffini, 
Psychologia,  §  302. 


SENSATION. 


55 


sensation  varies  with  the  force  of  the  former  stiniuhis.  Thus, 
if  d  represent  the  minimum  increment  that  must  be 
added  to  a  stimulus  of  the  force  Z  in  order  to  be  felt, 
there  will  be  needed  an  increment  of  2  ^  to  a  stimulus 
of  2  Z  to  be  perceived,  and  in  general  nd  must  be 
added  to  n  Z  to  cause  the  minimum  appreciable 
difference  in  the  resulting  sensation.  In  other  words, 
the  minimum  appreciable  increment  in  a  physical  stimulus  bears 
a  constant  ratio  to  that  stimulus,  though  this  ratio  dilfeis 


for  several  senses.  This  ratio,  |,  is  found  by  some 
observers  (though  others  give  different  results)  to  be  in 
sensations  of  light  yj^-,  in  muscular  sensations  j\-,  in 
sensations  of  pressure,  of  warmth,  and  sound  J.  The 
generalization  has  been  called  Weber's  Law. 

Continuing  Weber's  investigations,  Fechner  (1S61) 
formulated  the  law  in  a  more  complete  shape.  His 
main  object  was  to  find  some  fixed  unit  by  which  to 
measure  sensations.  He  believed  l.e  had  discovered 
■such  a  unit  in  the  least  observable  difference  between  two 
sensations.  This  he  supposes  to  be  a  constant  quantity 
for  the  same  sense,  whatever  be  the  intensity  of  the 
sensations,  excluding  extreme  limits.  Any  sensation  of 
intensity  N  may  be  conceived,  he  held,  as  equivalent  to 
N  of  these  units,  and  may  according  be  mathematically 
■calculated  in  terms  of  the  stimulus. 

To  take  an  example:  "If  stimulus  A  just  falls  short  ot 
producing  a  sensation,  and  if  r  be  the  percentage  of  itself 
which  must  be  added  to  it  to  get  a  sensation  which  is  barely 
perceptible — call  this  sensation  i — then  we  should  have  the 
series  of  sensation-numbers  corresponding  to  their  several 
stimuli,  as  follows : 

Sensation  o  —  stimulus  A 
Sensation  i  =  stimulus  A  (i+r) 
Sensation  2  =  stimulus  A  {i  +  r)^ 
Sensation  3  —  stimulus  A  (i  +rf 

Sensation  n  =  stimulus  A  (i  +  r)  n 

The    sensations    here    form    an    arithmetical    series,  and    the 

.stimuli  a  geometrical    series.  ...  So  that  we  may  truly  say 

(assuming  our  facts  to  be  so  far  correct)  that  the  sensations 

vary  in  the  same  proportion  as  the  logarithms  of  their  respective 

.stimuli.     And   we   can   thereupon   proceed   to   compute   the 


56  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


number  of  units  in  any  given  sensation  (considering  the  unit 
of  sensation  to  be  equal  to  the  just  perceptible  increment 
above  zero,  and  the  unit  of  stimulus  to  be  equal  to  the 
increment  of  stimulus  r,  which  brings  this  about)  by  multi- 
plying the  logarithm  of  the  stimulus  by  a  constant  factor 
which  must  vary  with  the  particular  kind  of  sensation  in 
question.     If  we  call  the  stimulus  R  and  the  constant  factor 

C,  we  get  the  formula : 

S  =  C  Log.  R. 

which  is  what  Fechner  calls  the  Psychophysisclie  Maas- 
foriuci:''-^  The  outcome,  accordingly,  of  these  investigations 
is  sunnned  up  in  the  so-called  psycho-physical  law:  To  increase 
the  intensity  of  a  sensation  in  arithmetical  progression,  e.g.,  as 
I,  2,  3,  4,  the  stiniiilus  must  be  increased  in  geometrical  progression, 
e.g.,  as  I,  2,  4,  8,  or,  the  sensation  increases  as  the  logarithm  of 
the  stimulus. 

The  absolute  sensibility  of  an  organ,  or  part  of  an 
organ,  is  measured  by  the  minimum  perceptible 
stimulus,  or  that  which  just  rises  above  the  threshold  of 
consciousness. ^^^  The  absolute  sensibility  of  the  skin  to 
tactual  pressure  varies  in  different  parts  from  -002  to 
•015  of  a  gramme;  the  absolute  sensibility  of  the  skin 
to  changes  of  temperature  varies  from  -2°  to  -9°  Centi- 
grade, the  skin  being  about  30°  Cent. ;  that  of  hearing  is 
the  sound  of  a  ball  of  cork,  i  milligramme  weight, 
falling  on  a  vibrating  plate  from  a  height  of  i  milli- 
metre, at  a  distance  of  91   mm.  from  the  ear;  that  of 

9  James,  Vol.  I.  pp.  538,  539. 

''"This  "absolute  sensibility"  is  ascertained  by  gradually 
increasing  an  imperceptible  stimulus,  or  by  diminishing  a  clearly 
perceptible  one  till  it  just  reaches  the  margin.  Similarly,  the 
minimum  observable  difference  can  be  obtained  either  by  starting  with 
two  equal  stimuli  and  progressively  unequalizing  them,  or  by 
begnining  with  easily  distinguishable  stimuli  and  reducing  the 
difference  until  they  are  barely  discernible.  To  eliminate  the  errors 
incidental  to  such  delicate  appreciations,  the  experiments  are  multi- 
plied and  combined  in  various  ways,  and  also  corrected  by  the 
ordinary  scientific  methods  of  measurement  such  as  that  of  average 
errors  or  that  of  correct  and  mistaken  cases.  Thus,  if  two  stimuli  differ 
by  less  than  the  minimum  observable  difference,  true  and  false  guesses 
as  to  which  is  the  stronger  tend  to  be  about  equal ;  but  as  soon  as 
the  difference  begins  to  exceed  the  minimum  limit,  the  correct 
judgments  rapidly  exceed  those  which  are  erroneous.  (See  E. 
Scripture,  The  Neiu  Psychology,  c.  iii.;  Ladd.  op.  cit.  p.  3O4;  James. 
ibid.  Vol.  I.  pp.  540,  541.) 


SENSATION.  57 


sight,  the  ^  Jy  of  the  Hght  reflected  by  white  paper  under 
the  full  moon.  11 

When  the  stimulus  has  reached  a  certain  intensity, 
further  increase  produces  no  appreciable  difference  in 
the  sensation.  This  maximum  stimulus  measures  the 
Jieight  of  sensibility  of  the  sense;  and  the  interval  between 
the  threshold  and  this  point  has  been  termed  the  range  of 
the  sensibility  of  the  sense. 

Criticism. — The  professed  object  of  this  line  of 
investigation  is  to  introduce  quantitative  measurement 
into  Phenomenal  Psychology,  and  so  to  reduce  this 
branch  of  mental  philosophy  to  the  condition  of  an 
exactscience.  Now,  whilst  we  readily  admit  that  great 
care  and  ingenuity  has  been  exhibited  in  carrying  out 
these  experiments,  and  that  many  of  the  facts  established 
are  curious  and  interesting,  we  believe  that  the  advocates 
of  Psycho-physics  mistake  and  seriously  exaggerate  the 
value  of  that  branch  of  study. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  objected  that  the 
fundamental  assumption  on  which  Fechner's  scheme  of 
measurement  rests  is  untenable.  The  so-called  least 
observable  differences  of  sensation,  or  more  correctly  the 
Judicial  acts  by  which  we  discriminate  barely  distinguish- 
able impressions,  are  not  constant  equal  quantities  of 
consciousness.  Still  less  can  it  be  proved  that  every 
sensation  is  a  definite  multiplication  of  such  units. i' 

2.  Next,  it  is  only  a  small  part,  and  that  the  lowest 
and  most  unimportant  part  of  mental  life,  that  can  be 
at  al  approached  by  the  instruments  of  this  science. 
Emotions,  volitions,  and  all  intellectual  processes  are 
obviously  beyond  the  reach  of  any  form  of  quantitative 
me  surement.  Even,  then,  if  psycho-physics  had 
attained  the  utmost  hopes  of  its  supporters,  and  if 
— what  appears  equall}^  unlikely — these  supporters 
became  agreed  as  to  their  results,  our  knowledge  of 
mental  life  would  not  really  be  thereby  much  advanced. 

3.  Again,  there  may  be  raised  an  objection   against 

11  Unfortunately  the  figures  given  by  different  observers  vary. 

'-  Cf  Ladd,  ihld.  pp.  361,  362;  Lotze,  MdapJiysic,  §§  25S,  259; 
James,  ibid.  p.  54G.  On  the  other  side,  cf  Wundt,  Hiiiuan  and 
Animal  Psycholvvy  (Eng. Trans.),  pp.  20— Co. 


58  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


the  conclusions  of  psychophysicists  even  within  the  re- 
stricted sphere  of  sensational  consciousness,  an  objection 
which  strikes  at  the  possibility  of  any  kind  of  quanti- 
tative estimate  of  mental  phenomena.     An  assumption, 
involved  in  all  Fechner's  experiments,  and  lying  at  the 
root  of  his  chief  psychological  law,  implies  that  while 
sensation  increases  in  quantity  or  intensity,  the  quality 
remains    unaffected.       A    locomotive    of    twenty-horse 
power  can  drag  a  load  twice  as    heavy  as  an   engine 
of  ten-horse  power.     The  force  exerted  in  such  a  case 
may   be  rightly  described    as    double  in   quantity  yet 
similar    in    quality.     But   we    can    hardly   say  this    as 
regards  the  energies  of  mental  life.     Sensations  of  light, 
sound,  temperature,  and  the  rest,  increased  in  intensity, 
do  not  appear  to  preserve   the  same   (pality   of  con- 
sciousness.    The  transition  from  black  to  white,  from 
hot  to  cold,  from  the  trickling  of   the  fountain  to  the 
roar   of    the   waterfall,    is    not    merely    a    variation   in 
quantity.        In    small     increments,    the    alteration    in 
quality    may   escape    notice,   but   when    the    effects   of 
large    changes    in    the    degree    of    the    stimulus    are 
compared,    introspection    seems   to   affirm    changes    of 
quality  as  well  as  of  quantity. 

4.  Finally,  these  difficulties  are  reinforced  by  serious 
attacks  from  careful  observers,  who  question  the  truth 
of  the  alleged  results  on  the  evidence  of  direct  experi- 
ence. Thus,  Hering,  for  example,  rejects  the  Weber- 
Fechner  generalization  on  the  grounds,  (a)  that  admit- 
tedly its  application  has  to  be  limited  to  a  very  narrow- 
range  above  and  below  normal  stimulation,  and  {b)  that 
it  is  completely  "  inapplicable  either  to  taste  or  smell, 
to  heat,  to  weight,  or  to  sound,  and  that  therefore  it 
has  not  the  character  of  a  general  law  of  sensibility."^-^ 

Interpretation  of  the  Weber-Fechner  Law. — Why,  it  may 

be  asked,  does  the  sensation  increase  more  slowly  than  its 

'^  Ribot,  La  PsycJwlope  AUcmandc,  p.  ig6.  Chapter  v.  of  that 
work  contains  a  good  reaumc  of  the  subject.  See  also,  Ladd's 
Physiological  r.\YcJio!of;y,  I't.  II.  c.  v.  The  reader  of  that  chapter  will 
notice  how  much  disagreement  prevails  regarding  the  figures.  Of 
scholastic  writers  on  this  subject,  see  Gutberlet,  Die  Psychologic, 
pp  34—41  ;  Mercier,  Psychologic,  pp.  148 — 154;  Farges,  L^  Cerveaii 
et  I'Aine,  pp.  209—226. 


SENSATION.  59 


objective  excitant  ?  Fechner  answers  that  his  f,'enerah;cation 
is  an  ultimate  law  describing  the  relation  between  physical 
stimuli  and  ps3xhical  reaction,  or  between  body  and  soul. 
The  intensity  of  the  nervous  change  transmitted  to  the  brain 
increases,  he  supposes,  in  direct  proportion  to  the  physical 
stimulus,  but  the  sensation  only  in  proportion  to  the  logarithm 
of  the  latter.  It  must,  therefore,  be  conceived  as  an  ultimate 
psycho-physical  law  for  which  no  further  explanation  can  be 
demanded. 

Others  give  2i  physiological  interpretation  to  the  generaliza- 
tion of  the  facts  in  so  far  as  this  holds  good.  It  is,  they 
assert,  not  an  ultimate  expression  of  the  relation  betweeia 
mental  and  material  action,  but  a  law  describing  the  relations 
between  the  external  physical  stimulus  and  the  nervous 
action  which  reaches  the  brain.  The  conscious  reaction  in 
this  view  increases  in  direct  proportion  to  the  intensity  of  the 
final  physiological  stimulus,  but  the  latter  increases  more 
slowly  than  the  physical  stimulus,  owing  to  the  augmentation 
of  resistance  and  friction  as  the  sphere  of  nervous  disturbance 
becomes  larger. 

Finally,  others  seek  to  explain  the  law  psychologically, 
maintaining  that  it  expresses  neither  the  relation  between  the 
physical  and  the  psychical  change,  nor  between  the  former 
and  physiological  action,  but  between  the  sensations  and  our 
powers  of  discriminating  them.  All  appreciation,  according 
to  these  writers,  is  relative  to  existing  states.  The  differences 
between  mental  states  have  their  value  determined  by  their 
relation  to  these  states,  diminishing  in  proportion  to  the 
intensity  of  the  latter. ^^ 

Whilst  the  reality  of  the  law  is  subject  to  such  serious 
dispute,  speculation  as  to  its  interpretation  appears  to  us 
neither  very  hopeful  nor  profitable,  but  the  physiological 
explanation  seems  to  give  a  sufficient  account  of  the  facts. 

Psychometry :  Reaction-time. — If  a  harpoon  be 
stuck  in  the  tail  of  a  whale  an  appreciable  interval 
elapses  before  the  tail  is  moved.  The  impression,  in 
fact,  requires  time  to  be  transmitted  along  an  affcvent 
nerve  to  the  whale's  brain  before  the  whale  becomes 
conscious  of  the  pain,  and  another  period  is  needed  for 
the  transmission  of  an  impulse  back  from  the  brain 
along  a  motov  nerve  to  set  the  tail  in  motion.  The 
whole  interval  is  called  reaction-time. 

A  similar  phenomenon  is  observed  in  the  case  of 

"  Cf.  Wundt,  i}}id.  pp.  59—64. 


6o  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


human  beings  in  regard  to  impressions  on  the  several 
senses.  In  recent  years  ingenious  psycho-metrical 
instruments  have  been  invented,  and  a  great  number 
of  elaborate  experiments  have  been  made  to  determine 
accurately  the  reaciioii-time  with  respect  to  different  kinds 
of  sensation.  The  general  plan  pervading  the  various 
methods  of  expermient  is  the  stimulation  of  some  sense- 
organ  to  v.-hich  the  subject  responds  by  a  sign  the 
instant  he  apprehends  the  sensation. ^'^  The  experiment 
can  be  varied  so  as  to  involve  simpler  or  more  complex 
operations.  Thus  the  subject,  who  is  blindfolded,  is 
asked  to  press  an  electric  button  as  soon  as  he  feels  a 
tap  on  either  knee,  whilst  a  finely  graduated  time- 
keeper measures,  to  the  one-hundredth  part  of  a  second, 
the  interval  between  the  tap  and  the  signal.  Next  he 
is  asked  to  press  the  button  only  when  the  right  knee  is 
tapped,  remaining  quiet  if  the  left  is  touched ;  or  he  is 
requested  to  signal  with  the  other  hand  if  he  feels  the 
sensation  in  his  left  leg.  The  act  of  choice  here  intro- 
duced considerably  lengthens  the  process.  Similar 
experiments  are  made  in  regard  to  the  time  occupied  in 
apprehending  and  discriminating  various  sensations  of 
colour,  sor.nd,  taste,  and  smell. 

Tlie  entire  process  between  the  impression  and  the 
motor  sign  has  been  analyzed  into  several  stages, 
amongst  vh'ch  the  following  may  be  easily  distin- 
guished:^^ (i)  The  excitation  of  the  end-organ  of  the 
sense  sufficiently  to  start  the  neural  change.  (2)  The 
conduction  of  this  neural  change  along  the  centripetal 
or  afferent  nerves  to  the  brain.  (3)  The  transformation 
of  the  sensory  impression  into  the  motor  impulse. 
(4)  The  transmission  of  this  motor  change  back  along 
efferent  nerves  to  the  appropriate  muscle.  (5)  The 
excitation  and  contraction  of  this  muscle  in  the  signalling 
action. 

Of  tliesc  stages  only  the  third  is  a  psycho-ph3sical 
event.  All  the  others  are  physiological,  and  as  their 
duration  can  be  approximately  determined  by  various 

^^  A  full  description  and  numerous  illustrations  of  these  various 
psycho-niclv'-'i]  machines  are  given  by  E.  Scripture,  op.  cit. 
^  '^  Cf.  I    dJ   '>p.  cit.  p.  470;  James,  op.  cit.  p.  88. 


SEMSA  TtON.  6t 


experiments  and  then  climinatccl,  the  lengtli  of  the 
strictly  psycho-physical  portion  of  the  whole  reaction, 
it  is  alleged,  may  be  estimated. 

Wundt  gives  as  average  total  reaction-time  of  a 
series  of  experiments,  for  impressions  of  sound,  0-128  of 
a  second;  for  light,  0*175;  for  touch  sensations,  o-i88. 
But  Exner,  Hirsch,  and  others  give  different  figures. 
Study  of  these  investigations  goes  to  prove  that  the 
reaction-time  varies  much  with  different  individuals. 
On  this  fact  is  based  the  "personal  equation"  of 
different  observers  which  have  to  be  taken  into  account 
in  certain  delicate  astronomical  observations.  Further, 
it  seems  clear  that  practice  shortens  the  reaction-time 
very  considerably,  and  that  expectant  attention  also 
diminishes  it.  On  the  other  hand,  fatigue  increases  it ; 
intensity  of  stimulus,  too,  causes  a  difference ;  the 
v/eather,  the  general  health  of  the  individual,  and  the 
nature  of  the  stimulus  also  modify  the  rapidity  of 
the  reaction. 

Many  writers  exhibit  a  laudable  enthusiasm  for  this 
new  department  of  investigation.  We  confess,  however, 
we  cannot  share  in  their  hopeful  expectations  of  psycho- 
logically valuable  future  results;  nor  does  the  character 
of  those  yet  reached  justif}^  the  very  roseate  anticipations 
entertained.  For  these  experiments  after  all  furnish 
physiological  rather  than  psychological  information.  They 
measure  the  speed  or  intensity  of  nervous  processes 
with  which  certain  mental  operations  may,  or  may  not, 
be  concomitant ;  but  they  throw  no  real  light  on  the 
quality  of  these  latter.  They  are  in  no  true  sense  a  record 
of  the  rapidity  of  thought,  and  if  employed  as  a  means  of 
measuring  intelligence  or  mental  development,  they  are 
utterly  misleading.  They  may  indeed  help  to  indicate 
the  delicacy  or  discriminative  sensibility  of  the  sense- 
organs  and  nervous  system,  but  the  extent  to  which  the 
reaction-time  can  be  shortened  by  a  little  practice  and 
other  slight  alterations  of  tlie  conditions  proves  what 
a  ver}^  insecure  standard  it  would  be  even  in  this 
respect.^'' 

^■^  Mr.    Sully    writes:    "Those    researches    show    that    mental 
capacity  in  general  grows  between  the  age  of  six  and  seventeen — at 


62  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


Readings. — On  the  physiology  of  the  nervous  system,  see  any  of 
the  elementary  text-books  of  Physiology.  Carpenter's  Mental  Physio- 
logy, c.  ii.,  and  R.  S.  Wyld's  Physics  and  Physiology  of  the  Senses, 
Pt.  IV.  treat  the  subject  well,  with  special  reference  to  Psychology. 
However,  by  far  the  best  and  most  exhaustive  work  on  the  physio- 
logical conditions  of  mental  life,  which  has  yet  appeared  in  English, 
is  Professor  Ladd's  Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology.  The  German 
reader  will  find  an  able  and  interesting  treatment  of  the  whole 
subject  of  sensation  by  Gutberlet,  Die  Psychologic,  pp.  12—48.  On  the 
history  of  the  terms  sensation  and  perception,  cf.  Hamilton,  Meta- 
physics, Vol.  II.  pp.  93 — 97,  and  Notes  and  Dissertations  on  Reid,  Note 
D.  The  subject  of  species  is  treated  in  all  the  Latin  manuals ; 
perhaps,  Sanseverino's  Dynamilogia,  pp.  373 — 403,  is  amongst  the 
best.  Suarez,  De  Anima,  Lib.  III.  cc.  2,  3,  discusses  the  matter  at 
length.  See  also  J.  Rickaby,  First  Principles,  pp.  8,  seq.  An  admir- 
able exposition  of  the  Scholastic  doctrine  of  intellectual  knowledge 
by  means  of  specks  is  contained  in  Kleutgen's  Philosophic  der  Vorzeit, 
U  18-52. 

first  quickly,  then  more  slowly,  &c."  [Teachers'  Handbook  of  Psychology, 
p.  94,  4th  Edit. ;  cf.  Scripture,  loc.  cit.  pp.  134,  169.)  The  value  of 
such  experixnents  as  a  standard  of  "  mental  capacity  "  is  evinced  by 
the  fact  that  the  reaction-time  of  a  pauper,  aged  77,  experimented 
on  by  Exner,  was  reduced  by  a  little  practice  from  0-9952  to  o  1866 
of  a  second  !  The  explanation  is  simple  enough.  The  "  mental 
capacity  "  of  the  old  man  was  pretty  much  the  same  at  the  end  as 
at  the  beginning  of  the  experiments,  but  his  nervous  apparatus  had 
acquired  the  "  knack  "  or  facility  of  reacting  in  less  than  one  fifth 
of  the  original  time.  Similarly,  children  may  exhibit  varying 
aptitudes,  inherited  or  acquired,  in  regard  to  such  operations,  as 
they  may  vary  in  their  power  of  acquiring  any  ordinary  reflex- 
action,  with  little  or  no  relation  to  their  intellectual  ability.  On 
the  whole  subject,  cf.  James,  Vol.  I.  c.  iii.  and  Ladd,  Part  II. 
c.  viii. 


CHAPTER    V. 

THE    SENSES. 

How  many  External  Senses  ? — A  group  ci 
sensations  containing  a  number  of  features  in 
common  are  assigned,  we  have  said,  to  a  special 
sense.  The  question  may  now  be  raised,  how  many 
senses  have  we  ?  There  has  been  a  good  deal  of 
disagreement  on  the  point  among  modern  writers, 
but  the  decision  arrived  at  does  not  seem  to  us  to 
be  of  very  much  importance,  provided  that  the 
various  forms  of  sensibility  be  recognized.  The 
specialization  of  the  organ,  the  nature  of  the 
stimulus,  and  the  quality  of  the  consciousness,  have 
each  been  advocated  as  the  true  principle  of  classi- 
fication, and  different  plans  have  consequently  been 
drawn  up.^     In  favour  of  the  old-fashioned  scheme 

^  Following  Kant,  Hamilton  styles  the  five  special  senses  the 
sensus  fixus,  and  adds  to  them  a  sixth  general  sense,  the  sensiis  vagus, 
common  feeling,  the  vital  sense,  or  aen^Fstiesis,  embracing  the  feelings 
of  temperature,  shuddering,  health,  muscular  tension,  hunger,  and 
thirst,  &c.  Dr.  Bain's  scheme  stands  thus:  a.  Muscular  sense. 
B.  Six  classes  of  organic  sensations:  (i)  of  muscle,  (2)  of  nerve, 
(3)  of  circulation  and  nutrition,  (4)  of  respiration,  (5)  of  temperature, 
(6)  of  electricity,  c.  The  five  special  senses.  G.  H.  Lewes  empha- 
sized the  importance  of  the  systemic  sensations,  e.g.,  feelings  of 
digestion,  respiration,  temperature,  circulation,  &c.  Mr.  Murray, 
who  adheres  consistently  to  distinction  of  organ  as  his  principle 
of  division,  gives  this  classification  :  I.  The  Five  Special  Senses. 
II.  General  Senses,    a.  Connected  with  a  single  organ:  (i)  muscular 


64  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


of  the  five  senses,  taste,  smell,  hearing,  sight,  and 
touch,  it  may  be  urged  that  it  recognizes  the  obvious 
structural  differences  of  organ,  to  a  great  extent  the 
most  marked  differences  in  the  quahty  of  the  con- 
sciousness, and  also  generic  differences  in  the 
phenomena  apprehended.  The  eye  reveals  to  us 
colours,  the  ear  sound,  the  nose  smell,  the  tongue 
taste,  and  touch  pressure.  In  the  language  of  the 
schools,  the  formal  objects  of  the  several  senses  are 
generically  different.  However,  if  this  classification 
be  adopted,  it  must  be  remembered  that  under  the 
sense  of  touch  are  comprised  many  groups  of  mental 
states  importantly  different  in  quality,  and  frequently 
attached  to  parts  of  the  organism  of  very  specialized 
character. 

Method  of  Exposition. — The  most  convenient 
order  of  procedure  will  be  to  start  from  the  simpler 
and  more  easily  described  faculties,  and  to  go  on 
gradually  to  those  of  a  higher,  more  varied  and 
complex  nature.  In  our  exposition  we  will  adopt 
the  usual  plan  of  saying  a  few  words  on  the  formal 
obj-ect  of  each  sense,  on  the  physiological  machinery 
employed,  and  on  the  character  of  the  consciousness 
awakened.  In  dealing  v/ith  this  last  phenomenon, 
which  is  the  proper  subject-matter  of  Psycholog}', 

sensations,  (2)  pulmonary  sensations,  (3)  alimentary  sensations. 
B.  General  sensations  not  confined  to  a  single  organ:  (i)  of  tem- 
perature, (2)  of  organic  injuries,  &c.,  (3)  of  electricity.  The  true 
principle,  however,  if  it  could  be  satisfactorily  applied,  would  be 
the  quality  of  consciousness.  Differentiation  of  organ  is  an  extrinsic 
physiological  consideration.  Still  the  difficulty  of  determining  how 
much  qual'.tative  difference  justifies  the  assumption  of  a  special 
s'.ose  renders  the  former  princiyli  of  little  value  once  we  depart 
from  th.e  old  scheme  oi  five  senses. 


THE   SENSES.  65 


the  two  chief  features  to  be  attended  to  are  what 
have  been  styled  the  emotional  and  the  intellectual 
aspects  of  the  sense.  By  the  former  is  meant,  the 
susceptibiHty  of  the  faculty  to  pleasure  or  pain ;  by 
the  latter,  its  efficiency  as  an  instrument  of  know- 
ledge of  the  external  world.  The  use  of  the  epithet 
*' intellectual,"  however,  is  very  inaccurate  here, 
and  still  more  so  when  applied  to  individual  sensa- 
tions. The  Intellect  is  a  faculty  essentially  distinct 
from  sensuous  powers,  and  its  activity,  just  as  that 
of  any  of  the  senses,  may  possess  a  pleasurable  or 
painful  character.  It  will  accordingly  be  more 
appropriate  to  term  this  property  of  a  sense  or 
sensation  its  cognitional  aspect. 

Taste.  —  Physiological  conditions.  —  The  formal 
object  of  the  sense  of  taste  is  that  quality  in  certain 
soluble  substances  in  virtue  of  which  they  are  called 
sapid.  The  organ  of  taste  is  the  surface  of  the 
tongue  and  palate.  Over  these  surfaces  are  dis- 
tributed the  gustative  papillce,  from  which  nerves 
proceed  to  the  brain.  In  order  to  excite  the  sensa- 
tion, the  body  to  be  tasted  must  be  in  a  state  of 
solution  in  the  mouth.  The  precise  nature  of  the 
action  of  the  sapid  substance  on  the  papillae  is 
unknown,  but  it  is  probably  chemical. 

Sensations. — The  sensations  of  this  faculty  do  not 
possess  such  definite  qualitative  differences  as  to 
fall  into  well-determined  groups,  and  consequently 
there  is  no  general  agreement  in  the  classification 
of  different  tastes.  The  proper  pleasure  of  the 
sense  is  sweetness;  its  proper  pain  bitterness.    Most 

F 


66  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


gustatory  sensations  involve  elements  of  tactual, 
nasal,  and  organic  feelings.  Thus,  acid,  alkaline, 
fiery,  and  astringent  tastes,  are  in  part  the  effects 
of  tactual  stimulation  ;  feelings  of  relish  and  disgust 
are  traceable  to  the  sympathy  of  the  alimentary 
canal ;  and  sensations  of  smell  also  influence  our 
estimation  of  the  sapid  qualities  of  many  substances. 
The  cognitional  value  of  this  sense  is  very  low.  Con- 
tinuous stimulation  rapidly  deadens  its  sensibility ; 
its  recuperative  power  is  tardy,  its  sensations  are 
wanting  in  precision,  and  they  can  be  but  very 
imperfectly  revived  in  imagination.  The  main 
grounds  of  its  cognitive  inferiority,  however,  lie  in 
its  essentially  subjective  character.  Abstracting 
from  the  information  afforded  by  concomitant 
tactual  sensations,  taste  originally  gives  us  no 
knowledge  of  external  reality,  and,  consequently, 
with  the  exception  of  the  vague  systemic  feelings 
of  the  organism,  it  must  be  ranked  lowest  as  a 
medium  of  communication  with  the  physical  world. 
On  the  other  hand,  viewed  from  the  standpoint 
of  feeling,  this  sense  is  capable  of  intense  but  short- 
lived pleasure  and  pain.  Though  the  lowest  of  our 
faculties  in  point  of  refinement,  and  the  most  subject 
to  abuse,  its  great  utility  as  a  guide  in  the  selection 
of  food  throughout  the  animal  kingdom  is  evident. 

Smell. — Physiological  conditions. — Odorous  par- 
ticles emitted  from  gaseous  or  volatile  substances 
constitute  the  appropriate  stimulus  of  this  sense. 
The  organ  of  smell  is  the  cutaneous  membrane 
lining  the  inner  surface  of  the  nose.    The  action  of 


THE  SENSES.  67 


the  odorous  substance  is  probably  of  a  chemical 
character,  and  the  simultaneous  inhaling  of  the  air 
is  requisite  for  the  production  of  the  sensation.  In 
the  act  of  inhalation  the  stimulating  particles  are 
drawn  through  the  nostrils  over  the  sensitive 
surface.  Even  the  strongest  smelling  substances 
are  not  perceived  as  long  as  we  hold  our  breath. 

Sensations. — This  sense  resembles  that  of  taste 
in  many  respects.  Vagueness  is  a  marked  feature 
of  each;  continuous  excitation  renders  both  obtuse; 
their  recuperative  power  on  the  cessation  of  the 
stimulus  is  weak;  and  both  are  originally  of  a  like 
subjective  character.  The  close  affinity  of  the  two 
faculties  is  exhibited  in  the  difficulty  of  determining 
how  far  the  recognition  of  a  particular  substance  is 
due  to  taste,  and  how  far  to  smell ;  and  in  the 
readiness  with  which  most  of  the  adjectives,  such 
as  sweet,  bitter,  pungent,  primarily  qualifying 
sensations  of  taste,  are  transferred  to  those  of 
smell.  The  attempt  to  distinguish  port  wine  from 
sherry,  apart  from  sight  and  smell,  is  a  familiar 
method  of  illustrating  the  former.  The  delicate 
susceptibility  of  smell  to  some  kinds  of  stimulation 
is,  however,  very  surprising.  The  merest  trace  of 
a  drop  of  oil  of  roses  awakes  a  pleasurable  feeling, 
and  as  infinitesimal  a  particle  as  the  one  thirty- 
millionth  part  of  a  grain  of  musk  is  perceptible. 
The  delicacy  of  this  faculty  in  the  dog  and  other 
brute  animals,-  as  is  well  known,  far  exceeds  what 

-  Cf.  Bernstein,  The  Five  Senses,  p.  290.  He  says  that  some 
animals  can,  when  the  wind  is  favourable,  scent  the  huntsman 
several  miles  away.  The  number  and  the  minuteness  of  the  volatile 
particles  which  proceed  from  objects  perceivable  at  such  distances 
pass  comprehension. 


68  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


it  attains  in  man.  Just  as  in  the  case  of  taste,  the 
sensations  of  smell  may  be  of  an  extremely  agree- 
able or  disagreeable  character.  They  stand  higher, 
however,  in  order  of  refinement.  They  are,  too, 
more  easily  revived  in  imagination ;  and,  being 
awakened  by  objects  at  a  distance,  these  sensations, 
like  those  of  sight,  assume  the  character  of  pre- 
monitory signs  of  other  future  experiences.  In  this 
way  the  sense  of  smell  comes  to  surpass  both  organic 
and  gustatory  sensations,  as  an  instrument  of  ex- 
ternal perception. 

Touch. — Under  the  generic  sense  of  touch  are 
comprised  a  variety  of  classes  of  feeHngs  widely 
different  from  each  other.  Consequently,  very  early 
in  the  history  of  Psychology,  we  meet  wdth  discus- 
sions as  to  whether  this  term  does  not  include  several 
specifically  distinct  senses.  Aristotle^  called  attention 
both  to  the  close  relationship  of  taste  with  touch, 
and  to  the  divergent  nature  of  sensations  of  tem- 
perature, of  softness  and  hardness,  and  of  contact 
proper.  It  would  certainly  seem  that  sensations 
of  temperature,  differing  so  much  in  quality  from 
those  of  touch  proper,  awakened,  moreover,  by 
distant  objects,  and  seated  either  in  different  nerves 
or  different  properties  of  nerve,  from  those  of  our 
tactual  feelings,  have  as  strong  claims  to  be  con- 
sidered the   utterances  of  a   separate  sense  as  our 

^  Aristotle,  in  the  De  Anima,  II.  11.  22 — 24,  holds  a  plurality  of 
senses  to  be  contained  under  the  generic  faculty  of  touch.  Else- 
where, in  the  De  Gen.  Animalium,  he  seems  to  adopt  the  monistic 
view.  St.  Thomas,  however,  prefers  to  look  on  these  sensations 
as  merely  differenv  classes  of  feelings  comprised  under  one  tactua. 
sense,  the  formal  object  of  which  has  not  received  a  definite  namel 
(Cf.  Sum.  i.  q.  78.  a.  3  ;  also  SchifTini,  Disp.  Mctaph.  Vol.  I.  p.  322.) 


THE  SENSES.  69 


gustatory  states.  Since,  however,  every  proposed 
subdivision  of  touch  into  separate  senses  appears 
open  to  grave  objections,  and  since  the  question  is 
really  of  no  very  great  importance,  the  most  con- 
venient plan  will  be  to  distinguish  and  describe 
separately  the  leading  modes  of  sensibility  included 
under  touch  in  its  widest  sense,  without  deciding 
whether  they  should  be  assigned  to  different  faculties. 
These  forms  of  consciousness  are :  (i)  the  organic 
sensations,  (2)  the  sensations  of  temperature,  (3)  touch 
proper,  and  (4)  the  muscular  sensations. 

The  Organic  Sensations,  Common  Sensibility, 
Ccenaesthesis,  or  the  Vital  Sense.— Under  these 
various  designations  are  included  the  numerous  modes 
of  sensuous  consciousness  attached  to  the  organism  as 
a  whole,  or  to  particular  portions  of  it.  Their  essential 
function  is  to  inform  us,  not  of  the  properties  of  the 
extra-organic  world,  but  of  the  good  or  ill  condition  of 
our  own  body.  Prominent  among  them  are  the  systemic 
sensations,  comprising  those  of  the  alimentary  canal, 
such  as  the  feelings  of  hunger,  of  thirst,  and  repletion, 
the  sensations  of  respiration,  of  circulation,  and  such 
other  states  as  are  normal  to  the  system.  In  addition 
to  these,  the  chief  remaining  organic  sensations  are 
those  arising  from  disease,  and  from  laceration  or 
fracture  of  any  part  of  the  organism.  Estimated  from 
a  cognitional  point  of  view,  the  organic  sensations  are 
of  little  importance.  With  the  exception  of  particular 
hurts,  they  are  of  an  indefinite  and  obscure  character. 
They  can  be  but  very  feebly  reproduced  in  imagination. 
Being  in  great  part  beyond  the  range  of  touch  and 
sight,  they  are  vaguely  and  imperfectly  localized,  and 
they  give  us  practically  no  information  regarding  the 
external    world.*     On   the   other   hand,    as   sources   of 

^  Common  sensibility  has,  however,  great  importance  from  an 
intellectual  standpoint  in  this  respect,  that  it  is  the  source  of  much 
error.  It  may  seriously  distort  men's  judgments.  Peace  and  war 
have  at  times  depended  on  the  Prime  Minister's  digestion. 


70 


SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


pleasure  and  pain,  they  possess  immense  influence  over 
the  tenour  of  our  existence,  and  they  are  of  the  greatest 
utihty  as  guardians  of  our  physical  health. 

Sense  of  Temipersiture.— Physiological  conditions.— 
Diffused  throughout  the  organism  as  a  whole,  yet 
specially  seated  in  the  skin,  the  sense  of  temperature 
has  claims  to  be  grouped  botli  with  the  organic  sensa- 
tions and  with  the  sense  of  contact  proper.  Some 
writers  have  maintained  that  our  consciousness  ot 
temperature  is  dependent  on  a  set  of  nerves  distinct 
from  those  employed  in  tactual  sensation.  This  is  not 
yet  absolutely  proved,  but  that  the  properties  of  the 
nerve-fibres  involved  are  completely  different^  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  either  class  of  feelings  may  be  almost 
entirely  suspended,  whilst  the  other  remains  compara- 
tivel}^  unaffected. 

Sensations. — As  our  consciousness  of  temperature  is 
relative  to  that  of  our  own  person,  this  sense  can  afford 
little  assurance  about  the  absolute  heat  or  coldness  of 
an  external  object.  When  the  environment  is  of  the 
same  temperature  with  that  of  the  part  of  our  body 
exposed,  we  are  unconscious  of  it.  If  we  pass  into  the 
chill  night  air  from  a  hot  room,  we  are  keenly  aware  of 
the  change,  but  even  before  the  skin  of  our  face  and 
hands  is  reduced  to  the  same  degree  of  warmth  as  the 
surrounding  atmosphere,  we  become  habituated  to  the 
stimulus,  and  consciousness  of  temperature  almost 
disappears.  It  has  been  found,  however,  that  wdthin 
a  moderate  range,  fine  variations  can  be  noticed  in 
comparing  the  temperatures  of  two  bodies ;  and  the 
hand  is  able  to  detect  a  difference  of  J  a  degree  Cent, 
in  two  vessels  of  water.  The  effect  of  heat  or  cold 
increases  with  the  extent  of  the  surface  exposed.  Thus, 
water  which  feels  only  comfortably  warm  to  the  hand 

''  Recent  ingenious  experiments  by  Goldscheider  and  other 
physiologists,  seem  to  show  not  merely  that  the  nervous  end- 
apparatus  of  temperature  sensations  differs  from  that  of  pressure 
and  of  pain,  but  even  that  there  are  in  the  skin  distinct  "  heat-spots  " 
and  "cold-spots"— minute  localities  sensitive  to  heat  but  not  to 
cold,  and  conversely.  This  appears  surprising  when  we  recollect 
that  to  the  physicist  heat  and  cold  are  purely  relative.  (Cf.  Ladd, 
op.  cit.  pp.  34^—350) 


THE  SENSES.  '  71 


or  arm,  may  cause  severe  pain  if  the  whole  person  is 
immersed.  In  extreme  heat  and  cold,  the  sensation  of 
temperature  proper  disappears,  and,  instead,  in  both 
cases,  a  like  feeling  of  keen  organic  pain  ensues.  In 
polar  voyages,  the  sailors  speak  of  cold  objects  burning 
their  hands.  Viewed  generally,  this  sense  is  of  little 
cognitive,  but  of  much  emotional  significance.  Its 
appropriate  pleasure  lies  in  moderate  warmth,  its 
specific  pain  in  extreme  heat  and  cold. 

Sense  of  Contact  or  Passive  Touch. — Physio- 
logical conditions. — The  organ  of  this  sense  consists  of  a 
system  of  papillcd  distributed  over  the  surface  of  the 
dermis,  or  under-skin,  which  covers  the  surface  of  the 
bod3\  Above  this  dermis  lies  the  cuticle  or  external  skin, 
which  acts  as  a  protection  for  the  papillae,  nerves,  and 
veins  lying  beneath.  From  the  papillae  proceed  nerve- 
fibrils  to  the  spinal  column  and  thence  to  the  brain. 
The  proper  stimulus  of  the  sense  of  touch  is  simple 
pressure  on  the  external  skin.  In  order  that  a  sensation 
be  awakened,  the  effect  of  the  physical  excitation  at 
the  surface  must  be  transmitted  along  a  sensory  nerve 
to  the  brain.  If  the  nerve  is  severed  above  the  point 
of  irritation,  no  mental  state  is  elicited,  and  if  an 
intersected  nerve  is  irritated  above  the  point  of  sever- 
ance, the  cause  of  the  sensation  aroused  is  judged  to  be 
at  the  old  peripheral  extremity.  From  this  it  has  been 
inferred  that  the  sensation  occurs  not  at  the  surface, 
but  in  the  brain  or  central  sensorium,  and  that  it  is  by 
experience  we  come  to  learn  the  seat  of  the  exterior 
impression.*^     If  this  doctrine  is  to  be  interpreted  as 

^  The  doctrine  that  the  true  seat  of  sensation  is  a  Hmited 
internal  centre  is  as  old  as  Aristotle.  (Cf.  St.  Thomas,  Comm.  De 
Anima,  II.  11.  22,  23.)  He  holds  there  that  the  heart  is  the  proper 
locus  of  tactual  sensation,  the  intervening  flesh  being  only  a  medium 
differing  from  the  air  or  other  external  media  by  the  fact  that  it  is 
not  an  accidental  but  a  connatural  instrument.  That  our  apparent 
consciousness  to  the  contrary  does  not  suffice  to  decide  the  question, 
he  shows  by  pointing  to  the  fact  that  if  a  covering  or  rigid  substance 
is  placed  between  the  skin  and  the  excitant,  we  then  localize  the 
sensation  at  the  outer  surface  of  the  new  tegument,  and  not  in  the 
skin.  In  the  De  Gen.  Animalium,  however,  he  seems  to  pass  into 
the  other  view.  (Cf.  also  P.  S.  Seewis,  Delia  Conoscenza  Sensitiva, 
pp.    368 — 372.)      Dr.  Stockl   is   among  the   most  distinguished   of 


72  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


implying  that  peripheral  stimuli  were  originally  localized 
by  us  in  the  brain,  or  that  the  soul  is  confined  within 
the  limits  of  the  brain  chamber,  and  that  the  action  of 
the  excitant  impinges  upon  it  there,  then  it  must  be 
rejected  as  warranted  neither  by  ph3'siological  nor 
psychological  evidence.  The  fact,  however,  may  be 
held  to  show  that  our  ability  to  localize  impressions 
is  very  largely  due  to  experience,  and  that  our  original 
capacity  in  this  respect  was  very  imperfect. 

The  physiological  process  which  is  the  proximate 
cause  of  sensation  contains  three  stages.  The  first  is 
the  peculiar  action  set  up  in  the  exterior  terminals  of 
the  nerves  of  the  various  senses.  The  specialization 
in  structure  and  constitution  of  these  apparatus,  which 
modern  Physiology  has  brought  into  prominence, 
demonstrates  the  significance  of  this  moment  in  the 
operation.  The  second  step  is  the  transference  of 
the  excitation  by  means  of  a  molecular  change  along 
the  nerve  to  the  brain.  Here  the  last  item  in  the 
physical  process  takes  place,  but  of  its  character  we 
know  virtually  nothing.  On  its  completion,  however, 
the  soul  which  animates  equally  every  part  of  the 
nervous  system,  and,  in  fact,  every  part  of  the  organism, 
reacts  in  the  form  of  a  conscious  sensation.  The 
quality  of  this  mental  state  is  affected  by  the  portion 
of  the  body  in  which  the  physiological  process  has 
taken  place ;  the  feeling,  for  instance,  of  an  impression 
on  the  leg  or  the  back  is  different  from  that  of  a  similar 
impression  on  the  arm.  Nevertheless,  the  sensation 
is  not  definitely  localized  from  the  beginning  at  the 
precise  spot  of  peripheral  stimulation ;  the  exact  site 
of  the  starting-point  of  the  neural  change  is  learned  by 
experience.  This  subject  will,  however,  be  discussed 
more  fully  in  a  future  chapter. 

Cognitional  Value  of  Touch. — The  sense  of  touch 
stands  very  high  as  a  medium  of  external  perception, 
•/et  its  sensations  possess  in  many  respects  the  vague- 


modern  scholastic  writers  who  support  the  view  that  sensation  is 
elicited,  not  in  the  external  parts  of  the  sense-organ,  but  in  the 
brain.  (Cf.  Empirische  PsycJwlogie,  §  6,  n.  12.) 


THE   SENSES.  73 


ness  and  want  of  precision  wliich  cliaracterize  the 
faculties  hitherto  dealt  with.  Thus  there  is  compara- 
tively little  variety  in  kind  among  our  tactual  feelings 
which  are  mainly  discriminated  as  rough,  smooth, 
gentle,  and  pungent.  They  possess,  however,  a  delicate 
sensibility  to  differences  in  the  intensity  and  duration 
of  the  stimulus,  and  still  more  important  in  this  con- 
nexion, they  are  endowed  with  fine  local  characters  on 
account  of  which  they  come  to  be  referred  with  great 
accuracy  to  the  place  of  excitation.  By  means  of  this 
property  the  mind  is  able  simultaneously  to  apprehend 
co-existing  points,  cognizing  them  as  separate ;  and  in 
this  apprehension  there  is  the  presentation  of  extended 
space.  The  simplest  form  of  tactual  sensation,  such  as 
that  of  the  contact  of  a  feather,  does  not  seem  to 
involve  the  feeling  of  pressure,  and  this  is  sometimes 
styled  the  sense  of  contact  proper,  but  it  scarcely 
passes  beyond  the  range  of  the  organic  sensations. 
The  vast  majority  of  our  sensations  of  contact  are 
sensations  of  pressure,  and  this  element  must  be 
included  under  the  sense  of  touch. 

Discriminative  Sensibility. — The  sensibility  of  the  skin 
to  purely  tactual  pressure  varies  in  different  parts  of 
the  body.  If  a  particular  point  on  the  hand  is  tested, 
we  can,  according  to  some  writers,  notice  the  difference 
between  two  successive  pressures  when  it  equals  the 
■^^th  of  the  original  weight.  Pressures  on  two  different 
hands  can  only  be  observed  when  one  exceeds  the  other 
by  "I.  The  capacity  of  touch  for  local  discrimination 
also  varies  in  different  parts  of  the  skin.  The  method 
of  experiment  adopted  by  Weber,  was  to  place  the 
two  points  of  a  pair  of  compasses  on  the  part  to  be 
examined,  and  then  to  widen  or  narrow  them  until  the 
two  points  could  be  just  felt  as  separate.  It  was  found 
that  along  portions  of  the  back  and  forearm  the  points 
of  the  compass  required  to  be  from  two  to  three  inches 
apart  in  order  to  be  distinguished,  whilst  on  the  tips  of 
the  fingers  and  the  tongue  an  interval  of  one  twelfth 
and  one  twenty-fifth  of  an  inch  sufficed.  The  spaces 
within  which  the  doubleness  of  the  stimulus  is  not 
observed  are  called  "sensory  circles,"  though  the  figure 


74  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


is  not  generally  an  exact  circle.  The  smallness  of  the 
circle  measures  the  perfection  of  the  sensibility. 

The  consciousness  of  mere  contact,  of  tactual 
pressure,  and,  with  some  writers,  that  of  temperature, 
comprise  the  feelings  which  should  be  grouped  under 
touch  proper.  There  are,  also,  a  few  other  special  modes 
of  tactual  sensation,  such  as  tickling,  and  itch,  which 
have  a  very  well  marked  character  of  their  own. 
Sensations  of  touch  cannot  be  very  vividly  reproduced 
in  imagination  ;  yet  the  reality  of  these  representations 
is  shown  by  our  power  of  comparing  a  present  sensation 
of  touch,  such  as  that  of  a  brush  or  piece  of  silk,  wdth  a 
recollected  experience,  and  also  by  the  manner  in  which 
ideal  sensations  of  touch  are  awakened  by  the  visual 
appearance  of  objects.  We  seem  io  see  the  roughness, 
smoothness,  or  softness  of  objects,  although,  of  course, 
these  properties  can  only  be  apprehended  by  touch. 
This  fact,  too,  marks  the  high  degree  of  associability 
possessed  by  these  sensations.  These  various  qualities 
of  the  sense  of  touch  give  it  great  importance  in  the 
department  of  objective  cognition.  We  have  not, 
however,  hitherto  laid  stress  on  the  fact  that  pressure, 
revealed  through  tactual  sensations,  is  an  influential 
agent  in  the  generation  of  our  conviction  of  the 
externality  of  the  material  world,  just  as  the  apprehen- 
sion of  co-existing  points  determines  our  assurance  of 
its  extension.  In  such  sensations  of  pressure  muscular 
feelings  are  often  implied,  and  though  passively  received 
impressions  of  contact  do  really  involve  the  apprehen- 
sion of  something  other  than  ourselves,  yet  it  is  when 
combined  with  the  muscular  sensations,  and  as  con- 
sequent on  the  effort  put  forth  by  our  own  energy,  that 
their  full  significance  in  the  apprehension  of  the  reality 
of  the  external  world  is  realized.  As  a  source  of 
pleasure  the  sense  of  touch,  apart  from  feelings  of 
temperature  and  other  organic  states,  ranks  low.  It 
has,  however,  been  selected  from  the  beginning  as  the 
sense  most  convenient  for  the  intiiction  of  chastisement, 
and  its  capacity  in  this  respect  is  indisputable. 

Active  Touch. — The  muscular  or  kinesthetic  sensa- 
iions. — Sensations   of  pressure  are  commonly    blended 


THE   SENSES.  75 


with  muscular  feelings  of  resistance  on  our  part,  and 
occasionally  with  those  of  movement.  These  feelings  of 
impeded  energy  and  of  movement  constitute  the  mani- 
festations of  the  so-called  active  or  muscidav  sense  of 
modern  pS3xhologists,  and  it  is  in  connexion  with  these 
that  the  intellectual  or  cognitional  importance  of  touch 
becomes  most  conspicuous.  The  difference  between 
the  tactual  and  muscular  consciousness  of  pressure  will 
be  realized  by  holding  up  a  half-pound  weight  on  our 
hand,  and  then  placing  the  same  weight  on  our  hand 
whilst  the  latter  is  supported  by  the  table.  In  the 
former  case  there  is  in  addition  to  the  tactual  impression 
a  feeling  described  as  a  sense  of  effort  or  strain.  Again, 
if  we  allow  our  arm  to  be  unresistingly  moved  by 
another  person,  we  shall  have  the  passive  consciousness 
of  pressure  or  contact,  with  also  faint  tactual  and 
organic  feelings  due  to  the  changing  position  of  the 
skin,  joints,  and  muscles.  But  if  we  ourselves  move  it, 
instead  of  the  passive  feeling  of  pressure  we  have  the 
consciousness  of  muscular  energy  put  forth,  accom- 
panied as  before  b}^  the  faint  organic  and  tactual 
sensations   due  to   the  varying   position   of  the   limb. 


Physiolog^ical  Conditions. — The  analysis  of  this  state  of 
consciousness  and  the  determination  of  the  physiological 
conditions  of  its  various  elements  have  given  rise  to  the 
Muscular  Sense  Controversy,  an  unsettled  dispute  in  which 
psychological,  physiological,  and  pathological  evidence  is 
invoked  on  both  sides. 

(i)  One  theory  holds  that  our  muscular  consciousness 
consists  merely  of  a  special  class  of  tactual  sensations  seated 
in  ordinary  afferent  nerves  in  the  skin  and  surface  teguments, 
the  crumpling,  pressure,  and  strain  of  which  excite  these 
feelings,  'i'o  this  it  is  objected  that  in  cases  where  the  skin  is 
rendered  insensible  by  disease  or  anassihetics  like  cocain,  the 
power  of  movement  and  the  feeling  of  effort  often  remain. 

(2)  The  second  theory  includes  among  the  elements  of  our 
muscular  consciousness  besides  those  of  the  skin,  sensations 
located  in  sensory  nerves  pertaining  to  the  muscles,  tendons, 
ligaments,  and  cartilage  connexions  of  the  joints.  All  these 
feelings,  it  holds,  are  the  concomitants  of  in-coming  nervous 
processes  along  aff'erent  nerves.  They  report  and  measure 
movement,  strain,   or  resistance  already  accomplished,   not 


76  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


something  to  be  done.     Among  the  advocates  of  this  view  are 
W.James,  Ferrier,  Bastian,  and  Munsterberg. 

(3)  The  third  theory  maintains  that  in  addition  to,  and 
quite  distinct  from  these  incoming  or  peripherally  excited 
feelings,  our  muscular  consciousness  includes  a  feeling  of 
innervation,  oi  effort  put  fortli,  the  mental  correlate  of  centrally 
initiated  outgoing  currents  of  motor  energy  which  traverse  the 
efferent  nerves  in  the  execution  of  movement  or  resistance. 
Its  chief  supporters  are  Bain,  Wundt,  Ladd,  Stout,  and 
Baldwin. 

In  behalf  of  (3)  it  is  argued  :  {a)  In  children  and  young 
animals  there  is  exhibited  from  the  very  beginning  a  fund  ot 
activity  and  spontaneous  movements  originated  by  a  surplus 
of  energy  rather  than  by  external  stimulation.  The  feeUngs 
attached  to  such  primitive  activity  must  have  for  their 
physical  basis  efferent  or  motor  discharges.  (Bain.)  {b)  A  patient 
who  strives  to  move  a  paralyzed  limb  is  conscious  of  effort 
without  any  sensation  of  movement — which  does  not  take 
place,  (c)  If  the  muscles  which  move  the  eye  to  right  or  left 
are  partly  paralyzed,  the  degree  of  rotation  needed  to  fixate 
an  object  is  over-estimated  and  its  position  misjudged.  This 
illusion  proves  that  our  estimate  of  the  movement  is  measured 
by  the  intensity  of  the  effort  or  innervation  which  has  to  be 
exerted,  not  by  incoming  sensations  of  muscular  contraction 
actually  accomplished  in  the  movement.  (Wundt.) 

In  favour  of  (2)  it  is  urged  by  W.  James :  (a)  The 
assumption  of  this  unique  active  sense  or  feeling  of  innervation, 
opposed  in  nature  to  all  other  forms  of  sensation, — whicli  are 
concomitants  of  afferent  nervous  processes — is  ^'unnecessary.'''' 
This  feeling,  were  it  ever  present,  would  have  vanished  as  a 
useless  link.  Movements  due  to  emotions  and  reflex  action 
occur  without  it.  {b)  There  is  really  no  introspective  evidence 
for  its  existence.  An  anticipatory  image  of  the  complex 
feeling  of  muscular  contractions,  involved  in  the  movement 
plus  the  volition  or  fiat  of  the  will — which  is  not  a  sensation — 
is  the  total  mental  state  revealed  by  careful  introspection. 
{c)  To  the  arguments  based  on  the  seeming  existence  and  our 
apparent  estimate  of  the  feeling  of  effort  in  cases  of  paralysis 
of  certain  muscles  where  incoming  sensations  from  them 
would  be  impossible,  it  is  answered  that  the  feeling  is  still 
really  of  a  purely  afferent  character  coming  from  the  strain 
of  other  groups  of  muscles,  especially  those  of  the  chest  and 
respiratory  organs,  as  will  be  noticed  if  we  "make  believe" 
of  shutting  our  fist  tight,  or  puUing  the  trigger  of  a  gun 
without  really  moving  our  fingers. 

We  confess  the  question  seems  to  us  as  yet  not  definitely 
decided.     The  reader  will  find  it  fully  discussed  in  VV.  James's 


THE   SENSES.  77 


Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  ii.  pp.  189  ff.  493  ff . ;    and   Ladd, 
Psychology  Descriptive  and  Explanatory,  pp.  115  ff.  218  ff. 

Cognitional  value. — The  discriminative  sensibility 
of  our  muscular  consciousness  to  varying  degrees 
of  resisting  force  is  very  delicate.  The  duration  of 
muscular  sensations  is  also  finely  felt.  This  latter 
property,  when  we  have  acquired  the  power  of  esti- 
mating velocity,  is  the  chief  instrument  in  our  measure- 
ment of  space.  A  sweep  of  the  arm  lasting  for  a  longer 
or  shorter  time,  velocity  being  equal,  passes  through 
a  greater  or  less  space.  Estimation  of  velocity  is  not 
an  original  quality  of  muscular  feeling,  but  is  learned 
by  experience.  Velocity  has  no  meaning  unless  in 
reference  to  space,  and  it  is  determined  by  th'j 
quantity  of  space  traversed  in  a  given  time.  We 
observe  that,  in  a  given  time,  a  certain  amount  of 
energy  is  required  to  move  the  arm  over  a  definite 
length  of  space,  known  by  sight  or  touch.  By 
association  the  degree  of  impetus  becomes  the  symbol 
of  the  rate  of  velocity.  The  calculation  of  the  quantity 
of  movement  executed  by  our  limbs  through  means 
of  the  muscular  feelings  alone,  unless  in  the  case  of 
a  familiar  act,  is  generally  very  imperfect.  If  we 
attempt  to  ascertain  the  size  and  shape  of  a  strange 
room  in  the  dark,  we  shall  find  how  vague  are  our 
notions  of  our  movement.  Similarly,  if  the  eyes  are 
closed  and  the  arm  is  bared  so  that  the  tactual  sensa- 
tions of  the  sleeve  are  eliminated,  the  inadequacy 
of  motor  estimation  of  space  will  become  apparent ; 
when  the  velocity  is  increased  we  invariably  tmder- 
value  the  distance  moved  through.^ 

The  muscular  sensations,  like  the  other  organic 
feelings,  cannot  be  vividly  revived  in  imagination, 
but    our    power   of    determining   the   exact    degree   of 

^  The  fact  that  our  muscular  appreciation  of  velocity  is  not 
innate  but  acquired,  and  is  at  best  vague  and  indefinite,  constitutes 
a  very  serious  difficulty  to  writers  like  Dr.  Bain,  who  resolve  our 
perception  of  space  into  the  consciousness  of  unextended  muscular 
sensations  varying  in  duration  and  velocity.  The  latter  idea 
involves  the  notions  both  of  space  and  time,  and  should  not  be 
assumed  as  an  innate  endowment,  least  of  all  by  the  empirical 
school.  (Cf.  Mahaffy,  The  Critical  Philosophy,  pp.  138 — 144) 


^S  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


energy  to  be  put  forth  in  the  practice  of  habitual  ^ 
actions,  such  as  standing,  walking,  writing,  speaking, 
and  the  hke,  is  very  dehcate.  The  sense  of  sight, 
just  as  well  as  that  of  contact,  is  a  heavy  debtor  to 
these  sensations.  Not  only  the  movements  of  the 
licad  and  the  eyes,  but  the  still  more  minute  changes 
by  which  the  convexity  of  the  crystallme  lens  is 
niodified  to  suit  the  varying  distance  of  the  object, 
are  all  effected  under  the  guidance  and  estimation 
of  muscular  sensations,  and  it  is  only  by  means  of 
their  acute  sensibility  that  many  of  the  nicest  dis- 
criminations of  the  visual  faculty  are  possible. 

Movement,  moreover,  enables  us  to  multiply  the 
experiences  of  each  sense,  to  vary  the  relations  between 
the  object  and  the  faculty,  and  to  bring  the  most 
sensitive  part  of  the  latter  to  bear  on  the  former. 
Consequently,  the  sensations  which  measure  move- 
ment play  an  important  part  in  perfecting  our  know- 
ledge of  the  properties  of  matter.  Still  it  is  the 
consciousness  of  foreign  resistance  revealed  in  tactual 
and  muscular  feelings  combined,  which  forces  upon 
us  most  irresistibly  the  reality  of  the  external  material 
world.  In  this  respect  the  cognitional  importance  of 
the  united  muscular  and  tactual  sense  exceeds  that 
of  sight  and  all  the  other  organic  faculties  together.^ 

Capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain.— l^he  muscular  feehngs 
may  give  rise  to  a  good  deal  of  pleasure  or  pain. 
When  the  body  is  in  a  healthy  condition  muscular 
exercise  affords  keen  enjoyment,  as  is  established  by 
the  general  popularity  of  field  sports.  The  proper 
pain  of  muscular  sensations  is  fatigue, _  and  this  can 
l)e  very  severe  when  forced  activity  is  maintained 
under  exhausting  conditions.  Besides  these  mental 
states  which  we  have  described,  the  muscles,  like 
other  parts  of  the  body,  can  be  the  subject  of  the 
pains  of  laceration  or  disease,  but  such  feelings  belong 
rather  to  the  general  group  of  organic  sensations, 

"  Amongst  the  qualities  of  matter  made  known  by  combined 
muscular  and  tactual  sensations  are  solidity,  shape,  size.,  hardness, 
softness,  elasticity,  liquidity,  &c.  Consciousness  of  movement  and 
of  variation  in  pressure  are  the  main  factors  in  such  perceptions. 


THE  SENSES.  79 


Hearing. — Physical  and  Physiological  conditions. — 
This  sense  is  aroused  by  vibratory  movements 
transmitted  from  the  sonorous  substance  through 
the  air  or  other  medium  to  the  ear.  The  organ 
of  hearing  consists  of  three  chief  parts,  the  external 
ear  including  the  pinna  and  external  ineatns,  the 
tympanic  cavity,  drum,  or  middle  ear,  and  the 
labyrinth  or  internal  ear.  The  two  extremities  of 
the  tympanic  cavity  are  connected  by  a  chain  of 
small  bones,  and  the  labyrinth  consists  chiefly 
of  a  number  of  small  cavities,  and  contains  a 
liquid  in  which  the  auditory  nerve  is  distributed. 
The  vibrations  transmitted  from  the  sounding  object 
are  concentrated  by  the  external  ear,  and  passed  on 
through  the  middle  ear  by  means  of  the  chain  of 
small  bones  to  the  liquid  contained  in  the  labyrinth. 
The  disturbance  of  this  substance  excites  the  auditory 
nerve,  and  this  excitation  is  the  immediate  ante- 
cedent of  the  sensation  of  sound. 

Musical  Sounds. — Sensations  of  hearing  naturally' 
divide  into  two  great  classes,  those  of  musical,  and 
those  of  non-musical  sounds.  Another  important 
division  is  that  into  articulate  sounds,  or  the  words 
of  language,  and  inarticulate  sounds.  When  these 
last  are  non-musical  they  are  called  noises.  The 
musical  character  of  the  first  class  of  sounds  seems 
to  be  dependent  on  the  periodical  nature  of  the 
vibrations  which  excite  these  sensations.  The  chief 
properties  of  musical  notes  besides  intensity,  are 
pitch,  quality,  and  timbre  or  clang.  The  pitch  of  a 
sound  means  its  altitude  on  the  musical  scale,  and 
is    determined    by   the   rapidity   of    the   vibration. 


8o  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


The  terms  timbre,  clang,  and  sometimes  musical 
quality,  designate  the  pecuhar  feature  by  which  the 
sound  of  a  note  on  one  instrument  differs  from  that 
iof  the  same  note  on  another.  Thus  the  timbre  of 
the  viohn  differs  from  that  of  the  cornet  and  of 
the  human  voice.  ^^  Particular  combinations  of  notes 
according  to  certain  relations  of  pitch  produce  the 
agreeable  effect  known  as  harmony.  Notes  which 
sounded  together  produce  instead  an  unpleasant 
sensation,  are  said  to  be  discordant  and  inharmonious. 
Under  certain  circumstances,  however,  discords 
may  be  pleasant.  Groupings  of  musical  sound  in 
particular  time  periods  produce  the  consciousness 
of  melody,  and  skilful  combinations  of  various  in- 
struments so  as  to  secure  harmony,  melody,  and 
agreeable  blending  of  timbre  conspire  to  awaken  the 
delightful  feelings  of  a  rich  symphony. 

Non-musical  Sounds. — Of  the  non-muiical  sounds 
the  number  which  are  classed  as  mere  noises  are 
practically  unlimited.  The  collisions  of  different 
bodies,  the  cries  of  the  various  animals,  the  roaring 
of  the  wind  and  of  the  ocean,  are  instances  of  such. 
All  forms  of  sound,  both  musical  and  non-musical, 
are  susceptible  of  discrimination  in  regard  to 
intensity  and  duration,  as  well  as  in  regard  to  quality. 
It  is  owing  to  the  very  great  delicacy  of  the  ear  in 
these  several  respects  that  articulate  speech  is  an 
instrument  of  such  enormous  value.  More  than 
five    successive    excitations   per    second    produce    a 

^'^  Helmholtz  explains  the  different  timbre  of  different  instruments 
as  due  to  variations  in  the  upper  tones  which  accompany  the 
proper  fundamental  note.  However,  this  theory  cannot,  as  yet,  be 
held  to  be  established 


V, 

V 


THE  SENSES.  8l 


continuous  sensation  in  the  eye,  while  the  recupera- 
tive power  of  the  auditory  nerve  is  so  perfect  that 
we  can  distinguish  sixteen  impressions  in  the  same 
length  of  time.  The  rapid  succession  of  sensa- 
tions, frequently  discriminated  by  but  slight  differ- 
ences in  character  and  intensity,  which  present  to 
us  without  fatigue  the  long  series  of  syllables 
constituting  a  speech,  exhibit  the  wonderful  per- 
fection of  this  sense  under  these  various  aspects.^^ 

Sounds  and  Signs. — Sounds  of  all  kinds  are  highly 
susceptible  of  being  conserved  in  the  memory  and 
reproduced  in  imagination,  and  they  are  also  readily 
associated  with  other  mental  states.  To  this  latter 
property  is  due  their  aptness  to  constitute  a  system  of 
symbols.  The  repeated  conjunction  of  the  sound  of  a 
name  with  the  perception  of  its  object  causes  the  former 
to  suggest  in  the  mind  of  the  child  the  idea  of  the  latter. 
Later  on,  with  the  dawn  of  intellect  and  reflexion,  words 
come  to  be  used  and  recognized  as  signs  of  things.  In 
acquiring  a  foreign  language,  the  primary  associations 
are  formed,  not,  as  in  learning  our  mother-tongue, 
between  the  foreign  words  and  the  objects  which  they 
signify,  but  between  the  former  and  the  corresponding 
terms  in  our  own  language,  by  the  assistance  of  which 
we  ordinarily  think  and   reason   about  the  objects  of 

"  A  good  musical  ear  is  one  that  possesses  a  fine  sensibility  to 
pitch,  to  melodious  groupings  of  successive  tones,  and  to  symphonic 
combinations  of  timbre.  A  good  linguistic  ear  is  one  finely  dis- 
criminative of  the  quality  of  sounds,  and  of  the  varying  degrees  of 
intensity  which  mark  intonation  or  accent.  As  a  consequence  the 
two  aptitudes  are  not  always  united.  The  ear  well  formed  to 
catch  the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  French,  German,  or  Italian 
languages,  may  be  insensible  to  considerable  differences  in  pitch,  and 
therefore  unconscious  of  the  discord  effected  by  inharmonious  com- 
binations. Perfection  in  either  line  implies  good  individual  capacity 
of  retention.  Keen  susceptibility  to  differences  of  pitch,  and  con- 
sequently to  musical  harmony,  may  be  found  where  the  general 
power  of  hearing  is  comparatively  feeble,  and  vice  versa.  For  a 
good  linguistic  ear,  however,  general  acuteness  of  the  sense  seems 
requisite. 


82  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


experience.  In  commencing  to  read  the  connexion  is 
first  formed  between  the  visual  sign  and  the  oral 
syllable  or  word,  though  gradually  the  intermediate 
representation  of  the  word  tends  to  drop  out  of  existence, 
and  in  the  end  tlie  written  symbol  immediately  suggests 
to  us  the  object  signified.^- 

Cognitional  importance  of  Hearing. — Notwithstanding 
its  very  delicate  sensibility  as  to  differences  in  quality, 
intensity,  and  duration,  in  addition  to  the  very  revivable 
and  associable  character  of  its  sensations,  which  all 
conspire  to  give  the  ear  such  high  intellectual  value  as 
a  representative  faculty,  it  ranks  very  low  as  a  direct 
medium  of  objective  knowledge.  Of  itself  it  affords  no 
information  of  the  extension  or  impenetrability  of 
bodies — the  two  fundamental  properties  of  matter. 
Indeed,  the  attribute  which  it  immediately  reveals  is 
of  purely  secondary  and  accidental  character.  Never- 
theless, of  such  a  high  order  are  the  intrinsic  excellences 
of  its  sensations,  and  so  admirably  are  they  adapted 
to  compose  a  perfect  system  of  signs,  that,  when  once 
a  few  elementar}^  experiences  have  been  gathered  by 
the  other  senses,  this  faculty  is  enabled,  by  appro- 
priating them,  to  put  us  into  a  position  to  take 
possession  of  the  rich  treasures  of  knowledge  acquired 
by  the  whole  human  race. 

Capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain. — The  capacity  of  the  ear 
for  pleasure  is  large,  while  its  potentialities  for  pain  are 
comparatively  limited.  The  agreeable  feelings  awakened 
by  the  qualities  of  musical  sound  are  of  the  noblest 
and  most  refined  character.  They  are  rich  in  variety, 
they  do  not  pall  by  long  continuance,  and  they  may 
be  frequently  renewed.  In  all  these  respects  the}^ 
differ  from  the  gratifications  of  the  less  refined  senses. 
A  far  greater  part,  however,  of  these  higher  pleasures 
are  traceable  to  intellectual  and  emotional  enjoyment 

^2  The  muscular  sensations  excited  in  uttering  words  either 
aloud  or  in  a  whisper,  make  a  parallel  line  of  association  with  the 
aural  and  visual  signs,  and  in  persons  in  whom  the  faculty  of 
articulation  is  more  retentive,  or  more  frequently  exercised  in 
acquisitions  of  this  sort,  thinking  and  reading  in  silence  tend  to  be 
accompanied  by  movements  of  the  lips.  Energetic  eftort  to  realize 
the  full  import  of  the  visual  sign  occasions  the  same  phenomenon. 


THE  SENSES.  83 


afforded  by  the  general  character  of  a  musical  com- 
position than  to  the  mere  sensuous  satisfaction  produced 
by  pleasant  sound.  Cultivation  increases  the  refine- 
ment and  extends  the  range  of  this  capacity  for 
happiness,  but  at  the  same  time  rendering  the  faculty 
more  keenly  alive  to  defects  and  blemishes  it  anni- 
hilates many  minor  pleasures  possible  to  the  less 
delicate  taste.  Discord  is  painful  to  the  musical 
ear,  and  harsh  sounds  of  any  kind,  as  well  as  intense 
noises,  have  an  unpleasant  effect  on  all  normally 
endowed  persons. 

Sight. — Physical  and  Physiological  conditions. — 
The  formal  object  of  the  eye  is  coloured  surface. 
According  to  the  now  generally  accepted  undulatory 
theory,  the  physical  conditions  of  sight  consist  of 
vibrations  transmitted  to  the  eye  through  the  inter- 
vening ether  from  the  reflecting  or  self-luminous 
body.  Difference  of  colour  depends  on  variation 
in  the  rate  of  rapidity  of  the  vibratory  movements. 
The  organ  of  vision  is  an  optical  instrument  of  a 
very  complicated  and  ingenious  construction.  The 
eye-ball  is  a  nearly  spherical  body  containing  within 
it  three  masses  of  transparent  liquid  or  gelatinous 
substances  called  humours,  and  so  arranged  as  to 
form  a  compound  lens.  The  shape  of  the  eye-ball 
is  secured  by  an  outer  coating  called  the  sclerotic, 
which  embraces  the  whole  eye  with  the  exception 
of  the  circular  spot  in  front,  where  the  transparent 
cornea  takes  its  place.  Under  the  sclerotic  is  a 
second  covering,  the  dark  choroid  coat,  and  over  the 
interior  surface  of  this  towards  the  back  of  the  eye 
is  distributed  the  retina.  This  is  a  transparent 
network  composed  of  several  layers  of  fibres  and 
nerve  cells,   and   connected  with  the  choroid  by  a 


84  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


layer  of  rods  and  cones.  These  latter  seem  to  be 
the  properly  sensitive  apparatus.  In  the  centre  of 
the  retina  is  the  yellow  spot,  which  is  the  most 
sensitive  part  of  the  organ,  and  here  the  rods  and 
cones  are  packed  in  greatest  abundance.  From  the 
retina  slightly  to  the  side  of  the  yellow  spot  the 
optic  nerve  proceeds  to  the  brain.  Rays  falling  on 
it  are  unperceived,  whence  it  is  styled  the  blind  spot. 
Of  the  humours  filling  up  the  main  body  of  the  eye, 
the  middle  one,  called  the  crystaUine  lens,  which  is 
of  double  convex  form,  is  the  most  important.  The 
shape  of  this  lens  is  capable  of  alteration,  being 
rendered  more  or  less  convex  by  the  automatic 
contraction  or  extension  of  the  ciliary  muscle  to 
suit  the  distance  of  the  object  viewed.  When 
something  is  presented  to  the  eye,  the  rays  passing 
from  it  enter  the  pupil  of  the  eye  and  are  con- 
centrated by  the  lens  arrangements  so  as  to  form 
an  inverted  image  on  the  retina.  From  the  layer 
of  rods  and  cones  forming  the  inner  stratum  of  the 
retina,  this  impression  is  conveyed  as  a  neural 
tremor  to  the  brain,  whereupon  the  sensation  is 
awakened. 

Sensations  of  Sight. — There  are  attached  to  the 
eye  both  muscular  and  visual  sensations  proper. 
The  former,  which  measure  the  movement  and  the 
greater  or  less  convexity  of  the  eye-ball,  contribute 
very  much  to  the  accurate  determination  of  the 
special  relations  of  visible  objects.  The  visual 
sensations  proper  are  those  of  light  and  of  colour. 
These  are  susceptible  of  very  delicate  shades  of 
difference,    and   the   various    hues    of    colour    and 


THE  SENSES.  85 


degrees  in  the  intensity  of  light  which  can  be 
distinguished  in  a  landscape  are  virtually  innumer- 
able. It  has  been  estimated  by  means  of  some 
ingenious  experiments  that  an  increase  in  the  force 
of  a  stimulus  equivalent  to  about  one  in  one  hundred 
can,  within  certain  limits,  be  just  discerned  by  the 
eye.  The  principal  species  of  colour  generally 
recognized  are  the  seven  hues  of  the  spectrum,  red, 
orange,  yellow,  green,  blue,  indigo,  and  violet. 
There  are  a  large  number  of  distinguishable  inter- 
mediate tints  between  these  leading  colours,  and 
the  terms  have  therefore  not  a  very  exactly  defined 
meaning.  These  various  hues  are  found  to  result 
from  the  analysis  of  white  light.  The  ether  vibra- 
tions which  excite  visual  sensations  are  of  enormous 
rapidity,  and  the  rate  increases  from  about  460 
billions  per  second,  for  red  rays,  to  about  670 
billions  in  the  case  of  violet. 

Helmholtz  and  others  have  traced  analogies  between  the 
colour  spectrum  and  the  musical  scale.  In  point  of  agree- 
ment we  find  {a)  a  series  of  seven  principal  colours,  in  corre- 
spondence with  the  notes  of  the  gamut,  {b)  both  series 
produced  by  variations  in  the  rate  of  the  vibratory  stimulus, 
and  {c)  both  capable  of  certain  agreeable  and  disagreeable 
combinations  described  as  harmonious  and  inharmonious. 
The  points  of  difference  are  however  greater,  {a)  The 
character  of  each  of  the  tones  of  the  musical  octave  is  so 
distinct  and  well  marked  as  to  have  been  recognized  from  the 
earliest  times ;  the  colours  of  the  spectrum  on  the  contrary 
are  vaguely  defined  and  pass  gradually  into  each  other,  many 
intermediate  hues  having  equally  good  claims  to  a  recognition 
in  the  scheme ;  {b)  the  change  in  the  musical  octave  advances 
regularly  in  one  direction,  each  succeeding  note  being  farther 
from  the  first,  while  in  the  spectrum  the  movement  is  along  a 
curve,  and  the  last  colour,  violet,  returns  nearer  than  either 
indigo  or  blue,  to  the  earlier  colours  red  and  orange ;  (c)  the 
auditory  sensation  rises  regularly  with  equal  increments  in 
the    rate   of    vibration,   whilst    large    changes    produce    no 


86  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


conscious  effect  in  parts  of  the  spectrum  ;  (d)  the  range  of 
vision  is  exhausted  by  a  single  octave,  while  the  ear  can  span 
from  six  to  eight. 

Composite  Sensations.— PAthough.  the  sensation  of  white 
is  evoked  by  a  combination  of  physical  stimuli  separately 
productive  of  other  feelings,  it  is  inaccurate,  as  we  have 
before  indicated,  to  speak  of  the  consciousness  of  white  as 
being  a  compound  or  complex  mental  state.  The  sensation, 
in  itself  unanalyzable,  must  be  accepted  as  such.^    The 
true  type  of  the  compound  or  complex  sensation  is  that 
aroused  by  a  union  of  different  voices  or  instruments, 
where  attention  enables  us  to  discriminate  the  separate 
elements  of  consciousness.     The  analysis  of  white  light, 
the  existence  of  various  forms  of  colour  blindness,  of 
colour    harmony,    and    of    what   are    called   iiegative^^ 
images,  have  suggested  the  hypothesis  that  the  nerves 
of  vision  distributed  in  the  retina  are  of  certain  different 
classes   adapted   to  respond  to   particular   elementary 
forms  of  colour.      The  theory  has   assumed    different 
forms  in  the  hands  of  different  scientists,  but  as  the 
question  is  physiological  rather  than  psychological,  w^e 
need  not  enter  into  it  here.^* 

Tone  and  Depth. — The  term  tone  is  sometimes  used  to 
express  the  position  of  a  colour  in  the  spectrum,  while 
depth  is  dependent  on  the  quantity  of  pure  white  light 

'^'•'  After-mages,  incidental  images,  or  spectra,  are  of  two  kinds, 
positive  and  negative.  The  former  term  is  used  to  denote  the  images 
of  sensuous  perceptions  of  objects,  which  frequently  continue  to 
persist  for  some  brief  time  after  the  cessation  of  the  stimulus.  If 
after  gazing  steadily  for  a  few  minutes  at  a  coloured  object  we  direct 
our  eyes  to  a  white  surface,  instead  of  the  positive  after-image  we 
become  conscious  of  an  image  of  the  object,  but  in  the  complementary 
hue.  This  is  termed  a  negative  image,  and  is  explained  on  the 
above  hypothesis  as  due  to  the  temporary  fatigue  and  consequent 
obtuseness  of  the  nerves  previously  excited,  which  are  now  unable 
to  absorb  their  share  of  the  new  stimulus. 

^*  The  survival  of  these  after-images  was  observed  by  Aristotle 
and  the  Scholastics:  "Si  aliquis  videt  aliquid  lucidum  ut  solem, 
et  subito  claudat  oculos,  non  advertendo  visum,  sed  observando 
illud  directe,  primo  apparebit  ei  color  rei  splendidae  deinde  muta- 
bitur  in  medics  colores  successive  donee  veniat  ad  nigrum,  et 
omnino  evanescat  et  hoc  non  continget  nisi  propter  simulacra 
splendid!  derelicti  in  visu."  (St.  Thomas,  Comm.  Dc  Somuiis,  lect.  2.) 


THE   SENSES.  87 


blended  with  the  colour  in  question.  The  word  intensity 
is  occasionally  employed  as  synonymous  with  depth; 
properly,  however,  it  should  signify  the  stronger  or 
feebler  force  of  the  sensation.  In  addition  to  the 
fineness  of  the  discriminative  power  of  sight  in  these 
several  respects,  visual  sensations  are  in  a  high  degree 
capable  of  being  retained  in  memory  and  recalled  in 
imagination.  In  fact,  so  superior  in  vivacity  are  the 
representations  of  this  faculty  to  those  of  the  other 
senses,  that  some  writers  have  been  found  to  deny, 
but  without  adequate  grounds,  the  existence  of  any 
other  kind  of  images.  The  eye,  though  surpassing  the 
other  senses,  is  less  delicately  sensible  to  the  duration 
of  the  stimulus  than  the  ear.  The  persistence  of 
positive  after-images  exhibited  in  the  continuous  im- 
pressions produced  by  the  rapid  circular  movement  of 
a  bright  object,  prevents  us  from  discerning  more  than 
five  or  six  successive  excitations  in  the  second. 

Cognitional  importance. — These  numerous  capabilities 
would  be  sufficient  of  themselves  to  secure  to  sight 
high  cognitional  rank,  but  it  is  to  the  fact  that  the  eye 
aftbrds  an  immediate  presentation  of  surface  extension^ 
that  its  fundamental  importance  as  a  source  of  objective 
knowledge  is  due.  The  apprehension  of  colour  neces- 
sarily involves  that  of  space  in  two  dimensions.  It  is 
undoubtedly  true  that  originally  the  single  eye,  if  it 
remained  in  a  fixed  position,  could  have  apprehended 
but  a  very  limited  quantity  of  surface,  that  its  precep- 
tion  of  shape  would  have  been  extremely  vague,  and 
that  it  could  have  afforded  no  information  at  all  as 
regards  distance;  but  nevertheless  the  sensation  of 
colour  necessarily  implies  some  perception  of  extension. 
The  point  will  be  made  clearer  when  we  come  to  treat 
of  the  development  of  sense-perception  ;  here,  however, 
we  would  note  that  the  means  by  which  our  visual 
perceptions  of  shape  and  distance  are  elaborated,  and 
our  apprehension  of  surface  enlarged,  are  changes  in 
the  position  and  form  of  the  eye  made  known  to  us  by 
muscular  sensations.  The  movement  of  the  axis  of 
the  eye  round  the  object  viewed,  the  convergence  of  the 
two  eyes  varying  with  its  distance,  the  self-adjusting 


88  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


process  by  which  the  optical  lens  is  flattened  or 
rendered  more  convex  so  as  to  focus  the  object  upon 
the  retina,  are  accompanied  by  faint  feelings  of  tension 
which  play  an  important  part  in  giving  precision  to 
our  spatial  cognitions.  In  mature  life  the  "local" 
sensibility  of  the  retina  is  very  fine.  Close  to  the 
centre  of  the  yellow  spot  irritations  as  near  together  as 
•004  mm.  are  felt  as  distinct ;  but  the  discriminative 
power  diminishes  as  we  pass  towards  the  circum- 
ference. The  size  of  the  retinal  image,  of  course, 
decreases  with  the  distance  of  the  object,  still  this 
extreme  delicacy  of  the  retina  to  the  local  character 
of  the  irritation  enables  the  eye  to  become  a  very 
perfect  instrument  for  the  accurate  appreciation  of 
extension. 

Capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain. — As  a  direct  source  of 
pleasure  or  pain  visual  sensations  rank  probably  lower 
than  those  of  any  other  faculty,  though  indirectly  they 
may  contribute  much  to  our  happiness.  Bright  lights 
and  hues  are  pleasing,  and  harmonious  combinations 
have  an  agreeable  effect.  A  strong  glare  of  light  is 
painful,  but  the  feeling  is  organic  rather  than  visual. 
Prolonged  confinement  in  the  dark  produces  an  intense 
desire  for  light  and  great  joy  on  first  restoration  to 
liberty,  but  the  pleasure  soon  fades.  The  contempla- 
tion of  the  beauties  of  nature  and  art  affords  rich  and 
refined  delight,  but  here  the  effect  is  of  an  intellectual 
and  emotional  character,  and  not  merely  an  immediate 
function  of  the  sense. 

The  Senses  compared. — In  our  last  chapter  we 
remarked  on  the  inverse  ratio  subsisting  between  the 
perceptional  and  the  pleasurable  or  painful  capacity  of 
the  senses.  Glancing  back  at  them  now,  when  they 
have  been  separately  passed  under  review,  and  their 
chief  features  described  in  detail,  the  truth  of  that 
observation  will  be  realized.  If  we  divide  our  tactual 
consciousness  into  the  two  great  groups,  the  organic 
sensations,  including  the  feelings  of  temperature  on  the 
one  side,  and  the  muscular  feelings  and  sensations  of 
touch  proper  on  the  other,  and  proceed  to  arrange 
them  first  according  to  emotional,  and  then  in  regard 


THE  SENSES.  89 


to  cognitional  rank,  we  shall  find  that  the  two  schemes 
will  assume  virtually  an  inverse  order.  Viewed  as 
direct  sources  of  pleasure  and  pain,  starting  from  the 
highest  they  seem  to  stand  thus :  organic  sensation, 
taste,  smell,  hearing,  muscular  and  tactual  states,  and 
sight.  But  marshalled  as  instruments  of  objective 
knowledge  the  order  is  reversed :  sight,  tactual  and 
muscular  sensations,  hearing,  smell,  taste,  and  lowest, 
the  organic  feelings.  This  classification  regards  only 
the  immediate  or  direct  emotional  and  cognitional 
properties  of  the  consciousness  of  each  sense,  and  the 
intrinsic  difficulties  of  all  such  comparison  would  pro- 
bably cause  diversity  of  view  about  the  former  scheme  ; 
still,  estimated  from  this  limited  standpoint,  it  seems  to 
us  approximately  correct. 

Indirectly,  indeed,  sight  is  a  much  more  important 
source  of  pleasure  and  pain  than  the  sense  of  smell, 
and  the  knowledge  of  the  universe  acquired  by  hearing 
far  exceeds  that  gathered  from  the  actual  experience 
of  all  our  other  senses  combined  ;  but  in  both  cases  we 
have  merely  appropriation  of  the  results  attained  by 
the  other  faculties,  and  extension  of  these  results  by 
means  of  association  and  inference.  Viewed  purely 
as  a  state  of  feeling,  a  sensation  of  colour  or  sound 
can  afford  much  less  pleasure  or  pain  than  an  agreeable 
odour,  or  a  nauseous  stench.  Similarly,  the  sensations 
of  hearing  are  more  precise,  more  finely  discriminable, 
and  more  vividly  revived  in  imagination,  not  only  than 
those  of  taste  and  smell,  but  even  than  our  tactual  and 
muscular  consciousness.  Yet,  inasmuch  as  they  give 
us  immediately  no  assurance  of  the  reality,  or  of  the 
extension  of  the  material  world,  they  must  be  ranked 
cognitionally  higher  than  taste  or  smell,  but  lower  than 
the  combined  muscular  and  tactual  sense.  Touch, 
indeed,  since  it  reveals  the  mechanical  properties  of 
the  world,  has  claims  to  stand  even  before  sight  as  an 
instrument  of  objective  cognition,  and  it  is  certainly 
more  necessary ;  still,  the  immense  range  of  the  latter 
faculty,  its  perfect  presentation  of  the  geometrical 
relations  of  the  universe,  and  the  delicacy  of  its  other 
cognitive  capabilities  have  led  us  to  place  it  at  the  head 


go  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


of  the  list.  We  need  not  attempt  any  further  justifica- 
tion of  the  arrangement  adopted,  as  the  reader,  by 
returning  on  our  treatment  of  the  senses  separately, 
may  ascertain  the  various  considerations  which  have 
led  to  our  conclusion. ^^ 

The  ♦'  Law  of  Relativity."— The  quality  and  intensity  of  a 
sensation  are  affected  not  only  by  the  character  of  its  own 
stimulus,  but  also  by  the  quality  and  intensity  of  other  simul- 
taneous or  immediately  preceding  sensations.  Thus  the  same 
water  is  apprehended  as  hot  or  cold  if  the  hand  has  been 
previously  dipped  in  a  liquid  of  lower  or  higher  temperature. 
The  same  article  may  feel  smooth  or  rough,  heavy  or  light, 
according  to  the  opposite  character  of  the  previous  experience. 
After  tasting  a  bitter  substance  water  appears  sweet.  The 
sudden  cessation  of  a  prolonged  noise  has  a  startling  effect, 
as  when  the  miller  is  awakened  by  the  stopping  of  his  mill. 
A  black  object  produces  a  stronger  impression  when  seen 
after  or  in  the  midst  of  a  white  field,  and  the  several  colours 
are  felt  more  deeply  "  saturated,"  that  is,  come  out  richer  and 
fuller  when  observed  at  the  same  time  or  immediately 
subsequent  to  those  of  complementary  hue.  In  general 
contrast,  whether  simultaneous  or  successive,  intensifies  the 
force  of  sensation. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  effect  of  protracted  stimulation  of 
a  sense  diminishes  and  may  finally  cease  to  be  noticed.  We 
are  ordinarily  unconscious  of  the  contact  of  our  clothes,  of 
the  pressure  of  our  own  weight  upon  our  limbs,  of  the 
continuous  hum  of  the  city,  of  the  smell  of  flowers,  or  of  the 
oppressiveness  of  the  atmosphere  in  a  room  where  we  have 
been  for  some  time,  and,  speaking  generally,  of  any  constant 
uniform  excitant. 

This  influence  of  variation  upon  consciousness  has  been 
called  by  recent  psychologists  the  "  Relativity  of  Sensation." 
It  is  a  well-known  experience  in  our  mental  life,  and  a  consi- 
derable factor  in  our  pleasures  and  pains.  It  was  familiar  to 
Aristotle  and  the  Schoolmen,  who,  on  account  of  its  effects, 
laid  down  the  rule  that  to  secure  correct  apprehension  the 

'•'''  Balmez,  Fundamental  Philosophy,  Bk.  II.  cc.  x.  xi.  maintains 
the  inferiority  of  touch  to  sight  and  hearing  from  a  cognitional 
point  of  view.  He  does  not,  however,  distinguish  sufficiently  in 
this  question  between  the  direct  or  immediate  efficacy  of  a  sense 
and  that  which  is  merely  mediate.  In  range  and  representative 
power  the  more  refined  senses  vastly  surpass  touch,  but  to  a  very 
large  extent  their  wealth  is  built  upon  the  capital  supplied  by  the 
more  fundamental  faculty. 


THE   SENSES.  qi 


several  sensuous  faculties  must  be  in  a  neutral  or  normal 
condition.^*"' 

But  the  sweeping  generalization  erected  upon  these  facts 
under  the  title  of  the  Law  of  Relativity  is  untenable.  Accord- 
ing to  this  doctrine,  at  least  as  expounded  by  some  of  its  best- 
known  advocates,  all  consciousness  is  merely /^^//;i^  of  difference 
or  change.  Thus  Hobbes  asserted  that  "  to  be  always  sensible 
of  one  and  the  same  thing  is  the  same  as  not  to  feel  at  all." 
Dr.  Bain  writes :  "  The  Principle  of  Relativity,  or  the  neces- 
sity of  change  in  order  to  our  being  conscious,  is  the  ground- 
work of  Thought,  Intellect,  and  Knowledge  as  well  as  Feeling. 
.  .  .  We  know  heat  only  in  the  transition  from  cold  and  vice 
versa.  .  .  .  We  do  not  know  any  one  thing  in  itself,  hut  only  the 
difference  between  it  and  another  thing.  .  .  .  The  present  sensa- 
tion of  heat  is  in  fact  a  difference  from  the  preceding  cold."^'' 

Criticism. — To  us  it  seems  clear  that  whilst  change — ■ 
motiis  de  potentia  ad  actum,  as  the  scholastics  termed  it — is  an 
essential  element  in  the  aivakening  of  sensation,  and  also  an 
important  factor  in  its  vividness,  it  is,  nevertheless,  the  very 
reverse  of  the  truth  to  assert  that  all  consciousness  is  a 
"feeling  of  difference."  In  sensation  we  are  primarily 
conscious  of  a  positive  quality,  for  instance,  of  a  sound  or  of 
a  colour,  not  merely  of  the  relation  between  two  feelings. 
All  comparison  presupposes  the  perception  of  the  terms  to 
be  compared,  and  the  primitive  act  of  the  sense  is  not  com- 
parative, but  simply  apprehensive.  What  man's  conscious- 
ness would  be  like  if  he  always  had  but  one  imvarying  form 
of  sensation  we  do  not  pretend  to  know ;  but  experience 
shows  that  we  may  continue  aware  of  a  uniform  stimulus,  for 
example,  of  a  musical  note  for  an  indefinite  time  if  it  be  not 
submerged  or  crowded  out  by  other  feelings,^^ 

^♦^  "  Sicut  tepidum  in  comparatione  ad  calidum  est  frigidum;  in 
comparatione  ad  frigidum  est  calidum.  .  .  .  Et  oportet  quod  sicut 
organum  quod  debet  sentire  album  et  nigrum  neiitrum  ipsorum 
hahet  actii  sed  utrumque  in  potentia;  et  eodem  modo  in  aliis  sensibus." 
(St.  Thomas,  De  Anima,  Lib.  ii.  lect.  23.  Cf.  also  Dc  Somniis,  lect.  2.) 

^^  Cf.  Senses  and  Intellect,  p.  321 ;  Emotions  and  IVill,  p.  550  ;  Body 
and  Mind,  p.  8i  ;  also  Hoffding,  Outlines,  pp.  114 — 117,  and  Wundt, 
op.  cit.  pp.  Ill — iig. 

^^  Mr.  J.Ward  has  forcibly  argued  against  the  supposed  law: 
(i)  That  the  axiom,  Idem  semper  sentire  et  non  sentire  ad  idem  recidiint, 
though  a  truism  in  reference  to  the  totality  of  mental  life,  or  to  con- 
sciousness as  a  whole,  is  false  as  regards  many  individual  impressions. 
(2)  That  the  suggested  illustrations,  e.g.,  insensibility  to  continuous 
motion,  temperature,  pressure  of  the  air,  &c.,  are  cases  of  physio- 
logical, not  psychical  habituation,  and  so  are  not  constant  mental 
impressions  at  all.     (3)  That  "  constant  impressions"  in  the  form 


92  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


\ 


The  actual  facts  on  which  the  "  Law  of  Relativity  "  and 
*'  Law  of  Contrast "  are  based  seem  to  receive  a  simple 
physiological  explanation  in  the  enfeebling  effect  of  fatigue 
upon  the  sense-organ  and  nerves  engaged.  These  latter 
become  habituated  to  the  stimulus,  and  react  with  less  energy 
if  the  same  excitation  be  prolonged,  whilst  contrasted  feelings 
employ  fresh  neural  elements  or  other  cerebral  tracts. 
Moreover,  from  the  mental  side  uniform  sensation  diminishes 
in  interest,  and  attention  being  drawn  away  by  rival  novel 
stimuli,  the  m.onotonous  experience  attracts  less  and  less 
notice. 

The  Relativity  of  Knowledge. — There  is  another  form  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  consciousness,  which  maintains 
that  all  our  knowledge  is  relative  to  us,  and  that  we  have 
accordingly  no  real  knowledge  of  things  outside  of  the  mind. 
This  latter  question  will  be  discussed  more  appropriately 
after  we  have  dealt  with  sense-perception,  and  we  shall  treat 
it  under  the  title  of  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge  at  the  end  of 
chapter  vii.  Both  doctrines  are  erroneous,  but  many  writers 
maintain  the  second  without  adhering  to  the  first,  although 
those  who  adopt  the  first  naturally  adhere  also  to  the  second. 

The    Scholastic    Doctrine    of    the    Internal    Senses.  —  In 

addition  to  those  sensuous  faculties  by  which  we  are  enabled 
to  perceive  external  objects,  the  mind  is  endowed  with  the 
capability  of  apprehending  in  a  sensuous  manner,  facts  of  a 
subjective  order.  This  power  or  group  of  powers  constitutes 
those  modes  of  mental  life  styled  by  the  schoolmen  the  Internal 
Senses.  The  Aristotelian  doctrine  elaborated  by  the  mediaeval 
thinkers  distinguishes  four  such  faculties,  the  sensiis  communis, 
the  vis  cestimativa  or  vis  cogitativa,  the  imagination,  and  the 
sensuous  memory.  They  were  termed  senses,  or  organic  powers, 

of  "fixed  ideas"  are  the  very  reverse  of  a  "blank."  (4)  That  if 
every  feeling  were  "  two-fold  "  or  a  "  transition,"  a  man  surrounded 
by  a  blue  sky  and  ocean,  or  passing  from  a  neutral  to  a  positive 
state  of  consciousness,  must  be  unaware  of  any  impression  at  all, 
which  is  not  the  fact.  (5)  There  is,  too,  the  old  difficulty  of 
Buridan's  ass.  (6)  Moreover  differences,  which  are  themselves  real 
presentations  or  objects  of  apprehension,  are  cognized,  e.g.,  degrees 
of  variation  in  shade,  pitch,  pressure,  &c.,  and  therefore  presuppose 
the  perception  of  the  absolute  terms.  Mr.  Ward  also  rightly  traces 
Dr.  Bain's  confusion  on  this  subject  to  his  ignoring  the  difference 
between  the  mere  successive  or  simultaneous  occurrence  of  two  related 
feelings,  and  the  intellectual  perception  of  their  relation.  {"  Psychology," 
Encycl.  Brit.  Qlh  Edit.  See  also  Mark  Baldwin,  Senses  and  Intellect, 
pp.  58—61  ;  W.  James,  Vol.  II.  pp.  G — 20;  and  Farges,  VObjectivitc 
de  la  Perception,  pp.  104 — 115,  202 — 208.) 


THE  SENSES.  93 


because  they  operate  by  means  of  a  material  organ,  and  have 
for  their  formal  objects  individual,  concrete,  sensuous  facts. 
The  word  internal  marks  their  subjective  character,  and 
the  internal  situation  of  the  physical  machinery  of  their 
operations. 

Sensus  Communis. — The  sensus  communis,  or  common 
sense,  has  also  been  styled  the  internal  sense  and  the  central 
sense.  It  has  been  described  by  St.  Thomas,  after  Aristotle, 
as  at  once  the  source  and  the  terminus  of  the  special  senses. 
By  this  faculty  we  are  conscious  of  the  operations  of  the 
external  sensuous  faculties,  and  we  are  made  aware  of 
differences  between  them,  though  we  cannot  by  its  means 
cognize  them  as  different.  Apart  then  from  intellect,  by  which 
we  formally  compare  and  discriminate  between  objects,  some 
central  sense  or  internal  form  of  sensibility  is  required,  both 
in  the  case  of  man  and  of  the  lower  animals,  to  account  for 
the  complete  working  of  sensuous  life.  In  the  growth  and 
development  of  sense-perception,  the  action  of  this  internal 
form  of  sensuous  consciousness  is  involved.  Antecedent  to 
and  independent  of  intellectual  activity,  the  revelations  of 
the  several  senses  must  be  combined  by  some  central  faculty 
of  the  sensuous  order,  and  it  is  this  interior  aptitude  which 
has  been  called  sensus  communis-}^ 

Vis  Aistimativa. — The  vis  cestimativa,  or  sensuous  judicial 
faculty,  was  a  name  attributed  to  those  complex  forms  of 
sensuous  activity  by  which  an  object  is  apprehended  as  fit 
or  unfit  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  animal  nature.  It  thus  denotes 
that  capability  in  the  lower  animals  which  is  commonly 
described  as  Instinct.     The  term  vis  cogitativa  was  sometimes 

19  It  has  been  held  by  St.  Augustine,  St.  Thomas  (of.  Sum.  i. 
q.  78,  a.  4.  ad  2.  and  87.  3.  3),  and  other  philosophers,  that  no 
sense  can  know  its  own  states,  and  that,  not  merely  for  the  co- 
ordination of  the  different  senses,  but  for  the  cognition  of  any  single 
sensation,  an  internal  faculty  in  addition  to  the  special  sense  is 
requisite.  Aristotle  {De  Anima,  III.  1.  2)  decides  against  this  view 
on  the  intelligible  ground  that  such  a  doctrine  would  involve  an 
infinite  series  of  sensuous  faculties.  Elsewhere,  however  [De  Somno 
et  Vigilia,  1.  2),  he  appears  to  adopt  the  contrary  theory.  Suarez 
argues  cogently  against  this  multiplication  of  faculties  as  unneces- 
sary, and  his  teaching  appears  to  us  sound.  No  sense  can  have  a 
reflex  knowledge  of  its  own  states,  but  this  does  not  prevent  a  sense 
from  having  concomitantly  with  the  apprehension  of  something 
affecting  it  an  implicit  consciousness  of  its  own  modifications.  A 
being  endowed  with  the  sense  of  touch  or  hearing  ought  to  be  con- 
scious, it  would  seem,  of  tactual  or  auditory  sensations  without  the 
instrumentality  of  any  additional  faculty.  (Cf.  Suarez,  De  Anifna, 
Lib.  III.  c.  ii.  and  Lahousse,  op.  cit.  pp.  160 — 163.) 


94  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


employed  to  designate  the  aptitude  for  analogous  operations 
in  man,  at  other  times  to  signify  a  certain  mode  of  internal 
sensibility  operating  concurrently  with  the  intellect  in  the 
perception  of  individual  objects.-" 

Sentimento  Fondamentale. — The  term  sentimcnto  fonda- 
mentale,  or  fundamental  feeling,  was  employed  by  Rosmini  to 
denote  an  assumed  faculty,  or  form  of  sensuous  consciousness, 
by  which  the  soul  is  continually  cognizant  of  the  body  in  which 
it  is  present.'^^  The  soul,  he  teaches,  and  not  the  living  being 
composed  of  both  soul  and  body,  is  the  true  principle  of  this 
feeling.  It  is  by  their  modification  of  the  sentimento  fonda- 
vientale  ihdii  the  impressions  of  the  special  senses  reveal  them- 
selves to  the  soul.  The  fundamental  feeling,  unlike  the  sensiis 
communis  of  the  scholastics,  is  held  to  have  been  ever  in  a 
condition  of  activity,  even  antecedent  to  the  exercise  of  the 
special  senses.  "  It  begins  with  our  life,  and  goes  on  con- 
tinuously to  the  end  of  it."  Nevertheless,  it  is  rarely  adverted 
to,  and  considerable  power  of  psychological  reflection  may  be 
required  to  discover  its  existence.  By  this  feeling  we  have  a 
subjective  perception  of  our  organism ;  through  sight  and 
touch,  on  the  other  hand,  we  apprehend  it  in  an  extra-subjective 
manner.  Finally,  the  union  of  soul  and  body  consists  in  an 
immanent  perception  of  the  activity  of  this  faculty. 

Sensus  Fundamentalis. — Tongiorgi  uses  the  terni  senstis 
fundamentalis  in  a  kindred  meaning  to  denote  an  inferior  form 
of  the  sensus  intimus.  By  the  sensus  intimus,  he  understands  a 
perpetual  consciousness  both  of  its  own  substantial  existence 
and  of  its  acts,  with  which  he  maintains  the  soul  to  be 
endowed.     This  actual  cognizance  of  itself  is  essential  to  the 

20  It  was  urged  that  intellect,  the  formal  object  of  which  is  the 
miiversal,  cannot  directly  apprehend  individual  substances  as  such. 
Nevertheless,  we  have  intellectual  knowledge  of  them,  for  we  form 
singular  judgments,  e.g.  :  "  This  plant  is  a  rose,"  "  Peter  is  a  negro." 
Consequently,  it  was  inferred,  there  is  a  special  form  of  internal 
sensibility  through  which  the  concrete  object  is  so  apprehended 
that  by  reflection  upon  this  sensuous  presentation  the  intellect  can 
cognize  the  singular  nature  of  the  object.  St.  Thomas  thus  describes 
the  operation  :  "  Anima  conjuncta  corpori  per  intellectum  cognoscit 
singulare,  non  quidem  directe,  sed  per  quandam  reflexionem,  in 
quantum  soil,  ex  hoc,  quod  apprehendit  suum  intelligibile,  revertitur 
ad  considerandum  suum  actum  et  speciem  intelligibilem,  quas  est 
principium  ejus  operationis,  et  ejus  specie!  originem,  et  sic  venit  in 
considerationem  phantasmatum  et  singularium  quorum  sunt 
phantasmata.  Sed  hac  rejiexio  compleri  non  potest,  nisi  per  adjunctionem 
virtutis  cogitative  et  imaginative."  {Q.  Un.  de  Anima,  a.  20.  ad  i.) 

21  ''By  the  fundamental  feeling  of  life  we  feel  all  the  sensitive 
parts  of  our  body."  (77*^;  Origin  of  Ideas,  Eng.  Trans.  §  705.) 


THE  SENSES.  95 


soul  and  independent  of  all  special  mental  modifications.  It 
is,  moreover,  natura  if  not  tempore  antecedent  to  them;  yet,  as 
the  soul  exists  always  in  some  particular  state,  it  can  never 
apprehend  itself  unless  as  determined  by  an  individual 
affection.  The  sensus  intimus  exerts  itself  in  a  higher  and  a 
lower  form,  as  rational,  and  as  sensuous  consciousness.  By 
the  inferior  order  of  activity  the  soul  continuously  feels  its 
presence  in  the  body  which  it  informs,  and  thus  apprehends 
the  various  impressions  which  occur  in  different  parts  of  the 
organism.  This  sensuous  cognizance  of  the  body  he  styles 
the  sensus fundamentalis,  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  common  root  or 
principle  of  the  external  senses,- 

Suarez'  doctrine. — Accepting  the  doctrine  of  Suarez,  that 
there  is  neither  a  real,  nor  formal  distinction  between  the 
internal  senses,  it  does  not  appear  to  us  to  be  of  any  very 
profound  importance  what  classification  of  faculties  we  select, 
as  best  fitted  to  mark  off  the  various  phases  of  mental  life 
which  have  been  allotted  to  internal  sensibility.  Moreover, 
the  brain  seems  to  be  the  common  physical  basis  for  all  these 
different  modes  of  consciousness,  so  that  there  is  no  differentia- 
tion of  organ  corresponding  to  special  operations  which  might 
tell  decisively  in  favour  of  any  particular  scheme  of  division. 

Internal  Sense. — The  term  internal  sense  has  had  a  variety 
of  significations  in  the  history  of  Philosophy.  In  the  Peri- 
patetic system,  sensus  internus  designated  generically  the  four 
faculties,  sensus  communis,  vis  cestimativa  vel  cogitativa,phantasia, 
a.nd  memoria  sensitativa ;  but  also  at  times  it  indicated  more 
specifically  the  sensus  communis.  In  the  Cartesian  school,  the 
sensus  intimus  or  conscientia,  signified  all  consciousness  of  our 
own  states,  whether  sensuous  or  intellectual ;  and  the  latter 

-^  St.  Thomas  applies  the  term  sensus  fundamentalis  to  the  faculty 
of  touch.  The  sensus  fundamentalis,  as  described  by  Rosmini  and 
Tongiorgi,  has  been  objected  to  by  modern  scholastic  writers  on 
various  grounds,  (i)  Internal  sensibility,  since  it  is  an  organic 
faculty  apprehending  concrete  sensuous  facts,  must,  like  external 
sense,  pertain  not  to  the  soul  alone,  but  to  the  whole  being — the 
composituni  humannm.  (2)  The  primary  function  of  internal  sense  is 
the  apprehension  of  the  modifications  of  the  external  senses,  its 
exercise  must  thus  follow,  and  not  anticipate,  that  of  the  latter. 

(3)  There  is  absolutely  no  evidence  for  the  existence  of  a  perpetual 
cognition  of  our  own  body  independent  of  all  special   activities. 

(4)  The  constitution  of  the  union  of  body  and  soul  in  the  perception 
of  the  former  by  the  latter  would  reduce  their  connection  to  that  of 
an  accidental  alliance.  (Cf.  Liberatore,  On  Universals,  Trans,  by 
E.  Dering,  pp.  130,  seq.,  also  PsycJwlogia,  §§  27 — 29;  Lahousse, 
Psych.  %%  348 — 355.  Contra:  Tongiorgi,  Psych.  271,  280;  Rosmini, 
The  Origin  of  Ideas,  Vol.  II.  Ft.  V.  c.  iii.,  and  Psychology,  Eng. 
Trans.  Bk.  I.  c.  vii.) 


ij 


96 


SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


term  has  retained  the  same  connotation  with  modern  scholastic 
writers.--^  With  Locke,  internal  sense  is  equivalent  to  the  intel- 
lectual faculty  of  reflection,  by  which  our  mental  states  are 
observed.  With  Kant,  it  comprises  the  sensuous  intuition  of 
our  mental  states,  not,  however,  as  they  are  in  themselves, 
but  as  modified  by  the  a  priori  form  of  time.  The  term 
internal  sense,  legitimate  in  its  original  signification  in  the 
Peripatetic  system,  is  very  inappropriate  in  its  modern  usage 
as  expressing  the  intellectual  activity  of  self-consciousness. 
That  activity  is  neither  in  point  of  object,  of  nature,  nor  of 
intrinsic  dependence  on  physical  organ  akin  to  the  senses. 

Basis  of  Division. — The  scholastic  classification  of  four 
internal  senses  was  grounded  on  the  existence  of  generic 
differences  in  the  formal  objects  o£  the  several  faculties.  The 
formal  object  of  the  sensiis  communis  consists  of  the  actual 
operations  of  the  external  senses ;  that  of  the  imagination  is 
the  representation  of  what  is  absent ;  the  function  of  the  vis 
(Bstimativa  is  the  apprehension  of  an  object  as  remotely 
suitable  or  noxious  to  the  well-being  of  the  animal ;  that  of 
the  sensitive  memory  is  the  cognition  of  past  sensuous  experi- 
ences. Some  writers  reduced  these  faculties  to  two,  others 
augmented  them  to  six.  The  nature  of  the  distinction  between 
these  senses  was  also  disputed.  Suarez,^*  after  a  careful 
examination  of  the  various  opinions  on  the  point,  decides 
against  the  existence  of  either  a  real  or  a /or;;m/ distinction, 
and  contends  that  Aristotle  is  with  him  in  looking  on  the 
internal  senses  as  merely  diverse  aspects  or  phases  of  a  single 
sensuous  facult3\^-^ 

Common  Sense. — Common  sense  is  also  a  very  ambiguous 
term,  (i)  In  the  Aristotelian  Psychology,  it  meant  only  the 
internal  sense  above  described.  (2)  It  has  been  since  used 
to  express  certain  universal  and  fundamental  convictions  of 
mankind.  It  is  in  this  signification  that  it  has  been  appealed 
to  as  a  philosophical  criterion  of  truth  by  the  Scotch  school. 
(3)  In  ordinary  language  it  implies  good  sense,  sound  practical 
judgment.  (4)  Common  sensibility,  and  also  common  sense,  have 
been  sometimes  used  by  psychologists  to  indicate  {a)  the 
faculty  of  touch,  and  {b)  the  ccenassthesis  or  the  vital  sense, 
and  the  various  forms  of  organic  sensibility. 

Readings. — On  classification  of  the  senses,  cf.  St.  Thomas,  Sj<w.  i. 
q.  78.  a.  3 ;  De  Anima,  II.  11.  22 — 24,  et  III.  1.  i  ;  De  Sensii  et  Sensato, 

^^  Cf.  Tongiorgi,  PsycJioIogia,  Lib.  III.  c.  ii. 
^*  De  Anima,  III.  c.  2. 

"^  Cf  also  Lahousse,  PsycJioIogia,  §§  221—223;  and  on  the  other 
side  Sanseverino,  Dynamilogia,  cc.  3 — G. 


1 


THE   SENSES.  97 


1.  I.  On  the  various  senses,  cf.  De  Anima,  II.  11.  13 — 24,  De  Sensu  et 
Sensato,  Lib.  I.  Pesch  gives  an  exhaustive  account  of  the  Scholastic 
teaching  on  the  external  senses  {Instit.  Psych.  §§  521 — 561.)  Cf.  also 
Salis  Sewis'  Delia  Coioscenza  Sensitjva.  Of  modern  works  on  the 
special  senses,  cf.  Wyld,  Physics  and  Philosophy  0/ the  Senses,  Pt.  III.; 
Ladd,  op.  cit.  Pt.  I.  c.  v.  and  Pt.  II.  cc.  iii.  iv.  The  Five  Senses  of 
Man,  by  Bernstein,  is  a  good  popular  treatise  in  many  respects,  but 
the  author  frequently  confuses  in  a  very  crude  manner  the  physical 
and  the  psychological  processes.  On  internal  senses,  cf.  St.  Thomas, 
Sum.  i.  q.  78.  a.  4 ;  De  Anima,  III.  11.  2,  3;  Suarez,  De  Anima,  III. 
cc.  II,  30,  31;  Lahousse,  Psychologia,  c.  v.  art.  i;  Sanseverino, 
Dynamilogia,  cc.  iii.  v. ;  Pesch,  Instit.  Psych.  §§  561 — 623. 


H 


CHAPTER  VL 

PERCEPTION    OF   THE    MATERIAL    WORLD  :    CRITICAL 

SKETCH    OF   THE    LEADING   THEORIES    OF 

EXTERNAL   PERCEPTION. 

Psychology  and   Philosophy  of  Perception.— 

How  do  we  perceive  the  External  Material  World  ? 
and :  What  are  our  grounds  for  believing  in  its  real 
existence  ?  These  are  the  problems  which  have  most 
harassed  Philosophy  since  the  days  of  Descartes. 
The  two  questions,  the  Nature  of  external  percep- 
tion and  the  Validity  of  our  belief  in  a  material 
universe,  are  most  intimately  bound  up  with  each 
other.  The  worth  of  every  theory  of  cognition 
must  be  estimated  by  the  sufficiency  of  the  account 
which  it  gives  of  the  reality  that  is  known. 
Accordingly,  though  only  the  question  of  the 
character  of  the  process  of  apprehension  is  strictly 
psychological,  while  the  validity  of  the  act  belongs 
to  Epistemology^  or  Applied  Logic,  we  shall  find 
it  very  advantageous  in  the  interests  of  our  own 
science  to  trespass   here  a  little  on  the  domain  of 

1  Epistemologv  is  that  branch  of  Philosophy  which,  whether  it  be 
allotted  to  Applied  Logic,  Rational  Psychology,  or  Metaphysics, 
investigates  the  truth  or  validity  of  knowledge  in  general.  It  is 
separated  by  modern  psychologists  from  their  science,  which, 
according  to  them,  has  to  deal  only  with  the  genesis  and  growth  of 
knowledge. 


PERCEPTION   OF   THE  MATERIAL    WORLD. 


99 


another  volume  of  the  present  series.  This  impossi- 
bility of  separating  the  problems  of  the  genesis  and 
the  truth  of  knowledge  shows  again  the  futility  ol 
all  attempts  at  isolating  Phenomenal  Psychology 
from  Rational  Psychology  and  Philosophy  proper. 

Sceptical  Theories.— Let  us  begin  with  the 
more  fundamental  question  :  What  are  our  grounds 
for  believing  in  the  existence  of  a  Material  World 
outside  and  independent  of  our  thought  ?  The 
answer  given  by  certain  philosophers  is  that  there 
are  no  real  grounds  for  this  belief,  and  that  it  is  an 
illusion,  or,  at  any  rate,  an  irrational  prejudice. 
This  is  Scepticism.  Now  scepticism  may  be  of  either 
of  two  species  :  the  one,  ahsoliite  or  universal,  which 
denies  or  disputes  the  possibility  of  attaining  certi- 
tude by  any  of  our  faculties,  or  in  any  department 
of  knowledge;  the  other  mitigated,  limited,  ov partial 
scepticism,  which,  admitting  certain  truths  as  evident, 
and  certain  faculties  as  infallible  sources  of  cognition, 
yet  discredits  some  convictions  of  mankind  generally 
deemed  to  be  of  vital  importance.  Against  absolute 
scepticism  argument  is  alike  useless  and  impossible. 
Its  advocate  is  in  an  impregnable  position,  because 
he  puts  himself  outside  the  pale  of  discussion. 
Nothing  can  be  dcre  for  such  a  man  except  to  leave 
him  alone.  Of  partial  or  mitigated  sceptics  there 
are  many  varieties,  but  our  concern  here  is  only 
with  that  class,  commonly  called  Idealists,  who  deny 
the  existence  of  an  independent  material  world. 
Several  of  these  philosophers  will  be  refuted  in 
detail  in  our  historical  sketch  in  the  latter  part  of 
this  chapter,  and  an  exhaustiv^e  treatment  of  scepti- 


loo  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


cism  in  general  is  to  be  found  in  the  volume  of  this 
series  on  First  Principles  of  Knowledge.'^  Accordingly, 
we  will  here  limit  ourselves  to  a  brief  enumeration 
of  the  arguments  establishing  the  existence  of  an 
external  material  world. 

Philosophical  proof  of  Realism. — (i)  The  reality 
of  other  minds  is  admitted,  we  believe,  by  every  sect 
of  idealists  falling  short  of  absolute  scepticism.  But 
our  assurance  of  the  existence  of  other  minds  is  only 
an  inference  from  changes  in  the  bodies  which  they 
animate.  Consequently  we  cannot  deny  the  exist- 
ence of  the  latter  outside  of  our  own  consciousness 
and  maintain  the  independent  reality  of  the  former. 
But  if  we  admit  the  existence  of  other  human 
bodies,  clearly  we  cannot  reject  any  part  of  the 
material  universe.  (2)  The  idealist  cannot  explain 
the  course  and  development  of  his  own  mental  life 
without  implying  the  permanent  extra-mental  exist- 
ence of  his  sense-organs  and  bodily  frame.  (3)  The 
established  relations  between  mental  states  and 
their  neural  conditions,  and  in  fact  all  the  chief 
truths  of  Physiology  become  unintelligible  absur- 
dities if  the  permanent  existence  of  a  material 
organism  outside  of  our  thought  is  denied.  (4) 
Physical  science  in  general  assumes  the  existence 
of  an  independent  material  world,  and  the  harmony 
of  its  teaching  with  later  results  verifies  the  assump- 
tion. (5)  The  mutual  confirmation  of  our  several 
senses,  exhibited  in  experiences  of  sight,  touch,  and 
movement,  similarly  demonstrates  the  existence  of 
a  material    universe   outside    of  the    mind.     These 

2  Cf.  Ft.  I.  c.  viii.  and  Ft.  II.  c.  ii. 


PERCEPTION   OF   THE   MATERIAL    WORLD.         loi 

faculties,    which     present    to    us    the     extensiontil 
character   of    physical    objects    in    widely   different 
terms   of  consciousness,   nevertheless  agree   unani- 
mously as  regards  the  spatial  relations  of  parts  to 
parts.     The  diagonal,  for  instance,  bears  the  same 
proportion  to  the  sides  of  the  square,'  \vhethor  the' 
lengths   of    the    lines    be   apprehended    by,  yisuaJ,  , 
tactual,  or  motor  sensations.     No'iV  ^thi^i.  ujianiraJty  ' 
is  perfectly  accounted  for  if  by  our  several  faculties 
we  perceive  a  material  world  which  really  embodies 
these  spatial  relations.     But  if  there  does  not  exist 
an   extended   reality  outside   of  our   consciousness 
this  agreement  in  the  testimony  of  different  witnesses 
is  inexplicable. 

Psychology  of  External  Perception. — Theory  of 
Mediate  Perception. — The  arguments  just  given  will 
be  more  fully  developed  in  the  historical  sketch  at 
the  end  of  this  chapter,  but  their  mere  summary 
statement  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  existence  of 
an  extended  material  world  of  which  our  body  forms 
part.  The  psychological  question  now  emerges : 
How  do  we  perceive  or  know  this  outer  universe  ? 
Answers  to  this  question,  in  spite  of  many  important 
minor  differences,  may  for  the  present  be  reduced  to 
two.  On  the  one  side  the  majority  of  non-Catholic 
philosophers  since  the  time  of  Descartes  assume 
that  the  unextended  mind  cannot  have  an  immediate 
apprehension  of  extended  reality  in  any  form.  It 
can  directly  know  only  its  own  states.  Consequently 
the  chief  effort  of  modern  speculation  has  been, 
either,  assuming  the  existence  of  a  Material  World, 
to  explain  how  from  a  knowledge  of  purely  subjective 


102  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


feelings  the  mind  can  attain  to  the  cognition  of  such 
an  extra-mental  reality,  or,  rejecting  the  existence 
of  this  latter,  to  account  for  the  universal  illusion. 

Philosophers  believing  in  some  sort  of  an  inde- 
pendent Material  World,  who  maintain  that  the 
mind  can  onlv  attain  to  a  knowledge  of  such  a 
world'  mediately  as  an  inference  from  the  ideas,  or 
subjective  representations,  of  which  alone  we  are 
immediately  cognizant,  have  been  styled  Representa- 
iionalists  or  advocates  of  Mediate  Perception.  They 
have  also  been  called  Hypothetical  Realists,  Hypothe- 
tical Dualists,  or  Cosmothetic  Idealists,  since  they  look 
on  the  external  universe  as  a  necessary  hypothesis  to 
account  for  the  ideas  of  w^hich  we  have  an  imme- 
diate perception.  All  these  authors  err  in  the  one 
common  but  groundless  assumption  that  the  human 
mind  can  immediately  know  nothing  but  its  own 
unextended  states.  Starting  from  this  false  hypo- 
thesis, their  theories  give  no  adequate  account  of 
our  knowledge  of  extension,  and  logically  lead  to 
subjective  Idealism.  We  will  expose  some  of  their 
chief  defects  presently  in  our  Historical  Sketch. 

Immediate  Perception. —  In  complete  opposition 
to  Representationalism  are  to  be  found  Aristotle,  all 
the  leading  scholastics,^  mediaeval  and  modern,  and 
in  this  country  during  the  past  hundred  years, 
Reid,  Stewart,  and  Hamilton.  At  the  present  day 
Drs.  Martineau,  Mivart,  M'Cosh,  and  Porter,  are 
amongst  the  best  known  English-speaking  repre- 
sentatives of  the  same  line  of  thought.  All  these 
philosophers,  notwithstanding  sundry  lesser  points 

3  See  pp.  52,  54. 


PERCEPTION   OF  THE  MATERIAL    WORLD.        103 


of  disagreement,  hold  that   man,   at   all  events  in 
some  cognitive  acts,  immediately  apprehends  extended 
material  reality.     They  teach  that  knowledge  is  not 
limited  to  the  perception  of  mental  states,  or  to  the 
discernment  of  the  relations  between  ideas.     There 
are  outside  and  independent  of  the  world  of  thought 
real   things;    and   we   can,    these   writers   agree   in 
common  with  the  universal  conviction  of  mankind, 
cognize  at  least   some   of  them.     This  theory  has 
been  named  by  Hamilton  the  doctrine  of  Immediate 
or   Presentative   Perception,    because    it   asserts    that 
some   objects   of    knowledge    can    be    immediately 
present   to   the    knowing   subject.     Its    supporters 
have  also  been  styled  Natural  Realists,  and  Natural 
Dualists,   because   they   maintain   the    existence   of 
extended  material  reality  standing  in  opposition  to 
the  immaterial  mind  to  be  a  primitive  deliverance  of 
our  percipient  faculties. 

We  hold  the  true  doctrine  to  be  that  of  Imme- 
diate or  Presentative  Perception.  My  present  know- 
ledge of  an  extended  material  universe  independent 
of  my  mind  is  inexplicable  unless  at  least  in  some  of 
my  percipient  acts  there  is  contained  an  immediate 
apprehension  of  extension  ;  and  this  apprehension 
necessarily  reveals  a  duahty  or  opposition  between 
the  simple  subject  of  consciousness  and  the  objective 
material  reality.  The  growth  and  development  of 
our  several  percipient  faculties  will  be  described  in 
detail  in  our  next  chapter,  so  that  it  will  be  our 
duty  here  merely  to  expound  accurately  what  we 
consider  to  be  the  general  philosophical  theory  of 
Presentative  Perception. 


104 


SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


Ambiguity  of  Terms. — We  must  begin  by  clearing 
up  certain  confused  notions  wliich  have  often  obscured 
and  disfigured  the  treatment  of  the  problem,  not  only 
on  the  part  of  our  opponents,  but  even  in  the  hands 
of  some  able  and  vigorous  defenders  of  Immediate 
Perception,  especially  among  the  Scotch  school.  The 
exact  meaning  to  be  assigned  to  the  terms.  Ego  and 
Non-EgOf  Self  and  Not-Self,  Mind  and  External  World, 
in  this  controversy  is  of  the  very  first  importance ;  or 
rather  the  vital  point  is  that  whatever  definite  significa- 
tions are  attached  to  them  be  adhered  to  throughout. 

Ego  and  Mind. — Now  in  the  first  place  by  the 
term  Ego  is  to  be  understood  during  the  present  dis- 
cussion the  entire  person,  the  whole  man  made  up  of  body 
and  soul.  The  Non-Ego  is,  therefore,  whatever  is  not 
part  of  my  person.  In  strictness  it  includes  God  and 
the  universe  of  pure  spirits ;  but  as  the  reality  of 
immaterial  beings  does  not  enter  into  our  present 
controversy,  we  may  define  the  Non-Ego  as,  the  Material 
Universe  distinct  from  my  own  animated  organism.  Self  and 
Not- Self  are  to  be  considered  as  synonymous  with  £^(7 
and  Non-Ego.  The  terms.  Mind  and  External,  or  better, 
Extra-Mental  World,  must  be  carefully  distinguished 
from  the  former  pairs  of  words.  Abstracting  from  all 
questions  as  to  the  substance  of  the  soul,  by  Mind  we 
here  understand  the  unextended  conscious  subject,  the  unity 
of  m}''  psychical  existence,  viewed  apart  from  my  body. 
By  the  External  or  Extra-Mental  World,  is  meant  all 
material  reality,  including  both  my  own  body  and  the 
extra-organic  universe.  Mind  is  thus  narrower  than 
Self  or  Ego,  and  External  World  is  wider  than  Not-Self 
or  Non-Ego. 

Man  not  a  Pure  Spirit. — In  the  second  place  we 
must  make  clear  our  starting-point.  Some  representa- 
tionalists  often  argue  as  if  the  mind  were  de  facto 
completely  separated  from  the  body,  or  at  any  rate 
standing  out  of  all  relations  to  the  corporeal  frame. 
What  would  be  the  nature  of  perception  in  such  a 
situation  we  do  not  pretend  to  determine :  it  is  not  the 
problem  of  Human  Psychology.  We  take  man  as  he 
is ;   one  being  made  up  of  mind  and  body,  endowed 


PERCEPTION   OF  THE   MATERIAL    WORLD.         105 

with  sensuous  as  well  as  intellectual  faculties,  and 
possessed  of  a  variety  of  extended  sense-organs,  the 
natural  instruments  by  which  he  acquires  knowledge, 
not  only  of  the  surrounding  world,  but  of  his  own  body.* 
Two  Questions. — Now  in  the  problem  of  the 
Perception  of  the  Material  Universe,  two  points  connected 
with  the  ambiguous  terms  just  defined,  and  consequently 
almost  invariably  confounded,  have  to  be  kept  apart. 
They  are,  in  fact,  two  distinct  questions — the  one,  my 
apprehension  of  extension  and  extra-mental  reality  in 
any  form,  the  other,  my  cognition  of  the  Non-Ego  or 
Extra-Organic  portion  of  the  material  world.  To  begin 
with  the  first :  we  hold  it  to  be  certain  that  at  all 
events  in  the  case  of  its  own  organism  the  Ego  has  an 
immediate  perception  of  extension.  In  sensations  of 
sight  and  pressure  there  is  directly  revealed  space  of 
two  dimensions.  Whether  the  cause  of  the  sensation 
is  externalized,  projected  beyond  the  surface  of  the 
extended  organism,  or  not,  the  conscious  state  aroused 
immediately  presents  extension.  The  proof  of  this  lies 
in  the  fact  that  if  extension  were  not  so  given  the 
perceptions  and  conceptions  of  space  of  which  in 
mature  life  we  are  indubitably  possessed  could  never 
have  been  generated.  If  the  mind  knew  only  its  own 
simple  subjective  modifications,  our  present  cognition 
of  material  objects  would  be  impossible.  No  aggrega- 
tion, composition,  or  fusion  of  mental  states  which 
individually  do  not  present  any  element  of  extension, 
could  produce  the  notion  of  extension.  If  some  of  our 
senses  have  directly  revealed  space  to  us,  the  repre- 
sentations of  material  objects  which  we  form  can  be 
accounted  for;  if  none  of  them  had  done  so,  these 
representations  could  never  have  arisen.  This  argument 
will  be  more  fully  developed  when  we  come  to  criticize 
in  detail  the  theories  advanced  to  explain  the  genesis 
of  an  external  world  of  three  dimensions  out  of  simple 
conscious  states. 

4  It  may  be  well  to  remind  the  student  here  that  this  assump- 
tion of  an  extended  human  body  does  not  involve  us  in  any  pet itio 
principU.  We  are  not  now  proving  the  existence  of  a  material 
world— that  we  have  done  some  pages  back— but  we  are  explaining 
Jww  man  perceives  this  world. 


io6 


SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


Immediate  perception  of  Extension. — Next  comes  the 
question  :  Do  any  of  our  percipient  acts  immediately 
make  known  to  us  the  existence  of  a  reahty  other  than 
ourselves?  It  is  here  precision  and  consistency  in  the 
use  of  the  terms  Ego,  External  World,  and  the  rest, 
become  vitally  important  for  clearness  of  thought  in  the 
present  discussion.  We  have  said  that  in  certain 
percipient  acts,  more  particularly  in  those  of  sight  and 
touch,  there  is  given  an  immediate  presentation  of 
extension  :  Of  what  is  this  extension  apprehended  to 
be  an  attribute  ?  To  what  is  it  cognized  to  belong  ? 
In  mature  life,  undoubtedl}',  we  perceive  in  an 
apparently  instantaneous  flash  of  cognition  that  the 
object  against  which  we  press  is  a  soft  velvet  cushion, 
that  what  we  see  is  a  red-brick  house  at  the  far  side 
of  a  river.  But  this  does  not  settle  the  question,  for 
in  these  acts  there  demonstrably  are  involved  complex 
processes  of  inference  or  association  of  ideas.  Taking, 
however,  the  sensations  of  vision  and  pressure  in  their 
simplest  form,  do  they  immediately  give,  in  addition  to 
the  perception  of  extension,  a  knowledge  of  material 
reality  as  distinct  from  the  percipient  agent  ?  The 
solution  of  this  question  will  be  found  in  reverting  to 
our  distinctions.  In  the  simplest  percipient  act  w-hich 
directly  reveals  extension  there  is  given  an  immediate 
apprehension  of  "otherness,"  at  least  in  the  sense  of 
the  extra-mental.  Extension,  whether  it  pertains  to  our 
own  sense-organs,  or  to  objects  outside  of  our  body,  is 
at  all  events  not  an  attribute  of  simple  mental  modifica- 
tions. It  is  opposed  to  the  subjective  conscious  act. 
Consequently,  aUhough  in  the  earlier  stages  of  life  such 
distinctions  may  not  be  explicitly  realized,  there  is 
given  in  the  immediate  presentation  of  extension — 
whether  this  extension  be  referred  to  the  Ego,  to  the 
Non-Ego,  or  not  determinately  to  either — an  immediate 
apprehension  of  what  is  not  the  Mind.  There  is  thus 
an  ultimate  duality  in  our  consciousness  at  least  in  this 
signification  that  some  of  our  faculties  are  capable  of 
immediate]}''  apprehending  extension,  and  extension 
thus  apprehended  necessarily  stands  opposed  to  the 
unextcnded  mind. 


PERCEPTION   OF  THE  MATERIAL    WORLD.         107 

Perception  of  extra-organic  Objects. — But  is  Duality 
immediately  given  in  the  wider  sense  ?  Does  the  per- 
cipient act  not  only  directly  manifest  to  me  an  extended 
phenomenon  irreducibly  opposed  to  the  simplicity  of 
the  purely  subjective  state,  but  does  it  also  immediately 
reveal  this  extended  phenomenon  as  other  than  my  Ego, 
other  than  my  Self  in  the  sense  of  my  whole  being,  body 
and  soul  ?  or  is  my  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a 
Non-Ego  in  the  strict  sense — of  a  material  world  outside 
of  my  own  body — is  this  cognition  of  a  more  complex, 
mediate,  and  possible  inferential  character?  This  is 
certainly  a  more  disputable  point.  The  majority  of 
Natural  Realists  seem  at  times  to  imply  that  the 
Non-Ego  in  the  sense  of  Extra-organic  material  reality 
is  originally  presented  as  extended,  distinct  from,  and 
opposed  to  my  whole  bodily  self;  but  the  distinction 
between  the  two  uses  of  the  term  Ego — as  including 
and  as  excluding  the  organism — is  on  such  occasions 
rarely  kept  clearly  in  view.  The  second,  or  qualified 
form  of  Natural  Dualism,  would  maintain  that,  whereas 
extension,  and  therefore  objective  reality,  standing  in 
opposition  to  the  mind,  is  originally  immediately  given 
in  sensations  of  my  own  organism,  yet  cognition  of 
material  reality  as  external  to  my  organism  is  a  result 
of  analysis,  comparison,  and  inference.  This  view,  in 
fact,  holds  that  our  perception  of  the  extra-organic 
universe,  although  in  tlie  developed  intelligence  so  easy 
and  rapid,  is  nevertheless  a  complex  process. 

It  does  not  appear  to  us  that  this  second  form  of 
the  doctrine  of  Presentative  Perception  is  always 
realized  with  sufficient  distinctness.  The  Non-Ego 
ma}^  indeed,  be  originally  and  immediately  presented 
in  some  of  the  infant's  first  percipient  acts  as  extrinsic 
to  its  organism.  But  this  is  not  necessary  tD  account 
for  our  later  knowledge.  Fortunately,  however,  this 
second  stage  of  the  problem  of  Perception  is  of  little  or 
no  philosophical  importance ;  and  at  any  rate  the 
line  of  demarcation  between  inference  and  immediate 
judgment  is  not  very  well  defined.  It  is  essential 
that  extension,  and  consequently,  a  reality  opposed  to 
the  unextended    subject  of  consciousness,   be  directly 


io8  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


presented,  but  granted  such  an  immediate  perception, 
even  limited  to  the  spatial  character  of  my  own  material 
organism,  our  knowledge  of  the  rest  of  the  universe 
would  be  easily  developed.^  In  the  next  chapter  we 
shall  describe  this  process  of  development.  Before 
doing  so,  however,  we  shall  insert  a  historical  retrospect. 

Historical   Sketch   of   Modern   Theories   of   External 

Perception. 

The  question  of  External  Perception  has  played  such  a 
large  part  in  modern  philosophical  speculation  that  we  deem 
it  expedient  to  attempt  a  brief  sketch  of  the  subject.  And 
we  do  this  all  the  more  willingly  because  experience  has 
assured  us  that  here,  as  often  elsewhere,  the  most  convincing 
proof  of  the  true  doctrine  is  to  be  found  in  a  careful  examina- 
tion of  the  history  of  counter-hypotheses. 

Descartes  (1596 — 1650),  whose  philosophical  speculations 
start  from  the  dictum  that  I  have  an  immediate  and  infallible 
knowledge  of  my  own  thought  and  of  nothing  more,  may  be 
justly  considered  the  author  of  the  problem  of  the  bridge 
from  the  mind  to  the  material  world.  It  is  to  Locke  (1632 — 
1704),  however,  that  the  various  forms  of  British  scepticism, 
together  with  the  idealism  of  Kant,  are  to  be  traced.  Know- 
ledge, Locke  repeatedly  maintains,  consists  in  the  perception 
of  agreement  or  difference  between  our  ideas.  We  thus 
immediately  apprehend,  not  an  external  reality,  but  our  own 
mental  states.  Nevertheless,  Locke  holds  that  a  material 
world  does  exist  outside  of  the  mind.  He  is  thus  a  Hypo- 
thetical Dualist.  We  only  know  psychical  representations, 
but  we  posit  as  their  cause  a  physical  universe. 

Bishop  Berkeley  (1685 — 1753)  soon  made  manifest  the 
inconsistencies  of  Locke's  teaching.  Berkeley  is  celebrated 
chiefly  for  two  contributions  to  the  history  of  Philosophy, 
his  system  of  Phenomenalistic  Idealism  and  the  Theory  of 
Vision  known  by  his  name.  The  essence  of  the  latter  is 
contained  in  the  two  tenets  that  the  eye  of  itself  can  perceive 
neither  (a)  distance,  nor  (b)  surface  extension.  Visual  sensa- 
tions had  originally  as  little  reference  to  space  as  sounds  or 

^  Thus  Hamilton  justly  observes:  "It  is  sufficient  to  establish 
the  simple  fact,  that  we  are  competent,  as  consciousness  assures  us, 
immediately  to  apprehend  the  Non-Ego  in  certain  limited  relations; 
and  it  is  of  no  consequence  whatever,  either  to  our  certainty  of  the 
reality  of  the  material  world,  or  to  our  ultimate  knowledge  of  its 
properties,  whether  by  this  primary  apprehension  we  lay  hold,  in 
the  first  instance,  on  a  larger  or  a  lesser  portion  of  its  contents." 
{On  Rcid,  p.  814.) 


MODERN  THEORIES  OF  EXTERNAL  PERCEPTION.  109 

tastes.     By  experience  and  association,  the  sensations  of  the 
eye    grow  to    be    symbols  of  tactual  and  motor  sensations 
which  constitute  our  knowledge  of  solid  bodies  and  of  space 
of  three  dimensions.     From  this  account  of  the  psychology 
of  perception  the  transition  to  his  metaphysical  theory  of  the 
nature  of  the   External  World  is  easy.     Locke's  groundless 
assumption  that  we  can  immediately  perceive   nothing  but 
our  own  mental   states,  is    accepted   without  question.     All 
objects   of  knowledge   are   held  to   be  reducible  to  ideas  of 
the  senses  (sensations),  internal  feelings  such  as  emotions, 
and   acts   of    the    imagination.      Accordingly,   we   may    not 
assert  the  existence  of  an  independent  extra-mental  world. 
We  can  know  or  perceive  only  what  is  in  the  mind.     The 
esse  of  every  knowable   object   is  percipi.     If  material   sub- 
stances  existed    beyond    consciousness,   they   could    in    no 
way   be   like  our    ideas,    and    cognition   of    such   things   by 
ideas   would    be   impossible.      Moreover,   matter   could    not 
act   upon   an    unextended  spirit.     Therefore  the   hypothesis 
of  an   inert  corporeal   world  which   has   existed  for  a  time 
unperceived  must  be  abandoned.     Still,  Berkeley  vigorously 
asserted    that    his    theory   is    in    complete    harmony    with 
the   belief   of    mankind.      The   table,    chair,    or   fire,   which 
I   perceive,    he   does   not   deny   to   exist ;    but,    adhering   to 
Locke's  assumption,  he  calls  whatever  is  apprehended   an 
idea,  and  going  still  further  he  repudiates  the  hypothetical 
material    cause  supposed    by  his  master  to    have  awakened 
these  ideas.     But  whence  then  do  these  ideas  come,  and  what 
happens  when  I  cease  to  perceive  them  ?     Berkeley  replies 
that  God,  and  He  alone,  is  the  cause  of  my  ideas.     By  the 
Divine  agency,  and  not  by  any  hidden  inconceivable  material 
substance,  the  permanence,  regularity,  and  orderliness  of  the 
ideas   are   sustained.      When    I    no    longer   think    of    ideas 
(material  objects)  they  still  endure  in  the  Divine  mind,  and 
may  be  apprehended  by  other  men.     In  Berkeley's  system, 
then,  there  are  held  to  exist  minds  or  spiritual  substances, 
ideas,  and  the  Divine  spirit.*^ 

^  Berkeley's  theory  may  be  objected  to  on  various  grounds,  such 
as  his  equivocal  use  of  the  terms  idea  and  conceive,  and  his  un- 
questioning acceptance  of  Locke's  assumption,  but  we  have  never 
seen  any  experiential  argument  which,  strictly  speaking,  disproves 
the  hypothesis  of  hyperphysical  Idealism.  God,  without  the  inter- 
vention of  a  material  world,  could  potcntid  absolutd  immediately 
produce  in  men's  minds  states  like  to  those  which  they  experience 
in  the  present  order.  The  only  demonstrative  argument  against 
the  Theistic  Immaterialist  is,  that  such  a  hypothesis  is  in  conflict 
with  the  attribute  of  veracity  which  he  must  ascribe  to  the  Deity. 
God  could  not  be  the  author  of  such  a  fraud. 


110  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


David  Hume  (171 1 — 1776),  similarly  starting  from  Locke's 
principles,  pushed  Berkeley's  Idealism  to  the  most  absolute 
scepticism.  All  cognitions,  or  all  objects  of  cognition — for 
with  these  writers  the  terms  are  interchangeable  —  are 
reducible  to  impressions  (sensations)  and  ideas,  fainter  copies 
of  the  former.  To  explain  our  belief  in  a  permanent  external 
reality,  as  well  as  to  account  for  our  other  fundamental 
convictions,  Hume  appeals  to  the  laws  ot  the  Association  of 
Ideas.  Through  '•  custom  "  by  the  reiterated  occurrence  of 
various  impressions  we  grow  to  believe  in  the  enduring 
existence  of  material  things  when  unperceived.  Such  belief 
is,  however,  an  illusion ;  we  only  know  the  transient  mental 
impressions.  There  is  no  such  thing  anywhere  as  an  abiding 
substance,  the  substratum  of  changing  qualities  or  accidents. 
We  have  no  "impression"  of  it,  therefore  it  does  not  exist. 
Berkeley  got  thus  far  as  regards  the  notion  of  materird 
substance;  but  Hume  logically  shows  that  by  the  same 
reasoning  the  idea  of  a  spiritual  substance,  of  a  permanent 
mind  amid  changing  states  of  consciousness  is  equally 
fictitious  and  unreal.  The  mind,  just  as  well  as  the  material 
world,  is  nothing  more  than  a  cluster  of  transitory  impres- 
sions. The  persuasion  that  nothing  can  begin  to  exist 
without  a  cause  is  also  due  to  association.  No  single 
experience  could  give  us  the  idea  of  causation ;  but  the 
frequent  repetition  of  two  successive  impressions  so  welds 
them  together  in  our  minds  that  we  are  deluded  into  the 
belief  of  some  mysterious  causal  knot  binding  them,  while 
there  is  really  no  connexion  but  that  of  succession.  This 
illusory  belief  in  particular  instances  of  causality  is  afterwards 
gradually  widened  into  the  universal  law,  that  every  being 
which  begins  to  exist  presupposes  a  cause. 

We  have  here  all  the  essentials  of  later  associatiovdsm.  The 
substantial  souls,  retained  by  Berkeley,  follow  the  material 
world  of  Locke,  and  the  Divine  Spirit  also  becomes  a  useless 
and  inconceivable  hypothesis.  Hume,  too,  possessed  the 
merit  of  realizing  clearly  and  frankly  admitting,  what  sub- 
sequent disciples  of  sensism  either  fail  to  see,  or  attempt  to 
ignore,  that  the  groundwork  of  physical  science,  and  the 
certainty  and  exactness  of  mathematics  are  fatally  destroyed 
by  consistently  following  out  the  assumptions  of  the  school. 
The  conclusions  of  the  Scotch  sceptic  thus  constitute  a 
complete  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  Locke's  principles. 

J.  Stuart  Mill  and  Dr.  Bain. — The  chief  modifications 
introduced  into  the  general  theory  by  more  recent  sensaticn- 
alists,  are  the  final  dismissal  of  Berkeley's  hypothesis  of 
the  Divine  action,  the  greater  importance  assigned  to  the 
muscular  sense,  and  a  more  elaborate  attempt  to  harmonize 


MODERN  THEORIES  OF  EXTERNAL  PERCEPTION,  m 


the  new  conception  of  the  external  world  with  ordinary 
beliefs.  However,  the  arguments  are  in  the  main  similar 
in  kind  to  those  urged  by  the  earlier  advocates.  Thus,  it 
is  asserted,  that  a  world  existing  independently  of  the  mind 
is  inconceivable.  "  To  perceive  is  an  act  of  the  mind.  .  .  . 
To  perceive  a  tree  is  a  mental  act;  the  tree  is  known  as 
perceived  and  not  in  any  other  way.  There  is  no  such  thing 
known  as  a  tree  wholly  detached  from  perception,  and  we 
can  only  speak  of  what  we  know."  Consequently,  the  hypo- 
thesis of  an  external  world  existing  when  unperceived  is 
absurd.  "  The  prevailing  doctrine  is  that  a  tree  is  something 
in  itself  apart  from  all  perception ;  that  by  its  luminous 
emanations  it  impresses  our  minds,  and  is  then  perceived, 
the  perception  being  the  effect  of  an  unperceived  tree  the  cause. 
But  the  tree  is  known  only  through  perception ;  what  it  may 
be  anterior  to  or  independent  of  perception  we  cannot  tell ; 
we  can  think  of  it  as  perceived  but  not  as  unperceived.  There 
is  a  manifest  contradiction  in  the  supposition,  that  we  are 
required  at  the  same  moment  to  perceive  the  thing  and  not  to 
perceive  it."'' 

The  ^^  Psychological'^  or  Empiricist  doctrine  of  our  belief  in 
matter. — The  chief  strength,  however,  of  the  theory  lies  in  the 
asserted  sufficiency  of  the  account  which  it  professes  to  give 
of  the  material  world  apprehended  by  us.  Assuming  as 
self-evident  the  axiom  that  we  can  know  only  our  own  ideas, 
the  external  universe,  it  is  alleged,  really  means  to  us  nothing 
more  than  certain  sensations  plus  possibilities^  of  other  sensa- 
tions. The  most  objective  and  real  attributes  of  material 
things  are  in  common  belief  their  extension  and  impenetrability. 

"^  Dr.  Bain,  Mental  Science,  pp.  197,  ig8.  In  Emotions  and  Will 
(3rd  Edit.),  p.  578,  he  still  denies  that  "  the  situation  intimates 
anything  as  an  existence  beyond  consciousness."  This  argument  in  the 
hands  of  Dr.  Bain,  as  in  those  of  Berkeley,  is  based  on  a  deceptive 
ambiguity  in  the  terms  "conceive"  and  "perceive."  We  cannot 
of  course /^/w/f^  an  unperceived  world,  nor  can  we  conceive  a  world 
the  conception  of  which  is  not  in  the  mind ;  but  there  is  no  contra- 
diction or  absurdity  in  the  proposition:  "A  material  world  of 
three  dimensions  has  existed  for  a  time  unperceived  and  unthought 
of  by  any  created  being,  and  then  revealed  itself  to  human  minds." 
Dr.  Bain's  description  of  the  "prevailing  doctrine"  is  only 
applicable  to  the  theory  of  mediate  perception.  It  does  not  r^fer 
to  Natural  Realism,  which  makes  the  external  material  reality  the 
perceived  and  not  the  2/Hperceived  cause  of  our  cognitions. 

*  It  should  be  carefully  borne  in  mind  that  in  the  associationist 
theory  a  "possibility  of  sensation"  is  not  a  real  actual  agent 
existing  out  of  consciousness.  It  is  as  such,  non-existent.  Its  only 
existence  is  in  the  idea  or  conception  by  which  future  experiences  ars 
represented.     Mill  seems  frequently  to  forget  this. 


112  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


Nevertheless,  these  properties,  it  is  asserted,  are  ultimately 
reducible  to  groups  of  muscular  feelings  possible  and  actual. 
"  The  perception  of  matter,  or  the  object  consciousness,  is 
connected  with  the  putting  forth  of  muscular  energy  as 
opposed  to  passive  feelings.  .  .  .  Our  object  consciousness 
further  consists  of  the  uniform  connection  of  Definite  feelings 
with  Definite  energies.  The  effect  that  we  call  the  interior 
of  a  room  is  in  the  final  analysis  a  regular  series  of  feelings 
of  sense  related  to  definite  muscular  energies.  A  movement 
one  pace  forward  makes  a  distinct  and  definite  change  in  the 
ocular  impressions ;  a  step  backwards  exactly  restores  the 
previous  impression.  .  .  .  All  our  so-called  sensations  are  in 
this  way  related  to  movenients.  .  .  .  On  the  other  hand, 
what  in  opposition  to  sensations  we  call  the  flow  of  ideas — 
the  truly  mental  or  subjective  life — has  no  connection  with 
our  movements.  We  may  remain  still  and  think  of  the 
different  views  of  a  room,  of  a  street,  of  a  prospect  in  any 
order."  ^ 

The  apparently  independent  world  of  every-day  experience 
has  not  suddenly  manifested  itself  to  us  after  the  manner  of 
a  transitory  hallucination.  It  is  a  gradual  growth,  and  it  is 
in  tracing  the  supposed  genesis  of  this  illusory  belief  that 
Mill  best  exhibited  his  psychological  and  metaphysical 
ingenuity.  Starting  with  the  postulates  of  expectation,  the 
occurrence  of  impressions,  and  the  laws  of  mental  associa- 
tion, he  professes  satisfactorily  to  explain  all  our  present 
convictions.  We  experience,  he  says,  various  sensations,  such 
as  those  of  colour,  sound,  and  touch.  After  they  have  passed 
away  we  conceive  them  as  possible.  These  feelings  usually 
occur  in  groups,  thus  the  consciousness  of  yellow  is  found  in 
combination  with  certain  sensations  of  contact,  of  smell,  and 
of  taste,  which  go  to  make  up  our  perception  of  an  orange. 
Similarly,  visual  feelings  precede  the  tactual  sensations  which 
we  have  come  in  course  of  time  to  call  the  table.  By  associa- 
tion the  groups  of  states  become  so  knotted  together  that  one 
of  them  by  itself  is  able  to  awaken  in  idea  the  rest,  and  to 
suggest  them  to  us  as  possible  experiences.  A  material  object 
is,  in  fact,  to  us  at  any  time  one  or  two  actual  feelings  with 
the  belief  in  a  suite  of  others  as  possible.  The  actual  im- 
pressions are  transient ;  the  possibilities  axe  permanent. 

In  addition  to  the  feature  of  permanence  and  fixity  among 
these  groups  of  possible  impressions  there  is  the  constant  and 
regular  order  which  we  observe  among  them.  By  association 
this  gives  rise  to  the  notions  of  causation,  power,  and  activity ; 
and  we  gradually  come,  on  account  of  their  permanent 
character,  to  look  upon  the  groups  of  possible  sensations  as 
^  Bain,  Mental  Science,  pp.  199,  200. 


MODERN  THEORIES  OE  EXTERNAL  PERCEPTION.  113 


the  cause  of  the  actual  feehngs.  Moreover,  finding  changes 
to  take  place  among  the  possibilities  of  our  impressions 
independently  of  our  consciousness,  we  are  led  by  abstraction 
to  erect  these  possibilities  into  an  entirely  independent 
material  world.  This  operation  is  completed  by  the  dis- 
covery, that  otJicy  human  beings  have  an  experience  similar 
to  our  own,  and  ground  their  conduct  on  the  same  permanent 
possibilities  as  ourselves.  Besides  the  apparent  permanence 
and  independence  of  the  material  world,  its  most  striking 
contrast  with  our  sensations  lies  in  its  extension  and  impene- 
trability. The  latter  property,  however,  is  merely  the  feeling 
of  muscular  action  impeded.  Space  is  similarly  an  abstrac- 
tion from  motor  feelings.  Muscular  sensations  differing  in 
duration  "give  us  the  consciousness  of  hnear  extension 
inasmuch  as  this  is  measured  by  a  sweep  of  a  limb  moved 
by  muscles.  .  .  .  The  discrimination  of  length  in  any  one 
direction  includes  extension  in  any  direction."  Not  only  is 
the  idea  of  space  derived  from  non-spatial  feelings  successive 
in  time,  but  this  mode,  "in  which  we  become  aware  of 
extension  is  affirmed  by  the  psychologists  in  question  to  be 
extension."  "  We  have  no  reason  for  believing  that  space 
or  extension  in  itself  is  anything  different  from  that  by  which 
we  recognize  it.''^"  The  synchronous  character  of  space 
receives  its  completion  from  sight,  which  presents  to  us 
simultaneously  a  vast  number  of  visual  impressions  associated 
with  possibilities  of  motor  and  tactual  feelings.  Such  is  the 
empiricist  theory  of  our  belief  in  a  material  world. 

Criticism.— Phenomenal  Idealism  as  thus  advocated  has 
been  attacked  from  many  different  points  of  view,  but  we  can 
here  afford  space  for  only  a  few  of  the  leading  diflficuhies 
which  seem  to  us  absolutely  fatal  to  the  hypothesis,  (i)  In 
the  first  place,  as  we  have  already  indicated.  Idealism  is 
incompatible  not  only  with  vulgar  prejudices,  but  with  the 
best  estabhshed  truths  of  science.  Astronomy,  Geology, 
physical  Optics,  and  the  rest  of  the  physical  sciences,  are 
inseparably  bound  up  with  the  assumption  that  matter  which 
is  neither  a  sensation  nor  an  imaginary  possibility  of  a  sensation 
exists  apart  from  observation.  They  teach  that  real,  actual, 
material  bodies,  of  three  dimensions,  not  only  exist,  but  act 
upon  each  other  according  to  known  laws  whilst  no  human  mind 
is  contemplating  them.  Possibilities  enjoying  no  existence 
beyond  consciousness  could  not  attract  each  other  with  a 
force  varying  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance ;  they 
could  not  pass  from  green  forests  into  coal  beds,  nor  could 
they  refract  or  interfere  with  other  phenomena  so  as  to 
determine  the  character  of  visual  sensations  independently  of 
^^  Mill's  Exam,  of  Hamilton  (2nd  Edit.),  pp  223,  229,  230. 
I 


I 


((    UNIVERSITY 


114 


SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


our  wills.  How,  for  instance,  is  the  double  discovery  of  the 
planet  Neptune  from  the  simultaneous  but  independent  calcu- 
lations by  Adams,  and  Leverrier,  to  be  explained,  if  there  are 
not  in  the  universe  besides  human  minds  extended  agents 
which  retain  and  exert  their  influence  when  unthought  of  by 
any  created  intelligence. 

(2)  This  irreconcilability  between  phj^sical  science  and 
phenomenal  IdeaHsm  results  in  a  very  noteworthy  case  of 
felo  de  sc  in  the  hands  of  Dr.  Bain.'  He  commences  his 
works  on  Empirical  Psychology  with  an  elaborate  account  of 
the  brain,  the  nervous  system,  and  the  various  sense-organs. 
Later  on  in  the  same  volumes  he  resolves  the  material  world, 
including,  we  presume,  the  aforesaid  objects,  into  a  collection 
of  mental  states.  Finally,  in  his  book  on  Mind  and  Body,  he 
rec-olves  the  mind,  that  is,  the  total  series  of  conscious  states, 
into  subjective  aspects  or  phases  of  neural  currents.  Now 
obviously  there  is  at  least  one  absurdity  here.  What  is  the 
exact  meaning  of  the  statement  that  a  mental  state  is  but  the 
subjective  aspect  of  a  nervous  process,  which  is  itself  but  a 
group  of  sensations  ?  At  one  time  the  mind  is  alleged  to  be 
a  function  of  the  brain,  and  elsewhere  the  brain,  with  the 
rest  of  the  physical  universe,  is  analyzed  into  a  plexus  of 
muscular  feelings  incapable  of  existing  beyond  consciousness. 
These  two  mutually  destructive  tenets.  Phenomenal  Idealism 
and  Physical  Materialism,  are  the  logical  outcome  of  the 
sensist  theory  of  cognition ;  but  unfortunately  disciples  of 
that  school  do  not  usually  reason  out  on  both  sides  the 
consequences  of  their  assumptions  with  the  clearness  and 
courage  of  Dr.  Bain.  The  only  subject  for  regret  is  that  the 
latter  writer  neither  attempts  to  reconcile  the  two  repugnant 
theses,  nor  frankly  avows  that  they  form  a  reductio  ad  ahsurdnm 
of  his  theory  .1^ 

^^  The  defence  suggested  by  some  writers,  that  the  scientific 
psychologist  is  no  more  bound  to  give  a  metaphysical  account  of 
the  materials  with  which  he  deals  than  the  astronomer,  or  the 
geologist,  is  a  mere  shallow  evasion  of  the  difficulty.  Psychology 
stands  here  in  quite  a  different  position  from  that  of  all  the 
physical  sciences.  Its  first  duty  is  to  furnish  such  an  exposition 
of  the  nature  of  cognition  as  will  secure  an  intelligible  meaning  to 
the  terms  employed  in  all  sciences  including  itself,  and  assuredly 
it  may  not  with  impunity  reduce  its  own  statements  to  nonsensical 
absurdities.  If  it  resolves  neural  currents  into  modifications  of 
consciousness,  it  may  not  then  turn  round  and  resolve  this  con- 
sciousness into  aspects  of  the  aforesaid  currents.  If  it  does  so,  it  is 
bound  at  all  events  to  explain  the  precise  significance  of  the  out- 
come of  this  interesting  dialectical  feat.  Mill's  very  just  contention 
against  Hamilton  is  very  much  to  the  point  here.    "  When  a  thinker 


MODERN  THEORIES  OF  EXTERNAL  PERCEPTION.  115. 


(3)  Again,  the  primary  assumption  on  which  all  pheno- 
menalistic  theories  since  the  days  of  Locke  have  been  based 
is  false.  That  we  can  only  know  our  own  mental  states,  that 
we  cannot  apprehend  material  reality  as  affecting  us  is' 
neither  an  a  priori  nor  a  self-evident  truth,  and  still  less  can 
it  be  established  from  experience.  The  fact  that  we  are 
unable  to  imagine  how  matter  can  act  upon  mind,  or  how 
mind  can  become  immediately  cognizant  of  something  other 
than  itself,  is  no  objection  against  the  clear  testimony  of 
consciousness,  as  manifested  after  the  most  careful  intro-. 
spection,  that  the  mind  does  immediately  perceive  something 
other  than  itself  acting  upon  it.  Moreover,  from  this  first 
illegitimate  assumption  flows  the  second  error,  that  extension 
is  identical  with  that  by  which  it  is  measured.  The  velocity  of 
a  moving  locomotive  or  of  a  flying  swallow  is  not  the  same 
thing  as  its  force.  Now,  our  knowledge  of  extension  may 
receive  accurate  definition  and  determination,  mainly  by 
means  of  the  muscular  sensations,  and  yet  what  we  call  the 
extension  of  objects  may  be  not  only  something  different 
from  these  sensations,  but  it  may  also  be  immediately 
apprehended  in  a  less  defined  manner  through  some  other 
senses. 

(4)  Further,  we  must  deny  in  toto  that  sensations,  muscular 
or  any  other,  viewed  in  themselves  as  purely  subjective,  non- 
spatial  feelings,  could  ever  by  any  process  of  addition  or 
transformation  be  worked  up  into  an  apparently  extra-mental 
world.  It  is  only  by  the  surreptitious  introduction  of 
extended  elements  that  an  extended  product  can  be  effected  ; 
and  the  great  use  made  of  the  muscular  sensations  in  the 
empiricist  theory  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  illicit  transition 
from  the  asserted  originally  subjective  signification  of  motor 
sensations  to  the  objective  meaning  implied  in  ordinary 
beliefs  is  liable  to  escape  notice.  If  these  feelings  are 
steadily  remembered  to  be  simple  states  of  consciousness 
varying  only  in  duration  and  intensity,  it  will  be  seen  that 
they  cannot,  any  more  than  sensations  of  sound  or  smell, 
"  consolidate "  into  extended  objects.  Duration — serial 
length  in  time — belongs  to  all  sensations,  yet  many  of  these 
afford  no  knowledge  of  space,  much  less  constitute  it.  Sensa- 
tions may  also  vary  in  intensity  without  evoking  the  notion 

is  compelled  by  one  part  of  his  philosophy  to  contradict  another 
part,  he  cannot  leave  the  conflicting  assertions  standing  and  throw 
the  responsibility  of  his  scrape  on  the  arduousness  of  his  subject ;. 
a  palpable  self-contradiction  is  not  one  of  the  difficulties  which  can 
be  adjourned  as  belonging  to  a  higher  department  of  science.*' 
(Exam.  pp.  122,  123.) 


I 


Ii6  SENSUOUS  LIFE 


of  velocity  ;  this  latter  cognition,  in  fact,  presnpposes  the  idea 

of  space. 

In   all   associationalist   accounts   of    the   genesis   of    our 
knowledge  of  an   external  world  there  is  a  continual   equi- 
vocation between  strictly  mental  existence  and  that  which  is 
intra-organic  but  not  purely  mental ;    between  the  significa- 
tion of  the  terms  describing  the  organism  legitimate  on  their 
principles  and  the  alleged  erroneous  meanings  which  these 
words  convey  to  the  vulgar  mind.     Notwithstanding  all  lofty 
disclaimers  to  the  contrary,  sensationalists  when  tracing  the 
gradual  manufacture  of  the  material  universe  out  of  simple 
states  of  consciousness,  really  do   assume   the  existence  of 
an   extended    organism,  as    known    from   the  first.      When 
Mr.  Bain,  or  Mr.  Spencer,  describes  how  muscular  feelings, 
varying  in  duration  and  velocity,  give  rise  to  the   belief  in 
extended  space,  the  explanation  seems  plausible  because  the 
reader  almost  inevitably  passes    from  the   subjective  inter- 
pretation, which   is   all  that  is   lawful  to  the  writer,  to  the 
objective  realistic  meaning  embodied  in  common   language. 
The  phrases,  "range  of  an  arm,"  "sweep  of  a  limb,"  and  the 
like,  employed  by  associationists  in  expounding  the  supposed 
origin  of  the  notion  of  extension,  necessarily  suggest  to  the 
mind  real   extended   objects   known   as   such,   and   so   con- 
veniently   hide    the    true    difficulty.      Commencing  with    a 
knowledge  of  our  own  body  as  extended,  the  development 
of  our  conviction  of  an  independent  material  world  might, 
perhaps,  even  on  sensationist  lines,  proceed  tolerably  enough; 
but  if  our  body  and  the  rest  of  space  are  nothing  more  than 
sensations,  and   if  the   mind   can   only  apprehend   its   own 
subjective  feelings,  then  the  first  step  is  impossible.     Suc- 
cessive muscular  or  tactual  feelings  in  the  interpretation  of 
these  sensations  permissible  to  Mr.  Spencer  or  Mill  can  no 
more  account  for  the  present  appearance  of  extended  objects 
than  experiences  of  sound,  of  smell,  or  of  toothache. 

(5)  The  argument  from  the  existence  of  other  minds  to  which 
we  have  before  alluded  may  also  be  here  urged  with  peculiar 
force  against  Mill  and  Dr.  Bain.  Both  of  these  writers  lay 
stress  upon  the  value  of  the  testimony  of  other  minds  in 
establishing  our  belief  in  an  independent  world.  Our  know- 
ledge, however,  of  other  minds  than  our  own  is  only  gained 
by  an  inference  from  changes  in  certain  portions  of  the 
physical  world,  assumed  to  have  a  real  existence  beyond  our 
consciousness.  Now  if  the  chief  premiss  is  invalidated,  if  it 
is  demonstrated  that  we  have,  and  can  have  no  knowledge 
of  anything  external  to  our  consciousness,  that  the  seemingly 
independent  human  organisms  around  us  are  only  modifica- 
tions  of  our  own   mind,  clusters   of  our   muscular  feelings 


MODERN  THEORIES  OF  EXTERNAL  PERCEPTION.  117 

actual  and  ideal,  then  assuredly  it  is  an  unworthy  superstition 
to  continue  to  put  faith  in  the  external  existence  of  other 
minds,  and  still  more  ridiculous  and  absurd  to  invoke  their 
testimony  as  a  leading  agency  in  the  generation  of  our  belief 
in  the  material  world,  including  of  course  the  bodies  from 
which  their  existence  is  inferred, 

(6)  There  remains  another  fundamental  difficulty  which 
goes  to  the  very  root  of  the  sensationist  philosophy.  This 
genesis  of  space  out  of  time  necessarily  implies,  at  all  events, 
the  existence  of  a.  pennanent  mind.  Under  the  pressure  of  Dr. 
W.Ward's  severe  criticism,  Mill  was  obliged  in  addition  to  his 
other  assumptions  to  "postulate "  memory.  A  mere  succession 
of  disconnected  feelings  could  never  give  rise  to  the  notion 
of  tiine,  and  still  less  could  the  possibilities  of  such  successive 
sensations  be  condensed  by  themselves  into  the  simultaneity 
of  space.  But  memory  is  precisely  what  the  doctrine  which 
reduces  the  mind  to  a  sei'ies  of  feelings  has  no  right  to  postulate. 
An  abiding  subject  permanent  among  our  changing  states 
is  an  essential  requisite  for  the  existence  of  memory.  If, 
however,  the  notion  of  time  is  impossible  to  the  sensationalist, 
a  fortiori  is  that  of  space. 

Emanuel  Kant  (1724 — 1804). — A  theory  of  perception 
equally  erroneous  with  that  of  Hume's  school,  but  starting 
from  an  almost  diametrically  opposite  conception  of  the 
nature  of  the  mind  and  of  cognition,  is  that  of  Kant.  Instead 
of  explaining  all  mental  products  as  complex  results  arising 
out  of  the  aggregation,  association,  and  coalescence  of  sensa- 
tions passively  received,  Kant  holds  the  mind  to  be  endowed 
from  the  beginning  with  certain  a  priori  or  innate  subjective 
"  forms,"  by  which  all  its  experience  is  actively  moulded  or 
shaped.  Among  the  most  important  of  these  are  the  two 
"  intuitions  "  of  Space  and  Time.  The  first  is  imposed  on  the 
acts  of  external,  the  second  on  those  of  internal  sensibility. 
The  sensations  of  our  external  senses  are  non-spatial  in  them- 
selves, and  they  are  awakened  by  a  non-spatial  cause.  It  is 
the  subjective  co-efficient  that  shapes  the  mental  act  so  as  to 
give  rise  to  the  perception  by  which  we  seem  to  apprehend 
extended  objects  outside  of  the  mind.  Similarly  our  mental 
states  are  presented  to  us  by  the  internal  sense — inner  con- 
sciousness— as  occurring  in  time.  This,  too,  is  an  illusion 
due  to  a  purely  subjective  factor  in  cognition.  We  have  no 
reason  for  supposing  that  these  states  are  not  timeless  iti 
themselves.  We  can  only  know  phenomena,  or  the  appearances 
of  things  as  shaped  and  coloured,  by  these  subjective  con- 
ditions;  to  noumena,  or  things-in-themselves,  we  can  never 
penetrate.  Still  the  existence  of  a  noiimcnon  beyond  con- 
sciousness Kant  maintains   as   requisite  to   account  for  our 


Ii8  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


cognitive  acts.  He  is  thus  a  Hypothetical  Duahst,  denying 
an  immediate  apprehension  of  an  external  reality,  but  asserting 
its  existence  as  a  necessary  supposition. 

Criticism. — Deferring  to  a  later  chapter  the  examination  of 
•Kant's  system  as  a  whole,  we  may  here  indicate  a  few  of  the 
objections  suggested  against  his  treatment  of  the  subject- 
matter  at  present  under  discussion.  In  the  first  place,  it  has 
been  urged  that  Kant's  attempted  proof  of  the  existence  of 
a  priori  ingredients  in  all  our  knowledge  is  invalid,  (a) "  Space," 
he  argues,  "  is  not  a  conception  which  has  been  derived  from 
outward  experiences.  For  in  order  that  certain  sensations 
may  'relate  to  something  without  me  .  .  .  and  that  I  may 
represent  them  not  merely  without  and  near  to  each  other, 
but  also  in  separate  places,  the  representation  of  space  must 
exist  as  a  foundation.  Consequently,  the  representation  of 
space  cannot  be  borrowed  from  external  phenomena  through 
experience,  but,  on  the  contrary,  this  external  experience  is 
only  possible  through  the  said  antecedent  representation."  ^'^ 
Space  is,  therefore,  a  purely  subjective  a  priori  form,  inherent 
in  the  constitution  of  the  mind,  and  imposed  on  the  raaterial 
element  given  in  sensation. 

This  method  of  reasoning  was  employed  by  Plato  to  show 
that  all  knowledge  is  really  innate.  It  sins  by  proving  too 
much.  If  it  were  true  that  we  could  not  apprehend  an  object 
as  extended  unless  we  had  a  previous  representation  of  ex- 
tension, then  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  we  could  never 
cognize  a  taste,  sound,  or  smell,  unless  we  had  antecedently 
a  similar  cognition  of  the  nature  of  the  taste,  sound,  or  smell. 
If  there  are  in  existence  extended  material  bodies,  and  if  we 
are  endowed  with  the  faculties  of  touch  and  sight,  there  is  no 
reason  why  we  should  not  immediately  perceive  the  spatial 
qualities  of  these  bodies  when  they  act  upon  our  senses. 
The  perception  may  of  course  be  at  first  vague,  but  frequent 
experience  can  perfect  it.^^ 

(b)  "  We  never  can  imagine  or  make  a  representation  to 

^^  Critique,  translated  by  Meiklejohn,  p.  24. 

^•^  In  maintaining  that  our  developed  knowledge  of  space  is  a 
result  of  experience,  a  distinction  not  always  realized  by  Kant 
should  be  made  between  the  abstract  concept  or  notion  of  space  in 
general  and  the  concrete  perception  of  an  individual  object  as  extended. 
The  former  is  an  elaborate  intellectual  product  reached  by  abstrac- 
tion, reflexion,  and  generalization,  and  presupposes  many  individual 
perceptions  of  concrete  extension.  The  perception,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  given,  vaguely  indeed  at  first  yet  truly,  in  the  immediate 
experience  of  an  extended  surface  affecting  the  sense  of  contact  or 
of  sight. 


MODERN  THEORIES  OF  EXTERNAL  PERCEPTION,  iig 


ourselves  of  the  non-existence  of  space,  though  we  may 
easily  enough  think  that  no  objects  are  found  in  it.  It  must, 
therefore,  be  considered  as  the  condition  of  the  possibility 
of  phenomena,  and  by  no  means  as  a  determination  dependent 
on  them,  and  is  a  representation  a  priori,  which  necessarily 
supplies  the  basis  for  external  phenomena."  (p.  25.)  This 
difficulty  is  solved  by  distinguishing  between  actual  or  real 
space,  and  possible  or  ideal  space.  The  former  is  identical 
with  the  voluminal  distance  or  interval  enclosed  by  the 
surface-limits  of  the  entire  collection  of  created  material 
objects,  the  latter  is  simply  the  possibility  of  extended 
objects.  Now,  although  all  material  things  were  annihilated, 
the  possibility  of  their  existence,  and  therefore  possible  space, 
would  remain.  Consequently,  having  once  apprehended 
the  extension  of  existing  bodies,  we  can  never  think  them  to 
be  impossible,  although  we  may  abstract  from  their  existence. 
The  conception  of  ideal  space,  or  the  possibility  of  material 
bodies,  is  thus  indestructible,  not  because  it  is  merely  a  con- 
dition of  thought,  but  because  it  is  a  condition  of  corporeal 
being. 

(c)  "  Space  is  no  discursive  or,  as  we  say,  general  con- 
ception of  the  relations  of  things,  but  a  pure  ifituition.  For, 
in  the  first  place,  we  can  only  represent  to  ourselves  one 
space,  and  when  we  talk  of  divers  spaces  we  mean  only  parts 
of  one  and  the  same  space.  Moreover,  these  parts  cannot 
antecede  this  one  all-embracing  space,  as  the  component 
parts  from  which  the  aggregate  can  be  made  up,  but  can  be 
cogitated  only  as  existing  in  it."  Again,  (d)  "  Space  is  repre- 
sented as  an  infinite  given  quantity."  To  these  arguments 
we  may  again  reply  that  a  general  conception  of  the  relations 
of  material  things,  or  an  abstract  notion  of  the  possibility  of 
extended  objects,  may  be  formed  from  many  perceptions 
of  diff'erent  parts  of  space.  The  fact  that  such  an  idea  of 
possible  space  represents  the  latter  as  infinite,  or  rather 
indefinite,  one,  and  all  embracing,  in  no  way  proves  that  this 
representation  is  given  a  priori. 

Kant  further  holds  that  the  necessity  and  universality  which 
characterize  geometrical  judgments  establish  the  subjective 
origin  of  our  cognition  of  space.  This  must  be  denied. 
Objects  without  the  mind  may  have  certain  modes  or  rela- 
tions of  a  contingent  and  others  of  a  necessary  nature.  But 
if  such  were  the  case  there  can  be  no  reason  why  the  mind 
should  be  incapable  of  apprehending  both  with  equal  truth. 
The  explanation  put  forward  by  Natural  Realism  is  that  there 
are  certain  essential  and  certain  other  accidental  conditions 
of  material  being,  and  that  these  are  reflected  by  necessary 
and  contingent  features  in  our  thought.    This  is  a  simple 


l2o  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


and  adequate  account  of  the  problem  without  the  gratuitous 
assumption  of  innate  forms. ^* 

Still  even  were  it  true  that  our  knowledge  of  external 
objects  in  no  way  represented  them,  the  doctrine  of  Kant, 
that  our  apparent  cognition  of  otcr  own  mental  states  as  they 
are  in-themselves  is  deceptive,  would  be  erroneous.  In  this 
region,  at  least,  the  distinction  between  phenomenal  knowledge 
and  noumenal  existence  is  utterly  invalid.  A  conscious  state 
cannot  have  any  existence-in-itself  apart  from  what  it  is  appre- 
hended to  be.  lis  esse  is  percipi.  Since,  then,  mental  states 
are  as  they  are  apprehended,  and  since  they  are  apprehended 
as  successive,  they  must  form  a  real  succession  in-themselves. 
They  cannot  be  timeless  as  they  are  non-spatial.  But  if  so 
Kant's  "  form  of  the  internal  sense  " — the  intuition  of  time — is 
extinguished.  According  to  him  time,  like  space,  is  merely  a 
subjective  condition  of  our  internal  consciousness  imposed  on 
realities  timeless  in  themselves.  As,  however,  there  is  a  real 
succession  in  our  ideas,  there  is  a  true  correlate  to  the  notion 
of  time.  A  sequence  of  changes  being  once  admitted  in  our 
conscious  states,  an  analogous  succession  of  alterations  cannot 
be  denied  to  the  external  reality  which  acts  upon  us,  and  so 
we  are  justified  in  maintaining  the  objective  validity  of  the 
notion.  The  whole  growth  and  evolution  of  each  man's 
mental  life,  and  its  connexion  with  the  development  of  his 
organic  existence,  affords  the  most  cogent  conceivable  evidence 
of  the  real  truth  of  the  conception  of  time. 

Further,  the  arguments  already  put  forward  against  Phe- 
nomenal Idealism  show  that  neither  space  nor  time  can  be  a 
purely  subjective /orm.  Physics  and  astronomy,  for  instance, 
are  irreconcilable  with  such  a  view.  Thus,  the  latter  science 
by  a  series  of  elaborate  deductions  from  {a)  ahstrsict  geometrical 
theorems  dealing  with  the  properties  of  pure  space,  and  (6) 
dynamical  \a.ws  describing  the  action  of  unperceived/oy<:^s  in 

^^  "  Kant's  fallacy  may  be  put  shortly — What  is  apodictic 
(necessary)  is  a  priori ;  what  is  a  priori  is  merely  subjective  (without 
relation  to  '  things-in-themselves ') ;  therefore  what  is  apodictic  is 
merely  subjective.  The  first  premiss,  however,  is  wrong  if  a  priori  is 
understood  in  the  Kantian  sense  to  mean  being  independent  of  all  ex- 
perience. Kant  wrongly  believes  that  certitude  to  be  possessed  a  priori 
(independently  of  all  experience)  which  we  really  attain  by  a  com- 
bination of  many  experiences  with  one  another  according  to  logical 
laws;  and  these  laws  are  conditioned  by  the  reference  of  the  subject 
to  the  objective  reality,  and  are  not  a  priori  forms.  He  erroneously 
maintains  that  all  orderly  arrangement  (both  in  time  and  space, 
and  that  which  is  causal)  is  merely  subjective."  (Ueberweg's  Logic, 
§  28.)  Kant  has  nowhere  shown  the  impossibility  of  necessary 
relations  being  disclosed  to  the  mind  in  real  objective  experience. 


MODERN  THEORIES  OF  EXTERNAL  PERCEPTION.    121 


an  orderly  manner  in  time,  foretells  a  transit  of  Venus  a 
century  hence,  and  the  result  verifies  the  assumptions.  Now 
the  introduction  of  the  second  element  is  peculiarly  in- 
compatible with  the  alleged  subjective  nature  of  space. 
A  consistent  system  of  pure  geometry  might  perhaps  be 
worked  out  in  such  an  a  priori  space,  but  there  would  be 
no  reason  why  its  theorems  should  exactly  apply  to  the 
operations  of  extra-mental  non-spatial  agents.  Accordingly, 
the  orderhness  of  the  universal  force  of  gravitation,  which 
varies  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance,  and  produces 
regular  movements  in  certain  intervals  of  time,  establishes 
agreement  between  the  supposed  mental  forms  and  the 
reality  beyond  consciousness. ^^  The  physicist  also  teaches 
us  that  the  external  causes  of  our  sensations  of  colour  and 
sound  are  vibratory  movements  of  ether  (in  extra-mental 
space)  occurring  in  succession  (in  extra-mental  time).  He 
further  informs  us  that  the  quality  of  the  sensation  is  deter- 
mined by  the  size  and  rapidity  of  these  waves.  Now  this 
teaching  is  irreconcilable  with  the  view  that  the  supposed 
space  and  time  are  merely  subjective  forms  of  outer  and  inner 
sensibility.  It  implies  that  the  so  called  noumena,  the  extra- 
mental  causes  of  our  sensations  of  colour,  occupy  a  real  space 
of  three  dimensions,  antecedent  to  and  independent  of  the 
observation  of  the  percipient  mind.^^ 

15  "Physical  phenomena  find  throughout  their  most  complete 
explanation  in  the  supposition  that  things-in-themselves  exist  in  a 
space  of  three  dimensions  as  we  know  it.  It  is  at  least  very 
doubtful  that  any  other  supposition  could  be  so  brought  into 
agreement  with  the  facts.  We  have,  therefore,  every  ground  for 
believing  that  our  conception  of  substances  extended  in  space  of 
three  dimensions  does  not  in  some  way  symbolize  things  which  exist 
in  themselves  in  quite  another  way,  but  truly  represents  things  as 
they  actually  exist  in  three  dimensions."  (Ueberweg's  Logic,  §  44, 
note.)  The  above  line  of  argument  is  also  urged  with  great  force 
in  Ueberweg's  History  of  Philosophy,  YoX.  II.  pp.  160 — 166. 

^^  Some  defenders  of  Kant  assert  that  he  never  really  intended 
to  make  space  and  time  purely  subjective,  and  Mr.  Mahaffy  replies 
rather  brusquely  to  Trendelenburg  that  Kant  "never  denied  their 
objectivity  unless  in  an  absurd  sense."  {Critical  Philosophy,  p.  68.) 
Undoubtedly  it  is  often  very  difficult  to  make  out  Kant's  meaning, 
but  if  there  is  a  single  point  on  which  he  seems  to  be  unmistakable 
it  is  that  space  and  time  are  formal,  or  purely  subjective.  Whereas 
sensations  of  sound  and  colour  are  given  from  ivithout,  space  and  time 
he  holds  to  be  subscribed  from  within.  "Space  does  not  represent 
any  property  of  objects  as  things-in-thcmselves,  nor  does  it  represent 
them  in  their  relations  to  each  other;  in  other  words,  space  does_  not 
represent  any  determination  of  objects  as  attached  to  the  objects 


122  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


In  addition  to  these  objections  a  number  of  other  defects 
in  Kant's  system  have  been  exposed.  He  assumes  without 
investigation  the  false  representatiouaUst  theory  in  vogue 
since  the  times  of  Descartes  and  Locke,  teaching  that  we 
have  no  immediate  knowledge  of  things  affecting  us,  but  only 
of  our  own  mental  states.  He  illogically  postulates  an  ex- 
ternal noumenal  world  as  the  cause  of  our  conscious  states, 
whereas  he  has  no  ground  for  asserting  its  existence,  espe- 
cially since  he  teaches  that  causality  is  another  deceptive 
intellectual  form  wdth  no  objective  value.  Finally,  he  is 
confused  and  inconsistent  in  expounding  the  nature  of  the 
supposed  a  priori  forms,  frequently  appearing  to  conceive 
them  as  complete  representations,  ready  made  from  the  start 
and  fitted  with  perfect  accuracy  on  to  the  first  act  of  percep- 
tion, whilst  at  other  times  he  seems  to  look  on  them  as  slowly 
and  gradually  realized  with  extended  experience. 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  starting  from  the  same  assumptions 
as  Hume  and  Mill,  nevertheless  rejects  Idealism,  substituting 
in  its  place  a  species  of  Hypothetical  Dualism  which  he  calls 
Transfigured  Realism.  With  him,  as  with  them,  we  can  know 
nothing  but  our  own  feelings  ;  yet  he  affirms  that  there  is 
outside  of  the  mind  an  Unknoivable  Reality,  the  objective 
cause  of  our  sensations.  But  beyond  the  fact  that  such  a 
noumenon  exists,  we  can  assert  nothing  of  it.  "  What  we  are 
conscious  of  as  properties  of  matter,  even  down  to  weight  and 
resistance,  are  but  subjective  affections  produced  by  objective 
agencies,  which  are  unknown  and  unknowable."  i''  His  defence 
of  this  theory  is  based  on  an  analysis  of  our  mental  operations 
akin  to  that  of  the  older  Associationists,  supplemented  by  an 
argument  against  the  Idealism  of  these  writers  extending  over 
some  nineteen  chapters.     The  chief  proofs  which  he  urges 


themselves,  and  which  would  remain  even  though  all  subjective 
conditions  of  the  intuition  were  abstracted.  .  .  .  Space  is  nothing 
else  than  the  form  of  all  phenomena  of  the  external  sense,  that  is, 
the  subjective  condition  of  the  sensibility  under  which  alone 
external  intuition  is  possible."  (Cf.  Critique.  Transcend.  .^EstJi.  §  4.) 
Such  passages  could  be  multiplied  indefinitely.  It  is  a  summary, 
but  not  very  convincing  disposal  of  opponents  to  simply  assert  that 
any  other  view  of  space  than  this  is  absurd.  If  it  is  still  maintained 
that  Kant  allowed  the  existence  of  a  noumenal  space  which  suffices 
for  the  demands  of  physical  science,  then  under  the  shadow  of  this 
obscure  and  elastic  term  we  have  admitted  an  extra-mental  extension 
of  three  dimensions  conditioning  the  unobserved  causes  of  our 
sensations,  and  the  chief  contention  of  the  Transcendental  ^^sthetic  is 
abandoned. 

"^"^  Principles  of  Psychology,  %  ^']2, 


MODERN  THEORIES  OF  EXTERNAL  PERCEPTION.  123 

against  Idealism  are  these:  (i)  Priority. — In  the  history  of 
the  race,  as  well  as  in  the  history  of  every  mind,  "  Realism  is 
the  primary  conception,"  and  Idealism  is  merely  derived  from 
and  subsequent  to  the  former.  (2)  Simplicity. — The  chain  of 
reasoning  establishing  Realism  is  simpler  and  shorter  than 
that  proving  Idealism.  The  latter,  too,  depends  on  the 
former.  (3)  Distinctness. — The  doctrine  of  Realism  is  pre- 
sented in  distinct  and  vivid  terms,  whilst  Idealism  can 
be  apprehended  only  in  a  vague  and  obscure  manner. 
(4)  Realism  is  established  by  the  criterion  of  the  Universal 
Postulate.  We  must  accept  as  true  what  we  are  obliged  to 
think,  and  we  cannot  think  away  the  existence  of  the  objects 
which  we  perceive. 

We  can  only  touch  on  one  or  two  points  of  this  theory 
here.  In  the  first  place,  though  Mr.  Spencer's  arguments 
are  undoubtedly  valid  against  the  idealist,  they  are  not  less 
efficacious  against  his  own  system.  All  the  proofs  from 
simplicity,  priority,  the  application  of  the  Universal  Postulate, 
and  the  rest,  tell  equally  in  favour  of  Natural  Realism  against 
Transfigured  Realism  as  expounded  by  himself.  In  the  second 
place,  Mr.  Spencer's  Transfigured  Realism  is  little,  if  at  all, 
fitter  to  meet  the  demands  of  science  than  Kant's  non-spatial 
noumena  or  Mill's  possibilities  of  sensation.  Accordingly,  for 
disproof  of  the  new  hypotheses,  we  refer  the  reader  back  to 
the  arguments  we  have  been  just  expounding.  Physical 
science  asserts  much  about  the  internal  relations  of  the 
extra-mental  causes  of  our  sensations,  which  implies  the 
existence  of  a  real  time,  and  of  a  space  of  three  dimensions 
apart  from  our  consciousness,  yet  truly  mirrored  by  the 
features  of  that  consciousness.  Mr.  Spencer's  own  state- 
ment, too,  that  there  are  variations  in  the  modes  of  the 
asserted  Unknowable  corresponding  to  our  consciousness  of 
changes  in  space  and  time,  abandons  his  most  important 
tenet  that  we  can  know  nothing  about  the  Unknowable  except 
its  existence.  The  same  difficulty  which  proved  fatal  to  the 
theories  of  Mill  and  Kant  tell  equally  against  Mr.  Spencer. 
Neither  the  assumptions  nor  conclusions  of  Physical  Science 
can  be  confined  within  the  territory  of  phenomena.  The 
notions  of  "  energy "  and  "  force  "  lying  at  the  root  of 
mechanics  and  physics,  and  the  laws  of  their  action  which 
science  professes  to  expound,  imply  that  the  mind  has  a  real 
valid  knowledge  of  the  supposed  noiunenal  or  unknowable 
causes  of  our  sensations.  Finally,  Mr.  Spencer's  reduction 
of  the  material  world,  which  we  appear  to  perceive,  into 
groups  of  feelings  is  based,  like  that  of  Hume  and  Dr.  Bain, 
on  the  false  assertion  that  we  cannot  have  an  immediate 
knowledge  of  external  reality. 


124  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


Probably  the  best  exposition  in  English  of  the  above  line 
of  argument,  based  on  the  conflict  between  Empiricism  and 
Physical  Science,  is  that  to  be  found  in  Mr.  Arthur  Balfour's 
Defence  of  rhilosophic  Doubt,  chapters  ix.  and  xii.  Viewed  as 
an  argiimentiim  ad  hominem  against  the  school  of  Mill  and 
Spencer,  the  reasoning  there  is  perfectly  valid,  and  seemingly 
unanswerable,  though  in  other  respects  some  of  the  sceptical 
CDncludons  appear  to  us  to  be  overdrawn. 

Headings.— The  First  Prineiples  of  Knoivledge,  by  John  Rickaby, 
Pt.  II.  c.  ii.  ;  Dr.  Mivart,  Nature  and  Thought,  c.  iii.  ;  On  Truth, 
cc.  vii. — xi. ;  Dr.  Martineau,  A  Study  of  Religion,  Vol.  I.  pp.  192 — 
214;  Hamilton,  Metaphysies,  Lect.  xxv.— xxviii. ;  Professor  Veitch's 
Hamilton,  cc.  v. — vii.;  Dr.  M'Cosh,  Exam,  of  Mill,  cc.  6,  7; 
Ueberweg,  Logic,  §§  37—44 ;  R.  Jardine,  The  Elements  of  the  Psycho- 
logy of  Cognition,  pp.  47—58,  125 — 148.  The  whole  subject  is  very 
ably  handled  by  A.  Farges  in  L'Objectivite  de  la  Perception  des  Sens 
ex'.ernes  et  ies  Theories  Modernes  (Paris,  1891).  See  also  J.  Mark 
Baldwin,  The  Senses  and  the  Intellect,  pp.  134 — 138.  The  ablest 
treatise  however  in  English  on  this  subject  is  Professor  T.  Case's 
Ph)sical  Realism  (Longmans). 


v-''^ 


CHAPTER   VII. 

DEVELOPMENT   OF   SENSE-PERCEPTION! 
EDUCATION    OF   THE    SENSES. 

Growth  of  Knowledge. — The  true  account  of 
our  cognition  of  the  external  world  is  that  which 
maintains  the  doctrine  of  immediate  perception — that 
in  some  of  its  acts  the  mind  directly  apprehends  a 
material  reality  other  than  itself;  but  there  is  no 
incompatibility  between  this  theory  and  the  admis- 
sion that  in  the  percipient  acts  of  mature  life  there 
are  involved  many  results  gathered  by  association, 
and  numerous  mediate  inferences  of  a  more  or  less 
complicated  nature.  The  advocate  of  immediate 
perception  is  not  committed  to  the  doctrine  that  the 
eye  of  itself  immediately  apprehends  something  pre- 
sented to  its  view  as  a  solid  brick  house  situated  at 
a  hundred  yards  distance,  nor  that  touch  from  the 
beginning  makes  known  a  particular  sensation  of 
pressure  as  due  to  a  squeeze  of  the  foot.  The 
apparently  simple  cognitions  which  succeed  each 
other  from  moment  to  moment  in  mature  life, 
contain  certain  primary  data  which  have  been 
immediately  presented  to  the  senses ;  but  a  large 
fraction  of  the  whole  is,  in  most  cases,  built  up 
out  of  contributions  furnished  by  imagination  and 


126  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


memory.  The  variety  of  the  elements  involved, 
and  the  plurality  of  the  stages  comprised  in  these 
brief  acts  of  knowledge,  have  been  dwelt  on  at 
copious  length  by  many  modern  psychologists,  and 
elaborate  descriptions  of  the  gradual  development 
of  apprehension  by  the  "aggregation,"  ''segrega- 
tion," and  "integration"  of  sensuous  "ingredients" 
into  the  final  product,  the  perceived  thing,  are  very 
familiar  to  the  reader  of  English  philosophical 
literature. 

Intellect  usually  ignored. — In  spite,  however,  of  the  seeming 
exhaustiveness  of  these  analyses  one  all-important  factor 
is  almost  invariably  omitted.  Intellect,  in  its  old  and  proper 
signification,  as  a  higher  rational  activity  superior  to  sense, 
awakened,  indeed,  to  exercise  by  the  latter,  but  transcending 
its  range — Intellect,  thus  understood,  is  ignored.  Yet  it  is 
precisely  this  faculty  which  makes  intelligible  the  stream  of 
change  disclosed  in  sensation.  The  formal  object  of  sense  is 
the  concrete  quality  of  the  individual  thing,  and  it  is  percipient 
of  successive  changes  and  co-existing  accidents  ;  but  it  cannot 
apprehend  the  being  or  essence  of  things ;  it  is  blind  to  the 
causality  of  agents,  and  to  the  substantiality  of  objects  ;  and  of 
those  numerous  relations  of  identity,  similarity,  unlikeness, 
dependence,  and  the  rest,  which  form  the  universal  frame- 
work, the  rational  tissue,  of  our  knowledge,  it  can  give  no 
account.  A  creature  endowed  merely  with  sensibility  could 
never  come  to  know  itself  as  a  person,  to  apprehend  itself  as 
an  abiding  ego,  and  to  set  itself  in  contrast  and  opposition  to 
an  objective  world.  Nor  could  it  come  to  truly  cognize  any 
portion  of  the  external  universe,  any  more  than  itself  as  a 
being.  Now  in  normal  perception  these  sensuous  and  intel- 
lectual elements  are  closely  interwoven,  and  it  may  require 
careful  attention  and  reflexion  to  separate  them. ;  but  none 
the  less  are  they  radically  different  in  kind.  As,  however,  the 
plan  of  our  work  requires  us  to  treat  of  intellectual  activity 
by  itself,  we  will  in  the  present  chapter  devote  ourselves 
mainly  to  the  exposition  of  the  development  of  the  sentient 
factor  in  the  process,  although,  of  course,  in  man's  actual 
experience  sense  and  intellect  are  not  thus  isolated. 

Complexity  of    perceptional    process. — Before 
beginning,  an  example  may  be  useful  to  show  the 


Development  of  sense-perception.        127 

reader  unfamiliar  with  psychological  analysis,  that 
seemingly  simple  perceptions  are  really  complex. 
Walking  in  a  field,  I  become  suddenly  conscious  of 
a  familiar  sound,  and  exclaim,  "  I  hear  my  big, 
white  dog  barking  in  the  road  on  my  right  about 
eighty  yards  away."  But  a  little  reflexion  will 
convince  me  that  the  sense  of  hearing  contributes 
only  a  small  share  to  such  a  percipient  act.  Of  the 
distance,  direction,  size,  and  colour  of  the  agent 
which  has  caused  the  noise,  my  ear  of  itself  can  tell 
me  nothing.  It  merely  presents  to  me  an  auditory 
sensation  of  a  particular  quality,  and  of  greater  or 
less  intensity  ;  the  remaining  elements  of  the  cogni- 
tion are  reproductions  of  past  experiences.  Similarly 
in  other  cases,  unnoticed  inferences,  and  faint  associa- 
tions furnished  by  the  rest  of  the  senses,  attaching 
to  the  direct  testimony  of  each  particular  faculty, 
simulate  after  a  time  the  character  of  immediate 
revelations  of  the  latter.  These  indirect  or  infer- 
ential cognitions  may  be  styled  the  acquired  perceptions 
of  the  sense  in  question.  It  is  the  office  of  the 
psychologist  carefully  to  analyze  these  into  their 
primitive  elements,  to  ascertain  what  are  the  ulti- 
mate data  afforded  by  each  sense,  and  to  trace  the 
chief  steps  in  the  process  by  which  the  elaborate 
result  is  reached. 

Development  of  Tactual  Perception.— Although 

in  describing  the  general  features  of  the  different  senses 
viewed  as  mental  powers,  the  order  of  treatment 
adopted  was  unimportant,  here  in  tracing  the  develop- 
ment of  perception  it  is  a  matter  of  great  moment  to 
follow  as  closely  as  possible  the  natural  order  in  which 


J2S  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


de  facto  the  several  faculties  come  to  offer  their  contribu- 
tions.^  Accordingly  we  will  commence  with  the  sense  of 
touch,  including  under  it  tactual  sensations  proper, 
feelings  of  pressure,  and  muscular  sensations,  whether 
of  resistance  or  of  movement.  It  seems  to  us  a  mistake 
in  this  connexion  to  endeavour  to  separate  the  conscious- 
ness of  pressure  from  that  of  mere  contact.  The  isola- 
tion is  purely  ideal.  The  difference  between  them  is 
one  of  degree,  and  in  the  actual  experience  of  the  child 
sensations  of  touch,  so  far  as  they  are  of  any  psj^cho- 
logical  significance,  involve  feelings  of  pressure.  The 
consciousness  of  resistance  to  active  effort  put  forth, 
indeed,  implies  a  new  element,  and  facilitates  the  appre- 
hension of  something  other  than  self  given  in  the 
recipient  sensation  of  passive  pressure,  but  even  this 
latter  state  makes  us  directly  cognizant  of  extra-mental 
reality.  Starting  then  with  the  sense  of  touch,  naturally 
the  first  question  which  meets  us  is :  How  do  we  come 
to  know  the  spatial  relations  of  the  several  parts  of  our 
own  person  P 

Localization  of  Sensations. — In  mature  life  we  instan- 
taneously localize  an    impression   in  the   point  of  the 


1  To  start  with  perception  by  taste,  smell,  or  hearing,  or  at  all 
events  to  take  any  of  these  as  the  true  type  of  external  perception, 
is  a  complete  inversion  of  what  is  actually  given  in  nature,  and  may 
lead  into  serious  philosophical  error.  These  are  precisely  the 
faculties  by  which  originally  we  do  not  obtain  any  direct  percep- 
tion of  matter.  They  are  wanting  in  the  most  important  feature  of 
that  species  of  cognition  which  they  are  supposed  to  exemplify. 
They  are  originally  of  an  almost  purely  subjective  character,  and 
are  therefore  but  little  better  suited  than  imagination  or  memory 
to  illustrate  the  manner  in  which  we  .come  to  know  the  material 
universe.  Hearing,  employed  not  for  the  illustration  of  indirect  or 
acquired  perceptions,  but  as  a  typical  representation  of  the  per- 
ceptual process  in  general ,  as  is  often  done  by  psychologists, 
misleads  the  reader  into  the  belief  that  since  by  far  the  greater 
part  of  the  information  yielded  by  this  faculty  is  of  a  mediate 
and  inferential  character,  testifying  only  to  possibilities  of  other 
forms  of  sensation,  therefore  all  modes  of  perception  are  of  a 
similarly  subjective  character,  and  no  percipient  faculty  gives  us 
a  direct  immediate  presentation  of  extended  matter.  Hearing 
and  smell  exhibit  abundantly  the  force  of  associated  or  acquired 
perceptions,  but  direct  perception  they  do  Jiot  illustrate. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  129 

body2  irritated;  and  some  writers  maintain  that  the 
affirmation  of  consciousness  is  of  such  a  character 
that  this  reference  of  a  feehng  to  the  part  excited  must 
be  a  natural  endowment  possessed  from  the  beginning. 
But  what  precisely  is  meant  by  saying,  "  I  feel  a  pain 
in  my  foot"  ?  The  statement  at  once  calls  up  a  visual 
image  of  the  member  affected ;  and  it  further  presents 
this  image  at  about  five  feet  in  a  nearly  vertical  line 
from  my  eyes.  However,  as  distance  cannot  be  directly 
apprehended  by  the  eye,  but  is  known  primarily  through 
muscular  sensations  of  movement,  and  as  the  visual 
image  of  my  foot  is  certainly  not  given  in  the  painful 
feeling  of  pressure,  the  first  consciousness  of  such  a 
sensation  could  not  have  been  similar  to  this.  We  are 
not  born  with  an  innate  idea  or  representation  of  our 
person.  Aristotle,  long  ago,  taught  that  all  knowledge 
starts  from  experience,  and  the  topography  of  our  own 
body  is  no  exception  to  the  rule.  By  observation  and 
experiment,  and  not  through  any  a  priori  endowment, 
we  have  come  to  learn  the  shape  and  appearance  of  our 
organism,  and  to  know  the  definite  locality  on  the  visual 
map  to  which  a  particular  tactual  stimulation  is  to  be 
referred.^ 

2  This  seems  true  in  the  case  of  sensations  of  surface  pressure, 
not  so,  however,  as  regards  the  organic  sensations,  or  those  of  the 
other  special  senses.  We  project  or  externalize  the  cause  of 
the  auditory  or  visual  sensation,  but  unless  the  impression  is 
markedly  painful  we  do  not  in  mature  life  advert  to  the  point  of 
the  organism  affected  by  the  stimuli  of  these  senses.  It  is  in  fact 
the  organic  or  tactual  element  involved  in  these  sensations  which 
enables  us  to  localize  them  in  our  own  body. 

3  Dr.  Gutberlet,  who  maintains  the  doctrine  that  an  original 
local  reference  of  a  very  vague  character  is  attached  to  sensa- 
tions of  contact,  summarizes  the  arguments  against  the  extreme 
"  nativistic  "  or  a  priori  view  :  (i)  We  appear  to  localize  impressions 
in  parts  of  the  body  demonstrably  incapable  of  sensations,  e.g.,  in 
our  bones,  teeth,  hair,  &c.  (2)  We  also  misinterpret  the  locus  of 
known  impressions,  assigning  them  to  wrong  places,  e.g.,  pressure 
of  the  elbow  is  felt  in  the  fingers,  irritation  of  the  brain  is  referred 
to  the  extremities.  (3)  Irritation  of  the  stump  of  an  amputated  leg 
causes  us  to  assign  the  sensation  to  the  locality  originally  occupied 
by  the  lost  limb.  (4)  We  sometimes  project  sensations  outside  of 
the  body,  e.g.,  the  feeling  of  pressure  to  the  end  of  a  walking-stick 
or  a  pen.     (5)  The  definiteness  of  localization  varies  considerably 

J       • 


130  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


Tactual  Cognition  of  the  Organism.— Although 
the  extreme  "  nativistic "  theory  is  thus  erroneous, 
exaggerated  empiricism  rushes  into  an  equally  false 
opinion  when  it  refuses  to  admit  the  presence  of  any 
element  of  a  local  character,  or  any  presentation  of 
extension  in  our  primitive  sensations  of  contact.  The 
true  doctrine,  as  usual,  lies  between  the  extreme  views. 
Impressions  of  extended  objects  are  given  from  the 
beginning  as  extended,  and  bearing  a  local  reference, 
but  of  an  extremely  vague  and  indefinite  character. 
From  the  apprehension  of  purel}^  unextended  sensations 
the  notion  of  extended  matter  cannot  be  formed,  and  in 
this  respect  the  cognition  of  the  spatial  character  of  our 
own  body  stands  in  the  same  situation  as  the  rest  of  the 
material  world.  The  extended  nature  of  the  organ  is 
given  simultaneously  with  that  of  the  extended  surface 
pressing  upon  it,  but  as  we  have  said,  this  primitive 
presentation  is  very  ill-defined.* 

Local  SigJis. — Of  the  shape  or  quantity  of  the 
surface  covered  our  knowledge  is  at  first  almost  infini- 
tesimal, whilst  of  the  local  relations  between  the  point 
affected  and  the  rest  of  our  person  we  necessarily  as  yet 
know  nothing.  Nevertheless  the  character  of  an  impres- 
sion is  largely  dependent  on  its  situation  ;  the  pressure, 
for  instance,  of  the  same  object  across  the  fingers,  the 
palm,  the  fore-arm,  on  the  head,  and  on  the  calf  of  the 

in  different  parts  of  the  body,  and  decreases  in  proportion  as  the 
part  affected  is  beyond  the  range  of  the  eye  and  of  the  hand,  e.g., 
irritation  in  the  back  and  within  the  organism.  {Die  Psychologic, 
pp.  Co,  Ci.) 

"*  "  There  is  an  element  of  voluminousncss  .  .  .  discernible  in  each 
and  every  sensation,  though  more  developed  in  some  than  in  others, 
and  this  is  the  original  sensation  of  space,  out  of  which  all  the  exact 
knowledge  we  afterwards  come  to  have  is  woven  by  processes  of 
discrimination,  association,  and  selection."  (James,  Vol.  II.,  p.  135) 
Similarly,  J.  Mark  Baldwin:  "No  purely  empirical  explanation  is 
sulhcient  to  account  for  the  extensive  form  of  sensation.  .  .  .  The 
power  to  perceive  space  is  as  native  as  the  power  to  percei\e 
anything  else ;  but  this  does  not  mean  that  space  is  native  to  the 
mind  any  more  than  trees  are  or  music.  Objects  are  given  to  us  in 
space,  and  space  is  given  to  us  with  objects."  {Senses  and  Intellect, 
p.  122.)  The  empiricism  of  the  associationists  on  this  question  is 
tailing  more  and  more  into  disrepute. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  131 


leg,  possesses  in  each  case  a  certain  distinctive  feature. 
Further,  this  variation  in  the  aspect  of  the  mental  state 
is  in  proportion,  though  not  in  a  constant  proportion, 
to  variation  in  locality.  Thus,  if  the  same  stimulus  be 
applied  to  two  points  on  the  arm,  separated  by  a  short 
interval,  the  sensations  aroused  will  contain  a  certain 
difference  of  character,  which  will  increase  if  the  inter- 
mediate distance  be  increased ;  similarly  with  impres- 
sions on  the  fingers,  though  here  change  in  the  sensation 
is  more  rapid  in  proportion  to  variation  of  locality. 
Assuming  the  faculty  of  apprehending  extended  impres- 
sions over  the  surface  of  the  body,  and  this  "  local 
colouring,"  which  marks  the  sensibility  of  the  different 
parts  affected,  if  an  object  is  moved  along  the  skin  from 
one  locality  to  another,  the  capacity  of  the  intermediate 
region  for  tactual  sensations  is  discovered. 

The  terms,  local  sign,  and  local  colour,  have  been  used  by 
Lotze  to  designate  a  purely  subjective  quality  varying  with 
the  part  of  the  organism  affected,  and  attached  to  the  purely 
subjective  non-spatial  presentations  of  sense.  These  local 
signs  become  symbols  of  the  muscular  sensations  of  movement 
required  to  pass  from  one  sensitive  point  to  another,  and  by 
their  means  out  of  mental  states,  individually  revealing  no 
element  of  extension,  the  notion  of  space  is  alleged  to  be 
built  up.  Lotze  thus  advanced  beyond  the  empiricism 
advocated  by  Dr.  Bain,  Mill,  and  other  English  sensationalists, 
in  admitting  the  necessity  of  more  than  mere  tactual  and 
muscular  sensations.  But  the  local  signs  cannot  generate, 
though  they  ma}'  be  of  great  value  in  defining  our  notion 
of  space.  A  direct  presentation  of  extension  must  be  some- 
how afforded  as  material  to  work  upon. 

Sensations  of  Double-Contact.  —  It  is  probably,  how- 
ever, the  experience  of  double-contact,  which  contri- 
butes most  to  the  definition  of  the  relative  situation  of 
the  several  parts  of  the  organism.  If  a  child  lays  his 
right  hand  upon  his  left  there  is  awakened  a  double 
tactual  feeling  of  extension.  If  he  then  moves  the  right 
palm  along  the  left  arm  up  to  the  elbow  or  shoulder  he 
becomes  conscious  of  a  series  of  muscular  sensations  in  the 
right  arm,  and  also  of  a  series  of  extended  tactual 
impressions  both   in  the  right  hand  and  along  the  left 


132  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


arm,  which  vary  in  character  as  they  depart  farther 
from  the  original  sensation  in  the  left  hand.  This 
movement  may  be  then  reversed  and  the  tactual  sensa- 
tions gone  through  in  the  opposite  direction ;  and 
finally  by  laying  the  left  arm  along  a  flat  surface,  or 
vice  versa,  the  series  of  tactual  impressions,  formerly 
given  in  succession,  will  now  be  presented  as  co-existing 
outside  of  each  other  in  space.  When  these  or  kindred 
experiments  have  been  executed  a  few  times,  the 
difference  in  character  of  the  tactual  impressions  on 
two  points  of  the  arm  awaken  by  association  a  repre- 
sentation of  the  number  of  tactual  sensations  and  of  the 
duration  of  the  series  of  muscular  sensations  required  to 
span  the  interval,  and  their  relative  situations  are  so 
far  defined.  In  this  way  a  blind  child  would  rapidly 
gather  by  experience  a  tolerably  accurate  knowledge 
of  the  configuration  of  its  body,  and  of  the  relative 
positions  of  its  varying  forms  of  tactual  sensibility. 
The  localization  of  impressions  would  become  more 
definite  in  the  parts  capable  of  being  easily  explored 
by  means  of  sensations  of  double  contact,  while  the 
outlying  districts  would  be  known  in  a  less  perfect  way. 
Combination  of  Touch  and  Sight. — Still,  it  is  sight 
which,  normally  speaking,  presents  to  us  the  rich 
realities  of  space.  Apprehending  in  a  simultaneous  act 
a  large  space  of  the  surface  of  the  body,  the  eye  far 
surpasses  in  efficiency  the  consciousness  of  double 
contact,  while  it  supplements  the  latter  experience  as  a 
third  witness  in  a  multitude  of  observations.  As  our 
education  advances  the  visual  image  of  the  point  of  the 
organism  stimulated  becomes  more  intimately  associated 
with  the  local  colouring  of  the  tactual  sensibility  of  that 
point,  and  the  map  of  the  sense  of  touch  is  translated 
into  that  of  sight. 

Tactual  Cognition  of  other  Extended  Objects. — 
Together  with  progress  in  our  knowledge  of  our  own 
body  proceeds  our  education  as  regards  the  material 
world  outside ;  every  increment  of  information  in  the 
one  department  is  a  corresponding  gain  in  the  other. 
Abstracting  again  from  vision,  when  the  child  lays  his 
liand  flat  on  some  object  before  him,  suppose  a  book, 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTIOM.  133 

he  becomes  conscious  of  an  extended  impression.  By 
moving  his  hand  he  experiences  two  concomitant  series 
of  tactual  and  motoy  sensations.  When  he  reaches  the 
edge  of  the  surface  the  tactual  sensations  cease,  and 
then  reversing  the  operation  he  may  reproduce  them  in 
the  opposite  order.  After  a  few  such  experiments,  he 
would  come  to  know  in  a  rough  way  the  number  of 
units  of  tactual  or  motor  sensations  necessary  to  pass 
from  the  first  to  the  last  impression  of  contact,  and  he 
would  thus  have  a  measure  of  the  length  or  hreadth  of 
the  book.  Suppose  he  then  takes  the  volume  between 
his  two  hands  or  fingers,  he  will  discover  that  it  presents 
several  resisting  surfaces,  and  some  further  experiments 
in  the  way  of  tactual  and  muscular  feelings  define  his 
knowledge  of  its  solidity  and  zveight. 

Here,  again,  as  before,  to  the  normally  endowed  being, 
the  visual  images  presented  by  sight  of  the  objects 
touched  and  handled  enormously  faciUtate  progress,  and 
gradually  enable  him  to  infer  the  temperature,  magnitude, 
solidit}^,  and  weight  of  things  at  a  distance.  This  mode 
of  education  is  going  on  in  one  shape  or  another  every 
moment  of  his  waking  existence,  and  consequently  his 
perception  of  the  objects  in  his  immediate  vicinity  very 
soon  becomes  tolerably  accurate. 

Permanent  existence  of  Material  Objects. — The  several 
members  and  parts  of  his  own  body  permanently  present 
as  the  centre  of  his  pleasures  and  pains,  and  the  subject 
of  his  sensations  of  double  contact,  are  known  to  be 
very  different  from  all  other  objects.  These  latter  by 
their  repeated  recurrence  to  his  notice  in  like  circum- 
stances, by  the  frequently  confirmed  experience  that  he 
can  renew  his  acquaintance  with  them  at  will,  and  by 
their  regularity  in  producing  their  effects,  whether 
observed  or  unobserved,  first  evoke  a  dim  belief,  and 
then  a  rational  conviction  as  to  their  abiding  existence 
when  beyond  his  view.  Consequently,  at  a  very  early 
stage  in  his  existence  he  becomes  alive  to  the  fact  that 
his  nurse,  his  bed,  his  food,  and  other  objects  of  interest 
are  not  annihilated  every  time  he  closes  his  eyes. 

Inferential  knowledge  of  othey  Minds. — Among  external 
objects  a  class  particularly  interesting  for  the  child  are 


134  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


organisms  like  in  shape  to  his  own,  These  bodies, 
moreover,  react  by  movement  in  response  to  stimuli 
just  as  he  himself  does.  But  in  his  own  case  his 
consciousness  assures  him  that  mental  states  are  the 
effects  of  similar  stimulation  and  the  causes  of  similar 
movements.  Consequently,  by  analogy  he  infers  that 
mental  existences  like  his  own  are  present  in  other  human 
bodies.  Language  is  indeed  the  strongest  evidence  for 
the  reality  of  other  human  minds,  but  even  when  it  is 
absent,  as  in  the  case  of  the  lower  animals,  the 
argument  is  felt  to  be  irresistible. 

These  other  human  minds  can  now  in  turn  afford 
valuable  corroboratory  evidence  concerning  the  objec- 
tive existence  and  permanence  of  material  objects  when 
doubts  as  to  the  possibility  of  illusion  are  awakened. 

Secondary  acquisitions. — We  have  spoken  so  far  of  the 
essential  capabilities  of  touch  :  a  word  may  be  of  interest 
now  on  the  special  or  accidental  acquirements  of  this  per- 
cipient faculty.  The  degree  to  which  the  sense  of  touch  can 
be  cultivated,  and  the  fineness  of  the  capacity  of  both 
muscular  and  tactual  sensations  for  being  discriminated 
appear  truly  amazing  when  thoughtfully  considered.  The 
miller  can  by  the  sense  of  feeling  distinguish  variations  in  the 
quality  of  flour  utterly  invisible  to  the  eye.  The  clothier  can 
recognize  subtile  differences  in  the  texture  of  silk,  linen,  or 
velvet,  of  an  equally  minute  character.  In  such  universal 
attainments  as  those  of  speaking,  reading,  writing,  playing 
the  piano,  shaving,  and  indeed  in  all  mechanical  arts,  the 
most  delicate  sensibility  is  exhibited.  These  actions  involve 
a  complicated  series  of  movements  under  the  guidance  of 
muscular  and  tactual  sensations  which  are  distinguishable 
by  differences  so  faint  that  we  are  fairly  lost  in  astonishment 
at  the  infinitesimal  forces  governing  thus  infallibly  the 
seemingly  easy  process. 

It  is  in  the  blind,  however,  that  this  sense  reaches  its 
proper  perfection.  By  them  space  is  known  and  remembered 
solely  in  terms  of  tactual  and  motor  experience.  Their 
attention  is  concentrated  on  this  field  of  cognition,  and  their 
powers  of  memory  devoted  to  its  service.  The  increased 
exercise  and  cultivation  of  the  remaining  senses  when  sight 
is  in  abeyance,  has  the  eftect  of  developing  these  faculties  in 
an  extraordinary  manner,  and  none  of  them  more  so  than 
that  of  touch.  The  blind,  for  instance,  who  have  been  taught 
to  read,  can  decipher  the  contents  by  passing  their  fingers 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  135 


rapidly  over  type  not  much  larger  than  the  print  of  the 
present  work,  with  a  facihty  that  seems  ineredible  to  their 
more  fortunate  brethren  who  make  the  attempt.  Dr.  Carpenter 
relates  of  Laura  Bridgman,  the  well-known  deaf  and  dumb 
mute,  that  she  unhesitatingly  recognized  his  brother  "  after 
the  lapse  of  a  year  from  his  previous  interview  by  the  '  feel ' 
of  his  hand."^  She  estimates  the  age  and  frame  of  mind  of 
her  visitors  by  feeling  the  wrinkles  of  their  face,  and  it  is  said 
that  she  can  even  perceive  variation  in  intensity  and  pitch  of 
voice  by  feeling  the  throat.*^  John  Metcalf,  the  celebrated 
blind  road-maker,  was  deemed  an  excellent  jud^^^e  of  horses. 
When  a  lad  he  was  a  favourite  guide  through  the  lanes  and 
marshes  of  his  native  county.  As  a  young  man  he  followed 
the  hounds  on  horseback  across  country,  and  on  one  occasion 
won  a  three  mile  race  round  a  circular  course.  These  latter 
feats,  however,  were  performed  rather  by  the  sense  of  hearing 
than  of  touch.  To  guide  him  in  the  race,  he  placed  a  man 
with  a  bell  at  each  post ;  and  in  the  hunting-field  the  cry  of 
the  hounds,  the  intelligence  of  his  horse,  and  his  knowledge 
of  the  country  enabled  him  to  keep  a  leading  place. *" 

Visual  Perception. — As  the  formal  object  of 
sight  is  merely  coloured  surface,  the  eye  cannot 
originally  inform  us  of  distance.  This  faculty,  even 
more  than  that  of  touch,  has  constituted  a  battle- 
ground for  the  "nativistic"  and  "emipirical"  theories. 
The  more  thoroughgoing  nativists  have  held  that  the 
eye,  or  rather  the  visual  organ  consisting  of  both  eyes, 
has  from  the  beginning  the  power  of  immediately 
or  intuitively  apprehending  the  distance  and  relative 
situation  of  objects,  just  as  well  as  the  ability  of 
perceiving  differences  of  colour.      Empiricists,   on 


^  Mental  Physiology,  §  127. 

*>  "  Pressing  thus  on  the  throat  of  several  persons  successively, 
she  sometimes  sportively  attempts  to  imitate  their  voice  with  her 
own  in  a  way  which  shows  that  she  does  distinguish  differences 
of  both  loudness  and  pitch  (paradoxical  as  the  language  may  be) 
without  any  conception  or  sensation  whatever  of  sound."  (Cf.  Mind, 
1879,  pp.  166,  167.) 

''  Smiles,  Lives  of  Engineers,  Yo\.      p  210. 


136  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


the  other  hand,  deny  to  the  eye  all  native  capacity 
of  cognizing  extension  in  any  form.  According  to 
their  view,  it  is  only  by  experience  and  association 
that  ocular  sensations,  which  in  themselves  bear  no 
more  reference  to  space  than  feelings  of  sound  or 
smell,  are  gradually  construed  into  extended  solid 
objects.  Here  again,  as  before,  it  will  be  found 
that  truth  lies  in  the  mean.  The  primary  percep- 
tion of  the  eye  is  simply  coloured  surface;  neither 
distance,  solidity,  nor  absolute  magnitude  is  origi- 
nally presented  to  us  by  this  sense.  These  are 
secondary  or  acquired  perceptions,  gained  by 
associating  in  experience  various  shades  of  colour, 
and  degrees  of  tension  in  the  ocular  muscles,  with 
different  motor  and  tactual  experiences.  But  surface 
space  is  originally  perceived  directly. 

The  original  presentation  of  superficial  extension  is  very 
vague.  The  central  point  of  the  retina  is  most  sensitive,  and 
the  shape  of  an  external  surface,  e.g.,  of  a  triangle,  is  defined 
by  moving  the  line  of  direct  vision  round  its  outline.  The 
relative  situation  of  the  parts  subtending  different  points  on 
the  retina,  and  the  intervals  of  space  between  them,  vaguely 
presented  by  the  quantity  of  intermediate  distinct  sentient 
points,  similarly  receive  accurate  determination  by  means  of 
the  muscular  sensations  involved  in  bringing  the  central  axis 
of  the  eye  to  bear  on  them.  In  sight,  as  in  touch,  Lotze 
amends  the  empirical  doctrine  by  the  hypothesis  of  "  local 
signs."  Though  the  sensations  of  diff'erent  points  of  the 
retina  are  qualitatively  diff'erent,  he  holds  that  there  is 
originally  no  presentation  of  extension.  By  association  the 
qualitative  mark  of  any  spot  awakens  a  representation  of  the 
quantity  of  muscular  sensation  requisite  to  direct  the  central 
point  towards  the  object  subtended  by  that  spot,  and  this, 
he  teaches,  is  all  that  spatial  distance  means.  Greater  or  less 
space  is,  in  fact,  merely  the  possibility  of  more  or  fewer 
muscular  feelings.  (Cf.  Metaphysic,  Book  III.  c.  iv.) 

Here  again,  as  in  the  development  of  tactual  perception 
the  hypothesis  of  "  local  signs  "  may  be  accepted  as  a  means 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  137 

of  explaining  the  determination  of  the  relative  positions  and 
comparative  magnitudes  of  objects  within  the  extended  field 
of  vision,  but  it  cannot  account  for  the  original  presentation 
of  extension  itself. 

Immediate  Perception  of  Surface  Extension. 

■ — The  argument  used  to  establish  the  direct  per- 
ception of  extension  by  D'Alembert,  Hamilton,  and 
others,  has  never  been  really  answered.  We  will 
adopt  Dr.  Porter's  enunciation  of  the  proof:  "  If 
two  or  more  bands  of  colour  were  present  to  the 
infant  which  had  never  exercised  touch  or  move- 
ment, it  must  see  them  both  at  once ;  and  if  it  sees 
them  both,  it  must  see  them  as  expanded  or  ex- 
tended ;  otherwise  it  could  not  see  them  at  all,  nor 
the  line  of  transition  or  separation  between  them. 
Or  if  a  disc  of  red  were  presented  in  the  midst  of 
and  surrounded  by  a  field  of  yellow  or  blue,  or  if  a 
bright  band  of  red  were  painted  so  as  to  return  as 
a  circle  upon  itself,  on  a  field  of  black,  the  band 
could  not  be  traced  by  the  eye  without  requiring 
that  the  eye  should  contemplate  as  an  extended 
percept  the  included  surface  or  disc  of  red."^ 


8  The  Hicman  Intellect,  p.  155.  Cf.  also  Balmez,  Fundamental 
Philosophy,  Book  II.  c.  xii.,and  Hamilton,  Metaph.\o\.  II.  pp.  165,  172. 
This  argument  is  restated  in  an  effective  manner  by  Mr.  Mahaffy, 
The  Critical  Philosophy,  pp.  115 — 121.  It  is  no  reply  to  say  that  the 
extent  of  colour  perceived  by  a  motionless  eye  is  very  small  and  its 
outline  vague.  This  is  true,  though  not  to  the  extent  that  Mill 
and  Dr.  Bain  would  make  out.  It  is  conceded  by  them  that  the 
retina  is  extended,  and  that  a  small  circle  of  colour  can  be  originally 
apprehended  by  sight  alone.  This  admits  at  once  the  leading  con- 
tention of  the  intuitive  school.  A  circle  of  the  one-tenth  of  an  inch 
in  diameter  is  as  truly  extended  as  the  orbit  of  a  planet,  while  no 
microscope  can  reveal  space  in  a  sound  or  an  odour,  and  no 
summation  of  these  latter  sensations  can  result  in  a  surface 
or  a  solid. 


I3S  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


Experimental  evidence. — This  demonstration  is   reinfoixed 
by  the  direct  evidence  of  a  number  of  experiments  tried  on 
persons   who   had    late   in   Hfe   been   couched   for   cataract. 
The  testimony  from  this  line  of  investigation  is  unhappily 
not  yet  in  as  satisfactory  a  condition  as  could  be  desired.     It 
is  a  significant  comment  on  the  lofty  claims  of  some  physio- 
logical    psychologists     to     find     that    the    experiments     on 
Cheseldeu's  patient  still  receive  a  leading  place  among  the 
most  recent  text-books.     In  spite  of  the  supposed  enormous 
and    fruitful    advances    of    physiological    psychology,    that 
venerable  and  oft-recounted  incident,  now  nearly  one  hundred 
and   seventy  years  old,  and  claimed  by  both  sides,  is  still 
amongst  the  least  unsatisfactory  cases  we  possess.     The  best 
experiment,   however,  on   the   whole,    seems   to   be   that   ot 
Dr.  Franz,  of  Leipzig  (1840).    In  the  operations  of  both  Franz 
and  Cheselden  the  subjects  were  intelligent  boys  of  seventeen 
and  eighteen  years  of  age.     When,  after  the  cataract  had 
been   removed,    the   eyes   of   the    patients   were   sufficiently 
healed  to  be  exposed  to  the  light,  a  series  of  observations  and 
experiments  were  instituted  in  order  to  ascertain  exactly  how 
much  they  could   directly  perceive  by  their  newly-received 
faculty.     The  points  of  importance  best  established  were  : 
(1)   that  the  newly-acquired  sense  presented  to  the  mind  a 
field  of  colour  extended  in  two  dimensions  of  space  ;  (2)  that 
it  did  not  afford  a  perception  of  the  relative  distances  of 
objects,  all  being  apprehended  in  a  confused  manner  as  in 
close  proximity  to  the  eye;  (3)  and  that,  consequently,  no 
information  was  given  as  to  the  absolute  magnitude  of  things. 
(4)  In  Franz's  case,  where  the  investigation  was  more  skilfully 
conducted  than  on  the  earlier  occasion,  the  patient  recognized 
the  identity  between  horizontal  and  perpendicular  lines  now 
seen  by  the  eye  and  those  formerly  known  by  touch.     He 
could  similarly  recognize  square  and  round  figures,  though  he 
could  not  distinguish  these  from  solid  cubes  and  spheres.'* 

"  These  two  cases,  and  others  of  less  value  during  the  interval, 
are  reported  in  the  I'liil.  Trans,  of  the  Royal  Society.  Dr.  Carpenter, 
Mental  Philosophy,  %l  161  and  167,  alludes  to  some  other  instances, 
and  others  again  are  cited  by  Helmholtz,  but  the  two  given  above 
are  among  the  best.  A  large  portion  of  the  account  of  Franz's 
case  is  transcribed  from  the  Phil.  Trans.  1841,  into  Mr.  Mahafly's 
Critical  Philosophy,  pp.  122 — 133,  and  in  briefer  form  into  Dr.  M 'Cosh's 
E:xam.  of  Mill,  pp.  163—165.  Hamilton's  Metaph.  Vol.  II.  pp.  177— 
179,  contains  the  Cheselden  case  at  length.  The  best  summary, 
however,  of  all  these  cases  is  given  in  Preyer's  Development  of  the 
Intellect  (1896),  pp.  286— 317.  The  fact  that  the  most  recent  case 
recorded  there  is  that  of  Franz,  already  fifty-six  years  old,  is 
instructive. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  139 


Analogical  argument. — The  force  of  the  evidence  in  favour 
of  the   immediate   apprehension   of    space   of  at   least   two 
dimensions  by  the  human  infant  is  still  further  increased  by 
the  fact  that  several  of  the  lower  animals  are  now  proved  to 
possess  a  perfect  appreciation  of  even  three  dimensions  of 
space  at  birth.    Mr.  Spalding  established  intuitive  perceptions 
in  the  case  of  chickens  by  covering  their  eyes  with  hoods  as 
soon   as   they   left   the   shell,  and   so   preventing   all   visual 
experiences  until  they  were  strong  enough  for  various  experi- 
ments.    When  the    hoods  were  removed  they  immediately 
showed  their  appreciation  of  spatial  relations.    "  Often  at  the 
end  of  two  minutes,"  says  Mr.  Spalding,  "  they  followed  with 
their  eyes  the  movements  of  crawling  insects,  turning  their 
head  with  all  the  precision  of  an  old  fowl.     In  from  two  to 
fifteen  minutes  they  pecked  at  some  speck  or  insect,  showing 
not   merely   an   instinctive   perception   of    distance,   but   an 
original   ability  to  judge,  to    measure  distance,  with  some- 
thing like   infallible   accuracy.  .  .  .  They   never   missed   by 
more  than  a  hair's  breadth,  and  that  too,  when  the  specks 
aimed  at  were  no  bigger,  and  less  visible,  than  the  small  dot 
of  an  /."i"^     He  shows  a  similar  power  of  intuitive  perception 
to   be   possessed    by   young  pigs   and    some   other   animals 
physically  well  developed  at  birth.     This  positive  proof  of 
the   existence  of  intuitive   apprehension   of  space   of  three 
^limensions  demonstrates  in  a  striking  manner  the  absurdity 
of  the  imphcit  assumption  in  associationist  accounts  of  the 
subject  that  immediate  vision  even  of  surface  extension  is 
impossible. 

Mediate  perception  of  Distance  and  Magnitude. 

— That  the  human  eye  has  not  originally  the  capacity  of 
estimating  distance  is  shown  by  such  experiments  as 
those  just  cited;  and  by  the  fact  that  in  mature  life  in 
unusual  circumstances,  as  for  instance,  at  sea,  we  feel 
at  a  great  loss  when  we  attempt  to  judge  the  length  of 
considerable  intervals  of  space.  The  simple  experi- 
ment of  closing  one  eye,  especially  when  entering  an 
unfamiliar  room,  also  shows  how  imperfect  is  our  purely 
visual  appreciation  of  distance.  And  the  various 
illusions  of  painting,  of  the  diorama,  and  of  the  stereo- 
scope, all  go  to  prove  the  truth  that  the  apparently 
immediate  apprehension  of  the  third  dimension  of  space 

'"  Cf.   Macmillan's  Magazine,  February,   1873;    James,   Vol.   II. 
pp.  394—400 ;  and  Preyer,  The  Senses  and  the  Will,  pp.  66,  235—241. 


I 


140  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


by  sight  is  really  an  acquired  perception,  which 
involves  a  rapid  process  of  inference  from  numerous 
visual  signs. 

In  developed  perception  there  are  engaged  many 
factors  whose  presence  and  action  are  commonly 
ignored.  Starting  from  an  originally  indefinite  appre- 
hension of  extended  coloured  surface,  we  find  that 
different  perspective  appearances,  shades  of  colour, 
and  degrees  of  tension  in  the  ocular  muscles  are  asso- 
ciated with  longer  or  shorter  distances  to  be  moved 
through  in  order  to  touch  the  coloured  object.  After  a 
sufficient  number  of  experiences  the  visual  appearance 
suggests  the  appropriate  amount  of  movement,  and  the 
former  becomes  the  symbol  of  the  latter.  The  chief 
elements  in  the  process  seem  to  be  the  following  : 

1.  Focal  adjustments — The  single  eye  is  subject  to 
different  muscular  sensations  according  to  the  varying 
distance  of  the  object  up  to  an  interval  of  twenty  feet. 
This  is  due  to  the  self-regulating  action  of  the  ciliary 
muscle,  which  increases  or  decreases  the  convexity  of 
the  crystalline  lens  so  as  to  adjust  the  focus  to  a  shorter 
or  longer  range. 

2.  Axial  adjustment.  —  The  muscular  sensations 
awakened  by  converging  the  axes  of  both  ej'es  to  meet 
in  a  point,  vary  according  as  the  object  is  nearer  or 
farther  within  a  space  of  two  hundred  yards. 

3.  Mathematical  perspective. — The  size  of  the  retinal 
image  and  the  apparent  size  of  an  object  change  with 
the  distance  of  the  latter ;  consequently,  if  its  real 
magnitude  is  already  known,  we  have  the  means  of 
determining  how  remote  it  is.  It  is  for  this  purpose 
the  painter  is  accustomed  to  introduce  the  figure  of  a 
man  or  of  some  well-known  animal  into  the  foreground 
of  his  pictures. 

4.  Aerial  perspective. — Finally,  changes  of  colour,  and 
the  greater  or  less  haziness  in  the  outlines  of  objects 
becomes  by  experience  the  signs  of  a  longer  or  shorter 
interval  between  them  and  us. 

Our  visual  perception  of  the  magnitude  of  an  object 

11  Cf.  Le  Conte,  Sight,  Part  II.  c.  v. 


DEVELOPMENT   OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  141 


is  an  inference  from  its  apparent  size  and  presumed 
distance,  and  most  of  the  steps  just  given  may  enter  into 
the  estimate.  Thus,  in  judging  the  dimensions  of  an 
unfamiHar  object,  such  as  a  rock,  or  a  mound  of  earth 
afar  off",  we  are  led  to  form  an  idea  of  the  length  of 
space  intervening  by  the  number  and  apparent  magni- 
tude of  known  objects  between  us  and  the  point  in 
question,  by  the  apparent  size  of  other  known  figures, 
such  as  those  of  men  or  animals  situated  in  its  vicinity, 
and  by  the  clearness  or  mistiness  of  the  outlines  of  the 
object  and  of  its  neighbours.  Having  thus  estimated 
the  distance  we  infer  the  real  from  the  apparent  magni- 
tude of  the  object. 

Mutual  aid  of  Sight  and  Touch. — The  education  of  tlie 
sense  of  sight  proceeds  concomitantly  with  that  of  the 
faculty  of  tactual  and  motor  sensations.  Mutually 
aiding  each  other  their  progress  is  very  rapid.  The 
advantages  gained  by  touch  through  the  consciousness 
of  double-contact  are  now  largely  increased  by  the 
addition  of  a  power  which  can  apprehend  in  an  instant 
the  entire  contour  of  the  body,  and  the  situation  of  the 
various  agents  acting  upon  it.  The  length  of  the  sweep 
of  the  arm  or  leg  are  known  not  merely  in  the  dim 
terms  of  subjective  motor  feelings,  but  through  the 
fine  visual  perceptions  of  space.  The  wide  range  of 
the  eye,  and  those  other  numerous  excellences  which 
have  been  detailed  in  describing  this  sense,  confer  upon 
its  acts  the  power  of  arousing  with  marvellous  facility 
and  speed  the  representation  of  associated  tactual  and 
muscular  sensations.  By  this  singularl}'  perfect  appro- 
priation of  the  acquisitions  of  touch,  vision  is  enabled 
to  inform  us  in  an  easy,  rapid,  and  admirable  manner 
of  a  multitude  of  the  tangible  properties  of  things  which 
we  could  never,  or  but  by  an  incredible  amount  of  labour, 
ascertain  through  actual  contact.  At  the  same  time, 
the  control  of  the  organ  of  sight  is  secured  by  the  ciliary 
muscles ;  and  while  we  watch  the  movement  of  the 
arm,  the  muscular  sensations  of  the  eye  reveal  the 
quantity  of  change  in  its  own  direction,  the  degree  of 
convergence  of  the  optic  axes,  and  the  increase  or 
decrease  in  the  copyexity  of  the  cr3'stalline  lens.     In 


142  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


this  way  by  the  mutual  co-operation  of  the  two  faculties 
our  knowledge  of  the  most  important  attributes  of 
matter  is  elaborated. 

Vision,  unlike  touch,  taste,  and  smell,  does  not  seem  to  be 
capable  of  much  advance  in  range  or  refinement  beyond  what 
it  normally  reaches.  The  skill  with  which  the  Indian  can 
follow  a  trail  and  the  sailor  recognize  an  object  at  sea  seem 
among  the  most  remarkable  effects  of  special  education  of 
this  sense.  Unlike  the  other  faculties,  sight  is  normally 
developed  almost  up  to  its  full  maximum  efficiency. 

Binocular  Vision. — A  large  district  of  the  spatial  scene 
apprehended  by  sight  is  common  to  both  eyes,  but  the  out- 
skirts on  either  side  extend  beyond  the  binocular  field  of 
vision,  and  can  be  reached  only  by  a  single  organ.  In  the 
perception  of  distant  objects  within  the  common  field  there  is 
ordinarily  formed  on  each  of  the  retinas  a  similar  picture, 
but  things  seen  in  our  immediate  neighbourhood  offer  a 
different  appearance  to  the  right  and  to  the  left  eye.  This 
fact  has  given  rise  to  the  problem  of  single  vision.  Why  with 
two  eyes  do  we  not  see  two  objects  instead  of  one  ?  Various 
explanations  have  been  suggested.  One  view  supposes  that 
we  originally  saw  double,  but  by  experience  have  learned  to 
assign  the  two  images  to  a  single  cause.  Another  maintains 
that  the  two  eyes  form  really  but  one  organ.  There  are,  it  is 
held,  "identical  or  corresponding  points  "  on  the  two  retinas, 
and  pairs  of  nerves  running  from  these  to  the  brain  coalesce, 
so  that  the  two  stimuli  are  fused  into  a  single  final  excitation 
awakening  but  one  sensation.  Other  writers  have  asserted 
that  although  the  two  eyes  see  different  pictures  yet,  at  any 
given  time,  we  attend  only  to  one. 

As  regards  the  last  hypothesis  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that 
one  eye  is  commonly  more  active  than  the  other,  and  most 
people  will  find  that  the  right  is  more  efficient  than  the  left ; 
still  it  is  going  beyond  the  evidence  to  assume  that  our 
attention  is  normally  so  concentrated  upon  the  activity  of 
one  eye  that  the  other  may  be  thrown  out  of  account.  In 
favour  of  the  second  view  may  be  urged  the  authority  of 
several  distinguished  German  physiologists  starting  with 
Miiller  fifty  years  ago,  who  consider  the  anatomical  evidence 
to  be  on  the  whole  in  support  of  the  physical  explanation. 
It  is  also  maintained  that  if  the  two  retinas  were  really 
subjects  of  two  distinct  sensations,  careful  reflexion  and 
examination  of  our  consciousness  ought  to  enable  us  to 
distinguish  them.  Finally,  it  is  held  that  the  analogy  in  the 
case  of  young  animals  constitutes  a  forcible  argument.     If 


DEVELOPMENT   OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  143 


the  two  eyes  are  co-ordinated  so  as  to  originate  a  sin£;lc 
perception  from  the  beginning  in  these  latter,  as  is  un- 
doubtedly the  case,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose,  where  there 
is  no  positive  evidence  to  the  contrary,  that  the  same  holds 
for  the  young  infant. 

On  the  other  side  it  is  argued  :  (a)  That  more  accurate 
knowledge  of  anatomy  does  not  bear  out  the  nativistic 
position.  {b)  That  points  physiologically  not  "  corres- 
ponding "  sometimes  give  rise  to  a  single  perception,  whilst 
on  other  occasions  points  that  ought  to  correspond  excite 
double  vision.  In  abnormal  conditions,  such  as  squinting, 
where  the  derangement  is  permanent,  vision  is  single,  in  spite 
of  the  non-correspondence  of  identical  points,  and  when  the 
irregularity  has  been  removed  by  surgical  means,  so  that  the 
two  axes  get  into  a  normal  position,  double  vision  arises  for  a 
time,  but  by  continued  experience  passes  again  into  single 
vision.  {c)  Some  writers  contend  that  the  "  conflict  or 
rivalry  of  the  retinas,"  which  takes  place  when  the  two  eyes 
are  made  to  contemplate  different  colours,  is  in  favour  of  the 
empirical  theory.  If  there  was  a  real  physical  fusion  of  the 
nerve  currents  from  the  retinas  to  the  brain,  then  we  ought 
to  have  a  sensation  of  an  intermediate  character  and  not,  as 
is  the  case  at  present,  an  alternative  struggling  sensation  of 
each.  A  modification  of  this  experiment,  however,  is  held 
by  others  to  support  the  nativistic  theory.'^  {d)  It  is  also 
urged  that  the  illusion  produced  by  the  stereoscope,  where 
two  dissimilar  pictures  presented  to  the  different  eyes  give 
rise  to  the  perception  of  a  single  object,  confirms  the  empirical 
theory.^^ 

On  the  whole  that  view  seems  to  us  to  be  nearest  to  the 
truth  which,  while  admitting  a  certain  degree  of  natural 
harmony  in  the  structure  of  the  two  instruments,  yet  assigns 
to  experience  the  development  and  perfection  of  binocular 
vision.^** 

^-  Cf.  Wyld,  Physics  and  Philosophy  of  the  Senses,  pp.  226,  227. 

'^  The  stereoscope  is  an  instrument,  invented  by  Wheatstone, 
and  improved  by  Brewster,  in  which  slightly  dissimilar  pictures, 
such  as  would  be  presented  to  the  right  and  left  retinas  by  a  neigh- 
bouring solid  object,  are  simultaneously  set  separately  each  before 
the  appropriate  eye.  The  result  is  an  irresistible  conviction  of  a 
single  solid  object.  The  empirical  school  hold  this  fact  to  establish 
that  single  vision  is  really  an  interpretation  of  two  mental  images 
attained  by  experience.  Their  opponents,  however,  would  argue 
that  though  illusory  in  the  present  case,  the  single  apprehension  is 
due  to  native  disposition  and  not  merely  to  association. 

^^  The  reader  interested  in  the  question  will  find  the  empirical 
doctrine  supported  by  Carpenter,  op.  cit.  §§   168— 171,  and  Bern- 


144  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


The  importance  of  binocular  vision  in  the  perception  of 
soHdity  and  distance  is  very  great.  The  muscular  tension 
involved  in  the  convergence  of  the  axes  of  the  two  eyes,  and 
the  dissimilarity  in  the  two  retinal  impressions,  confer  an 
immense  advantage  on  the  double  organ.  Somewhat  analo- 
gously to  the  case  of  the  two  hands  in  the  sense  of  touch, 
and  to  the  two  ears  in  hearing,  the  twin  members  of  the 
visual  faculty,  by  means  of  their  different  standpoints,  are 
enabled  to  bring  forward  valuable  contributions  of  a  new 
character.  Moreover,  though  double-contact  aids  us  by  two 
distinct  and  separable  experiences,  while  ordinarily  in  sight 
but  one  sensation  is  consciously  realized,  yet  the  effect  of  the 
second  visual  organ,  whether  due  to  experience  or  connate 
aptitude,  is  such  that  we  obtain  an  instantaneous  perception 
of  the  third  dimension  of  space. 

Erect  Vision. — In  addition  to  binocular  vision,  a  second 
"anomaly"  of  sight  is  found  in  the  perception  of  objects  as 
erect  while  the  image  on  the  retina  is  inverted.  Some  writers 
refuse  to  admit  the  existence  of  any  special  difficulty.  We  do 
not,  they  point  out,  see  the  retinal  image  but  the  object,  and 
it  is  simply  a  law  of  our  nature  that  an  inverted  image 
awakens  the  perception  of  an  erect  object.  Others  accen- 
tuate the  fact  that  during  the  transmission  of  the  retinal 
impression  to  the  brain  in  the  form  of  a  neural  tremor,  the 
original  spatial  relations  of  the  parts  must  be  lost,  and  so 
there  is  no  reason  why  the  resulting  mental  state  should 
redistribute  them  in  their  old  position.  The  erection  of  the 
object  will  then  be  due  either  to  innate  disposition  or  acquired 
habit.  Dr.  Carpenter  holds  that  "  one  of  the  most  elementary 
of  our  visual  cognitions  is  the  sense  of  direction,  whereby  we 
recognize  the  relations  of  the  points  from  which  the  rays 
issue  and  thus  see  the  objects  erect,  though  their  pictures  on 
the  retina  are  inverted."  ^^  By  this  "extradition,"  rays  of 
light  falling  from  above  or  below  will  be  referred  back  to  their 
source.  He  appeals  to  the  operations  for  cataract  as  con- 
firming his  view.  The  question  is,  however,  of  no  great 
philosophical  significance. 

stein,  The  Five  Senses,  pp.  128,  seq.  On  the  other  side,  of.  R.  S. 
Wyld,  op.  cit.  pp.  221 — 227.  P.  Salis  Sewis,  Delia  Conoscenza  Sensi- 
tiva,  pp.  483 — 486,  opposes  the  physiological  explanation  which 
he  traces  back  to  Galen.  La  Psychologic  Allemande  Contemporaine, 
pp.  118 — 145,  by  M.  Ribot,  gives  an  account  of  the  dispute  between 
Nativists  and  Empiricists  in  Germany.  However,  this  book,  which 
is  written  entirely  from  an  empiricist  standpoint,  is  very  unreliable. 
^^  Mental  Physiology,  §  165. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  145 


Auditory  Perception. — The  ear  gives  us  origi- 
nally no  knowledge  of  the  spatial  relations  of  the 
external  world,  nor  even  of  the  nature  of  the  objec- 
tive cause  of  the  sensations  of  sound.  Of  the 
acquired  perceptions  of  this  faculty  the  most  re- 
markable are  the  sense  of  the  direction  of  a  sounding 
body,  and  the  sense  of  its  distance.  Both  are  due  to 
association,  and  neither  of  them  reach  in  man  a 
very  high  degree  of  perfection.  If  while  our  eyes 
are  closed  a  noise  is  produced  near  us  by  the  con- 
cussion of  two  objects,  such  as  keys,  we  shall  find 
it  almost  impossible  to  localize  the  sound,  especially 
when  the  experiment  is  performed  above  our  head 
or  near  our  feet.  In  mature  life  we  estimate  the 
distance  of  a  familiar  sound  by  means  of  its  in- 
tensity. If  it  is  of  a  rare  character,  such  as  that 
of  thunder  or  of  the  explosion  of  gunpowder,  we 
feel  completely  at  a  loss.  The  discrimination  of 
direction  is  dependent  on  the  difference  in  the 
effects  produced  in  the  two  ears,  and  also  on  the 
variation  in  the  character  or  intensity  of  the  sound 
brought  about  by  moving  the  head.  An  object  on 
the  right  side  makes  a  stronger  impression  on  the 
right  than  on  the  left  ear,  and  the  sound  is  intensified 
by  bringing  the  head  or  body  to  that  side,  or  by 
setting  the  ear  in  a  more  direct  line  with  the 
sonorous  object.  Hares  and  other  animals  endowed 
with  large  movable  ears  far  surpass  man  in  this 
respect.  Careful  cultivation  may  extend  consider-, 
ably  the  power  of  distinguishing  faint  sounds,  and, 
we  find  certain  uncivilized  tribes,  as  well  as  some 
species  of  the  lower  animals,  in  which  this  sense  has ' 

K 


146  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


been  developed  to  a  surprising  degree  as  a  means 
of  ascertaining  the  advent  of  their  foes  or  their  prey. 
Its  imperfection  as  an  imformant  regarding  space 
is  partially  redeemed  by  the  fineness  of  its  appre- 
ciation of  time  lengths,  and  to  this  quality  its  value 
not  merely  as  the  musical  faculty,  but  as  the  instru- 
ment of  social  communication  is  largely  due. 

Gustatory  and  Olfactory  Perception. — Neither 
the  sense  of  taste  nor  that  of  smell  afforded  us  origi- 
nally an  immediate  perception  of  external  reality. 
If  we  make  the  experiment  of  tasting  a  liquid  of 
moderately  sweet  or  sour  flavour,  which  is  at  the 
same  temperature  as  the  organ,  we  shall  find  that 
even  in  mature  life  the  resulting  sensation  is  of  a 
vague  ill-defined  character,  and  contains  little  more 
direct  reference  to  the  external  world  than  a  head- 
ache, or  a  general  feeling  of  depression.  In 
experience,  however,  special  tastes  have  been  found 
to  be  invariably  excited  by  objects  possessing  par- 
ticular tactual  and  visual  qualities,  and  therefore  the 
three  classes  of  sensation  come  to  be  associated  so 
that  either  may  recall  the  others.  By  cultivation 
this  faculty  can  be  developed  in  a  very  surprising 
degree,  and  the  expert  can  detect  variations  in  the 
flavour  of  tea,  wine,  and  other  articles  so  faint  as  to 
be  utterly  imperceptible  to  the  ordinary  mortal.  The 
first  odours  which  assailed  our  nostrils  probably 
awoke  us  up  to  an  indefinite  pleasurable  or  painful 
feeling,  and  to  nothing  more.  But  after  a  time 
we  grew  to  associate  certain  smells  with  particular 
objects  known  by  touch  and  sight,  and  as  the 
higher  activities  of  the   mind    unfolded  themselves 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  147 


we  began  to  apprehend  the  former  as  the  cause  of 
the  latter.  To  the  circumstance  that  this  sense  is 
stimulated  by  effluvia  of  distant  bodies,  much  of  its 
superiority  to  taste,  both  in  point  of  refinement  and 
of  cognitional  importance,  is  due.  As  revealing 
future  gustatory  experiences,  and  giving  timely 
warning  of  poisonous  or  unwholesome  food,  olfac- 
tory perception  becomes  an  instrument  of  con- 
siderable value.  This  faculty,  like  that  of  taste,  is 
susceptible  of  a  high  degree  of  cultivation,  and  in 
the  absence  of  some  of  the  other  senses  it  has 
reached  a  remarkable  degree  of  acuteness. 

Objections  solved.— The  account  we  have  just  given  of 
the  gradual  growth  of  perception  obviates  various  difficulties 
urged  against  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Reahsm.  Mr.  Bain,  for 
instance,  objects  against  Hamilton  that  the  terms  "  external," 
"independent,"  and  "  reahty  "  "  are  not  simple  and  ultimate 
notions,  but  complex  and  derived,"  and  consequently  that 
"it  is  inadmissible  to  regard  any  proposition  involving  them 
as  an  ultimate  fact  of  consciousness."  ^^  Undoubtedly  these 
terms  in  ordinary  language  imply  a  variety  of  elements  which 
it  would  be  absurd  to  assert  are  all  given  in  the  "  primitive 
unanalyzable  dictum  of  consciousness."  Accordingly,  to  main- 
tain that  the  first  sensation  of  pressure  or  sight  revealed  to 
the  infant  a  material  world  as  external,  independent,  and  real, 
in  the  full  significance  of  these  words,  would  be  as  unjustifi- 
able as  to  hold  that  the  first  glance  at  a  triangle  or  circle 
presents  to  us  all  its  geometrical  properties.  Starting  from 
impressions  of  sight  and  touch  which  vaguely  present  to  us 
extended  reality  other  than  our  perceiving  mind,  our  present 
well-defined  knowledge  of  our  own  sentient  organism,  and  of 
objects  external  to  it,  became  gradually  elaborated.  The 
continuous  existence  of  these  realities  when  unperceived, 
which  especially  establishes  their  independence  of  the  Ego^ 
is  guaranteed  by  memory,  reflexion,  and  inference,  and  not 
by  direct  intuition.  Finally,  through  the  same  means  we 
learn  to  distinguish  between  the  illusions  of  the  imagination 
and  the  genuine  deliverances  of  the  external  senses,  and  so 
come  to  comprehend  the  full  meaning  of  reality. 

^^  Mental  Science,  p.  120. 


148  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


The  objection  that  we  cannot  have  an  immediate  know- 
ledge of  an  "  external  reality,"  that  "  it  is  impossible  to 
understand  how  the  mind  can  be  cognizant  of  a  thing 
detached  from  itself,"  ^^  is  equally  futile.  It  is  at  least  fully 
as  impossible  to  understand  how  the  mind  can  be  cognizant 
of  itself.  How  mind  and  body  are  united,  Jiow  either  can  act 
upon  the  other,  or  indeed  how  any  one  thing  can  7nove 
another,  are  to  our  present  faculties  insoluble  questions ;  but 
the  fact  that  there  is  interaction  cannot  be  denied  any  more 
than  the  growth  of  plants  or  the  existence  of  gravitation, 
merely  because  we  cannot  imagine  how  such  an  event  is 
possible.  If  the  living  body  is  informed  and  animated 
throughout  its  whole  being  by  a  spiritual  soul,  why  should  not 
the  sentient  organism  so  constituted  be  capable  of  responding 
to  a  material  stimulus  by  an  immediately  percipient  act  ? 
A  priori  dogmas  as  to  what  is  or  is  not  impossible  are  here 
out  of  place,  especially  in  the  hands  of  empiricists.  To 
experience  we  must  appeal,  and  this  testifies  that  in  sensa- 
tions of  pressure  and  sight  we  are  immediately  percipient  of 
something  other  than  our  own  mental  states,  whilst  observa- 
tion of  many  of  the  lower  animals  proves  that  they  can 
accurately  appreciate  spatial  relations  from  birth. 

Co-operation  of  External  Senses,  Internal 
Sense,  and  Intellect. — We  have  endeavoured,  in 
the  present  chapter,  to  trace  the  growth  of  each  of 
the  external  senses  separately,  and  we  have  tried  to 
confine  ourselves  to  the  development  of  the  sensuous 
factor  in  apprehension.  But  in  real  life  there  is  no 
such  isolation.  The  external  senses  are  all  con- 
nected with  the  same  brain,  and  they  are  all  faculties 
of  the  same  mind.  Their  several  activities  are 
accordingly  unified  in  the  same  interior  sensuous 
consciousness.  In  human  beings,  as  well  as  in  the 
lower  animals,  the  operations  of  the  senses  are 
synthesized  by  internal  sentiency,  and  apart  from 
all  higher  rational  activity,  the  sensations  of  the 
different  senses  are  obscurely  felt  as  similar  or 
dissimilar. 

1'^  Mental  Science,  p.  209. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  149 

But  in  man,  during  mature  life,  even  the 
simplest  acts  of  perception  usually  involve  in- 
tellectual activity,  and  it  is  virtually  as  impossible 
to  assign  the  exact  date  of  the  first  awakening  of 
rational  cognition  as  it  is  to  point  to  the  birth  of 
the  primitive  free  volition.  In  both  departments 
lower  grades  of  consciousness,  sentiency  and  spon- 
taneity, precede  as  necessary  conditions  the  higher 
forms  of  mental  life ;  and  to  the  child  during  the 
years  of  early  infancy  the  existence  of  the  external 
world  is  given  as  an  instinctive  and  indestructible 
belief,  and  its  reality  is  for  him  little  more  than  that 
of  sensations  and  possibilities  of  sensations. 

Dr.  Porter  very  aptly  remarks:  "It  is  quite  conceivable, 
as  has  been  already  suggested,  that  before  those  percepts 
(perceived  things)  and  sensations  (qualities  apprehended  by 
sensations)  are  connected  under  the  relation  of  substance 
and  attribute,  they  should  be  known  as  constant  attendants, 
co-existent  or  successive,  and  that,  simply  as  conjoined,  the 
presence  or  the  thought  {i.e.  sensuous  image)  of  the  one 
should,  under  the  laws  of  association,  suggest  the  thought  of 
the  other.  It  is  under  this  relation  that  things  and  properties 
are  known  to  the  animal.  It  is  obvious  that  the  animal 
cannot  and  does  not  distinguish  the  relation  of  conjunction 
from  that  ot  causation.  If  he  has  experienced  one  sensation 
or  sense-percept  in  connection  with  another,  the  repetition  of 
the  one  brings  up  the  image  of  the  other,  and  the  pain  and 
pleasure,  the  hope  and  fear,  which  are  appropriate  to  it. 
The  dog  connects  with  the  whip  in  the  hand  of  his  master 
the  thought  (image)  of  chastisement  and  pain ;  with  the  sight 
of  his  gun  or  his  walking-stick,  the  excitement  of  a  ramble  or 
of  sport."  i« 

Intelligent  Cognition  not  mere  Instinctive  Belief.— 
It  is  through  a  confusion  between  the  spontaneous  faith 
embodied  in  the  primitive  percipient  act  and  the  rational 
conviction  evoked  in  the  developed  consciousness  by  intel- 
lectual perception,  that  Reid  and  others  were  misled  into 
describing  our  assurance  of  external  reality  as  an  instinctive 

18  The  Human  Intellect,  §  166. 


i:;o  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


&^//^/ irresistibly  suggested  by  the  sensation.  Instinctive  belief 
stands  opposed  to  intelligent  cognition  as  being  blind  and 
irrational.  No  grounds  can  be  assigned  for  its  existence, 
and  no  cogent  reason  can  be  adduced  for  its  validity.  The 
mere  fact  that  a  mental  state  of  this  character  is  inde- 
structible does  not  alone  afford  it  a  sufficient  philosophical 
guarantee,  while  the  appearance  of  idealist  philosophers 
would  seem  to  imply  that  such  a  faith  can  at  all  events  suffer 
temporary  eclipse.  But  our  knowledge  of  material  objects 
is  not  of  this  kind.  However  blind  and  unintelligent  may  be 
the  trust  of  the  infant  or  the  brute  in  an  external  world, 
developed  cognition  in  man  is  essentially  other  than  im- 
pulsive faith  ;  and  his  certainty  of  a  material  universe,  au 
assurance  in  which  rational  intuition,  abstraction,  reflexion, 
and  inference  are  involved,  and  which  is  based  on  reasons 
as  solid  as  those  we  have  already  advanced,  is  most  erron- 
eously described  as  an  instinctive  belief. 

Mental  and  Cerebral  development. — Mental  development  is 
marked  by  growth  in  power,  enlargement  in  range  and 
variety,  and  increase  in  the  complexity  of  our  mental  activi- 
ties. Much  industry  has  been  recently  devoted  to  the 
systematic  observation  of  the  working  of  the  faculties  of  the 
mind  from  earliest  childhood,  and  although  the  psychologist's 
interpretations  of  the  infant's  mental  states  may  remain  of 
doubtful  value,  careful  study  of  facts  must  ultimately  prove 
fruitful  in  the  interests  of  truth.  Among  the  results,  partly 
physiological,  partly  psychological,  claimed  to  be  established 
are  the  following. 

The  weight  of  the  human  brain  at  birth  is  about  one-sixth 
of  that  of  the  whole  body.  The  brain  more  than  doubles  its 
size  during  the  first  year,  after  which  its  increase  is  much  less 
rapid,  and  although  it  continues  to  grow  very  slowly  to 
middle  life,  it  has  nearly  reached  its  full  size  by  the  end  of 
the  seventh  year,  At  maturity  it  averages  between  one- 
fortieth  and  one-fiftieth  of  the  weight  of  the  body,  reaching  in 
normal  adult  Europeans  from  about  forty-six  to  fifty-two 
ounces.  Whilst  during  infancy  it  thus  grows  rapidly  in  bulk, 
it  also  exhibits  increasing  distinctness  and  perfection  in  its 
several  parts,  and  its  convolutions  become  deeper  and  more 
marked.  The  sense-organs  also,  though  very  imperfect  at 
first,  develop  still  more  speedily,  and  within  a  few  weeks,  or 
at  most  a  few  months,  they  attain  maturity.  Experiments  go 
to  show  that  the  newly-born  child  is  deaf,  probablj'  owing  to 
the  presence  of  a  fluid  in  the  internal  cavit}-  of  the  ear,  which 
is  only  gradually  replaced  by  air.  At  first,  sound  produces 
merely  a  vague  shock,     The  muscular  control  over  the  eves 


DEVELOPMENT   OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  151 

is  imperfect,  and  according  to  some  observers  during  the  first 
days  of  its  life  the  infant  merely  distinguishes  light  from 
darkness,  whilst  the  capacity  to  discriminate  colours  remains 
very  feeble  for  some  weeks. ^•*  The  child  seems  to  be  unable 
to  distinguish  different  distances,  by  means  of  sight.  Although, 
as  we  have  already  observed,  this  aptitude  is  enjoyed  from 
the  beginning  in  a  completely  developed  condition  by  some  of 
the  lower  animals.  Sensations  of  contact  are  of  a  similarly 
indefinite  character.  On  the  whole  it  is  probable  that  the 
consciousness  of  the  infant  during  the  first  weeks  of  its  life  is 
of  a  vague,  indefinite,  drowsy  character,  in  which  there  is 
little  or  no  awareness  of  the  various  qualities  of  sensations 
which  will  become  so  widely  differentiated  later  on.^° 

With  varied  and  contrasted  experiences,  however,  the 
sensibility  to  different  stimuli  rapidly  improves,  and  the 
monotony  of  the  earher  somnolency  is  more  and  more  broken 
up.  Each  stimulation  leaves  a  certain  residual  effect  in  the 
faculty,  and  repetition  of  an  impression,  while  strengthening 
the  power  exercised,  also  tends  to  awaken  a  faint  curiosity 
and  interest,  and  the  infant  begins  to  compare  in  a  semi- 
conscious way  different  experiences,  and  also  to  recognize 
them  on  their  recurrence.  As  definiteness  of  impressions  is 
increased  memory  improves,  and  conscious  attention  is  called 
more  and  more  into  play,  and  intellect  proper  begins  to  exert 
itself.  The  primary  tendency  of  all  mental  activity  is  objec- 
tive— self-consciousness  coming  later.  The  course  and  the 
range  of  development  is  determined  in  part  by  inherited 
temperament,  in  part  by  surrounding  circumstances,  physical, 
intellectual,  and  moral. 

Periods. — The  periods  of  development  are  variously  divided 
by  different  writers,  but  in  general  the  following  are  recog- 
nized as  distinct  epochs.     Infancy,  reaching  to  nearly  the  end 

13  Cf.  Preyer,  The  Mind  of  the  Child,  Part  I.  pp.  180— 1S3.  Some 
of  his  conclusions,  however,  seem  very  hazardous  and  scarcely 
warranted  by  the  evidence.  Their  uncertainty  illustrates  clearly 
the  grave  difficulties  inherent  in  the  objective  method  as  employed 
in  Comparative  Psychology. 

2"  "The  baby  assailed  by  eyes,  ears,  nose,  skin,  and  entrails  at 
once,  feels  it  all  as  one  great,  blooming,  buzzing  confusion."  (James, 
Vol.  I.  p.  488.)  J.Ward  {"Psychology,"  Encyc.  Brit. ,gih  Edit.)  similarly 
insists  that  the  primitive  consciousness  must  be  a  sensory  continuum, 
a  homogeneous  mass,  as  it  were  of  feeling  in  which  the  separate 
elements  have  to  be  gradually  discriminated  and  differentiated  by 
subsequent  experiences.  This  is  a  striking  reversal  of  the  old 
associationist  "  atomistic  "  view  which  conceived  mental  develop- 
ment as  mainly  a  process  of  fusion  or  "chemical  combination"  of 
originally  distinct  impressions. 


152  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


of  the  second  year,  during  which  the  several  faculties  of 
sense-perception  reach  maturity,  the  power  of  locomotion  is 
imperfectly  acquired,  and  the  first  efforts  at  speech  are  made. 
Childhood  comes  next,  reaching  to  the  seventh  year.  Memory 
and  imagination  show  considerable  progress.  Curiosity 
frequently  manifests  itself,  and  the  so-called  "play-impulse" 
or  tendency  to  spontaneous,  random  movement  is  active. 
A  lull  self-conscious  knowledge  of  his  own  personality  is 
reached  early  in  this  period,  although  the  general  tendency  of 
the  mind  is  objective  ;  and  the  power  of  voluntary  self-control 
and  reflective  obedience  to  rule  is  ordinarily  sufficiently 
developed  before  the  eighth  year  to  constitute  the  child 
responsible  for  his  acts  where  temptation  does  not  exceed  a 
moderate  degree  of  strength.  For  this  reason  moral  theolo- 
gians have  fixed  on  the  seventh  year  as  the  date  about  which 
the  "  use  of  reason  "  is  commonly  reached. 

The  next  seven  years  mark  the  period  of  boyhood,  during 
which  the  faculty  of  memory  increases  in  strength  and  intel- 
lectual abstraction  comes  more  into  play.  Self-control  too 
grows  in  power,  and  individual  peculiarities  reveal  them- 
selves. This  is  especially  the  plastic  period  when  the  founda- 
tions of  those  moral  and  intellectual  habits  are  to  be  laid 
which  will  in  great  part  determine  the  quality  of  the  boy's 
future  career.  If  habits  in  conflict  with  truthfulness,  generosity, 
obedience,  or  purity  are  in  possession  at  the  age  of  fifteen,  it 
is  extremely  difficult  to  dislodge  them  afterwards. 

The  period  of  youth,  covering  the  next  seven  years,  marks 
the  final  "setting"  of  the  character  in  various  directions. 
Whilst  the  memory  and  imagination  continue  active,  the 
intellectual  faculty  of  abstract  conception,  judgment,  and 
reasoning  rapidly  expands,  and  the  power  of  introspection 
also  increases.  The  emotions  and  passions  come  into  pro- 
minence. This  is  especially  the  season  for  building  up  ideals. 
It  is  the  age  of  enthusiasm,  of  poetry,  and  of  fancy,  but  it  is 
also  the  epoch  during  which  our  most  important  intellectual 
convictions  and  moral  habits  crystallize  and  determine  for 
good  or  ill  the  course  of  our  whole  future  life. 

Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities  of  Matter. — 

Oar  knowledge  of  the  smell,  sound,  taste,  or  tempera- 
ture of  objects  differs  widely  in  character  from  our  cog- 
nition of  their  extension,  figure,  or  number.  The  latter 
are  called  primary,  the  former  secondary  qualities  of  matter. 
The  significance  of  this  difference  has  played  a  prominent 
part  in  the  history  of  the  Philosophy  of  Perception  in 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  153 


modern  times,  especially  in  England,  but  the  distinction 
was  clearly  grasped  in  its  most  essential  bearings  by 
Aristotle  and  St.  Thomas.  Aristotle  distinguished 
between  ''common"  and  "proper  sensibles,"  and 
further  between  the  latter  in  a  state  of  formal  actuality 
or  energy  (eV  ivcpyeia,  in  actu),  and  in  a  dormant  or 
potential  condition-^  (eV  Suva/^ct,  in  potentia).  The  "  proper 
sensibles  "  are  the  qualities  in  bodies  which  correspond 
to  the  specific  energies  of  the  several  senses — colour, 
sound,  odour,  taste,  temperature,  and  other  special 
tactual  qualities.  Under  the  "  common  sensibles  "  were 
mcluded  extension,  figure,  motion,  rest,  and  number. 
They  are  perceived  through,  but  smiultaneously  with, 
the  sensibilia  propria,  and  by  more  senses  than  one. 
Moreover,  the  sensihilia  propria  do  not  exist  in  a  state  of 
actuality  except  when  perceived,  but  only  virtually  as 
dormant  powers  of  matter.  To  this  latter  most  profoundly 
important  distinction,  erroneously  imagined  to  be  a 
discovery  of  modern  philosophy,  we  will  return  again. 
Aristotle's  doctrine  on  both  points  was  adopted  by 
St.  Thomas,'--  who  reduced  the  various  forms  of 
common  sensibles  to  that  of  quantity.  This  was  con- 
ceived to  be  the  most  fundamental  attribute  of  matter, 
and  the  various  qualities  which  give  rise  to  the  special 
sensations  were    looked    upon   as   properties   inhering 

21  There  was  also  another  distinction  recognized  by  the 
Peripatetic  school,  that  of  sensibile  per  se  and  sensibile  per  accidens. 
That  is  sensibile  per  accidens  which  is  apprehended  indirectly 
through  being  accidentally  conjoined  with  something  which  is 
sensibile  per  se ;  and  in  this  signification  individual  corporeal  sub- 
stances were  said  to  be  sensibile  per  accidens,  "  ut  si  dicimus  quod 
Diarus  vel  Socrates  est  sensibile  per  accidens,  quia  accidit  ei  esse 
album."  (St.  Thomas,  De  Anima,  Lib.  II.  1.  13.)  Both  sensibilia  propria 
and  sensibilia  communia  were  held  to  be  sensibilia  per  se ;  the  former, 
however,  being  classed  as  per  se  primo  vel  proprie,  the  latter  as  per  se 
secundo.  The  several  "proper  sensibles  "  (per  se  primo)  were  defined 
to  be  the  formal  object,  or  appropriate  stimulus  of  the  different 
special  senses.  The  "  common  sensibles  "  (sensibilia  per  se  sed  non 
proprie),  extension,  figure,  &c.,  manifest  themselves  through,  but 
simultaneously  with,  the  sensibilia  propria.  They  are  thus  not 
mediate  acquisitions  derived  from  the  former,  but  forms  of  reality 
directly  revealed  through  them. 

--  Cf.  Sum.  i.  q.  78.  a.  3.  ad  2.  and  iii.  q.  77.  a.  2. 


154  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


in  it.     From  this  to  the  modern  division  into  primary 
and  secondary  quaHties  the  transition  is  obvious. 

Descartes,  between  whom  and  Locke  the  credit 
of  the  discovery  of  the  ancient  distinction  has  been 
supposed  to  lie,  taught  that  the  attributes,  Magnitude, 
Figure,  Motion,  Situation,  Duration,  and  the  Hke,  are 
clearly  perceived.  We  have  an  idea  of  them  as  they 
may  be  in  the  object.  On  the  other  hand,  Colour,  Pain, 
Odour,  Taste,  et  cetera,  are  not  thus  apprehended.  We 
have  only  a  confused  and  obscure  knowledge  of  some- 
thing or  other  in  the  external  body  which  causes  these 
sensations  in  us. 

Locke,  who  borrowed  from  Galileo  the  terms 
Primary  or  Real  and  Secondary  Qualities  to  mark  the  old 
distinction  between  the  common  and  proper  sensibles,  gives 
solidity,  extension  or  bulk,  figure,  motion  or  rest,  and 
number,  as  included  in  the  first  class.  These  attributes 
we  cannot  conceive  as  separable  from  matter,  and, 
moreover,  they  are  like  the  ideas  by  which  we  represent 
them.  The  secondary  or  imputed  qualities,  colours, 
sounds,  tastes,  smells,  and  the  rest,  are  not  essential  to 
the  idea  of  matter.  Where  present  in  bodies  they  exist 
merely  as  powers  to  produce  sensations,  properties 
emerging  out  of  occult  modifications  of  the  primary 
attributes,  and  capable  of  awakening  in  us  feelings  in 
no  way  like  themselves. 

Berkeley  and  Hume,  proceeding  from  Locke's 
most  fundamental  doctrine  that  we  can  only  know  our 
own  ideas,  quickly  demolished  the  distinction.  Hume 
even  demonstrated  that,  on  Locke's  principles,  the 
primar}'-  qualities,  extension,  and  the  rest,  are  less  real 
and  objective  than  the  secondary,  for  the  former  are 
merely  complex  subjective  products  elaborated  out  of 
the  latter,  and  so  the  purest  of  mental  fictions.  In  the 
Kantian  philosophy,  although  the  subject  is  not  explicitly 
treated,  the  objective  significance  of  the  two  groups  is 
similarly  reversed.  As  Space  is  an  exclusively  sub- 
jective form,  while  the  sensatiors  of  smell,  sound,  et 
cetera,  have  some  sort  of  an  external  correlate,  however 
remote  from  them  in  kinship,  the  latter  would  seem  to 
be  of  a  less  purely  ideal  character. 


DEVELOPMENT   OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  155 

Sir  W.  Hamilton  from  a  psychological  point  of 
view  distinguishes  three  classes  :  (i)  Primary  or  objective. 
(2)  Seciindo- primary  or  subjectivo-objective,  and  (3)  Secondary 
or  subjective  qualities. ^3  The  primary  qualities  include  all 
the  relations  of  matter  to  space  whether  as  container 
or  contained.  These  are  (i)  Extension,  (2)  Divisibility, 
p  (3)  Size,  (4)  Density,  (5)  Figure,  (6)  Absolute  Incom- 
pressibility,  (7)  Mobility,  (8)  Situation.  These  attri- 
butes are  completely  objective.  They  are  percepts 
proper,    implying   no   reference   to    sensation    in   their 

23  These  groups  have  been  also  styled  the  geometrical,  mechanical, 
^.nd.  physiological  properties,  and  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  [Principles  of 
Psychology,  Pt.  VI.  cc.  xi. — xiii.)  still  further  enriches  our  already 
exuberantly  wealthy  terminology  by  the  invention  of  the  terms, 
statical,  statico-dynamical,  and  dynamical,  to  mark  substantially  the 
same  distinctions.  In  the  dynamical  or  secondary  attributes  the 
external  body  is  active,  the  mind  is  wholly  passive.  These  qualities 
are  objectively  occult  properties  in  virtue  of  which  matter  modifies 
the  forces  brought  to  bear  on  it,  so  as  through  these  forces  to 
awaken  sensations.  With  the  exception  of  taste,  they  act  across  a 
distance ;  they  are  accidents  cognizable  apart  from  the  body,  and 
manifested  only  incidentally.  In  experiences  of  the  statico-dynamical 
kind,  both  subject  and  object  are  simultaneously  agent  and  patient. 
These  attributes  are  known  through  some  objective  re-activity 
evoked  by  subjective  activity.  "In  respect  of  its  space  [statical) 
attributes,  body  is  altogether  passive  and  the  perception  of  it  is 
wholly  due  to  certain  mental  operations."  Unlike  the  other  attri- 
butes, "  extension  is  cognizable  through  a  wholly  internal  co-ordina- 
tion of  impressions  ;  a  process  in  which  the  extended  object  has  no 
share."  Some  distinctive  features  of  the  different  groups  previously 
recognized  are  here  pointed  out,  but  there  are  also  some  errors. 
The  mind  is  never  purely  passive,  even  in  sensations  like  those 
of  colour,  taste,  et  cet.,  the  mental  reaction  is  as  real  as  the  physical 
stimulation.  Consequently  the  distinction  between  the  dynamical 
and  statico-dynamical  fails.  Mr.  Spencer  is  right  in  holding  that 
the  primary  are  not  the  direct  object  of  the  special  senses  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  secondary  qualities.  In  the  words  of  St.  Thomas 
the  sensibilia  communia  do  not  constitute  formal  objects  of  individual 
senses.  Still  they  are  not,  as  Mr.  Spencer's  exposition  implies, 
purely  subjective  products,  but  forms  of  reality  revealed  through, 
yet  concomitantly  with,  certain  of  the  proper  sensibles.  Surface 
extension  as  such  does  not  of  course  stimulate  the  retina  or  the 
nerves  of  touch  ;  it  is  made  known  in  experiences  of  pressure  and 
colour.  Still  it  is  not  a  mediate  inference  from  the  latter,  nor  a 
complex  integration  of  unextended  feelings  of  any  kind.  Cognition 
of  the  third  dimension  of  space  results,  as  we  have  already  described, 
from  a  reapplication  of  the  same  faculties  in  a  new  direction. 


156  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


meaning,  though  involving  sensation  in  their  first 
apprehension.  They  are,  he  holds,  absolutely  essential 
to  body ;  deprived  of  them  matter  is  inconceivable. 
The  secundo -primary  qualities  comprehend  gravity, 
cohesion,  repulsion,  and  inertia.  Viewed  as  objective 
they  are  forces  resisting  our  locomotive  faculty  or  muscular 
energy.  As  subjective  they  are  revealed  through  the 
varying  affections  of  pressure  in  the  sentient  organism. 
Involving  in  their  meaning  these  subjective  sensations, 
they  do  not  possess  the  objective  independence  of  the 
primary  qualities.  They  are,  moreover,  not  essential 
to  matter.  The  secundary  qualities  are  not  in  propriety 
qualities  of  bodies  at  all.  As  apprehended  they  are 
only  sensations  which  lead  us  to  infer  objective  pro- 
perties in  the  external  thing.  They  are  experienced 
as  idiopathic  affections  of  our  organism,  indefinite  in 
number,  and  producible  by  a  variety  of  stimuli. 
Besides  the  sensations  of  the  special  senses,  Hamilton 
includes  in  this  class  a  number  of  other  feelings,  such 
as  shuddering,  titillation,  and  sneezing.  They  are  of 
course  in  no  way  essential  to  matter. ^^ 

Criticism. — The  recognition  of  the  distinction  in 
kind  between  the  primary  and  the  secondary  qualities,  or 
between  the  common  and  proper  sensibles,  is  justified  meta- 
physically by  the  more  and  less  fundamental  character 
of  the  two  classes  respectively,  and  psychologically  by 
the  numerous  differences  in  the  mode  of  their  appre- 
hension. Among  these  latter  enough  attention  has 
not  been  directed  to  the  ancient  distinction  based  on 
the  fact  that  secondary  and  secundo-primary  qualities 
are  disclosed  only  through  a  single  sense,  while  the 
primary  attributes  are  revealed  through  a  plurality  of 
independent  sources.  This  circumstance,  as  well  as 
their  more  intelligible  nature,  makes  our  cognition  of 

2-1  As  regards  Hamilton's  treatment  of  the  subject :  (i)  There  is 
no  warrant  either  metaphysical  or  psychological  for  the  intermediate 
class.  On  both  grounds  it  belongs  to  the  third.  (2)  It  is  absurd  to 
speak  of  secondary  qualities  of  matter  as  not  being  properties  of 
matter  at  all,  but  merely  conscious  states.  Hamilton,  moreover, 
is  peculiarly  inconsistent  in  this  respect,  since  he  elsewhere  holds 
that  all  our  senses  make  us  immediately  cognizant  of  the  non-ego. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  157 

them  clearer,  more  convincing,  and  more  compre- 
hensive. The  perfect  identity  of  ratios  subsisting 
between  parts  of  space,  e.g.,  the  relation  of  the  side 
to  the  diagonal  of  the  square,  known  through  visual 
and  tactual  sensations,  the  mathematical  power  of  the 
blind,  and  the  recognition  of  circular  and  square  figures 
by  those  just  receiving  sight  for  the  first  time,  present 
an  irresistible  testimony  to  the  reality  of  what  is 
affirmed  by  such  diverse  witnesses.  In  addition  to 
this,  the  manifestation  of  extension  in  the  two  different 
experiences  of  colour  and  pressure  enables  us  to  detach 
in  a  singularly  perfect  manner  the  common  element, 
and  so  to  form  an  abstract  idea  of  extension,  far 
■surpassing  in  clearness  those  derived  from  any  single 
sensuous  channel. 

The  Relativity  of  Knowledge. — This  expression  has  been 
used  in  a  great  variety  of  meanings,  (i)  The  phrase  Relativity 
of  Knowledge,  or  rather  the  Law  or  Principle  of  Relativity,  has 
been  used  to  signify  a  leading  tenet  of  Bain  and  Wundt — 
that  knowledge  and  feeling  are  possible  only  in  transition, 
that  we  can  know  anything  (  nly  by  knowing  it  as  distinguished 
from  something  else,  that  ni  fact  all  consciousness  is  of 
difference.  We  have  discussed  the  subject  at  the  end  of 
chapter  v.  This  doctrine,  however,  is  not  that  ordinarily 
intended  when  we  speak  of  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge. 

(2)  The  Relativity  of  Knowledge  in  its  most  important  sense 
refers  not  to  the  nature  of  the  relations  between  one  known 
object  and  another,  but  to  that  between  the  known  object 
and  the  knowing  mind.  All  systems  of  philosophy  which 
reject  the  doctrine  of  immediate  perception  of  extended 
reality  must  maintain  that  our  knowledge  is  relative  to  the 
mind  in  the  sense  that  we  can  never  know  anything  but  our  own 
subjective  states.  Among  these  the  most  consistent  thinkers, 
as  we  have  argued,  are  the  idealists  proper.  They  logically 
maintain  that  if  we  have  no  knowledge  of  anything  beyond 
consciousness,  it  is  unphilosophical  to  suppose  that  anything 
else  exists.  This  thoroughgoing  view  is  represented  by  Hume, 
and  by  Mill  at  times.  The  great  majority  of  modern  philo- 
sophers, however,  shrinking  back  from  this  extreme,  have 
adopted  some  intermediate  position  akin  to  that  of  Kant  or 
Mr.  Spencer.  They  maintain  that  while  all  our  knowledge  is 
relative  to  our  own  mental  states,  and  in  no  way  represents 
or  reflects  reality,  yet  there  is  de  facto  some  sort  of  reality 
outside  of  our  minds.     Our  imaginary  cognitions  of  space, 


158  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


time,  and  causality  are  universal  subjective  illusions  either 
inherited  or  elaborated  by  the  mind ;  consequently,  since 
these  fictitious  elements  mould  or  blend  with  all  our  experi- 
ence, we  can  have  no  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves,  of 
noiimena,  of  the  absolute.  But  notwithstanding  this,  and  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  the  principle  of  causality  has  no  more 
real  validity  than  a  continuous  hallucination,  these  philo- 
sophers  are  curiously  found  to  maintain  the  existence  of  a 
cause,  and  even  of  an  external,  non-mental  cause  of  our 
sensations. 

(3)  True  doctrine. — Another,  and  what  we  maintain  to  be 
the  true  expression  of  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge,  and  one 
which  is  in  harmony  with  the  theory  of  immediate  or  pre- 
sentative  perception,  holds — (a)  that  we  can  only  know  as 
much  as  our  faculties,  limited  in  number  and  range,  can 
reveal  to  us  ;  (b)  that  these  faculties  can  inform  us  of  objects 
only  so  far,  and  according  as  the  latter  manifest  themselves ; 
(c)  that  accordingly  (a)  there  may  remain  always  an  indefinite 
number  of  qualities  which  we  do  not  know,  and  (b)  what  is 
known  must  be  set  in  relation  to  the  mind,  and  can  only  be 
known  in  such  relation.^^ 

So  much  relativity  is  necessarily  involved  in  the  very 
nature  of  knowledge,  but  it  in  no  way  destroys  the  worth  of 
that  knowledge.  If  knowledge  is  defined  to  imply  a  relation 
betweep  the  mind  and  the  known  object,  and  if  the  noumenon 
•or  thiiig-in-itself  is  defined  to  signify  some  real  element  of  an 
■object  which  never  stands  in  any  relation  to  our  cognitive 
powers,  then  a  knowledge  of  noumena  or  things-in-themselves  is 
obviously  an  absurdity.-^  But  if  by  noumena  are  understood,  as 

-^  What  is  given  in  one  or  more  relations  may  necessarily 
implicate  other  relations,  and  these  may  subsist  not  merely  between 
the  mind  and  other  objects,  but  between  the  several  objects  them- 
selves. Still,  mediate  cognitions  of  this  sort  are  knowledge  only  in 
so  far  as  they  are  rationally  connected  with  what  is  immediately 
given.  Our  knowledge  of  the  mutual  dynamical  influence  of  two 
invisible  planets,  which  faithfully  reflects  their  reciprocal  relations, 
is  but  an  elaborate  evolution  of  what  is  apprehended  by  sense  and 
intellect  in  experiences  where  subject  and  object  stand  in  immediate 
relations 

-^  "  To  speak  of  '  knowing,'  '  things  in  themselves,'  or  '  things  as 
they  are,'  is  to  talk  of  not  simply  an  impossibility,  but  a  con- 
tradiction ;  for  these  phrases  are  invented  to  denote  what  is  in  the 
sphere  of  being  and  not  in  the  sphere  of  thought ;  and  to  suppose  them 
known  is  ipso  facto  to  take  away  this  character.  The  relativity  of 
cognition  [i.e.,  in  the  sense  defined)  imposes  on  us  no  forfeiture 
of  privilege,  no  humiliation  of  pride ;  there  is  not  any  conceivable 
form  of  apprehension  from  which  it  excludes  us."  (Cf.  Martineau, 
A  Study  of  Religion,  Vol.  I.  p.  119.) 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  159 


Kant  on  the  one  side,  and  sensationalists  like  Mr.  Spencer  on 
the  other  seem  to  mean,  hypothetical  external  causes  ot"  onr 
sensations,  which  yet  somehow  do  not  in  any  way  reveal 
their  character  through  these  sensations,  then  we  must,  in 
the  first  place,  deny  the  assumption  that  we  can  only  know 
our  own  conscious  states,  and,  in  the  second,  we  must  point 
out  the  fundamental  contradiction  common  to  both  schools 
of  disputing  the  objective  or  real  validity  of  the  principle  of 
causality,  whilst  in  virtue  of  a  surreptitious  use  of  this  rejected 
principle  they  affirm  the  reality  of  an  unknowable  noumenal 
cause. 

Cognition  of  Primary  and  Secondary  qualities  compared. — 
Admitting  all  knowledge  to  be  relative  in  the  third  sense 
defined,  there  yet  remain  grades  in  the  comparative  perfection 
of  cognitions  gained  through  diverse  channels ;  and  here  the 
distinctions  both  between  sense  and  intellect,  and  between 
the  primary  and  secondary  qualities  of  matter,  assume  great 
importance.  The  doctrine  that  colours,  sounds,  and  the 
other  secondary  qualities  do  not  exist  in  objects  as  they  are 
in  the  mind  has  been  often  cited  as  a  modern  psychological 
discovery.  This,  however,  is  a  complete  mistake.  The  wide 
difterence  which  separates  the  objective  or  material  conditions 
of  sound,  colour,  and  the  rest  from  the  corresponding  subjec- 
tive consciousness,  was  as  clearly  and  as  firmly  gi'asped  by 
Aristotle  and  St.  Thomas,  as  by  Locke,  Hume,  Kant,  or 
Herbert  Spencer.  The  acute  minds  of  the  sensationalists 
and  sceptics  of  Ancient  Greece  had,  in  fact,  raised  in  one 
form  or  another  all  the  most  forcible  difficulties  now  urged 
by  their  modern  representatives,  and  the  Stagirite  was 
necessarily  led  to  answer  them.  He  did  this  by  pointing  out 
the  distinction  between  the  potential  condition  and  the  com- 
pleted realization  of  the  secondary  properties.  Sound  and 
colour  in  apprehension  he  describes  as  having  reached  their 
full  perfection,  actuality,  or  energy,  whilst  when  unperceived 
they  exist  in  the  object  merely  in  a.  potential  or  virtual  state. 
In  this  stage  he  recognized  them  simply  as  powers  capable  of 
arousing  sensation.  He  even  called  attention  to  the  ambiguity 
arising  from  the  frequent  use  of  the  same  word — e.g.,  "  sound" 
or  "  taste,"  to  designate  both  the  physical  property  and  the 
mental  state;  and  he  employs  the  two  terms,  sanation  and 
audition,  to  bring  out  the  difference.  He  thus  successfully 
opposed  the  scepticism  of  the  ancient  empiricists,  who  denied 
all  reality  or  differences  of  colours,  sounds,  and  the  rest  apart 
from  perception,  by  admitting  their  contention  as  regards  the 
full  realization  of  the  qualities  of  matter,  while  refusing  to 
allow  its  truth  in  reference  to  the  potential  conditions  of 
these  qualities.     Neither  light,  nor  sounds,  nor  odours  would 


i6o  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


exist  in  their  proper  signification  as  actualities  if  all  sentient 
beings  were  withdrawn  from  the  universe ;  but  they  would 
still  remain  as  potencies  ready  to  emerge  into  life  when  the 
recipient  faculty  appeared.  Aristotle's  treatment  of  the  subject 
was  adopted  and  elucidated  by  St.  Thomas,  and  we  deem  the 
matter  of  such  importance  that  we  cite  a  number  of  passages 
from  both  the  Greek  philosopher  and  his  scholastic  com- 
mentator below.2'' 

Sensuous  and  Intellectual  cognitions  compared. — Through  its 
secondary  qualities,  then,  an  object  is  known  by  any  sense 
only  as  something  capable  of  producing  a  particular  sensation 
in  me.     The  primary  attributes  are,  however,  of  such  a  kind, 


"7  "  Sensibilis  autem  actus  et  sensus  idem  est,  et  unus;  esse 
autem  ipsorum  non  idem.  Dice  autem  ut  sonus  secundum  actum, 
et  auditus  secundum  actum.  Contingit  enim  auditum  habentia 
non  audire,  et  habens  sonum  non  semper  sonat.  Cicm  autem  operetur 
potens  (id  quod  potest)  audire,  et  sonet  potens  sonare,  tunc  secundum 
actum  auditus  simul  fit,  et  secundum  actum  sonus.  Quorum 
dicet  aliquis  hoc  quidem  auditionem  esse,  hoc  verum  sona- 
tionem."  (Aristotle,  De  Anima,  Lib.  III.  Lect.  2.)  "  Sonativi 
(rei  sonorae)  igitur  actus,  aut  sonus  aut  sonatio  est.  Auditivi 
autem,  aut  auditus  aut  auditio  est.  Dupliciter  enim  auditus,  et 
dupliciter  sonus.  Eadem  autem  ratio  est  et  in  aliis  sensibus  et  sctisi- 
hilibus  ,  .  .  sed  in  quibusdam  nomina  quoque  sunt  posita,  ut 
sonatio  ac  auditio ;  in  quibusdam  caret  alterura  nomine ;  visio 
enim  dicitur  actus  visus,  at  coloris  (actus)  nomine  vacat,  et 
gustativi  gustatio  est,  at  saporis  nomen  non  habet."  {id.  ib.) 
"  Necesse  est  quod  auditus  dictus  secimdum  actum,  et  sonus  dictus 
secundum  actum,  simul  salventur  et  corrumpantur ;  et  similiter  est 
de  sapore  et  gustu,  et  aliis  sensibilibus  et  sensibus.  Sed  si  dicantur 
sectindum  potent iam,  non  necesse  est  quod  simul  corrumpantur  et 
salventur.  Ex  hac  autem  ratione  (Aristoteles)  excludit  opinionem 
antiquorum  naturalium  .  .  .  dicens,  quod  priores  naturales  non 
bene  dicebant  in  hoc,  quia  opinabuntur  nihil  esse  album,  aut 
nigrum,  nisi  quando  videtur ;  neque  saporem  esse,  nisi  quando 
gustatur ;  et  similiter  de  aliis  sensibilibus  et  sensibus.  Et  quia 
non  credebant  esse  alia  entia,  nisi  sensibilia,  neque  aliam  virtutem  cognos- 
citivam,  nisi  sensum,  credebatit  quod  totum  esse  et  Veritas  rerum  esset  in 
apparere.  Et  ex  hoc  deducebantur  ad  credendum  contradictoria 
simul  esse  vera,  propter  hoc  quod  diversi  contradictoria  opinantur, 
Dicebant  autem  quodammodo  recte  et  quodammodo  non.  Cum  enim 
dupliciter  dicatur  sensus  et  sensibile,  scilicet  secundum  potentiam  et  secundum 
actum,  de  sensu  et  sensibili  secundum  actum  accedit  quod  ipsi  dicebant 
quod  non  est  sensibile  sine  sensu.  Non  autem  hoc  verum  est  de 
sensu  et  sensibili  secundum  potentiam.  Sed  ipsi  loquebantur  sim- 
pliciter,  id  est  sine  distinctione,  de  his  quae  dicuntur  multipliciter." 
(St.  Thomas,  Comm.  de  Anima,  Lib.  IIL  1.  2,  ad  finem).  Cf. 
Hamilton,  Notes  on  Reid,  pp.  826—830. 


DEVELOPMENT   OF  SENSE-PERCEPTION.  i6i 


and  presented  to  us  in  such  a  manner,  that  our  knowledge 
of  them,  even  when  Umited  to  the  range  of  the  sensuous 
faculties,  is  of  far  superior  importance  to  that  which  we 
possess  of  the  sensibilia  propria.  In  themselves  the  primary 
attributes  consist  of  extensional  determinations  universal  to 
matter,  and  independent  of  the  nature  of  the  sentient  faculty. 
In  relation  to  us  the  fact  of  their  being  revealed  through  the 
several  channels  of  ocular,  motor,  and  tactual  sensations, 
gives  our  sensuous  perception  of  them  a  clearness  and  distinct- 
ness far  surpassing  that  oi  the  proper  seusibles. 

But  it  is  as  affording  material  for  intellectual  knowledge 
that  their  true  value  is  to  be  estimated.  Disclosed  through 
distinct  channels  the  common  presentation  is  instinctively 
detached  by  the  higher  abstractive  activity  of  the  mind ;  and 
since  it  is  thus  given  to  us  unobscured  by  any  subjective 
affections  of  sensibility,  it  is  perceived  in  a  very  perfect  and 
comprehensive  manner.  Owing  to  this  fact  our  simplest 
intellectual  cognitions  of  spatial  relations  are  enabled  to 
image  with  distinctness  and  lucidity  the  most  fundamental 
laws  of  the  physical  world. 

Finally,  by  observation,  reasoning,  and  abstraction  we 
come  to  discern  in  these  primary  attributes  universal  exten- 
sional relations  conditioning  the  mutual  connexion  and  inter- 
dependence of  material  objects  apart  from  their  perception 
by  the  knowing  spirit.  We  are  assured  that,  although  the 
reahzation  of  the  secondary  qualities  requires  the  presence  of 
the  sentient  faculty,  yet  the  most  important  part  of  the 
meaning  of  the  primary  attributes  holds  in  its  absence :  we 
see  that  while  perception  is  essential  to  the  one,  it  is 
accidental  to  the  other.  Remote  and  compHcated  deductions 
from  a  few  primary  luminous  intuitions  of  space  and  number, 
together  with  certain  assumptions  as  to  the  action  of  real 
force,  are  found  to  describe  accurately  the  future  conduct  of 
the  universe.  Astronomy  and  Physics,  the  Law  of  Gravita- 
tion as  well  as  the  Undulatory  Theory  of  light,  imply  the 
extra-mental  validity  of  our  notions  of  space,  motion,  and  real 
energies,  and  assume  their  existence  and  action  apart  from 
observation.  The  verification  which  subsequently  observed 
results  afford  to  our  reasoned  deductions  must,  consequently, 
be  held  to  estabhsh  that  these  conceptions  are  neither  "  inte- 
grations "  of  purely  subjective  feeUngs,  nor  mental  "forms," 
which  in  no  way  represent  the  hypothetical,  unknowable, 
external  noumenon,  but  true  cognitions  which  mirror  in  a 
veracious  manner  the  genuine  conditions  of  real  or  ontolo- 
gical  being.  Our  knowledge,  then,  of  the  primary  attributes 
does  not  relate  exclusively  to  our  own  mental  states,  as  is 
asserted  in  the  prevalent  creed  of  relativity.  Still  in  the  case 
L 


I 


i62  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


of  these,  as  well  as  of  the  secondary  qualities,  we  can  never 
know  the  object  unless  in  so  far  as  it  reveals  itself  directly  or 
indirectly  to  our  faculties,  and  in  the  simplest  creature  there 
will  always  remain  beyond  our  ken  an  indefinite  number  of 
secrets  which  a  higher  intelligence  might  scrutinize,  so  that 
the  perfection,  range,  and  penetration  of  knowledge  is,  in 
truth,  ever  relative  to  the  knowing  mind. 

Readings. — On  immediate  perception,  cf.  Farges,  L'Objectivite  de 
la  Perception,  pp.  17 — 36,  83—99,  155 — 181;  also  J.  Mark  Baldwin, 
Senses  and  Intellect,  c.  viii. ;  Dr.  Porter,  The  Human  Intellect,  Pt.  I. 
cc.  iii. — vi. ;  Balmez,  Fundamental  Philosophy,  Vol.  I.  pp.  267 — 324, 
339 — 360.  Oa  the  localization  of  sensations,  cf.  Gutberlet,  op.  cit. 
pp.  59—84;  Mercier,  Psychologie,  pp.  132 — 147;  On  the  Primary 
and  Secondary  Qualities  of  Matter,  cf.  St.  Thomas,  De  Anima,  II. 
1.  13;  Hamilton,  Metaph.  II.  108— 115;  Notes  on  Reid,  pp.  825,  seq. ; 
On  Relativity  of  Knowledge,  St.  Thomas,  De  Anima,  III.  1.  2; 
Martineau,  A  Study  of  Religion,  Bk.  I.  c.  iv. ;  M'Cosh,  Exam,  of  Mill, 
c.  X.  and  Intuitions  of  Mind,  pp.  340,  seq.  (2nd  Edit.) ;  Dr.  Mivart, 
On  Truth,  c.  x. ;  Mark  Baldwin,  op.  cit.  58 — 63. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

IMAGINATION. 

Imagination  defined.  —  Imagination  may  be 
defined  as  the  faculty  of  forming  mental  images 
or  representations  of  material  objects,  apart  iroi^' 
the  presence  of  the  latter.  The  representaiioii 
so  formed  is  called  in  nearly  all  recent  psycno- 
logical  literature  an  idea.  This  application  of  a 
term,  which  in  the  old  philosophies  invariably 
expressed  the  universal  representations  of  the  intel- 
lect, is  unfortunate  ;  but  it  has  become  so  general 
that  there  is  little  hope  of  restoring  the  word  to  its 
ancient  and  proper  signification.  Accordingly,  to 
avoid  confusion,  when  employing  the  word  idea  to 
denote  the  general  concept  or  notion,  we  will  add 
the  epithet  intellectual  to  mark  its  supra-sensuous 
character.  The  term  phantasm,  by  which  the  school- 
men expressed  very  concisely  the  acts  of  the  imagi- 
nation, has  been  employed  in  the  same  sense  by 
Dr.  M'Cosh,  and  occasionally  also  by  Hamilton  and 
Dr.  Porter,  and  we  will  use  it  along  with  the  word 
ima^e  to  denote  this  sensuous  representation. 

Ideas  and  Impressions. — The  idea  or  phantasm 
of  the  imagination  differs  in  several  respects  from 
the  percept,  presentation,  or  impression,  that  is  the 
act  by  which  w^e  perceive  a  real  or  present  object, 


I 


1 64  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


such,  for  instance,  as  a  house.  The  idea  is  almost 
invariably  very  faint  in  intensity  as  compared  with 
the  impression.  The  outlines  of  the  one  are  obscure 
and  its  constituent  parts  confusedly  presented,  while 
the  other  is  realized  in  a  clear  and  distinct  manner. 
Still  more  striking  is  the  contrast  between  the 
unsteady  transitory  character  of  the  representation 
and  the  permanent  stability  of  the  perceived  object. 
The  image,  too,  is  normally  subject  to  our  control, 
and  can  be  annihilated  by  an  act  of  will ;  the  sensa- 
tion, on  the  contrary,  so  long  as  the  sense  is  exposed 
to  the  action  of  the  object,  is  independent  of  us.  The 
imagination,  moreover,  may  vary  the  position  of  its 
object,  and  our  own  movements  do  not  force  us  to 
leave  behind  us  the  idea.  With  the  percept  of  the 
external  sense  it  is  otherwise ;  every  change  in  our 
situation  produces  an  alteration  in  its  appearance. 
Depending  on  these  lesser  differences  is  the  dis- 
tinction most  noted  of  all,  the  reference  to  objective 
reality,  the  belief  in  external  independent  existence 
which  accompanies  the  act  of  sense-perception  but 
is  absent  from  that  of  the  imagination.  And  yet,  as 
St.  Thomas  pointed  out  long  ago,^  ideas  are  con- 
founded with  real  objects,  if  not  corrected  by  actual 
perception  or  free  exercise  of  intellect. 

Scholastic  Doctrine. — The  Phantasy  or  Imagination  was 
classed  as  an  internal  sense  by  the  philosophers  of  the 
Peripatetic  school.  This  view  was  based  on  the  facts  that 
the  imagination  operates  by  means  of  a  physical  organ — the 
brain ;  that  it  represents  particular  concrete  objects ;  and 
that  these  have  only  an  internal  or  subjective  existence.  It 
was  accordingly  defined  to  be  an  internal  power  of  the 
sensuous  order.  It  was  distinguished  from  the  sensiis  communis, 

1  Qq.  Disp.  De  Malo,  III.  a.  3,  ad  o 


IMAGINATION.  165 


by  the  circumstance  that  while  the  function  of  that  faculty- 
was  held  to  be  the  apprehension  and  distinction  of  the  actual 
operations  of  the  several  senses,  and  of  the  qualities  of  objects 
hie  et  nunc  perceived  by  them,  the  imagination  forms  repre- 
sentations or  images  of  objects  even  in  their  absence.  Modern 
writers  commonly  describe  this  aptitude  of  the  mind  as  an 
intellectual  power,  but  that  this  opinion  is  erroneous  wil 
become  evident  later  on. 

Productive  and  Reproductive  Imagination. — Several  forms 
of  the  activity  of  the  imagination  have  been  allotted  special 
names.  The  most  commonly  accepted  division  of  the  faculty 
is  that  into  Reproductive  and  Productive  Imagination.  The 
former  term  is  employed  to  designate  the  power  of  forming 
mental  pictures  of  objects  and  events  as  they  have  been 
originally  experienced,  while  the  Productive  Imagination 
signifies  the  power  of  constructing  images  of  objects  not 
previously  perceived.  The  term  Reproductive  Imagination 
is  used  by  some  writers  to  denote  the  faculty  of  memory 
in  general.  This  usage  is  objectionable.  The  differentia  of 
memory  is  not  reproduction,  but  recognition.  All  imagination, 
as  we  urge  above,  is  essentially  reproductive.  The  chief 
features  in  which  remembrance  differs  from  mere  revival  of 
images  are :  (i)  The  freedom  of  the  imagination  as  to  the 
number  and  variety  of  its  acts,  the  Hmited  character  of  our 
recollections;  (2)  the  casual  and  variable  order  of  the  former 
states,  the  serial  fixity  and  regularity  of  the  latter ;  (3)  the 
isolated  nature  of  imaginary  events,  the  solidarity  or  related- 
ness  of  remembered  occurrences,  which  are  inextricably  inter- 
woven with  multitudes  of  other  representations ;  (4)  finally, 
the  peculiar  reference  to  my  own  actual  experience  involved 
in  the  act  of  identification  or  recognition,  which  forms  part  of 
the  recollection  but  is  absent  from  the  creations  of  fancy. 

The  spontaneous  action  of  the  faculty  is  sometimes  called 
the  passive  imagination  as  contrasted  with  the  active  or 
voluntary  exercise  of  its  powers."^  The  epithets  constructive 
and  creative,  are  frequently  applied  to  Productive  Imagination, 
especially  when  the  product  is  of  a  noble  or  beautiful  kind. 
Strictly  speaking,  however,  the  imagination  does  not  create 
0r  produce  anything  completely  new;  it  merely  combines 
into  novel  forms  elements  given  in  past  sensations.  These 
fresh  combinations  are  effected  under  the  guidance  of  will 
and  judgment,  and  accordingly  Hamilton  has  styled  this 
aptitude,  the  "  Comparative  Imagination,"  and  the  "  Faculty 
of  Relations."  It  has  also  been  asserted  that  its  range  is  not 
limited  to  objects  of  sense.  This  view  is  gravely  erroneous. 
The  scope  of  imagination  is  rigidly  confined  to  the  reproduc- 
'  Cf.  Mark  Baldwin,  op.  cit.  p.  224. 


i66  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


tion  of  former  data  of  sense,  and  the  congenital  absence  of 
any  faculty  correspondingly  limits  the  field  of  the  phantasy. 
The  imagination,  moreover,  should  not  any  more  than  external 
sense  be  called  a  faculty  of  relations,  since  both  alike  are 
equally  incapable  of  apprehending  such  supra-sensuous  reali- 
ties. It  is  the  intellect  which  in  one  case  as  in  the  other 
perceives  abstract  relations,  and  it  is  as  serious  an  error  to 
confuse  rational  activity  with  the  power  of  forming  sensuous 
images  as  with  the  capability  of  experiencing  sensations. 

Functions  of  the  Imagination. — The  Imagination  plays  an 
important  part  in  artistic  and  mechanical  construction,  and 
in  the  more  concrete  branches  of  physical  science.  In  all 
forms,  however,  of  constructive  imagination  the  three  factors, 
purpose,  attention,  and  discrimative  selection  co-operate.  There 
must  be  at  least  in  dim  outlines  before  the  mind  an  aim  or 
object  to  be  realized.  Then,  as  in  order  to  satisfy  this  vague 
desire  the  spontaneous  activity  of  the  faculty  brings  forward 
its  materials,  the  attention  is  fixed  on  those  likely  to  fit  in  to 
the  wished-for  ideal.  Finally,  selective  discrimination  retains 
those  judged  to  be  appropriate  and  rejects  the  remainder. 

^Esthetic  Imagination. — In  the  creation  of  works  of  art  the 
fancy  of  the  poet,  painter,  sculptor,  or  musician,  is  employed 
in  grouping  and  combining  his  materials  so  as  to  awaken 
admiration  and  satisfaction  in  the  mind.  At  times  his  aim 
will  be  to  hold  the  mirror  up  to  nature,  in  order  to  delight  by 
the  exquisite  skill  and  fidelity  with  which  he  reproduces  an 
actual  experience  recalled  by  the  memory.  At  other  times 
he  assumes  a  nobler  part,  and  seeks  to  give  expression  to 
some  thought  embodying  an  ideal  type  of  beauty  or  excel- 
lence, which  is  never  met  with  in  the  commonplace  world  of 
real  life,  but  is  dimly  shadowed  forth  in  rare  moments  by  our 
own  imagination.  The  Beautiful  is  indeed  the  proper  aim  of 
the  aesthetic  fancy,  as  that  of  the  scientific  imagination  is  the 
True,  and  so  discriminative  selection  directs  the  attention 
towards  those  elements  which  when  combined  will  result  in 
an  Ideal.  This  function  of  the  Imagination  is  called  Idealiza- 
tion. Intellectual  and  volitional  activity,  however,  are  involved 
in  such  operations.  The  ideals  formed  may  be  artistic,  scien- 
tific, ethical,  or  religious.  Analysis  of  past  experience  and 
synthetic  recombination  of  the  elements  constitute  the 
essential  stages  of  the  process  in  each  department.  Both 
operations  involve  attention,  abstraction,  and  comparison,  so 
that  the  highest  powers  of  the  soul  are  employed  in  this 
exercise.^  This  faculty  is  said  to  be  rich,  fertile,  or  luxuriant 
when  images  of  great  variety  issue  forth  in  spontaneous 
abundance.  Taste,  on  the  other  hand,  implies  judicious  or 
=^  Cf.  Dr.  Porter,  op.  cit.  §§  353  -37--. 


IMAGINATION.  167 


refined,  rather  than  luxuriant  fancy.  Great  genius  in  any  of 
the  branches  of  art  presupposes  a  fertile  imagination,  but 
true  excellence  is  attained  only  when  this  power  is  controlled 
and  directed  by  good  judgment.  The  importance  of  Imagi- 
nation in  mechanical  contrivance  and  invention  is  obvious. 
The  power  of  holding  firmly  before  the  mind  a  clear  and 
distinct  representation  of  the  object  to  be  formed  is  one  of 
the  most  necessary  qualifications  of  constructive  ability. 

Scientific  Imagination. — The  relations  between 
imagination  and  science  have  been  the  subject  of 
much  dispute,  some  writers  holding  that  a  rich  and 
powerful  imagination  is  adverse  rather  than  favour- 
able to  scientific  excellence,  while  others  consider 
this  aptitude  to  be  "as  indispensable  in  the  exact 
sciences  as  in  the  poetical  and  plastic  arts."  And 
that  "it  may  accordingly  be  reasonably  doubted 
whether  Aristotle  or  Homer  were  possessed  of  the 
more  powerful  imagination."* 

Concrete  Sciences.— To  answer  the  question  we  must 
distinguish  different  branches  of  science.  In  departments  of 
concrete  knowledge,  such  as  geology,  botany,  animal  physi- 
ology, and  anatomv,  the  imagination  is  exercised  almost  as 
much  as  in  history ,'oratory,  or  poetry ;  and  even  in  astronomy 
and  chemistry  it  plays  an  important  part.  The  acquisition 
of  information,  and  the  extension  of  our  command  over  any 
of  the  fields  of  physical  nature  involve  careful  use  of  our 
powers  of  external  sense-perception ;  and  progress  is 
measured  by  the  number  and  quality,  the  clearness  and  com- 
plexity, the  readiness  and  precision  of  the  ideas  gathered. 
Fresh  species,  new  properties,  novel  modes  of  action,  must 
be  more  distinctly  apprehended,  more  firmly  retained,  and 
more  easily  reproduced  in  imagination  with  every  successive 
advance.  The  native  efficiency  of  this  faculty  must,  conse- 
quently, largely  determine  the  rate  of  improvement  and  the 
limit  of  excellence  attainable  by  each  individual.  In  the 
region  of  original  research,  and  especially  in  the  construction 
of^hypotheses,  fertility  of  imagination  is  an  essential  element 
of  success ;  and  the  leading  men  in  the  history  of  these 
sciences  have  almost  invariably  been  endowed  with  a  bold 
and  teeming  fancy. 

'^  Hamilton,  il/^l'fl///.  ii.  p.  265. 


168  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


Scientific  HypotJicscs. — Discoveries  in  Science,  where  they 
are  not  directly  suggested  by  some  lucky  accident,  generally 
start  from  hypotheses  more  or  less  erroneous  which  are 
gradually  revised  and  corrected  till  they  embrace  all  the 
tacts.  Scientific  hypotheses  differ  from  the  guesses  we  are 
constantly  making  in  all  matters  merely  in  the  clearness  with 
which  they  are  conceived,  and  the  rigour  with  which  they 
are  tested.  All  guesses  involve  exercise  of  the  Imagination, 
and  so  in  proportion  to  the  fertility  of  this  faculty  will  be  the 
mind's  readiness  in  framing  hypotheses  of  every  kind.  An 
efficient  imagination  contributes  much  to  clearness  and 
precision  in  the  suppositions  put  forward  by  the  intellect, 
and  if  well  under  control,  it  facilitates  their  retention  in 
distinct  consciousness  and  so  renders  them  susceptible 
of  searching  examination.  The  great  scientists,  such  as 
Newton  and  Kepler,  have  been  even  more  remarkable  for 
their  rigorous  severity  in  testing,  than  for  their  originality 
in  inventing  their  hypotheses.  But  the  accurate  represen- 
tation of  possible  causes  and  effects,  the  firm  and  distinct 
grasp  of  such  conceptions,  the  anticipation  of  probable 
consequences,  the  comparison  of  diverse  modes  of  action 
likely  to  happen  under  different  contingencies,  and  the 
careful  following  out  of  trains  of  reasoning  from  conditional 
assumptions  are  all  much  facilitated  by  superior  natural 
aptitude  and  judicious  culture  of  the  imagination. 

According  as  man's  memory  is  well  stored  with  infor- 
mation in  any  branch  of  science,  his  fancy  becomes  fertile 
in  picturing  the  action  of  unobserved  causes  and  agencies, 
and  in  proportion  as  he  is  familiar  with  its  subject-matter, 
his  imagination  will  instinctively  reject  guesses  likely  to 
clash  with  known  facts.  A  certain  acquired  sagacity  controls 
and  directs  his  conjectures  along  likely  paths  and  lead  him 
to  detect  those  unobtrusive  analogies  which  are  the  fruitful 
parent  of  so  many  great  discoveries.  Mr.  Mark  Baldwin 
thus  writes  :  "  The  imagination  is  the  prophetic  forerunner 
of  all  great  scientific  discoveries.  The  mental  factors  seen 
to  underlie  all  imaginative  construction  are  here  called  into 
play  in  a  highly  exaggerated  way.  The  associative  material 
presented  covers  generally  the  whole  area  of  the  data  of  the 
scientific  branch  in  hand ;  familiarity  with  the  principles 
and  laws  already  discovered  is  assumed  and  in  general  a 
condition  of  mental  saturation  with  the  subject.  ...  In 
most  cases  the  beginning  of  a  discovery  is  nothing  more  than 
a  conjecture,  a  happy  supposition.  The  mind  at  once  begins 
to  search  for  means  of  testing  it,  which  itself  involves  the 
imagination  of  new  material  dispositions.  These  tests  are 
made  more  and  more  rigid,  if  successful,  until   the  crucial 


IMAGINATION.  169 


test,   as   it   is   called,  is  reached,  which   cither   confirms   or 
disproves  the  hypothesis."*^ 

Abstract  Sciences.— When,  however,  we  pass  from  the 
concrete  to  the  more  abstract  branches  of  knowledge,  such  as 
pure  mathematics,  logic,  and  metaphysics,  we  find  imagina- 
tion sinks  into  a  secondary  position.  The  materials  with 
which  the  mathematician  or  the  metaphysician  deals  are  not 
representations  of  phantasy,  but  of  intellect.  They  are 
devoid  of  those  impressive  concrete  qualities  which  dis- 
tinguish the  sensuous  image  from  the  abstractions  of  thought; 
and  the  chief  difficulty  of  the  beginner  is  to  turn  aside  from 
the  obtrusive  features  of  the  phantasm,  and  keep  solely  in 
view  the  delicate  but  vital  relations  which  constitute  the 
essence  of  scientific  knowledge. 

It  seems  to  us,  then,  to  be  the  very  reverse  of 
truth  to  say  that  imagination  holds  a  place  in 
abstract  science  similar  to  that  which  it  occupies 
in  poetry.  As  all  thought  is  representative,  the 
abstract  thinker  must,  of  course,  be  capable  of 
forming  representations  of  the  subjects  of  his  specu- 
lation ;  and  the  distinctive  characteristic  of  genius 
in  this  direction  lies  in  the  power  to  grasp  vigorously 
some  fruitful  notion  and  to  concentrate  upon  it  for 
long  periods  the  whole  energy  of  the  mind.  Still 
it  is  a  grave  error  to  confound  the  rational  activity 
of  the  intellect  with  the  operations  of  the  sensuous 
imagination.  And  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that 
although  elastic  and  fertile  powers  of  fancy  often 
accompany  great  intellectual  gifts,  and  although 
even  in  the  abstract  sciences  discovery  may  be  at 
times  materially  aided  by  the  power  of  holding 
steadily  before  the  mind  concrete  images  ;  neverthe- 
less it  is  the  intellect  and  not  the  imagination  that 

5  Senses  and  Intellect,  pp.  236,  237.  There  are  many  valuable  obser- 
vations in  his  chapter  on  this  subject. 


I70  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


apprehends  the  universal  relations  which  form  the 
framework  of  science. 

Dangers  of  Imagination. — It  is  needless  to  point 
out  how  easily  richness  of  imagination  may  prove 
detrimental  rather  than  beneficial  to  scientific  pro- 
f^ress.  In  Ethics  or  Metaphysics,  no  less  than  in 
History  or  Biology,  exuberant  and  prolific  fancy 
when  uncontrolled  by  reason,  may  divert  attention 
from  the  essential  to  the  accidental,  may  pervert 
and  mislead  the  powers  of  judgment,  and  may  so 
confuse  the  reason  that  fiction  is  substituted  for 
objective  reality,  and  brilliant  poetic  hypotheses  are 
preferred  to  the  prose  of  commonplace  truth. 

Fancy. — The  term  Fancy  is  sometimes  used  to 
mark  the  activity  of  the  imagination  as  exercised  in 
the  production  of  comic,  or  even  of  beautiful  images, 
provided  they  be  of  a  minute  or  trivial  type.  Fancy, 
too,  is  confined  to  the  sphere  of  the  unreal  whilst 
imagination  may  represent  the  actual.  The  epithets 
merry,  playful,  weird,  which  are  applied  to  the 
former,  indicate  the  various  kinds  of  action  in  which 
it  manifests  itself,  and  it  is  with  that  aptitude  unt 
and  humour  are  mainly  connected. 

Wit  and  Humour. — Intellect,  as  well  as  imagination,  is 
involved  in  the  exhibition  and  appreciation  of  li^it  and 
humour,  but  the  happy  suggestions  of  the  fancy  are  the 
essential  materials  which  go  to  make  up  the  amusing 
picture.  Wit  and  humour  agreeing  in  some  respects  are 
distinguished  in  others.  Both  aptitudes  imply  the  power 
of  noting  and  manifesting  unexpected  points  of  agree- 
ment between  apparently  disparate  ideas ;  but  wit  excels 
in  brilliancy  and  pungency.  It  is,  too,  of  a  more  in- 
tellectual character,  while  humour  appeals  rather  to  the 
moral  side  of  human  nature.  The  witty  man  is  quick  tc 
perceive  incongruous  associations  of  every  kind,  the  humouris 


IMAGINATION.  171 


is  a  close  observer  of  the  foibles  and  weaknesses  of  his 
fellow-men.  Humour  is  mainly  innate,  wit  is  to  some  extent 
am.enable  to  education  and  culture.  Humour,  implying  the 
power  of  sympathy  with  the  feelings  of  others,  is  commonly 
associated  with  good  nature,  while  wit  is  frequently  sharp 
and  unpleasant.  This  distinction  is  admirably  expressed  in 
Thackeray's  saying  that  "  Humour  is  wit  tempered  by  love." 
The  most  degraded  form  of  wit  is  exhibited  in  puns,  where 
commonly  there  is  merel}^  an  accidental  similarity  in  oral 
sound.  The  felicitous  apprehension  of  a  hidden  connexion 
between  incongruous  ideas,  which  constitutes  the  essence  of 
true  wit,  is  almost  invariably  absent. 

Illusions. — As  the  activity  of  Imaj^ination  is  the 
chief  source  of  certain  abnormal  mental  phenomena  of 
an  important  character  described  as  illusions,  halluci- 
nations, dreams,  and  the  like,  this  will  be,  perhaps,  the 
most  appropriate  place  to  treat  of  them.  In  ordinary 
language  the  terms  illusion,  delusion,  and  fallacy  are 
frequently  used  in  the  same  sense  to  denote  any 
erroneous  conviction.  In  a  more  limited  signification 
fallacy  means  a  vicious  reasoning,  an  intellectual  in- 
ference of  a  fallacious  character,  whilst  illusion  signifies 
a  deceptive  or  spurious  act  of  apprehension,  a.nd  delusion 
implies  a  false  belief  of  a  somewhat  permanent  nature, 
and  of  a  more  or  less  extensive  range.  These  states 
of  consciousness  have  in  common  the  note  of  untruth- 
fulness ;  and  we  may,  from  a  psychological  standpoint, 
define  a  mental  act  to  be  untrue,  which  disagrees  from 
its  object  as  that  object  is  known  by  the  normal  human 
mind.  An  illusion  is  thus  a  deceptive  cognition  which 
pretends  to  be  immediately  evident,  and  it  can  refer  to 
mistaken  memories  and  erroneous  expectations,  just  as 
w^ell  as  to  false  perceptions  of  the  external  senses.^ 

Sources  of  Illusion. — The  causes  of  illusion  we  may  in 
the  first  place  roughly  divide  into  two  great  classes, 
according  as  they  belong  to  the  subjective  or  the  objective 
worlds.  Our  mistakes  may  arise  either  from  mental 
influences,  or  from  irregular  conditions  of  the  material 
universe,  including  among  the  latter  the  state  of  our 
own  organism. 

^  Cf.  Mr.  Sully's  Illusions,  cc.  i.  ii.     Many  of  these  phenomena 
tre  very  skilfully  analyzed  by  that  writer. 


172  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


Mental  influences. — The  wide  range  of  the  first  group 
win  become  evident  if  we  recall  the  various  elements 
which  we  have  shown  in  a  previous  chapter  to  be 
involved  in  apparently  simple  acts  of  sense-per- 
ception. The  material  directly  presented  to  us,  even 
by  the  power  of  vision,  is  extremely  small.  By  far 
the  greater  part  of  the  information  given  through 
each  act  of  apprehension  is  due  to  memor}^,  inference, 
and  associated  sensations  of  other  faculties  faintly  re- 
vived in  imagination.  Accordingly,  the  condition  of 
the  mind  immediately  antecedent  to  the  impression  of 
any  particular  object  has  a  most  important  influence 
in  determining  how  this  object  will  be  perceived.  If 
the  imagination  is  vigorously  excited,  and  if  we  have 
a  lively  expectation  of  beholding  some  special  occur- 
rence, there  is  a  considerable  probability  that  anything 
bearing  even  a  distant  resemblance  to  it  will  be  mis- 
taken for  the  anticipated  experience.  As  the  ph3^sical 
concomitants  of  the  activity  of  the  imagination  are 
similar  in  kind  to  those  of  real  sensation,  and  as  even 
in  normal  perception  a  large  part  of  the  mental  product 
is  furnished  by  the  phantasy  from  the  resources  of 
previous  experiences,  it  is  not  surprising  that  where 
anticipation  of  an  event  is  very  strong,  and  its  repre- 
sentation very  vivid,  the  mind  may  perceive  an  occur- 
rence before  it  happens,  or  apprehend  an  object  where 
none  exists.  This  species  of  deception,  in  which  a 
mental  state  is  excited  without  any  external  cause,  is 
called  a  subjective  sensation.  Such  simulated  cognitions 
may  work  very  serious  effects  on  the  organism.  The 
pain  or  pleasure,  according  to  the  agreeable  or  dis- 
agreeable character  of  the  illusion,  may  be  fully  as 
intense  as  if  the  appearance  were  a  reality." 

"  "  A  butcher  was  brought  into  the  shop  of  Mr.  Macfarlan,  the 
druggist,  from  the  market-place  opposite,  labouring  under  a  terrible 
accident.  The  man  on  trying  to  hook  up  a  heavy  piece  of  meat 
above  his  head  slipped  and  the  sharp  hook  penetrated  his  arm  so 
that  he  himself  was  suspended.  On  being  examined  he  was  pale, 
almost  pulseless,  and  expressed  himself  as  suffering  acute  agony. 
The  arm  could  not  be  moved  without  causing  excessive  pain,  and 
in  cutting  off  the  sleeve  he  frequently  cried  out ;  yet  when  the  arm 
was  exposed  it  was  found  to  be  quite  uninjured,  the  hook  having 
only  traversed  the  sleeve  of  his  coat."  (Carpenter,  op.  cit.  p.  15S.) 


IMAGINATION.  173 


In  addition  to  expectation,  desire,  and  fear,  are 
the  mental  states  which  have  the  largest  share  in  the 
production  of  illusion.  The  strength  of  the  inclination 
to  believe  in  that  which  we  like,  manifests  itself  in  every 
department  of  human  life.  Yet,  paradoxical  as  it  may 
at  first  sight  appear,  dislike  can  also  contribute  to  the 
generation  of  an  illusory  behef.  The  most  important 
constituent  in  the  emotion  of  fear  is  aversion,  but  it  is 
a  matter  of  frequent  experience  that  a  lively  fear  of 
anything  tends  to  create  in  the  mind  a  counterfeit 
perception  of  it.  The  timid  wayfarer,  travelling  by 
night,  sees  a  highwayman  in  every  gatepost,  whilst  the 
child  who  has  just  been  listening  to  ghost  stories 
converts  the  furniture  of  his  moonlit  bed-room  into 
fairies  and  hobgoblins.  Inordinate  anxiety  generates 
all  sorts  of  doubts  and  suspicions,  and — • 

Trifles  light  as  air 
Are  to  the  jealous  confirmation  strong. 

The  mental  process  in  the  case  of  fear  is,  however, 
fundamentally  akin  to  that  of  desire.  The  immediate 
effect  of  both  sentiments  is  intense  excitation  of  the 
imagination,  a  lively  picture  of  the  desired  or  dreaded 
event  is  conjured  up  by  the  fancy,  and  the  vivid  image 
is  taken  for  the  reality. 

Othey  influences. — The  second  group  of  causes  of 
illusion,  which  may  be  roughly  described  as  non- 
mental,  are  subdivided  according  as  the  deception  is 
due,  {a)  to  ill-health  either  of  the  particular  organ 
employed,  or  of  the  brain  and  nervous  system  as  a 
whole,  or  (b)  to  some  irregularity  in  the  composition  of 
the  medium  intervening  between  the  organism  and  the 
object  apprehended. 

(a)  Organic. — The  forms  of  illusion  which  may  arise 
from  an  unsound  condition  of  the  organ  are  very 
numerous.  A  sense  may  be  subject  to  permanent  defects 
such  as  partial  deafness,  short-sightedness,  and  colour- 
blindness, or  it  may  suffer  transient  disabilities  such  as 
fatigue,  disarrangement,  and  temporary  disease  of  the 
nerves  employed  in  a  particular  perception.  After 
steadily  gazing  at  a  small  disc  of  a  brilliant  colour,  the 


174  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


eye  will  see  a  similar  spot  of  a  complementary  hue  if 
directed  immediately  afterwards  towards  a  plain  white 
surface.  Intense  stimulation  of  any  of  the  senses  renders 
it  for  a  time  insensible  to  lesser  excitations.  Santonin  in- 
duces colour-blindness  to  violet,  and  other  drugs  deaden 
other  modes  of  sensibility.  The  disease  of  jaundice 
sometimes  gives  things  a  yellow  tinge.  In  certain 
cerebral  and  nervous  diseases  illusions  often  take  a 
more  pronounced  and  extreme  form,  and  the  mind 
may  not  only  misapprehend  real  things,  but  it  may 
even  become  incapable  of  distinguishing  between  actual 
objects  and  pure  phantoms  of  the  imagination.  An 
aberration  of  this  extreme  and  permanent  kind  is  com- 
monly termed  a  halliicination.  The  passenger  who,  in 
a  London  fog,  mistakes  a  lamp-post  for  a  policeman, 
is  said  to  be  under  an  illusion.  The  fever-patient  who 
sees  his  empty  room  crowded  with  people,  and  the 
lunatic  who  believes  he  is  the  Emperor  of  China,  are 
possessed  by  hallucinations.  The  passage,  however, 
from  the  one  state  to  the  other  is  gradual,  and  there  is 
no  rigid  line  of  demarcation  separating  them.  The 
cause  of  these  aberrations  seems  to  lie  in  the  abnormal 
working  of  the  interior  physical  processes  which 
usually  give  rise  to  sensations,  or  which  have  accom- 
panied particular  cognitions  in  the  past,  and  so  cause 
these  latter  to  be  reproduced  from  memory  with  such 
vividness  as  to  be  confounded  with  real  impressions. 
The  illusions  of  delirium  tremens,  and  of  manv  forms 
of  mental  derangement,  are  probably  caused  b}'-  mis- 
taking internal  irritation  of  the  nerves  for  external 
natural  sensations.  And  complete  lunacy  may  arise 
either  from  disorder  of  the  functions  of  the  cerebrum, 
caused  by  the  presence  of  poisonous  materials  in  the 
blood,  or  from  some  organic  disease  which  has  already 
seized  on  the  substance  of  the  brain. 

{h)  External. — The  deceptions  originated  by  irregular 
conditions  of  the  environment  are  very  familiar.  If  we 
gaze  at  the  sun  through  a  piece  of  red  or  green  glass, 
only  rays  of  these  colours  will  be  allowed  to  pass,  and 
its  disc  will  appear  of  a  corresponding  hue.  A  dull 
wintry  landscape  observed  through  a  transparent  sub- 


IMAGINATION.  175 


stance  of  a  slightly  yellow  tint  assumes  a  golden 
autumnal  appearance.  The  magic  effects  of  the  trans- 
formation scene  at  the  pantomime  are  the  result  of  the 
skilful  management  of  coloured  lights,  and  spectral 
apparitions  are  commonly  produced  by  the  manipula- 
tion of  concave  mirrors  at  the  sides  of  the  stage.  In 
operations  of  this  nature,  however,  the  sense  is  perfectly 
truthful  as  regards  its  own  revelations.  It  responds  in 
an  appropriate  manner  to  its  proximate  stimuli,  and  the 
error  is  due  to  the  abnormal  relations  between  the  latter 
and  the  remote  object  which  they  ordinarily  present  to 
the  mind.     ^ 

Illusion  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  term  comes 
into  existence  when  we  pass  from  the  immediate  data 
of  the  senses  to  their  indirect  or  acquired  ^perceptions. 
Here,  when  the  customary  character  of  the  environ- 
ment is  changed,  the  imagination  excited  through  past 
association  may  induce  complete  deception.  Our  esti- 
mate of  distance  and  magnitude  may  thus  be  altogether 
invalidated.  A  figure  seen  through  a  fog  is  enlarged 
because  the  vagueness  of  its  outlines  causes  us  to 
exaggerate  its  distance.  The  perspective  appearance 
of  landscape  paintings  and  of  stereoscopic  pictures,  as 
well  as  the  ingenious  contrivances  to  which  the  diorama 
owes  its  success,  are  designed  to  awaken  through  the 
imagination  by  means  of  the  laws  of  suggestion  an 
illusory  belief  as  regards  the  spatial  relations  of  the 
several  parts  of  the  perceived  object.  Akin  to  this 
class  of  illusions  are  some  others  due  to  the  unusual 
presence  or  absence  of  materials  for  comparison.  The 
empty  rooms  of  a  house  in  the  process  of  building 
always  look  smaller  than  they  really  are,  because  we 
have  not  the  customary  furniture  to  call  our  attention 
to  the  capacity  of  the  space.  Similarly,  a  dispro- 
portionately large  table  diminishes  the  size  of  a 
chamber.  On  the  other  hand,  a  multiplicity  of  small 
objects  magnifies  a  given  amount  of  space.  A  field 
with  hay-cocks  scattered  over  it,  a  harbour  with  ships, 
or  an  orchard  studded  with  apple-trees,  seems  far 
larger  than  the  same  space  when  empt3^  The  other 
senses  are  subject  to  analogous  mistal  es.     The  illusion 


176  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


produced  by  an  echo  is  similar  to  that  of  the  looking- 
glass.  In  a  rarified  atmosphere  the  force  of  sound  is 
lowered  in  a  surprising  degree.  De  Saussure  judged 
the  explosion  of  a  pistol  at  the  top  of  Mont  Blanc 
to  be  about  equal  to  that  of  a  common  cracker  below. 
Want  of  homogeneity,  moreover,  in  the  intervening 
medium  can  interrupt,  reflect,  or  change  the  character 
of  sound  just  as  of  light. 

Dreaming  and  Reverie. — A  specially  interesting  form  of 
illusion,  or  rather  hallucination,  is  that  exhibited  in  dreaming. 
Dreams  are  mental  processes  which  take  place  during  sleep, 
and  are  in  some  respects  akin  to  states  of  reverie  which  occur 
during  waking  life.  In  dreaming  the  imagination  assumes 
the  part  played  in  waking  life  by  the  external  senses. 
During  sleep  the  activity  of  these  latter  falls  into  almost 
complete  abeyance ;  volitional  control  over  the  course  of 
thought  ceases ;  the  power  of  reflexion  and  comparison  is 
suspended ;  and  the  fancy  of  the  dreamer  moves  along 
automatically  under  the  guidance  of  association.  Considera- 
tion of  these  circumstances  will  help  us  to  partially  account 
for  the  peculiar  features  of  the  dream.  Its  chief  charac- 
teristics are,  (a)  its  verisimilitude,  (b)  its  incoherence  and 
extravagance,  (r)  its  possession  of  a  certain  coherence 
amid  this  inconsistency,  and  (d)  the  exaggeration  of  actual 
impressions. 

{a)  Verisimilitude. — The  apparent  reality  of  the  dream  is, 
in  great  part,  a  consequence  of  the  cessation  of  the  action  of 
the  external  senses.  In  sleep  the  images  of  the  fancy  which 
may  arise  within  us  are  not  subject  to  the  correction  which 
the  presentations  of  the  senses  are  ever  furnishing  during 
waking  life.  Even  in  the  most  profound  reverie,  when  our 
thoughts  move  along  at  random,  there  is  always,  so  long  as 
we  are  awake,  a  plentiful  stream  of  sensation  flowing  in  upon 
the  mind  through  the  several  faculties  ;  and  although  we 
scarcely  advert  to  them,  these  sensations  exert  a  steady 
counteracting  influence  on  the  flights  of  fancy.  The  objects 
which  we  dimly  see  around  us,  the  tactual  and  auditory 
impressions  of  which  we  are  vaguely  conscious,  all  conspire 
to  keep  us  in  constant  collision  with  reality  ;  and  when  we 
imagine  ourselves  at  the  head  of  an  army,  or  in  the  jaws  of  a 
tiger,  the  obscurely  apprehended  table  and  chairs  of  our  room 
exert  a  silent  check  upon  the  credence  we  are  inclined  to 
give  to  all  vivid  ideas.  In  sleep  it  is  otherwise  ;  the  corrective 
action  of  the  external  senses  being  cut  off,  we  are  completely 


IMAGINATION.  177 


at  the  mercy  of  the  phantasy,  and  place  imphcit  confidence 
in  each  new  illusory  cognition.'' 

(b)  Incoherence. — The  inconsistency  of  the  dream  seems  to 
be  due  to  its  course  being  left  entirely  to  the  guidance  of 
fortuitous  associations  modified  by  the  interference  of  acci- 
dental sensations  at  the  moment.  The  absence  of  voluntary 
attention  or  control  over  our  thoughts  disables  us  from 
reflecting  upon  the  ideas  which  arise  spontaneously,  and 
prevents  us  from  comparing  them  with  past  experience,  or 
with  each  other.  In  reverie,  on  the  contrary,  this  voluntary 
power  rarely  sinks  into  complete  abeyance,  and  on  the 
suggestion  of  some  flagrant  absurdity,  the  mind  can  exert 
itself  against  the  illogical  train  of  images,  and  even  if  it 
permits  the  incongruous  series  to  take  their  course,  at  least 
reserves  its  assent.  The  casual  entrance  of  the  few  external 
impressions  which  penetrate  to  the  mind  during  sleep,  and 
the  action  of  the  systemic  sensations  are  probably  fertile 
sources  of  new  lines  of  thought.  But  since  self-command  no 
longer  exists,  although  we  may  feel  a  vague  surprise  at  the 
chaotic  groupings  of  ideas  thus  effected,  we  are  yet  unable  to 
elicit  the  reflective  act  by  which  the  inconsistency  may  be 
brought  home  to  us,  and  accordingly  thought  follows  thought 
in  an  arbitrary  manner. 

(r)  Coherence. — The  consistency  of  the  dream,  in  so  far  as 
it  occasionally  exists,  probably  results  in  part  from  an  orderly 
succession  of  previously  associated  ideas,  in  part  from  a 
faint  power  of  selection  exerted  by  a  dominant  tone  of  con- 
sciousness at  the  time,  which  rejects  striking  eccentricities. 

(d)  Exaggeration. — The  exaggeration  of  occasional  real 
impressions  is  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  while  the^  great 
majority  of  external  sensations  are  excluded,  those  which  do 
find  entrance  are  thereby  in  a  peculiarly  favourable  position. 
They  are  in  novel  isolation  from  their  surroundings ;  their 
nature  is  vaguely  apprehended;**  and  they  cannot  be  con- 

^  8  Lewes,  following  Hartley,  explains  the  apparent  reality  of  the 
phantasms  of  the  dream,  mainly  by  the  suspension  of  the  corrective 
action  of  the  external  senses.  Cf.  Physiology  of  Common  Life,  pp.  367 — 
370.  Carpenter,  Mental  Physiology,  §  482,  in  accordance  with  the 
important  part  he  assigns  to  Will  in  mental  Hfe,  like  Stewart,  lays 
chief  stress  on  "  the  entire  suspension  of  volitional  control  over  the 
current  of  thought  "  during  sleep.  St.  Thomas  had  anticipated  both 
explanations.  He  accounts  for  the  illusions  of  sleep  by  the  suspen- 
sion of  the  senses  combined  with  the  interruption  of  the  voluntary 
control  of  reason.     See  note  on  next  page. 

9  Mr.  Sully  {Illusions,  pp.  147—149)  ascribes  the  magnifying 
agency  of  the  dream  chiefly  to  the  obscure  manner  in  which  the 
nature  of  the  stimulus  is  apprehended— igtiotum  pro  magnifico.     The 

M 


17S  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


fronted  with  other  experiences.  Accordingly  they  usurp  the 
whole  available  resources  of  consciousness,  and  so  assume  an 
utterly  inordinate  importance,  A  slight  sensation  of  cold  or 
pressure,  if  it  accidentally  fits  in  with  the  current  of  our 
dream,  may  thus  give  rise  to  the  illusion  that  we  are  lost  in  a 
snow-storm,  or  crushed  under  a  falling  house.  The-  seeming 
rapidity  of  events,  which  is  simply  the  rapidity  of  thoughts 
confounded  with  reality,  is  explained  in  the  same  way.^*^ 

In  brief,  then,  as  following  Aristotle,  St.  Thomas  himself 
repeatedly  teaches,  the  mind  accepts  the  representations  of 
the  imagination  as  real  objects  unless  it  be  checlced  by  some 
other  faculty ;  consequently  when,  as  in  sleep,  the  senses  and 
the  free  application  of  the  understanding  which  constitutes 
voluntary  attention  are  suspended,  illusion  is  inevitable. ^^ 

Readings. — On  the  Imagination,  of.  St.  Thomas,  Comm.  De  Anima, 
Lib.  III.  Lect.  4 — 6;  Mark  Baldwin,  op.  cit.  c.  xii. ;  Carpenter, 
Mental  Physiology,  c.  xii.;  Hamilton,  MetapJi.  Lect.  xxxiii. ;  Porter, 
cp.  cit.  Part.  II.  cc.  v.  vi.  ;  Gutberlet,  Die  Psychologie,  pp.  83,  seq. 
On  Illusions,  cf.  Farges,  L'Ohjectivite  de  la  Perception  des  Sens  Externes, 
pp.  184 — 237;  Baldwin,  op.  cit.  c.  xiii.  The  subject  of  Dreams  is 
treated  by  Aristotle  in  a  special  tract,  cf.  St.  Thomas,  Co;;/;;?.  D^ 
Somn'.is.     Carpenter,  op.  cit.  c.  xv.  is  good  on  the  same  subject. 

force  of  a  novel  impression  even  in  waking  life  is  usually  over- 
estimated. In  sleep  the  general  lethargy  of  the  higher  centres 
engaged  in  cognition  prevents  proper  recognition  of  even  familiar 
stimuli,  and  so  converts  them  into  strange  or  formidable  phenomena. 

^^  "  The  only  phase  of  the  waking  state  in  which  any  such 
intensely  rapid  succession  of  thoughts  presents  itself,  is  that  which 
is  now  well  attested  as  a  frequent  occurrence,  under  circumstances 
in  which  there  is  imminent  danger  of  death,  especially  by  drown- 
ing, the  whole  previous  life  of  the  individual  seems  to  be  presented 
instantaneously  to  his  view,  with  its  every  important  incident 
vividly  impressed  on  his  consciousness,  just  as  if  all  were  combineci 
in  a  picture,  the  whole  of  which  could  be  taken  in  at  a  glanco^^ 
(Carpenter,  op.  cit.  §  484,  note.) 

^^  "  Quod  rerum  species  vel  similitudines  non  discernantur  a 
rebus  ipsis,  contingit  ex  hoc  quod  vis  altior,  quae  judicare  et  dis- 
cernere  potest,  ligatur.  .  .  .  Sic  ergo  cum  offeruntur  imaginariae 
similitudines,  inhasretui  eis  quasi  rebus  ipsis,  nisi  sit  aliqiia  alia  vis 
qua  contradicat,  puta  sensus  aut  ratio.  Si  autem  sit  ligata  ratio,  et 
sensus  sopitus,  inharetur  similitndinibus  sicut  ipsis  rebus,  ut  in  visiis 
dormientium  accidit,  et  ita  in  phreneticis."  {Qq.  Disp.  De  Malo  III. 
a.  3.  ad  9.     Cf.  Comment,  in  Arist.,  De  Somniis,  Lect.  iv.) 


CHAPTER    IX. 

MEMORY.      MENTAL    ASSOCIATION. 

Memory. — The  term  Memory,  in  ordinary  lan- 
guage, designates  the  faculty  of  retaining,  repro- 
ducing, and  recognizing  representations  of  past 
experiences.  These  several  features  of  memory 
vary  in  degree  of  perfection  in  the  same,  and  in 
different  individuals.  Viewed  as  the  capacity  for 
preserving  our  mental  acquisitions  this  power  has 
been  called  the  Conservative  Faculty.  It  is  an 
essential  condition  of  all  knowledge.  The  simplest 
act  of  judgment,  as  well  as  the  longest  chain  of 
reasoning,  necessarily  implies  retention.  But  acqui- 
sition plus  conservation  is  not  enough.  During  the 
whole  of  our  life  the  greater  portion  of  our  mental 
possessions  lie  below  the  surface  of  consciousness, 
and  exist  only  in  a  condition  of  potential  resusci- 
tation. It  is  the  power  of  recalling  and  recognizing 
these  dormant  cognitions  which  completes  and 
perfects  this  instrument  of  knowledge.-  The  act 
of  recognition  is  radically  distinct  from  the  mere 
re-apparition  of  an  old  mental  state;  but  both  have 
been  sometimes  comprehended  under  the  Repro- 
ductive Faculty, 

Aristotle  distinguishes  between  memory  [fxvr^^irj),  the  passive 
faculty  of  retention,  and  reminiscence  {avu^vrjo-n),  the  power  of 


J  So  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


active  search  or  recall.  The  division  is  analogous  to  that  of 
modern  writers  into  spontaneous  or  automatic  memory,  and 
voluntary  memory,  or  the  power  of  recollection.  The  operation 
of  reminiscence  is  compared  by  St.  Thomas  to  that  of 
syllogising,  a  progress  from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  from 
the  remembered  to  the  forgotten.  As  it  involves  volitional 
and  rational  activitv  it  is  restricted  to  man,  whilst  memory  is 
common  to  the  brutes.  Hamilton  confines  the  narne  memory 
to  the  retentive  or  conservative  capacity  of  the  mind,  whilst 
under  the  reproductive  faculty  he  includes  both  reproduction 
and  recognition.  The  imagination  proper,  he  describes  as 
the  representative  faculty. 

Reproduction. — A  brief  study  of  our  minds 
reveals  the  fact  that  even  spontaneous  thoughts 
and  recollections  of  past  events  do  not  occur 
completely  at  random.  Our  fancy  can,  it  is 
true,  move  in  a  very  rapid  and  seemingly  arbitrary 
manner,  whilst  widely  remote  actions  and  episodes 
often  reappear  in  imagination  in  an  unexpected  and 
disconnected  way.  Still,  closer  attention  to  the 
reproduced  states  will  usually  disclose  faint  and 
unobtrusive  connexions  binding  together  the  links 
of  what  looked  like  a  haphazard  series  of  thoughts. 

Process  of  Recollection.— But  it  is  in  the  act  of 

reminiscence  or  recollecttoii,  in  the  sustained  effort  to  recall 
some  past  experience,  we  perceive  most  clearly  that  the 
current  of  representations  which  pass  before  our  con- 
sciousness do  not  proceed  in  an  entirely  casual  and 
lawless  manner.  Starting  from  a  vague  notion  of  the 
event  which  we  wish  to  remember,  we  try  to  go  back 
to  it  by  something  connected  with  it  in  time,  in  place, 
or  by  any  other  kind  of  affinity.  We  first  endeavour 
to  place  ourselves  in  the  mental  situation  of  the 
original  incident.  Then  we  notice  that  by  fixing  our 
attention  on  any  particular  occurrence  we  bring  it  into 
greater  vividness,  and  numerous  attendant  circum- 
stances are  gradually  recalled.  Our  ordinary  procedure 
is  accordingly  to  seize  upon,  and  intensify  by  attention, 


MEMORY.  i8i 


the  force  of  that  one  of  the  newly-awakened  recollec- 
tions which  we  judge  most  likely  to  lead  to  the  desired 
end.  When  our  gaze  is  focussed  on  this  fresh  centre  a 
new  system  of  objects  related  by  similarity,  contiguity, 
or  contrast,  begins  to  emerge  from  obscurity,  and  here 
we  repeat  our  process  of  choice,  picking  out  again  the 
most  promising  train.  By  reiterated  selections  and 
rejections  of  this  kmd  we  approach  gradually  closer 
and  closer  to  the  object  of  pursuit,  until  it  finally  flashes 
upon  us  with  a  more  or  less  lively  feeling  of  satisfaction. 
Throughout  our  investigation  we  must  have  had  some 
vague  idea,  some  general  outline  of  the  experience  of 
which  we  are  in  search,  in  order  to  direct  us  along  the 
most  likely  paths.  This  is  made  evident  in  the  final 
act  of  recognition,  for  in  this  stage  we  become  conscious 
that  the  rediscovered  fact  fits  precisely  into  the  vague 
outline  still  retained.  The  accompanying  pleasure  is 
due  to  the  perception  of  agreement  between  the  new 
and  the  old,  together  with  the  feeling  of  relief  occasioned 
by  having  the  undefined  want  satisfied. 

Laws  of  Association. — The  study  of  such  an 
operation  as  that  just  described  convinces  us  that 
our  recollections  succeed  each  other  not  arbitrarily, 
but  according  to  certain  laws.  Careful  observation 
of  our  mental  processes  have  enabled  psychologists 
to  reduce  such  laws  to  a  few  very  general  principles. 
These  principles  which  condition  the  reproduction 
of  phenomena  of  the  mind  have  been  called  the 
Laws  of  Mental  Suggestion  or  the  Laws  of  the 
Association  of  Ideas.     The  chief  of  these  are  : 

(i)  The  law  of  similarity  or  affinity  in  character. 

(2)  The  law  of  contrast  or  opposition  in  character. 

(3)  The  law  of  contiguity,  comprising  association 
{a)  in  space,  and  {h)  in  time. 

Similarity. — The  Law  of  Similarity  expresses  the 
general  condition  that  the  mind  in  the  presence  of  any  mental 


1 82  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


state  tends  to  repvoditce  the  like  of  that  state  in  past  experience; 
or  as  it  is  sometimes  enunciated,  mental  states  suggest 
or  recall  their  like  in  past  experience.  The  previous  form 
of  expression,  however,  possesses  the  advantage  of 
calHng  attention  to  a  point  frequently  overlooked  by 
EngHsh  psychologists,  namely,  that  it  is  in  the  mind, 
and  not  in  the  transient  phenomena,  the^  binding  or 
associating  force  dwells.  An  impression  oridea,  viewed 
merely  as  an  individual  phenomenon,  contains  no  reason 
in  itself  why  another  mental  event  like  or  unlike  it 
should  be  its  successor.  It  is  only  the  permanence  of 
the  Subject  which  renders  association  of  the  states 
possible.  The  mind,  retaining  as  habits  or  faint  modi- 
fications former  experiences,  resuscitates  on  the  occur- 
rence of  similar  or  contrasted  events  the  latent  state, 
and  recognizes  the  likeness  which  subsists  between  the 
new  and  the  old.  The  vicious  reasoning  of  sensation- 
alist writers  who  explain  both  the  mind  and  the  material 
world,  including  the  human  organism,  as  a  product  of 
the  association  of  ideas  is  thus  obvious. 

Examples  of  association  by  similarity  are  innu- 
merable. A  photograph  recalls  the  original,  a  face 
that  we  see,  a  story  that  we  read,  a  piece  of  music  or  a 
song  that  we  hear,  all  remind  us  of  similar  experiences 
in  the  past.  Even  the  less  refined  sensations  of  touch, 
taste,  and  smell,  cause  us  to  recollect  like  impressions 
in  our  previous  life.  Painting,  sculpture,  the  drama, 
and  the  rest  of  the  fine  arts,  seek  to  please  by  their 
success  in  imitation.  The  pleasures  of  wit  and  humour, 
the  charm  of  happy  figurative  language  in  poetry  or 
prose,  and  the  admiration  won  by  great  strokes  of 
scientific  genius,  are  in  the  same  way  largely  based  on 
the  satisfaction  of  the  tendency  by  which  the  mind  is 
impelled  to  pass  from  a  thought  to  its  like. 

Contrast. — The  Laiv  of  Contrast  enunciates  the 
general  fact  that  the  mind  in  the  presence  of  any  mental  state 
tends  to  reproduce  contrasted  states  previously  experienced.  Or 
it  may  be  formulated  in  the  proposition  that  mental 
slates  suggest  contrasted  states  of  past  experience.  The  idea 
of  prodigal  wealth  recalls  that  of  needy  poverty,  cold 
suggests   heat,    black   white,    virtue   vice,    and   so   on. 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION,  183 

From  the  beginning,  however,  this  law  has  been  felt 
to  be  reducible  to  morS  ultimate  principles.  In  fact, 
to  declare  broadly  that  mental  states  are  inclined  to 
revive  former  perceptions  both  like  and  unlike  them 
would  approach  paradox,  if  not  actual  contradiction. 
The  truth  is,  this  law  in  so  far  as  it  is  mental  and  not 
an  effect  of  organic  reaction  is  a  result  of  the  combined 
forces,  similarity  and  contiguity.  This  will  be  made 
evident  presently. 

Contiguity. — The  Laiu  of  Contiguity  formulates  the 
truth  that  the  mind  in  the  presence  of  an  object  or  events  whethe-v 
actual  oy  ideal,  tends  to  recall  other  objects  and  events,  fovnievly 
closely  connected  in  space  or  time  with  that  now  present.  It  is 
often  impossible  to  draw  a  rigid  line  between  associa- 
tions due  to  close  connexion  in  time  and  those  founded 
on  contiguity  in  space.  When  looked  at  from  the 
mental  side,  we  say  the  subjective  impressions  occurred 
simultaneously,  or  in  close  succession  ;  viewed  from 
the  opposite  standpoint,  we  say  the  perceived  objects 
were  locally  contiguous.  Suggestion  by  contiguity 
whether  in  space  or  time  is  the  most  important  and 
far  reaching  form  of  association.  It  is  not  confined 
to  cognitive  acts,  but  includes  emotions,  volitions,  and 
external  movements  as  well.  It  is  the  principle  upon 
which  every  system  of  education  both  mental  and 
physical  is  based  ;  and  by  the  sensationalist  school  in 
this  country  it  has  been  erected  into  an  omnipotent 
agency  through  which  all  knowledge  and  belief  regard- 
ing space  and  time,  mind  and  matter,  have  been 
created.  We  have  pointed  out  in  treating  of  sense- 
perception  how  the  taste,  smell,  touch,  and  sight  of 
objects  mutually  suggest  one  another.  Contiguous 
association  is  also  a  leading  source  of  our  pleasures 
and  pains.  The  process  of  learning  to  walk,  to  speak, 
and  to  write,  and  the  acquisition  of  the  various  manual 
arts,  rest  upon  the  tendency  of  acts  which  are  repeated 
in  succession  to  become  so  united  that  each  impels  to 
the  reproduction  of  the  next.  Language  is  possible 
because  auditory  sounds  grow  to  be  associated  on  the 
one  side  with  the  visual  image  of  the  object,  and  on 
the  other  with  the  complex  cluster  of  motor  or  muscular 


1 84  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


impulses  involved  in  the  utterance  of  the  name  ;  and 
literature  is  intelligible  only  through  the  marvellous 
command  which  repeated  associations  have  given  us 
over  the  innumerable  combinations  of  individual  letters 
which  cover  the  page  of  a  book. 

Time  order, — Although,  as  we  have  said,  associations 
in  space  are  often  intimately  related  to  connexions  in 
time,  there  is  one  important  feature  in  which  these 
latter  differ  from  the  former.  Owing  to  the  permanent 
coexistence  of  the  separate  parts  of  an  extended  object, 
and  to  our  visual  power  of  simultaneously  apprehending 
these  parts,  no  particular  point  becomes  endowed  with 
any  special  priority ;  consequently  we  can  in  imagina- 
tion, as  in  the  previous  reality,  pass  in  any  order  from 
each  point  to  every  other.  But  in  serial  states,  where 
each  separate  impression  has  dropped  out  of  conscious- 
ness before  the  appearance  of  the  next,  the  whole  force 
of  the  association  is  to  reproduce  the  mental  states  in 
their  original  order  of  occurrence. 

Reduction  of  these  laws. — Contiguous  sugges- 
tion is  an  agency  of  such  extensive  range  in  mental 
phenomena  that  some  psychologists  hold  similarity, 
contrast,  and  all  other  forms  of  association,  to  be 
merely  special  applications  of  this  ultimate  principle. 
Others,  on  the  contrary,  consider  contiguity  to  be  a 
particular  case  of  similarity — likeness  in  space  or 
time. 

Contrast  analyzed. — That  the  law  ot  contrast  is  resolv- 
able we  have  before  stated.  Contraria  sunt  ejiisdem  generis. 
Contrast  presupposes  similarity  in  genus.  There  is  no 
disposition  in  the  mind  to  pass  from  the  idea  of  civili- 
zation to  that  of  liquid  or  of  black,  because  there  is  no 
relation  of  similarity  between  them.  But  there  is  an 
easy  transition  in  thought  from  civilization  to  barbarism, 
from  solid  to  liquid,  and  from  black  to  white,  because 
each  pair  of  terms  refer  to  a  common  class.  Still  this 
does  not  quite  complete  the  explanation,  as  there  may 
be  many  species  in  the  class,  and  there  is  no  special 


MENTAL  ASSOCIATION.  if 5 

inclination  felt  to  pass  to  intermediate  objects,  such  as 
from  white  to  green  or  red.  It  is  here  the  principle  of 
contiguous  suggestion  supplements  that  of  similarity. 
We  are  accustomed  to  meet  in  literature,  in  language, 
and  in  daily  experience,  contrasted  terms  and  objects 
bound  together  in  pairs  ;  and  in  fact  the  entire  judicial 
function  of  the  intellect  consists  in  the  discrimination 
of  unlike  things,  and  assimilation  of  those  which  are 
like,  so  that  we  naturally  acquire  a  facility  for  passing 
from  a  notion  to  its  opposite. 

Attempted  analysis  of  similarity. — The  effort  to  reduce 
similarity  and  contiguity  to  a  single  principle  is  not 
quite  so  successful,  though  they  are  evidently  connected. 
Psychologists  who  maintain  that  contiguity  is  the  most 
general  principle,  explain  suggestion  by  apparent 
resemblance  as  really  due  to  the  fact  that  those  features 
in  the  present  object  which  also  existed  in  the  former 
object  arouse  by  contiguity  the  parts  which  were 
adjacent  to  them  on  that  occasion.  Thus,  when  tiie 
face  of  a  stranger  reminds  me  by  similarity  of  an  old 
friend,  it  is  held  that  the  process  consists  of  a  deeper 
impression  of  the  common  features,  which  results  from 
the  fact  of  these  features  having  been  previously  per- 
ceived, and  then  a  consequent  reinstatement  of  the 
lineaments,  formerly  contiguous,  whilst  our  interest 
and  attention  is  withdrawn  from  those  adjacent  in  the 
present  experience. 

The  following  analysis  of  Similarity  is  given  by  the 
German  psychologists  Maas  and  Biunde  :  Let  the  face  now 
seen  for  the  first  time  be  called  B.  Let  the  former  face 
recalled  through  the  resemblance  of  B  be  styled  A.  Let  the 
points  common  to  both  be  called  ;;/.  Let  the  unlike  features 
peculiar  to  B  be  named  b,  and  let  those  peculiar  to  A  be 
named  a.  Now,  when  B  is  observed,  the  familiar  hut 
unexpected  feature  in  attracts  notice,  while  the  less  interesting 
b  is  ignored.  But  ni  has  been  formerly  frequently  joined  witli 
a  constituting  the  total  representation  A,  and  accordingly 
bringing  back  its  old  associate  it  reinstates  A.  "  When,  for 
example,  I  look  at  the  portrait  of  Sir  Philip  Sydney,  I  am 
reminded  of  its  likeness  to  the  portrait  of  Queen  Elizabeth, 
because  of  the  ruff  which  is  about  the  neck  of  each,  which  in 
this  case  is  the  only  common  feature,  and  attracts  at  once  the 


iS6  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 

attention.  The  ruff  brings  back  everything  besides  in  Her 
Majesty's  portrait — the  head-dress,  the  features,  the  sceptre, 
the  robes,  &c.,  till  the  whole  is  restored."^  Mr.  J.  Ward  on 
similar  lines  contends  that  it  is  in  previous  contiguity  alone 
the  associative  or  suggestive  force  lies,  and  that  similarity  is 
only  an  incidental  relation  recognized  after  the  reproduction 
is  accomplished.- 

Attempted  analysis  of  contiguity. — Writers  who  look 
upon  similarity  as  the  ultimate  law,  describe  contiguity 
as  merely  a  particular  case  of  resemblance.  No  part  of 
the  present  representation,  it  is  urged,  can  be  "common" 
to  the  previous  mental  state  in  the  strict  sense  of  being 
numerically  one  and  identical  on  the  two  occasions. 
Even  the  mental  states  aroused  by  the  contemplation 
of  the  same  object  now  and  five  seconds  ago  are  two 
really  different  conscious  acts.  But  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  an  experience — a  sensation,  an  intellectual  cogni- 
tion, or  an  emotion — often  recalls  a  similar  state  that 
occurred  amid  completely  different  surroundings  at  a 
very  distant  period.  There  is,  for  instance,  no  con- 
nexion of  contiguity  between  the  present  perception  of  a 
photograph  seen  for  the  first  time  and  a  friend's  face 
whom  I  have  not  met  for  twenty  years.  We  must 
therefore,  it  is  argued,  admit  as  an  ultimate  fact  this 
tendency  of  the  mind  to  reproduce  past  experiences 
connected  with  the  present  by  likeness  alone.  More- 
over, cases  described  as  contiguous  associations  are 
merely  particular  forms  of  similarity — likeness  in  space 
or  time.  When,  for  example,  a  bridge  recalls  the  image 
of  a  house  that  used  to  stand  hard  b}^  the  association 
is  said  to  be  one  of  a  partial  resemblance  between  the 
present  and  past  mental  states.  The  mind  is  at  present 
in  a  state  like  that  in  which  it  was  before. 

Herbert  Spencer  makes  similarity  the  sole  ultimate 
principle  :  "  The  fundamental  law  of  association  is  that  each 
(mental  state),  at  the  moment  of  presentation,  aggregates 
with  its  like  in  past  experience.  .  .  .  Besides  this  there  is  no 
other  ;  but  all  further  phenomena  of  association  are  inci- 
dental." Similarly  Hbffdmg:  "  Every  association  by  contiguity 
presupposes    an    association    by   similarity,    or   at    least    an 

1  Porter,  op.  cit.  §  247.  -  "  Psychology,"  Encyd.  Brit. 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION.  iSf 

immediate  recognition.  When  the  apple  before  me  carries 
my  thoughts  to  Adam  and  Eve,  this  is  because  first — perhaps 
so  quickly  that  I  am  hardly  conscious  of  it — I  have  thought 
of  the  apple  on  the  tree  of  knowledge.  The  association  by 
similarity  lying  at  the  root  of  association  by  contiguity  may 
easily  escape  our  attention.  But  it  is  a  link  which  cannot  be 
dispensed  with."  (Op.  cit.  p.  158.) 

Hamilton  originally  accepted  the  analysis  of  Maas,  and 
enounced  as  the  one  comprehensive  principle  of  Association 
the  Law  of  Redintegration  or  Totality  :  Thouf^lits  suggest  each 
other  which  have  previously  constituted  parts  of  the  same  entire  or 
total  act  of  cognition.^  Moreover  he  traced  the  recognition  of 
this  principle  back  to  St.  Augustine,^  and  even  to  Aristotle. 
Subsequently,  however,  in  his  work  On  Reid,  Note  D,-'"''-- 
Hamilton  abandoned  this  view,  and  acknowledged  both 
Similarity  and  Contiguity  as  irreducible.  He  thus  formulates 
the  two  principles :  (i)  The  Law  of  Repetition,  or  of 
Direct  Remembrance  : — Thoughts  co-identical  in  modification 
{i.e.  similar  as  acts  of  the  mind)  but  differing  in  time,  tend  to 
suggest  each  other.  (2)  The  Law  of  Redintegration,  of 
Indirect  Remembrance,  or  of  Reminiscence  : — Thoughts 
once  co-identical  in  time,  are  however  different  as  mental  modes, 
again  suggestive  of  each  other,  and  that  in  the  mutual  order  which 
they  originally  held.  The  terms  Direct  and  Indirect  mark  the 
fact  that  a  mental  state  immediately  or  directly  recalls  its 
like  in  the  past,  and  mediately  the  unlike  states  formerly 
contiguous  to  this  restored  element.  This  latest  position  of 
Hamilton  is  akin  to  that  of  St. Thomas,  as  will  be  seen  later. 

Criticism. — It  seems  to  us  that  similarity  and 
contiguity,  though  they  are  usually  allied  in  their 
operation,  contain  each  a  separate  element  of  its  own. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  is  a  fundamental  irreducible  law 
that  present  mental  states  tend  to  awaken  represen- 
tations of  their  lihe  in  past  life.  On  the  other,  these 
reproduced  representations  usually  call  up  nnlihe 
adjacent  elements,  which  formerly  co-exited  along 
with  them.  The  second  fact  cannot  be  really  resolved 
into  the  first,  nor  the  first  into  the  second.  We  may 
of  course  manage  to  include  both  forms  of  suggestion 
in  one  verbal  statement,  but  their  radical  difference 
will  still  remain.  Though  the  adjectives  "  similar  "  or 
"same"  may  be  used  to  mark  agreement  of  date  as 

3  Mctaph.  Vol.  IL  p.  238.  ^  Confessions,  \.  c.  19. 


i88  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


well  as  likeness  of  quality,  we  must  not  forget  that 
coincidence  in  time  is  something  essentially  different  from 
affinity  in  nature. 

Physiological  hypothesis.  —  It  is  suggested  that  the 
physiological  counterpart  of  the  law  of  suggestion  by 
contiguity  lies  in  the  tendency  of  groups  of  cerebral  nerve 
elements  which  have  acted  together  in  the  original  experience 
to  do  so  again  whenever  any  portion  of  the  group  is  stimulated. 
The  hypothesis  seem3  plausible  though,  of  course,  there  is  no 
direct  evidence  on  the  point. 

The  physical  correlate  of  the  law  oi  similarity  is  supposed 
in  the  same  way  to  consist  of  a  certain  "  sympathetic  "  power 
of  a  present  neural  excitation  to  re-awaken  to  activity  nervous 
elements  formerly  excited  in  a  similar  way.  The  neural 
tremor  accompanying  the  original  cognition  left  it  is  assumed 
in  the  cerebral  substance,  an  abiding  disposition  to  repeat 
itself;  and  the  present  similar  excitation — presumably  in 
different  cellular  matter — it  is  supposed,  may  by  a  sort  of 
sympathetic  influence  evoke  a  rehearsal  of  the  old  movement. 
This  we  confess  seems  to  us  much  less  satisfactory.  In  what 
sense  is  the  cerebral  neural  tremor  corresponding  to  the 
retinal  image  of  a  six-inch  photograph  peculiarly  like  that 
excited  by  the  original — a  six-foot  man — seen  three  months 
ago  ?  How  is  this  "  sympathetic  affinity  "  to  be  conceived  ? 
It  seems  to  us  that  suggestion  by  similarity — where  this 
cannot  be  reduced  to  contiguity — involves  the  higher  supra- 
sensuous  activity  of  the  mind,  to  which  the  appropriate 
cerebral  action  is  unimaginable.     Hence  the  difficulty. 

Co-operative  Associations. — The  terms  compound, 
or  complex  associations,  are  used  to  designate  those 
forms  of  suggestion  where  two  or  more  distinct  lines  of 
connexion  co-operate  in  the  reproduction  of  a  mental 
state,  or  series  of  mental  states.  The  word  co-operative 
appears  to  us  to  describe  more  accurately  the  nature 
of  this  process  in  which  several  separate  strands  join 
together  to  intensify  the  force  of  association.  The 
phrase,  conflicting  associations,  will  then  designate  with 
precision  those  contrasted  phenomena  in  which  the 
lines  of  suggestive  force   are  divergent.     Instances  of 


co-operative  association  are  abundant ;  in  fact,  we 
rarely  find  suggestion  acting  along  a  solitary  isolated 
path.  The  recollection  of  a  poem  may  be  effected 
partly  by  auditory  associations  of  rhyme   and   metre, 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION.  1S9 


I 


partly  by  the  succession  of  connected  thoughts,  and 
partly  by  the  visual  picture  of  the  page  on  which  the 
verses  were  printed.  Most  familiar  acquisitions  such 
as  walking,  speaking,  writing,  brushing  our  hair,  playing 
the  piano,  are  the  result  of  the  co-operation  of  parallel 
series  of  tactual,  motor,  and  visual  or  auditory  series 
of  associated  sensations ;  and  the  great  assistance 
which  local  associations  afford  in  resuscitating  forgotten 
events  where  the  other  links  have  become  attenuated  is 
well  known. 

Conflicting  Associations. — Conflicting  or  obstruc- 
tive associations  illustrate  the  incidental  disadvantages 
which  we  so  frequently  find  attached  to  the  working 
of  a  generally  useful  law.  Just  as  a  desired  recollection 
may  be  facilitated  by  several  convergent  associations  of 
similarity  or  contiguity,  so  may  it  be  impeded  by  their 
divergence.  A  verse,  or  a  word,  which  is  connected  in 
a  poem  or  speech  with  more  than  one  context,  frequently 
tends  to  shunt  us  off  the  right  track.  The  aim  of  the 
riddle  or  conundrum  is  this  very  result.  The  recol- 
lection of  a  name  of  which  we  possess  the  first  letter 
may  be  similarly  obstructed ;  and  the  accidental  pre- 
sence of  any  strong  counter-association  connected  with 
a  present  idea,  may  temporarily  interfere  with  our 
power  of  reminiscence.  The  best  method  of  procedure 
in  such  cases,  experience  teaches  us,  is  to  secure  a  new 
unprejudiced  start  by  turning  away  from  the  subject 
altogether  for  awhile,  until  the  vivacity  of  the  connexion 
between  the  obstructive  word  or  idea  and  the  divergent 
series  has  diminished,  or  until  we  can  hit  upon  some 
independent  line  of  suggestion  when  the  pursuit  may 
be  resumed  with  better  prospects  of  success.  The 
sudden  revivals  of  lost  ideas,  whilst  we  are  immersed 
in  a  new  occupation,  after  a  vainly  protracted  search, 
are  in  this  way  explained.  Psychologically  misleading 
associations  were  in  the  ascendant  during  our  futile 
struggles,  and  physiologically  the  perturbed  state  of  the 
brain  rendered  the  reproduction  of  the  neural  correlate 
of  the  desiderated  representation  impossible.  But  the 
subsequent  readjustment  gave  rise  to  the  particular  set 
of  conditions  psychical  and  physical  which  made  resus- 


igo  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


citation  feasible,  and  which,  either  automatically  or 
influenced  by  a  lingering  semi-conscious  volition,  dis- 
interred the  lost  thouglit. 

Secondary  Laws. — In  addition  to  these  primary 
laws  of  association  or  suggestion,  there  are  certain 
other  general  conditions  determining  the  efficiency 
of  memory  and  recollection.  Some,  or  all  of  these, 
have  been  variously  expressed  under  such  titles  as, 
the  law  of  preference,  the  secondary  laws  of  suggestion, 
and  general  conditions  of  acquisition  and  reproduction. 
However  they  be  described,  they  serve  to  explain 
the  varying  force  of  associations  not  accounted  for 
by  the  other  group.  The  leading  principles  in  this 
secondary  class  are:  (i)  Vividness  of  impression; 
(2)  Frequency  of  repetition;  and  (3)  Recentness. 

Vividness. — Assuming  the  action  of  the  other  laws 
to  remain  constant,  the  deeper,  the  more  intense,  or  the 
more  vigorous  the  original  impression,  the  more  perma- 
nent is  its  retention,  and  the  easier  its  reproduction. 
The  vividness  of  an  impression  is  itself  dependent 
objectively  on  the  inherent  attractiveness  or  force  of  the 
stimuli,  and  subjectively  upon  the  energy  of  our  voluntary 
attention.  The  novelt}',  beauty,  or  overwhelming  power 
of  a  single  experience  may  give  it  life-long  permanence  ; 
and  deep  interest  or  intense  application  of  attention 
may  largely  compensate  for  the  absence  of  the  other 
conditions  of  reproduction.  To  awaken  and  sustain 
interest  must  therefore  be  always  a  chief  aim  of  the 
teacher,  as  whatever  is  learned  by  this  motive  is  both 
acquired  with  greater  facility  and  retained  with  greater 
tenacity. 

Frequency. — The  influence  of  repetition  need  not 
be  dwelt  on.  By  reiteration,  especially  at  short 
intervals,  the  feeble  association  created  by  the  first 
contiguous  occurrence  of  two  events  becomes  gradually 
converted  into  an  almost  irresistible  suggestive  force, 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION.  191 

and  a  frail  link  of  similarity  is  changed  into  an  iron 
bond.  It  is  by  repetition  that  in  the  last  resort  all  other 
imperfections  of  memory  must  be  made  good. 

Recentness. — The  third  law  is  also  familiar.  The 
shorter  the  time  that  has  elapsed  and  the  fewer  the 
intervening  impressions,  the  more  easily  a  past  thought 
or  series  of  thoughts  is  recollected.  Consequently  it  is 
important  that  the  first  lessons  in  a  new  subject  be 
repeated  at  brief  intervals,  otherwise  the  effect  of  each 
impression  will  have  completely  faded  away  before  the 
next  effort.  The  co-operation  of  one  or  more  of  these: 
laws  with  one  or  more  of  the  others  will  account  for 
variations  in  the  suggestiveness  or  suggestibility  of 
particular  mental  states. 

Order  of  reproduction. — Of  two  associated  terms, 
such  as  a  name  and  its  object,  a  sign  and  the  thing: 
signified,  a  means  and  its  end,  one  ma}^  have  far  more 
power  of  recalling  the  other  than  vice  versa.  This  may 
be  due  either  to  the  customary  movement  of  our  atten- 
tion in  a  regular  order,  as  in  the  case  of  repeating  the 
alphabet,  or  to  the  direction  whither  our  interest 
naturally  tends,  as  where  symbols  or  means  point  to 
the  ultimate  object.  It  may  also  be  due  to  the  circum- 
stance that  one  of  the  terms  has  been  met  with  more 
frequently,  or  more  recently  than  the  other,  or  to  the 
fact  that  it  is  connected  with  a  larger  number  of 
co-operative  threads  of  association  now  present. 

Retention. — The  problem  of  the  conservation  of 
experiences  has  been  as  keenly  discussed  as  that  of 
reproduction.  That  cognitions  do  de  facto  persist 
in  some  form,  whilst  not  realized  in  consciousness, 
is  indeed  only  a  hypothesis,  but  yet  one  which  is 
irresistibly  forced  upon  us.  We  have  continuous 
evidence  that  we  can  recall  familiar  past  events, 
and  we  are  consequently  convinced  that  they  have 
dwelt  within  us  during  the  interval.  The  theory 
offered    by   Aristotle    and    the    schoolmen    on    this 


192  -  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


subject  was  summed  up  in  the  phrase  which 
describes  the  memory  as  thesaurus  specienim.  By 
species,  as  we  have  already  stated,  the  scholastic 
philosophers  understood  modifications  which  reflect 
in  a  psychical  manner  external  objects,  and  which 
have  been  excited  in  the  soul  by  the  action  of  these 
objects.  These  species  or  cognitional  acts  were 
classed  as  sensuous  or  intellectual  according  as  they 
pertained  to  intellect  or  sense,  and  the  mediaeval 
psychologists  taught  that  when  experiences  have 
disappeared  from  consciousness  the  soul  is  endowed 
with  the  capacity  of  retaining  these  modifications 
as  faint  dispositions  or  habits.  But  the  retention  is 
not  solely  mental ;  the  organism  co-operates.  The 
soul  is  not  a  detached  spirit,  but  an  informing 
principle  dependent  on  the  body  which  it  animates. 
Consequently  the  latter  co-operates  in  conservation 
and  reproduction,  just  as  in  the  original  perception. 
The  physical  impression,  like  the  mental  act,  must 
persist  in  a  habitual  manner  ready  to  be  recalled 
into  activity  on  an  appropriate  occasion.^ 

Ultra-Spiritualist  theory.— Modern  writers  who 
have  departed  from  this  view  have  commonly  erred  by 

^  Cf.  St.  Augustine  [Epist.  ix.  ad  Neb.  n.  3).  "  Itaque,  ea  quar 
ut  ita  dicam,  vestigia  sui  motus  animus  figit  in  corpore,  possuni 
et  manere,  et  quemdam  quasi  habitum  facere,  quae  latenter,  cum 
agitata  fuerint,  et  contractata  secundum  agitantis  et  contractantis- 
voluntatem  ingerunt  nobis  cogitationes,  et  somnia."  Also 
St.  Thomas :  "  Dicit  (Aristoteles)  manifestum  esse  quod  oportet 
intelligere  aliquam  talem  passionem  a  sensu  esse  factam  in  anima 
et  in  organo  corporis  animati,  cujus  quidem  animas  memoriam 
dicimus  esse  quemdam  quasi  habitum,  quae  quidem  passio  est  quasi 
quaedam  pictura.  .  .  .  Dicit  autem  in  anima  et  in  parte  corporis; 
quia  cum  hujusmodi  passio  pertineat  ad  partem  sensitivam  quae 
est  actus  organici  corporis,  hujusmodi  passio  non  pertinet  ad  solam 
animam  sed  ad  conjunctum."  {Covim.  De  Memoria,  i.  1.  3.) 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION.  193 

accounting  for  memory  as  a  property  of  the  soul  alone 
or  of  the  body  alone.  Sir  William  Hamilton  looks  on 
all  physiological  hypotheses  on  the  subject  as  unphilo- 
sophical,  and  as  affording  no  insight  into  the  nature  of 
memory,  and  he  asserts  that  "  all  of  them  are  too 
contemptible  even  for  serious  criticism."^  This  remark 
is  perfectly  just  if  the  physical  theory  hy  itself  be 
advanced  as  an  adequate  explanation  of  memory,  that 
is,  apart  from  any  retention  by  the  permanent  mind  ; 
but  otherwise  it  is  untenable. 

Physiological  basis  proved. — That  there  is  a  subsidiary 
concomitant  process  of  organic  conservation,  on  which  the 
mind  is  at  least  partially  dependent,  is  rendered  probable  by 
a  multitude  of  facts,  (i)  In  youth,  while  the  organism  is 
most  plastic,  we  are  capable  of  acquiring  easily  the  most 
enduring  habits  and  recollections.  (2)  The  faculty  becomes 
impaired  in  later  life  as  the  organism  grows  less  pliable. 
(3)  Injuries  of  the  brain,  fevers,  and  cerebral  diseases, 
frequently  act  in  a  striking  manner  on  memory  whilst  the 
other  cognitional  faculties  remain  unaffected.  Determinate 
periods  of  life,  special  kinds  of  experience,  classes  of  words, 
particular  languages,  certain  parts  of  speech,  and  even  indi- 
vidual letters,  have  been  suddenly  erased  by  physical 
derangements  of  the  cerebrum.  (4)  Moreover,  these  losses 
have  often  been  suddenly  restored  on  the  recurrence  of 
abnormal  cerebral  conditions.  (5)  Finally,  in  ordmary  experi- 
ence health,  vigour,  and  freshness  of  the  brain  are  found  to 
be  most  important  conditions  of  the  acquisition  of  krttrvv  ledge. 

Hamilton's  own  theory  is  that  of  Herbart  and  many 
German  spiritualist  philosophers.  He  explains  memory, 
in  accordance  with  the  doctrine  of  latent  or  uncon- 
scious mental  modifications,  as  a  result  of  the  self- 
energy  of  the  mind.  Presentations  or  cognitions  are 
not  passive  impressions,  but  spontaneous  activities  of 
the  soul,  exerted  on  the  occasion  of  external  stimuli. 
As  modes  of  a  subject  one  and  indivisible  they  cannot 
be  destroyed — a  part  of  the  ego  must  be  detached  or 
annihilated  if  a  cognition  once  existent  be  again 
extinguished.  The  real  problem  with  Hamilton,  then, 
is  not  that  of  remembrance,  but  of  obliviscence  ;  and 
this  he  explains  as  due  to  the  gradual  enfeeblement  and 

6  Metaphysics,  Vol.  II.  p.  211. 

N 


194 


SEISfSUOUS  LIFE. 


obscuration  of  former  states  owing  to  the  rise  of 
successive  activities  into  the  limited  sphere  of  con- 
sciousness. This  dehtescence  or  subsidence  of  the  old 
energies  is  continuous,  but  they  are  never  completely 
obliterated. 

Regarding  this  doctrine  we  have  room  here  only 
to  point  out  the  erroneous  idea  involved  in  conceiving 
a  past  act  of  perception  as  persisting  in  a  merely 
lowered  degree  of  activity.  In  such  a  view  conscious- 
ness would  be  but  an  accident  of  cognition.  This  error 
is  traceable  to  the  literal  interpretation  of  metaphorical 
language  regarding  the  surface  of  consciousness.  A 
cognition  cannot  whilst  retaining  its  reality  as  a  cog- 
nition, sink  into  unconsciousness,  just  as  a  balloon  or  a 
diving-bell  descends  into  denser  or  more  profound 
strata.  The  true  conception  of  retention  is  the  old  one, 
per  modum  hahitus.  An  act  of  knowledge  when  it  has 
passed  out  of  thought  is  no  longer  an  activity  or  energy; 
as  an  act  it  has  perished,  but  during  its  existence  it 
wrought  an  effect  on  the  soul  in  the  shape  of  a  habit  or 
disposition,  which  on  the  recurrence  of  suitable  con- 
ditions is  capable  of  giving  rise  to  a  representation  of 
the  former  state. 

Purely  Physical  theory.  — Far  more  seriously 
erroneous,  however,  is  the  theory  which,  exaggerating 
the  capacity  of  the  organic  factor,  would  explain 
memory  in  purely  materialistic  fashion.  Dr.  Bain, 
Mr.  Spencer,  Dr.  Maudsley,  and  M.  Ribot,  are  well- 
known  representatives  of  this  view.  Memory  is  in  this 
hypothesis,  ''per  se  a  biological  fact — by  accident  a 
psychological  fact."  ^  To  each  cognitive  act,  sensuous 
or  intellectual,  there  corresponds  a  definite  disturbance 
of  some  group  of  nerve-fibres  and  nerve-cells  in  the 
brain.  Such  a  cluster  of  neural  elements  vibrating  or 
acting  together  in  any  way  retain  a  tendency  to  act  in  a 
similar  way  again.  Lines  of  least  resistance  are  formed, 
and  every  repetition  of  a  conscious  act  with  its  re- 
grouping of  the  appropriate  collection  of  cells  gives 
greater  stability  to  the  cerebral  registration.  These 
organic  modifications  are,  however,  according  to  the 
'  Ribot,  Diseases  of  the  Memory,  p.  lo. 


MENTAL   ASSOCIAITON.  195 

more  recent  exponents,  to  be  viewed,  not  so  much  in 
the  Hght  of  mechanical  impressions  stamped  upon  the 
substance  of  the  brain,  as  "dynamical  affinities"  or 
alliances,  created  between  separate  centres  of  activity 
by  means  of  which  simultaneous  re-excitations  of  the 
original  groupings  may  be  secured.  The  revival  of  the 
old  neural  tremor  affords  then,  it  is  supposed,  an 
abundantly  sufficient  explanation  of  the  phenomenon 
of  recollection.  *'  Memory  is,  in  fact,  the  conscious 
phase  of  this  physiological  disposition,  when  it  becomes 
active  or  discharges  its  functions  on  the  recurrence  of 
the  particular  mental  experience."  ^ 

Recognition. — The  weak  point  of  this  theory  when 
put  forward  as  a  complete  explanation  of  memory  is  that 
it  simply  ignores  the  essence  of  the  problem — the  act  of 
recognition.  Apart  from  the  insuperable  difficulty  due  to 
the  physiological  law  of  metabolism — the  fact  of  per- 
petual change  going  on  in  the  material  substance  of  the 
body — this  hypothesis  fails  to  distinguish  between  the 
reproduction  of  states  like  former  ones  and  the  identification 
of  this  similarity.  The  problem  to  be  solved  is  how 
some  striking  experience,  such  as  the  sight  of  Cologne 
Cathedral,  the  death  of  my  father,  a  friend's  house  on 
fire,  the  first  pony  I  rode,  can  be  so  retained  during  a 
period  of  fifty  years  that,  when  an  old  man,  I  feel 
absolute  certainty  of  the  perfect  agreement  in  many 
details  between  the  representation  of  the  event  now  in 
my  mind  and  the  original  perception.  The  circumstance 
that  the  passage  of  a  neural  tremor  through  a  system 
of  nerve-fibres  may  leave  there  an  increased  facility  for 
a  similar  perturbation  in  the  future,  in  no  way  indicates 
how  this  second  excitation  or  its  accompanying  mental 
state  is  to  recognize  itself  as  a  representation  of  the  first. 
To  account  for  the  facts  there  is  required  a  permanent 
principle  distinct  from  the  changing  organism,  capable 
of  retaining  the  old  states  in  some  form  or  other,  and 
also  in  virtue  of  its  own  abiding  identity,  capable  of 
recognizing  the  resuscitated  image  as  a  representation 
of  the  former  cognition.  Given  such  a  principle,  the 
persistence  of  physiological  "traces"  or  "vestiges" 
8  Dr.  Maudsley,  The  Physiology  of  the  Mind,  p.  513, 


[96  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


may  facilitate  its  powers  of  reproduction,  and  may 
serve  to  account  for  differences  in  individual  endow- 
ments ;  but  without  such  an  abiding  mind  the  plastic 
properties  of  the  nerve  are  useless  to  explain  the 
phenomenon. 

The  fact  of  recognition  is  invariably  overlooked  in  this 
point  of  the  controversy  by  the  adversaries  of  mental  reten- 
tion. Thus  Mr.  Mark  Baldwin  asserts  that  a  cognition  is 
"a  mental  product  dependent  upon  a  (cerebral)  process,  and 
in  the  absence  of  this  process  it  simply  ceases  to  exist.  The 
true  answer  to  the  question,  as  to  where  the  presentation  is 
in  the  time  between  perception  and  memory  (reproduction)  is 
no  where.'"  (Op.cit.p.  156.) 

To  this  it  may  be  objected  that  it  is  by  no  means  easy  to 
define  precisely  where  the  cognition  is  even  when  revived. 
There  is  probably  a  commotion  in  some  part  of  the  cerebrum, 
but  obviously  that  is  not  the  *'  mental  product."  Secondly, 
Mr.  Baldwin  is  quite  right  in  urging  that  the  presentation  no 
longer  exists  in  an  actual  condition.  Certainly  not,  after  the 
Herbartian  view,  "  sunk  in  sub-consciousness  like  a  stone  in  a 
lake."  Still,  the  fact  of  recognition  implies  more  than  an 
abiding  modification  of  brain  substance  to  connect  the  two 
mental  events.  The  act  of  recollection  is  not  simply  the 
production  of  a  mental  state  like  the  former  due  to  the  repe- 
tition of  a  similar  cerebral  process.  It  is  not  merely  "  a  really 
new  presentation  "  resembling  the  old  image.  It  involves  a 
recognition  of  agreement  between  the  present  state  and  the 
previous  experience  possible  only  if  that  experience  has  been 
retained  in  some  form  or  other  by  the  agent  who  identifies 
them  ;  and  this  agent  is  not  merely  an  aggregate  of  cellular 
matter.  Whether  we  choose  to  speak  of  the  retention  as 
accomplished  through  species,  or  "  modifications,"  or  "  dispo- 
sitions "  wrought  in  the  mind,  the  persistence  of  the  effect  of 
the  former  mental  act  in  the  mind,  and  not  merely  in  the 
brain,  is  the  only  means  by  which  we  can  rationally  account 
for  the  subsequent  identification  of  the  present  with  the  past 
experience. 

Reminiscence.  —  Besides  recognition,  however, 
the  special  form  of  active  or  voluntary  memory  termed 
recollection,  or  reminiscence,  refutes  the  materialistic  hypo- 
thesis. In  this  operation  the  mind  controls  and  directs 
the  course  of  its  ideas.  The  process  involves  reflexion, 
comparison,  and  active  intellectual  cognizance  of  rela- 
tions, whilst  the  free  acceptance  or  rejection  of  selected 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION.  lay 


lines  of  thought  constitutes  its  most  essential  feature. 
Now,  at  the  very  most,  the  purely  ph3'sical  theory 
might  account  for  the  awakening  of  representations  ot 
former  experiences  by  the  accidental  action  of  some 
external  stimulus  which  sets  the  group  of  nerves  engaged 
vibrating  in  tlie  old  way.  But  if  there  be  no  such 
external  stimulus  how  is  the  recollection  to  be  ex- 
plained ?  Undoubtedly,  faint  sense  impressions  coming 
from  without  sometimes  resuscitate  involuntary  memo- 
ries, but  our  every-day  life  assures  us  that  long  past 
occurrences  are  also  deliberately  recalled  by  the  mind 
itself.  It  tells  us  that  we  can  employ  the  laws  of 
association  to  reproduce  at  choice  special  series  of 
events,  and  that  according  as  they  arise  we  can  again 
select  particular  individuals  from  these  series  to  form 
new  starting-points.  But  clearly  the  mere  persistence 
of  modifications  in  the  cellular  substance  of  the  brain 
could  not  account  for  this  operation. 

It  has  been  well  said  :  '*  The  sensory'cell  is  not  self- 
acting  ;  it  does  not  of  itself  originate  sensation.  .  .  . 
And  if  it  be  not,  we  need,  in  default  of  impulse  from 
without,  impulse  from  an  inner  sphere  of  experience, 
where  intellectual  activity  proceeds  under  laws  quite 
different  from  those  which  apply  in  connection  with 
purely  sensor}^  action."^ 

Intellectual  and  sensuous  memory. — This  third  element  of 
memory  involved  in  the  act  of  recognition  introduces  us  to 
the  question :  Is  memory  a  sensuous  or  an  intellectual  faculty? 
Although  recollection  in  man  commonly  involves  intellectual 
activity,  we  have  discussed  memory  here  along  with  the 
sensuous  powers  of  the  mind  because  a  1  ige  portion  of  the 
phenomena  of  this  faculty  do  not  transcend  the  order  of 
sensuous  life  ;  and  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  mere 
increase  in  refinement  or  complexity  should  not  cause  sense 
to  be  confounded  with  intellect,  a  mistake  which  is  so  often 
made  in  English  philosophical  literature. 

Dr.  Bain,  for  instance,  of  his  large  volume  on  The  Senses 
and  the  Intellect,  devotes  the  half  entitled  Intellect  to  expounding 
the  association  of  mental  states.  Now,  in  our  view,  this  is  in 
the  main  what  intellect  is  not.  The  laws  of  suggestion  or 
association  are  best  exhibited  in  the  purely  automatic  working 

^  Calderwood,  The  Relations  of  Mind  and  Brain,  p.  2S2. 


198  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


of  reproduction,  and  they  account  for  the  various  operations 
of  animal  consciousness ;  but  they  are  in  no  way  character- 
istic manifestations  of  the  superior  rational  activity  which 
constitutes  intellect,  though  of  course  cognitions  of  an  intel- 
lectual order  may  suggest  each  other. 

Neither  the  acquisition,  nor  the  retention  of  sensuous 
impressions,  nor  even  their  automatic  reproduction  under  the 
laws  of  suggestion,  exceeds  the  range  of  sense.  Nay,  there 
is  nothing  incompatible  with  the  nature  of  an  exclusively 
sentient  mind  in  the  presence  of  a  feeling  that  a  revived 
image  is  familiar  or  has  been  presented  to  us  before.  A  man 
whose  intellectual  activity  is  completely  absorbed  in  some 
abstract  train  of  thought  may  make  a  complicated  journey 
through  a  city,  or  perform  any  other  familiar  mechanical 
operation,  guided  by  sensuous  memory  and  the  hardly  noticed 
impressions  of  various  well-known  objects.  But  besides  such 
processes  as  these,  man  can  acquire,  retain,  and  reproduce 
rational  cognitions ;  he  can  recall  past  acts,  sensuous  or 
rational ;  he  can  formally  or  explicitly  compare  the  present 
representation  with  the  past  experience,  and  recognize  identity 
or  difference  between  them ;  he  can  form  the  notion  of  time ; 
and  he  can  by  a  reflective  process  of  reminiscence  localize  an 
occurrence  at  a  determined  date  in  the  past.  In  all  these 
operations  intellect  is  essentially  implied,  and  consequently 
v/e  must  admit  a  rational  as  well  as  a  sensuous  memory. 

Scholastic  controversy. — There  has  been  much  subtle 
discussion  among  the  schoolmen  as  to  the  forms  and  modes 
of  memory  which  are  to  be  deemed  sensuous  or  intellectual. 
St.  Thomas,  in  a  well-known  passage^°  says:  "  Cognoscere 
praeteritum  ut  prcEteritnm  est  sensus,"  but  the  "  ut  preteritum  " 
may  have  more  than  one  signification.  Suarez  maintains  that 
"  intellectus  rem  cognoscit  cum  affectionibus  sen  conditioni- 
bus  singularibus  perfectius  multo  quam  sensus  ;  "  also  that 
"  Sensus  novit  praeteritum  tantum  materialiter,  intellectus 
vero  formaliter."  Amongst  recent  text  -  books  of  note, 
Lahousse  asserts,  "  Absurdum  est  (dicere)  memoriae  sensitivae 
proprium  esse  apprehendere  prcetevitum  detevminatum,  iiti  est 
pycdievitiim,'"  and  he  urges,  "  Ens  prassens  non  apprehenditur 
a  sensu  tanquam  prassens ;  apprehendi  enim  deberet  ratio 
praesentiae  ut  sic,  quae  ratio  abstracta  non  attingitur  a  sensu." 
Sanseverino  defends  a  somewhat  different  view.  St.  Thomas 
appears  at  times  to  say  that  past  events  are  cognized  as  past 
per  se  by  sense,  and  only  per  accidens  by  intellect ;  elsewhere, 
however,  he  explicitly  distinguishes  between  the  remembrance 
of  a  past  object  and  of  the  percipient  act  by  which  it  was 
apprehended.  The  memory  of  the  former  he  considers  as 
^0  Qu.  Disp.  de  Vevit.  q.  x.  a.  2,  c. 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION.  199 


per  se  sensuous,  though  per  accidens  it  may  belong  to  intellect. 
The  proper  object  per  se  of  intellect  is  the  essence  or  nature 
of  things  without  reference  to  present,  past,  or  future.  Time 
is  a  particular  determination  merely  incidental  to  an  object, 
and  is  apprehended  by  the  universal  faculty  only  indirectly 
through  reflexion.  As  regards  a  previous  percipient  act, 
however,  it  can  be  known  as  past  by  the  intellect  not  merely 
thus  per  accidens,  but  per  se.  Still  even  here  the  definite 
chronological  situation,  like  every  other  individual  determina- 
tion, is  only  indirectly  apprehended  by  intellect  through 
reflexion,  and  is  accordingly  merely  per  accidens  the  object  of 
that  faculty.  St.  Thomas  thus  seems  to  teach  that  the 
occurrence  of  a  sensuous  impression  of  an  object  may  carry 
with  it  the  feeling  that  this  object  has  been  apprehended 
before,  and  this  feeling  may  even  refer  the  occurrence  to  a 
definite  point  of  the  previous  time  series,  just  as  an  external 
sense  may  localize  a  body  in  space.  The  formal  recognition, 
however,  of  agreement  between  a  present  representation  and 
a  past  object  or  state  must,  on  St.  Thomas'  principles,  be 
deemed  an  act  of  intellect.  This  is  the  feature  of  memory 
most  in  Suarez'  mind,  and  Dr.  Gutberlet  would  apparently 
account  for  some  of  the  differences  of  opinion  on  the  subject 
by  the  term  "  memory  "  being  used  by  other  writers  mainly 
to  signify  reproduction  apart  from  recognition.  The  reader 
wishing  to  study  the  question  at  length  may  consult  St. Thomas, 
Sum.  i.  q.  79.  a.  6,  Qu.  Disp.  de  Verit,  q.  x.  a.  3,  c,  and  De  Mem. 
et  Rem.  1.  2  ;  Suarez,  De  Anima,  IV.  c.  x. ;  Lahousse,  Psych.  III. 
c.  X.  a.  5  ;  Sanseverino,  Dynam.  c.  vi.  a.  2 ;  Liberatore,  Psych. 
c.  i.  a.  7  ;  and  Gutberlet,  op.  cit.  p.  108. 

Qualities  of  good  memory. — The  estimation  of 
time,  the  localization  of  events  in  the  past,  expectation 
and  some  other  operations  connected  with  memory,  will 
be  more  conveniently  treated  in  a  future  chapter.  But 
we  may  add  a  word  here  on  the  qualities  of  a  good 
memory  and  the  aim  of  the  teacher  with  respect  to  this 
faculty.  Excellence  of  memor}^  is  measured  by  facility 
of  acquisition,  tenacity,  and  readiness  of  reproduction. 
These  properties  frequently  exist  in  the  same  person  in 
inverse  degrees  of  excellence.  The  lawyer  and  the 
actor  attain  great  perfection  in  the  rapidity  with  which 
they  can  commit  to  memory  the  facts  of  a  new  case  or 
a  part  in  a  new  play,  but  in  a  short  time  the  whole 
subject  is  again  erased  from  the  mind.  The  capacity 
of   memory  varies  much   in  different  individuals,  and 


200  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


history  affords  us  many  examples  of  powers  that  seem 
to  the  ordinary  mind  marvellous. 

Thus  Ben  Jonson,  it  is  alleged,  could  repeat  all  that 
he  had  ever  written,  and  most  of  what  he  had  said. 
Scaliger  learned  by  heart  the  Iliad  and  Odyssey  in  three 
weeks,  and  the  whole  of  the  Greek  poets  in  three 
months.  Pascal,  it  is  said,  could  remember  anything 
he  had  ever  thought.  Lord  Macaulay  could  after  a 
single  attentive  perusal  reproduce  several  pages  of  a 
book,  and  discovered  by  accident  that  he  could  repeat 
the  whole  of  Paradise  Lost.  Cardinal  Mezzoffanti  knew 
forty-eight  different  languages  and  many  dialects. ^^ 

Training  of  the  memory  forms  an  important  part 
of  the  first  stages  of  all  systems  of  education.  The 
teacher  must  here  carefully  distinguish  between  instruc- 
tion or  the  storing  the  mind  with  useful  information  and 
education  proper  or  the  development  of  mental  facult}'. 
Accordingly,  although  many  of  the  earlier  educational 
exercises  aim  primarily  at  the  acquisition  of  certain 
necessary  items  of  knowledge  such  as  the  alphabet, 
parts  of  speech,  meanings  of  words,  tables  and  the  like, 
which  must  be  learned  by  sheer  force  of  repetition, 
nevertheless  the  teacher's  chief  aim  must  be  to  cultivate 
in  the  pupil  a  habit  of  judicious,  not  ot  mere  mechanical 
memory.  That  is,  he  must  accustom  the  child  to 
exercise  remembrance  by  means  of  the  internal  or 
rational  connexion  of  ideas  rather  than  by  mere  conti- 
guous association.  He  must  see  that  the  subject-matter 
is  understood  and  not  merely  reproduced  hy  rote.  Further, 
he  should  profit  by  the  teaching  of  physiology  and 
psychology:  (i)  to  avoid  over-estimating  the  feeble 
powers  of  the  very  young ;  (2)  to  allot  the  period  when 
the  brain  is  physically  in  the  best  condition  for  the 
work  of  learning  by  heart ;  (3)  to  exercise  the  mind  in 
frequent  repetition  at  short  intervals  in  order  to  deepen 
the  first  impression  before  it  has  faded  away.^- 

11  Cf.  Hamilton,  Metaph.  ii.  pp.  225 — 227. 

^2  St. Thomas'  rules  for  the  cultivation  of  memory  are  a  practical 
embodiment  of  the  Laws  of  Suggestion  and  admirably  adapted  to  the 
development  of  judicious  memory.  They  are  thus  well  summarized 
in  B.  Boedder's  Psych.  Rat.  §  249: — I.  {Similarity).  Similitudinibus 
convenientibus  minus  consuetis  res  abstractas  tibi  declara.    II.  {Conti- 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION.  201 


Hisk)rical  Sketch. — The  phrase,  Association  of  Ideas,  has 
played  such  an  important  part  in  the  history  of  Enghsh 
Philosophy  that  it  appears  to  us  advisable  to  make  a  few 
additional  remarks  on  the  subject.  The  reality  of  association 
as  a  principle  governing  the  faculty  of  recollection  is  undeni- 
able, and  has  been  recognized  by  philosophers  from  the  time 
of  Aristotle.  In  the  light,  however,  of  a  hypothesis  put 
forward  to  account  for  certain  peculiar  intellectual  states,  it 
seems  to  have  been  first  advocated  in  this  country  by  Hobbes, 
and  later  on  with  far  greater  ingenuity  by  Hume.  It  is  in  this 
second  sense  that  Associationism  has  become  the  central 
tenet  of  the  English  school  of  thinkers  which  has  thence 
received  its  title.^^ 

Mental  Association,  as  the  universal  condition  of  memory, 
was  distinctly  expounded  and  reduced  to  the  three  general 
laws  of  similarity,  contrast,  and  propinquity  in  time,  space,  or 
some  extrinsic  relation,  by  Aristotle.  In  a  very  erudite 
article,!*  Hamilton  vindicates  for  the  Greek  philosopher  the 
honour  of  having  first  discovered  and  formulated  these  laws. 
We  can  only  afford  to  cite  a  few  sentences  freely  translated 
by  Hamilton,  but  the  whole  chapter  of  the  De  Memoria  et 
Reminiscentia  dealing  with  the  subject  is  well  worthy  of  study. 
"Reminiscence,"  says  Aristotle,  "takes  place  in  virtue  ot 
that  constitution  of  our  mind,  whereby  each  mental  movement 
(modification)  is  determined  to  arise  as  the  sequel  of  a  certain 
other.  .  .  .  When,  therefore,  we  accomplish  an  act  of  remi- 
niscence, we  pass  through  a  certain  series  of  precursive 
movements,  until  we  arrive  at  a  movement  on  which  the  one 
we  are  in  quest  of  is  habitually  consequent.  Hence,  too,  it  s 
that  we  hunt  through  the  mental  train  excogitating  what  we 
seek  from  (its  concomitant  in)  the  present  or  some  other  {time), 
and  from  its  similar  or  contrary  or  coadjacent.  Through  this 
process  reminiscence  is  effected,  for  the  movements  {i.e., 
mental  modifications)  are  in  these  cases  sometimes  the  same, 
sometimes  at  the  same  time,  sometimes  parts  of  the  same  whole, 
so  that  (starting  thus)  the  subsequent  movement  is  already 
more  than  half  accomplished."  ^^ 

St.  Thomas,  in  his  Commentaries,  developes  the  doctrine  of 
Aristotle  in  a  manner  which  exhibits  close  study  of  the  nature 
of  mental  association.     The  ultimate  cause  of  remembrance, 

gtiity).  Cum  ordine  dispone  quae  memoria  tenere  cupis.  III.  {Attention). 
Sollicite  et  nun  affectu  addisce,  qua?  cupis  rememorari.  IV.  (Repetition). 
Quae  rememorari  tua  multum  interest  ea  frequenter  meditare.  {Sum. 
2a  2ae,  q.  49.  a.  i.  ad  2.) 

^3  On  this  distinction,  cf.  "  Mental  Association,"  by  Croom 
Robertson,  En  eye.  Brit. 

1"  On  Reid,  note  D**.  i"  On  Reid,  pp.  899,  900. 


202  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


he  repeats,  lies  in  the  native  tendency  of  the  mind  to 
reproduce  representations  in  the  order  of  the  original  impres- 
sions.^*' He  then  passes  on  to  amphfy  Aristotle's  treatment 
of  the  mode  of  reminiscence,  and  to  expound  more  fully  the 
general  laws  governing  reproduction.  The  process  of  recollec- 
tion may  advance,  he  observes,  along  a  time  series  of  events, 
from  the  recent  to  the  most  distant,  and  vice  versa  ;  or  starting 
from  a  known  object  it  may  be  guided  by  any  of  the  three 
indicated  relations.  At  times  remembrance  is  awakened  by 
force  of  similarity,  as  when  thinking  of  Socrates  we  are 
reminded  of  Plato,  who  resembled  him  in  wisdom.  At  other 
times  the  bond  of  connexion  is  contrariety,  as  when  the 
thought  of  Hector  recalls  that  of  his  opponent  Achilles. 
Finally,  the  third  principle  of  suggestion  is  vicinity  in  space, 
or  time,  or  some  other  form  of  propinquity.  After  illustrating 
by  examples  these  three  general  laws,  he  goes  on  to  indicate 
in  a  much  clearer  manner  than  Aristotle  their  further  analysis 
and  reduction :  In  all  three  forms  of  suggestion  the  ultimate 
ground  of  reminiscence  lies  in  the  connexion  of  the  previous 
"movements"  of  the  soul.  Association  by  similarity  is  due 
to  identity  in  mental  modification  subsisting  between  the 
similar  experiences.  Contrast  is  based  upon  the  simultaneity 
of  the  two  terms  in  apprehension.  Local  propinquity  and 
other  modes  of  contiguity  are  merely  cases  of  partial  similarity; 
impressions  produced  by  adjacent  objects  overlap,  and  the 
common  part  in  the  revived  state  reproduces  its  ancient 
collateral  features.^''     We  have  thus  co-identity  in  nature  and 

^^  "  Causa  autem  reminiscendi  est  ordo  motuum,  qui  relinquuntur 
in  anima  ex  prima  impressione  ejus,  quod  primo  apprehendimus  .  .  . 
reminiscentias  contingunt  per  hoc  quod  unus  motus  natus  est  post 
alium  nobis  occurrere."  [Ibid.) 

^■^  "  Hoc  autem  primum,  a  quo  reminiscens  suam  inquisitionem 
incipit,  quandoque  quidem  est  tempus  aliquod  notum,  quandoque  res 
aliqiia  nota.  (i)  Secundum  tempus  quidem  incipit  quandoque  a  nunc, 
id  est  a  prcesenti  tempore,  procedendo  in  prseteritum,  cujus  quaerit, 
memoriam.  .  .  .  Quandoque  vero  incipit  ab  aliquo  alio  tempore  .  .  . 
et  procedit  descendendo.  ...  (2)  Similiter  etiam  quandoque  remi- 
niscitur  aliquis  incipiens  ab  aliqua  re  cujus  memoratur,  a  qua 
procedit  ad  aliam,  triplici  ratione  :  {a)  Quandoque  quidem  ratione 
similitudinis :  sicut  quando  aliquid  aliquis  memoratur  de  Socrate,  et 
per  hoc  occurit  ei  Plato,  qui  est  similis  ei  in  sapientia.  {h)  Quan- 
doque vero  ratione  contrarietatis;  sicut  si  aliquis  memoretur  Hectoris,  et 
per  hoc  occurrit  ei  Achilles,  [c)  Quandoque  vero  ratione propinquitatis 
cujuscunque :  sicut  cum  aliquis  est  memor  patris,  ei  per  hoc  occurrit 
ei  filius.  Et  eadem  ratio  est  de  quacunque  alia  propinqiiitate,  vet 
societatis,  vel  loci,  vel  temporis ;  et  propter  hoc  fit  reminiscentia,  q^da 
motus  horiim  se  invicem  conscquuntitr.  [a)  Quorundam  enim  prae- 
missorum  motus  sunt  idem,  sicut  prsecipue  similium ;  {d)  quorundam 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION.  203 


in  time,  or  what  Hamilton  calls  the  laws  of  direct  and  of 
indirect  remembrance,  laid  down  by  St,  Thomas  as  the  two 
general  principles  of  association.  Accordingly,  notwith- 
standing the  contempt  which  writers  of  the  Associationist 
school  have  invariably  exhibited  towards  the  schoolmen,  we 
find  in  these  terse  remarks  of  St,  Thomas,  now  over  six 
hundred  years  old,  a  statement  and  analysis  of  the  Laws  of 
Association  virtually  as  complete  and  exhaustive  as  that  given 
by  any  psychologist  from  Hobbes  to  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer. 

Of  the  later  scholastics,  Vives  goes  most  fully  into  the 
treatment  of  this  subject,  and  it  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say 
that  there  is  no  form  of  association  viewed  as  a  condition  of 
memory  which  he  has  not  expounded  and  illustrated,^^ 

The  chief  interest,  however,  in  the  history  of  the  doctrine 
of  mental  association  centres  in  modern  psychology ;  and  it 
is  there  that  we  find  association  advocated  not  only  as  a 
general  condition  of  reproductive  memory,  but  also  as  a 
philosophic  principle  adequate  to  explain  the  constitution  of 
numerous  important  mental  states.  Locke,  in  the  Essay,  in 
1685,  contributed  the  phrase  Association  of  Ideas,  as  the  title 
of  a  chapter  dealing  with  peculiarities  of  character,  but  did 
little  more  on  the  subject.  Hobbes  had  previously  made 
occasional  observations  on  the  power  of  association,  but  it  is 
clear  from  the  terms  and  phrases  which  he  employs,  that,  in 
spite  of  his  vigorously  expressed  contempt  for  the  schoolmen, 
he  silently  borrowed  from  them  on  this  topic. 

In  this  country,  nevertheless,  it  was  not  till  Berkeley's 
writings  appeared  (1709 — 13),  and  still  more  decidedly  in 
Hume's  Essay  on  Human  Nature  (1728),  that  mental  association 
was  insisted  on  as  a  virtually  omnipotent  principle  in  the 
genesis  of  knowledge.  But  on  the  Continent,  already  in  the 
middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  Pascal,  and  after  him 
Malebranche,  had  indicated  the  extensive  influence  of  mental 
association  ;  and  even  Condillac  was  as  early  as  Hartley,  who 

autem  simid,  scilicet  contrarioriim,  quia  cognito  uno  contrariorum 
simul  cognoscitur  aliud  ;  {c)  quandoque  vero  quidam  motus  habent 
partem  aliorum,  sicut  contingit  in  quibuscunque  propinquis,  quia  in 
unoquoque  propinquorum  consideratur  aliquid  quod  pertinet  ad 
alterum,  et  ideo,  illud  residuum,  quod  deest  apprehensioni,  cum  sit 
parvum,  consequitur  motum  prioris,  ut  apprehenso  prime  consequenter 
occurrat  apprehensioni  secundum."  (St.  Thomas,  De  Mem.  1.  v.) 

^^  Cf.  Vives,  De  Anima,  Lib.  II.  c.  De  Mem.  et  Rem.  We  have 
not  space  to  quote,  but  the  reader  will  find  a  number  of  passages 
cited  from  him  in  Hamilton's  Notes  on  Keid,  pp.  892,  893,  896,  898, 
902,  qo8.  A  very  little  study  even  of  these  extracts  will  show  how 
familiar  to  scholastic  philosophers  were  many  of  the  supposed 
discoveries  of  Hobbes,  Hume,  and  later  associationalist  writers. 


104  SENSUOUS  LITE. 


is  the  recognized  founder  of  the  Associationahst  school  in  this 
country.  In  his  Observations  on  Man  (1748),  in  connexion  with 
a  theory  of  neural  vibrations,  Hartley  expounded  a  system 
of  mechanical  association,  in  which  imagination,  memory, 
judgment,  reasoning,  emotions,  and  passions,  are  all  reduced 
to  associations  of  sensations.  Later  on  in  the  century, 
Associationism  was  advocated  by  Tucker  in  the  science  of 
Ethics,  and  by  Alison  in  the  sphere  of  /Esthetics.  Approval 
and  remorse,  good  and  evil,  beauty  and  ugliness,  were  all 
analyzed  into  pleasant  and  painful  sensations  associated  in 
experience  with  certain  actions  and  objects. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  present  century  James  Mill,  in 
h.\s,  Analysis  of  the  Phenomena  of  the  Human  Mind  (1829),  re- 
expounded  the  doctrines  of  Hartley  and  Hume,  and  may  be 
styled  the  second  founder  of  the  school.  Sensations,  and 
ideas,  which  are  merely  faint  reverberations  of  defunct  sensa- 
tions, worked  up  in  various  ways  by  force  of  association,  and 
especially  by  that  form  of  suggestion  included  under  the  laiv 
of  indissoluble  association,  account  for  the  sum-total  of  our 
mental  possessions.  Sensations  or  ideas,  repeatedly  recurring 
together  or  in  close  succession,  and  never  apart,  tend  to 
combine  in  such  an  indissoluble  or  inseparable  manner  that  one 
necessarily  or  irresistibly  suggests  the  other.^'^     By  a  species 

^^  The  terms  indissoluble  and  inseparable  are  defective  even  as 
expressions  of  the  associationist  view.  It  is  not  maintained  that  the 
associated  states  are  absolutely  inseparable,  since  a  reversal  of 
previous  experience  is  always  possible.  The  lai;i  of  irresistible 
suggestion,  advocated  as  a  better  title  by  Mr.  Murray,  would  be  a 
less  objectionable  phrase  to  indicate  the  element  of  truth  contained 
in  the  doctrine.  The  powerful  influence  of  continuous  association 
is  indisputable,  and  the  acquired  perceptions  of  the  senses  which  we 
have  discussed  in  an  earlier  chapter  illustrate  its  action  ;  but  mere 
association  is  utterly  unable  to  account  for  the  unity  of  the  mind, 
or  for  the  necessity  of  mathematical  or  metaphysical  truths.  The 
phrase,  mental  chemistry,  is  also  inappropriate  and  misleading.  The 
chief  forms  of  mental  action  to  which  this  name  has  been  applied 
are :  (a)  The  asserted  subjective  creation  of  an  imaginary  material 
world  by  the  agglutination,  solidification,  and  externalization  of 
sensations  and  ideas ;  {b)  the  production  of  the  alleged  illusory 
necessity  pertaining  to  certain  judgments,  e.g.,  mathematical  axioms. 

(a)  Now,  subjective  feelings  do  not  solidify  or  crystallize  into  a 
simulated  material  object.  The  true  process,  as  we  have  shown  in 
chapter  vii.,  is  one  of  growth  in  the  perfection  of  our  knowledge  of 
real  things.  Successive  sensations  reveal  new  qualities  of  the  object, 
and  gradually  elaborate  cognition.  The  object,  vaguely  and  obscurely 
apprehended  in  the  primitive  tactual  or  visual  sensation,  receives 
more    complete   determination    by    each    subsequent    impression. 

(b)  That  necessary  judgments  cannot  be  a  result  of  association  will 
be  shown  in  a  future  chapter. 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION.  205 


of  *' mental  chemistry"  the  contiguous  states  fuse  or  combine, 
so  as  to  generate  products  utterly  unlike  the  constituent 
elements.  The  visual  appearances  of  objects  come  thus  to 
suggest  irresistibly  their  distance,  and  we  imagine  we  see  an 
object  to  be  hard,  soft,  hot,  cold,  rough,  or  smooth.  By  this 
means  are  created  such  universal  illusions,  as  the  necessity 
of  mathematical  judgments,  the  unity  of  the  mind,  and  the 
externality  and  permanence  of  a  material  world. 

John  Stuart  Mill  and  Dr.  Bain  develope  the  same  principles, 
and  enrich  their  treatment  with  numerous  ingenious  illus- 
trations. The  effect  of  hostile  criticism  from  various  stand- 
points has  been  to  modify  very  considerably  the  treatment 
of  Psychology  by  the  more  recent  representatives  of  associa- 
tionism.  Dr.  Bain's  chief  contribution  to  the  resources  of 
the  school  was  the  allotment  to  the  mind  of  a  reservoir  of 
spontaneous  activity  continually  fed  by  the  accumulation 
of  superfluous  muscular  energy.  By  judicious  management 
of  this  new  fund,  many  deficits  in  the  sensist  theory  of  both 
the  cognitive  and  volitional  departments  of  mental  life  could, 
it  was  believed,  be  made  good. 

In  still  greater  contrast  to  the  views  of  James  Mill  and  the 
earlier  writers  of  the  school,  is  the  exposition  of  the  Associ- 
ationist  system  offered  by  Mr.  Sully  in  his  Outlines  of  Psycho- 
logy. (Cf.  cc.  ix.  X.)  The  old  doctrine  of  a  purely  pa.ssive  mind, 
wherein  sensations  through  a  process  of  agglutination  coalesce 
into  all  kinds  of  intellectual  products,  is  virtually  aban  cned, 
and  instead  we  have  ascribed  to  the  mind  active  powers  of 
attention,  comparison,  and  judgment.  This  last  act,  too,  is 
not,  as  with  Mr.  Bain,  the  "  fact  of  similarity  or  dissimi- 
larity" — the  capability  of  experiencing  like  or  unlike  feelings 
— but  the  intellectual  faculty  of  cognizing  this  relation  of 
likeness  or  unlikeness.  These  considerable  improvements, 
which  bring  the  sensist  theory  of  mental  life  more  into 
harmony  with  the  results  of  actual  observation,  and  help  to 
obviate  some  of  the  most  telling  objections  urged  against  the 
unreformed  doctrine,  are,  on  the  other  hand,  very  dearly 
purchased  from  a  logical  point  of  view.  It  is  difficult  to  see 
how  the  fundamental  article  of  the  Sensist  school — the  tenet 
that  the  mind  is  nothing  more  than  a  cluster  or  series  of 
feelings — can  be  harmonized  with  the  imported  doctrine, 
which  attributes  to  this  "mind"  the  active  power  of  dis- 
criminating, combining,  and  organizing  these  states.  The 
truth  is,  the  best  part  of  Mr.  Sully's  description  of  mental 
operations  belongs  to  an  alien  conception  of  the  mind,  and 
is  not  easy  to  reconcile  with  his  general  position  as  a  sensist 
philosopher.  The  elder  Mill,  Condillac,  and  the  other  earlier 
advocates  of  Sensism,  possessed  at  least  the  merit  of  under- 


2o6  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


standing  and  frankly  attempting  to  face  the  real  problem  for 
their  school.  Postulating  only  .those  assumptions  which  were 
legitimate  to  them,  they  sought  to  explain  how,  out  of  sense 
impressions  passively  received  from  without,  our  illusory 
belief  in  a  permanent  human  mind,  as  well  as  in  a  material 
world,  could  be  produced.  The  result  was,  as  is  virtually 
admitted  by  their  descendants,  a  miserable  caricature  of  the 
observed  facts.  The  modern  representative  of  the  school, 
while  accepting  their  fundamental  doctrine  that  the  mind  is 
nothing  but  an  aggregate  or  series  of  feelings  externally 
awakened,  nevertheless  ascribes  to  this  mind  inherent  activity. 
Such  a  procedure,  however,  as  was  felt,  I  believe,  by 
the  earlier  associationists,  is  incompatible  with  the  essential 
principles  of  their  system. 

Obliviscence. — From  the  laws  of  memory  the  general 
conditions  of  forgetfulness  can  be  easily  deduced.  The 
converse  of  the  primary  laws  of  suggestion  may  be  formulated 
in  the  statement  that  events  unconnected  by  either  similarity  or 
contiguity  with  present  mental  states  usually  lie  beyond  the  sphere 
of  recall.  The  correlative  of  the  secondary  law  is  expressed 
in  the  proposition  that  the  tendency  of  an  experience  to  lapse  out 
of  memory  is  in  proportion  to  the  feebleness  of  the  original  impres- 
sion and  the  infrequency  of  its  repetition.  The  third  law  of 
obliviscence  enunciates  the  general  fact,  that  a  mental  impres- 
sion becomes  obliterated  in  proportion  to  the  length  of  time,  and  the 
number  and  vivacity  of  the  other  mental  states  which  have  inter- 
vened since  its  last  occurrence  or  reproduction. 

The  phrase,  Law  of  Obliviscence,  is  also  employed  by 
J.  S.  Mill  to  describe  an  important  element  in  the  law  of 
"  inseparable"  association,  viz.,  the  general  fact  that  "when 
a  number  of  ideas  suggest  one  another  by  association  with 
such  certainty  and  rapidity  as  to  coalesce  together  in  a  group 
all  the  members  of  the  group  which  remain  long  without 
being  attended  to  have  a  tendency  to  drop  out  of  conscious- 
ness."^^ The  evanescence  of  the  separate  letters  and  words 
of  a  printed  page  leaving  us  in  possession  only  of  its  general 
purport  is  the  favourite  illustration.  The  phenomenon  is 
merely  an  instance  of  the  law  of  inattention.  The  amount 
of  mental  energy,  and  consequently  the  depth  of  the  impres- 
sion, devoted  to  the  individual  units  is  reduced  to  a  minimum, 
as  the  whole  force  of  our  thought  is  concentrated  on  the 
meaning  of  the  entire  paragraph. 

Readings. — On  Memory,  of  St.  Thomas,  Comm.  in  Arist.  De  Mem. 
et  Reminisc:  also  Sum.  i.  q.  79.  a.  6  and  7  ;  Suarez,  De  Anima,  Lib.  IV. 
c.  10;  Hamilton,  Metaphysics,  Lect.  xxx.  xxxi. ;    Carpenter,  Mental 

^^  Exam.  c.  xiv.  p.  259. 


MENTAL   ASSOCIATION.  207 


Physiology,  c.  x.  On  the  Physiology  of  Memory,  cf.  Carpenter,  op.  cit. 
pp.  436—448  ;  Ladd,  op.  cit.  Ft.  II.  c.  10,  §§  15 — 21  ;  Farges,  Le 
Cerveau  et  VAme,  pp.  322—328,  Some  good  remarks  on  the 
Materialist  theory  are  to  be  found  in  Professor  Calderwood's 
Relations  of  Mind  and  Brain,  pp.  272 — 84.  On  Mental  Association, 
cf.  Hamilton,  On  Reid,  notes  D**,  D***.  On  the  Validity  of 
Memory,  J.  Rickaby,  First  Principles,  Pt.  II.  c.  vi.  On  Memory 
and  Empiricism,  cf.  Ward,  Philosophy  of  Theism,  pp.  xiv. — xvii.  and 
64 — 67.  For  a  collection  of  curious  anecdotes  illustrating  various 
aspects  of  those  faculties,  see  Abercrombie  On  the  Intellectual  Powers, 
Pt.  III.  sect.  I. 


I 


CHAPTER    X. 

SENSUOUS    APPETITE    AND    MOVEMENT, 

Sensuous  Appetency.— In  our  classification  of 
mental  activities  we  have  marked  off  as  standing  in 
strongest  opposition  to  the  cognitive  operations  of 
the  mind  the  class  of  states  embracing  appetites, 
desires,  impulses,  volitions,  emotions,  and  the  like. 
There  is  no  accepted  English  term  which  accurately 
expresses  what  is  common  to  them  all.  The  desig- 
nation active  powers,  employed  by  Reid  and  Stewart, 
ought  obviously  to  include  the  intellect.  Orectic 
faculty — the  literal  transcription  of  the  Aristotelian 
term — is  too  unfamiliar.  Hamilton  gave  currency 
to  the  epithet  conativCf  which  emphasizes  the  idea 
of  effort  prominent  in  some  of  these  acts ;  whilst 
others  prefer  the  title  appetitive  faculty.  These  two 
last  names  seem  to  us  on  the  whole  exposed  to 
fewest  objections  ;  however,  it  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  phenomena  of  appetency  include  not 
only  states  of  yearning  for  absent  pleasures,  but  also 
the  enjoyment  of  gratifications  attained. 

Appetite. — The  term  appetite  was  used  in  a  very  wide 
sense  by  mediaeval  writers  to  denote  all  forms  of  internal 
inclination,  comprehending  alike  the  natural  tendencies  or 
affinities  {appetiius  iiaitiratis)  of  plants  and  inorganic  sub- 
stances, which  impel  them  towards  what  is  suitable  to  their 
nature,  and  the  feelings  of  conscious  attraction  (appetiius 
elicitus)  in  sentient  and  rational  beings.     The  formal  object 


SENSUOUS  APPETITE   AND   MOVEMENT.  209 


of  the  appetitive  faculty  in  this  broad  signification  is  the  good. 
Under  the  good  is  comprised,  not  merely  the  pleasant,  but 
everything  in  any  fashion  convenient  to  the  nature  of  the 
being  thus  attracted.  Continued  existence,  fehcity,  develop- 
ment, and  perfection,  together  with  whatever  is  apparently 
conducive  to  these  ends,  are  all  in  so  far  good,  and  conse- 
quently a  possible  object  of  appetency ;  whilst  whatever  is 
repugnant  to  them  is  a  mode  of  evil,  and  therefore  a  ground 
for  aversion  or  the  negative  activity  of  the  same  faculty. 

Of  conscious  appetite  the  schoolmen  recognized  two  kinds 
as  essentially  distinct — rational  and  sensitive.  The  former 
has  its  source  in  intellectual,  the  latter  in  sensuous,  appre- 
hension. The  two  faculties,  however,  do  not  act  in  isolation; 
desires  and  impulses  in  the  main  sensuous  often  embody 
intellectual  elements,  and  we  therefore  deem  it  best  to 
postpone  the  chief  portion  of  our  treatment  of  appetency  to 
Part  II.  of  the  present  book. 

The  scholastics  also  divided  couative  states  into  appetiius 
cvncupiscibiles  and  appctitiis  ivascibiles.  The  appetitive  side  of 
the  soul  was  investigated  by  mediaeval  writers  mainly  from 
the  standpoint  of  Ethics  or  Moral  Theology.  The  modern 
branch  of  study  known  as  ^Esthetics,  the  analysis  of  the 
mental  states  aroused  by  the  contemplation  of  the  beautiful 
and  the  sublime,  and  the  dissection  of  our  emotions,  which 
take  up  so  much  room  in  psychological  treatises  of  the  present 
day,  found  little  or  no  space  in  their  speculations. 

Modern  writers  commonly  confine  the  term  appetite  to 
certain  organic  cravings.  These  arise  from  the  physical 
condition  of  the  body ;  they  are  mainly  of  a  periodically 
recurrent  character,  and  they  are  essential  to  the  preser- 
vation of  the  individual  or  the  species.  The  chief  forms 
usually  enumerated  are  those  of  hunger,  thirst,  sleep,  exercise, 
and  sex.  All  these  activities  are  of  the  lower  order  of  mental 
life,  and  have  their  source  in  sensation.  Thus  hunger  springs 
from  the  uneasy  feelings  of  the  alimentary  canal  arising  from 
privation  of  the  nutriment  on  which  its  appropriate  functions 
are  exercised.  The  craving  for  sleep  or  physical  activity  is 
similarly  awakened  by  fatigue  or  the  consciousness  of  an 
accumulation  of  surplus  energy.  Besides  these  peculiarly 
organic  appetites  there  are  tendencies  in  all  sentient  beings 
towards  objects  and  actions  in  harmony  with  their  nature  or 
some  part  of  it.  The  appropriate  satisfaction  of  such  incli- 
nations commonly  awakens  pleasure,  whilst  excess  or  defect 
causes  pain,  and  thus  brings  into  play  two  great  protective 
agencies  which  guard  the  life  of  the  individual  and  the  race. 
The  gregarious  instinct,  maternal  affection,  feelings  of  anger, 
jealousy,  and  fear,  may  also  belong  to  the  purely  sensuous 

O 


210  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


order  of  conscious  life  provided  they  contain  no  element  of 
reflective  activity,  and  it  is  in  this  form  they  are  exhibited 
by  lower  animals. 

Movement.  —  Appetency  expresses  itself  in 
motion.  The  tree  pushes  out  its  roots  and  opens 
its  leaves  in  search  of  nutriment.  The  animal, 
stirred  up  by  feeling,  creeps,  walks,  runs,  swims,  or 
flies  in  pursuit  of  its  food.  And  man,  too,  is  con- 
stantly moving  one  or  other  of  his  limbs,  or  organs, 
to  gratify  some  need  or  desire.  In  later  life,  the 
instant  a  volition  is  exerted,  the  appropriate  move- 
ment or  chain  of  movements  necessary  for  its 
satisfaction  follows  with  precision.  Yet  this  has  not 
been  always  so.  We  know  that  our  skill  in  hand- 
writing, cricket,  or  skating,  is  the  outcome  of  many 
unsuccessful  efforts  ;  and  we  have  only  to  watch  a 
child  of  eighteen  months  toddling  from  one  chair  to 
another  to  realize  that  even  our  most  natural  move- 
ments have  been  very  gradually  acquired. 

Voluntary  movement  analyzed. — If  we  analyze 
any  complex  deliberate  action  of  mature  life,  such  as 
tying  our  shoe-lace,  putting  a  book  on  a  shelf,  or  trying 
to  hit  a  ball  at  tennis  or  at  cricket,  we  shall  discover 
that  several  distinct  elements  are  involved.  First,  a 
visual  image  of  the  contemplated  act,  its  extent, 
direction,  and  velocity,  is  formed.  Accompanying  this, 
especially  if  the  operation  be  unusual,  there  is  a  motor 
representation,  a  faint  imaginary  rehearsal  of  the 
movement,  in  which  there  is  an  estimate  taken  of  the 
quantity  and  quality  of  muscular  effort  to  be  employed. 
Finally  there  is,  at  least  in  volitional  acts,  the  Jiaf,  or 
act  of  the  will,  that  discharges  the  motor  energy  into  the 
selected  channels  causing  the  imagined  action  to  be 
realized.  The  Will,  of  course,  does  not  consciously  pick 
out  the  particular  muscles  to  be  exerted.    It  is  only  late 


SENSUOUS  APPETITE  AND   MOVEMENT.  21  r 

I     . . . _ 

in  life  that  the  mind  learns  the  existence  of  such 
muscles.  But  past  experience  has  revealed  to  us 
different  kinds  of  musculav  feelings,  and  the  will  selects 
which  of  these  shall  be  re-exerted.  The  entire  con- 
sciousness arising  out  of  volitional  effort  and  muscular 
strain  has  been  called  the  feeling  of  innervation,  and  there 
is  much  dispute  as  to  its  nature.  Whatever  be  its 
physiological  accompaniments  and  the  ingredients  of 
which  it  is  composed,  it  is  by  controlling  and  varying 
this  innervation  under  the  guidance  of  incoming  sensa- 
tions muscular,  tactual,  and  visual,  that  the  direction, 
range,  and  rapidity  of  the  movement  is  determined. 
But  how  is  this  intelligent  control  of  motor  energy 
evolved  ?  How  does  the  infant  come  to  be  able  to 
select,  not  the  right  muscles,  of  which  it  may  never  know 
anything,  but  the  right  muscular  feelings  to  be  stirred  up 
in  order  to  accomplish  a  particular  complex  operation  ? 
This  is  the  question  of  the  development  of  the  poi^^er  of 
locomotion.  In  order  to  answer  it  we  must  distinguish 
several  kinds  of  movements. 

Automatic  movements. — In  the  first  place  we 
find  that  all  living  animal  organisms  perform  certain 
vital  actions,  independently  of  stimulation  from  without. 
I  The  pulsations  of  the  heart  and  the  circulation  of  the 
^  blood  are  perhaps  the  best  illustrations  of  this  class  of 
movements.  They  are  called  automatic.  They  are  the 
unconscious  outcome  of  the  living  mechanism. 

Reflex  action. — There  is  another  class  of  actions 
which  differ  from  the  former  in  that  they  are  occasioned 
by  peripheral  stimulation.  These  are  movements  in 
response  to  sensory  impressions  without  the  inter- 
vention of  any  conscious  effort — the  involuntary  reflexion 
of  an  afferent  impulse  back  along  an  efferent  nerve, 
e.g.,  winking,  sneezing,  swallowing.  (See  p.  46.)  Such 
movements  are  styled  reflex ;  but  they  often  gradually 
fade  into  the  other  groups,  especially  in  acquired  habits. 
Original  reflex  actions  are  unlearned  and  involuntary, 
though  they  may  sometimes  become  subject  to  the  will, 
as  in  the  act  of  coughing. 

Impulsive  action. — Yet  another  class  of  move- 
ments  are   apparently  common  to   man   with    all    the 


I 


212  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


lower  animals  from  birth.  They  differ  from  automatic 
movements  in  their  irregularit}^,  and  from  reflex  action 
in  seeming  to  be  occasioned  not  by  external  stimulation, 
but  by  internal /^(f/mo'5.  They  are  impulsive  actions,  and 
chiefly  out  of  these  voluntary  movements  are  developed. 

Origin  of  voluntary  movement. — How  then  are  the  first 
impulsive  acts  of  the  infant  converted  into  the  freely  directed 
complex  operations  of  later  life  ?  Broadly  speaking,  two 
theories  prevail  among  modern  psychologists.  Primitive 
impulsive  action  is  of  two  kinds — random  and  instinctive.  One 
theory  derives  all  voluntary  action  from  the  former,  the  other 
insists  on  the  important  part  played  by  the  latter  combined 
with  reflex  movements. 

Theory  of  random  action. — Dr.  Bain  insists  upon  the  exist- 
ence of  a  fund  of  spontaneity  in  the  infant  organism.  There 
are  exhibited,  he  urges,  in  children  and  young  animals 
a  quantity  of  movements  of  an  aimless  character.  Apart 
from  external  stimulation  and  reflex  action,  when  fresh  and 
healthy  the  young  animal  exerts  its  limbs,  and  frisks  and 
gambols  in  a  purposeless  manner.  The  living  engine,  in  fact, 
generates  a  surplus  of  motor  power,  which  tends  to  relieve 
itself  in  action  of  any  kind.  This  is  the  source  of  the  play- 
impulse.  Under  the  so-called  "  Law  of  Self-conservation," 
formulated  in  the  statement  that  pleasure  is  accompanied  with 
heightened  energy,  and  pain  untJi  lowered  energy,  this  original 
haphazard  action  assumes  definite  lines.  Amongst  the  for- 
tuitous movements  some  result  in  a  pleasant  experience,  and 
in  consequence  of  the  heightened  energy  tend  to  sustain 
themselves,  whilst  painful  actions,  by  the  consequent  lowering 
of  activity,  become  suppressed,  "  as  when  an  animal  moving 
up  to  a  fire  encounters  the  scalding  heat  with  its  depressing 
(sic)  influence,  and  therefore  has  its  locomotion  suspended."^: 
By  repetition  the  lucky  movements  become  associated  with ' 
the  pleasure  attained,  and  after  a  time  the  mere  idea  of  this 
pleasure  is  able  by  force  of  this  association  to  excite  the 
appropriate  action  to  obtain  it.  When  this  stage  is  reached 
we  have,  according  to  Dr.  Bsiin,  free  voluntary  control. 

Objections  to  the  theory. — Opponents  object :  (i)  That  both 
the  statement  and  application  by  Bain  of  the  alleged  Law  are 
untenable.  Whilst  pleasure  commonly  awakens  desire  for  a 
renewal  or  continuance  of  an  act,  it  often  tones  down  general 
vitality.  Pains,  on  the  other  hand,  augment  activity.  Punish- 
ment is  a  universally  recognized  means  of  stirring  up  energy ;' 

^  Mental  Science,  p.  80. 


SENSUOUS  APPETITE  AND  MOVEMENT.  213 


whilst  intense  pleasures  are  frequently  exhausting.  (2)  Even 
granting  the  Law,  as  expounded  by  Dr.  Bain,  the  fortuitous 
pleasant  and  painful  experiences  arising  out  of  random  action 
would  be  far  too  few  to  account  for  the  rapidity  of  acquisition, 
and  for  the  complex  character  of  many  of  the  acts  of  ver^ 
early  life  both  in  animals  and  children.  (3)  Further,  instinct,  it 
is  urged,  is  proved  to  be  as  primordial  a  phenomenon  as 
random  action,  and  if  admitted  to  be  a  vera  causa  of  complex 
movements  in  the  lower  animals,  it  is  unscientific  to  reject  it 
as  an  explanation  of  similar  acts  in  man.  (4)  To  us  the  most 
serious  error  is  the  identification  of  voluntary — i.e.,  freely 
willed  movement  with  impulsive  action  merely  moulded  into 
a  definite  shape  by  the  strongest  pleasure.  Complex  move- 
ments of  a  well-trained  dog  are  in  this  view  the  type  of 
voluntary  action.^ 

Theory  of  instinctive  action.— The  opposite  school  insist 
much  on  reflex  action,  and,  since  evolution  and  the  doctrine  of 
heredity  have  become  popular,  still  more  on  instinct  as  contri- 
buting the  chief  materials  towards  the  voluntary  movements 
of  later  Ufe.  Amongst  the  impulsive  actions  both  of  the  lower 
animals  and  of  the  human  infant  are  to  be  found,  they  urge, 
a  multitude  of  movements  which  exhibit  a  striking  uniformity 
or  regularity  throughout  the  species.  They  involve  greater 
complexity  than  in  the  case  of  merely  reflex  action.  They 
manifest  an  unconsciously  purposive  character.  Finally,  they 
are  "  unlearned,''  or  at  least  so  rapidly  acquired  when  the 
organism  is  sufficiently  mature  as  to  be  justly  considered 
innate  habits.  These  constitute  instinctive  actions  properly  so 
called.  Thus  ducklings,  on  leaving  the  nest,  take  to  the 
water  and  swim  ;  young  swallows  fly,  and  chickens,  just  out  of 
the  shell,  peck  at  insects  with  perfect  accuracy.  Similarly, 
young  pigs  just  born  trot  about,  and  calves  and  lambs 
scramble  to  their  legs  after  a  few  failures,  and  find  their 
mother's  udder.^  To  the  human  infant  potentially  endowed 
with  reason,  and  designed  to  be  reared  and  instructed  by 
intelligent  parents,  fewer  definite  instincts  are  allotted  by 
nature  than  to  the  young  animal,  and  nearly  all  these  which 
he  receives  need  a  longer  time  to  develop.  Still,  recently  more 
exact  and  scientific  observation  of  children  has,  it  is  main- 
tained, established  a  sufficient  quantity  of  instinctive  action 
to  account  for  the  growth  of  voluntary  complex  movement. 

The  most  complex  operation  in  the  power  of  the  infant 
possessed  at  birth  is  the  act  of  sucking.     In  addition  to  this 

2  See  Martineau,  A    Study   of  Religion,  Vol.   II.  pp.  206-224; 
Sidgwick,  Methods  of  Ethics,  Bk.  II.  c.  v.  §  4. 

3  For  a   fuller  treatment   of   this  subject   see  the   section  on 
Instinct  in  the  supplementary  chapter  on  Comparative  Psychology. 


£14  3EMSU0US  LIFE. 


there  are  enumerated  as  instinctive  movements,  though  some 
of  them  require  from  three  to  twelve  months  to  manifest 
themselves,  the  actions  of  grasping  and  pointing  at  objects, 
of  carrying  objects  to  the  mouth,  of  biting  and  chewing,  of 
crying  and  smiling,  of  turning  the  head  aside  with  a  frown,  of 
holding  the  head  erect,  of  sitting  up,  of  standing,  of  creeping, 
and  of  walking.  For  many  of  these  the  appropriate  muscles 
and  nerve-centres  need  time  to  mature,  but  when  this  period 
has  arrived,  it  is  maintained,  that  the  impulse  to  creep, 
stand,  or  walk,  shows  itself  with  striking  suddenness,  and  the 
new  aptitude  is  often  perfected  with  a  rapidity  quite  incom- 
patible with  the  associationist  theory  of  fortuitous  successes. 
Imitation. — The  instinct  to  utter  sounds  is  present  from 
the  beginning,  but  the  impulse  to  imitate  sounds,  as  well  as 
other  actions,  appears  later,  and  often  quite  abruptly.  The 
instinct  of  imitation,  which  exhibits  itself  in  smiling,  frowning, 
laughing,  and  other  gestures,  in  the  dramatic  impulse,  and 
the  make-believe  games  of  childhood,  in  the  force  of  fashion, 
and  in  the  contagion  of  enthusiasm  and  panic,  is  one  of  the 
greatest  educative  forces  in  human  life.  These  various  forms 
of  instinctive  movement,  it  is  argued,  account  sufficiently  for 
man's  acquisition  of  a  complete  command  over  his  power  of 
movement  without  appealing  to  the  hypothesis  of  random 
action.* 

Growth  of  control  of  movement.  Probable 
theory. — It  seems  to  us  that  the  arguments  adduced 
in  support  of  the  latter  view  prove  the  insufficienc}'  of 
the  "  random"  theor}^  The  fact  that  all  men  walk  upright. 
is  the  outcome  not  of  fortuitous  action  in  all  directions, 
but  of  an  instinctive  impulse  hereditary  in  the  human 
race.  Yet  such  evidence  does  not  exclude  the  agencies 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  nor  the  effect  of  casual  or  unde- 
signed experience  in  developing  our  powers  to  perform 
definite  movements,  as  is  indeed  fully  admitted  by  the 
leading  advocates  of  Instinct.  Voluntary  action  is 
freely  dcsived  action.  But  desire  implies  a  striving 
towards  a  hno-wn  good,  towards  2i  preconceived  end.  Volun- 
tary movement  therefore  pre-supposes  a  representation 
of  the  movement,  or  of  its  separate  parts,  not  merely  in 
terms   of  visual,    but    of  motor  sensation.     In  order  to 

*  See  James,  Vol.  II.  pp.  403,  ff.  ;  Bain,  Emotions  and  Will,  II. 
c.  i.  ;  Preyer,  The  Mind  of  the  Child,  Part  I.  cc.  xi.  xii.;  Baldwin, 
Emotions  and  Will,  c.  xiii. ;  Hoffding,  pp.  30S — 312. 


SENSUOUS  APPETITE  AND  MOVEMENT.  215 


pronounce  a  word,  or  to  swim,  it  is  not  enough  to  be 
able  to  imagine  the  sound  of  the  word,  or  the  picture  of 
a  man  swimming,  we  must  be  acquainted  with  the 
muscular  feelings  involved  in  such  actions,  and  these 
must  necessarily,  on  their  first  occurrence,  have  been 
not  anticipated. 

The  child,  subject  to  obscure  feelings  and  cravings, 
seeks  relief  in  movements,  some  of  a  purely  haphazard, 
others  of  a  vaguely  purposive,  or  instinctive  character. 
Part  of  these  actions  turn  out  pleasant,  whether  acci- 
dentally or  because  they  satisfy  an  instinct,  matters 
not ;  part  of  them  result  in  pain.  Whatever  be  the  true 
expression  of  Dr.  Bain's  Laii^  of  self -conservation,  and 
whatever  be  the  real  effect  of  pleasure  and  pain  on 
general  vitality,  there  is  indisputably  a  tendency  in  the 
living  organism  to  prolong  and  repeat  movements 
which  afford  satisfaction,  and  to  check  those  which 
prove  disagreeable.  The  infant  rejoices  to  reiterate  the 
same  sound,  and  the  same  movement  of  its  arm  or  leg 
again  and  again.  With  each  successive  repetition  the 
force  of  association  between  the  muscular  feeling  and 
the  pleasant  result  increases,  and  each  tends  more  and 
more  to  suggest  the  other.^  However,  the  motor 
feeling  is  less  easily  pictured  by  the  imagination,  and 
much  less  interesting  in  itself  than  the  agreeable  result. 
Accordingly  its  force  in  consciousness  diminishes,  and 
after  a  time  the  wish  for  the  effect  results  in  the  per- 

^  As  suggestion  acts  in  the  oi-der  of  the  original  experience,  it 
has  been  objected  that  an  agreeable  effect  caitnot  suggest  the  action 
which  caused  it.  But  the  original  tendency  to  reiteration  solves  the 
difficulty.  Thus,  suppose  an  impulse  {a)  finds  vent  in  a  motor' 
feeling  [b)  which  causes  an  agreeable  experience  [c)  auditory- 
tactual,  gustatory,  or  visual.  If  the  process  is  repeated  in  succes 
sion  a  few  times  (as  when  an  infant  cries  la,  la,  la)  we  have  {a)  [b)  [c) 
{a)  (b)  {c),  Sec,  in  which,  at  every  repetition,  the  agreeable  effect  (c), 
precedes  (a),  and  so  tends  in  the  future  to  suggest  it.  That  is,  the 
representation  of  the  pleasant  effect  will  excite  the  impulse  which 
will  in  turn  awaken  the  motor  feeling,  and  so  on,  until  a  new  presen- 
tation intervenes,  and  inhibits  the  process.  The  tendency  to 
repetition  may  be  due  physiologically  to  the  facility  of  adhering  to 
a  nervous  path  once  opened,  or  to  the  lively  sensibility  and  unstable 
condition  of  nerve-centres  recently  excited.  Cf.  Martineau,  Vol.  II. 
pp.  208,  2og  ;   and  James,  Vol.  11.  pp.  582 — 592. 


2iC  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


formance  of  the  action  without  any  advertence  to  the 
muscular  feelings. 

The  earliest  motor  exertions  will,  of  course,  be  very 
simple,  and  the  connexion  between  action  and  the 
pleasing  effect  immediate.  The  child  touches  a  smooth 
object,  and  finds  the  experience  agreeable  ;  or  he  utters 
a  cry,  and  rejoices  in  the  discovery  of  his  power  of 
noise.  Later  on  his  vague  tentative  efforts  will  result 
in  the  combination  of  t\\o  or  more  actions,  and, 
encouraged  by  his  successes,  he  will  gradually  come  to 
perform  more  and  more  complex  c  perations,  to  conceive 
more  distant  ends,  and  to  be  incited  by  the  anticipation 
of  more  remote  results.  As  Professor  Dewey  remarks : 
"  The  infant  begins  with  a  very  simple  and  immediate 
idea.  His  first  efforts  are  limited  to  movements  con- 
taining very  few  elements,  and  the  end  of  which  is 
directly  present.  The  consciousness  of  an  end  which  is 
remote,  and  which  can  be  reached  only  by  the  systematic 
regulation  of  a  large  number  of  acts,  cannot  be  formed 
until  the  combination  of  motor  impulses  has  realized 
some  such  end."*' 

Voluntary  Action. — Freedom,  however,  means  more 
than  complexity.  So  long  as  we  merely  have  feeling 
tending  to  issue  into  action,  even  though  that  action  be 
complex  and  towards  a  pre- conceived  object,  we  have 
not  voluntary  action  strictly  so  called.*'  Under  the 
influence  of  such  unreflecting  desires  the  somnambulist, 
and  in  simpler  cases  the  lower  animals,  perform  elaborate 
operations  which  are  nevertheless  involuniavy,  not  free. 
In  the  earlier  years  of  childhood  all  action  is,  of  this 
kind,  completely  determined  by  feelings  and  tempera- 
ment. But  later  on,  as  experience  extends  and  intellect 
IS  developed,  conflicting  motives  and  rival  courses  of 
possible  action  emerge  into  consciousness.  The  child 
finds  himself  able  to  inhibit  particular  impulses.  The 
power  of  reflexion  awakens  within  him,  and  he  becomes 
aware  that  he  can  cJioose  or  decide  which  of  the  impulsive 
tendencies  he  will  approve,  which  of  the  competing 
desires   within   him    he  will   adopt    and   identify   with 

^  Psychologv,  3rd  Edit.  p.  381. 
'  That  is  in  the  modern  sense — deliberate  or  free  action. 


SENSUOUS  APPETITE   AND   MOVEMENT,  217 

himself.^  When  this  stage  is  reached,  we  have 
voliintavy  action  in  the  true  sense.  But  it  should  not  be 
forgotten  that  in  such  voluntary  action  the  physical 
movement  is  really  carried  out  by  the  mechanism  of 
the  organism  working  substantially  in  the  same  manner 
as  in  purely  impulsiva  or  automatic  action,  save  in  so 
far  as  the  discharge  of  physical  energy  is  initiated  or 
modified  by  volition.  Bodily  movement  is,  in  the 
language  of  the  schoolmen,  actus  imperatus,  not  acttts 
elicitus — action  commanded  or  sanctioned^  but  not  actually 
exerted  by  the  will. 

A  kindred  treatment  of  this  subject  is  thus  sum- 
marized by  Professor  Ladd  :  "  The  voluntary  movements 
of  the  body  presuppose  the  impulsive,  and  yet  they  reach 
far  back  into  the  obscurity  of  the  earlier  development 
of  consciousness.  Strictly  speaking,  they  imply  the 
presence  in  consciousness  of  two  or  more  different  or 
conflicting  ideas  of  mction,  one  of  which  rather  than 
the  others  is  realized  as  a  sequence  of  an  act  of 
conscious  choice.  They  imply  then  a  considerable 
development  of  the  activities  of  ideation  and  volition. 
Moreover,  those  movements,  which  are  ordinarily  called 
voluntary,  are  really  so  only  with  respect  to  certain  of 
their  elements ;  they  also  contain  elements  which  must 
be  classed  as  reflex,  centrally  coordinated,  and  impul- 
sive. The  term  '  voluntary '  fitly  lays  the  emphasis 
upon  the  conscious  act  of  choice ;  and  this  in  turn 
implies  ideas  of  various  possible  forms  of  bodily  motion 
gained  by  previous  experience  with  the  correlated  states 
of  conscious  feeling  and  conditions  of  the  body  as  giving 
rise  to  or  modifying  these  states."  ^ 

We  may  therefore  classify  movements  according  to 
their  origin,  their  voluntariness,  and  their  conscious 
or  unconscious  character  thus  : 

**  Lotze  accurately  observes:  "An  action  is  'voluntary'  in 
case  the  interior  initial  state  (impulse)  from  which  a  motion  would 
originate  as  a  result  does  not  merely  take  place,  but  is  approbated,  or 
adopted,  or  endorsed,  by  the  will.  Every  action  is  '  involuntary ' 
which  mechanically  considered  issues  from  the  same  initial  point, 
and  wholly  in  the  same  manner,  but  without  having  experienced 
such  approbation.'''  {Outlines  of  Psychology ,  p.  87.) 

^  Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology,  p.  528. 


2is  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


W 
> 

o 

<5 


I 


J 


/  (a)  Automatic  (unconscious  and  uncontrollable) 

,     11  1  1  \     r  Unconscious  |  .       ,     , 

(b)  Reflex  (uncontrollable)    -'   Coj^scious  Unvoluutayy. 

1  (c)  Impulsive  or  Instinctive    j  Uncontrollable  I 

(conscious)  I  Controllable  ^  Voluntary. 

((/)  Volitional  (conscious  and  controllable)  J 

Secondary  Automatic  action  or  Acquired  Reflexes.— Volun- 
tary actions,  at  first  painfully  learned,  may  now  through 
frequent  repetition  cease  to  require  any  conscious  effort  for 
their  performance,  or  at  least  for  their  continuation.  They 
thus  become  assimilated  to  .reflex  or  automatic  action.  The 
child  learnmg  to  play  the  piano  has  at  first  to  make  a 
separate  volitional  effort  to  apprehend  each  note  and  to  press 
each  key.  Next,  each  movement  suggests  its  successor 
without  any  separate  effort.  Later  on,  even  the  intervening 
sensory  impressions  drop  out  of  consciousness;  and  the 
process  has  passed  into  the  condition  of  reflex  action.  Nay, 
he  may  come  to  be  able  to  play  at  sight  a  piece  in  which  his 
fingers  execute  extremely  rapid  combinations  of  movements 
in  response  to  the  visual  impressions  of  the  notes,  whilst  his 
attention  is  distracted  by  other  thoughts.  The^  tendency  of 
repetition  to  convert  volitional  into  reflex  action  is  one  of  the 
most  important  agencies  in  the  economy  of  our  nature.  The 
whole  effect  of  education  depends  upon  it,  and  our  entire 
Hfe  is  an  illustration  of  it.  In  walking,  speaking,  reading, 
writing,  in  the  various  accomplishments,  games,  handicrafts, 
in  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  operations  of  our  daily  life, 
from  making  our  toilet  in  the  morning  to  undressing  at  night, 
we  are  ever  performing  inadvertently  complex  operations, 
involving  the  deUcate  coordination  of  many  muscles,  which 
at  first  were  accomplished  with  difficulty  and  perhaps  after 
many  unsuccessful  efforts.  From  the  similarity  of  these 
mechanical  modes  of  action  to  unconscious  vital  movements 
and  sensori-motor  actions  they  have  been  styled  secondarily 
automatic,  and  also  acquired  reflex  actions. 

Ideo-motor  action.— Not  only  can  movement  be  initiated 
by  vohtional  effort,  by  sensory  impressions  and  by  associated 
movements ;  it  can  also  be  excited  by  the  mere  idea  of  the 
action  itself.  Though  advocated  as  a  modern  discovery,  this 
truth  was  not  unfamiliar  to  the  schoolmen.^^  We  have  seen 
that  in  the  deliberate  performance  of  a  movement  we  first 
form  a  representation  of  that  movement.  Now  it  is  a  matter 
of  common   experience   that   in  proportion  as   the  image— 

?«  See  Pere  Coconnier,  L'Hypnotismc  Franc,  p.  346. 


SENSUOUS  APPETITE  AND   MOVEMENT.  219 

especially  the  motor  image — becomes  more  lively,  it  tends  of 
its  own  accord  without  any  effort  of  will  to  pass  into  reality. 
Vivid  ideas  tend  to  realize  themselves.  The  physiological  expla- 
nation suggested  is  that  the  same  nerve-centres  which  are 
engaged  in  the  actual  sensation  or  movement  are  also  the 
seat  of  the  representation,  but  excited  in  a  feebler  manner. 
The  thought  of  past  sea-sickness  awakened  by  the  peculiar 
smell  of  the  ship's  cabin  has  sometimes  realized  itself  before 
the  ship  has  left  the  harbour.  The  sight  of  an  object  on  the 
floor  moves  an  absent-minded  man  to  stoop  and  pick  it  up. 
Most  of  the  movements  in  reverie,  dreaming,  somnambulism, 
and  the  hypnotic  state,  are  the  outcome  of  motor  ideas. 
The  overpowering  force  of  the  vivid  idea  of  falling  down 
from  a  precipice  or  high  building  has  probably  been  the 
cause  of  many  seemingly  deliberate  suicides.  The  temptation 
sometimes  awakened  by  express  prohibitions  and  the  fasci- 
nation exerted  by  great  crimes,  and  by  the  horrible,  or  the 
disgusting,  is  similarly  explained  by  the  absorbing  force  of  a 
vividly  suggested  idea. 

Expectant  attention. — Intense  anticipation  causes  us  to 
rehearse  in  imagination  the  movements  as  well  as  the  sensa- 
tions to  which  we  look  forward.  Some  at  least  of  the 
phenomena  of  "thought-reading"  are  thus  explained.  The 
"subject"  endeavouring  to  "will"  or  intently  realize  the 
word  or  the  action  unconsciously  guides  the  hand  of  the 
"reader,"  or  in  some  other  way  gives  external  expression  to 
the  idea  absorbing  his  mind.  Mono-manias  are  often  due  to 
the  "possession"  or  "obsession"  of  the  mind  by  some 
"  fixed  idea "  which,  arising  perhaps  out  of  a  morbid  con- 
dition of  the  brain,  inhibits  the  corrective  influence  of  other 
intellectual  acts  and  suspends  volitional  control.  The  patient 
is  often  aware  of  the  folly  or  the  wickedness  of  the  insane 
impulse,  yet  feels  unable  to  extinguish  the  craving  to  carry 
out  the  suggestion. 

Here,  as  in  the  case  of  sensori-motov  action,  the  facility  of 
the  transition  from  the  mental  state  to  the  physical  act 
increases  with  repetition ;  and  in  familiar  acts  the  passage 
from  the  idea  to  its  realization  is  so  easy  and  smooth  that 
some  psychologists  have  made  it  a  ground  for  denying  that 
voluntary  or  appetitive  activity  is  ultimately  distinct  from 
cognition.  It  is  quite  true  that  the  will  very  frequently 
effects  its  object  indirectly  by  increasing  the  strength  of  an 
idea  through  attention  until  this  idea  prevails  over  all  other 
ideas  in  the  field  of  consciousness  and  then  realizes  itself  in 
movement.  But  the  striving,  the  tension  in  appetency  is 
different  in  kind  from  the  activity  of  cognition ;  and  the  fiat 
or  veto  which  consents  to  or  rejects  a  solicitation  is  quite 


220  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


distinct   in   nature   from    mere    increase    or    diminution    of 
attention  to  the  thought  as  a  thought. 

The  question  Jiow  an  unextended  volition  can  move  a 
material  limb  brings  us  in  face  of  a  final  inexplicability. 
That  the  soul  is  endowed  with  a  locomotive  faculty  is  simply 
an  ultimate  fact.  Our  life-long  experience  assures  us  that 
mind  and  body  do  interact,  but  How  we  cannot  tell. 

Readings.— On  Appetite,  of.  St.  Thomas,  Sum.  i.  q.  80;  Suarez, 
De  Anima,  Lib.  V.  cc.  1—4  ;  Joseph  Rickaby,  Moral  Philosophy,  Pt.  I. 
c.  iv.  ;  Farges,  Le  Cerveau  et  I'Ame,  pp.  404 — 411;  Dr.  Stockl, 
Lehrbuch  d.  Phil.  §§  18—20.  On  Movement,  Farges,  op.  cit.  pp. 
233 — 273;  Mercier,  Psychologie,  pp.  26^ — 280;  Pesch,  Institutiones 
Psychologic^,  §§  eej—eji ;  Dr.  Gutberlet,  Die  Psychologic,  Pt.  I.  c.  iii. ; 
Ladd,  op.  cit.  pp.  526—531 ;  Carpenter,  Mental  Physiology,  pp,  17— 
23,  70-80,  100 — 107. 


CHAPTER   XI. 

FEELINGS    OF   PLEASURE    AND    PAIN. 

Feeling. — A  large  portion  of  modern  works  on 
Psychology  is  usually  devoted  to  the  treatment  of 
the  phenomena  allotted  to  the  Faculty  of  Feeling. 
The  words,  emotion,  passion,  affection,  sentiment,  and 
the  like,  are  employed  to  denote  the  acts  of  this 
third  mental  power.  We  have  deemed  it  on  the 
whole  convenient  to  retain  the  term  in  common 
use,  though  we  deny  the  necessity  of  assuming 
the  existence  of  another  ultimate  faculty  generically 
distinct  from  those  of  cognition  and  appetency. 

Terms  defined. — The  word  feeling  is  used  in  several 
meanings:  (i)  To  denote  certain  kinds  of  cognitive  sensations, 
especially  those  of  the  faculty  of  touch.  (2)  To  express  the 
pleasurable  or  painful  aspect  of  all  species  of  mental  energy. 
(3)  To  signify  complex  forms  of  mental  excitement  of  a  non- 
cognitive  character.  (4)  As  equivalent  to  a  particular  kind 
of  rational  cognition  of  an  obscure  character  in  which  the 
mind  has  vivid  certainty  without  knowledge  of  the  grounds  of 
this  conviction.  Emotion  is  employed  as  synonymous  with 
feeling  in  the  second  and  third  meanings,  more  especially  in 
the  latter.  Passion  signifies  an  appetitive  or  emotional  state, 
where  the  excitement  reaches  an  intense  degree.  Affection 
usually  denotes  emotional  states  in  which  the  element  of 
liking  or  dislike  is  prominent ;  with  some  writers  the  term  is 
confined  to  acts  having  persons  for  their  objects.  Sentinieiit 
signifies  an  emotion  of  an  abstract  or  highly  developed 
character.  In  ordinary  language,  especially  in  the  adjectival 
form,  it  is  contrasted  with  reasoned  conviction  and  practical 
activity. 


222  SENSUOUS   LIFE. 


In  dealing  with  tliis  department  of  mental  life  we 
believe  that  our  best  course  will  be  to  give  here  a  short 
treatment  of  feeling  understood  as  the  pleasurable  or 
painful  tone  of  mental  activities  generally ;  and  in  a 
later  chapter  we  shall  examine  in  particular  a  few  of 
the  more  important  states  usually  classed  as  emotions. 

Aristotle's  Theory  of  Feeling. — The  subject  of 
the  nature  and  conditions  of  pleasure  and  pain,  like  so 
many  other  psychological  problems,  was  grasped  by 
Aristotle,  over  two  thousand  years  ago,  with  such 
clearness  and  treated  with  such  fulness  that  little  of 
substantial  importance  has  been  added  by  any  modern 
thinker.  The  doctrine  of  Hamilton  or  Mr.  Spencer, 
for  instance,  is  merely  the  old  theory  in  new  phrase- 
ology. We  shall,  therefore,  adhere  closely  to  the 
account  of  the  subject  given  by  the  Greek  philosopher. 

(i)  Nature  of  Pleasure. — In  opposition  to  Plato,  who 
held  that  all  pleasure  is  merely  a  transition,  a  passage 
from  pain,  and  consequently  of  a  negative  or  relative 
character,  Aristotle  teaches  that  there  are  positive  or 
absolute  pleasures.  Admitting  that  the  satisfaction  of 
certain  bodily  cravings,  such  as  hunger  and  thirst, 
produces  agreeable  feeling,  he  argues:  "This  does  not 
happen  in  all  pleasures ;  for  the  pleasures  of  mathe- 
matical studies  are  without  (antecedent)  pain ;  and  of 
the  pleasures  of  the  senses  those  which  come  by 
smelling  are  so ;  and  so  are  sounds  and  sights,  and 
many  recollections  also,  and  hopes.  By  what  then 
will  these  be  generated  ?  for  there  have  been  no 
wants  of  anything  to  be  supplied."^  Pleasure,  in 
fact,  he  repeatedly  asserts,  is  a  positive  concomitant 
or  resulting  quality  of  the  free  and  vigorous  exercise 
of  some  vital  energy.  It  is  the  efflorescence,  the  bloom 
of  healthy  activity.  To  each  faculty,  whether  sensuous 
or  intellectual,  belongs  an  appropriate  pleasure. 
Vision,  hearing,  and  the  activities  of  the  other  senses, 
are  all  productive  of  agreeable  feeling,  but  still  more  so 
is  intellectual  speculation. 

(2)  Intensity. — The  intensity  of  the  pleasure  depends 

^  EtJiics,  Lib.  X.  c.  3. 


FEELINGS   OF  PLEASURE   AND   PAIN.  223 

partly  on  the  state  of  the  faculty  or  habit  which  lies  at 
the  root  of  the  activity,  partly  on  the  nature  of  the 
object  which  forms  the  stimulus.  In  proportion  as  the 
energy  of  the  faculty  is  greater,  and  its  object  more 
fitted  to  elicit  lively  response,  so  is  the  pleasure  the 
keener.  The  most  perfect  pleasure  results  in  the 
greatest  delight.  Furthermore,  pleasure  is  not  merely 
an  effect  of  the  exertion  of  the  mental  pov/er :  it  reacts 
upon  the  energy  from  which  it  springs,  stimulates  that 
energy,  and  perfects  its  development.  Agreeable 
feehng,  in  fact,  is  at  once  the  result  and  the  final 
complement  of  vital  energies. 

Aristotle  thus  reasons  :  ''  Since  every  sense  energizes 
with  reference  to  its  object,  and  that  energizes  perfectly 
which  is  well  disposed  with  reference  to  the  best  of  all 
the  objects  which  fall  under  it,  .  .  .  this  must  be  the 
most  perfect  and  the  most  pleasant;  for  pleasure,  is 
attendant  upon  every  sense,  as  it  is  also  upon  every  act 
of  intellect  and  contemplation ;  but  the  most  perfect  is 
the  most  pleasant,  and  the  most  perfect  is  the  energy 
of  that  which  is  well-disposed  with  reference  to  the 
best  of  all  the  objects  that  fall  under  it.  Pleasure, 
therefore-,  perfects  the  energy.  But  that  there  is  a 
pleasure  in  every  act  of  the  perceptive  faculty  is 
evident  ;  for  we  say  that  sights  and  sounds  are 
pleasant ;  and  it  is  also  evident  that  this  is  most  so, 
when  the  perceptive  faculty  is  in  the  most  efficient 
condition,  and  energizes  on  the  most  suitable  object." ^ 

(3)  Duration. — The  duration  of  a  pleasure  is  similarly 
determined  by  the  nature  of  the  stimulus  and  the  con- 
dition of  the  faculty.  So  long  as  a  harmonious  relation 
subsists  between  them — so  long,  in  fact,  as  the  faculty 
is  fresh  and  vigorous  and  the  action  of  the  stimulus 
suitable — the  energy  will  be  agreeable.  For,  there  will 
then  be  an  easy  spontaneous  activity  in  harmony  with 
the  nature  of  the  mental  power.  But  no  human  faculty 
is  capable  of  incessant  exertion,  and  when  an  energy 
becomes  relaxed  or  fatigued,  the  corresponding  pleasure 
decreases,  and  will  soon  pass  into  the  state  of  pain. 

(4)  Variation. — Hence  the  utility  of  change.     It  is 

2  Ethics,  Lib.  X.  c.  iv. 


bENSUOUS  LIFE. 


the  decay  of  vital  force  during  incessant  action  which 
explains  the  charm  of  novelty.  Whilst  an  experience 
is  new,  the  efficiency  with  w'hich  our  mental  powers 
are  api)lied  to  it  is  at  a  maximum,  but  as  time  goes 
on  vigour  diminishes,  and  the  operation  becoming 
less  perfect,  the  pleasure  proportionately  declines. 
Agreeable  feeling  is,  therefore,  the  concomitant  of  the 
exercise  of  our  faculties,  as  long  as  that  exercise  is 
spontaneous  and  unimpeded.^ 

(5)  Qitcility. — Pleasures,  Aristotle  further  teaches, 
may  be  held  to  differ  in  hind  in  so  far  as  they  are  per- 
fections of  specifically  different  energies.  Intellect  and 
the  several  senses  are  essentially  different  faculties, 
their  operations  must  similarly  differ,  and  consequently 
the  pleasures  which  result  from  and  perfect  these  latter 
must  also  differ  in  kind.  Conflicting  pleasures,  or 
rather  the  pleasures  of  conflicting  energies,  neutralize 
each  other,  and  may  even  result  in  positive  pain.  This 
follows  inevitably  from  the  nature  of  pleasure.  For 
when  several  faculties  interfere  with  each  other,  their 
energies  are  deteriorated,  just  as  if  they  were  improperly 
exerted  or  acted  upon  by  an  unsuitable  stimulus.  But 
when  our  activities  are  exhausted  and  impeded,  the 
resulting  state  is  necessarily  disagreeable.  The  moral 
rank  of  the  feeling  is  determined  by  that  of  the  faculty 
to  which  it  belongs,  superior  energies  begetting  nobler 
pleasures. 

Nature  of  Pain. — From  this  analysis  of  pleasure  we 
derive  at  once  a  correlative  doctrine  of  pain.  The 
latter  mode  of  consciousness  arises  by  excess  or  defect 
in    the    exercise   of   a   facult}',   or    by   imperfection    or 

2  St  Thomas  thus  paraphrases  Aristotle:  "  Quaehbet  operatic 
sensus  maxime  est  delectabilis  quando  et  sensus  est  potentissimus, 
id  est  optime  vigens  in  sua  virtute,  et  quando  operatur  respectu 
talis  objecti,  id  est  maxime  convenientis.  Et  quamdiu  in  tah  dis- 
cs itione  manet  et  ipsum  sensibile  et  animal  habens  sensum,  tamdiu 
manet  delectatic.  .  .  .  Tamdiu  erit  delectatio  in  operatione  quamdiu 
de  una  parte  objectum  quod  est  sensibile  vel  intelligibile  est  in  debita 
ex  positione,  et  ex  alia  parte,  ipsum  operans,  quod  est  discernans 
eplpsensum  vel  speculans  per  intellectum.  .  .  .  Et  nullus  continue 
iredctatur,  quia  laboret  in  operatione  quam  co.isequitur  delectatio." 
{Eihtcs,  Lib.  X.  lect.  6.) 


FEELINGS   OF  PLEASURE   AND   PAIN.  225 


unsuitability  in  the  nature  of  the  object.  Excess  and 
defectxniay  refer  either  to  the  duration  or  to  the  degree 
of  the  excitement.  Both  states  are  also  dependent  on 
the  natural  scope  and  efficiency  of  the  faculty,  its 
acquired  habits,  and  its  actual  condition  of  health  and 
energy.^ 

Laws. — The  above  results  may  be  enumerated  in 
the  following  general  statements:  (i)  Pleasure  is  an 
accompaniment  of  the  spontaneous  and  healthy  activity  of  our 
faculties,  and  pain  is  the  result  of  either  their  restraint  or 
excessive  exercise.  (2)  Pleasure  augments  with  increasing 
vigour  in  the  operation  up  to  a  certain  normal  medium  degree  of 
exertion,  and  progressively  diminishes  after  that  stage  is  passed  : 
farther  on  the  pleasure  disappears  altogether,  and  beyond  this 
line  pain  takes  its  place. 

The  reader  can  easily  justify  for  himself  the  general  appli- 
cation of  this  law  by  reflecting  on  various  activities,  such  as 
those  of  physical  pursuits,  of  the  senses,  of  the  imagination, 
and  of  intellect.  The  most  striking  exception  is  found  in  the 
case  of  a  few  experiences — e.g.  disagreeable  tastes  and  smells 
— which  appear  to  be  unpleasant  even  in  the  faintest  degree. 
This  circumstance  is  ascribed  to  the  fact  that  some  stimuli 
have  an  essentially  noxious  or  corrosive  effect  on  the  sense- 
organ.  The  excessive  or  painful  limit  is  thus  virtually 
identical  with  the  threshold  of  consciousness.  The  number, 
however,  of  such  excitants  is  probably  much  less  than  is 
commonly  supposed.  This  is  shown  by  the  fact,  that  several 
of  our  worst  smelling  and  tasting  substances — certain  acids, 
for  instance — in  diluted  forms  contribute  to  the  production  of 
very  agreeable  mixtures. 

The  laws  just  stated  are  supplemented  or  qualified  by 
other  subsidiary  principles  :  (a)  The  Law  of  Change — variaiio 
delectat. — Change  is  agreeable.  There  is  a  certain  degree  of 
relativity  in  most  of  our  pleasures.  The  hedonic  quality  of 
an  activity  is  increased  by  contrast  with  a  previous  state 
of  consciousness.  Ttie  pleasures  of  existence  are  augmented 
by  alternations  of  rest  and  exercise.  Nature  has  given  a 
certain  rhythmic  constitution  to  our  conscious  life  and  the 

^  "  Operationes  sunt  delectabiles,  in  quantum  sunt  pyoportionata 
et  connaturales  operanti:  cum  autem  virtus  humana  sit  finita,  secun- 
dum aliquam  mensuram  operatio  est  sibi  proportionata  ;  unde  si 
excedat  illam  mensuram  jam  non  erit  sibi  proportionata,  nee  delec- 
tabilis,  sed  magis  laboriosa  et  atta^dians."  {Sunt.  I-II,  q.  32.  a.  i. 
ad  3.) 


226  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


temporary  repose  of  each  faculty,  or  its  cessation  from  one 
form  of  exercise  gives  fresh  zest  lor  another  activity,  (b)  The 
Laiv  of  Accommodation. — Continuous  or  frequent  exercise  dulls 
and  blunts  the  faculty.  It  becomes  habituated  to  its  stimulus, 
unless  prolongation  of  the  stimulation  results  in  inflammation 
or  some  new  disorder.  The  nervous  reaction  grows  feebler 
and  the  feeling  of  pleasure  diminishes.  Fortunately  sensibility 
to  pain  is  also  deadened.  This  is  particularly  observable 
in  sensations  of  taste.  With  frequent  use  stronger  condiments 
and  stimulants  are  required  to  produce  an  equal  effect. 
[c]  The  Law  of  Repetition. — Whilst  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  just  stated,  continuous  or  frequent  exercise  tends  to 
diminish  the  pleasure  of  an  activity,  on  the  other  hand 
repetition  of  a  neutral  or  even  painful  experience  often 
endows  it  with  a  new  pleasure.  Sometimes,  indeed,  the 
reiteration  of  an  action  originally  disagreeable  creates  a  habit 
that  results  in  a  strong  craving  for  its  exercise. 

Feeling  not  a  third  faculty. — The  explanation  we 
have  given  of  the  nature  of  pleasure  and  pain,  enables 
us  to  see  the  error  of  assuming  a  third  faculty  radically 
distinct  from  cognition  and  appetency,  in  order  to 
account  for  the  phenomena  of  feeling  in  this  sense. 
Pleasure  and  pain  are  not  special  products  of  a  new 
activity.  They  consist  in  the  harmonious  or  in- 
harmonious, the  healthy  or  unhealthy  working  of  any 
and  every  mental  power.  We  cannot  separate  the 
agreeable  or  disagreeable  character  of  our  various 
operations  from  these  operations,  and  then  set  it  up  as 
an  act  of  a  fresh  facult3^  Pleasure  and  pain  are  merely 
aspects  of  the  fundamental  energies  of  the  mind.  We 
are  warranted  in  postulating  a  special  perfection  in  the 
soul  as  a  ground  for  tactual  or  gustatory  consciousness, 
but  we  may  not  gratuitously  call  into  existence  addi- 
tional faculties  to  inform  us  of  the  varying  perfection 
of  these  activities.  The  pleasure  which  passes  into 
pain  with  increase  of  stimulation,  is  but  the  tone  of  the 
function,  not  the  manifestation  of  a  new  power. 

Theories  of  Pleasure  and  Pain. — The  ancient  Greek  views 
on  this  subject,  though  often  criticized  as  vague  and  imperfect, 
contain,  as  we  have  observed,  the  main  features  of  all  sub- 
sequent theories.  Among  modern  writers,  Spinoza  insists  on 
the  relative  side  of  the  phenomena,  for  him  pleasure  is 
progress — "  the  transition  from  a  less  to  a  greater  perfection." 


FEELINGS   OF  PLEASURE   AND   PAIN.  227 


Kant  inclines  still  more  to  the  Platonic  doctrine.  He  defines 
pleasure  as  "  a  feeling  of  the  furtherance  or  promotion  of  the 
life-process ;  "  whilst  pain  is  "  the  feeling  of  its  hindrance." 
But  as  such  promotion  implies  hindrance  to  be  overcome, 
pleasure,  he  holds,  always  presupposes  previous  pain. 
Schopenhauer  and  modern  pessimists  dwell  much  on  this 
negative  aspect  of  pleasure.  According  to  them  all,  agreeable 
feeling  is  merely  escape  from  pain  by  the  satisfaction  of  some 
want. 

On  the  other  side,  Descartes,  followed  by  Leibnitz,  teaches 
that  pleasure  consists  in  the  consciousness  of  perfection 
possessed.  Hamilton,  adhering  more  closely  to  Aristotle, 
defines  pleasure  as  "  the  reflex  of  the  spontaneous  and 
unimpeded  activity  of  a  power  of  whose  energy  we  are 
conscious;"  and  pain  as  "the  reflex  of  over-strained  or 
repressed  exertion."  Bain  formulates  his  doctrine  in  the 
"  Law  of  Self-Conservation  :  "  Pleasure  is  the  concomitant  of  an 
increase,  pain  of  an  abatement  of  some  or  all  vital  functions. 
Recent  physiological  psychologists  adopt  the  Aristotelian 
conception  of  pleasure  and  pain,  but  emphasize  in  their 
definitions  what  they  assume  to  be  the  underlying  organic 
process  —  the  integration  or  disintegration  of  the  neural 
elements  employed,  and  the  adjustment  or  maladjustment  of 
the  organ  to  the  stimulus  or  general  environment.  Thus 
Grant  Allen  describes  pain,  as  "  the  subjective  concomitant  of 
destructive  action  or  insufficient  nutrition  in  any  sentient 
tissue ; "  and  pleasure,  as  "  the  subjective  concomitant  of 
the  normal  amount  of  function  in  any  such  tissue."  Whilst 
Herbert  Spencer  would  enlarge  the  generalization  and  adapt 
it  to  the  evolutionist  hypothesis.^  With  him  pleasure  is  the 
outcome  of  organic  equilibrium,  harmonious  functioning.  It  is 
the  accompaniment  of  normal  medium  activity  of  an  organ, 
and  is,  consequently,  beneficial.  Excessive  or  defective 
exercise,  on  the  other  hand,  results  in  pain  and  so  tends  to 
cause  a  return  to  equilibrium.  The  protective  influence  of 
pleasure  and  pain  is,  therefore,  he  maintains,  an  agency 
of  the  first  importance  in  the  struggle  for  life. 

Criticism. — Whilst  fully  acknowledging  the  value  of  any 
light  to  be  gathered  from  physiology  concerning  the  organic 
conditions  of  pleasure  and  pain,  especially  of  the  sensuous 
faculties,  the  psychologist  may  yet  fairly  object  that  the 
account  of  the  phenomena  given  by  Aristotle  in  terms  of  con- 
sciousness is  both  more  appropriate  in  this  science  and  more 
defensible  in  itself,  than  these  later  physiological  theories  on 

^  Cf.  Baldwin,  Emotions  and  Will,  c.  v.  and  Spencer,  Principles  of 
Psychology,  Vol.  I.  Part  II.  c.  ix. 


228  SENSUOUS  LIFE. 


the  subject.  Aristotle's  doctrine  receives  immediate  support 
and  confirmation  from  introspective  observation,  whereas 
these  "  scientific  "  descriptions  are  still,  to  say  the  least,  in 
great  part  hypothetical.  It  is  far  from  being  proved  that 
even  sensuous  pleasure  is  invariably  accompanied  by  integra- 
tion or  nutrition  of  the  nervous  mechanism,  and  that  pain 
always  means  physiological  waste  and  injury.  A  large  class 
of  pleasant  stimulants  may  be  injurious  to  vital  functions; 
several  kinds  of  agreeable  food  are  not  wholesome,  or  at  all 
events  not  so  in  proportion  to  their  pleasantness.  Many 
exciting  pleasures  are  not  beneficial,  and  they  would  seem  to 
involve  disintegration  and  injury  of  neural  tissue  rather  than 
its  reparation ;  whilst  other  experiences  and  exercises  not 
immediately  pleasurable  are  found  to  be  wholesome.  The 
cerebral  conditions  of  the  higher  rational  and  aesthetic  feelings 
are  still  more  obscure.  When  the  generalization  is  enlarged 
in  the  interests  of  the  theory  of  evolution,  the  exceptions 
become  still  more  numerous,  and  the  asserted  coincidence 
between  immediate  pleasure  and  ultimate  profit  in  the  struggle 
for  existence  can  only  be  maintained  by  the  introduction  of 
so  many  qualifications  to  meet  each  conflicting  instance, 
that  our  confidence  in  the  universality  of  the  alleged  law,  and 
in  the  deductions  derived  from  it,  is  seriously  diminished. 
Still  the  broad  fact  observed  by  Aristotle,  and  reiterated  by 
Christian  philosophers  from  the  earliest  times,  that  pleasure 
in  general  accompanies  energies  in  harmony  with  the  well- 
being  of  the  organism  whilst  pain  results  from  what  is 
injurious  cannot  be  gainsaid. 

Readings. — For  Aristotle's  theory  of  Pleasure  and  Pain,  see  his 
Ethics,  Lib.  X.  cc.  i — 5;  St.  Thomas,  Comment.  \\.  i — g;  Farges, 
Le  Cerveau,  6-c.,  pp.  412 — 419 ;  and  Hamilton,  Metaphysics,  'Led.  xliii. 
The  fullest  exposition  of  the  scholastic  doctrine  is  given  by  M.  J. 
Gardair,  Les  Passions  et  la  Volontc,  pp.  117 — 190.  On  Feeling,  cf. 
Jungmann,  Das  Gemiith,  §§  53 — Co,  83,  seq. 


PSYCHOLOGY. 


Book  I. 

Empirical  or  Phenomenal  Psychology. 
Part   II. — Rational   Life, 


CHAPTER   XII. 

INTELLECT   AND    SENSE. 

Erroneous  Views. — Hitherto  we  have  been  treating 
mainly,  though  not  exclusively,  of  the  sensuous 
faculties  of  the  mind  ;  we  now  pass  on  to  the 
investigation  of  its  higher  activities,  and  we  at  once 
find  ourselves  in  conflict  with  a  number  of  philoso- 
phical sects,  ancient  and  modern,  variously  des- 
cribed as  Sensationists,  Associationists,  Materialists, 
Phenomenists,  Positivists,  Empiricists,  Evolutionists, 
who  differing  among  themselves  on  many  points 
agree  in  the  primary  dogma  that  all  knowledge  is 
ultimately  reducible  to  sensation.  According  to 
them  the  mind  possesses  no  faculty  of  an  essentially 
supra-sensuous  order.  All  our  most  abstract  ideas, 
as  well  as  our  most  elaborate  processes  of  reasoning, 
are  but  sensations  reproduced,  aggregated,  blended, 
and  refined  in  various  ways. 


230  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Terms  explained.  —  These  several  names  emphasize 
special  characteristics  which  are,  however,  all  consequences 
of  the  chief  doctrine.  The  word  sensationalism^  and  its 
cognates,  mark  the  attempted  anal3'sis  of  all  cognition  into 
sensation.  Materialism  points  to  the  fact  that  on  the  sensist 
hypothesis  we  can  know  nothing  but  matter,  and  that  there 
is  no  ground  for  supposing  the  human  mind  to  be  anything 
more  than  a  function  or  a  phase  of  an  organized  material 
substance.  PJienomenism  calls  attention  to  the  circumstance 
that  by  sense  alone,  and  consequently  according  to  the 
sensational  theory  of  knowledge,  we  can  never  know  anything 
but  phenomena — the  sensuous  appearances  of  things.  This 
is  the  fundamental  tenet  of  Positivism.  We  must  cease  from 
all  aspirations  after  Metaphysics  or  knowledge  of  ultimate 
realities  and  confine  our  efforts  to  positive  science — that  is  the 
ascertainment  of  laws  observable  in  phenomena.  Empiricism 
(e/x7reipta,  experience)  accentuates  the  assumption  of  this 
school  that  all  our  mental  possessions  are  a  product  of 
purely  sensuous  experience.  The  stress  laid  by  its  leading 
representatives  in  this  country  on  the  principle  of  mental 
association  has  caused  them  to  be  styled  the  Associaiionalist 
school.  All  psychologists  who  assume  the  Evolutionist  hypo- 
thesis to  apply  to  the  human  mind  without  qualification  or 
reserve,  as  e.g.  James  and  Mark  Baldwin,  even  if  they  differ 
in  some  points  from  the  older  sensationists,  are  practically  at 
one  with  them  here. 

Intellect  essentially  different  from  Sense. — In 

direct  opposition  to  this  theory  we  maintain  that  the 
mind  is  endowed  with  two  classes  of  faculties  of 
essentially  distinct  grades.  Over  and  above  Sensibility 
it  possesses  the  power  of  Rational  or  Spiritual  Activity. 
The  term  IntcUect,  with  the  adjective  Intellectual,  was 
formerly  retained  exclusively  to  denote  the  cognitive 
faculty  of  the  higher  order.  The  word  Rational  also 
designated  the  higher  cognitive  operations  of  the  mind, 
but  it  frequently  expressed  all  forms  of  spiritual 
activit}^  as  in  the  phrases  Rational  Will  and  Rational 
Emotions.  The  term  Reason  is  used  sometimes  to  signify 
the  total  aggregate  of  spiritual  powers  possessed  by 
man,i  sometimes  to  mean  simply  the  intellectual  power 

'^  In  this  general  sense  the  possession  of  reason  is  said  to  separate 
man  from  the  brute.  Kant  means  by  Reason  {Vernunft)  the  power 
of  immediately  apprehending  truth  by  iniuiticn,  whilst  Understand- 


INTELLECT  AND   SENSE.  231 

of  understanding,  and  sometimes  to  express  the  parti- 
cular exercise  of  the  understanding  involved  in  the 
process  of  ratiocination,  or  reasoning.  Reasoning  and 
Understanding  do  not,  however,  pertain  to  different 
faculties.  The  former  is  but  a  series  of  applications,  a 
continuous  exercise  of  the  latter.  The  Rational  Appetite 
or  Will  is  itself  a  consequence  of  the  same  power,  so  we 
must  look  upon  Intellect  as  the  most  fundamental  of 
the  higher  faculties  of  the  soul.  The  words  Intellect 
and  Intellectual  we  intend  to  retain  exclusively  for  this 
superior  grade  of  mental  life,  and  we  shall  thus  avoid 
the  lamentable  confusion  caused  by  the  modern  use  of 
these  terms  as  signifying  all  kinds  of  cognition,  whether 
sensuous  or  rational. 

So  far,  however,  we  have  merely  asserted  a  differ- 
ence in  kind  between  Sense  and  Intellect ;  it  is  now  our 
duty  to  prove  our  doctrine.  By  affirming  the  existence 
of  a  faculty  specifically  distinct  from  that  of  sense,  we 
mean  to  hold  that  the  mind  possesses  the  power  of 
performing  operations  beyond  the  scope  of  sense.  We 
maintain  that  many  of  its  acts  and  products  are  distinct 
in  kind  from  all  modes  of  sensibility  and  all  forms  of 
sensuous  action  whether  simple  or  complex  ;  and  that 
no  sensation,  whatever  stages  of  evolution  or  trans- 
formation it  may  pass  through,  can  ever  develope  into 
thought.  We  have  already  investigated  at  length  the 
sentient  life  of  the  soul,  and  to  it  we  have  allotted  the 
five  external  senses,  internal  sensibility,  imagination, 
sensuous  memory,  and  sensitive  appetite.  The  supe- 
riority of  the  spiritual  life  over  these  sensuous  activities 
will  be  established  by  careful  study  of  the  nature  and 
formal  object  of  its  operations. 

Proof  of  doctrine. — Intellect  we  may  define  broadly 
as  the  faculty  of  thought.  Under  thought  we  include 
attention,  judgment,    reflexion,   self-consciousness,   the 

ing  {Verstand)  is  for  him  the  source  of  the  generalizations  of  thought. 
Such  a  usage  is  still,  however,  contrary  to  ordinary  language  in 
this  country.  The  verb  to  reason  and  the  participle  reasoning  show 
that  this  term  denotes  not  the  contemplative,  but  the  discursive 
activity  of  the  intellect.  First  truths  are  apprehended  by  the 
understanding. 


232  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


formation  of  concepts,  and  the  processes  of  reasoning. 
These  modes  of  activit}'  all  exhibit  a  distinctly  supra- 
sensuous  element ;  and  in  order  to  bring  out  the  differ- 
ence between  intellect  and  sense,  we  shall  sa}'  a  few 
words  on  each  of  these  operations.  We  shall  begin  with 
some  observations  on  attention  as  the  most  convenient 
introduction  to  the  study  of  intellectual  activity  in 
general,  although  the  strictly  supra-sensuous  character 
of  Intellect  is  more  clearly  presented  in  some  of  the 
other  functions,  especially  in  that  of  conception.  We 
shall  however  undertake  a  fuller  investigation  of  atten- 
tion in  a  future  chapter. 

Attention. — By  attention  is  here  meant  the  special 
direction  of  the  higher  cognitive  energy  of  the  mind 
towards  something  present  to  it  ;  or  in  scholastic 
language  appUcatio  cogitationis  ad  ohjectum.  The  w'ord  is 
sometimes  used  in  a  vague  sense  to  signif}^  the  fact  ol 
being  more  or  less  vividly  conscious  of  the  action  ot 
any  stimulus ;  but  in  its  strict  signification  it  implies  a 
secondary  act,  an  interior  reaction  of  a  higher  kind 
superadded  to  the  primitive  mental  state.  When  from 
a  condition  of  passive  sensibility  to  impressions  we 
change  to  that  of  active  attention,  there  comes  into 
play  a  distinctly  new  factor.  In  the  former  state  the 
mind  was  wholly  excited  and  aw-akened  from  without, 
in  the  latter  it  presents  a  contribution  from  the 
resources  of  its  own  energy.  In  this  exercise  of 
attention  an  additional  agency  which  reacts  on  the 
existing  impressions  is  evoked  into  life,  and  aspects 
and  relations  implicit  in  the  orginal  impressions  are 
apprehended  in  a  new  manner.  The  mind  grasps  and 
elevates  into  the  region  of  clear  consciousness  hitherto 
unnoticed  connexions  which  lie  beyond  the  sphere  of 
sense.  It  fixes  upon  properties  and  attributes  and  holds 
them  steadily  up  for  separate  consideration,  while  the 
uninteresting  qualities  are  for  the  time  ignored. 

This  complementary  phase  of  attention  by  which 
the  neglected  features  are  ignored  is  called  by  modern 
writers  abstraction.  It  is  the  necessary  counterpart  of 
the  former.  By  the  very  act  of  concentrating  our 
mental  energy  on  certain  aspects  of  an  object  we  turn 


INTELLECT   AKD   SENSE.  233 


away  from  others.     Both  the  positive  and  the  negative 
side  of  the  activity  manifest  its  difference  from  sense. 
Thus,  suppose  an  orange  has  been  lying  on  the  table 
before  me.     I  have  for  some  time  been  conscious  of  its 
presence,  but  I  have  not  specially  directed  my  attention 
towards  it.  Now,  however,  some  circumstance  or  other, 
a  thought  originating  within  the  mind  or  a  movement 
without,   awakens   the   intellect,   and   immediately  the 
object  has  a  new  reality  for  me.     I  advert  to  the  shape 
of  the  fruit,  and,  abstracting  from  its  remaining  proper- 
ties, I  notice  its  likeness  to  otlier  objects  described  as 
spherical.     Again  my  attention  centres  on  its  colour, 
and  I  compare  its  similarity  in  this  respect  with  other 
things  present  or  absent.     In  like  manner  I  may  think 
of  its  weight,  its  probable  taste  or  smell,  and  compare 
it  under  any  of  these  respects  with  other  fruits,  neglect- 
ing for  the  time  all  the  rest  of  its  attributes,  or  I  niay 
consider  the  object   as  a  unity,  a  ivhole,  a  thing  distinct 
from   other  beings.     Further,  whilst   attending  to  one 
attribute  apart   I   am   fully  aware  of  the  existence  of 
others  in   the  concrete  object   present  to  my  mind.     I 
am  quite  conscious  that  the  separation  is  purely  mental, 
and  that  the  object  of  my  thought  does  not  exist  in  this 
ideal  and  abstract  manner  in  itself,  or  a  parte  rei.     Now 
in  all  these  operations  something  more  is  implied  than 
sensation.     A  sensation  can  neither  attend  to  itself  nor 
consciously  abstract  from  particular  attributes,  and  it 
can  still  less  apprehend  relations  between  itself  and  its 
fellows. 

Comparison  and  Judgment— But  when  exercised 
in  explicitly  comparative  and  Judicial  acts,  the  supra- 
sensuous  nature  of  attention  is  even  more  clearly 
manifested.  We  fix  upon  a  certain  attribute  of  two 
or  more  objects,  and  comparing  the  objects  pronounce 
them  to  be  alike  or  unlike  in  this  feature.  This  judgment 
is  evidently  distinct  from  the  sensation  or  image  of 
either  object,  though  it  presupposes  sensations  or 
images  of  both.  It  implies,  in  fact,  a  mental  act 
distinct  from  the  related  impressions  by  which  the 
relation  subsisting  between  them  is  apprehended  in 
an    abstract    manner.     To    affirm    that   the  taste   of  a 


234  NATIONAL   LIFE. 


certain  claret  is  like  that  of  sour  milk,  or  that  the  earth 
resembles  an  orange,  there  is  required  in  addition  to  the 
pair  of  compared  ideas  a  superior  force  which  holds 
them  together  in  consciousness,  and  discerns  the 
relation  of  similarity  between  them.  Neither  the 
mere  co-existence,  nor  still  less  the  successive  occurrence 
of  two  impressions,  could  ever  result  in  the  perception 
of  a  relation  between  them,  unless  there  be  a  third 
distinct  activity  of  a  higher  kind  to  which  both  are 
present,  and  which  is  capable  of  apprehending  the 
common  feature.^  A  change  in  our  feelings  or  sensuous 
consciousness  is  possible,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact,  often 
takes  place  without  the  act  of  intellectual  attention 
which  gives  rise  to  the  judgment.  For  the  consistent 
sensationalist,  who  necessarily  dissolves  the  mind  into 
a  series  of  conscious  states  devoid  of  all  real  unity,  not 
only  is  the  conviction  of  personal  identity  throughout 
our  life  a  hallucination,  but  even  the  simplest  act  of 
comparison  effected  between  two  successive  ideas  is  a 
sheer  impossibility. 

Necessary  Judgments.  —  Among  judgments  in  general, 
which  exemplify  the  activity  of  a  higher  power  than  sense, 
there  are  a  special  class  commonly  spoken  of  as  necessary 
judgments,  which  demonstrate  with  peculiar  cogency  the 
working  of  intellect.  The  mind  affirms  as  necessarily  and 
universally  true,  that  "two  things  which  are  equal  to  a  third 
must  be  equal  to  each  other,"  that  "nothing  can  begin  to 
exist  without  a  cause,"  that  "  we  ought  never  to  do  evil,"  that 
"two  straight  lines  can  never  enclose  a  space,"  that  "three 
and  two  must  always  make  five,"  and  so  on  of  a  variety  of 
other  necessary  propositions.  A  careful  examination  of 
judicial  acts  of  this  kind  will  manifest  that  they  express  truths 
of  a  different  nature  from  that  contained  in  the  assertion  or 
denial  of  the  existence  or  occurrence  of  a  particular  concrete 

2  "A  feeling  qualified  by  a  relation  of  resemblance  to  other 
feelings  is  a  different  thing  from  an  idea  of  that  relation,  different 
with  all  the  difference,  which  Hume  ignores,  bctxveen  feeling  and 
thought,  between  consciousness  and  self-consciousness."  (Cf.  Green, 
hitroduction  to  Hume's  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  %  213.)  The  con- 
founding of  the  sensuous  capacity  of  experiencing  like  or  unlike 
impressions  with  the  intellectual  power  of  recognizing  their  likeness 
or  unlikeness  was  formerly  a  universal  characteristic  of  the  sensa- 
tionist  psychologists  of  this  country. 


INTELLECT  AND   SENSE.  235 

fact.  These  truths  hold  necessarily  and  universally.  They  are 
moreover  objectively  valid  :  they  are  independent  of  my  per- 
ceiving them.  Their  contradictory  is  absolutely  unthinkable. 
It  is  not  merely  that  I  cannot  conceive — in  the  sense  of  being 
able  to  imagine — the  opposite.  It  is  not  that  I  am  under  a 
powerful  persuasion,  an  irresistible  belief  on  the  point.  It  is 
not  that  one  idea  inevitably  suggests  the  other.  There  is 
something  distinctly  over  and  above  all  this. 

The  blind  man  cannot  conceive  colour.  A  few  centuries 
since  most  people  would  have  found  it  hard  to  believe  that 
people  could  live  at  the  other  side  of  the  earth  without 
tumbling  off.  On  the  other  hand,  a  man's  name,  or  his 
voice,  irresistibly  revives  the  representation  of  his  face  ;  and 
the  appearance  of  fire  inevitably  awakens  the  expectation  of 
heat.  Yet  in  the  former  cases  the  mind  after  careful  reflexion 
does  not  pronounce  the  existence  of  an  absolute  impossibility, 
nor  does  it  assert  in  the  latter  a  necessary  connexion.  We 
cannot  affirm  them  to  be  impossible  or  necessary,  because 
the  intellect  does  not  clearly  apprehend  any  such  impossi- 
bility or  necessity.  But  it  is  completely  diiferent  in  the  class 
of  the  judgments  we  have  indicated  above.  The  moral  law 
must  hold  for  all  intelligence ;  the  principle  of  causality  and 
the  axioms  of  mathematics,  must  be  necessarily  and  every- 
ivhire  true.  Now  this  necessity  cannot  be  apprehended  by 
sense.  The  sensuous  impression  is  always  of  the  individual, 
the  contingent,  the  mutable.  It  informs  us  that  a  particular 
fact  exists,  not  that  a  universal  truth  holds.  Snow  may  perhaps 
be  black,  ground  glass  may  be  wholesome  and  nutritious, 
and  a  number  of  the  laws  of  physical  nature  may  be  changed 
every  twelve  months  in  distant  stellar  regions  ;  but  the  truths 
of  arithmetic  and  geometry,  the  principle  of  causality,  and 
the  moral  law  are  as  immutable  there  as  with  us.  This 
immutability  is  distinctly  realized  by  the  mind,  and  such 
realization  is  certainly  not  explicable  by  mere  sense. 

Universal  and  Abstract  Concepts. — It  is,  however, 
in  the  formation  of  abstract  and  universal  concepts, 
which  prescind  from  the  particular  determinations  of 
space  and  time,  and  thus  completely  transcend  the 
scope  of  sense  that  the  spiritual  activity  of  the  Intellect 
is  best  manifested."^  Abstract  and  universal  concepts 
we  assuredly  possess.  They  are  the  necessary  materials 
of  science.  Judgments,  whether  contingent  or  necessary, 

•^  "  Differt  sensus  ab  intellectu  et  ratione  quia  intellectus  vel 
ratio  est  ufiiversitliion,  quae  sunt  ubique  et  semper  ;  sensus  autem  est 
siiigiilarium."  (St.  Thomas,  De  scnsu  et  scnsato,  1.  i.) 


236  NATIONAL    LIFE. 


presuppose  them.  Without  them  general  knowledge 
would  be  impossible;  consequently  we  must  be  endowed 
with  some  power  capable  of  forming  such  ideas.  But 
in  the  sensationist  catalogue  of  faculties  no  such  power 
is  to  be  found.     Ergo,  that  inventory  is  incomplete. 

By  no  one  has  the  inability  of  the  imagination  to 
form  universal  notions  and  concepts  been  better  shown 
than  by  the  writers  of  the  sensationalist  school  itself. 
Berkeley  in  a  well-known  passage  clearly  states  the 
nominalist  argument  declaring  that  whatever  we 
imagine  must  have  some  definite  size,  colour,  shape, 
and  the  rest.  Therefore  it  is  concluded  we  cannot 
form  any  truly  abstract  or  universal  concept.^  The 
legitimate  inference,  however,  is  something  very  different 
— to  wit,  that  the  sensist  assumption  regarding  the 
nature  of  mental  life  is  false.  Since  de  facto  we  do 
possess  these  abstract  and  universal  ideas,  and  since 
the  sensationist  view  of  the  mind  cannot  account  for 
them,  that  conception  of  the  mind  must  be  wrong. 
There  is  some  faculty  omitted  from  its  list. 

To  establish  the  existence  of  these  intellectual 
Concepts  or  Ideas  and  their  difference  from  sensuous 
Images  we  can  only  indicate  the  marks  by  which  they 
are    distinguished,    and    then   appeal    to    each    man's 

^  "Whether  others  have  this  wonderful  faculty  of  abstracting 
their  ideas,  they  best  can  tell ;  for  myself  I  find  I  have  a  faculty 
of  imagining  or  representing  to  myself  the  ideas  of  those  particular 
things  I  have  perceived,  and  of  variously  compounding  and 
dividing  them.  I  can  imagine  a  man  with  two  heads,  or  the  upper 
parts  of  a  man  joined  to  the  body  of  a  horse.  I  can  consider  the 
hand,  the  eye,  the  nose,  each  by  itself  abstracted  and  separated 
from  the  rest  of  the  body.  But,  then,  whatever  hand  or  eye  I 
imagine,  it  must  have  some  peculiar  shape  and  colour.  Likewise 
the  idea  of  man  that  I  frame  to  myself,  must  be  either  of  a  white,  or 
a  black,  or  a  tawny,  a  straight  or  a  crooked,  a  tall  or  a  low,  or  a 
middle-sized  man."  {Principles  of  Human  Knoivledgc.)  The  passage 
is  directed  against  a  confused  paragraph  in  Locke's  Essay,  Bk.  IV. 
c.  vii.  §  g.  Berkeley  confounds  the  phantasm  of  the  imagination 
with  the  intellectual  concept.  We  cannot  form  an  abstract  or 
universal  phantasm  ;  but  the  intellect  most  certainly  does  appre- 
hend universal  ideas,  which  abstract  from  varying  accidental 
qualities.  The  ethical  thesis,  "  Man  is  responsible  for  his  acts," 
or  any  other  such  general  scientific  proposition,  involves  a  notion 
equally  applicable  to  the  straight  or  crooked,  black,  or  white. 


INTELLECT  AND   SENSE.  237 


internal  experience.  The  concept  represents  the  nature 
or  essence,  e.g.,  of  man  or  triangle,  in  an  abstract  con- 
dition, ignoring  or  prescinding  all  accidental  indi- 
vidualizing conditions.  The  image,  on  the  contrary, 
reproduces  the  object  clothed  with  these  concrete  deter- 
minations. The  concept  is  universal  (unum  in  pluribus), 
capable  of  representing  with  equal  perfection  all  objects 
of  the  class — because  it  includes  only  the  essential 
attributes  contained  in  the  definition  of  the  object. 
The  image,  whether  it  be  distinct  or  obscure,  can  truly 
picture  only  one  individual  object  of  some  particular 
colour,  shape,  size,  and  the  rest.  The  concept  since  it 
merely  includes  the  essential  attributes  is  something 
fixed,  immutable,  necessary.  If  changed  in  the  least 
element  its  nature  would  be  destroyed.  For  the  same 
reason  it  is  said  to  be  eternal :  not  of  course  as  a  positively 
existing  being,  but  negatively  as  an  intrinsic  possibility. 
It  abstracts  from  all  time,  and  there  never  was  an  instant 
when  it  was  impossible.  The  image,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  unstable,  fluctuating  with  respect  to  many  of  its 
component  elements,  and  contingent.  Blurred  repre- 
sentations of  this  kind  have  been  styled  "generic" 
images,  but  they  are  in  no  true  sense  universal.  They 
are  merely  individual  pictures  of  an  indistinct  or 
obscure  character.  That  these  distinctions  are  real, 
will  become  clear  to  each  one  who  carefully  examines 
his  own  consciousness.  When  we  employ  the  terms 
man,  triangle,  cow,  iron,  virtue,  me  mean  something. 
These  expressions  have  a  connotation,  a  meaning  which 
is  more  or  less  perfectly  apprehended  by  the  mind. 
Now  that  connotation  as  thus  grasped  in  a  mental  act  is  the 
general  concept. 

There  commonly  accompanies  the  use  of  these  words  a 
sensuous  image,  picturing  some  individual  specimen,  or  a 
group  or  series  of  specimens ;  but  it  is  neither  about  these 
individual  examples,  nor  about  the  oral  sound  that  our 
judgments  are  enunciated.  When  we  say,  "The  cow  is  a 
ruminant,"  "  The  whale  is  a  mammal,"  "  The  sum  of  the 
angles  of  a  triangle  is  equal  to  two  right  angles,"  "  Truth  is  a 
virtue,"  we  speak  not  of  the  particular  phantasm  in  the 
nnagination,  whether  it  be  definite  or  hazy,  and  still  less  of 
the  vocal  word.    We  do  not  mean  tliis  triangle,  whale,  or  cow. 


238  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


but  every  triangle,  cvoy  whale,  and  every  cow.  Whilst  the 
{a.ncy  pictures  an  individual  the  intellect  i'/un^s  the  universal, 
and  this  thought  is  the  general  notion  or  concept.  The  state- 
ment of  certain  nominalists  that  we  have  nothing  in  our  mind 
but  a  particular  image  made  to  stand  for  any  individual  of  the 
class  practically  concedes  the  whole  case,  whilst  slurring  over 
the  concession  in  the  phrase  which  we  have  italicized.  The 
intellectual  operation  by  which  the  essential  features  in  the 
particular  specimen  are  apprehended  and  conceived  as  standing 
for  ^^  any  individual''  of  the  class  is  precisely  what  constitutes 
the  universal  conception.  Exactly  herein  lies  the  abstraction 
and  generalization  productive  of  the  intentio  universalitatis — 
the  universal  significance  of  the  general  notion.  The  higher 
faculty  seizes  on  the  essential  attributes  forming  the  common 
nature  of  the  class,  and  our  consciousness  of  this  common 
nature  as  separately  realizable  in  each  member  of  the  class 
is  the  universal  idea. 

It  was  long  ago  justly  insisted  on  by  Plato,  and  before 
him  by  Parmenides,  that  mere  sense  could  never  afford 
general  knowledge,  and  that  without  universal  concepts 
science  is  impossible.  Pure  and  mixed  mathematics  no 
less  than  chemistry  and  biology  logically  lose  their  rigorous 
precision  and  universality  as  well  as  their  objective  validity 
if  the  reality  of  general  conceptions  be  denied.  The  pene- 
trating mind  of  Hume,  the  acutest  thinker  of  the  sensist 
school,  clearly  saw  this,  and  accepted  the  conclusion  that 
even  the  mathematical  sciences  can  only  afford  approximate 
truth.^  The  existence  of  universal  ideas  or  concepts  we  must 
thus  consider  as  established. 

Reflexion  and  Self-consciousness. — Lastly,  the 
act  of  reflecting  upon  our  own  conscious  states  is 
essentially  beyond  the  sphere  of  sense.  We  find  that 
"we  can  observe  and  study  our  own  sensations,  emotions, 
and  thoughts.     We  can  compare  them  with  previous 

^  "-When  geometry  decides  anything  concerning  the  proportions 
of  quantity,  we  ought  not  to  look  for  the  utmost  precision  and 
exactness.  None  of  its  proofs  extend  so  far.  It  takes  the  dimen- 
sions and  proportions  of  figures  justly,  but  roughly,  and  with  some 
liberty.  Its  errors  are  never  considerable,  nor  would  it  err  at  all 
did  it  not  aspire  to  such  absolute  perfection."  (Cf.  Treatise  on 
Human  Nature,  p.  350  ;  also  5;§  273,  274.)  Mill  and  later  disciples 
of  the  school,  whose  scientific  faith  is  stronger  than  their  regard 
for  consistency,  try  to  give  mathematics  a  more  respectable  appear- 
ance. On  the  value  of  that  attempt,  cf  Jevons,  Contemp.  Review, 
Dec.  1877;  Ueberweg's  Log:ic,  §  129,  and  Appendix,  §  15;  and 
Courtney's  Metaphysics  of  Mill,  c.  viii. 


INTELLECT  AND   SENSE.  239 


states,  we  can  recognize  them  as  our  own ;  and  we 
can  apprehend  the  perfect  identity  of  the  subject  of 
these  states  with  the  being  who  is  now  reflecting 
on  them,  the  agent  who  struggles  against  a  temp- 
tation, and  the  agent  who  knows  that  he  is  observing 
his  own  struggle.  Every  step  of  our  work  so  far 
has  involved  the  reflexive  study  of  our  own  states, 
and  consequently  the  exercise  of  an  intellectual  power. 
To  analyze,  describe,  and  classify  mental  phenomena 
an  activity  distinct  from  and  superior  to  sense  is 
required,  and  it  is  only  because  we  are  endowed  with 
such  a  supra-sensuous  faculty  that  we  can  recognize 
ourselves  as  something  more  than  our  transient  states. 
The  teaching  of  the  sensist  school  from  Hume  to  Mill 
is  logical  at  least  on  this  point.  They  fully  admit  that 
if  their  assumption  is  true,  if  the  only  cognitive  faculty 
possessed  by  the  mind  is  sensuous  in  character,  then  it 
follows  that  the  mind  must  be  conceived  as  nothing 
more  than  sensations  and  possibilities  of  sensations. 

Intellect  a  spiritual  faculty. — These  various  forms 
of  mental  activity,  attention,  abstraction,  the  perception 
of  relations,  comparison,  judgment,  the  formation  of 
universal  and  abstract  conceptions,  the  intuition  of  the 
necessar}^  character  of  certain  judgments,  and  reflexive 
observation  of  our  own  states,  demonstrate  the  existence 
in  the  mind  of  a  higher  cognitive  faculty  than  that  of 
sensuous  knowledge.  This  superior  aptitude  of  the 
soul  is  what  the  scholastic  philosophers  styled  the 
intellect;  and  they  described  it  as  a  spivitiial  or  non- 
organic faculty  in  opposition  to  sense,  which  they  affirmed 
to  be  organic,  corporeal,  or  material.  By  these  latter 
epithets,  however,  they  did  not  mean  to  imply  that 
sensuous  life  is  similar  in  kind  to  the  forces  or  properties 
of  matter,  or  to  the  physiological  functions  of  the 
organism.  They  merely  intended  to  teach  that  all 
sensuous  states  have  for  their  proper  objects  material 
phenomena,  and  are  exerted  by  means  of  a  bodily 
organ.  External  and  internal  sensibility,  imagination, 
and  sensuous  memory  are  ail  essentially  or  intrinsically 
dependent  on  the  organism.  Thus  sensations  of  touch, 
or  phantasms  of  colour,  are  possible  only  to  a  soul  that 


240  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


informs  a  body,  and  can  only  be  elicited  by  modifica- 
tion of  an  animated  system  of  nerves.  It  is,  therefore, 
legitimate  to  say  that  the  eye  sees,  and  the  ear  hears, 
or  better,  that  the  soul  sees  and  hears  by  means  of 
these  instruments.  On  the  other  hand,  by  describing 
the  activity  of  intellect  as  spiritual  or  non-organic,  the 
scholastics  implied  that  it  is  a  function  of  the  mind 
alone ;  that  unlike  sentiency  it  is  not  exerted  by  means 
of  any  organ. 

Unity  of  Consciousness. — It  seems  to  us  incontestible  that 
when  properly  understood  this  is  the  true  doctrine.  It  is 
false  to  say  that  the  brain  thinks,  or  even  that  the  mind 
thinks  by  means  of  the  brain,  although  we  may  allow  the 
phrase  that  it  sees  by  the  instrumentality  of  the  eye  or  hears 
by  that  of  the  ear.'^  To  establish  this  it  is  only  necessary  to 
revert  to  the  points  already  considered.  First,  as  regards 
self-consciousness,  the  subject  of  this  activity  must  be  of  a 
spiritual  or  incorporeal  nature.  For  in  such  an  operation 
there  is  realized  a  species  of  perfect  identity  between  agent 
and  patient  which  is  utterly  incompatible  with  any  form  of 
action  that  pertains  to  a  corporeal  organ.  Thus,  I  find  that 
I  can  not  only  think  or  reason  about  some  event,  but  /,  the 
being  who  thinks,  can  reflect  on  this  thinking;  and,  moreover, 
/  can  apprehend  myself  who  am  reflecting,  and  who  know 
myself  as  reflecting,  to  be  absolutely  identical  with  the  being 
who  thinks  and  reasons  about  the  given  event.  But,  evidently, 
such  an  operation  cannot  be  effected  by  a  faculty  exerted  by 
means  of  a  material  organ.  One  part  of  matter  may  act 
upon  another,  it  may  attract  or  repel  it,  it  may  be  "reflected  " 
or  doubled  back  upon  it :  but  the  same  atom  can  never  act 
upon,  or  reflect  upon  itself.  The  action  of  a  material  atom 
must  always  have  for  its  object  something  other  than  itself. 
This  indivisible  iiuity  of  consciousness,  exhibited  in  the  act  of 
knowing  myself,  is  therefore  possible  only  to  a  spiritual  agent, 
a  faculty  that  does  not  operate  by  means  of  a  material  organ. 

Apprehension  of  the  abstract  and  universal. — Again,  the 
characteristic  notes  of  the  organic  or  sensuous  state  consist 

^  "  When  organs  of  understanding  or  of  reason,  instruments  0/ Judging 
and  thinking  are  spoken  of,  we  confess  that  we  have  no  idea  either 
what  end  such  theories  can  serve,  or  what  advantage  there  could  be 
for  the  higher  intellectual  life  in  all  this  apparatus  of  instruments. 
None  of  these  relating  energies  (rational  activities)  from  whose 
inexhaustibly  varied  repetition  all  our  knowledge  is  derived  can  be 
in  the  smallest  degree  promoted  by  the  co-operation  of  corporeal 
force  "    Cf.  Lotze,  Miciocosmus  (English  Trans.),  p.  323. 


INTELLECT  AND   SENSE.  241 

in  its  representing  a  concrete  material  phenomenon,  and  in 
its  being  aroused  by  the  impression  of  the  object  on  the 
organ.  The  intellectual  act,  on  the  contrary,  whether  it 
manifests  itself  in  the  shape  of  the  universal  concept,  of 
attention  to  abstract  relations,  or  in  the  apprehension  of 
necessity,  does  not  represent  an  actual  concrete  fact,  and  is 
not  evoked  by  the  action  of  a  material  stimulus.  The 
formal  object  of  sense  is  the  concrete  individual :  that  of 
intellect  is  the  abstract  and  universal.  An  organic  faculty  can 
only  respond  to  definite  corporeal  impressions,  and  can  only 
represent  individual  concrete  objects.  But  universal  ideas, 
abstract  intellectual  relations,  and  the  necessity  of  axiomatic 
truths  do  not  possess  actual  concrete  existence,  and  so  cannot 
produce  an  impression  on  any  organ.  Yet  consciousness 
assures  us  that  they  are  apprehended  by  us ;  consequently,  it 
must  be  by  some  supra-organic  or  spiritual  faculty.  We 
have  thus  proved  the  existence  of  a  supra-sensuous  or 
spiritual  form  of  life  in  the  cognitive  region  of  the  mind  : 
later  on,  when  dealing  with  Free-will,  we  shall  establish  in 
the  sphere  of  appetency  a  similar  truth. 

Intellect  mediately  dependent  on  the  brain. — 

In  asserting  that  the  intellect  is  a  spiritual  faculty, 
we  do  not  of  course  imply  that  it  is  in  no  way 
dependent  on  the  organism,  any  more  than  in  main- 
taining the  freedom  of  the  will  we  suppose  this  latter 
faculty  to  be  uninfluenced  by  sensitive  appetite. 
It  is  indisputable  that  exhaustion  of  brain  power 
accompanies  the  work  of  thinking ;  but  the  fact 
that  the  exercise  of  imagination  or  of  external 
sense  forms  a  conditio  sine  qua  non  of  intellectual 
activity,  accounts  for  such  consumption  of  cerebral 
energy.  Although  intellect  is  a  spiritual  faculty  of 
the  mind,  it  presupposes,  so  long  as  the  soul  informs 
the  body,  the  stimulation  of  the  organic  faculty  of 
sense.  This  was  expressed  in  the  language  of  the 
schools  by  saying  that  intellectual  activity  depends 
extrinsically  or  per  accidens  on  the  organic  faculties. 
The  universal    concept,  the  intellectual  judgment, 

Q 


242  NATIONAL   LIFE. 


the  act  of  reflexion,  are  not,  like  sensation,  the 
results  of  the  stimulation  of  a  sense-organ,  but 
products  of  purely  spiritual  action.  The  inferior 
mode  of  mental  life  is  awakened  by  the  irritation  of 
sentient  nerves,  the  superior  activity  is  due  to  a 
higher  reaction  from  the  unexhausted  nature  of  the 
mind  itself;  and  the  ground  for  this  reaction  lies  in 
the  fact  that  the  same  indivisible  soul  is  the  root  of 
both  orders  of  faculties.  Intellectual  cognition 
always  involves  self-action  on  the  part  of  the  mind, 
but  the  conditions  of  such  self-action  are  posited  by 
impressions  in  the  inferior  recipient  faculties.  The 
nature  of  the  process  will  be  more  fully  described  in 
chapter  xv. 

Balmez  and  Lotze  on  Sensationism. — The  doctrine  ex- 
pounded in  the  present  chapter  is  of  such  vital  importance, 
yet  so  completel}^  unfamiUar  to  the  student  whose  reading 
has  been  confined  to  the  current  psychological  text-books  of 
this  country,  that  we  deem  it  well  worth  while,  for  the  better 
enforcement  of  our  teaching,  to  cite  a  few  passages  from 
foreign  philosophers  of  note.  We  shall  select  for  our  puirpose 
Balmez,  the  brilliant  and  original  Spanish  metaphysician  of 
the  first  half  of  this  century,  and  Lotze,  the  ablest  recent 
representative  of  the  combined  Hegelian  and  Herbartian 
schools,  who  in  addition  holds  high  rank  in  physiological 
science. 

In  Chapter  ii.,  Book  iv.,  of  his  Fundamental  Philosophy, 
Balmez  examines  the  sensational  psychology  of  Condillac, 
and  his  criticism  of  that  author  applies  with  equal  justice  to 
the  entire  empirical  school  of  this  country  from  Hume  and 
Hartley  to  Bain  and  Sully.  In  the  conception  of  the  mind 
held  in  common  by  all  these  writers  sense  is  the  sole  parent 
and  source  of  all  knowledge.  There  is  no  rational  activity 
essentially  distinct  from,  and  superior  to,  that  of  sense.  The 
formation  of  concepts,  the  operations  of  comparison  and 
judgment,  and  the  application  of  thought  in  the  act  of 
attention,  are  merely  sensations  coalescing  or  conflicting  in  a 
fainter  or  more  vivid  stage.  Balmez'  observations  on  the 
system  of  the  original  parent  of  French  sensism  will,  conse- 
quently, be  very  much  to  the  Doint.      After  a  brief  account  of 


INTELLECT  AND   SENSE.  243 


Condillac's  hypothetical  statue,  which,  at  first  endowed  with 
a  single  mode  of  sensibility,  gradually  developes  higher  forms 
of  mental  power,  the  Spanish  philosopher  lays  bare  the 
deficiencies  of  the  sensist  doctrine  : 

Attention. — "  Condillac  calls  capacity  of  feeling,  when  applied 
to    an     impression,    attention.       So    if    there    be     but    one 
sensation  there  can  be  but  one  attention.      If  various  sensa- 
tions succeeding  each  other  leave  some  trace  in  the  memory 
of  the  statue,  the  attention  will,  when  a  new   sensation  is 
presented,  be  divided  between  the  present  and  the  past.    The 
attention  directed  at  one  and  the  same  time  to  two  sensations 
becomes    comparison.      Similarities  and  differences   are   per- 
ceived by  comparison,  and  this  perception  is  a  judgment.     All 
this   is    done    with    sensations    alone ;     therefore    attention, 
memory,  comparison,  and  judgment  are  nothing  but  sensa- 
tions transformed.      In   appearance  nothing    clearer,   more 
simple,  or  more  ingenuous  ;    in  reality  nothing  more  confused 
or  false.      First  of  all,  this  definition  of  attention  is  not  exact. 
The  capacity  of  feehng,  by  the  very  fact  of  being  in  exercise, 
is  apphed   to   the   impression.      It   does  not  feel  when   the 
sensitive  faculty  is  not  in  exercise,  and  this  is  not  in  exercise 
except  when  applied  to  the  impression.     Consequently  attention 
would  he  nothing  hut  the  act  of  feeling ;  all  sensation  would  he 
attention,  and  all  attention  sensation ;    a  meaning  which  no  one 
ever  yet  gave  to  these  words.     Attention  is  the  application  of 
the  mind   to   something;    and   this   apphcation   supposes   the 
exercise  of  an  activity  concentrated  upon  its  object.  Properly 
speaking,  when  the  mind  holds  itself  entirely  passive  it  is  not 
attentive  ;  and  with  respect  to  sensations,  it  is  attentive  when 
by  a  reflex  act  we  know  that  we  feel.      Without  this  cognition 
there  can  be  no  attention,  but  only  sensation  more  or  less 
active,   according    to    the   degree  in    which    it    affects    our 
sensibility.       If  Condillac    means    to   call    the    more    vivid 
sensation  attention,   the    word  is  improperly   used ;     for   it 
ordinarily   happens   that   they   who   feel   with    the    greatest 
vividness  are  precisely  those  who  are  distinguished  for  their 
want   of  attention.     Sensation   is   the  affection  of  a  passive 
faculty;  attention  is  the  exercise  of  an  activity.'' 

Judgment. — The  difference  between  a  sensation  of  more  or 
less  vivacity  and  the  intellectual  act  of  attention  is  here 
clearly  exhibited,  but  the  distinction  between  sense  and 
thought  is  made  still  more  evident,  when  the  Spanish 
philosopher  passes  on  to  Comparison  and  Judgment :  "  Is  the 
perception  of  the  difference  of  the  smell  of  the  rose  and  that  o-t 
the  pink  a  sensation  ?  If  we  answer  that  it  is  not,  we  infer 
that  the  judgment  is  not  the  sensation  transformed  ;  for  it  is 
not  even  a  sensation.      If  we  are  told  that  it  is  one  sensation, 


244  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


we  then  observe  that  if  it  be  either  that  of  the  rose  or  that  of 
the  pink,  it  follows  that  with  one  of  these  sensations  we  shall 
have  comparative  perception,  which  is  absurd.      If  we  are 
answered  that  it  is  both  together,  we  must  either  interpret 
this  expression  rigorously,  and  then  we  shall  have  a  sensation 
which  will  at  once  be  that  of  the  pink  and  that  of  the  rose, 
the  one  remaining  distinct  from  the  other,  so  as  to  satisfy  the 
conditions  of  comparison  ;    or  we  must  interpret  it  so  as  to 
mean  that  the  two  sensations  are  united  ;    in  which  case  we 
gain  nothing,  for  the  difficulty  will  be  to  show  how  co-existence 
produces   comparison,  and  judgment,    or  the  perception  of  the 
difference.      The  sensation  of  the  pink  is  only  that  of  the  pink, 
and  that  of  the  rose  only  that  of  the  rose.      The  instant  you 
attempt  to  compare  them  you  suppose  in  the  mind  an  act  by 
which  it  perceives  the  difference  ;    and  if  you  attribute  to  it 
anything  more  than  pure  sensation  you  add  a  facidty  distinct 
from  sensation,   namely,   that   of  comparing  sensations,   and 
appreciating  their  similarities  and   differences.      This   com- 
parison, this  intellectual  force,  which  calls  the  two  extremes 
into  a  common  arena  without  confounding  them,  discovers 
the  points  in  which  they  are  alike  or  unlike  each  other,  and, 
as  it  were,  comes  in  and  decides  between  them,  is  distinct 
from  the  sensation;    it  is  the  effect  of  an  activity  of  a  different 
order,  and   its  development   must  depend  on   sensations   as 
exciting  causes,  as  a  condition  sine  qua  non;  but  this  is  all  it 
has  to  do  with  sensations  themselves  ;    it  is  essentially  distinct 
from  them,  and  cannot  be  confounded  ivith  them  without  destroying 
the  idea  of  comparison,  and  rendering  it  impossible.    No  judgment 
is  possible  without  the  ideas  of  identity  or  similarity,  and 
these  ideas  are  not  sensations.      Sensations   are  particular 
facts  which  never  leave  their  own  sphere,  nor  can  be  applied 
from   one   thing  to   another.     The   ideas  of  similarity   and 
identity   have   something   in   common   applicable    to    many 
facts.  .  .  .     Nor  can  memory,  properly  so  called,  of  sensa- 
tions be  explained  by  themselves  ;    and  here  again  Condillac 
is  wrong.      The  statue  may  recollect  to-day  the  sensation  of 
the  smell  of  the  rose  which  it  received  yesterday,  and  this 
recollection  may  exist  in   two  ways  :    first,  by  the  internal 
reproduction  of  the  sensation  without  any  external  cause,  or 
relation  to  time  past,  and  consequently  without  any  relation 
to  the  prior  existence  of  a  similar  sensation  ;    and  then  this 
recollection  is  not  for  the  statue  a  recollection  properly   so 
called,  but  only  a  sensation  more  or  less  vivid;    secondly,  by 
an  internal  reproduction  with  relation   to  the  existence  of  the 
same  or  another  similar  sensation  at  a  preceding  time,  in  which 
Recollection  essentially  consists ;    and  here  there  is  something 
more  than  sensation— here  are  the  ideas  of  succession,  time, 


INTELLECT   AND   SENSE.  245 


priority,  and  identity  or  similarity,  all  distinct  or  separable 
from  sensations.  Two  entirely  distinct  sensations  may  be 
referred  to  the  same  time  in  memory,  and  then  the  time  will 
be  identical  and  the  sensations  distinct.  The  sensation  may 
exist  without  any  recollection  of  the  time  it  before  existed,  or 
even  without  any  recollection  of  having  ever  existed,  conse- 
quently sensation  involves  no  relation  to  time."  '' 

Lotze. — We  shall  now  turn  to  the  German  philosopher. 
In  one  of  the  best  pieces  of  Psychology  which  he  has  written 
— the  chapter  on  the  "  Mental  Act  of  Relation,"  ^  Lotze 
remarks  :  "  The  view  which  regards  Attention  as  an  activity 
exercised  by  the  soul  and  having  ideas  {i.e.,  sense-impressions, 
images,  &c.)  for  its  objects,  and  not  a  property  of  which  the 
ideas  are  subjects,  was  right.  The  latter  notion  was  the  one 
preferred  by  Herbart  (and  by  the  sensist  school).  According 
to  him  (and  them),  when  we  say  that  we  have  directed  our 
attention  to  the  idea  b,  what  has  really  happened  is  merely 
that  b,  through  an  increase  of  its  own  strength,  has  raised 
itself  in  consciousness  above  the  rest  of  the  ideas.  But  even 
were  the  conception  of  a  variable  strength  free  from  difficulty 
in  its  application  to  ideas,  the  task  which  we  expect  attention 
to  perform  would  still  remain  inexplicable.  What  we  seek  to 
attain  by  attention  is  not  an  equally  increasing  intensity  of 
the  represented  content  just  as  it  is,  but  a  grov/th  in  its 
clearness;  and  this  rests  in  all  cases  on  the  perception  of 
relations  which  obtain  between  its  individual  constituents. 
Even  when  Attention  is  directed  to  a  perfectly  simple 
impression,  the  sole  use  in  exerting  it  lies  in  the  discovery  of 
relations.  ...  If  we  wish  to  tune  a  string  exactly,  we 
compare  its  sound  with  the  sound  of  another  which  serves  as 
a  pattern,  and  try  to  make  sure  whether  the  two  agree  or 
differ.  .  .  .  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  moments  when  we 
cannot  collect  ourselves,  when  we  are  wholly  occupied  by 
a  strong  impression,  which  yet  does  not  become  distinct,  because 
the  excessive  force  of  the  stimulation  hinders  the  exercise  of 
the  constructive  act  of  comparison."  ^ 

In  an  earlier  part  of  the  same  chapter  he  establishes 
still  more  clearly  the  supra-sensuous  nature  of  Attention, 
as  manifested  in  comparison  and  judgment :  "  The  con- 
sciousness of  the  relations  existing  between  various  single 
sensations  (among  which  we  reckon  here  the  sum  formed  by 
the  sensations  when  united)  is  not  given  simply  by  the 
existence  of  these  relations  considered  simply  as  a  fact.  So 
far  we  have  considered  only  single  ideas,  and  the  ways  in 

'  Fumiarncntal  Philosophv,  Vol.  II.  §§  7 — 13. 
**  Metaphysics,  Bk.  III.  »  §  273. 


246  RATIONAL  LIFE. 


which  they  either  exist  simultaneously  in  consciousness, 
or  else  successively  replace  one  another  ;  but  there  exists  not 
only  in  us  this  variety  of  ideas  and  this  change  of  ideas,  but 
also  an  idea  of  this  variety  and  change.  Nor  is  it  merely  in 
thought  that  we  ought  to  distinguish  the  apprehension  of 
existing  relations  which  arises  from  an  act  of  reference  and 
comparison,  from  the  mere  sensation  of  the  individual 
members  of  the  relation  ;  experience  shows  that  the  tivo  are 
separable  in  reality,  and  justifies  us  in  subordinating  the 
conscious  sensation  and  representation  of  individual  contents 
to  the  referring  or  relating  act  of  representation,  and  in 
considering  the  latter  to  be  a  higher  activity, — higher  in  that 
definite  sense  of  the  word  according  to  ivhich  the  higher  necessarily 
presupposes  tJie  lower,  but  does  not  in  its  own  nature  necessarily 
proceed  from  the  lower.  Just  as  the  external  sense-stimuli  serve  to 
excite  the  soul  to  produce  simple  sensations,  so  the  relations  which 
have  arisen  betiveen  the  many  ideas,  whether  simultaneous  or 
successive,  thus  produced,  serve  the  soul  as  a  new  internal  stimulus 
stirring  it  to  exercise  this  new  reacting  activity. '^^  When  two 
ideas,  a  and  b,  have  arisen  as  the  ideas  '  red  '  and  '  blue,'  they 
do  not  mix  with  one  another,  disappear,  and  so  form  the 
third  idea,  c,  of  '  violet.'  If  they  did  so  we  should  have 
a  change  of  simple  ideas  without  the  possibility  of  a  com- 
parison between  them.  This  comparison  is  itself  possible 
only  if  one  and  the  same  activity  at  once  holds  a  and  b  together 
and  holds  them  apart,  but  yet,  in  passing  from  a  to  b,  is 
conscious  of  the  change  caused  in  its  state  by  these  transi- 
tions, and  it  is  in  this  way  that  the  new  idea  (concept),  y, 
arises,  the  idea  of  a  definite  degree  of  qualitative  likeness 
or  unlikeness  in  a  and  b. 

"  Again  :  if  we  see  at  the  same  time  a  stronger  light, 
a,  and  a  weaker  light,  b,  of  the  same  colour,  what  happens  is 
not  that  there  arises  in  place  of  both  the  idea,  c,  of  a  light 
whose  strength  is  the  sum  of  the  intensities  of  the  two. 
If  that  did  arise  it  would  mean  that  the  material  to  which  the 
comparison  has  to  be  directed  had  disappeared.  The 
comparison  is  made  only  because  one  and  the  same  activity, 
passing  between  a  and  b,  is  conscious  of  the  alteration  in  its 
state  sustained  in  the  passage  ;  and  it  is  in  this  way  that  the 
idea  y  arises,  the  idea  of  a  definite  quantitative  difference. 
Lastly  :  given  the  impressions  a  and  a,  that  which  arises  from 
them  is  not  a  third  impression=2rt ;  but  the  activity,  passing 
as  before  between  the  still  separated  impressions,  is  conscious 
of  having  sustained  no  alteration  in  the  passage  :  and  in  this 

^^  Lotze's  doctrine  here  is  in  strikingly  close  affinity  to  the 
Bcholastic  teaching  on  intellectual  activity.  Cf.  also  Microccsmus, 
Bk.  II.  c.  iv.  §  I.     The  italics  throughout  are  our  own. 


INTELLECT  AND   SENSE.  247 

way  would  arise  the  new  idea  y  of  identity.  We  are  justified 
in  regarding  all  these  different  instances  of  y  as  ideas  (concepts) 
of  a  higher  or  second  order.  They  are  not  to  be  put  on  a  line 
with  the  ideas  (images)  from  the  comparison  of  which  they 
arose."  (§  268.) 

Again  :  "  My  immediate  object  is  to  indicate  what 
happens  at  least  with  such  clearness  that  every  one  may 
verify  its  reality  in  his  own  internal  observation.  It  is  quite 
true  that,  to  those  who  start  from  the  circle  of  ideas  common  in 
physical  mechanics,  there  must  be  something  strange  in  the 
conception  of  an  activity,  or  {it  is  the  same  thing)  of  an  active 
being,  which  not  only  experiences  two  states  a  and  b  at  the 
same  time  without  fusing  them  into  a  resultant,  but  which 
passes  from  one  to  the  other  and  acquires  the  idea  of  a  third 
state  y  produced  by  this  very  transition.  Still  this  process  is 
a.  fact ;  and  the  reproach  of  failure  in  the  attempt  to  imagine 
how  it  arises  after  the  analogies  of  physical  mechanics,  falls 
only  upon  the  mistaken  desire  of  construing  the  perfectly  unique 
sphere  of  mental  life  after  a  pattern  foreign  to  it.  That  desire 
I  hold  to  be  the  most  mischievous  which  threatens  the 
progress  of  Psychology."  (§  269.) 

The  Controversy  concerning-  Universals. — Different  views 
as  to  the  nature  of  sensuous  and  intellectual  cognition  gave 
rise  to  the  great  philosophical  disputes  as  to  the  existence, 
origin,  and  validity  of  General  Concepts.  These  problems 
ramify  into  Logic  and  Metaphysics  as  well  as  into  Psychology. 
The  two  former  sciences  are  mainly  concerned  with  deter- 
mining the  objective  counterpart  of  such  ideas  ;  the  last  with 
their  subjective  reality  and  their  origin.  The  solidarity  of 
these  distinct  questions,  and  the  mutual  interdependence  of 
the  particular  solutions  advanced  in  regard  to  each,  are, 
however,  only  one  more  proof  of  the  impossibility  of  isolating 
psychology  from  philosophy.  Modern  writers  often  express 
surprise  at  the  intense  interest  these  discussions  once  aroused. 
But  the  reason  is  obvious  to  any  one  who  understands  their 
real  significance.  They  are  of  vital  importance  to  epistem- 
ology,  or  the  theory  of  knowledge,  and  consequently  to  every 
system  of  Metaphysics  and  Theology, 

Extreme  Realism.— One  school,  represented  by  Plato  in 
ancient  Greece,  taught  that  universals  {unum  in  piuribus) 
existed  formally  as  universals  outside  of  the  mind;  that  corres^ 
ponding  to  every  general  idea,  such  as  genus,  species,  triangle, 
animal,  man,  truth,  &c.,  there  exists  somewhere  beyond 
this  world  of  changing  phenomena,  a  reality  which  is 
formally  and  actually  abstract  and  universal — universalia 
separata.  This  doctrine  was  refuted  by  Aristotle  and  rejected 
by  St.  Thomas  and  the  vast  majority  of  the  schoolmen.     But 


'248  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


a  kindred  theory,  maintaining  that  universals  exist  really  in 
things — formally  as  universals — antecedent  to  and  independent 
of  our  minds,  was  advocated  by  William  of  Champeaux 
(died  1 121),  and  by  a  few  other  scholastic  philosophers. 
In  this  view,  numerically  one  and  the  same  essence  is 
common  to  all  the  individuals  of  a  species — the  humanity  of 
Peter  is  identical  with  that  of  Paul.  This  form  of  exaggerated 
realism  was  seen  to  lead  inevitably  to  Pantheism ;  and  so  it 
soon  fell  into  disrepute.  It  has  not  been  explicitly  defended 
by  any  school  for  some  centuries  past,  yet  certain  forms  of 
modern  German  idealism  have  very  close  affinity  to  it. 

Nominalism. — At  the  extreme  opposite  pole  of  philoso- 
phical thought  is  Nominalism,  the  logical  outcome  of  sensa- 
tionism.  For  it  the  only  universality  lies  in  the  word. 
Outside  of  the  mind  there  exists  nothing  but  singular  concrete 
objects.  Groups  of  these  resemble  each  other  in  certain 
qualities,  and  we  ticket  them  with  a  common  name.  They 
are  apprehended  in  individual  sense-impressions  and  repre- 
sented by  individual  pictures  of  the  imagination.  These 
latter  vary  in  distinctness,  but  whether  clear  or  obscure, 
vague  or  definite,  fluctuating  or  comparatively  stable,  each 
such  image  at  any  given  time  is  capable  of  representing  but 
one  object.  It  is  necessarily  singular ;  the  word  or  common 
name  alone  is  universal  in  that  it  impartially  stands  for  any 
member  of  the  class.  This  theory — that  universals  exist 
neither  in  material  things  nor  in  the  mind,  that  they  are 
mere  words,  flatus  vocis — formulated  in  the  eleventh  century 
by  Roscellinus  has  been  the  common  doctrine  of  sensationist 
psychologists,  from  Hobbesto  Bain  and  Sully. 

Conceptualism. — In  opposition  to  Nominalism,  Conceptual- 
ism  maintains  that  the  mind  has  the  power  of  forming 
genuinely  universal  concepts ;  that  is,  ideas  capable  of  truly 
representing  every  member  of  a  given  class.  The  Conceptualist 
agrees  with  the  Nominalist  in  denying  the  existence  of  any 
form  of  universality  outside  of  the  mind  ;  but  on  the  other 
hand  he  teaches  that  the  mind  has  the  power  to  construct 
truly  universal  notions,  quite  distinct  from  the  images  of  the 
imagination ;  and  in  proof  of  the  existence  of  such  universal 
notions,  he  employs  most  of  those  arguments  which  we  our- 
selves adduce,  although  he  does  not  follow  some  of  them  out 
to  their  legitimate  consequences.  Conceptualism  has  varied 
much  in  the  hands  of  different  writers,  from  Abelard  (1079 — 
1 142)  to  Kant  and  Lotze,  and  from  these  to  more  recent  repre- 
sentatives like  Mr.  Stout  and  Dr.  J.  Ward  ;  but  they  all  agree 
in  rejecting  that  mechanical  view  of  the  mind  which  lies  at 
the  basis  of  sensism  and  nominalism,  and  which  conceives  all 
cognition  as  the  product  of  the  automatic  composition  and 


INTELLECT  AND   SENSE.  2.19 

conflict,  agglutination  and  counteraction  of  sensuous  impres- 
sions, and  they  ascribe  to  the  mind,  under  one  form  or  another, 
an  inherently  active  power  of  co-ordinating  and  combining 
individual  sense  impressions  by  means  of  these  universal 
notions  which  it  constructs.  For  our  own  part,  whilst  we 
gladly  acknowledge  the  good  wori<  which  Conceptualism  has 
done  by  its  criticism  of  both  Nominalism  and  Ultra-Realism, 
we  must  insist  on  its  deficiency  in  failing  to  recognize  in 
reriim  iiatura  real  objective  foundation  for  our  universal  ideas. 
The  a  priori  element  in  knowledge  is  exaggerated.  The 
universal  concept  is,  in  most  of  these  systems,  conceived  as 
a  too  purely  subjective  creation  of  the  mind — a  mental 
abstraction  devoid  of  a  true  foundation  in  external  reality. 
All  knowledge  becomes  in  their  view  essentially  relative  and 
limited  to  our  own  mental  states. 

Moderate  Realism.  —  There  remains  the  doctrine  of 
Moderate  Realism,  taught  in  ancient  times  by  Aristotle,  and 
in  the  middle  ages  by  St.  Thomas  and  the  vast  majority  of 
the  schoolmen.  This  theory  is  generally  ignored  by  modern 
writers,  who  almost  invariably  represent  the  Scholastic 
Philosophers  as  adhering  en  masse  to  the  extravagant  realism 
of  Plato  or  of  William  of  Champeaux.  Yet  the  well-known 
fact  that  Aristotle  ruled  supreme  in  the  schools  from  the 
twelfth  to  the  sixteenth  century  ought  to  have  preserved  even 
those  who  never  read  a  scholastic  work  from  so  egregious  an 
error.  Moderate  Realism  holds  with  Conceptualism  against 
Nominalism  that  not  only  the  common  name  of  the  members 
of  a  class  is  universal,  but  that  there  are  truly  universal- 
concepts,  not  mere  sensuous  images  or  phantasms,  whether  of 
a  singular  or  confused  generic  type.  Secondly,  it  teaches 
against  both  Conceptualism  and  Nominalism  that  there  is  a 
real  objective  foundation  for  this  universal  concept,  in  the 
perfectly  similar  natures  of  the  members  of  the  same  class. 
The  essence,  the  constituent  features,  the  nature,  type,  or 
ideal  plan,  of  man,  triangle,  silver,  is  repeated  and  contained 
equally  in  each  concrete  sample  of  the  class,  however  much 
these  may  accidentally  differ.  It  is,  of  course,  numerically 
different,  and  individualized  by  particular  determinations  in 
each  instance.  But  considered  in  the  abstract  apart  from 
these  individual  determinations  it  might  equally  well  be 
realized  in  any  member  of  the  class.  The  essence  is  thus 
said  to  be  potentially  universal,  and  the  concept  of  such  an 
essence  can  be  employed  to  represent  truly  all  the  possible 
members  of  the  class.  It  is  upon  the  perfect  similarity  of 
natures  in  all  the  members  of  a  class  thus  grasped  in  a 
universal  concept  that  the  objective  validity  of  science  rests. 
Cieneral  notions  are  therefore  not  purely  mental  figments; 


250  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


they  are  intellectual  constructions,  but  reposing  on  objective 
foundations  in  the  real  order  of  things.  Moderate  Realism 
accordingly  agrees  with  Nominalism  and  Conceptualism  in 
condemning  the  extravagant  realism  which  maintained  the 
existence  of  universals  formally  as  universals  outside  of  the 
mind.  Universal  ideas  are  abstractions,  but  still  they  have  a 
genuine  basis  in  reahty,  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  mathe- 
matics and  the  other  sciences  have  real  validity.  Such  is  the 
doctrine  of  Moderate  Realism  advocated  by  Aristotle  and 
St.Thomas,^^  the  only  theory,  we  believe,  at  once  in  harmony 
with  introspection  and  capable  of  affording  an  adequate 
groundwork  for  mathematics  and  the  other  sciences. 

It  is  so  satisfactory  to  find  our  teaching  confirmed  by  such  a 
prominent  and  thorough-going  sensationalist  as  G.  H.  Lewes, 
that  we  shall  cite  him  at  length.  We  do  this  all  the  more 
gladly  as  he  acknowledges  that  the  nominalist  view  of  Mill 
and  Bain  would  render  mathematical  science  indistinguish- 
able from  a  series  of  worthless  propositions  deduced  from  a 
collection  of  artificial  definitions  and  arbitrary  postulates : 
"To  the  geometer  the  circle  is  not  a  round  figure  visible  by 
his  eye,  but  a  figure  visible  by  his  mind  in  which  all  the  radii 
from  the  centre  are  absolutely  equal ;  it  is  not  this  particular 
circle,  it  is  the  ideal  circle."^^  Again:  "The  objects  of 
mathematical  study  are  reals  in  the  same  degree  as  that  in 
which  the  objects  of  any  other  science  are  reals.  Although 
they  are  abstractions,  we  must  not  suppose  them  to  be 
imaginary,  if  by  imaginary  be  meant  unreal,  not  objective. 
They  are  intelligibles  of  sensibles ;  abstractions  ichich  have  their 
corcretes  in  real  objects.  The  line  and  the  surface  exist,  and 
have  real  properties,  just  as  the  planet,  the  crystal,  and  the 

^^  "  Unitas  sive  communitas  naturas  humanse  non  est  secundum 
rem,  sed  solum  secundum  considevationem."  (St.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol. 
I.  q.  39,  a.  3.)  "  Universalia  secundum  quod  sunt  universalia  non 
sunt  nisi  in  anima.  Ipsae  autem  naturae,  quibus  accidit  intentio 
universalitatis  sunt  in  rebus."  (St.  Thomas,  D^/i;?/;;^,  lib.  ii.  lect.  12.) 
"  Ipsa  natura  cui  accidit  vel  intelUgi,  vel  ahstvahi,  vel  intentio  univer- 
salitatis non  est  nisi  in  singularibus.  Sed  hoc  ipsum  quod  est 
intelligi  vel  abstrahi  vel  intentio  universalitatis,  est  in  intellectu.  .  .  . 
Humanitas  quas  intelligitur  non  est  nisi  in  hi.-^c  vel  illo  homine  ;  sed 
quod  humanitas  apprehendatur  sine  individualibus  conditionibus, 
quod  est  '  ipsam  abstrahi,*  ad  qnod  sequitur  intentio  universali- 
tatis, accidit  humanitati  secundum  quod  percipitur  ab  intellectu." 
{Sum.  Theol.  I.  q.  85,  a.  2,  ad  2.)  "  Humanitas  enim  est  aliquid  in  re, 
non  tamen  ibi  habet  rationem  universalis  quum  non  sit  extra  animam 
aliqua  humanitas  multis  communis:  sed  secundum  quod  accipitur 
in  intellectu,  adjungitur  ei  per  operationem  intellectus  intentio 
secundum  quam  dicitur  species."  {Id.  I.  Dist.  ig,  a.  5,  ad  i.) 

^'^  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  Vol.  I.  p.  344. 


INTELLECT  AND   SENSE. 


2SI 


animal  exist  and  have  real  properties.  It  is  often  said,  '  The 
point  without  length  or  breadth,  the  line  without  breadth, 
and  the  surface  without  thickness  are  imaginary ;  they  are 
fictions,  no  such  things  exist  in  reality.'  This  is  true,  but 
misleading.  These  things  are  fictions,  but  they  have  a  real 
existence,  though  not  in  the  insulation  of  ideal  form,  for  no  idea 
exists  out  of  the  mind.  These  abstractions  are  the  limits  of 
concretes.  Every  time  we  look  on  a  pool  of  water  we  see  a 
surface  without  thickness,  every  time  we  look  on  a  parti- 
coloured surface  we  see  a  line  without  breadth  as  the  limit 
of  each  colour.  Both  surface  and  line  as  mathematically 
defined  are  unimaginable,  for  we  cannot  form  images  of  them, 
cannot  picture  them  detached;  but  that  icJiich  is  tinpicturable 
may  be  conceivable,  and  the  abstraction  ivhich  is  impossible  to 
perception  and  imagination  is  easy  to  conception.  It  is  thus  that 
scnsibles  are  raised  to  intcUigiblcs,  and  the  constructions  of 
science — conceptions — take  the  place  of  perceptions.  But 
the  hold  on  reality  is  not  loosened  by  this  process.  When  we 
consider  solely  the  direction  of  a  line  we  are  dealing  with  a 
fact  of  Nature,  just  as  we  are  dealing  with  a  fact  of  Nature 
when  we  perform  the  abstraction  of  considering  the  move- 
ment of  a  body  irrespective  of  any  other  relations.  .  .  .  Not 
only  is  it  misleading  to  call  the  objects  of  Mathematics 
imaginary,  it  is  also  incorrect  to  call  them  generalizations. 
They  are  abstractions  of  intuitions.  Any  particular  line  we 
draw  has  breadth,  any  particular  circle  is  imperfect ;  con- 
sequently generalized  lines  and  circles  [scil.,  by  imagination 
=  generic  images)  must  have  breadth  and  imperfection. 
Whereas  the  line  or  circle  which  we  intuit  mathematically 
is  an  abstraction  from  which  breadth  or  imperfection  has 
dropped,  and  the  figures  we  intuit  are  these  figures  under  the 
form  cf  th3  limit."  {Id.  420.) 

The  student  will  find  further  information  on  this  question 
in  our  historical  sketch  in  the  next  chapter. 

Readings. — On  the  essential  difference  between  Intellect  and 
Sense,  cf.  St.  Thomas,  De  Anima,  Lib.  III.  1,  7  ;  Contra  Gentiles, 
Lib.  II.  c.  66;  Boedder,  Psych.  Rat,  §§  106 — 112;  Mivart,  On 
Truth,  c.  XV.  ;  Balmez,  Fundamental  Principles,  Bk.  IV.  ;  Kleutgen, 
Phil.  d.  Vorzeit,  §§  33 — 39.  The  universal  concept  is  admirably 
treated  both  by  Abbe  Piat,  LTdee,  pp.  50 — 64  ;  iSo — 220  ;  and  by 
Fere  Peillaube,  Theorie  des  Concepts,  cc.  2,  3  ;  see  also  Logic  (present 
series),  cc.  7,  8.  Green's  Introduction  to  Hume's  Treatise  on  Human 
Nature  contains  an  able  examination  of  Sensism, 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

CONCEPTION.       ORIGIN  „OF    INTELLECTUAL    IDEAS. 
ERRONEOUS    THEORIES. 

Origin  of  Ideas. — We  have  shown  in  our  last 
chapter  that  certain  mental  products  are  essentially 
distinct  from  those  of  our  sensuous  faculties  and 
must  be  due  to  some  higher  power  of  the  soul.  The 
question  next  arises  :  How  are  these  supra-sensuous 
results  effected  ?  This  is  the  problem  of  the  Origin 
of  Intellectual  Ideas.  Epistemology,  or  the  branch 
of  Philosophy  which  investigates  the  validity  of 
human  knowledge  in  general,  is  peculiarly  interested 
in  this  question.  For  upon  the  answer  given  by 
the  Psychologist  as  to  how  our  conceptions  have 
originated  may  seriously  depend  the  Philosopher's 
decision  as  to  their  worth  and  truth.  The  chief 
solutions  advanced  are,  (i)  the  hypotheses  of  Innate 
Ideas,  and  a  priori  "Mental  Forms ;  (2)  Empiricism 
or  the  sensationalist  theory;  and  (3)  the  Peripatetic 
doctrine.  The  first  exaggerates  the  contribution  of 
the  mind  to  a  maximum.  The  second  reduces  it  to 
a  minimum.  The  third  whilst  deriving  all  know- 
ledge from  experience  insists  upon  the  important 
part  played  by  the  rational  activity  of  the  mind  in 


CONCEPTION.  253 


the  elaboration  of  knowledge.     It  will  be  dealt  with 
in  the  next  chapter. 

Furthermore,  either  in  connexion  with  the 
doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  or  independently  of  it, 
some  modern  philosophers  have  sought  to  solve 
the  problem  of  knowledge  by  metaphysical  hypo- 
theses concerning  the  relations  subsisting  between 
the  human  mind  and  the  Deity.  The  chief  of  these 
have  been  the  theories  of  Divine  Assistance, 
Ontologism,  Pre-established  harmony,  and  Monistic 
Pantheism.     We  shall  give  a  brief  sketch  of  each. 

Theory  of  Innate  Ideas. — A  common  characteristic 
of  many  philosophers  who  justly  insist  on  the  spirit- 
uality of  the  soul  is  to  unduly  exaggerate  the  opposition 
between  mind  and  body,  and  some  of  them  are  inclined 
to  adopt  an  extravagant  dualism,  denying  the  possibility 
of  any  mutual  interaction  between  the  spiritual  and 
material  substances.  Supra-sensuous  mental  pro- 
ducts, such  as  the  ideas  of  being,  imity,  the  true,  the 
good,  necessary  truths,  and  the  like,  cannot,  these 
philosophers  maintain,  have  been  originated  by  sensuous 
observation  ;  they  are  presupposed  in  all  experience 
and  transcend  it.  They  must  consequently  have  been 
innate  or  inhorn  m  the  mind  from  the  beginning,  ante- 
cedently to  all  acquired  knowledge.  Such,  in  a  word,  is 
the  case  for  this  theory. 

Disproof. — There  are  numerous  fatal  objections  to 
it.  Firstly,  it  may  be  rejected  as  a  gratuitous  h3'pothesis. 
Unless  it  be  demonstrated  that  some  portion  of  our 
knowledge  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  the  combined 
action  of  sense  and  intellect,  the  assumption  of  such  a 
native  endowment  is  unwarranted.  But  this  demon- 
stration is  impossible.  Moreover,  the  genesis  of  vastly 
the  greater  portion  of  our  knowledge  can  be  traced  to 
experience,  and  there  is  every  reason  for  supposing 
that  the  residual  fraction  has  arisen  in  the  same  way. 
Secondly,  by  the  very  nature  of  the  case  there  can  be  no 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  any  ideas  antecedent  to 


254  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


experience.  Thirdly,  all  our  earliest  ideas  are  of  objects 
known  by  sensible  experience,  it  is  about  such  sensible 
material  objects  our  first  judgments  are  elicited,  and 
to  these  we  always  turn  to  illustrate  our  loftiest  and 
most  abstract  conceptions.  The  words,  too,  employed 
to  express  supra-sensuous  realities  are  primarily  drawn 
from  sensible  experiences  and  material  phenomena. 
Moreover,  persons  deficient  in  any  sense  from  birth  are 
deprived  of  a  corresponding  class  of  ideas.  But  these 
facts  are  obviously  in  conflict  with  the  supposition  of  a 
supply  of  ready-made  supra-sensuous  cognitions  from 
the  beginning.  Lastly,  we  may  add  that  the  tendency 
of  physiological  science  is  to  make  the  doctrine  of  the 
mutual  independence  of  body  and  soul  less  tenable 
every  succeeding  day. 

Kant's  doctrine  and  the  other  theories  which  we 
have  mentioned  must  be  dealt  with  separately. 

Empiricism. — The  Sensationist  oi  Empiricist  theory 
of  knowledge  stands  in  the  completest  opposition  to  the 
views  of  Kant,  and  of  the  supporters  of  innate  ideas. 
Starting  from  the  assumption  that  sensuous  and 
intellectual  activity  are  essentially  the  same  in  kind, 
the  aim  of  the  former  school  is  to  make  it  appear  that 
universal  and  abstract  concepts,  necessary  judgments, 
self-consciousness,  and  all  our  higher  spiritual  cogni- 
tions are  merely  more  complex  or  refined  products  of 
sense.  The  logical  corollary  of  this  theory,  though 
not  usually  brought  prominently  into  notice,  is  the 
repudiation  of  the  spirituality  of  the  soul,  or  at  all 
events  the  denial  of  all  rational  grounds  for  belief  in 
this  most  important  doctrine.  If  all  mental  operations 
are  of  a  sensuous  organic  nature,  then  evidently  there  is 
no  reason  for  asserting  that  the  soul  of  man  is  a 
spiritual  principle  of  an  order  superior  to  that  of  the 
brute.  The  method  of  the  empiricist  is,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  depreciate  the  value  of  those  peculiar  charac- 
teristics which  mark  ofi"  our  intellectual  acts ;  and,  on 
the  other,  to  exaggerate  the  capabilities  of  sense. 
Universal  concepts  are  either  confounded  with  the 
concrete  phantasms  of  the  imagination,  or  their 
existence  is  boldly  denied.      The  necessity  of  axiomatic 


THEORIES   OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE,  255 

judgments  is  explained  as  the  effect  of  customary 
experience ;  and  the  notion  of  Self  is  analyzed  into 
a  cluster  of  conscious  states.  All  our  cognitions,  in 
fact,  are  merely  more  or  less  elaborate  products  evolved 
by  the  automatic  action  of  association  out  of  sense 
impressions  and  their  reproduced  images.  As  the 
mind  itself  is  only  the  resulting  outcome,  the  aggregate 
of  sensuous  states,  it  can  of  course  be  endowed  with  no 
superior  active  force  capable  of  uniting,  comparing,  or 
in  any  way  working  upon  the  materials  of  sense.  This 
indeed  is  the  fundamental  defect  of  empiricism.  It 
ignores  the  active  energy  of  intellect  with  which  the 
mind  is  endowed,  and  consequently  it  can  give  no 
adequate  account  of  those  higher  intellectual  concep- 
tions on  which  we  dwelt  in  the  last  chapter. 

Historical   Sketch   of   Theories   of  General  Knowledge. 

The  advantage  to  the  student  of  Psychology  of  even 
a  rough  idea  of  the  history  of  speculation  on  the  subject  of 
Intellectual  Cognition  justifies  us,  we  believe,  in  giving  a 
compendium  of  the  leading  theories  on  the  question,  together 
with  a  few  brief  critical  remarks  on  the  most  important 
points. 

Innate  Ideas:  Reminiscence:  Ultra-realism, — The  originator 
of  the  hypothesis  of  Reminiscence  was  Plato.  The  sensible 
world  is  for  him  no  true  world  at  all.  It  is  merely  a  congeries 
of  transient  phenomena  which  changing  from  moment  to 
moment  never  really  are.  The  real  world,  that  which  alone 
truly  ^'5  and  does  not  pass  away,  is  disclosed  to  us  in  our 
intellectual  ideas.  Such  universal  concepts  as  being,  unity, 
substance,  the  beautiful,  reveal  to  us,  obscurely  indeed,  but  still 
with  truth,  the  immutable  and  the  necessary.  Now  these 
spiritual  notions  cannot  either  directly  or  indirectly  be 
derived  from  sensuous  perception  ;  they  are  natural  endow- 
ments of  the  soul,  retained  by  it  from  a  previous  existence. 
Truth,  goodness,  humanity,  beauty,  and  the  rest,  however, 
do  not  possess  merely  a  subjective  existence,  as  abstract 
concepts  in  the  mind.  They  formally  exist  as  imiversals  in 
the  genuinely  real  world  of  which  the  present  material 
universe  is  only  a  faint  imperfect  reflexion.  In  that  celestial 
land  the  human  spirit  formerly  dwelt,  and  there  contemplated 
these  ideas  or  abstract  essences  as  they  exist  in  themselves. 
For  some  crime,  now  unknown,  it  was  evicted  from  its  true 
home  and  incarcerated  in  the  prison  of  the  body.     Although 


RATIONAL    LIFE. 


much  the  greater  part  of  its  ancient  knowledge  was 
obliterated,  there  yet  remained  in  a  dormant  condition  traces 
of  the  mental  acts  by  which  the  soul  in  its  previous  life 
contemplated  the  real  ideas.  These  imperfect  mental  states 
are  the  universal  ideas  of  our  present  experience,  and  they 
awake  on  the  occasion  of  sensuous  perceptions.  They  are 
not,  however,  in  any  way  produced  by,  or  elaborated  out  of 
these  latter.  They  are  merely  evoked  from  the  inner 
resources  of  the  mind  on  the  occurrence  of  corporeal  pheno- 
mena, which  in  a  shadowy  manner  resemble  the  original 
types — the  Real  Universals. 

Criticism. — We  have  here  the  doctrine  of  exaggerated 
realism.  In  this  form  it  implies  two  distinctive  tenets  :  (a) 
the  reality  of  universals  ds  such—  Univevsalia  extra  rem  vel 
ante  rem ;  and  {b)  the  existence  of  innate  ideas  by  which  these 
are  revealed.  The  former  is  a  logical  or  metaphysical 
problem,  and  for  a  complete  discussion  of  the  subject  we 
refer  the  reader  to  other  volumes  of  the  present  series.^  The 
second  is  properly  a  psychological  question.  Plato  is  un- 
doubtedly right  in  accentuating  the  vital  importance  of  the 
intellectual  elements  of  knowledge,  but  the  assumption  of  a 
pre-natal  existence  is  arbitrary  and  untenable,  whilst  the 
doctrine  of  real  universals  is  laden  with  absurdities.  The 
only  proofs  urged  in  favour  of  the  hypothesis  of  innate  ideas 
are  the  peculiar  supra-sensuous  character  of  intellectual 
representations,  and  the  fact  that  the  answering  of  children 
to  judicious  interrogation  seems  to  show  that  they  are 
possessed  of  such  ideas  before  they  can  have  formed  them 
from  experience.  The  first  argument,  however,  has  no  force 
against  the  Aristotelian  theory,  which  accounts  for  supra- 
sensuous  ideas,  as  the  result  of  the  higher  spiritual  faculty  of 
the  mind  apprehending  the  universal  nature  of  real  sensible 
objects.  The  second  difficulty  founded  on  the  "heuristic" 
method  of  instruction  is  also  ineffective,  for  this  regulated 
process  of  interrogation  is  either  virtually  a  means  of  teaching 
and  communicating  the  idea  in  question,  or  the  latter  is  of 
such  a  simple  character  as  to  be  formed  in  at  least  a  vague 
manner  in  our  earliest  experience. 

Descartes  (1596 — 1650).  Instead  of  explaining  innate  ideas 
as  "  reminiscences  "  of  cognitions  of  a  previous  life,  Christian 
philosophers  conceived  them  as  inscribed  by  God  on  the 
soul  at  its  creation.  The  earliest  important  thinker  among 
modern  philosophers  supporting  the  hypothesis  of  innate 
ideas   was   Descartes.      For  him   soul    and    body   are   two 

^  Cf.  Logic,  c.  viii.  and  the  First  Principles  of  Knoivledge,  Pt.  II. 
c.  iv.  A  good  sketch  of  Plato's  Philosophy  is  given  in  Stockl's 
History  of  Philosophy,  g§  29,  30. 


THEORIES  OF  GENERAL  KNOWLEDGE.  257 


substances  connected,  indeed,  at  one  point  in  the  brain,  as 
the  soul  is  situated  in  the  pineal  gland,  but  mutually  inde- 
pendent of  each   other.     They  are   completely   opposed   to 
each  other  in  nature  and  have  nothing  in  common.     The 
soul  is  simple;  its  essence  is  thought.     The  essence  of  matter 
is  extension.     Accordingly  real  interaction  between  them  is 
impossible ;  and  their  seeming  mutual  influence  can  only  be 
explained  by  Divine   intervention,  though  this  consequence 
became   clearer   in   the   hand   of  Descartes'   followers.     He 
divides  ideas  into  three  classes,  adventitious  ideas  gathered  by 
sense-perception, /«2d;7/o2<5  ideas  constructed  by  the  imagina- 
tion, and  innate  ideas  possessed  by  the  mind  from  the  dawn  of 
its  existence.     Without  these  latter  science  would  be  impos- 
sible.    Among  them  are  the  ideas  of  the  infinite,  of  myself,  of 
substance,  and,   in   fact,   all   universal   notions   expressive   of 
metaphysical  realities.     These  ideas  are  in  no  way  caused  by 
external  objects,  but  merely  wake  up  into  life  on  the  occasion 
of  the   sensuous   perception  of  the  latter.     Yet,  they  truly 
represent    the    essences    of    such    objects,   since    God    has 
ordained  them  for  that  purpose.     These  innate  ideas  are  at 
times  described  as  real  representations,  "  entities,"  effected 
by  God;  though  later  on,   under  the  exigencies  of  contro- 
versy, they  were  reduced  to  mere  dispositions  or  tendencies 
of  the  mind.     The  former  tenet  is,  however,  more  conform- 
able with  his  general  view.     Even  the  "  adventitious  "  ideas 
are  not  the  result  of  the  immediate  action  of  material  objects 
on  the  mind.     Soul  and  body  are  so  contrasted  in  Descartes* 
view  that,  as  we  have  observed,    interaction  seems  impos- 
sible, and  his  theory  of  sense-perception  is  therefore  confused 
and  inconsistent.     At  times  he  conceives  the  act  of  appre- 
hension as  a  mental  state  excited  by  God  on  the  occasion  of 
the  physical  impression  reaching  the  brain,  whilst  elsewhere 
he  seems  to  consider  the  perception  as  an  intellectual  infer- 
ence from  a  subjective  effect  to  an  objective  cause.^ 

2  Descartes  is  remarkable  not  so  much  for  his  treatment  of  the 
oyigin  of  knowledge  as  for  his  attempted  proof  of  its  validity.  To 
build  philosophy  on  a  secure  basis  he  starts  with  a  process  01 
methodical  or  simidated  doubt.  I  can  doubt,  he  says,  the  veracity 
of  my  senses,  mathematical  axioms,  the  existence  of  the  external 
world,  &c.,  &c.  ;  but  I  cannot  doubt  that  I  think,  and  to  think  I 
must  exist.  Cogito  ergo  sum,  is  thus  the  first  fact  and  the  last  truth 
in  Philosophy.  To  advance  further  a  criterion  or  rule  of  certainty 
is  required,  and  by  studying  the  one  unassailable  truth,  this 
criterion  is  discovered  to  consist  in  a  peculiar  clearness  of  apprehen 
sion.  I  am  indubitably  certain  of  my  own  existence,  because 
I  clearly  perceive  that  my  doubt  or  thought  involves  it.  What- 
ever, then,  I  have  a  clear  idea  of,  is  to  be  considered  true.  The  next 
R 


258  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Geulincx  (1625 — i66g),  a  disciple  of  Descartes,  frankly 
faced  the  difficulty  resulting  from  this  extravagant  dualism^ 
and  formally  advocated  the  doctrine  of  "  occasionalism "  or 
'■'■  Divine  assistance.''^  He  boldly  denied  the  possibility  of 
efficient  action  between  body  and  mind.  Changes  in  the  one 
are  but  the  "  occasions  "  of  the  production  by  God  of  appro- 
priate changes  in  the  other.  Our  ideas  of  external  objects 
are  excited  not  by  the  objects,  but  by  God  Himself.  Similarly 
in  the  case  of  all  other  secondary  causes  the  Divine  interven- 
tion or  assistance  is  the  only  real  efficient  agency. 

Ontologism. — The  consequences  of  the  Cartesian  oppo- 
sition between  soul  and  body  developed  by  Geulincx,  were 
carried  still  further  in  Malebranche's  (1638— 1715)  mystical 
theory  of  a  Vision  en  Dieu.  Corporeal  objects  cannot  effect 
impressions  on  an  unextended  mind  so  as  to  generate  ideas 
of  themselves  in  the  latter.  But  as  it  is  a  limited  being,  the 
mind  cannot  derive  such  ideas  from  itself.  It  therefore 
beholds  them  in  another  spirit — the  Infinite  Being.  God 
contemplates  all  creatures  reflected  in  His  own  essence.  All 
created  beings  have  their  types  and  exemplars  in  the  Divine 
ideas  which  are  identified  with  the  essence  of  God.  Male- 
branche  thus  improves  on  Plato.  The  ideas  are  no  longer 
separate  entities ;  they  are  one  with  the  mind  and  nature  of 
God.  Since  we  exist  in  God  as  in  the  place  of  spirits,  there  is 
no  reason  why  we  should  not  have  an  immediate  knowledge 
or  intuition  of  Him.  '•^ Dieu  est  tres  ctroitemcnt  uni  a  nos  dines 
pay  sa  presence,  de  sortc  qu'on  pent  dire  qu'il  est  le  lieu  des  esprits, 

step  is  to  guarantee  the  validity  of  this  criterion.  I  find  within  me 
a  clear  idea  of  an  Infinite  Being.  Whence  is  this  ?  (a)  Clearly  not 
from  a  finite  creature ;  and  mc>reover  (b)  the  idea  of  an  Infinite 
Being  involves  all  possible  attiibutes  including  existence.  Ergo, 
such  a  Being  really  exists.  The  idea  of  infinite  also  clearly  implies 
perfection  and  veracity  ;  but  a  veracious  God  cannot  have  created 
me  for  perpetual  and  necessary  deception.  When,  therefore,  I 
have  a  clear  idea,  I  must  be  in  possession  of  truth.  Scientific 
certainty  is  now  restored,  and  the  construction  of  a  bridge  from  the 
subjective  to  the  objective  world  eftected.  I  have  a  clear  idea  of 
mathematical  axioms,  of  the  physical  universe  as  extended,  &c.,  &c. 
There  are  several  fatal  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  Descartes, 
(i)  The  system  of  Methodical  Doubt  leads  logically  to  absolute 
scepticism.  We  cannot  prove  the  veracity  of  our  faculties  ;  if  we 
start  with  even  fictitious  doubt  we  can  never  recover  certainty  of 
any  value.  (2)  The  criterion  of  "clear  "  ideas  is  vague,  indefinite, 
and  worthless.  (3)  His  attempted  justification  involves  a  vicious 
circular  argument.  The  existence  and  veracity  of  God  are  proved 
by  my  possession  of  a  clear  idea,  and  again  the  validity  of  my  clear 
ideas  is  itself  established  by  the  veracity  of  God.  For  a  full 
treatment  of  Descartes'  System,  cf.  Rickaby,  First  Principles,  c.  ix. 


THEORIES   OF   GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  259 


dc  memequc  les  espaccs  sont  en  iin  sens  le  lieu  des  corps.'"  {Recherche 
de  la  Verite,  Lib.  III.  Pt.  2,  c.  6.) 

We  have  not,  however,  a  complete  comprehension  of  the  Infi- 
nite Being.  Nor  do  we  behold  Him  absolutely  as  He  is  in  Hitnself, 
but  only  as  He  is  in  relation  to  creatures.  (This  thought  was 
developed  by  later  ontologists,  as  in  Gioberti's  teaching  that 
the  primary  act  of  intelligence  is  the  apprehension  of  God  as 
creating  existences  ;  and  Rosmini's  virtual  identification  of 
our  intuition  of  the  ideal,  or  possible  being,  with  that  of  the 
Infinite  Being.)  The  Divine  ideas,  in  fact,  mediate  between 
our  minds  and  material  objects  :   We  see  all  things  in  God. 

Criticism. — The  doctrine  that  the  Infinite  Being  is  the 
immediate  and  proper  object  of  human  cognition,  and  the 
source  of  our  knowledge  of  all  other  things,  is  called  Ontolo- 
gisni.  It  is  exposed  to  several  fatal  objections  :  (i)  The  most 
careful  reflective  examination  of  our  consciousness  fails  to 
detect  the  alleged  intuition  of  God.  (2)  The  intuition  of  God 
as  having  relation  to  creatures  would  involve  an  immediate 
apprehension  of  His  essence.  (3)  All  our  knowledge  starts  from 
the  sensuous  perception  of  material  objects,  and  from  these 
our  analogical  conceptions  of  immaterial  beings  are  formed 
by  abstraction  and  exclusion  of  imperfections  incompatible 
with  supernatural  existence.  Moreover,  we  invariably  turn 
back  to  sensuous  cognitions  to  illustrate  our  more  abstract 
notions,  which  would  not  be  the  case  if  the  Infinite  immortal 
being  were  the  primitive  and  proper  object  of  our  intellect. 
(4)  The  theory  rests  on  a  false  assumption  of  a  mere  acci- 
dental union  existing  between  soul  and  body,  and  is  in  conflict 
with  the  intimate  relations  subsisting  between  our  sensuous 
and  intellectual  knowledge.  (5)  All  forms  of  ontologism  which 
teach  that  the  immediate  objects  of  our  perception  are  not 
material  creatures,  but  the  ideas  or  the  essence  of  God  incline 
on  the  one  hand  towards  the  idealism  of  Berkeley,  and  on  the 
other  towards  the  pantheism  of  Spinoza,  as  they  tend  to 
identify  the  visible  universe  with  God  Himself. 

In  favour  of  ontologism  it  is  urged  that  it  accounts  for  the 
universality,  necessity,  and  eternal  character  of  our  intellectual 
ideas,  as  they  possess  these  properties  in  God;  and,  in 
addition,  it  explains  the  presence  of  the  conception  of  the 
Infinite  Being  in  our  minds.  The  answer  is,  that  these  facts 
can  also  be  accounted  for  by  intellectual  abstraction  and 
reflexion  exercised  on  the  data  supplied  by  sense,  without 
gratuitously  assuming  an  immediate  vision  of  God. 

Christian  Philosophy  has  always  taught  that  the  essences 
of  created  beings  are  faint  infinitesimal  reflections  of  arche- 
typal ideas  in  the  Divine  Mind.  The  eternal  intrinsic 
possibility  of  each  object,  the  ideal  plan  which  when  actuahzed 


26o  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


makes  up  its  essence,  has  its  ultimate  foundation  in  the 
eternal  essence  of  God,  contemplated  by  the  Divine  Intellect 
as  imitable  ad  extra.  It  is  realized  in  the  physical  order  by 
the  creative  act  of  the  Divine  Will ;  and  it  is  discovered  by 
our  intellect  in  the  creature,  as  we  perceive  the  plan  of  the 
artist  in  his  work.  Ontologism  thus  inverts  the  true  order  of 
knowledge.  We  do  not  descend  to  a  knowledge  of  the  thing 
through  the  Divine  Idea,  but  we  ascend  to  the  Divine  Idea 
from  the  thing. 

Pantheistic  Monism. — Notwithstanding  his  exaggerated 
dualism,  Descartes'  inaccurate  definition  of  substance  as,  "that 
which  so  exists  that  it  stands  in  need  of  nothing  else  for  its 
existence,"  his  denial  of  all  real  causal  action  by  creatures, 
and  his  reduction  of  the  essence  of  matter  to  extension,  and 
that  of  the  soul  to  thought,  contain  the  germs  of  the  pan- 
theistic Monism  developed  by  the  Jew,  Baruch  Spinoza  (1632 — 
1677).  The  fact  that  the  exposition  of  mental  life  given  by 
various  popular  writers  on  empirical  psychology  at  the 
present  day  admittedly  results  in  Spinoza's  monism,  is  our 
excuse  for  devoting  here  some  space  to  the  founder  of  modern 
pantheism.^  His  system  is  elaborated  in  his  chief  work,  the 
Ethica,  in  geometric  fashion  from  a  few  definitions  and  axioms: 
Substance  is  "that  which  exists  in  itself,  and  is  conceived 
by  itself,  i.e.,  the  conception  of  which  can  be  formed  without 
the  aid  of  the  conception  of  anything  else."  It  follows  from 
this  definition  that  there  can  be  only  one  substance,  self- 
existing  and  infinite.  Attribute  is  "that  which  the  mind 
perceives  as  constituting  the  essence  of  substance."  A  mode 
is  "  the  accident  of  substance,  or  that  which  is  in  something 
else  through  the  aid  of  which  it  is  conceived."  The  one 
absolutely  infinite  substance  is  constituted  by  innumerable 
relatively  infinite  attributes,  of  which  only  two  are  known  to 
us.  These  are  extension  and  thought.  They  manifest  them- 
selves in  finite  modes  which  comprise  the  universe  of  physical 
things  and  minds  with  which  we  are  acquainted.  Every 
particular  existence  is  only  a  modification,  an  individualiza- 
tion of  the  universal  substance.  Neither  human  souls  nor 
material  objects  are  self-subsistent;  they  are  merely  transitory 
modes,  or  as  recent  writers  say,  "  aspects "  of  the  one 
infinite  being.  This  one  eternal,  absolute  substance  is  God. 
This  God  is  the  immanent  indwelling,  self-evolving  cause  of 
the  totaUty  of  things.  It  is  neither  intelligent  nor  free.  All 
things  are  identified  in  it.  God  and  the  universe  differs 
merely  as  natiira  naturans  and  natura  naturata.  The  Divine 
substance  evolves  itself  according  to  the  inner  necessity  of 

3  Cf.  Sully,  The  Human  Mind,  Vol.  II.  p.  369;  Hoffding,  Outlines 
of  Psychology,  p.  68. 


THEORIES  OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  261 

its  being,  and  this  is  the  only  "  freedom  "  which  it  possesses. 
The  laws  of  nature  are  absolutely  immutable.  They  proceed 
from  the  essence  of  God  with  the  same  necessity  as  its 
geometrical  properties  flow  from  the  essence  of  the  circle  or 
triangle.  Divine  action  is  not  in  view  of  ends  ;  there  are  no 
final  causes. 

Thought  never  acts  on  the  extended,  nor  matter  on  mind. 
Both  harmoniously  develop  their  serial  changes  in  parallel 
lines,  but  in  mutual  independence.  The  dualism  of  Descartes 
is  thus  retained,  but  only  to  be  unified  in  the  identity  of  the 
infinite  substratum.  The  soul  is  the  "  idea  " — the  subjective 
aspect — of  the  body.  They  are  really  one  individual  thing 
differently  conceived.  Both  are  merely  modes  or  phases  of  the 
Divine  substance ;  the  one  of  the  attribute  of  thought,  the 
other  of  extension.*  All  things  are  animated,  though  in  varying 
degrees  of  perfection.  The  supposed  freedom  of  the  human  will 
is  an  illusion.  Every  incident  in  the  history  of  the  universe  is 
necessarily  evolved  out  of  the  infinite  substance,  and  so  has 
been  inexorably  predetermined  from  all  eternity.  Good  is  that 
which  is  useful  to  human  well-being ;  evil  is  the  reverse.  Since 
the  soul  is  merely  an  aspect  of  the  body,  immortality  in  the 
form  of  a  continuity  of  personal  life  after  dissolution  of  the 
body  is  of  course  impossible.  The  individual  will  be  re- 
absorbed in  the  omnivorous  infinite  substance.  We  are  only 
"  tiny  wavelets  on  the  great  ocean  of  substance,  we  roll 
our  little  course,  and  sink  to  rise  no  more."  Such  is  the 
philosophical  conception  of  the  human  soul,  of  God  and  of 
the  universe,  to  which  much  of  the  current  psychology  is 
designed  to  conduct  the  reader.  It,  therefore,  seems  desirable 
that  the  student  should  clearly  understand  whither  he  is  to  be 
led  by  the  "  new  Spinozism." 

We  cannot  enter  into  a  criticism  of  pantheism  here.  It 
suffices  to  say  that  Spinoza's  theory  is  entirely  built  up  out  of 
his  definitions  and  axioms,  and  that  these  have  been  shown 
to  be  inaccurate  and  untenable  by  many  writers  ;  whilst  even 
in  his  demonstrations  the  author  does  not  consistently  adhere 
to  them.'^  The  identification  of  God  with  blind  necessarily- 
evolving  all-devouring  substance  is  little,  if  at  all,  preferable 
to  bald  and  naked  atheism.     The  fatalism  involved  in  the 

•*  "  Mens  (humana)  at  corpus  unum  idemque  sunt  individuum, 
quod  jam  sub  cogitationis,  jam  sub  extensionis  attribute  concipitur." 
{Ethica,  Pt.  II.  Prop.  21.) 

^  Cf.  Boedder,  Natural  Theology,  pp.  200 — 205,  and  449 — 460  ; 
Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theories,  Vol.  I.  pp.  234 — 370;  Saisset, 
Modern  Pantheism,  Vol.  I.  pp.  92 — 160.  Ueberweg's  History  of 
Philosophy,  Vol.  II.  pp.  55,  seq. ,  also  contains  some  good  criticisms 
of  Spinoza's  system. 


262  NATIONAL   LIFE. 


system  is  subversive  of  tiie  notions  of  responsibility,  merit, 
duty,  and  sin,  good  and  evil,  together  with  all  moral  ideas. 
Finally,  the  belief  of  mankind  in  a  future  life  is  an  idle 
dream. 

Leibnitz  (1646 — 1716). — In  marked  opposition  to  the  sensa- 
tionism  of  Locke  on  the  one  hand  and  to  the  monism  of  Spinoza 
on  the  other  stands  the  German  Leibnitz.  Agreeing  with  the 
Cartesian  view  of  the  soul  as  essentially  active,  he  defended 
the  existence  of  innate  ideas  against  the  English  empiricist ; 
whilst  instead  of  the  one  universal  substance  of  the  Jewish 
pantheist  he  substitutes  an  infinite  number  of  individual 
substances,  monads.  Retaining  the  excessive  dualism  of 
Descartes,  with  its  inevitable  denial  of  interaction  between 
soul  and  body,  yet  seeking  to  avoid  alike  the  continuous 
series  of  miracles  required  by  the  doctrine  of  "  Occasion- 
alism," the  mysticism  of  the  Vision  en  Dieii,  and  the  fatalistic 
Pantheism  of  Spinoza,  Leibnitz  invented  the  ingenious 
theory  of  Pre-established  Harmony.  The  universe  he  holds  to 
be  composed  of  an  infinite  number  of  monads.  These  monads 
are  simple  unextended  substances,  energetic  atoms,  endowed 
with  forces  analogous  to  the  ideas  or  emotions  of  the  mind. 
A  laiv  of  continuity  in  the  form  of  a  continuous  gradation  in 
stages  of  perfection  holds  universally  throughout  creation 
from  the  lowest  and  most  imperfect  to  the  highest  created 
monad.  God  is  the  primitive,  uncreated,  infinite  monad. 
Spirits  and  human  minds  are  single  monads  of  high  rank. 
Material  substances,  including  the  human  body,  consist  of 
aggregates  of  inferior  monads.  There  is  no  real  transient 
action  between  different  monads.  The  existence  of  each  is 
made  up  of  a  series  of  immanent  changes  developed  in 
harmony  with  those  of  the  rest  of  the  universe  of  monads. 
The  states  or  "ideas"  of  each  monad  reflect,  more  or  less 
clearly  in  proportion  to  its  rank,  the  condition  of  all  other 
monads.  Each  monad  is  thus  a  mirror  of  the  universe — a 
microcosm  imaging  the  macrocosm.  The  soul  and  body  of  man 
have  been  so  created  and  mated  by  God  as  to  run,  like  two 
clocks  started  together,  through  parallel  series  of  changes. 
Since  all  monads  have  been  originally  created  with  appro- 
priate initial  velocities  and  corresponding  rates  of  develop- 
ment, Leibnitz  holds  that  all  the  phenomena  of  perception 
and  volition  are  adequately  accounted  for.  Such  is  the  theory 
of  Pre-established  Harmon)-. 

The  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  that  nothing  can  happen 
without  a  sufficient  or  determining  reason,  plays  an  important 
part  in  his  scheme.  The  Divine  and  the  human  will  alike 
require  a  determining  ground  for  every  act.  The  creation  of 
the  present  out  of  all  possible  worlds  which  hovered  eternally 


THEORIES   OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  263 

before  the  mind  of  God,  is  optimistically  explained  by  its 
being  the  absolutely  best.  Its  evolution  is  the  gradual 
realization  of  a  Divine  plan.*^  Descartes'  mechanical  doctrine 
of  inert  matter,  Locke's  conception  of  a  purely  passive 
recipient  mind,  and  the  pantheistic  monism  of  Spinoza  in 
which  all  existing  beings  are  resolved  into  mere  modes  of 
one  infinite  substance,  are  thus  replaced  by  a  system  in  which 
all  reality,  whether  spiritual  or  material,  is  transformed  into 
a  hierarchical  multiplicity  of  living  forces.  To  Locke's 
aphorism.  Nil  est  in  intellect u  quod  non  fuerii  pvius  in  sensu, 
Leibnitz  replied.  Nisi  intcllectiis  ipse,  defending  the  inherent 
activity  of  the  mind,  and  ascribing  to  it  an  original  fund  of 
native  endowments.  Intellectual  ideas  and  fundamental 
principles  must  be  innate,  for  they  could  not  have  been 
generated  by  sensuous  experience.  We  find  them  within  us 
as  soon  as  we  attain  to  perfect  consciousness ;  and  they  have 
the  character  of  universality  and  necessity,  while  sense  dis- 
closes only  the  particular  and  the  contingent.  We  possess 
the  ideas  of  God,  of  our  own  Ego,  and,  consequently,  of 
duration  and  of  change,  none  of  which  are  in  any  way 
derivable  from  experience.  Still,  like  Descartes,  Leibnitz  at 
times  tones  down  the  theory  of  innate  ideas  until  it  almost 
vanishes.  The  ideas  do  not  exist  as  actual  cognitions  from 
the  beginning;  neither  quite  as  pure  potencies.  They  are 
best  described,  comme  des  inclinations,  des  dispositions,  des 
habitudes,  on  des  virtualites  natnrelles,  et  non  pas  comme  des 
actions.  They  exist  merely  as  unconscious  perceptions  until 
they  are  evoked  into  the  stage  of  apperception ;  that  is,  until 

^  Hence  Leibnitz  is  commonly  spoken  of  as  an  Idealist.  The 
ambiguity  of  this  word  should  be  carefully  borne  in  mind  by  the 
student.  Idealism  or  rationalistic  idealism  in  one  usage  is  equivalent 
to  Teleologism,  and  denotes  the  view  that  the  world  is  governed  by 
an  idea  or  plan.  Aristotle  and  theistic  philosophers  are  idealists 
in  this  sense,  though  they  may  believe  in  the  existence  of  a  real 
material  world.  A  special  form  of  this  teleological  idealism  is 
optimism,  which  maintains  the  ideal  perfection  of  the  world.  Idealism 
in  another  signification,  or  Phenomenal  Idealism,  as  we  have  explained 
in  a  previous  chapter,  means  the  theory  which  denies  all  material 
reality.  We  can  only  know  ideas,  viz.,  sensations,  phenomena,  &c. 
Hume  and  Dr.  Bain  are  idealists  in  this  sense.  Idealism  in  the 
first  signification  is  opposed  to  a  purely  mechanical  theory  of  the 
genesis  and  conservation  of  the  world ;  in  the  last  to  realism,  or 
the  assumption  of  the  existence  of  a  real  extra-mental  world.  The 
term  Realism  is  also  ambiguous.  It  is  employed  (i)  in  the  sense  just 
mentioned  to  signify  the  doctrine  of  a  real  independent  world,  and 
(2)  as  opposed  to  Nominalism  and  Conceptnalism  to  denote  the  theories 
(exaggerated  and  moderate  realism)  which  maintain  the  objective 
validity  of  general  notions.     Cf.  First  Principles,  Ft.  II.  cc.  ii.  iv. 


264  RATIONAL  LIFE. 


they  are  formally  realized  in  consciousness.  However, 
although  there  appears  to  be  placed  a  distinction  between 
the  origin  of  intellectual  ideas  and  the  acts  of  sensuous 
apprehension,  the  theory  of  Pre-established  Harmony 
necessarily  makes  them  both  equally  the  result  of  a  purely 
subjective  evolution  of  the  native  possessions  of  the  mind. 

Criticism. — The  system  of  Leibnitz  is  a  beautiful  and 
ingenious  creation  of  a  great  intellect,  but  fanciful  and 
incredible  in  the  highest  degree.  As  regards  the  special 
question  of  perception,  the  hypothesis  of  a  universe  of 
isolated  monads  working  out  independent  lines  in  pre- 
established  harmony  is  gratuitous,  incapable  of  proof, 
and  impossible  to  reconcile  with  the  veracity  of  God  or 
the  Freedom  of  the  Will.  The  sole  ground  of  the  creation 
of  this  world  is,  Leibnitz  teaches,  its  superior  rationality, 
its  absolute  consistency,  and  inner  perfection.  Yet  when 
examined,  it  turns  out  to  be  a  gigantic  sham.  "  While  none 
of  its  members  condition  each  other,  everything  goes  on  as  if 
they  did.""  With  all  the  semblance  of  real  unity  and  inter- 
action, the  parts  possess  no  more  genuine  connexion  than  the 
incidents  of  an  unreal  dream.  As  regards  the  wavering 
exposition  of  the  nature  of  innate  ideas  by  both  Descartes 
and  Leibnitz,^  it  maj^  be  observed,  that,  if  all  which  is  claimed 
to  be  innate  is  the  capability  of  forming  ideas  out  of  materials 
presented  by  sense,  then  the  doctrine  is  correct ;  but  if 
instead  it  is  held  to  be  purely  out  of  the  mind's  own  resources, 
apart  from  any  real  co-operation  of  external  objects,  that 
our  ideas  are  evolved,  then  all  the  objections  to  the  innate 
theory  already  indicated  stand.  There  can,  moreover,  be 
advanced  no  reason,  which  does  not  involve  flagrant  petit io 
principii,  for  asserting  that  innate  ideas  truly  represent  the 
objective  world;  and  the  logical  outcome  is  therefore  subjec- 
tive idealism.  For  Leibnitz,  especially,  it  is  peculiarly  inde- 
fensible to  assume  the  real  existence  of  the  material  world 
which,  in  his  view,  effects  no  real  change  in  our  mental  states. 
Nay,  were  it  annihilated  it  would  not  be  missed !  This 
amazing  consequence  is  worth  remembering  in  view  of  the 
frequent  advocacy  at  the  present  day  of  theories  of  psycho- 
physical parallelism,  which  similarly  deny  all  interaction 
between  mental  and  bodily  processes. 

Rosmini  (1797 — 1855)  I'educed  the  stock  of  innate  cogni- 
tions to  the  single  conception  of  ideal  being,  which  he  considers 
to  be  a  mental  form,  a  condition  of  knowledge,  and  the  light 

'  Cf.  Lotze,  Metaphysic,  §  79. 

8  Cf.  Liberatore  On  Universals  (Trans.),  pp.  78,  90 — 102;  also 
Stockl,  Geschichtc  dcr  Neucren  Philosophie,  Vol.  I.  §  78. 


THEORIES   OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  265 

of  reason.  This  idea  is  involved  in  every  other  idea  and 
judgment,  and  so  must  precede  them  all.  By  the  application 
of  this  innate  form  to  our  sensations  sensuous  apprehension 
is  converted  into  the  intellectual  perception  of  objective  exist- 
ence. Against  this  single  idea,  all  the  old  objections  to  the 
larger  hypothesis  still  hold.  Moreover,  the  alleged  combi- 
nation of  the  intellectual  form  with  the  sensation  presents  to 
us  a  very  obscure  and  dubious  conception,  and  affords  an 
extremely  unsatisfactory  account  of  the  objective  reality  of 
our  knowledge  of  being.  The  inference  from  the  universality 
of  the  idea  of  being  in  our  cognitions  to  its  innate  origin  is 
unwarrantable.  Every  perception  contains  this  idea,  because 
every  external  object  apprehended  involves  this  attribute.  It 
is  a  form  of  all  knowledge,  a  datum  of  all  cognition,  but  not 
therefore  an  innate  form,  a  subjective  datum.  This  idea  is 
generated  at  the  dawn  of  intellectual  life,  though  at  first  it  is 
presented  in  the  vaguest  and  most  ill-defined  form.  Finally, 
if  this  idea  which  is  predicated  of  all  real  objects  be,  as 
Rosmini  in  his  later  writings  implies,  an  intuition  of  the 
Infinite  Being,  the  doctrine  leads  to  Pantheism.'' 

Innate  a  priori  Mental  Forms. — Excited  by  the  thorough- 
going scepticism  of  Hume,  which  destroyed  the  possibility  of 
knowledge,  Kant  (1724 — 1804)  attempted  to  elaborate  a  theory 
of  cognition  which,  combining  the  elements  of  truth  possessed 
by  Locke,  Descartes,  and  Leibnitz,  would  afford  a  solid  basis 
for  science.  The  chaotic  and  conflicting  systems  of  specula- 
tion with  which  Germany  has  been  deluged  during  the  past 
century  are  very  significant  evidence  as  to  the  amount  of 
success  attending  Kant's  eftbrt. 

His  chief  works  are  the  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason  and 

^  Besides  the  arguments  in  favour  of  innate  ideas  indicated  in 
the  brief  accounts  given  of  the  above  writers,  it  has  been  urged  :  (i) 
that  thought  is  essential  to  the  human  mind,  and  so  must  have  been 
ever  present ;  (2)  that  at  all  events  the  desire  of  happiness,  which 
involves  many  ideas,  is  innate ;  (3)  that  axioms  or  first  principles, 
intellectual  and  moral,  are  known  by  all  from  an  early  age,  and 
must  therefore  be  implanted  from  the  beginning.  It  may  be 
replied:  (i)  that  \.h.e faculty  of  thought  is  essential  to  the  soul,  and 
possibly  the  exercise  of  its  vegetative  or  sentient  functions  may  be 
continuous,  but  there  is  absolutely  no  evidence  that  actual  thought  is 
essential ;  (2)  that  the  aptitude  or  disposition  to  seek  happiness 
when  occasions  are  presented  to  us,  is  indeed  innate  ;  but  this  is  quite 
different  from  innate  actual  desires  or  cognitions  of  particular  forms 
of  happiness;  (3)  that  such  universal  cognitions  are  also  merely 
the  result  of  our  common  faculties.  Given  certain  experiences,  the 
intellect  of  man  is  at  an  early  age  capable  of  discovering  by 
observation,  comparison,  and  reflexion,  simple  and  obvious  truths. 


266  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


the  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason.  The  former  treatise 
comprises  an  examination  into  the  origin,  extent,  and  hmits 
of  knowledge.  Tlie  first  step  in  Philosophy  must  be  criticism 
as  opposed  to  dogmatism  on  the  one  side,  and  to  scepticism  on 
the  other.  By  criticism  Kant  means  an  attempted  scrutiny 
into  the  range  and  validity  of  our  knowledge.  Dogmatism,  he 
maintains,  assumes  while  scepticism  rejects,  alike  unwarrant- 
ably, the  veracity  of  our  faculties.  Kant's  criticistn  results  in 
the  denial  of  real  knowledge  of  everything  transcending 
experience.  There  is  a  purely  subjective  or  mental  co-efficient 
in  all  cognition  which  destroys  its  validity.  This  is  especially 
illustrated  in  synthetic  a  priori  judgments.  Judgments  are 
either  synthetic  or  analytic.  The  latter,  always  necessary  in 
character,  are  formed  by  mere  analysis  of  the  subject,  e.g., 
the  whole  is  greater  than  a  part.  Synthetic  judgments  may  be 
either  a  posteriori  and  contingent,  e.g.,  England  is  a  naval 
power;  or  a  priori  and  necessary,  e.g..  Nothing  can  begin  to 
exist  without  a  cause.  Two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose  a 
space.  How  are  these  synthetic  a  priori  judgments  possible  ? 
Whence  is  their  peculiar  necessity  and  their  universality  ? 
This  is  the  problem  attacked  by  the  Kantian  philosophy. 
These  judgments  are  not,  it  is  asserted,  derived  from  mere 
experience ;  for  mere  empirical  generalizations  can  never 
attain  this  absolute  kind  of  certainty.  Yet  they  are  not  purely 
analytical  or  verbal  propositions.  Synthetic  a  priori  judgm.ents 
are  effected,  Kant  answers,  by  the  action  of  certain  innate 
mental  forms  which  condition  all  our  knowledge.^**  Whatever 
is  presented  to  the  mind  is  moulded  by  these  forms  of  the 
Ego,  and  unified  in  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception,  thsit 
is,  in  the  permanent  activity  of  the  pure  original  unchange- 
able self-consciousness.  Human  cognition  is  an  amalgam  of 
two  elements,  a  product  of  two  co-efftcients — the  form  {die 
Form)  due  to  the  constitution  of  the  mind,  and  the  matter 
{der  Stoff)  due  to  the  action  of  the  external  object.  We  can 
only  know  the  phenomenon — the  mental  state  resulting  from 
both  factors.     To  the  noumenon,  the  Ding-an-sich,  the  thing  in 

^•^  Kant  thus  agrees  with  Descartes  and  Leibnitz  in  maintaining 
that  universal  and  necessary  axioms  cannot  be  gathered  from 
external  experience,  but  must  have  their  source  in  the  original 
furniture  of  the  mind  itself.  Whilst,  however,  the  latter  philoso- 
phers ascribe  to  these  cognitions,  in  spite  of  their  subjective  origin, 
real  or  ontological  validity,  Kant  more  logically  renounces  this 
tenet.  Previous  to  Kant  a  priori  knowledge  meant  knoidedge  of 
effects  from  their  causes.  He  has  arbitrarily  changed  the  meaning  of 
the  phrase  to  mean  knowledge  the  necessity  of  which  he  asserted 
to  be  due  solely  to  the  mind,  and  so  to  be  independent  of  experience. 
Cf.  Ueberweg's  Hist,  of  Phil.  Vol.  H.  pp.  i6i,  162. 


THEORIES   OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  2Gj 


itself,  we  can  never  penetrate.     It  is  only  revealed  to  ns  as 
shaped  by  the  a  priori  fonn  of  the  mind. 

In  Perception  the  a  priori  element  is  exhibited,  as  we  have 
described  at  length  in  chapter  vi.  in  the  sensnous  intuitions 
of  space  and  iime,  which  mould  our  external  and  internal 
sensibility.^^  The  acts  of  the  Understanding,  which  unify  the 
chaotic  manifold  presented  by  sense,  are  conditioned  by 
another  class  of  twelve  purely  mental  forms  called  categories. 
These  notions  are  a  priori.  They  "  lie  ready  in  the  under- 
standing from  the  first."  Things  in  themselves  have  not 
unity,  plurality,  substantiality,  causality,  and  the  rest.  These 
categories  are  true  not  of  the  noumenon,  but  only  of  the 
phenomenal  object — that  which  appears  in  consciousness. 
We  are  subjectively  necessitated  to  think  of  change  as  under 
the  law  of  causation,  of  accident  as  inhering  in  substance, 
and  so  on ;  but  we  have  no  ground  for  supposing  such  to  be 
the  case  with  the  Ding-an-sich.  With  respect  to  General 
Notions,  Kant's  doctrine  involves  a  form  of  Conceptualisni 
maintaining  in  opposition  to  Nominalism,  the  truly  universal 
character  of  concepts ;  whilst  on  the  other  hand  it  denies  the 
extra-mental  validity  ascribed  to  them  by  Moderate  Realism. 

Finally,  the  activity  of  the  Reason  which  still  further 
unifies  the  data  offered  by  Sense  and  Understanding  is  also 
conditioned  by  three  purely  subjective  Ideas.  They  are  the 
psychological  idea  of  the  Soul,  as  the  thinking  substance ;  the 
cosmological  idea  of  the  universe  as  a  totality  ;  and  the  idea  of 
God.  These  a  priori  conceptions  apply  to  corresponding  real 
objects  no  more  than  the  other  forms  and  categories.  They 
are  the  source  of  inevitable  illusions  occasioning  "paralo- 
gisms "  and  "  antinomies,"  or  contradictions  of  the  pure 
reason  itself.  In  particular  the  empty  idea  of  the  Ego  is  the 
basis  of  the  deceptive  pseudo-science  of  Rational  Psychology, 
The  conclusions  of  this  science  are  all  based  on  the  ille- 
gitimate application  of  the  purely  formal  or  subjective  notion 
of  substance  to  the  Ego  as  a  noumenon.  In  deducing  the  attri- 
butes of  simplicity,  identity,  individuality,  we  invariably  fall 
into  a  paralogism  confounding  the  Ego  as  logical  subject  of  a 
proposition  with  a  real  substance.  We  mistake  the  merely 
formal,  subjective  unity  of  Self  for  that  of  a  real  indivisible 
being.  The  aspiration  to  reach  a  knowledge  of  things-in- 
themselves  is  doomed  to  failure  :  we  can  only  know  phenomena 

^'^  The  a  priori  form  of  space  generates  the  necessity  and 
universality  of  all  geometrical  judgments,  the  form  of  time  does 
the  same  for  arithmetical  propositions — such  at  least  is  Kant's 
view  as  interpreted  by  Hamilton,  Mansel,  Kuno  Fischer,  and  others. 
Mr.  Mahaffy,  Critical  Philosophy,  p.  64,  contends  that  both  sciences 
were  in  Kant's  opinion  based  on  the  intuition  of  space.- 


268  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


■ — things  when  shaper!  and  coloured  by  mental  forms.  The 
outcome  of  the  criticism  of  the  Pure  Reason  then  is  the 
repudiation  of  knowledge  regarding  whatever  transcends 
experience. 

The  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason  contains  Kant's  moral 
system — stoicism  of  a  rigorous  type.  He  there  seeks  to 
restore  in  the  form  of  belief  what  he  has  previously  demolished 
as  rational  cognition.  Though  the  existence  of  the  Deity,  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  freedom  of  the  will  are 
incapable  of  proof,  if  not  also  replete  with  contradictions,  yet 
their  admission  is  exacted  by  the  needs  of  our  moral  nature. 

Criticism. — (i)  It  has  been  forcibly  urged  against  Kant's 
system  as  a  whole  that  the  central  problem  of  the  Critique — 
the  question  whether  our  faculties  can  attain  real  truth — is 
based  on  an  erroneous  view  of  the  proper  aim  and  method 
of  Philosophy.  The  dogmatical  standpoint  is  the  only  one 
which  can  be  consistently  maintained.  We  must  from 
the  beginning,  under  penalty  of  absolute  scepticism  and 
intellectual  suicide,  assume  the  capacity  of  the  mind  to  attain 
real  truth.  Every  attempt  to  demonstrate  the  veracity  or 
the  mendacity  of  our  faculties  must  involve  either  a  vicious 
circle  or  a  contradiction.  Thought,  as  Hegel  argued,  can 
only  be  scrutinized  by  thought,  and  to  require  a  criticism  of 
thought  antecedently  to  the  acceptance  of  its  validity  is 
like  refusing  to  enter  the  water  till  we  are  able  to  swim.^- 

(2)  The  proof  of  the  subjectivity  of  the  categories  and  ideas 
rests  largely  on  the  analogy  which  holds  between  them  and 
the  forms  of  sensibility,  Space  and  Time,  the  subjective  nature 
of  which  is  supposed  to  be  already  established.  For  a  refuta- 
tion of  this  latter  point  we  refer  the  reader  back  to  pp.  118 
— 121.  Kant's  various  illustrations  of  synthetic  a  priori  judg- 
ments are  reducible  either  to  contingent  a  posteriori  generali- 
zations or  analytical  truths.  For  a  brief  treatment  of  this 
question  we  refer  the  reader  to  the  volume  of  this  series  on 
Logic,  pp.  61 — 67.  An  elaborate  justification  of  our  assertion 
will  be  found  in  Balmez,  Bk.  I.  c.  xxix.,  and  Harper's  Meta- 
physics of  tlic  School,  Bk.  IV.  c.  v. 

(3)  Kant's  argument  against  Rational  Psychology  is  based 
on  his  peculiar  theory  of  knowledge  and  the  assumption  of 
his  complex  scheme  of  forms,  categories,  and  ideas  interven- 
ing between  the  mind  and  its  cognition  of  itself.  Accordingly 
it  shares  the  fate  of  that  theory.  But  even  if  the  mind 
enjoyed    only   a    mediate   or    representative    perception   of 

^-  Cf.  Lotze,  Mctaphysic,  §§  8,  9.  For  a  general  justification  of 
the  doctrine  of  Philosophical  Method  asserted  here,  see  Rickaby, 
First  Principles  of  Knowledge,  cc.  vi.  vii. 


THEORIES  OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  269 

external  reaJity  its  knowledge  of  its  own  states  and  of  itself  as 
existing  in  these  states  is  immediate.  We  do  not  deduce  the 
substantiality  of  the  soul  from  an  a  priori  conception  of 
substance ;  nor  is  our  conviction  of  its  simplicity,  abiding 
identity  and  individual  reality  based  on  a  paralogism.  We 
have  an  immediate  intellectual  apprehension  of  the  mind  in 
its  oivn  operations.  Self-consciousness  combined  with  memory 
reveals  the  mind  to  us  as  an  indivisible  reality  which  remains 
the  same  amid  a  succession  of  varying  feelings,  which  is  the 
connecting-point  of  all  thoughts,  the  subject  of  real  activities 
and  modifications,  and  knowing  itself  distinguishes  itself  from 
all  other  beings.  The  unity  of  the  mind  is  not  merely  formal. 
This  mind,  self,  or  ego  cannot  be  an  empty  illusory  idea,  or  a 
pure  nothing.  The  nature  of  self-consciousness  will  be  care- 
fully-investigated in  a  future  chapter. 

(4)  Kant's  assumption  of  the  existence  of  an  external 
noumenon  in  any  shape,  is  inconsistent  with  the  reduction  of 
the  principle  of  causality  to  an  a  priori  form.  We  are  justified 
in  believing  in  an  external  reality  as  the  cause  of  our  sensa- 
tions only  if  the  principle  of  causality  is  really  valid,  applicable 
to  noumena,  and  not  a  purely  subjective  illusion. 

(5)  Finally,  as  a  barrier  against  the  scepticism  of  Hume, 
and  as  a  solid  basis  for  science,  the  Critical  Philosophy  is  a 
complete  failure.  Hume  analyzes  all  knowledge  into  transitory 
mental  states ;   and  necessary  truths  into  irresistible  subjective 
beliefs  generated  by  customary  associations.     The  substitu- 
tion by  the  German  philosopher  of  7iecessary  hut  stiW  purely 
subjective  laws  or  forms  of  thought  for  such  beliefs,  does  not 
really  touch  the  sceptic.     Inasmuch  as  these  laws  inhere  in 
all  human  minds  and   condition  all  experience,  Kant  calls 
them  at  times  objective  and  universal  as  opposed  to  individual 
variability,  but  still  they  are  merely  mental.     They  might,  it 
is  true,  explain  the  harmony  of  the  activity  of  human  minds, 
were  these  isolated  from  the  physical  universe  and  occupied 
solely   in   deducing   mathematical    theorems   from    abstract 
axioms.      But    Astronomy,     Geology,     Physics,     Chemistry, 
Physiology,  assume  and  verify  the  reality  of  laws  other  than 
the  creations  of  the  mind.     They  assert  unmistakably  that 
there  are  real  powers  acting  upon  us  and  upon  each  other  in 
space  and  time,  according  to  laws  which  we  know  :  they  show 
us  that  different  minds  agree  in  their  representations  of  such 
modes  of  action  :  and  they  demonstrate  that  these  regular 
modes  of  action  continue  unchanged  in  the  absence  of  all 
human  minds.     Science,  in  fact,  assumes,  and  the  verification 
of  its  predictions  justifies  the  assumption,  that  the  laws  of 
cognition  mirror  the  laws  of  real  existence.     Kant  denies  this, 
and  his  substitution  of  innate  and  necessary  but  still  purely 


270  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


subjective  forms  of  knowledge  for  the  subjective  beliefs  of 
Hume,  does  not  afford  a  whit  more  solid  ground  for 
science. ^■^ 

Later  German  Idealism. — That  the  intermediate  position 
between  dogmatism  and  scepticism  assumed  by  the  Critical 
Philosophy  is  untenable  was  speedily  demonstrated  by  the 
logic  of  histor}'.  Like  every  system  of  partial  scepticism  it 
inevitably  leads  to  universal  doubt  and  only  awaited  the 
thinker  sui^ciently  consistent  and  audacious  to  draw  the 
final  conclusion.  If  such  irresistible  convictions  as  those  of 
the  reality  of  space,  time,  causality,  unity,  personal  identity, 
and  the  rest  are  to  be  deemed  illusions,  then  not  only  the 
instinctive  beliefs  and  yearnings  on  which  Kant  would  rest 
the  existence  of  God  and  a  future  life,  are  worthless,  but  also 
our  persuasion  of  the  extra-mental  existence  of  things-in- 
themselves  is  unjustifiable.  J.  G.  Fichte  (1762 — 1814)  boldly 
took  this  last  step,  and  even  in  Kant's  lifetime  logically 
deduced  from  his  master's  principles  consequences  from 
which  the  author  of  the  Critical  Philosophy  shrank  as  false 
and  pernicious. 

If  the  formal  element  of  cognition,  space,  causality,  and 
the  rest  be  a  purely  subjective  creation,  argued  this  uncom- 
promising thinker,  why  may  not  the  matter  of  knowledge,  and 
consequently  the  noumenon  itself  be  also  a  mental  fiction  ? 
Accordingly  he  concluded  as  the  simplest  explanation  that 
both  matter  and  form  of  knowledge  are  the  product  of  the 
activity  of  the  Ego.  The  manifold  contents  of  experience, 
just  as  well  as  the  a  priori  intuitions  and  categories  of  cognition 
are  furnished  by  a  creative  faculty  within  us.  Only  the  Ego 
is  ;  what  seems  the  non-ego  is  only  its  own  self-limitation. 
Each  human  mind,  or  finite  ego  is,  however,  merely  a  mode 
of  the  Absolute  Ego  which  is  ever  opposing  itself  to  itself. 

Empiricism. — In  complete  opposition  to  Kant  and  the 
defenders  of  innate  ideas  stands  the  Empiricist  school. 
Previous  to  Kant  and  Hume,  in  his  Essay  on  the  Human 
Understanding  (i6go),  John  Locke  sought  "  to  inquire  into  the 
origin,  certainty,  and  extent  of  knowledge,  and  the  grounds 
of  belief,  opinion,  and  assent."  This  work  is  the  fountain- 
head     of    modern    sensism,    empiricism,    materialism,    and 

13  Readings  on  Kant,  Kleutgen,  op.  cit.  §§  337 — 368;  Balmez, 
op.  cit.  Bk.  I.  c.  29,  Bk.  III.  cc.  16,  17,  Bk.  VII.  cc.  12 — 14; 
Martineau,  A  Study  of  Religion,  Vol.  I.  pp.  70 — So;  T.  Pesch,  S.J., 
Kant  et  la  science  moderne;  Peillaube,  op.  cit.  Pt.  II.  c.  2;  Piat, 
op.  cit.  pp.  140 — 180;  Ueberweg,  Logic,  §§  36 — 44;  History  of 
Phil.  Vol.  II.  pp.  159,  seq.,  especially  the  notes;  Dr.  Stockl, 
Geschichte,  Vol.  II.  ;  and  Dr.  Gutberlet,  Logik  und  Erkenntnisstheoric, 
pp.  185—204. 


THEORIES   OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  271 

phenomenal  idealism.'*  Locke  starts  with  the  rejection  of 
innate  ideas  or  innate  principles  in  any  form.  The  mind  is 
originally  a  tabula  rasa,  a  clean  slate  on  which  nothing  is 
written.  The  sources  of  all  our  knowledge  are  external 
sense-perception  and  reflexion  or  internal  perception.  Nil 
est  in  intellectu  quod  non  fiicrit  prius  in  sensu.  Knowledge 
consists  in  the  perception  of  agreement  or  difference  hetween 
our  ideas.  The  ultimate  elements  of  knowledge  are  ideas 
received  through  the  senses.  These  aggregated  in  various 
ways  form  compound  or  complex  ideas,  which  are  divided  into 
three  classes,  modes,  substances,  and  relations.  Ideas  of 
primary  qualities  of  bodies — extension,  solidity,  figure,  &c., 
are  like  their  objective  correlates,  but  ideas  of  secondary 
qualities,  taste,  colour,  &c.,  are  not.  By  reflexion  or  internal 
sensibility  we  know  our  volitions  and  feelings.  By  internal 
and  external  sense  combined,  we  form  ideas  of  power,  unity, 
and  the  like.  Substance,  the  self-subsisting  substratum  which 
we  imagine  to  be  the  support  of  the  qualities  of  bodies,  is  a 
mental  fiction.  It  cannot  be  apprehended  by  internal  or 
external  sense  ;  but,  as  we  are  unable  to  imagine  that  the 
ideas  we  perceive  by  our  senses  inhere  in  nothing,  we  suppose 
the  existence  of  a  substratum  which  binds  them  together. 

Influence. — Locke's  influence  in  Philosophy  has  been  great 
mainly  in  two  directions.  On  the  one  hand  he  gave  a  powerful 
impulse  to  Empirical  Psychology,  and  on  the  other  his 
defective  analysis  of  our  mental  endowments  resulted  in  a 
sensationalism  which  rapidly  developed  into  materialism  and 
scepticism.  The  stimulus  given  to  the  study  of  mental 
phenomena  should  within  its  own  sphere  have  been  a  real 
gain  to  Philosophy,  but  occurring  unfortunately  at  an  epoch 
when  Metaphysics  had  fallen  into  discredit,  the  use  and  value 
of  this  method  in  the  treatment  of  metaphysical  questions 
proper  became  absurdly  over-estimated.  Accordingly,  most 
modern  thinkers  from  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  Kant,  to  Mill 
and  Mr.  Spencer,  have  been  led  to  devote  a  prodigious 
amount  of  labour  to  the  obscure  question  of  the  origin  of 
knowledge,  and  then,  on  the  strength  of  some  very  dubious 

"  The  student  is  sometimes  confused  by  the  assertion  that  a 
particular  tenet  leads  both  to  idealism  and  to  materialism.  The 
explanation  is  that  the  one  is  a  deduction  of  Epistemology,  the  other 
of  Rational  Psychology.  The  former  refers  to  the  nature  and  validity 
of  knowledge,  the  latter  to  the  constitution  of  the  soul.  Thus,  as  we 
show  elsewhere,  the  sensist  philosopher  in  expounding  his  theory  of 
cognition  must  dissolve  the  material  world  into  a  series  of  conscious 
ideas,  whilst  in  dealing  with  Rational  Psychology,  he  must  reduce 
the  mind,  that  is,  this  series  of  conscious  states,  to  an  aspect 
or  function  of  nerve  matter. 


272 


RATIONAL   LIFE. 


solutions  therein  adopted,  to  determine  authoritatively  the 
validity  or  invalidity  of  all  our  cognitions  and  beliefs. 

As  regards  particular  tenets  of  Locke  we  have  only  space 
to  remark:  (i)  that  his  conception  of  the  mind  as  a  passive 
recipient  tablet,  and  his  non-recognition  of  its  supra-sensuous 
activity,  are  fatal  blemishes  to  his  psychology ;  (2)  that  as  a 
consequence  he  can  give  no  adequate  account  of  all  our  most 
important  notions,  such  as  those  of  God,  self,  substance,  and 
the  various  intellectual  operations  insisted  on  in  a  previous 
chapter;  (3)  that  his  view  of  knowledge  as  the  perception 
of  agreement  or  disagreement  between  ideas  and  not  things, 
and  his  doctrine  of  mediate  perception  leads  inevitably  to 
subjective  ideaUsm.  If  we  can  only  know  our  mental  states, 
then  we  have  no  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a  material 
world  beyond  these  states.  (4)  His  use  of  the  important 
word  idea  is  fatally  ambiguous  throughout  his  whole  work, 
and  he  similarly  confounds  mental  with  merely  intra-organic 
phenomena.  The  vital  deficiencies  in  his  doctrine  of  sense- 
perception  and  in  his  conception  of  intellect  were  evinced  in 
the  next  generation  by  the  Idealistic  and  Sceptical  deductions 
of  Berkeley  and  Hume  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  the  Sen- 
sualism of  Condillac,  Helvetius,  and  the  French  MateriaHsts 
on  the  other.15  Both  Berkeley  and  Hume  ignore  the  essential 
difference  between  sense  and  intellect,  but  as  we  have  already 
sketched  their  systems  (pp.  108— no),  we  must  omit  them 
here.  The  most  thoroughgoing  disciple  of  Locke  in  this 
direction  was  the  French  philosopher  Condillac.  He  omits 
Locke's  second  source  of  experience,  reflexion,  altogether,  and 
endeavours  to  build  up  the  edifice  of  knowledge  by  external 
sense  alone.  Hartley,  in  this  country,  similarly  conceived 
the  mind  as  a  passive  recipient  something,  in  which  by 
association  our  sensations  and  phantasms  combine,  coalesce, 
and  become  refined  into  spiritual  cognitions.  It  will,  how- 
ever, be  most  useful  to  pass  on  to  the  latest  representatives 
of  the  Sensist  school,  and  we  shall  take  Bain  and  Sully  as  its 
leading  present  advocates. 

Recent  Nominalism. — The  following  account  of  Conception 
and  Judgment  is  given  by  Dr.  Bain  :  "  We  feel  identity  among 
stars  in  spite  of  their  variety,  the  things  thus  identified  make 
a  class,  and  the  operation  is  called  classifying."  "  We  are 
able  to  attend'^^  to  the  points  of  agreement  of  resembling  things 

15  The  best  examination  in  English  of  Locke's  system  is, 
perhaps,  that  from  the  Neo-Hegelian  standpoint,  contained  in 
Green's' Introduction  to  Hume's  Treatise  on  Human  Nature.  Cf. 
also  Stockl's  Geschichte.  §§  32—45- 

1''  True,  we  are  capable  of  attention,  but  this  implies  more  than 
sensibility.'    Again,  what  are  "  points  of  agreement  "  ?     Clearly  not 


THEORIES   OE  GENERAL    KNOWLEDGE.  273 


and  to  neglect  the  points  of  difference,  as  when  we  think  of 
the  roundness  of  round  bodies  .  .  .  this  is  named  the  power 
of  abstraction."  Nevertheless  "  abstraction  does  not  consist 
in  the  mental  separation  of  one  property  of  a  thing  from  the 
other  properties,  as  in  thinking  of  the  roundness  of  the  moon 
apart  from  its  luminosity,  .  .  .  such  a  separation  is  imprac- 
ticable:' We  merely  "  imagine  a  thing  in  company  with 
others  having  the  attribute  in  question,  and  affirm  nothing  of 
the  one  concrete  thing  which  is  not  true  of  all  the  others." 
We  sometimes  seem  to  approach  to  an  abstract  idea,  but  it 
is  really  impossible.  Even  in  geometry  the  concrete  lines  and 
figures  are  a  necessity.  "  Length  is  the  name /or  one  or  more 
things  agreeing  in  the  property  so  called,  and  the  property  is 
nothing  but  this  agreement."  "  The  only  generality  possessing 
separate  existence  is  the  Name.  General  ideas  separated  from 
particulars  have  no  counterpart  in  Reality  (as  implied  in 
Realism),  and  no  Mental  existence  (as  affirmed  in  Con^ 
ceptualism).  .  .  .  Neither  can  we  have  a  mental  Conception 
of  any  property  abstracted  from  all  others;  we  cannot 
conceive  a  circle  except  as  of  some  colour  and  some  size ;  we 
cannot  conceive  justice  except  by  thinking  of  just  actions." 
Logically  enough,  then,  following  out  the  principles  of 
sensism,  he  holds  also  that  "  the  existence  of  a  supposed 
external  and  independent  material  world  is  the  crowning 
instance  of  the  abstraction  converted  into  the  separate 
entity."!^ 

Criticism. — Such  is  Bain's  psychology  of  universal  con- 
cepts, and  we  shall  now  comment  on  it.  The  expressions, 
"  feeling  "  or  "  sense  of  difference  or  identity,"  are  inaccurate 
if  used  of  the  comparative  act  in  the  same  meaning  as  when 
applied  to  the  consciousness  of  the  original  sensations.  The 
perception  of  agreement  or  difference  is  an  intellectual  cogni- 
tion. If  "  we  are  able  to  attend  to  the  points  of  agreement  ol 
resembling  things,  and  to  neglect  the  points  of  difference," 
then  it  is  not  true  that  "  we  cannot  make  a  mental  separation 
of  one  property  of  a  thing  from  other  properties."  Attention 
to  one  particular  aspect  of  objects  and  neglect  of  the  rest 
constitutes  precisely  the  mental    separation   of  the   former 

a  concrete  quality,  like  a  taste  or  smell,  capable  of  stimulating  a 
sensuous  faculty.  "  Agreement  "  is  a  relation  between  perceived  things 
and,  consequently,  its  apprehension  requires  the  exercise  of  an 
additional  activity  superior  to  that  engaged  in  the  two  or  more 
existing  impressions.  This  activity  must  hold  the  two  separate 
impressions  together  and  discern  the  relation  of  likeness  or 
unlikeness  between  them. 

1'^  Mental  Science,  Bk.  II.  c.  v. 


274  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


property  ;  and  in  this  the  essence  of  abstraction  consists.  It 
is,  moreover,  on  the  exercise  of  this  intellectual  faculty  that 
the  science  of  geometry,  and,  in  fact,  all  general  knowledge 
depends.  We  attend  to  those  features  of  our  figure  which 
are  common  to  all  the  class,  and  we  omit  the  rest.  Our 
demonstration  proceeds  solely  from  the  attribute  or  group  of 
attributes  which  are  contained  in  the  concept  of  the  species 
of  figure  with  which  we  deal ;  and  if  we  allow  any  accidental 
qualities  to  intrude,  our  proof  may  become  at  once  vitiated. 
It  is,  of  course,  indisputable  that  we  cannot  picture  by  the 
imaf^ination  length  separated  from  the  line,  or  surface  from 
the  plane;  but  this  does  not  prevent  us  from  thinking  the 
length  whilst  we  ignore  the  other  qualities.  When  I  prove  a 
thesis  in  geometry  regarding  the  length  of  some  line,  I  fix  my 
attention  solely  on  the  length  of  the  imperfect  line  before  me, 
although  of  course  my  senses  must  apprehend  it  as  possessing 
breadth.  Now,  this  act  of  attention  is  a  thought,  a  cognition 
presenting  to  me  that  something  which  forms  the  subject  of 
my  elaborate  demonstration — a  universal  idea :  and  the 
denial  either  of  its  abstract  character  or  of  its  real  objec- 
tive foundation  annihilates  the  science  of  Geometry.  (See 
p.  250.) 

Dr.  Bain's  definition  of  length  as  "  the  name  of  one  or 
more  things  agreeing  in  this  property,"  illustrates  well  the 
violence  that  must  be  done  to  common  language  and  common 
thought  in  order  to  adapt  them  to  the  needs  of  the  Sensist 
Psychology.  Length  is  not  the  name  of  things — the  fishing- 
rod,  the  piece  of  string,  and  the  River  Thames — any  more 
than  motion  is  the  name  of  the  steam-engine,  the  swallow, 
and  the  perambulator.  It  is  simply  the  name  of  a  common 
property  which  the  mind  can  consider  and  reason  about 
"irrespective  of  any  other  relations."  It  is  quite  true  that 
we  cannot  form  a  sensuous  image  or  phantasm  of  a  circle 
except  of  some  particular  colour,  size,  &c.,  and  it  is  also  true 
that  the  intellect  cannot  elicit  a  universal  idea  without  the 
presence  of  a  concrete  image ;  but  given  this  latter,  we  can 
contemplate  in  thought  the  specific  or  universal  features 
abstracting  from  those  which  are  individual. 

The  comparative  or  judicial  activity  of  the  mind  Dr.  Bain 
resolves  into  the  Law  of  Relativity.  (See  p.  91.)  He  holds  that 
"  the  really  fundamental  separation  of  the  Intellect  is  into 
three  facts  called  (i)  Discrimination,  the  sense,  feeling,  or 
consciousness  of  difference.  (2)  Similarity,  the  feeling  or 
consciousness  of  agreement,  and  (3)  Retentiveness,  or  the 
power  of  memory  or  acquisition.  These  three  functions, 
however,  much  as  they  are  mingled  in  our  mental  operations, 
are  yet  totally  distinct  properties,  and  each  the  groundwork 


THEORIES   OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  275 


of  a  distinct  structure.  .  .  .  They  are  the  Intellect,  the  whole 
Intellect,  and  nothing  but  the  Intellect." 

The  attempted  reduction  of  Intellect  to  a  mere  phase  of 
the  Law  of  Relativity  lies  open  to  the  fatal  objection  that  it 
confounds  in  the  crudest  manner  two  essentially  distinct 
things — capacity  for  discriminable  feelings,  and  the  power  of 
discriminating  between  them.  Bain's  language  concerning  the 
so-called  "facts"  of  discrimination  ignores  the  radical  diver- 
sfty  between  the  mere  occurrence  of  unlike  feelings  and  the 
comparative  act  of  the  higher  faculty  by  which  that  unlike- 
ness  is  cognized.  Transition  from  one  feeling  to  the  other, 
change  from  one  state  of  consciousness  to  another,  is  very 
different  from  the  intellectual  act  of  attention  by  which  we 
may  and  do  at  times  recognize  that  transition,  and  compare 
those  states.  Among  low  stages  of  animal  life  we  frequently 
find  the  keenest  susceptibility  to  different  sensations.  But  the 
intellectual  perception  of  them  as  different  is  wanting.  The 
same  objection  appHes  to  his  treatment  of  the  "  fact  "  of 
agreement. 

With  regard  to  the  third  "  fact  "  or  "function  "  he  is  even 
less  happy.  "  Retentiveness "  strictly  understood  means 
simply  the'  persistence  in  the  mind  or  body  of  a  disposition 
towards  the  re-excitation  of  a  state  which  has  once  occurred. 
Now  this  capability  of  conservation  or  resuscitation  is  not  a 
specially  intellectual  or  cognitive  property  at  all.  If,  however, 
it  is  to  be  interpreted  more  largely  as  involving  recognition 
and  equivalent  to  "  memory,"  then  it  is  clearly  not  simple  or 
ultimate  in  Dr.  Bain's  sense,  but  is  in  part  made  up  of  the 
other  "  fact  "  or  cognition  of  agreement. 

Dr.  Sully,  who  is  at  present  probably  the  most  popular 
representative  of  the  Sensist  school,  seems  to  have  felt  the 
inadequacy  of  the  account  of  our  knowledge  given  by  his 
predecessors.  In  chapters  ix.  x.  of  his  Outlines  of  Psychology, 
he  analyzes  and  describes  the  process  of  thinking.  Some  of 
his  remarks  there  appear  to  us  accurate  enough  ;  but  usually 
when  this  is  the  case  they  seem  to  be  inconsistent  with 
his  Sensationalist  assumption  that  "  all  mental  activity  is  of 
one  and  the  same  kind  throughout  its  manifold  phases.''  (p.  26.)^'^ 

^8  The  phrase  "manifold  phases"  is  happily  vague;  but  in 
substance  Mr.  Sully  adopts  the  sensist  principle  that  at  bottom  all 
mental  life  is  essentially  of  one  kind — sensuous  consciousness.  How 
the  admission  of  a  power  of  "  active  self-direction  "  (p.  73)  and  of 
those  various  activities  involved  in  comparison  of  impressions, 
cognition  of  relations,  and  reflexion  on  states  of  self  (cc.  ix.  x.)  is 
to  be  reconciled  with  this  view,  he  does  not  attempt  to  explain. 
For  our  own  part,  we  cannot  easily  imagine  a  more  fundamental 
difference  in  kind  than  that  between  the  sensibility  exhibited  in 


276 


NATIONAL  LIFE. 


We  can  only  cite  a  few  typical  phrases  which  will  nevertheless 
sufficiently  justify  our  observations:  "All  thinking  is  repre- 
sentation hke  imagination,  but  it  is  of  a  different  kind." 
"  Thinking  deals  with  abstract  qualities  of  things— that  is, 
aspects  common  to  them  and  many  other  things,  e.g.,  the 
possession  of  life." 

These  statements  are  true,  but  directly  opposed  to 
Nominalism,  involved  in  Sensism,  and  frankly  accepted  by 
Dr.  Bain.  If  "  thinking  is  representation  like  imagination, 
but  of  a  different  kind,''  and  if  "  abstract  qualities  of  things, 
that  is,  aspects  common  to  them  and  many  other  things,"  can 
be  thus  represented  in  thought,  then  evidently  the  Sensist 
tenet  that  there  can  be  no  really  general  notions  or  concepts, 
and  that  the  only  thing  which  is  universal  is  the  word  or 
name,  is  abandoned.  Again :  thinking,  "  like  the  simpler 
forms  of  cognition,  consists  in  discrimination  and  assimi- 
lation, in  detecting  differences  and  agreements,"  but  "  it  is 
of  a  higher  kind  involving  much  more  activity  of  mind.  .  .  . 
All  thinking  involves  comparison.  ...  By  an  act  of  com- 
parison is  meant  the  voluntary  direction  of  the  attention  to 
two  or  more  objects  at  the  same  moment,  or  in  immediate 
succession,  with  a  view  to  discover  differences  or  agreements." 
This  power  he  holds  to  be  beyond  that  of  even  intelligent 
brutes.  Here,  again,  the  description  is  correct,  but  utterly 
incompatible  with  the  empirical  conception  of  the  mind  as  a 
mere  collection  of  impressions. 

Generic  Images. — In  treating  of  the  nature  and  origin  of 
universal  ideas.  Dr.  Sully  adheres  to  Nominalism.  He  seeks, 
indeed,  to  improve  that  doctrine,  which  has  suffered  some- 
what severely  under  recent  criticism,  but  yet  accepts  the  old 
sensist  view,  which  confounds  the  phantasm  of  the  imagina- 
tion with  the  intellectual  concept.  He  defines  the  concept  as 
"the  representation  in  our  minds  answering  to  a  general 
name,  such  as  sailor,  man,  animal."  But,  "  what  is  in  the 
mind   is  a  kind  of  composite  image  formed  by  the  fusion  or 

passive  sensations  awakened  by  the  reception  of  concrete  im- 
pressions, and  the  active  and  reflective  energies  exerted  in  reflective 
attention  to,  and  comparison  of,  these  impressions.  If  there  is  a 
mind  in  the  sense  of  a  real  unit,  an  abiding  energy,  endowed  with 
intellectual  or  spiritual  as  well  as  sensuous  powers,  then  it  is  con- 
ceivable that  such  a  mind  should  be  capable  of  reacting  through  its 
superior  faculty,  and  of  attending  to,  comparing,  and  reflecting 
upon  the  sensuous  impressions  which  it  has  received.  But  if  all 
mental  life  is  essentially  one  in  kind,  and  the  mind  itself  but  the 
series  of  sensuous  states,  then,  where  this  active  self-direction  and 
this  reflective  comparing  force  is  to  come  from,  we  confess  ourselves 
unable  to  conceive. 


THEORIES  OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  277 


coalescence  of  many  images  of  single  objects,  in  which  indi- 
vidual differences  are  blurred,  and  only  the  common  features 
stand  out  prominently.  .  .  .  This  may  be  called  a  typical,  or 
generic  image.'' 

The  Generic  Image,  like  a  composite  photograph,  is,  in 
fact,  the  residual  effect  of  a  series  of  impressions  of  similar 
objects;  the  common  lineaments  are  deepened  whilst  the 
marginal  and  accidental  variations  annul  each  other,  leaving 
a  vague  outline.  Dr.  Sully  believes  that  this  generic  image 
offers  "  a  way  of  reconciHng  the  opposed  views.  As  generic  it 
differs  in  an  important  way  from  the  detailed  particular  image. 
As  an  image  it  meets  the  contention  of  the  nominalist  that  all 
ideation  is  at  bottom  imagination."  {The  Human  Mind,  p.  346.) 

Criticism.— (i)  This  remark  suggests  the  impression  that  Dr. 
Sully  has  missed  the  significance  of  the  controversy.  Which- 
ever side  be  right,  the  dispute  between  Nominalists  and  their 
opponents  is  by  no  means  so  puerile.  The  difference  between 
the  Sensationist  conception  of  mental  action  and  that  of  the 
Kantian,  Aristotelian,  and  other  schools,  which  maintain  the 
reality  of  universal  concepts,  is  of  too  fundamental  a  character 
to  be  so  easily  bridged  over.  The  hypothesis  that  the 
universal  concept  is  a  decayed,  worn-down  image,  instead  of 
being  a  distinct  and  definite  phantasm,  as  implied  by  earlier 
empiricists,  is  not  hkely  to  win  realist  converts.  (2)  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  this  "  generic  "  image  is  as  far  removed  from 
the  universal  concept  proper  as  is  a  vivid  definite  image.  It 
is  merely  a  confused  fluctuating  phantasm  with  the  indi- 
viduahzing  characteristics  partially  obliterated ;  a  _  sort  of 
mean  or  average  picture,  somewhat  as  a  figure  seen  in  a  fog. 
But  though  imperfect  and  indistinct,  it  is  still  a  representation 
of  a  particular  character.  When  the  mathematician  proves  a 
theorem  concerning  the  triangle,  whether  the  diagram  on  the 
black-board  be  clear  and  distinct,  or  faded  and  obscure,  it  is 
in  itself  equally  individual;  but  it  assists  the  intehect  to  hold 
before  its  gaze  throughout  the  process  the  complexus  of  attri- 
butes which  constitute  the  essence  and  nature  of  triangle— the 
concept  of  triangle.  The  phantasm  of  the  imagination, 
whether  vivid  and  definite,  or  vague  and  "  generic,"  performs 
a  similar  function,  but  in  itself  it  is  as  individualistic  as  the 
figure  on  the  black-board.i^  Xhe  concept  alone  is  truly 
universal,  since  it  alone  really  and  completely  applies  to  all 

19  "  L'image  generique  d'homme,  represente  des  traits  qui  ne 
sont  pas  communs  a  tous  les  hommes ;  tous  les  hommes  n'ont  pas 
un  age  moyen,  une  taille  moyenne.  Les  enfants  et  les  vieillards  les 
grands  et  les  petits  des  deux  sexes  sont  des  hommes,  et  la  represen- 
tation qui  les  embrassera  tous  pourra  seule  etre  appelee  generale  et 
universelle  ou  simplement  concept."  (Peillaube,  op.  cit.  p.  66.) 


278  RATIONAL' LIFE. 


possible  members  of  the  class.  The  concept  too  may  be 
quite  distinct  while  the  image  is  confused  ;  and  the  former  is 
stable  whilst  the  latter  varies  from  moment  to  moment.  (See 
above,  pp.  237.)  (3)  Furthermore,  it  may  be  urged  that  the 
generic  image  hypothesis  is  in  conflict  with  the  results  of  more 
careful  investigation  into  the  working  of  the  imagination.  It 
is  clear  from  Galton's  inquiries  that  people  vary  enormously 
with  respect  to  the  vividness  of  their  power  of  imagination 
and  visualization  of  past  experiences.  The  best  images  which 
many  can  form  of  absent  individual  objects,  such  as  their 
breakfast-table,  their  bed-room,  or  their  father,  are  of  the 
vague  "generic"  type;  whilst  others  profess  to  be  able  to 
call  up  representations  of  these  objects  which  rival  the 
original  perceptions  in  liveliness  and  accuracy  of  detail. 
When  men  think  or  reason  about  general  classes  of  objects, 
the  indistinctness  of  their  images  naturally  varies  with  their 
individual  powers  of  visualization.  Some  men  apparently 
employ  much  more  distinct  and  vivid  phantasms  than  others; 
but  the  concept  may  be  equally  perfect  and  universal  in  both. 
It  can  hardly  be  maintained  that  hazy  images  or  confused 
perceptions  conduce  to  greater  perfection  of  scientific  notions, 
yet  this  seems  to  be  the  logical  consequence  of  the  recent 
theory  which  would  reduce  the  general  concept  to  the  vague 
and  generic  rather  than  to  the  clear  and  distinct  phantasms  of 
the  imagination.  The  truth  is,  it  is  radically  different  from  both.^*' 

^•^  Mr.  G.  F.  Stout  argues  very  effectiv^ely  against  the  "  generic  " 
image  theory  :  "We  may  fairly,  say  that  all  images,  as  compared 
with  percepts,  are  vague,  and  it  does  not  appear  that  the  images 
which  are  treated  as  representatives  of  a  class,  are  more  obscure 
than  others,  or  that  they  have  a  different  kind  of  obscurity.  If  I 
trace  in  my  mind's  eye  the  course  of  a  river,  or  a  particular  walk 
which  I  have  taken,  and  if  I  do  not  make  any  extraordinary  effort 
to  recall  details,  the  images  which  pass  through  my  mind  are  mere 
outline  sketches,  in  which  certain  characteristic  features  of  objects 
have  a  certain  prominence,  whilst  the  rest  is  left  vague.  Yet  the 
ideal  train  is  wholly  concerned  with  particulars,  d^nd  not  with  univer- 
sals  as  such.  Suppose  that,  on  the  contrary,  I  desire  to  bring  before 
my  mind  the  general  characters  distinctive  of  the  kind  of  substance 
called  "  chalk."  ...  I  find  that  the  kind  of  image  which  suits  my 
purpose  best,  is  one  which  is  more  definite  and  detailed  than  those 
which  serve  my  turn  in  recalling  a  series  of  particular  facts.  On 
the  whole,  the  obscure  and  fluctuating  character  of  a  mental  image 
seems  rather  to  unfit  it  as  a  vehicle  of  generalization.  ,  .  .  The 
marginal  obscurity  makes  the  whole  picture  evanescent  and  fluctu- 
ating. In  many  instances  a  percept  better  fulfils  the  function  of  a 
class-type  than  a  pictorial  representation."  (Analvtic  Psychology, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  180,  181.  Cf.  Peillaubc,  Tltcorie  dcs  Concepts,  pp.  57 — 68; 
al.so  Clarke,  Logic,  c.  7;  and  Kleutgen,  op.  cit.  §  802.) 


THEORIES  OP  CEMERAL  KNOWLEDGE.  279 

Positivism. — Sensationism  and  Empiricism,  as  we  have 
seen,  lead  as  surely  to  phenomenism,  or  the  denial  of  all 
knowledge  of  things  in  themselves,  as  Kantianism.  This 
doctrine  of  nescience,  which  is  now  the  creed  of  a  large 
number  of  scientists  as  well  as  professional  philosophers, 
received  its  most  formal  enunciation  in  the  Positivism  of 
Auguste  Comte  (1798 — 1857),  This  is  the  substance  of  the 
French  philosopher's  teaching  :  Metaphysics,  or  the  investi- 
gation of  the  first  cause  of  things,  of  their  inner  nature  and 
last  end,  is  a  chimerical  science.  Human  reason  can  never 
learn  anything  about  God,  the  soul,  man's  origin  or  destiny : 
consequently  Natural  Theology  and  Rational  Psychology  are 
alike  illusory.  Agnosticism,  in  fact,  describes  the  true  philo- 
sophical attitude.  The  absolute  in  every  form  is  unknowable  ; 
cognition  is  limited  to  the  relative,  the  phenomenal.  Theism, 
atheism,  pantheism,  materialism,  and  spiritualism,  are 
equally  irrational  and  indefensible.  All  attempts  to  search 
after  the  ultimate  causes  of  phenomena  must  be  condemned 
as  worse  than  useless.  All  metaphysical  entities,  such  as 
substance,  cause,  faculty,  force,  should  be  banished  from  our 
minds  as  empty  and  unreal  phantoms.  The  aim  of  the 
human  intellect  must  henceforth  be  to  observe,  analyze,  and 
classify  facts,  to  register  the  succession  and  coexistence  of 
phenomena,  and  then  to  generalize  by  induction  so  as  to 
formulate  their  laws  ;  but  never  may  it  seek  in  its  reasonings 
to  transcend  the  field  of  experience.  Laws  of  phenomena 
constitute  the  goal  of  human  science.  Phenomena  alone  are 
real,  useful,  positive.  Positive  science  is  therefore  the  science 
of  phenomena ;  and  the  function  of  the  Positive  Philosophy 
consists  in  the  classification  and  methodizing  of  the 
sciences. 

The  sciences  Comte  arranges  according  to  their  com- 
plexity after  a  hierarchical  plan.  Ascending  in  serial  order 
from  the  simpler,  more  abstract  and  prior  in  order  of  time, 
they  are  thus  placed  :  mathematics,  astronomy,  physics, 
chemistry,  biology,  and  sociology.  Each  depends  upon  all 
the  others  which  precede  it.  Psychology  is  merely  a  branch 
of  biology,  to  be  investigated  by  objective  methods  (see 
pp.  21,  22) ;  whilst  ethics  is  a  department  of  sociology. 

The  other  leading  feature  in  Comte's  system  is  the 
historic  conception  of  the  three  states.  The  human  mind 
in  its  development  necessarily  passes  through  three  stages : 
the  theological,  in  which  it  explains  natural  phenomena  by 
the  interference  of  personal  agents — supernatural  beings :  the 
metaphysical,  in  which  it  accounts  for  phenomena  by  meta- 
physical entities,  occult  causes,  and  scholastic  abstractions — 
such  as  substances,  forces,  faculties,  and  the  like ;   finally,  the 


28o  RATIONAL  LIFE. 


positive  period,  at  last  happily  arrived,  in  which  man  abandons 
all  such  futile  investigations  and  confines  himself  to  formu- 
lating the  laws  which  connect  phenomena. 

Later  on  Comte,  acknowledging  the  necessity  of  an  object 
to  satisfy  the  religious  instincts  of  man's  nature,  crowned 
his  system  by  the  invention  of  a  curious  species  of  religion — 
the  worship,  with  an  elaborate  ritual,  of  Humanity  in  general. 
This  last  production  of  his  speculative  genius,  however,  met 
with  acceptance  among  very  few  of  his  followers.  Indeed, 
here  in  England  the  Positive  Philosophy  has  experienced  very 
severe  criticism  at  the  hands  of  Spencer,  Huxley,  and  others 
who  themselves  profess  many  of  its  chief  doctrines.  In  morals 
Comte  insisted  much  on  altruism — aiming  at  the  happiness  not 
of  self  but  of  others — as  the  ethical  end  of  life.  Christianity 
fosters  selfishness,  and  so  the  disappearance  of  Christian  and 
Theistic  belief  will  lead,  he  prophesies,  to  great  purity  and 
perfection  of  general  morality. 

Criticism. — We  have  to  deal  only  with  the  psychology 
of  Positivism.  It  is  needless  to  do  more  than  recall  the  utter 
failure  of  Comte's  attempt  to  discredit  introspection  and  to 
degrade  the  science  of  the  mind  into  a  branch  of  cerebral 
physiology.  The  practical  outcome  of  his  teaching  is 
materialism.  As  to  Comte's  oft-repeated  assertion,  reiterated 
by  his  followers,  that  we  can  never  know  anything  of  the 
absolute,  but  only  of  the  relative ;  it  is  a  piece  of  dogmatism 
deriving  its  chief  plausibility  from  an  ambiguity  we  have 
before  alluded  to,  in  such  terms  as  absolute,  noumenon, 
phenomenon,  and  relative.  (See  pp.  158,  159.)  If  by 
"  absolute "  or  "  noumenon,"  be  meant  some  element  of 
reality  which  never  stands  in  any  relation  to  our  faculties, 
and  so  never  reveals  itself  to  the  mind,  then  it  is  obvious  we 
can  never  know  that  "  absolute  "  or  "  noumenon."  But,  if 
under  the  term  "  absolute  "  be  included,  as  these  writers 
intend,  active  essences  in  the  world  around  us,  agents 
which  really  cause  and  do  not  merely  precede  events,  an 
abiding  being  v/hich  is  the  real  subject  of  our  evanescent 
conscious  states  as  well  as  the  truly  absolute,  the  primary 
cause  and  last  end  of  finite  perishing  creatures ;  then, 
assuredly,  the  human  mind  can  attain  knowledge  of  the 
"  absolute."  Reason  knows  the  absolute  by  the  very  fact 
that  it  cognizes  the  relative  to  be  relative.  Knowledge  of  the 
relative,  as  such,  involves  as  its  necessary  consequence 
knowledge  of  the  absolute.  It  is  because  it  recognizes  the 
ere  itures  and  events  of  the  physical  world  along  with  its  own 
states  and  acts  as  relative  that  the  mind  is  led  to  the  discern- 
ment of  the  absolute  author  in  the  one  case,  and  the  per- 
manent ground  in  the  other.   The  phenomenal,  the  changing, 


THEORIES  OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  281 

the  relative  are  all  unthinkable  without  the  real,  the  permanent 
— the  absolute,  if  we  choose  to  call  it.^^ 

The  prohibition  of  Positivism  to  search  for  knowledge  of 
anything  beyond  the  region  of  sensible  experience  is  arbitrary 
and  vain,  whilst  Comte's  prophecies  regarding  the  quiescence 
of  the  human  mind  in  the  positivist  creed  are  already 
notoriously  falsified.  The  principle  of  causality  appeals  to  the 
reason  both  as  an  objective,  transcendental  law,  embracing 
all  contingent  existence,  and  as  an  imperative,  insatiable 
impulse  in  the  quest  of  truth.  The  instinct  to  seek  out  the 
ultimate  ivhy  as  well  as  the  how  is  the  essential  outcome  of 
the  rational  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  It  is  this  inap- 
peasable  curiosity  which  most  of  all  distinguishes  man  from 
the  brute  animal ;  and  has  been  the  motive  power  which 
has  effected  every  great  advance  in  the  extension  of  human 
knowledge.  The  view,  therefore,  that  the  highest  develop- 
ment of  human  reason  can  content  itself  with  the  mere 
accumulation,  registration,  and  generalization  of  sensible 
facts,  and  can  remain  in  stolid  indifference  to  all  those  great 
problems  which  have  engrossed  the  loftiest  intelligence  from 
Plato  and  Aristotle  to  St.  Thomas  and  Dante,  and  again 
from  these  down  to  Newton  and  Leibnitz,  is  possible  only  to 
a  mind  blinded  by  anti-theological  prejudice. 

The  Origin  of  Axioms  and  Necessary  Truths  :  Associa- 
tionist  Theory. — Besides  universal  concepts,  necessary  truths, 
and  especially  those  which  have  been  called  synthetic  a  priori 
judgments,  have  been  advanced  in  proof  of  the  existence  of  a 
supra-sensuous  faculty.  Examples  of  these  are  the  axioms  of 
mathematics  :  "  Two  things  which  are  equal  to  a  third  are 
(necessarily)  equal  to  each  other;  "  "Equals  added  to  equals 
give  equals  ;  "  "  Two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose  a  space  ;  " 
the  principle  of  causality :  "  Nothing  can  begin  to  exist 
without  a  cause;"  and  also  self-evident  ethical  maxims: 
"  Right  ought  to  be  done  ;  "  "  Ingratitude  is  wrong,"  and  so 
on.     These  judgments,   we  maintain,    affirm  necessary  and 

"^  On  the  distinction  between  the  Absolute  simpUciter — God,  and 
the  absolute  secundum  quid,  or  in  a  certain  respect,  that  is,  finite 
substances  viewed  as  wholes  in  themselves  apart  from  particular 
sets  of  relations,  see  Kleutgen,  op.  cit.  §  542  ;  also  Vallet,  Le  Kantisme 
et  le  Positivisme,  c.  iv.  Martineau's  Types,  Vol.  I.  Bk.  II.  contains 
one  of  the  best  reviews  of  Comte  in  English.  The  reader  will  find 
a  good  account  of  Positivism  in  Auguste  Comte,  sa  Vie,  sa  Doctrine, 
and  Le  Positivisme  depuis  Comte,  by  P.  Griiber,  S.J.  A.  J.  Balfour's 
Defence  of^  Philosophic  Doubt  and  Foundations  of  Belief  contain  admir- 
able criticism  of  the  methods,  assumptions,  and  consequences  of 
Positivism, 


282  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


universal  truths.  They  must  hold  ahcays  and  everywhere,  even 
in  the  most  distant  parts  of  the  universe.  God  cannot  infringe 
them.  The  peculiar  necessary  character  of  these  propositions 
Kant  sought  to  explain,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the  hypothesis 
of  subjective  forms  or  laws  inherent  in  the  constitution  of  the 
mind.  Empiricism  endeavours  to  account  for  this  necessity  by 
mental  association.  The  axioms  are,  it  is  asserted,  mere 
generalizations  from  continuous  experience.  They  have 
been  reached  by  observation  and  comparison  of  the  empirical 
facts  around  us,  and  they  may  be  legitimately  extended  by 
inference  throughout  the  world  of  our  experience,  but  beyond 
this  we  cannot  assert  that  they  must  hold.  In  distant  stars 
2  +  3  may  equal  4. 

Historically,  Hume  was  the  first  to  try  to  systematically 
account  for  the  necessity  of  these  judgments  by  sensuous 
experience.  Our  conviction  as  to  the  necessity  of  the 
principle  of  causality,  and  our  belief  in  the  reality  of  some 
sort  of  influx  of  the  cause  into  the  effect,  he  explains  as  the 
result  of  custom.  Reiterated  observation  of  one  event  following 
another  begets  the  delusion  that  there  is  some  sort  of  nexus 
between  them ;  while  there  is  really  nothing  but  succession. 
Later  sensationalists  with  much  ingenuity  extended  the  appli- 
cation of  this  principle  ;  and  the  Law  of  Inseparable,  Indis- 
soluble, or  Irresistible  Association  was  claimed  to  be  an 
instrument  capable  of  accounting  for  all  our  most  important 
intellectual  principles.  The  leading  modern  representative 
of  the  school  on  this  question  is  J.  S.  Mill.  In  his  Logic,  and 
in  his  Examination  of  Sir  IV.  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  he  pro- 
pounded and  defended  the  doctrine  that  all  so-called  necessary 
truths,  mathematical  axioms  among  the  rest,  are  merely 
generalizations  from  sensuous  experience,  and  their  seem- 
ingly necessary  character  is  only  an  instance  of  inseparable 
or  irresistible  association  between  the  ideas  of  the  subject  and 
predicate  which  is  created  by  their  repeated  conjunction. 
Dr.  Bain  adopts  the  same  view,  and  speaks  in  the  most 
confused  manner  of  the  various  doctrines  opposed  to  the 
Empirical  theory.-'^ 

"  Mental  Science,  Bk.  I.  c.  6.  He  there  confounds  in  an  aston- 
ishing fashion  the  hypothesis  of  innate  ideas,  the  Kantian  system  of 
a  priori  forms,  and  the  intuitional  theory  as  held  by  writers  like 
Drs.  W.  Ward,  M'Cosh,  and  the  great  majority  of  modern  anti- 
phenomenists.  The  innate  hypothesis  maintains  that  the  mind  is 
endowed  from  its  birth  with  a  disposition  to  evolve  these  cognitions 
purely  from  its  own  nature.  External  occurrences  may  be  the 
occasion,  but  they  really  contribute  nothing  towards  the  genesis  of 
these  principles.  Innatism  differs  from  the  Kantian  view  by  ascribing 
real   extra-mental    validity  to  these   first    truths.      Tho  intuitional 


THEORIES  OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  283 


The  Associationist  doctrine  will  be  best  exhibited  by 
a  few  citations  from  Mill,  on  Mathematical  truths: 
"What  is  the  ground  for  our  belief  in  (mathematical) 
axioms  ?  What  is  the  evidence  on  which  they  rest  ?  They 
are  experimental  truths,  generalizations  from  experience." '-^^ 
Accordingly  it  follows  "  that  demonstrative  sciences  {e.g.. 
Geometry)  are  all  without  exception  inductive  sciences  ;  that 
their  evidence  is  that  of  experience."  They  cannot  be 
legitimately  extended  to  "  distant  stellar  regions,"  for  we  are 
not  justified  in  assuming  the  uniformity  of  nature  far 
beyond  our  experience,  and  axioms  based  on  such  experience 
are  limited  to  the  regions  where  we  know  such  uniformity  to 
prevail.2*  The  "  feehng  of  necessity"  with  which  mathe- 
matical and  metaphysical  axioms  are  affirmed,  is  a  product 
of  association.  To  say  that  a  proposition  is  necessary  is 
another  way  of  saying  that  its  contradictory  is  inconceivable  ; 
and  this  is  precisely'the  effect  to  be  expected  from  associa- 
tion. "We  should  probably  be  able  to  conceive  a  round 
square  as  easily  as  a  hard  square  or  a  heavy  square,  if 
it  were  not  that  in  our  uniform  experience  at  the  moment 
when  a  thing  begins  to  be  round  it  ceases  to  be  square,  so  that 
the  beginning  of  one  impression  is  inseparably  associated 
with  the  departure  of  the  other.  .  .  .  We  cannot  conceive 
two  and  two  as  five,  because  an  inseparable  association 
compels  us  to  conceive  it  as  four.  .  .  .  And  we  should 
probably  have  no  difficulty  in  putting  together  the  two  ideas 
supposed  to  be  incompatible  {e.g.,  round  and  square,  &c.),  if 
our  experience  had  not  first  inseparably  associated  one  with 
the  contradictory  of  the  other." -^     Many  such  inseparable 

theory  teaches,  indeed,  that  the  mind  is  endowed  with  a  native 
faculty  for  the  apprehension  of  such  verities,  but  it  denies  that  they 
are  purely  subjective  contributions.  They  have  their  origin  in 
experience,  but  neither  their  necessity  nor  universality  are  based 
upon  mere  reiteration  of  experience.  The  human  intellect,  when  an 
appropriate  object  is  presented  to  it,  perceives  certain  necessary 
relations  holding  between  subject  and  predicate.  It  then  affirms  the 
proposition  as  necessary,  because  it  is  compelled  not  by  any  a  priori 
form,  or  innate  idea,  but  by  the  objective  necessity  of  the  relation  which 
is  seen  to  hold  in  the  reality. 

23  Cf.  Logic,  Bk.  II.  c.  V.  §  4.  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the 
genesis  and  validity  of  a  belief  are  different  questions.  Still,  as  we 
have  before  ur^jed,  they  are  often  intimately  connected,  and  the 
range  and  application  of  a  conviction  may  vitally  depend  on  the 
mode  of  its  origin— a  truth  which  the  reader  will  perceive  by 
comparing  the  Kantian,  Empiricist,  and  Intuitional  theorie.s, 

-*  Logic,  Bk.  III.  c.  xvi.  j-  4. 

?5  Exam.  (2nd  Edit.)  pp.  68,  6g. 


284  RATIONAL   LIFE, 


associations  are,  he  argues,  effected  by  experience.  Dark- 
ness is  necessarily  associated  in  the  minds  of  children  and 
timid  persons  with  terror.  We  cannot  revisit  the  scenes 
of  particular  events  without  recalling  them.  The  ancients 
could  not  conceive  people  living  at  the  Antipodes,  from  their 
habitual  experience  that  objects  so  situated  would  fall  off. 
Now,  mathematical  axioms  and  the  other  primary  truths  are 
perpetually  forcing  themselves  on  our  notice,  and  are  con- 
sequently eminently  calculated  to  generate  subjective 
necessities  of  the  character  ascribed  to  them.  It  is,  therefore, 
illogical  to  postulate  any  other  origin  for  these  truths,  since, 
like  all  the  rest  of  our  knowledge,  they  can  be  accounted  for 
by  association  and  sensuous  experience.  We  have  stated 
the  doctrine  of  Associationism  upon  this  subject  at  length, 
because  it  was  considered  for  a  number  of  years  to  be  the 
greatest  achievement  of  the  Sensist  school,  and  because  its 
untenability,  in  spite  of  all  the  ingenuity  devoted  to  its 
elaboration,  shows  the  utter  insufficiency  of  the  Empirical 
theory  of  knowledge. 

Criticism. — (i)  In  the  first  place  the  term  inconceivable, 
as  has  been  pointed  out  by  every  successive  writer  on  the 
subject,  is  grievously  abused.  This  word  may  signify  among 
other  meanings,  (a)  unpicturable  by  the  imagination,  e.g.,  red 
by  the  blind  ;  {b)  incredible,  though  not  intrinsically  impossible, 
e.g.,  a  race  of  horned  horses;  (c)  positively  unthinkable,  in  the 
sense  that  the  proposition  so  characterized  is  seen  to  be 
necessarily  false.  Now,  throughout  Mill's  whole  treatment 
of  the  question,  even  after  hostile  criticism  had  forced  him  to 
advert  to  the  ambiguity,  he  confounds  these  various  meanings 
of  the  term  in  a  manner  which  fatally  vitiates  his  reasoning. 
Frequency  of  association  may  beget  in  the  mind  an  incapacity 
to  separate  two  states  of  consciousness,  and  long  continued 
experience  or  absence  of  experience  may  make  something 
inconceivable  in  the  sense  of  (a)  or  {b),  which  is  not  so  in  that 
of  (c).  In  affirming  that  two  things,  each  equal  to  a  third, 
must  always  and  everywhere  equal  each  other,  that  2-1-3  = 
4-1- 1,  or,  that  whatever  begins  to  exist  must  have  a  cause,  we 
enounce  a  judgment  the  reversal  of  which  is  not  merely 
inconceivable  through  an  incapacity  of  the  mind :  it  is 
positively  perceived  to  be  absolutely  impossible.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  was  always  easy  to  imagine  men  at  the  opposite  side 
of  the  earth,  but  unfamiliarity  with  the  notion  of  its  rotundity, 
or  of  change  in  the  direction  of  gravitation,  rendered  the 
suggestion  very  difficult,  though  not  impossible,  to  believe. 

(2)  To  the  assertion  that  the  "  peculiar  feeling  of  necessity  " 
which  marks  these  axioms  is  just  what  would  be  produced  by 
association,  we  reply  that  it  is  not  a  matter  of  subjective 


THEORIES   OE  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  285 


feeling  at  all,  but  an  intelligent  insight  of  objective  necessity. 
In  my  present  mental  and  bodily  constitution  I  am  necessarily 
pained  by  extreme  heat  or  cold.  I  am  forced  to  feel  certain 
tastes  as  agreeable  or  the  opposite ;  and  I  cannot  imagine 
sensations  afforded  by  a  different  set  of  faculties  from  those 
with  which  man  is  endowed.  But  reflexion  tells  me  that  this 
necessity  or  incapacity  is  subjective.  The  facts  might  be 
reversed.  On  the  other  hand,  in  contemplating  the  proposi- 
tion that  two  things  which  are  each  equal  to  a  third  must  be 
equal  to  each  other,  I  am  conscious  not  merely  that  I  must 
believe  this  truth,  like  any  contingent  experience,  but  also 
that  it  must  objectively  and  necessarily  be  so;  that  it  can 
never  be  reversed. 

(3)  Again,  many  of  these  necessary  truths  are  perceived 
to  be  such  too  early  in  life  and  too  rapidly  to  be  ex- 
plained by  accumulated  experience.  Mill  was  driven  illogically 
to  abandon  the  doctrine  that  it  is  by  real  experience  of 
external  nature  we  are  gradually  convinced  that  two  straight 
lines  cannot  inclose  a  space,  and  to  adopt  the  intuitional 
theory  that  by  reflexion  on  the  ideas  of  straight  lines  we 
can  form  that  judgment.  His  attempted  justification  was 
that  the  clearness  with  which  the  imagination  can  depict 
geometrical  figures  rivals  that  of  actual  experience ;  but  this 
certainly  does  not  hold  for  many  arithmetical  and  algebraical 
judgments.2<5  'pj^g  proposition  that  4  +  5  =  6-f3,  when  once 
clearly  comprehended  in  a  single  experiment,  is  cognized  to 
be  necessarily  true,  though  we  may  never  have  noticed  the 
fact,  or  juxtaposed  these  ideas  before  in  our  Hfe.  Similarly, 
the  still  more  universal  truth  x-\-i-\-y — i=x-\-y.  The  pro- 
position that  a  trilateral  figure  must  be  triangular,  is  also 
seen  to  be  necessarily  true,  as  soon  as  it  is  reflected  upon, 
although  these  ideas  may  never  previously  have  been  com- 
pared. 

(4)  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  numerous  cases  where 
two  facts  have  been  uniformly  conjoined  throughout  our 
entire  experience,  and  yet  they  are  not  apprehended  by  the 
mind  as  necessarily  connected.  I  have,  for  instance,  always 
found  fire  possessed  of  the  property  of  warmth,  yet  I  can  easily 
believe  that  this  property  can  be  suspended  or  separated 
from  it,  "  while  by  mere  consideration  of  the  ideas,"  without 
having  once  experienced  some  particular  mathematical  truth, 
such  as  that  2-f9  =  3-f8,  "I  am  convinced  that  not  even 
Omnipotence  could  overthrow  that  equahty ;  .  .  .  that  which 
I  have  never  experienced  I  regard  as  necessary ;  that  which 
I  have  habitually  and  unexceptionally  experienced,  I  regard  as 
contingent.     Most  certainly,  therefore,  mere  constant  uniform 

*6  Cf.  Dr.  Ward's  Philosophy  of  Theism,  Vol.  I.  pp.  55,  seq. 


286  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


experience  cannot  possibly  account,  as  Mr.  Mill  thinks  it  does, 
for  the  mind's  conviction  of  self-evident  necessity."-' 

Evolutionist  Theory.— The  Sensist  teaching  on  the  origin 
of  necessary  truths  has  assumed  a  fresh  shape  in  the  hands 
of  those  writers  of  the  school  who  maintain  the  human 
intellect  to  have  been  evolved  from  that  of  a  non-rational 
animal.  In  its  present  garb  the  theory  claims  to  possess  the 
combined  merits  of  the  hypotheses  of  innate  ideas,  of  a 
-brinri  forms  of  thought,  and  of  inseparable  association,  while  it 
escapes  their  deficiencies.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  is  the  leading 
advocate  of  the  new  form  of  the  old  creed.  In  his  view 
axiomatic  truths,  both  scientific  and  moral,  are  products  of 
experience  extending  back  through  the  history  of  the  race. 
The  so-called  necessities  of  thought  have  been  produced  by 
association  working  not  merely  through  the  short  life  of  the 
individual,  but  away  back  through  the  millions  of  generations 
of  ancestors  which  have  intervened  between  man  and  the 
original  protozoa.  Mental  associations  contracted  in  the 
experience  of  each  individual  modify  his  organism.  These 
modifications  are  transmitted  by  heredity,  and  appear  in  the 
offspring  as  mental  tendencies  or  predispositions.  They 
continue  to  accumulate  and  increase  in  every  successive 
generation,  until  the  intellectual  deposit  takes  final  shape 
as  a  necessary  law  of  thought  or  a  form  of  the  mind.  Space, 
time,  causality,  duty,  are  complex  notions  which  have  been 
elaborated  during  the  long  ages  of  ancestral  experience. 
*'  They  have  arisen  from  the  organized  and  consolidated  expe- 
rience of  all  antecedent  individuals  who  bequeathed  their 
slowly  developed  nervous  organizations  .  .  .  till  they  [i.e., 
mental  acquisitions  embodied  in  nervous  modifications)  prac- 
tically became  forms  of  thought  apparently  independent  of 
experience."  2^ 

2"  Ward,  Ibid,  p  49.     Cf.  M'Cosh,  Exam,  of  Mill,  c.  xi. 

2s  See  Spencer,  cited  by  Bain,  op.  cit.  p.  722.  Comparison  of 
the  evolutionist  doctrine  with  other  theories  concerning  the  origin 
and  nature  of  these  primary  truths  is  interesting :  A.  The  Evolu- 
tionist maintains,  (i)  the  existence  of  obscure  innate  ideas  or 
cognitions,  as  (2)  an  organic  inheritance,  (3)  from  a  lower  iorm  of 
life,  (4)  acquired  by  sensuous  experience,  during  a  vast  period 
(5)  and  therefore  of  eminent  validity  within  the  field  of  possible 
experience:  B.  Plato  upheld  (i)  innate  -ideas  or  cognitions,  as 
(2)  faint  spiritual  vestiges  (3)  of  a  previous  life,  of  a  higher  grade,  but 
(4)  not  derived  from  sensuous  experience,  (5)  and  therefore  of  eminent 
validity:  C.  Descartes  and  Leibnitz  defended  (i)  innate  ideas  or 
cognitions,  as  (2)  divinely  implanted  in  the  mind,  (3)  and  therefore 
of  eminent  validity  :  D.  Kant  held  (i)  innate  forms,  (2)  antecedent 
to   and   conditioning  all  experience,   (3)   and  therefore  subjectively 


THEORIES  OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  287 

Criticism.— The  eagerness  with  which  the  new  theory  has 
been  received  by  disciples  of  the  Sensist  school  shows  how 
utterly  inadequate  the  old  Associationist  view  was  felt  to  be, 
even  among  the  circle  of  its  own  advocates.  Yet  careful 
examination  of  the  subject  has  convinced  us  that  the  solitary 
argumentative  superiority  the  new  doctrine  possesses  over  its 
parent  is  that  of  removing  the  question  from  the  region  of 
rational  discussion,  and  situating  it  where  proof  and  disproof 
are  alike  impossible.  This,  however,  is  hardly  an  excellence 
which  the  empiricist  can  consistently  admire.  The  only 
criterion  which  he  recognizes  is  that  of  experience ;  the  first 
condition  of  a  hypothesis,  capability  of  verification.  Now, 
there  is  no  theory,  however  wild,  that  has  yet  been  broached 
on  the  subject — not  even  that  of  the  ante-natal  existence  of 
the  soul  conjured  up  by  the  poetic  fancy  of  Plato — which  is 
more  utterly  beyond  the  possibility  of  scientific  proof  than  the 
new  doctrine.  If  it  has  to  be  admitted  by  positivist  psycho- 
logists that  it  is  practically  impossible  to  get  reliable  evidence 
concerning  the  earlier  mental  states  of  the  infant,  it  can  hardly 
be  disputed  that  the  nature  and  development  of  the  intellectual 
and  emotional  faculties  of  our  remote  ancestors  of  pre-human 
times  are  completely  shut  out  from  our  ken.-^  Geology  and 
Palaeontology  may  throw  light  on  the  anatomic  structure  of 
the  earlier  forms  of  animal  life,  but  their  mental  endowments 
cannot  be  deduced  from  their  fossil  remains.  Consequently, 
any  hypothesis  put  forward  as  to  the  character  and  growth 
of  the  notion  of  space,  time,  causality,  and  morality  in  the 
alleged  transitional  species  of  past  ages  is  as  much  outside 
the  pale  of  science,  as  are  the  habits  and  customs  of  the 
natives  of  Sirius.  The  earlier  sensationists,  defective  though 
their  system  was,  at  all  events  appealed  in  great  part  to  a 
tribunal  before  which  evidence  could  be  tendered,  and  they 
at  least  professed  to  base  their  creed  upon  the  facts  of  human 
consciousness;  but,  as  Dr.  Martineau  forcibly  urges,  "their 
modern  followers  take  refuge  from  this  strong  light  in  an 
earlier  twilight  where  nobody  can  tell  exactly  what  goes 
on.  ...  If  Hobbes,  as  often  happens,  gives  us  a  piece  of 
droll  psychology,  every  one  who  knows  himself  can  tell 
whether  it  is  true  or  false,  and  lay  his  finger  on  any  distortion 
it  contains.     If  Darwin  describes  the  inward  conflict  of  an 

necessary  within  the  field  of  possible  experience,  but  (4)  of  no  real 
validity  as  applied  to  things-in-themselves  :  H.  Associafionism  denies 
innate  ideas  in  any  form,  and  ascribes  the  necessity  of  these  cogni- 
tions to  the  constant  experience  of  the  individual's  own  life. 

-^  Cf.  Groom  Robertson,   "Axioms,"  Encycl.  Brit.   (9th   Edit.;, 
also  Sully,  Sensation  and  Intuition,  pp   lo — 13, 


288  RATIONAL   LIFE. 

extinct  baboon,  he  paints  a  fancy  picture  of  what  remains  for 
ever  without  a  witness."  ^^ 

Furthermore,  the  doctrine  of  transmitted  hereditary  ex- 
perience as  appUed  to  necessary  truths  rests  on  a  profound 
psychological  misinterpretation  of  their  character.  It  is 
credible  that  an  instinct,  or  a  tendency  towards  a  particular 
species  of  emotion  or  action  can  be  inherited ;  but  the  in- 
tuition of  necessary  truths  is  something  essentially  different. 
We  have  before  pointed  out  that  we  do  not  apprehend  the 
necessity  of  an  axiom  from  any  blind  incapacity  or  negative 
limitation  of  thought ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  the  translucent 
self-evidence  of  the  truth  itself  which  extorts  assent.  We 
may  in  our  present  constitution  be  necessarily  pained  by 
extreme  cold  and  heat,  we  may  necessarily  relish  honey,  or 
enjoy  the  scent  of  the  rose,  yet  that  these  things  are  necessarily 
so  for  all  consciousness  we  do  not  judge  ;  but,  that  two  things 
each  equal  to  a  third  are  equal  to  each  other,  we  not  only 
necessarily  affirm,  but  affirm  as  necessarily  holding  in  all 
being,  and  for  all  intelligence.  Assent  to  self-evident  axioms 
is,  then,  not  a  blind  instinct  due  to  habit  either  inherited  or 
acquired,  but  a  rational  apprehension  of  intelligible  relations 
objectively  true. 

Again,  the  hypothesis  is  exposed  to  the  objection,  quod 
nimis  probat  nihil  probat.  If  it  is  true  that  ancestral  experience 
has  been  transmitted  in  this  way,  we  ought  to  find  (a)  innate 
cognitions  of  a  large  number  of  other  phenomena,  and  (b) 
a  more  perfect  knowledge  of  space  and  other  native  endow- 
ments in  the  human  infant  than  in  young  animals  of  inferior 
species.  Now  as  regards  {b),  although  we  do  not  see  sufficient 
evidence  for  denying  to  babies  an  intuitive  though  vague 
perception  of  extension,  it  would  seem  to  be  certainly  estab- 
lished that  chickens  and  young  pigs  apprehend  space  from 
the  first  with  an  accuracy  scarcely  attained  by  the  fully 
developed  man.  As  for  (a),  if  it  is  true  that  the  peculiar 
feature  of  necessity  pertaining  to  these  truths  is  due  to  the 
uniform  experience  of  our  ancestors,  registered  and  trans- 
mitted in  nervous  tissue,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  why  such 
judgments  as  that  "fire  burns,"  "stones  fall  to  the  ground, 
and  sink  in  water,"  "timber  floats,"  "night  follows  day," 
and  the  like,  have  not  a  similar  character.  These  proposi- 
tions must  represent  a  pretty  uniform  experience  of  our 
ancestors  for  a  long  way  back  in  the  series,  while  the  number 
of  occasions  on  which  it  was  cognized  that  7  +  5  =  3  +  9,  or 
the  number  of  times  when  the  idea  of  "  trilateral  "  was  com- 
pared with  that  of  "  triangular  "  and  found  to  be  conjoined  in 

2^'  Types  of  Ethical  Theories,  Vol.  II.  p.  340, 


THEORIES   GF   GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  289 

experience,  cannot  in  the  pre-mathematical  age  have  been 
very  frequent ;  yet  the  former  are  perceived  to  be  contingent, 
the  latter  necessary. 

Another  difficulty  may  be  urged  as  to  the  nature  of  that 
experience  which  generates  these  mental  forms.  What  is 
the  "environment,"  the  "  cosmos,"  that  has  been  gradually 
creating  these  necessities  of  thought  ?  All  forms  of  sensism 
logically  reduce  space  and  extension  to  muscular  feelings. 
Such  a  "cosmos"  is,  however,  obviously  of  too  shadowy  a 
character  for  the  needs  of  evolutionism.  Mr.  Spencer, 
indeed,  here  postulates  an  infinite  unknowable  energy  as 
eternal ;  but  other  disciples,  such  as  Mr.  Sully,  though 
sympathetic  on  many  points,  look  upon  this  assumption  as 
a  surviving  relic  of  the  vulgar  anthropomorphic  instinct.'*^ 
Anyhow  the  difficulty  remains  :  do  these  necessities  which 
get  translated  into  our  consciousness  condition  that  objective 
energy  in  itself?  If  so,  then  we  would  seem  to  have  got  the 
admission  of  objective  necessary  truth  which  holds  for  all 
being,  and  which  reveals  itself  to  the  mind.^^  If  not,  what 
right  is  there  for  assuming  that  the  action  of  this  eternal 
energy  was  universally  uniform  throughout  all  past  time  ? 
There  remains,  finally,  the  insuperable  objection  that  the 
soul  being  a  spiritual  principle,  as  we  shall  prove  hereafter, 
cannot  have  been  inherited  from  non-rational  animals. 

Intuitionalist  Doctrine.  —  The  true  view  lies  between 
Innatism  and  Empiricism.  Although  all  knowledge  starts 
from  experience,  it  is  false  to  assert  that  all  axioms  are  mere 
forniulce  summing  up  a  gathered  experience,  whether  of  the 
individual  or  of  the  race,  and  that  our  knowledge  is  limited  to 
the  range  of  such  experience.  Necessary  truths  may  be  either 
self-evident  or  deduced  from  such  by  demonstration.  The 
former  are  called  Axioms.  Of  these  the  most  universal  and 
fundamental  is  the  Principle  of  Contradiction  :  Nothing  can 
both  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time.  To  the  ordinary  human 
mind^^  the  theorems  of  Euclid  are  examples  of  the  second  class. 

^^  Op.  cit.  pp.  20 — 22.         ^■-  Cf,  Martineau,  Ibid.  pp.  356 — 358. 

■^  Necessary  truths  were  termed  by  the  Schoolmen  per  se  Jiota  ; 
and  were  held  by  them  to  be  analytic  in  a  broad  sense.  That  is,  of 
such  a  nature  that  a  full  analysis  of  the  subject  and  predicate 
reveals  their  mutual  implication.  When  this  implication  is  not 
immediately  obvious,  as,  e.g.,  in  the  proposition,  "  The  square  of  the 
hypothenuse  must  equal  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  the  sides  of  a 
right-angled  triangle,"  it  was  said  to  be  per  se  nota  quoad  se,  in 
contrast  to  self-evident  axioms,  which  are  per  se  nota  quoad  nos.  Thus 
St.  Thomas  :  "  Quselibet  propositio,  cujus  predicatum  est  de  ratione 
subjecti,  est  immediata  et  per  se  nota  quantum  est  de  se.  Sed 
quarundum  propositionum  termini  sunt  tales  quod  sunt  in  notitia 

T 


250  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


The  self-evident  necessary  truths  which  comprise  the 
various  axioms  are  discerned  by  rational  or  intellectual  intuition : 
that  is,  by  simple  consideration  of  the  terms  that  is  of  the 
objects  of  thought  about  which  they  are  affirmed.  Just  as 
we  are  capable  of  perceiving  contingent  impressions  by 
sense,  we  have  also  the  power  of  apprehending  the  natures 
of  things,  and  the  necessary  relations  which  these  involve 
by  the  intellect.  These  intellectual  intuitions  start  from 
sensuous-perception  of  single  objects,  and  it  is  only  later 
on  by  a  deliberate  reflex  act  that  the  universal  truth  which 
these  particular  cases  contain  is  formally  generalized.  Thus 
when  Aristotle  says  that  Axioms — Dignitates,  as  the  school- 
men quaintly  translate  them — are  reached  by  induction, 
he  does  not  mean  that  they  are  generalizations  formed 
by  prolonged  and  reiterated  comparison  of  individuals,  but 
that  experience  of  some  particular  examples  is  needed  to 
enable  the  intellect  adequately  to  comprehend  the  two  terms. 
When  this  is  effected,  the  necessary  and  universal  judgment 
emerges  spontaneously  as  an  intuition.  We  are  not  endowed 
at  birth  with  a  collection  of  these  simple  general  cognitions, 
but  with  an  intellectual  aptitude  for  their  easy  and  rapid 
discovery  in  concrete  cases.  This  natural  aptitude,  universal 
in  the  human  race,  the  scholastics  called  the  Hahitus  princi- 
piorum.  Thus,  to  take  a  particular  example,  I  do  not  begin 
life  by  an  intuitive  recognition  of  the  abstract  universal  truth. 
What  is  greater  than  the  greater  is  greater  than  the  less;  but, 
observing  A  to  be  greater  than  B,  which  latter  I  also  know  to 
be  greater  than  C,  I  intuitively  recognize  as  a  self-evident 
necessary  truth  that  A  must  be  greater  than  C,  becoming 
at  the  same  time  implicitly  aware  of  the  universal  principle 
exemplified.  Afterwards,  by  a  deliberately  reflexive  act, 
I  elevate  this  implicit  cognition  to  the  rank  of  the  explicit 
or  formally  universal  truth — every  such  A  must  be  greater 
than  C.  I  have  thus  reached  the  Axiom  without  a  pro- 
tracted comparison  of  a  large  number  of  A's  with  C's. 
The   process   is   similar   in   the   discovery   of  the  Principles 

omniuni,  sicut  ens  et  nniini,  et  alia  quae  sunt  entis  in  quantum  ens. 
Nam  ens  est  prima  conceptio  intellectus.  Unde  oportet  quod  tales 
propositiones  non  solum  in  se  sed  etiam  quoad  nos,  quasi  per  se 
nota^  habeantur ;  sicut  quod  non  contingit  idem  esse  ct  non  esse,  et 
quod  iotum  sit  niajus  sua  parte.  Unde  et  hujusmodi  principia  omnes 
scientiae  accipiunt  a  metaphysica,  cujus  est  considerare  ens  sim- 
pliciter  et  ea  quce  sunt  entis."  {Post  Analytic,  I.  lect.  5.)  He  also 
points  out  that  cognition  of  such  necessary  principles  varies  with 
the  actual  development  of  individual  minds:  "  Intellectus  principi- 
orum  consequitur  ipsam  naturam  humanam  quae  aequaliter  in 
omnibus  invenitur  .  .  .  et  tamen  secundum  majorem  capacitatem 
intellectus,  unus  magis  vel  minus  cognoscit  veritatem  principiorum, 
quam  alius."  {Sum.  2-23?,  q.  5,  a  4,  ad  3.) 


{ 


THEORIES   OF  GENERAL   KNOWLEDGE.  291 


of  CGuiradiction  and  Causality.  Neither  is  a  mere  generali- 
zation from  a  multitude  of  observations,  and  neither  is  held 
in  an  abstract  form  by  the  child.  But  having  intellectually 
apprehended  in  particular  sensuous  experiences  the  notions 
in  the  one  case  of  '-being"  and  in  the  other  of  "thing 
beginning  to  exist,"  there  is  needed  only  an  easy  effort  of 
reflexion  upon  the  notions  employed  in  the  singular  com- 
parison to  intuitively  recognize  the  Axiom/''*  Afterwards  in 
complicated  reasonings  I  may  recur  to  the  general  rule  to 
justify  a  particular  step  about  which  I  am  dubious,  but  the 
relation  is  first  apprehended  in  the  singular  experience. ^'^ 
Truths  of  this  character  are  rightly  termed  transccndenial. 
They  are  not  limited  to  the  field  of  observed  phenomena. 
They  underlie  and  extend  beyond  experience ;  and  they  con- 
stitute a  body  of  knowledge  of  an  entirely  distinct  order  from 
that  comprised  in  the  experiential  sciences. 

Readings. — Perhaps  the  best  history  of  Theories  of  Knowledge  is 
that  contained  in  the  first  volume  of  Erkenntnisslehrc,  von  Al.  Schmid 
(Munich).  The  literature  on  the  nature  and  origin  of  Necessary 
Truth  is  abundant.  Essays  i,  2,  4,  and  5,  in  Dr.  Ward's  Philosophy 
of  Theism,  Vol,  I.  are  exhaustive.  See  also  Kleutgen,  op.  cit.  §§  288— 
309;  Dr.  M'Cosh,  Exavi.  of  Mill,  cc.  xi.  xii.  and  Intuitions  of  Mind, 
passim;  and  Mr.  Courtney's  Metaphysics  of  Mill,  cc.  vii.  viii. 

^'  "  Intellectus  principiorum  dicitur  esse  habitus  naturalis.  Ex 
ipsa  enim  natura  animae  intellectualis  convenit  homini  quod  statim, 
cognito  quid  est  totum  et  quid  est  pars,  cognoscat  quod  omne 
totum  est  majus  sua  parte ;  et  simile  est  in  ceteris.  Sed  quid  sit 
totum  et  quid  sit  pars,  cognoscere  non  potest  nisi  per  species  intelli- 
gibiles  a  phantasmatibus  acceptas,  et  propterea,  Aristoteles  in  fine 
Posteriorum  ostendit  quod  cognitio  principiorum  provenit  nobis  ex 
seusu."  (1-2,  q.  51,  a.  i.)  Just  as  being  stands  first,  according  to 
St.  Thomas,  in  the  order  of  conception,  so  is  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction— the  opposition  of  being  and  non-being — primary  in  the 
judicial  order:  "In  prima  quidem  operatione  (apprehensio)  est 
aliquod  primum  quod  cadet  in  conceptione  intellectus,  scil.  hoc 
quod  dico  ens ;  nee  aliquid  hac  operatione  potest  mente  concipi  nisi 
intelligatur  ens  :  et  quia  hoc  principium  :  Impossibile  est  esse  et  non 
esse  simid,  dependet  ex  intellectu  entis,  sicut  hoc  principium  :  Omne 
totum  est  majus  sua  parte,  ex  intellectu  totius  et  partis,  ideo  hoc 
etiam  principium  est  naturaliter  primum  in  secunda  operatione 
intellectus,  scilicet  componentis  et  dividentis.  Nee  aliquis  potest, 
secundum  banc  operationem  intellectus,  aliquid  intelligere  nisi  hoc 
principio  intellecto."  {Metaphys.  Lib.  IV.  lect.  6.) 

35  Cf  M'Cosh's  Intuiticns  of  Mind,  Bk.  i.  Pt.  I.  c.  ii.  §§  3,  4.  The 
Aristotelico-Scholastic  doctrine  concerning  the  nature  and  origin 
of  axiomatic  truths  is  admirably  expounded  by  T.  de  Regnon,  SJ., 
Mctaphysique  dcs  Causes,  Livre  I.  cc.  2,  4,  5. 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

CONCEPTION:      ORIGIN    OF    INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS 

{continued). 

Summary  of  past  Chapters. — In  chapter  xii.we 
proved  that  sensuous  and  intellectual  activit}^  differ 
in  kind.  We  defined  intellect  as  the  *'  faculty  ot 
thought,"  including  under  thotcght,  conception,  judg- 
ment, reasoning,  supra-sensuous  attention  and  self- 
consciousness.  In  chapter  xiii.  we  have  sketched  at 
considerable  length  the  attempts  made  by  the  chief 
modern  schools  of  psychologists  to  explain  the 
relations  between  sensuous  cognition  and  thought, 
and  to  trace  the  origin  of  the  latter.  It  will  be  now 
our  own  duty  to  face  this  latter  question,  and 
examine  more  closelv  the  nature  of  our  intellectual 
operations. 

Thought  an  Activity. — If  we  analyze  a  process  of  thought, 
we  shall  observe,  in  the  first  place,  that  it  is  in  a  marked 
manner  an  activity.  Even  in  simple  sensations,  such  as  those 
of  sight,  there  is  genuine  psychical  activity  of  a  certain  kind  ; 
for  the  mind  truly  reacts  to  the  physical  stimulus  by  a  con- 
scious state.  Still,  compared  with  thought,  sensuous  life  is 
relatively  recipient  and  passive.  In  thinking,  however,  as  in 
recalling  a  train  of  reasoning,  in  following  an  argument  or  in 
solving  a  mathematical  problem,  we  are  conscious  of  the 
mind  as  active.  It  attends  to  certain  objects  and  abstracts 
from  others;   it  brings  together  difterent  ideas  and  compares 


ORIGIN   OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  293 


them  ;  it  resolves  complex  conceptions  into  simpler  elements; 
it  judges,  infers,  and  generalizes;  and  throughout  all  these 
operations,  even  when  proceeding  automatically  or  ^yithout 
voluntary  effort,  this  rational  consciousness  is  of  an  eminently 
active  character. 

Thought  Universal.— But  a  far  more  important  feature  of 
thought  is  that  it  deals  with  general  relations  and  abstractions. 
Whilst  sensuous  apprehension  is  confined  to  the  individual 
and  concrete,  thought  can  lay  hold  of  the  abstract  and  the 
universal,  or  of  the  general  aspects  of  things.  Images  and 
representations  of  particular  objects,  it  is  true,  accompany 
our  thinking;  and  when  the  subject  of  consideration  is 
singular,  or  when  a  train  of  thought  consists  mainly  of  the 
reminiscence  of  concrete  experiences,  the  intellect  indirectly 
apprehends  singular  events.^  Still  the  direct  object  of  intel- 
lectual activitv,  even  in  particular  experiences,  is  the  universal 
and  abstract. '  Introspection  informs  us  that  in  all  thinking 
operations  the  mind  seizes  on  general  features  of  things,  their 
agreements  or  differences,  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect, 
of  substance  and  accident,  of  unity,  plurality,  and  connexions 
in  space  or  time.  The  study  of  thought  expressed  in  language 
makes  this  clear,  for  the  common  nouns,  adjectives,  and 
verbs,  as  well  as  prepositions  and  adverbs,  all  symbolize 
universal  notions  and  abstractions— but  abstractions  having 
their  foundation  in  reality. 

Take,  for  instance,  a  newspaper  article,  and  analyze  it. 
You  will  find  that  it  is  composed  of  reasonings  or  argu- 
ments. These  are  resolvable  into  several  separate  judgments 
enunciated  in  propositions ;  and  these  last  are  ultimately 
reducible  to  terms  and  single  words  expressive  ot  general 
ideas  or  concepts.  When  thus  analyzed  the  proposition — 
e.g.,  "  Liberty  is  a  natural  right,"  yields  four  such  universal 
notions,  and  "  Bread  is  cheap,"  gives  three.  It  is  the 
function  of  Psychology  to  study  the  nature  of  these  intel- 
lectual processes;  and,  accordingly,  in  this  chapter  we 
purpose  to  treat  of  the  formation  of  universal  notion'-  or 
concepts. 

Conception:  Two  Questions. — When  investi- 
gating the  formation  of  concepts,  it  is  important 
to  distinguish  two  separate,  though  connected 
questions  : — How  are  they  elaborated  ?    and    How 

1  "  Intellectus  noster  directe  non  est  cognoscitivus  nisi  univer- 
salitim.  Indirecte  autem  et  quasi  per  quamdam  reflexionem  potest 
cognoscere  singidare."  (St.  Thomas,  Qq.  disp.  Be  verit.  q.  8,  a.  14.) 


^94  NATIONAL   LIFE. 


are  they  originated  ?  The  former  may  be  stated 
thus :  Given  the  most  rudimentary  and  indeter- 
minate acts  of  intellectual  apprehension,  what  is  the 
process  by  which  these  are  developed  and  elaborated 
into  the  clear  and  distinct  universal  concepts,  the 
specific  ideas,  and  scientific  notions  of  later  life  ? 
The  other  is  : — How  are  these  primitive  intellectual 
data  themselves  obtained  ?  Or  :  How  is  the  rational 
faculty  of  the  mind  evoked  into  activity  and  made 
cognizant  of  the  object  which  stimulates  the  sense?  - 

Elaboration  of  Universal  Concepts. — Intuitive 
Abstraction  and  Generalization:  In  mature  life  the  per- 
ception of  a  single  specimen  is  often  the  occasion  of 
our  forming  a  truly  universal  idea.  For  instance, 
whilst  visiting  the  Zoological  Gardens,  an  unfamiliar 
object  presents  itself  to  my  senses  and  awakens  an  act 
of  intellectual  attention.  I  at  once  apprehend  it  as  a 
large  -  dark  -  hairy-  skinned  -  hump  -  backed  -  long  -  necked- 
four-footed-self-moving  thing.  The  complex  idea  thus 
awakened  in  my  mind  was  termed  by  the  schoolmen  a 
direct  or  potentially  universal  concept.  Considered 
abstractly  in  itself  it  is  neither  universal  nor  singular. 
The  same  holds  true  of  any  simple  idea  given  in  an  act 
of  any  direct  perception,  such  as  that  of  colour  or  taste. ^ 

-  The  above  distinction  may  be  useful  to  the  reader  of  the 
Scholastic  manuals.  Under  the  heading  Origin  of  Ideas,  these  works 
discuss  the  second  question,  whilst  English  text-books  of  Psychology 
confine  themselves  exclusively  to  the  first. 

^  "The  conception  of  an  abstract  quality  is,  taken  by  itself, 
neither  universal  nor  particular.  If  I  abstract  zvhitc  from  the  rest 
of  a  wintry  landscape  this  morning,  it  is  a  perfectly  definite  con- 
ception, a  self-identical  quality  which  I  may  mean  again  ;  but  as  I 
have  not  yet  individualized  it  by  expressly  meaning  to  restrict  it  to 
this  particular  snow,  nor  thought  of  the  possibility  of  other  things 
to  which  it  may  be  applicable,  it  is  so  far  but  a  floating  adjective." 
(James,  Vol.  I.  p.  473.)  Compare  St.  Thomas:  "Si  quaeratur 
utrum  ista  natura  (natura  humana  considerata  modo  absoluto  ut 
abstracta)  possit  dici  una  vel  plures,  neutrum  concedendum  est,  quia 
utrumque  est  extra  conceptum  humanitatis,  et  utrumque  potest  sibi 
(humanitati)  accidere.    Si  enim  pluralitas  esset  de  ratione  ejus  nun- 


ORIGIN   OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  295 


I  may  now,  by  an  act  of  reflective  consciousness,  turn 
my  attention  back  from  the  thing  to  the  idea,  and  whilst 
considering  the  idea  advert  to  its  susceptibihty  of 
being  reaHzed  or  reproduced  in  an  indefinite  number  of 
similar  beings.  In  this  second  stage  the  idea  has 
become  a  perfectly  general  concept,  called  by  the 
schoolmen  a  reflex  universal.  The  object  before  me  may 
happen  to  be  a  unique  monster ;  but,  nevertheless, 
it  suffices  for  the  formation  of  the  logically-universal 
concept. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  me  to  see  and  compare  several 
examples  of  the  class.  I  have  not  to  await  the  automatic 
evolution  of  a  generic  image  by  the  fusion  of  a  succession  of 
impressions.  The  mind's  spontaneous  power  of  abstraction 
and  generalization,  when  once  awakened,  can  itself  construct 
the  universal  notion.  The  single  experience  reveals  to  me 
the  union,  and,  therefore,  the  compatibility  of  the  collection 
of  notes  which  constitute  the  concept ;  I  perceive  its  internal 
possibility,  and  advert  to  its  susceptibility  of  multiplication. 
The  idea,  however,  thus  rapidly  formed  may  not  represent 
accurately  any  existing  class  of  object ;  it  most  probably  does 
not  correspond  to  an  actual  species.  The  colour  or  the  size, 
for  instance,  which  enter  into  my  representation  may  be 
accidental  or  even  peculiar  to  the  particular  animal  before 
me.  The  idea  is  truly  general,  but  the  generalization  is  pre- 
cipitate, and  probahly  false  if  supposed  to  represent  the 
actual  order  of  the  physical  universe.  It  possesses  what  Abbe 
Piat  calls  Viiniversalite  de  droit,  but  not  yet  riiniversalite  defait. 
It  is  a  logical,  not  a  scientific  universal.  It  has  to  be  per- 
fected by  protracted  experience,  which  involves,  on  the  one 
hand,  a  diligent  observation  of  new  examples,  and  on  the 
other,  reiterated  reflective  consideration  and  readjustment  of 
the  idea,  so  as  to  adapt  it  more  closely  to  the  facts.'* 

quam  posset  esse  una,  quum  tamen  una  sit  secundum  quod  est  in 
Socrate.  Similiter  si  unitas  asset  de  intellectu  et  ratione  ejus,  tunc 
esset  una  et  eadem  natura  Socratis  et  Platonis,  nee  posset  in 
pluribus  plurificari."  {De  Ente  et  Essentia,  c.  IV.  Cf.  Rickaby,  First 
Principles,  p.  316. ) 

■*  "  Considerons  par  exemple  la  couleur  d'une  boule  d'ivoire. 
Par  elle-meme  cette  couleur  est  la  qualite  de  cette  boule,  un  mode 
indissolublement  lie  a  cette  boule,  n'existant  et  ne  pouvant  exister 
qu'en  elle.  Mais  qu'une  fois  cette  couleur  soit  le  terme  de  mon 
intelligence  que  je  n'en  aie  pas  seulement  la  sensation,  mais  encore 
I'idee,  aussitot  et  par  le  fait  raeme,  avant  de  savoir  si  cette  qualite  se 


296  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Furthermore,  in  +'  j  act  of  apprehension,  whicli  seemed  so 
rapid,  we  cognize  the  object  as  dark-coloured,  hairy-skinned, 
self-moving,  and  the  Hke.  But  each  of  these  adjectives 
expresses  a  universal  notion,  and  the  complex  conception  of 
the  camel  is  thus  easily  attained,  only  because  we  are  already 
in  possession  of  the  more  elementary  ideas,  of  which  it  is 
constituted.  In  mature  life  cognition  is  often  a  process  of 
rt?-cognition,  perception  an  exercise  of  apperception;  we 
comprehend  an  object  by  bringing  it  under  a  class,  or  a 
system  of  intersecting  classes  with  which  we  are  already 
famiUar.  But  we  must  not  be  misled  by  this  fact  into  the 
error  that  all  cognition  is  classification.-''  The  notion  of  being, 
which  is  the  most  primitive,  the  most  indeterminate,  and  the 
widest  of  all  ideas,  and  which,  moreover,  enters  into  all  our 
intellectual  cognitions,  is  not  the  outcome  of  a  process  of 
comparison,  but  of  intellectual  intuitionS'  The  same  is  true  of 
simple  ideas  presented  in  direct  acts  of  apprehension,  though 
the  exigencies  of  language  force  us  to  express  the  experience 
in  the  form  of  classification.  In  the  mental  act  itself,  we  may 
simply  intuit  an  object  or  attribute,  which  may  or  may  not  be 
familiar ;  but  if  we  seek  to  put  the  thought  into  words,  it  must 
be  in  terms  symbolic  of  recognized  classes — e.g.,  "That  is 
scarlet,"  or  "  This  is  painful."  Moreover,  the  nature  of 
mental  action  must  be  the  same  in  kind  throughout  man's 
life,  although  intellectual  activity  is  very  faint  and  feeble  in 
the  early  stages  of  its  exercise ;  at  all  events,  any  con- 
rencontre  ailleurs  dans  la  nature,  je  la  vols  applicable  a  une  infinite 
d'autres  boules  d'ivoire  et  peut-etre  aussi  a  une  infinite  d'autres 
corps.  II  en  est  de  meme  de  toute  substance,  de  tout  mode,  de  tout 
rapport,  de  tout  ce  que  nous  connaissons.  Un  objet  quelconque  qui 
penetre  dans  notre  conscience  empirique,  acquiert  sous  le  regard  de 
notre  conscience  rationelle  et  du  premier  coup  une  sort  iVuniversalite 
qui  va  jusqu'  a  I'infini.  Dans  tout  individu  donne,  I'intelligence 
decouvre  une  essence  et  dans  cette  essence  la  possibilite  de  se  realiser 
dans  tons  les  temps  et  tous  les  lieux  autant  de  fois  qu'on  le  voudra. 
Au-dessus  de  riiniversalite  de  fait  il-y-a  VnniversaUte  de  droit.,  dont  le 
propre  est  d'etre  essentielle  a  I'dee  ;  Xo^iqne,  3.hso\\.\e."  IL' Intellect 
Actif,  p.  82.) 

^  Herbert  Spencer's  laboured  assault  on  the  possibility  of  a 
notion  of  the  absolute  {First  Principles,  pp.  79—82)  is  based  on  this 
fallacy.  "God  being  unclassable,"  is  not  thereby  "unknowable.". 
We  can  conceive  Him  as  a  unique  Being,  possessed  of  intelligence,' 
power,  and  holiness  without  limit;  and  our  conception,  though 
inadequate,  is  good  so  far  as  it  goes. 

^  "  In  his  autem  quae  in  apprehensione  homlnum  cadunt  quidam 
ordo  invenitur  nam  illud  quod  primo  cadit  in  apprehensione  est  ens 
cujus  intellectus  includitur  in  omnibus  qu;vcumque  quis  appre- 
hendit."  (St.  Thoma"=;,  Sum.  Thcol.  1-2,  q.  94,  a.  2.) 


ORIGIN   OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  297 


jectures  we  make  as  to  the  developme  ^t  of  rational  cognition 
in  childhood  must  be  based  on  what  w^.  know  of  the  working 
of  the  human  mind  at  a  later  period — but,  of  course,  corrected 
and  qualified  by  all  relevant  facts  that  we  can  gather  from  a 
diligent  study  of  infant  life. 

Intellectual  Apprehension.— At  what  age  intel- 
lectual cognition  proper  begins  it  is  impossible  to 
determine.  The  sensuous  faculties  must,  however, 
have  attained  a  certain  maturity  before  the  liigher 
functions  of  the  mind  are  evoked  into  activity. 
Careful  observation  seems  to  establish  that  the 
primitive  consciousness  of  the  infant  is  an  ill-defined 
sensory  continuum,  a  mass  of  obscure  homogeneous 
feeling  in  which  there  is  little  advertence  to  differences 
of  objects  or  sensations.  (See  p.  151.)  With  frequent 
exercise  and  varied  experience  in  the  manner  already 
described,  the  sensuous  powers  develop  until  they  are 
sufficiently  perfect  to  minister  to  intellectual  cogni- 
tion. When  this  stage  is  reached  the  intellectual  act 
elicited  must  be  the  same  in  kind  as  that  which  the 
mind  exerts  in  later  life.  It  must  be  an  act  of  intel- 
lectual apprehension,  but  of  course  of  the  vaguest 
character.  The  widest  and  most  indeterminate  con- 
ception under  which  we  can  cognize  any  object  is  that 
of  betJig  or  thing.  The  earliest  intellectual  cognition 
elicited  by  the  child  is,  therefore,  the  apprehension  of 
an  object  as  a  being,  or  rather  as  an  ens  extensnm — a 
stretched-out-thing,  whilst  vague  intuitions  of  moving- 
being,  coloured  -  being,  resisting  -  being,  are  almost 
simultaneously  reached.  It  takes  in  objects  as 
confused  ivholes  before  it  discriminates  their  separate 
parts.  It  perceives  them  as  totalities  before  dis- 
tinguishing their  various  attributes.  But  the  process 
by  which  the  vague  notions  thus  reached  are  contracted 
and  enriched,  are  analj^zed,  clarified,  and  perfected  is  11 

merely  the  reiterated  exercise  of  this  same  intellectual  || 

power  of  apprehensive  attention.  || 

Comparative  Abstraction. — Attention  is  especially  „ 

awakened  by  repetition  of  an  experience,  especially  if 
this  be  connected  with  the  child's  own  physical 
comfort  or  pleasure.      The  frequent  re-appearance  of 


298  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


some  object  excites  interest.  The  sensuous  perception 
becomes  more  perfect ;  the  image  produced  in  the 
imagination  more  distinct.  Suppose,  for  instance, 
that  some  agreeable  phenomenon,  as,  e.g.,  a  bright  red 
garment  or  a  cup  of  milk  breaks  in  from  time  to  time 
upon  the  drowsy  consciousness  of  the  infant  ;  the 
pleasure  occasioned  \vill  stimulate  attention  to  the 
object  ;  the  recurring  incident  or  group  of  incidents 
will  be  noticed,  and  observation  will  be  concentrated 
upon  them.  This  focussing  of  attention  on  part  of  an 
experience  has  as  its  counterpart  abstraction  or  precision, 
that  is,  the  temporar}'  withdrawal  of  our  mental  gaze 
from  the  elements  unattended  to.  Still,  the  contraction 
of  our  attention  to  one  object  or  part  of  an  object  is  not 
so  complete  as  to  result  in  the  entire  ignoring  of  its 
surroundings.  Indeed,  with  repetition  of  the  experience 
the  surroundings  themselves  become  matters  of  interest, 
and  the  variations  which  accompany  the  constant  factor 
begin  to  be  discerned  more  and  more  clearly.  Whilst 
some  attributes  presented  in  the  original  vague  act  ot 
apprehension  recur  regularly,  others  are  intermittent 
or  disappear.  The  red  garment  first  observed  when 
stretched-out  is  afterwards  noticed  folded  in  various 
ways,  and  its  shape  is  different.  The  milk  is  now  hot, 
now  cold,  sometimes  sweetened  with  sugar,  some- 
times not,  and  the  like.  The  notion  of  sameness  amid 
change  is  being  evoked,  and  this  leads  the  child  to 
compare. 

Comparison  and  Discrimination. — Comparison 
plays  a  considerable  part  in  the  elaboration  of  our  con- 
cepts ;  but  it  implies  their  previous  existence  in  at  least 
a  vague  form.  The  mind  cannot  compare  unless  b}-  an 
act  of  apprehension  it  is  already  in  possession  of  the 
terms  to  be  compared.  Partial  variation  accompanying 
partial  sameness  in  the  objects  of  experience  stimulates 
the  judicial  activity  of  the  mind,  which  at  first  acts 
feeblv,  but  with  increasing  firmness  and  distinctness 
as  the  faculties  develop.  Discrimination  involves 
analysis,  the  splitting-up  of  the  perceived  object  into 
its  constituent  elements  ;  whilst  this  very  process  of 
separation  pre-supposes  an   intuitive  synthetic  grasp  of 


ORIGIN   OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  299 


tlie  object  as  ^  ?c'/;tV^  in  the  original  conception,  which 
is  now  reahzed  with  greater  distinctness.  The  shape, 
colour,  temperature,  and  softness  of  the  garment,  and 
the  sweetness,  temperature,  and  colour  of  the  milk  are 
distinguished  as  attributes  of  the  perceived  object,  and  the 
cliild  is  perfecting  its  notion  of  unity  and  coming  to 
realize  the  difference  between  substance  and  accident  in 
the  original  vague  ens  externum.  It  should  not,  however, 
be  forgotten  that  the  recognition  of  sameness  involves 
■memory ;  and  that  although  the  natural  tendency  of  the 
mind  is  in  the  beginning  altogether  objective,  there 
must  be  an  implicit  awareness  of  its  own  enduring 
existence,  developing  in  the  consciousness  of  the  child 
concomitantly  with  its  cognition  of  the  persistence  of 
external  things. 

But  the  infant's  experience  is  not  limited  to 
the  recurrence  of  the  same  individual  objects.  He 
perceives  different  beings  resembling  each  other  in  fewer 
or  more  features ;  and  his  attention  is  called  to  the 
recurrence  of  a  common  element  in  quite  different 
situations.  Thus,  after  he  has  grown  familiar  with  the 
red  garment,  he  observes  a  red  table-cover  or  a  red 
neck-tie,  and  adverting  to  the  similarity  not  unfre- 
quently  manifests  his  satisfaction  at  the  discovery. 
This  is  an  important  epoch  in  the  elaboration  of  the 
general  concept,  for  such  an  experience  stimulates 
in  a  livel}^  manner  the  abstractive  power  of  the 
intellect,  and  incites  the  infant  mind  to  consciously 
consider  and  dwell  upon  the  conception  redness  in  a 
conjpletely  abstract  state. 

Generalization. — The  transition  to  the  perfectly 
general  concept,  the  formally  reflex  universal  idea,  is 
now  very  rapid.  The  child  having  observed  tliis  red 
colour  in  different  objects,  and  conceived  it  in  the 
abstract  by  a  further  reflective  act,  considers  it  as 
capable  of  indefinite  realization  in  other  objects. 
The  mind  exerts  its  synthetic  power  and  constructs 
new  specimens,  all  embodying  this  attribute,  and  con- 
sciously adverts  to  the  fact  that  it  may  be  predicated  of 
them  all. 

As  we  have  already  pointed  out,  the  formation  of  a 


3O0  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


general  concept  is  quite  possible  in  mature  life  after  a 
single  perception  ;  and  the  operation  may  be  similarly 
within  the  power  of  the  child  at  a  very  early  date. 
Nevertheless,  it  seems  to  us  more  probable  that  the 
reflective  consideration  of  the  concept  involved  in  the 
act  of  formal  generalization  is  ordinarily  excited  in 
the  infant  by  the  comparison  of  different  objects  and  the 
discovery  of  a  common  attribute  in  several  individuals. 
But  the  view  of  the  older  empiricists  that  generali- 
zation is  simply  the  outcome  of  an  accumulation  oi 
experiences  is  utterh^  erroneous.  The  active  generali- 
zing impulse  is  innate  in  our  rational  nature.  Na}^ 
experience  is  needed  not  to  stimulate  and  excite,  but 
to  check  and  moderate  this  generalizing  tendency. 
The  chief  use  of  reiterated  observation  is  rather 
to  correct  and  verify  than  to  generate  universal  con- 
ceptions. 

Precisely  the  same  functions  of  the  intellect — 
attention,  abstraction,  analysis,  synthesis,  comparison, 
and  discrimination — are  employed  in  fashioning  the 
notions  of  science  and  those  of  ordinary  life ;  and  their 
work  in  both  cases  is  the  same — to  correct,  adjust,  and 
verify  the  vague  idea  generated  spontaneously  by  the 
mind's  own  activity  operating  on  concrete  individual 
facts.  Science  is,  after  all,  but  a  further  elaboration 
and  systematization  of  our  ordinary  cognitions,  em- 
ploying more  careful  methods  of  observation. 

Let  us,  for  example,  trace  the  growth  of  the  idea  of  cat. 
By  its  repeated  appearance  before  the  infant  pussy  excites 
attention,  and  is  apprehended  as  a  white-fonr-legged-self- 
moving-thing.  On  subsequent  occasions  it  is  observed  standing, 
moving,  sometimes  mysteriously  crumpling  itself  up  and  sitting 
down,  sometimes  lying  seemingly  dead  on  the  hearth-rug.  The 
image  of  pussy  is  by  this  time  very  distinct,  but  the  concept  is 
still  very  imperfect.  It  is  merely  that  white-four-legged-self- 
moving-thing-which-does-curious-acts.  Still  the  mind  can 
and  probably  does  generalize  it.  The  child  is  quite  prepared 
to  apply  the  notion  to  an  indefinite  number  of  white,  self- 
moving  quadrupeds.  Later  on  a  black  cat  intrudes,  and  the 
general  likeness  in  form,  movement,  and  habits,  is  recognized, 
whilst  the  mind  is  disconcerted  by  the  startling  dissimilarity 
in  colour.    The  notion  of  cat  has  now  to  be  enlarged  to  accom- 


ORIGIN   OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  301 


inodate  itself  henceforth  to  all  hues.  Next  day  the  child 
observes  a  St.  Bernard's  dog,  and  manifests  his  appreciation 
of  the  similarity  in  this  new  self-moving  quadruped.  For  him 
it  is  a  big  cat.  If  a  second  dog  now  appear,  the  original 
idea  is  seen  to  embrace  two  classes  of  objects.  The  concepts 
of  dog  and  cat  are  distinguished  and  contrasted;  attention  is 
directed  to  their  points  of  agreement  and  difference,  and 
both  notions  become  speedily  well  defined.  The  shape  of  the 
cat,  its  furry  skin,  its  stealthy  movement,  its  peculiar  cry,  are 
combined  and  held  together  by  a  synthetic  intellectual  act, 
and  the  concept  of  cat  is  formed  and  ready  to  be  contrasted 
with  the  idea  of  dog,  or  sheep,  or  to  be  inductively  applied  to 
all  future  cats.  The  child's  comparatively  clear  conception 
of  these  domestic  animals  are  thus  elaborated  out  of  the 
primitive,  ill-defined,  and  obscure  apprehension  of  four-legged - 
self-moving-being.  Increasing  experience  continues  to  perfect 
these  conceptions,  of  the  nature  of  common  objects  until  the 
average  knowledge  possessed  in  the  child's  social  environment 
is  reached,  when  progress  ordinarily  stops,  and  his  ideas 
become  practically  fixed.  Thus,  the  conceptions  of  cat  and 
dog,  bread  and  butter,  are  approximately  the  same  among 
most  people  of  the  same  degree  of  culture. 

Commonly,  however,  when  a  special  branch  of 
science  is  undertaken,  there  is  at  once  a  new  start,  and 
an  enlarged  field  of  possible  knowledge  concerning  the 
things  of  which  it  treats  opens  out  before  our  minds. 
Still,  the  process  is  fundamentally  of  the  same  kind, 
and  the  clear,  distinct,  and  rich  conception  which  the 
chemist  possesses  of  the  nature  of  wafer,  as  composed 
of  oxygen  and  hydrogen  and  exhibiting  a  thousand 
affinities  and  properties  which  distinguish  it  from  other 
species  of  things,  is  only  a  better  elaborated  form  ot 
the  infant's  idea  of  the  disagreeable  thing  in  which  he 
is  daily  washed."    In  fact  the  growth  of  our  intellectual 

"*  Mercier  justly  insists  :  "  Nous  n'arrivons  pas  subitement  a 
Vessence  spi'cifiquc  des  choses :  nous  commencons  par  saisir  leurs 
qualites,  comme  quelque  chose  de  concret  et  de  subsistant,  nous  ne 
distinguons  pas  de  prime  abord,  entre  la  substance  comme  telle  et  les 
accidents  qui  I'affectent  et  y  sont  inherents,  entre  les  qualites  con- 
tigentes  et  les  caracteres  neccssaircs,  c'est-a-dire,  \es proprii-tcs  natuvelles 
ou  les  notes  essentielles  du  sujet  que  nous  voudrions  pouvoirdcfinir.  .  .  . 
Ce  n'est  que  plus  tard,  par  voie  de  comparaison  et  an  moyen  de 
I'induction  ....  que  nous  approchons  d'une  maniere  mediate,  de  la 
connaissance  de  I'csscnce  specifique  des  etres  et  de  ce  premicv  fond 
substanticl  qui  demeure  invariable  che^  eux  a  travers  les  variations 


302  RATIONAL   LIFE 


knowledge  Is  a  continuous  descent  down  Porphyry's  tree. 
Each  step  augments  what  logicians  call  the  compre- 
hension or  connotation  of  our  subjective  conceptions  ;  that 
is,  it  increases  our  knowledge  of  the  essential  attributes 
of  the  being  represented  by  our  idea,  whilst  on  the 
other  hand  it  lessens  the  extension  or  field  of  objects  to 
which  the  idea  can  be  applied. 

Thought  and  Language. — Naming. — The  group 
of  attributes  summed  up  in  a  concept  thus  formed 
could,  however,  neither  be  retained  in  the  memory  nor 
communicated  to  others  unless  they  were  embodied  in 
some  definite  sign.  Hence  we  mark  them  with  general 
names.  This  is  the  final  act  of  denomination^  the  import- 
ance of  which  in  the  growth  of  knowledge  and  the 
elaboration  of  our  concepts  of  specific  essences,  it 
would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate.  The  recurrence  of 
the  name  will  awaken  in  the  future  b}^  association 
sensuous  images  of  the  individual  objects  perceived  in 
the  past,  but  its  essential  functions  are  to  hold  together 
and  express  the  nucleus  of  attributes  which  constitute 
the  common  nature  apprehended  in  the  universal 
concept.  Hamilton  has  characterized  words  as  the 
"  fortresses  of  thought,"  and  the  phrase  very  fitly 
indicates  one  of  their  most  important  duties.  They 
establish  our  command  over  conceptions  which  have 
been  gained  by  a  protracted  experience  and  might 
otherwise  be  soon  lost.  By  definition  a  term  is  made 
to  signify  a  determinate  group  of  properties  which  we 
have  frequently  found  together.  It  registers  the  result 
of  a  long  series  of  observations ;  it  is  readily  repre- 
sented in  imagination,  and  serving  as  a  general  symbol, 
it  is  handled  with  the  greatest  ease  in  our  reasoning 

incessantes  de  leurs  accidents."  {PsycJwIogie,  p.  345.)  Similarly 
Coconnier  :  "  Examinez  les  idees  que  vous  faites  des  difterents 
etres,  et  vous  verrez  que  vous  les  avez  toutes  constituees  a  I'aide 
des  notions  transcendentales  et  communes  de  i'ontologie,  notions 
generales  d'etre,  de  substance,  de  qualites,  de  cause,  d'action,  de 
space,  etc.  D'apres  cela  nos  idees  des  choses  materielles  sont 
comme  autant  de  faisceaux,  de  concepts  additiones,  reunis  et 
groupes  en  autant  dediverses  manieres  que  nous  connaissonsd'etres 
materiels  differents."  {L'Ame  humaine,  p.  130.  Cf.  Feillaube,  Thcoric 
des  Concepts,  pp.  302,  303,  32G,  332—335.) 


ORIGIN   OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  303 


processes.  These  great  advantages  of  language  in 
relation  to  complex  ideas  are  conspicuously  illustrated 
in  sciences  like  Botany  and  Chemistry,  the  nomenclature 
and  terminology  of  which  have  been  formed  on  syste- 
matic principles. 

Communication  of  Ideas. — But  the  value  of  words  is  even 
more  obvious  as  instruments  of  communication,  for  which 
purpose,  indeed,  they  were  primarily  invented.  Here  the  con- 
dition of  the  child  who  comes  into  the  possession  of  a  language 
already  made  is  obviously  very  different  from  that  of  a  human 
being  huilding  up  a  system  of  speech  for  himself.  The  former 
receives  an  enormous  gratuitous  gift  of  precious  conceptions 
to  be  appropriated  with  the  least  possible  labour.  The  child 
born  into  the  inheritance  of  a  cultivated  language  starts  from 
a  level  which  has  required  numberless  generations  of  great 
minds  to  build  up;  and  just  as  cities,  roads,  railways,  and 
machinery  are  contributions  of  the  labours  and  the  genius  01 
past  centuries  towards  his  material  welfare,  so  the  vocabulary 
of  which  he  is  put  in  possession  with  almost  equal  facility  is 
an  accumulated  legacy  of  incalculable  worth  in  the  enrich- 
ment of  his  intellectual  life. 

Ideas  prior  to  Words. — Useful,  however,  as  language  is  for 
the  development  and  perfection  of  thinking,  thei  e  is  no 
evidence  that  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  thought.  Tlie  idea 
precedes  the  word  ;  the  latter  is  invented  to  express  the 
former.  The  child  is  possessed  of  many  simple  ideas  before 
he  can  give  utterance  to  them  by  oral  sounds.  Deaf  mutes 
are  proved  to  have  performed  many  intellectual  operations 
before  they  employ  any  kind  of  signs  to  express  them. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  probable  that  in  normal  life  no  lengthy 
chain  of  thought  is  carried  on  without  the  mind  assisting  itself 
by  the  use  of  words  which,  in  the  case  of  the  dumb,  are 
replaced  bv  movements,  images,  or  physical  symbols  of  some 
other  sort.^ 

Second  Question. — Origin  of  Ideas. — Having  thus 
described  at  length  what  seems  to  us  to  be  the  most 
common  process  b}^  which  the  primitive  vague  intel- 
lectual apprehensions  of  being,  extended  being,  moving 
being,  coloured   &£^ni>;r-'-aftd' the"  like,  are  contracted   and 

^  Max  Muller,  who  argues  for  the  inseparabihty  of  thought  and 
language,  gives  a  history  of  the  dispute  in  his  Science  of  Thought, 
pp.   32 — 64.  Cf.  also   Mivart,  On    Truth,   c.  xvi.;   James,   Vol.   II. 

355—358- 


304  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


elaborated  into  the  specific  ideas  and  scientific  con- 
ceptions of  later  life,  the  question  still  remains :  How 
are  these  most  indeterminate  notions  themselves 
originally  obtained  ?  What  are  the  relations  between 
the  sensuous  and  the  rational  functions  of  the  mind  in 
the  initial  act  of  intellectual  cognition  ?  Some  able 
scholastic  psychologists  reply  that  the  operation  is 
incapable  of  further  analysis.  Consciousness  assures 
us  that  the  intellect  lays  hold  of  the  abstract  and 
universal  aspect  in  the  concrete  sensible  phenomenon ; 
but  we  cannot  penetrate  beyond  this  ultimate  fact/^ 
The  schoolmen,  howeveir,  in  general,  answered  this 
question  by  the  theory  of  the  Intellectus  A  gens,  therein 
developing  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of  the  abstractive 
activity  of  the  intellect.  This  theory  is  thus  an  attempt 
to  explain  Jiow  intellectual  activity  is  evoked,  and  in 
what  ivay  the  primitive  abstractive  operation  is  exerted. 
It  is  therefore  a  hypothesis  put  forward  to  give  a  fuller 
account  of  certain  well  established  facts ;  and  its  value 
is  to  be  measured  like  that  of  any  other  hypothesis  by 
its  success  in  explaining  the  phenomena.  It  accord- 
ingly stands  on  quite  a  different  level  from  that  of  the 
tenet  that  intellect  is  a  spiritual  abstractive  faculty 
essentially  different  from  sense.  This  latter  doctrine 
we  believe  to  be  a  demonstrated  truth,  whilst  the 
former  can  only  claim  to  be  a  probable  or  plausible 
theory ;  and  it  seems  to  us  very  important  to  recognize 
clearly  the  relatively  subordinate  character  of  this  very 

^  Dr.  G.  Hageman  thus  writes:  "The  soul  must  be  endowed 
with  the  facuhy  of  abstraction.  The  mind  immediately  abstracts  the 
essence  of  the  object,  just  as  in  sense-perception  the  soul  imme- 
diately apprehends  the  stimulus.  But  we  are  just  as  incapable  of 
obtaining  an  insight  into  the  process  of  the  spiritual  abstractive  activity  as 
of  deducing  the  nature  of  sensuous  activity  from  the  essence  of  the 
soul."  (Psychologic,  §.  93,  Sechste  Auflage,  1897.)  Similarly  Abbe 
Piat  :  "  Notre  avis  a  nous,  est  que  I'acte  original  par  lequel  I'intel- 
ligence  opere  sur  les  donnees  empiriques,  resiste,  comme  I'emotion 
ou  I'acte  libre,  a  toute  definition  vraiment  positive  ;  il  y  reste  uii 
n'sidu  impenetrable."  {L'Idee,  p.  244  ;  cf.  L'lntellect  Actif,  pp.  134,  135.) 
"Patet  nil  certum  remansisse  apud  Scholasticos  in  hac  difiicili 
quaestione,  nisi  solam  formationem  harum  idearura  per  vim  abstrac- 
tivam  intellectus  .  .  .  Quicunqueenim  per  vim  intellectus  abstractivam 
idearum  originem  explicat,  verc  intra  schclam  viaiiet."  (P.  J.  Mendive, 
S.J.,  Psych ologia,  p.  301.) 


ORIGIN   OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  305 

speculative  discussion.  Modern  writers  with  the  most 
superficial  information  regarding  mediaeval  thought,  are 
wont  utterly  to  mistake  the  weight  assigned  to  different 
questions ;  and  they  would  fain  identify  the  fate  of  the 
grand  fabric  of  the  whole  scholastic  S3'stem  with  a  few 
ingenious  and  very  speculative  solutions  of  subtle  meta- 
physical problems  of  comparatively  inferior  significance. 
Accordingly,  with  fair  warning  to  those  not  familiar 
with  the  Scholastic  Philosophy  that  this  is  amongst  the 
most  obscure  and  difficult  of  the  discussions  of  the 
schoolmen,  we  shall  give  an  exposition  of  the  subject 
for  the  sake  of  those  who  may  wish  to  go  deeper  into 
mediaeval  metaphysics. 

Aristotelico-Scholastic  Theory  of  Abstraction. — This  starts 
from  the  truths  already  established,  that  in  mature  life  the 
mind  is  in  possession  of  truly  abstract  and  universal  ideas 
which  transcend  the  range  of  the  lower  or  organic  faculties, 
and  thus  force  upon  us  the  admission  of  a  higher,  supra- 
sensuous  power.  These  ideas  represent  under  an  abstract 
and  universal  form  the  essence  or  nature  which  exists  indi- 
vidualized by  material  conditions  in  sensible  objects.  We 
have  thus  two  grades  of  cognitive  faculties,  sense  {aia-Orjais], 
the  lower ;    and  intellect  (vovs),  the  higher  or  spiritual  power. 

I.  Formal  objects  of  Intellect  and  of  Sense. — The  formal  object 
of  sense — that  which  it  is  ordained  to  apprehend — is  some 
particular  phenomenon,  some  concrete  quality  or  material 
thing.  The  formal  object  of  intellect  is  being  in  general,  the 
essence  or  quiddity  of  things  in  its  widest  sense. i*^     Within  the 

^'^  The  student  must  be  constantly  on  his  guard  against  inter- 
preting "essence"  to  imply  all  that  is  contained  in  "specific 
nature."  Amongst  its  synonyms  in  scholastic  literature  are  :  Quod 
quid  est ;  or,  What  any  thing  is  ;  the  Quidditas,  Whatness,  Washeit, 
rh  rl  liv  fJvai;  or  the  nature  of  an  object,  the  ratio  interna,  la  raison 
intime,  the  realized  idea  or  plan,  the  actualized  internal  possibility 
of  a  thing,  the  sum  of  the  notes  which  constitute  it.  Every  positiv^e 
answer  to  the  question,  What  is  that  ?  reveals  the  essence.  The 
answer  may  vary  in  definiteness  from:  "It  is  something,"  to 
"  It  is  a  dark-extended-four- footed-long-necked-hump-backed-hairy- 
skinned-self-moving-being."  The  former  expresses  the  essence  in 
its  most  indeterminate  form  ;  the  latter  approximates  towards  the 
conception  of  the  specific  essence  of  a  camel.  Some  of  the  above 
synonyms — e.g.,  nature,  are  more  frequently  used  to  designate  the 
specific  essence ;  but  there  is  no  fixed  usage.  When  it  is  said 
that  the  intellect  abstracts  the  essence,  this  term  must  be  understood 
in  its  widest  sense  ;  the  more  determinate  specific  essence,  as  before 
stated,  is  attained  by  observation,  comparison,  and  induction. 

U 


3o6  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


sphere  of  being  is  included  substance  and  accident,  body  and 
spirit,  creator  and  creature,  actual  and  possible  reality  ;  in 
fact,  everything  capable  of  being  in  any  measure  understood. 
It  is  under  this  aspect  that  every  object  of  thought  is 
apprehended,  it  is  the  simplest  and  widest  of  notions,  and 
into  it  all  notions  are  finally  resolved.  But,  although  the 
formal  object  of  intellect  embraces  all  forms  of  being,  yet  the 
human  intellect  has  for  its  connatural,  inimediate,  or  propor- 
tionate object)  the  abstract  and  universal  essences  of  sensible 
or  material  things.  The  connatural  object  of  a  faculty  signifies 
that  towards  which  it  directly  tends,  as  opposed  to  that  which 
it  can  cognize  only  mediately  and  indirectly,  or  by  analogy. 
God  and  other  pure  spirits  are  thus  not  the  connatural  object 
of  the  human  intellect.  They  are  known  not  by  intuition, 
but  by  inference  and  analogy ;  whilst  our  earliest  intellectual 
ideas  are  all  of  sensible  objects. 

2.  All  knowledge  starts  from  experience. — At  the  beginning  of 
life  the  mind  is  in  a  purely  potential  condition  with  respect 
to  knowledge.  There  are  no  innate  cognitions,  whether  sen- 
suous or  intellectual.  The  mind  is  described  as  a  tabula  rasa — 
a  clean  tablet  on  which  nothing  is  yet  written — although  this 
term  is  not  completely  appropriate,  since  such  a  tablet  is 
entirely  passive,  whilst  the  intellect  is  endowed  with  an 
innate,  or  a  priori  active  power  of  modifying  itself,  so 
as  to  generate  abstract  or  immaterial  representations  oi 
sensible  objects.  In  order  to  apprehend  any  of  these  objects, 
there  must  be  wrought  in  the  mind  a  form,  modification,  or 
determination  by  which  it  is  assimilated  to  the  object.  This 
modification  or  form,  is  called  the  species  impressa,  and  we 
have  described  in  chapter  iv.,  how  material  objects  acting 
upon  the  senses  produce  modifications  by  which  the  lower 
faculties  are  determined  to  the  sensuous  apprehension  of  these 
objects.  But  for  intellectual  cognition  the  higher  faculty  must 
be  similarly  determined  by  a  form  of  a  higher  order — a 
species  intelligibilis  impressa — to  elicit  a  conception  of  the 
universal  nature  or  essence  of  the  object. 

3.  Intellect  us  Agens. — The  action  of  the  material  object 
awakens  sensuous  perception,  which  results  in  a  concrete 
phantasm  of  the  object  in  the  imagination  from  which  the 
intellectual  concept  is  derived.  But  neither  this  sensuous 
perception  of  the  object  nor  the  resulting  phantasm  can 
directly  effect  the  species  intelligibilis  impressa  or  generate  an 
intellectual  concept.  They  only  contribute  the  "  material  " 
elements  or  conditions  to  the  elaboration  of  the  concept.  For 
neither  the  physical  thing  nor  the  phantasm  can  directly 
reveal  itself  to  the  cognitive  intellect.  Both  are  individual, 
concrete,    material,    whilst    the    object   of    the    intellect   is 


ORIGIN  OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  307 

universal,  abstract,  and  immaterial.  They  contain,  indeed,  a 
universal  essence,  but  individualized  in  its  material  deter- 
minations. It  is  in  this  state  only  fundamentally  universal, 
and  therefore  not  apt  to  be  immediately  taken  up  into  the 
intellect.  It  is,  according  to  the  scholastics,  as  yet  only 
potentially  intelligible,  somewhat  as  red  or  green  is  only 
potentially  sensible  in  the  dark ;  it  needs  to  be  made  actually 
intelligible,  in  order  to  be  apprehended  by  the  intellect.  It 
has  to  he  abstracted  ^^  from  its  individualizing  corporeal  con- 
ditions. Indeed,  it  was  the  conviction  of  this  incapacity 
of  the  sensible  material  thing  to  directly  manifest  itself  to 
the  intellect  and  thus  modify  the  spiritual  faculty  that  induced 
Plato  to  assume  the  existence  of  real  abstract  immaterial 
essences  separate  from  sensible  phenomena. 

It  is  in  order  to  account  for  this  modification  of  the 
spiritual  faculty,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  for  the  excita- 
tion of  the  intellect  to  the  generation  of  the  abstract  repre- 
sentation of  the  essence  existing  individualized  in  the 
phantasm  that  the  schoolmen  ascribe  to  the  intellect  not 
merely  the  capacity  of  being  modified  so  as  to  represent  the 
various  objects  in  an  abstract  or  spiritual  manner,  but  also  an 
active  energy  or  force  of  its  own,  which  is  chief  agent  in  the 
production  of  this  modification.     The  only  other  alternative 

^^  It  should  be  noted  that  the  schoolmen  employed  the  words 
abstraction,  and,  to  abstract,  in  the  converse  signification  of  that 
which  has  prevailed  since  Kant.  With  modern  writers  intellectual 
abstraction  primarily  signifies  the  ignoring  or  omission  of  the 
attributes  not  attended  to  ;  with  the  schoolmen  it  was  understood 
to  primarily  mean  the  positive  side  of  the  operation — the  assumption 
by  the  mind  of  the  part  selected,  of  the  attributes  which  are  attended 
to.  A  process  of  abstraction,  therefore,  formerly  signified  the 
taking  up  of  something  :  now  it  would  signify  the  neglect  of  some- 
thing. (Cf.  Logic,  present  series,  pp.  102.)  Still,  by  the  "  abstraction  " 
of  the  essence  or  species  from  the  sensuous  representation,  the 
schoolmen  did  not  mean  the  physical  extraction  of  certain  parts  of 
the  latter,  but  the  reproduction  of  its  essential  features  in  an 
abstract  manner  in  a  higher  form  of  consciousness.  Thus,  Suarez  : 
"  Observandum  est,  speciem  non  dici  abstrahibilem,  vel  abstrahi,  a 
phantasmatibus,  quasi  ipsa  species  prius  esset  immixta  phantas- 
matibus,  unde  postea  separetur  ab  intellectu  agente,  ac  transferatur 
in  possibilem  ;  hoc  enim  puerile  esset  cogitare.  .  .  .  Intellectum 
ergo  abstrahere  speciem,  nil  est  aliud  quam  virtute  sua  efficere  speciem 
spiritualem  repraesentantem  eandem  naturam,  quam  phantasma 
repraesentat,  modo  tamen  quodam  spiritual! ;  illaque  elevatio  a 
materiali  repraesentatione  phantasmatis  ad  spiritualem  repraesenta- 
tionem  speciei  intelligibilis  dicitur  abstractio ;  ex  quo  aperte  constat 
abstractionem  non  esse  actionem  distinctam  a  productione  speciei." 
{De  Anima,  Lib.  IV.  c.  2,  §  18.    Cf.  Sum.  i.  q.  85,  a.  i,  ad  3,  4.) 


3oS  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


is  to  assume  that  the  intellect  is  determined  to  apprehend  its 
object  by  an  external  spirit,  angelic  or  divine.  This,  however, 
is  a  fanciful  and  gratuitous  hypothesis  incapable  of  proof, 
and  in  conflict  with  much  of  the  evidence  adduced  against  the 
doctrines  of  innate  ideas  and  of  ontologism.  We  are,  they 
argue,  thus  compelled  to  attribute  the  generation  of  intellectual 
ideas  to  an  inherent  force  of  the  intellect  itself,  which,  reacting 
on  the  occasion  of  sensory  stimuli,  effects  in  itself  the  modifica- 
tion by  which  the  object  is  apprehended  under  a  universal 
aspect.  This  force  is  the  active  intellect,  the  Intellectiis  Agens. 
They  define  it  as  :  /I  certain  instinctive  spiritual  force  or  energy  of 
the  mind,  which  acting  spontaneously  on  the  presentation  of  objects 
in  the  imagination,  generates  ''species  intelligibiles''  of  them,  or, 
an  active  faculty  whereby  the  intellect  modifies  itself  so  as  to 
represent  in  a  spiritual  or  abstract  manner  ivhat  is  concretely 
depicted  in  the  phantasm. 

The  argument  is  put  briefly  by  other  scholastics  thus: 
Neither  the  object  itself,  the  sensuous  impression,  nor  the  phan- 
tasm can  generate  species  intelligibiles,  by  which  the  intellect 
is  determined  to  cognize  the  object,  for  this  modification  is  a 
spiritual  accident,  and  none  such  can  be  produced  by  material 
agencies.  It  is  a  fundamental  axiom,  that  no  being  can  efl"ect 
in  another  what  is  not  contained  in  itself,  either  formally 
or  eminently,  and  a  spiritual  accident  is  contained  in  a 
corporeal  agent,  neither  formally  nor  eminently.  Therefore, 
the  modification  of  the  intellectual  faculty  must  be  imme- 
diately due  to  a  spiritual,  not  an  organic  agency.^'^ 

4.  Intellect  us  Possibilis. — The  mind's  capability  of  being 
modified  so  as  to  express  the  essence  of  the  object  in  a 
concept  is  termed  the  intellectus  patiens  vel  possibilis.  It  is  the 
intellectus  patiens  which  formally  understands.  The  intel- 
lectus agens  must  be  conceived  as  instinctive  or  blind ;  its 
"  abstractive  "  action  is  productive  of  intelligence,  not  formally 
intelligent  itself.  Its  function  is  to  effect  the  modification  by 
which  the  act  of  intelle  tual  consciousness  is  immediately 
awakened.^"'  It  may  be  here  asked  if  the  action  of  the  intel- 
lectus agens  be  instinctive,  why  does  it  issue  into  the  precisely 
appropriate  activity  ?  Why  does  it  effect  exactly  the  right 
modification  to  represent  the  object  of  the  sensuous  impression 

^-  Cf  Kleutgen,  op.  cit.  §§  18—32, 45—49,  776,  777 ;  also  Peillaube, 
op.  cit.  pp.  294 — 300. 

^^  The  different  functions  ascribed  to  the  intellectus  agens  and 
patiens  illustrate  the  scholastic  distinction  between  an  active  and  a 
passive  faculty.  Both  together  constitute  the  actually  intelligent 
mind  ;  but  the  former  actuates  its  object,  makes  it  pass  from  a 
potential  or  virtual  condition  to  one  of  actualization,  whilst  the  latter 
ii  actuated  by  its  object. 


ORIGIN   OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  309 


when  the  latter  cannot  directly  act  upon  it  ?  The  answer  lies 
in  the  fact  that  both  sense  and  intellect  have  their  source  in 
the  same  indivisible  soul,  which  is  so  constituted  that  on  the 
stimulation  of  the  former  the  latter  sympathetically  responds 
by  a  higher  reaction  of  its  own — somewhat  as  the  appetitive 
faculty,  which  conceived  as  such  is  blind,  tends  towards  an 
object  apprehended  by  a  cognitive  faculty  as  good.  In  both 
cases  it  is  the  soul  itself  which  acts  through  the  faculty. 

Distinction  between  the  Active  and  Passive  Intellect. — It  was 
disputed  among  the  schoolmen,  in  what  way  and  to  what 
extent  the  intellectus  agens  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
intellectus  patiens.  The  Arabian  philosopher  Avicenna  and 
certain  of  his  disciples  interpreted  Aristotle's  somewhat 
obscure  language  on  the  point,  to  mean  that  the  intellectus 
agens  is  "separate"  not  merely  from  the  human  body,  but 
also  from  each  individual  soul.  They,  accordingly,  conceived 
this  power,  after  a  pantheistic  fashion,  as  one  universal  spirit, 
which  in  some  mysterious  way  operates  upon  the  passive  or 
recipient  intellects  of  all  men.  This  gratuitous  and  fanciful 
hypothesis  was  unanimously  rejected  by  the  schoolmen,  who 
all  deny  to  the  intellectus  agens  any  existence  separate  from 
the  individual  soul.  But  here  the  agreement  ends.  The 
majority  conceive  the  intellectus  agens  and  intellectus  patiens  as 
two  real  subjectively  distinct  faculties  of  the  soul,  on  the 
ground  that  they  are  opposed  as  agent  and  patient,  mover 
and  moved.  The  function  of  the  one,  it  is  urged,  is  to  effect 
the  species  impressa,  whilst  that  of  the  other  is,  when  thus 
modified,  to  apprehend  the  object.  Other  scholastic  philo- 
sophers, however,  argue  very  forcibly  against  this  multipli- 
cation of  faculties  as  excessive.  They  object  that  the 
hypothesis  of  two  intellects  is  unnecessary,  and  they  maintain 
that  these  terms  only  designate  different  aspects  or  aptitudes 
of  the  same  power.  The  name,  intellectus  agens,  denotes  the 
mind  as  capable  of  modifying  itself,  whilst  the  intellectus  patiens 
signifies  the  same  mind  considered  from  the  other  standpoint 
as  capable  of  being  modified.  In  this  view  they  are  sub- 
jectively merely  virtually  distinct  powers.^'* 

5.  Species  Intelligibiles:  Verhuni  Mentale.  The  modification 
of  the  mind  viewed  as  wrought  in  the  intellectus  patiens 
by  the  intellectus  agens,  constitutes  the  species  intelligibilis 
impressa.     The  union  of  this  species  imprcssa  with  the  intel- 

^^  "  Intellectus  agens  rcalitev  a  passibili  non  distinguitur.  Nam 
intellectus  dicitur  agens,  quatenus  actionem  cognoscitivam  producit ; 
patiens  vero,  quatenus  banc  ipsam  actionem  in  se  recipit  hsec  autem 
duo  munera  ad  unam  et  eandem  potentiam  pertinent."  (J.  Mendive, 
S.J.,  Psychologia,%  514.  Cf.  Boedder,  op.  cit.  §§  162,163;  Pesch, 
op.  cit.  §838.) 


3IO  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


lectits  patiens  results  in  the  conception  of  the  abstract  essence, 
the  generation  of  the  abstract  idea  of  the  object,  which  is 
called  the  species  intelligibilis  expressa,  inasmuch  as  it  is  the 
intellectual  expression  of  the  object.  The  same  act  looked  at 
under  a  somewhat  different  aspect  as  the  realization  or  utter- 
ance of  the  thought  of  the  object  by  the  mind  to  itself  is  called 
the  verbiim  mcntale,  or  mental  word.^'^  Finally,  this  same  product 
considered  as  the  intellectual  expression  of  the  essence  of  the 
object  abstracted  from  the  individualizing  notes  which  accom- 
pany it  in  the  physical  world  is  called  the  direct,  or  potential 
universal.  It  is  not  as  yet  an  actually  or  formally  universal 
concept.  It  prescinds  alike  from  universality  and  individuality. 
It  merely  expresses  in  an  indeterminate  manner  the  essence 
of  the  object,  omitting  all  individualizing  conditions.  More- 
over, it  is  not  the  object  of  cognition,  but  the  instrument  or 
means  by  which  the  intellect  apprehends  its  object.  It  is  the 
medium  quo,  not  the  medium  quod percipitur. 

Formally  Universal  Ideas. — It  is  only  by  subsequent  re- 
flexion that  this  potentially  universal  concept,  thus  reached 
by  the  spontaneous,  direct,  abstractive  action  of  the  intellect 
is  elaborated  into  the  reflex  ov  formally  universal  concept  of  the 
logician.  The  schoolmen,  as  we  have  already  observed,  are 
extremely  brief  on  this  latter  part  of  the  process  ;  but  under 
the  term  "reflexion,'  they  must  intend  to  include  conscious 
abstraction,^"  ideal  comparison,  involving  analysis  and 
synthesis,  and  also  generalization.  For,  in  the  reflective 
operation   by  which    the    primitive   abstract    conception   is 

^•^  The  allusions  of  modern  writers  to  the  vcrhuui  mentalc  of  the 
schoolmen  exhibit  an  amusing  ignorance  of  the  meaning  of  the  term. 
The  phrase  simply  signifies  with  mediaeval  writers,  the  mental  act 
corresponding  to  a  common  noun — e.g.,  triangle,  man,  responsi- 
bility. These  words,  it  may  be  presumed,  have  a  meaning  or  con- 
notation. The  thought  by  which  the  mind  comprehends  that 
meaning  is  the  verhum  mcntale,  just  as  the  vocal  sound  by  which  it 
communicates  this  thought  to  another  mind  is  the  verhum  orak. 

^^  The  reader  must  be  careful  to  distinguish  two  forms  of 
"  abstraction"  in  the  scholastic  account  of  the  process.  The  first 
consists  of  the  initial  act  spontaneously  exerted  by  the  intcUectus  agens. 
It  is  instinctive  being  preceded  by  sensuous  but  not  by  intellectual 
cognition.  It  is  called  "abstraction,"  because  it  effects  ihe  abstract 
representation  of  the  concrete  object.  It  is  not  preceded  by  but 
productive  of  the  abstract  concept.  In  the  second  stage  the  intellect 
already  in  possession  of  this  representation  consciously  adverts  to 
the  essential  features  contained  in  it,  whilst  it  deliberately  ignores 
or  withholds  attention  from  concomitant  accidents.  The  first  stage 
is  an  act  of  instinctive  election  by  the  intellect,  the  second  is  one  of 
conscious  selection.  (Cf.  Peillaube,  ibiil.  pp.  293 — 300,  also  Boedder, 
op.  cit.  §§  159—163.) 


ORIGIN   OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  311 

formally  universalized,  it  must  be  held  before  the  mind  by  a 
deliberate  act  of  attention.  The  collection  of  notes,  which 
constitute  its  internal  possibility,  must  be  consciously  realized, 
and  then  it  must  be  judged  capable  of  representing  an  inde- 
finite number  of  ideal  or  imaginary  individuals,  or  of  being 
actualized  in  the  various  possible  members  of  a  class.  But 
such  ideal  comparison  and  generalization  is  the  natural 
outcome  of  our  rational  nature ;  it  may  take  place  with  great 
rapidity,  and  the.  constant  check  of  careful  observation  and 
experiments  is  needed  to  secure  that  our  conceptions  and 
generalizations  are  in  harmony  with  reality,  after  the  manner 
described  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  chapter. 

Summary. — The  scholastic  theory,  then,  may  be  thus 
briefly  stated  :  An  object  produces  an  impression  on  a  sen- 
sitive faculty.  This  results  in  a  sensuous  phantasm  in  the 
imagination,  and  here  the  work  of  the  lower  power  ends. 
Since,  however,  in  man  the  sensuous  faculties  of  cognition 
have  their  source  in  a  soul  also  endowed  with  intellectual 
aptitudes,  the  latter  now  issue  into  action.  The  presence  of 
the  phantasm  forms  the  condition  of  rational  activity,  and 
the  intellect  abstracts  the  essence  ;  that  is,  by  its  own  active 
and  passive  capabilities  generates  the  concept  which  expresses 
in  the  abstract  the  essence  of  the  object.  By  a  further 
reflective  act  it  views  this  abstract  concept  as  capable  of 
representing  any  member  of  the  class,  and  thus  constitutes  it 
a  formally  universal  idea.^'' 

^'  Mercier  formulates  the  scholastic  doctrine  in  the  three  fol- 
lowing propositions:  (i)  "  U  intelligence  est  originairement  en  puissance 
a  regard  de  son  acte  de  pensee ;  pour  qu'elle  soit  en  etat  d'accomplir 
son  acte,  il  faut  qu'elle  soit  informee  par  une  espece  intelligible 
(species  intelligibilis),  substitut  del'objet  a  connaitre.  Aussi  I'entende- 
ment,  s'appelait-il,  dans  I'ecole,  intellect  possible  ou  potentiel.  (2)  La 
formation  de  I'espece  intelligible  demande  t(ne  double  cause,  I'image  (le 
phantasma)  fournie  par  I'acte  del'imagination,  et  une  force  d'abstrac- 
tion  appelee  intellect  actif  ov  intellect  agent,  capable  de  degager  I'image 
de  ses  caracteres  d'individuation  et  de  rendre  ainsi  I'objet  assimil- 
able par  la  puissance  cognitive  de  I'entendement.  L'image  est 
ainsi  la  cause  instrumentale — i.e.  la  cause  efficiente  subordonnee  ; 
I'intellect  actif,  la  cause  principale  de  la  production  de  I'espece  intel- 
ligible. (3)  Lorsque  la  puissance  intellectuelle  est  informee  par 
une  espece  intelligible  appropriee  a  sa  nature  et  qui  lui  rend  I'objet 
present,  elle  passe  de  la  puissance  a  I  'acte,  elle  se  dit  a  elle-meme  ce  que 
la  chose  est  [quod  quid  est)  ;  en  un  mot,  elle  connait.  La  connaissance 
ou  la  pensee  n'est  pas,  en  effet,  autre  chose  que  cette parole  mentale 
qui  nous  dit  ce  que  quelque  chose  est."  [Psychologie,  pp.  321,  322.) 
The  phantasma  is  rather  causa  formalis  vel  exemplaris  than  efficiens. 
The  true  causa  principalis  is  the  soul,  or  rather  the  man;  but  the 
intellectus  agens  may  fairly  be  described  as  the  cliief  active  energy 
(agens  principalis)  in  the  process.  (Cf.  lioedder,  op.  cit.  §§  167.) 


312  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Doctrine  of  St.  Thomas.— For  the  convenience  of  the 
student  desirous  of  a  better  understanding  of  the  scholastic 
philosophy,  we  shall  here  give  a  selection  of  extracts  from 
St.  Thomas  bearing  on  this  abstruse  and  difficult  question. 
We  shall  mark  them  with  numbers  corresponding  to  the 
paragraphs  in  our  own  exposition.  It  will,  however,  be 
useful  to  premise  them  by  the  explanation  of  certain  scholastic 
terms  and  phrases. 

The  Intellcctus  Agens  is  said  :  (i)  to  convert  or  diyect  itself 
towards  the  phantasm  {se  convevtere  ad  phantasma),  and  (2)  to 
abstract  from  it  the  essence  (abstrahere  essentiam),  or,  (3)  to 
iUuminate  and  make  actually  intelligible  what  is,  potentially  intel- 
ligible in  the  phantasm  ;  moreover,  (4)  throughout  the  process 
the  intellcctus  agens  is  chief  agent  (a^^n5^n«c//»a/^),  while  the 
phantasm  is  viewed  merely  as  an  instrumental  agent  {agens 
instrunientale).  This  metaphorical  language  is  used  in  order 
to  elucidate  by  analogies  what  is  involved  in  the  single 
instantaneous  act :  (i)  Indicates  that  the  concept  formed  by 
the  intellcctus  agens  is  of  the  object  represented  by  the 
phantasm.  The  intellect  is  likened  to  a  painter  who  turns 
towards  the  object  he  is  about  to  copy.  (2)  Since  the  concept 
formed  by  the  intellect  expresses  the  essential  attributes  of 
the  phantasm  they  are  said  to  be  abstracted  from  the  latter. 
(3)  Here  the  intellcctus  agens  is  likened  to  the  sun  illuminating 
colours  indiscernible  in  the  darkness  though  potentially  dis- 
tinguishable. The  phantasm  contains  potentially  universal 
relations  individualized  in  concrete  material  conditions,  and 
the  activity  of  intellect  evokes  them  into  the  light  of  actual 
consciousness.  (4)  The  intcllectus  agens  is  termed  agens  princi- 
pale,  inasmuch  as  it  plays  the  most  important  part  in  the 
operation,  being  causa  efficiens. 

Extracts. — i.  Id  quod  est  primo,  et  per  se  cognitum  a 
virtute  cognoscitiva,  est  proprium  ejus  objectum.  {Sum.  Thcol. 
I,  q.  85,  a.  8.)  Primo  autem  in  conceptione  intellcctus  cadit 
ens,  quia  secundum  hoc  unumquodque  cognoscibile  est  in 
quantum  est  actu  unde  ens  est  proprium  objectum  intellcctus, 
et  sic  est  primum  intelligible,  sicut  sonus  est  primum  audibile. 
(i,  q.  5,  a.  2.) 

2.  Intellcctus  autem  humanus,  qui  est  infinuis  in  ordine 
intellectuum,  et  maxime  remotus  a  perfectionc  divini  intel- 
lcctus, est  in  potentia  respectu  intelligibilium  ;  ct  in  principio 
est  sicut  tabula  rasa,  in  (pia  nil  est  scriptum,  ut  Philosophus 
dicit.  (I,  q.  79,  a.  2.)  ♦ 

3.  Hoc  quilibet  in  se  ipso  experiri  potest,  quod  quando 
aliquis  conatur  aliquid  intclligere,  format  sibi  aliqua  phantas- 
mata  per  moduni  exeniplorum,  in  (piibus  (juasi  inspiciat, 
quod    intelligere    studet.    .    .    ,    Particulare    autem    appro- 


I* 


ORIGIN   OF  INTELLECTUAL   IDEAS.  31  j 

hendimus  per  sensum  et  imagiriationem,  et  ideo  necesse  est, 
ad  hoc  quod  intellectus  actu  intelligat  suum  objectum  pro- 
prium,  quod  convertai  se  ad  phantasniata  ut  speculetur  naturam 
universalein  in  particular!  existenteni  (i,  q.  84,  a.  7.) : 

Phantasniata  et  illuminantur  ab  intellectu  agente,  et  iterum 
ab  eis  per  virtutem  intellectus  agentis  species  intelligibiles 
abstrahiintuv ;  illuminantur  quidem,  quia  sicut  pars  sensitiva 
ex  conjunctione  ad  intellectuni  efficitur  virtuosior,  ita  phan- 
tasniata ex  virtute  intellectus  agentis  redduntur  habilia,  ut  ab 
eis  intentiones  intelligibiles  abstrahuntur ;  abstrahit  autem 
intellectus  agens  species  intelligibiles  a  phantasmatibus, 
in  quantum  per  virtutem  intellectus  agentis  accipere  possumus 
in  nostra  consideratione  naturas  specierum  sine  individualibus 
conditionibus  secundum  quarum  similitudines  intellectus 
informatur.  (i,  q.  85,  a.  i,  ad  4.) 

4.  Necessitas  ponendi  intellectuni  possibileni  in  nobis  fuit 
propter  hoc,  quod  nos  invenimur  quandoque  intelligentes  in 
potentia,  et  non  in  actu.  Unde  oportet  esse  quandam 
virtutem,  quae  sit  in  potentia  ad  intelligibilia  ante  ipsum 
intelligere,  sed  reducitur  in  actum  eorum  cum  sit  sciens,  et 
ulterius  cum  sit  considerans.  Et  hsec  virtus  vocatur  intellectus 
possibilis.  (i,  q.  54,  a.  4.) 

5.  Quicumque  autem  intelligit,  ex  hoc  ipso,  quod  intelligit, 
procedit  aliquid  intra  ipsum,  quod  est  conceptio  rei  intellectae, 
ex  vi  intellectiva  proveniens,  et  ex  ejus  notitia  procedens. 
Quam  quidem  conceptionem  vox  significat  et  dicitur  verbum 
cordis  significatum  verbo  vocis.  (i,  q.  27,  a.  i.) 

Species  intelligibilis  non  est  objectum  in  quod  feratur 
cognitio.  .  .  .  Dicenda  est  species  intelligibilis  se  habere  ad 
intellectuni,  ut  quo  intellectus  intelligit.  .  .  .  Sed  quia  intel- 
lectus supra  seipsum  reflectitur,  secundum  eandem  reflexionem 
intelligit  et  suum  intelligere  et  speciem,  qua  intelligit ;  et  sic 
species  intellecta  est  secundario  id  quod  intelligitur ;  sed  id, 
quod  intelligitur  primo,  est  res,  cujus  species  intelligibilis  est 
similitudo.  (i,  q.  85,  a.  2.) 

Readings. — The  most  complete  treatment  of  the  whole  subject 
is  to  be  found  in  Peillaube's  Tlicoric  des  Concepts,  Existence,  Origine, 
Valenr.  Fiat's  L' Intellect  Actif  and  L'ldee  contain  valuable  matter; 
the  latter  work  largely  repeats  the  former.  Mercier's  Psychologie, 
pp.  300 — 350,  is  good.  Cf.  Liberatore  On  Univcrsah  (Trans.),  Op.  II., 
and  Psychologia,  c.  iv.  art.  6,  and  Boedder,  PsycJiologia,  c.  iii. 


CHAPTER   XV. 

JUDGMENT   AND    REASONING. 

Under  the  term  thinking,  besides  the  formation  of 
concepts,  there  are  included  the  operations  of  judg- 
?nent  and  reasoning  or  inference.  The&e  several  pro- 
cesses are,  however,  merely  different  exercises  of  the 
.same  faculty,  the  intellect.  As  we  have  already  in 
chapter  xiii.  dwelt  on  some  of  the  most  important 
aspects  of  judgment,  we  shall  handle  this  subject 
briefly  here.  We  shall  also  in  the  present  chapter 
examine  the  special  features  of  the  form  of  judicial 
activity  exhibited  in  belief  and  conscience. 

Definition  of  Judgment. — A  judgment  is  that 
mental  act  which  is  signified  in  an  oral  proposition, 
such  as,  "Gold  is  heavy."  It  has  been  defined  as  the 
mental  act  by  which  ive  perceive  the  agreement  or  disagreement 
hetiueen  two  ideas,  and  also  as  the  mental  act  by  iz'hich  some- 
thing is  asserted  or  denied,  St.  Thomas  himself  defines  it 
as  an  act  of  intellect  whereby  the  mind  combines  or  separates 
two  terms  by  affirmation  or  denial.  If  the  first  definition 
is  employed,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the  word 
"  idea"  here  means,  not  the  state  of  consciousness,  but 
the  objective  concept  [conceptus  objectiviis),  the  attribute  in 
the  external  thing  corresponding  to  the  subjective  idea. 
Locke  and  some  other  modern  writers  have  taught  that 
the  formal  object  of  the  judgment  is  the  agreement  or 
disagreement,  the  congruence  or  conflict  of  two  sub- 
jective notions.     This  is  an  error  based  on  a  false  view 


JUDGMENT   AND   REASONING.  315 


of  the  nature  of  cop^nitive  consciousness.      The  most 
essential  feature  of  all  knowledge,  except  of  course  that 
which   is   reached    by    introspection,    is    its    objective 
import.      But  in   man   the  judicial   act  is  the  type  of 
perfect  knowledge,  and  accordingly  carries  in  its  con- 
stitution in  an  especial  manner  this  reference  to  external 
fact.     In  the  assertions,  "Water  rusts  iron,"   "Some 
sausages  are  not  wholesome,"  "  Trilateral  figures  are 
triangular,"  very  little  reflexion  reveals  to  us  that  we 
do  not  merely  allege  a  relation  between  the  two  con- 
ceptions juxtaposed  in  the  mind.     We  mean  to  affirm 
that  something  does  or  does  not  hold  without  the  mind, 
in  rerujH  natura.'^  Furthermore  in  asserting  that  something 
holds  objectively,  w^e  implicitly  affirm  that  our  subjective 
mental  act  truly  mirrors  this  external  situation.     It  is 
in  this  concomitant  affirmation  of  conformity  between 
the  judicial  act  and  its  objective  correlate  that  formal 
truth  or  falsity  lies.   For  this  reason  truth  and  falsehood 
in  the  strict  sense  belong  only  to  judgments  and  not  to 
mere  conceptions. 

Analysis  of  the  Judicial  Process.— In  the  formal  act  of 
judgment  we  can  distinguish  several  elements  or  stages, 
though  it  would  not  be  possible  to  separate  all  of  them :  (i)  The 
apprehension  of  the  thing  or  object  about  which  the  judgment 
is  made;  (2)  the  separation  or  separate  grasp  of  the  two 
terms — the  two  aspects  or  phases  of  the  thing  which  are  to 
be  compared;  (3)  their  juxtaposition;  (4)  the  perception  of 
the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  juxtaposed  concepts ; 
and  (5)  the  concomitant  awareness  that  the  mental  juxta- 
position of  ideas  corresponds  to  the  objective  reality.  It  is 
true  that  in  easy  spontaneous  judgments  some  of  these 
elements  are  so  rapidly  slurred  over  as  to  be  scarcely  dis- 
coverable. But  if  the  reader  reflects  upon  a  judgment 
deliberately  given  in  answer  to  such  a  question  as  :  Is  the 
prisoner  guilty  ?  he  will  be  able  easily  to  distinguish  these 
several  elements.     Or,  let  us  suppose  the  judgment  to  refer 

1  This  doctrine,  which  is  the  common  teaching  of  St.  Thomas 
and  the  leading  scholastics,  has  been  re-discovered  by  modern 
logicians  during  the  last  forty  years.  Mill  devoted  considerable 
pains  to  establish  it  against  Hamilton  and  the  conceptualist 
logicians.  (Cf.  Logic,  Bk.  I.  c.  v.  and  Exam.  c.  win.)  The  student 
will  find  this  subject  treated  in  the  volume  on  Logic  of  the  present 
series,  Pt,  II.  c  iii-,  and  in  the  volume  on  First  Principles,  c.  ii. 


3i6  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


to  some  concrete  fact  or  event,  as,  for  instance,  the  snow- 
covered  ground,  or  a  moving  train.  I  first  perceive  the 
object  as  a  unity  or  totality.  The  primitive  act  of  appre- 
hension is  indistinct.  I  am  only  imphcitly  conscious  of  the 
predicate ;  that  is,  I  do  not  as  yet  formally  distinguish  it  from 
the  other  attributes  which  constitute  the  object.  I  then  by 
a  selective  act  of  attention  analyze  the  object.  I  mentally 
separate  one  attribute  from  the  rest.  I  abstract  or  lay  hold, 
as  it  were,  of  the  colour  or  motion  by  one  concept,  and  the 
earth  or  the  train  by  another.  I  next  combine  them  by  an 
act  of  synthesis ;  that  is,  I  consider  them  separately  as  dis- 
tinguished from  each  other  yet  in  connexion  with  each  other. 
In  doing  so  I  perceive  the  relation  of  agreement  between 
them.  I  realize  that  the  predicate  is  a  closer  determination 
of  the  conception  representing  the  subject,  and  that  the 
attribute,  quality,  or  aspect  of  the  thing  for  which  it  stands  is 
really  part  of  the  thing  apprehended  under  another  form  as 
subject.  In  this  act  I  am  aware  that  my  mental  synthesis 
of  subject  and  predicate  reflects  the  real  union  of  the  object 
with  the  attribute.  It  is  in  this  last  act  that  assent  is  per- 
fected. This  feature  is  more  clearly  discerned  in  formal 
comparison  of  universal  notions,  as  e.f^.,  A  square  is  a  rect- 
angular figure,  or,  The  diamond  is  hard,  than  in  judgments 
immediately  occasioned  by  external  perception.  In  the 
latter,  the  element  of  simple  apprehension  is  more  prominent, 
consequently  the  mental  attitude  is  more  objective,  and  the 
concomitant  implicit  consciousness  of  the  mind's  own  action 
is  fainter  though  still  really  there.  (See  p.  52.)  This  last 
element  of  the  judicial  process  is  particularly  emphasized  in 
Ueberweg's  definition  of  judgment  as,  "the  consciousness  of 
the  objective  validity  of  a  subjective  union  of  conceptions 
whose  forms  are  different  but  belong  to  each  other."  ^ 

Judgment  thus  involves  both  analysis  and  synthesis — the 

2  Logic,  §  67.  Similarly  Bradley,  Principles  of  Logic,  cc.  i.  ii. 
Cf  St.  Thomas:  "Per  confirmitatem  intellectus  et  rei  veritas 
definitur.  Unde  conformitatem  istani  cognoscere  est  cognoscere 
veritatem.  Hanc  autem  nullo  mode  sensus  cognoscit.  Licet  enim 
visus  habeat  similitudinem  visibilis,  non  taraen  cognoscit  compara- 
tionem,  quas  est  inter  rem  visam,  et  id  quod  ipse  apprehendit  de  ea. 
Intellectus  autem  conformitatem  sui  ad  rem  intelligibilcm  cognoscere 
potest  :  sed  tamen  non  apprehendit  earn,  secundum  quod  cognoscit 
de  aliquo  quod  quid  est.  Sed  quando  judicat,  rem  ita  se  habere, 
sicut  est  forma,  quam  de  re  apprehendit,  tunc  primo  cognoscit  et 
:licit  verum.  Ethoc  facit  compoiioido,  et  dividendo.  .  .  .  Ideo  propric 
loquendo  Veritas  est  in  intellectu  componente,  et  dividente  non 
lutem  in  sensu,  nee  in  intellectu  cognoscente  (juod  (juid  est  {i.e.,  m 
actu  simplicis  apprehensionis)."  [Suju.  i.  q.  10,  a.  2.) 


JUDGMENT  AND   REASONING.  V7 


breaking  up  of  the  original  presentation  and  the  TCiiniting  of 
its    parts,   which    are    now   exphcitly   cognized    as    distinct 
constituents  of  the  total  object.     Herein  hes  the  efficacy  of 
the  judicial  activity  of  the  mind  in  developing  our  knowledge. 
The  highest  function  of  intelligence  is  not  judging  or  reason- 
ing, but  intuition.     It  is  because  of  the  obscurity  and  inade- 
quacy   of    the    intuitions    of    the    human    mind    that    our 
conceptions    have    to    be    perfected    by  this    analytic    and 
synthetic  activity — dividendo  et  componendo,  as  the  schoolmen 
taught.     Could  we  obtain  a  comprehensive  conception  of  the 
nature  of  the  triangle  or  of  carbon,  by  simple  apprehension, 
the  laborious  comparisons  and  reasonings  of  the  geometrician 
and  the  chemist  would  be  unnecessary.^    The  starting-point 
of  the  judgment  is  a  percept  or  a  notion  apprehended  in  an 
indistinct   or   undeveloped   form.      The   result   is   the   same 
percept   or   notion,   but   possessed   in   a   more   distinct   and 
perfect  manner.  A  proposition  containiu;^  a  complex  predicate 
as,  for  instance  :    The  orange  is  a  yelloic,  spherical,  sweet,  juicy 
fruit,  really  expresses  the  result  of  many  judgments.      All 
our  conceptions,  both  scientific   and  vulgar,  are,  as  we  have 
already  seen  (pp.  297 — 302),  elaborated  by  successive  acts  of 
discrimination  and  assimilation  in  this  way.      Judgnient  is 
not  merely  automatic  fusion  or  association  of  ideas,  still  less 
of  concrete  impressions.      It  involves  active  abstraction.      In 
all  propositions  the  predicate  is  a  universal  term,  and  even  in 
singular  judgments  the  subject  is  considered  under  an  abstract 
aspect.     The  mind  holds  the  two  concepts  together  hut  apart; 
it  unites  them  whilst  keeping  them  distinct.     It  retains  hold  of 
both  throughout  the  entire  operation.     The  force  of  attention 
to  the  two  compared  ideas  is  constantly  varying,  the  subject 
being  vividly  realized  at  one  moment,  the  attribute  or  quality 
at  the  next.     But  neither  can  completely  fade  out  of  con- 
sciousness  during  the   process;    otherwise,  the  judicial  act 
would  be  impossible.     The  faculty  of  Retention  is  as  essential 
a  condition  of  judgment  as  that  of  Assimilation  and  Discrimi- 
nation.     Herein  lies  evidence  of  the  indivisible  unity  of  the 
mind  as  a  real  persisting  being.     Two  successive  impressions 
or  "sections"  of  a  "stream  of  consciousness"  cannot  compare 
themselves  with  each  other.     Nor  could  a  third  born  after 
the  death  of  both  do  so,  unless  it  be  the  act  of  a  real  abiding 

3  "  Si  intellectus  noster  statim  in  ipso  principio  videret  con- 
clusionis  veritatem,  nunquam  intelligeret  discurrendo,  vel  ratio- 
cinando.  Similiter  si  intellectus  statim  in  apprehensione  quidditatis 
subjecti  haberet  notitiam  de  omnibus,  quae  possunt  attribui  subjecto, 
vel  removeri  ab  eo,  nunquam  intelligeret  componendo  et  dividendo 
sed  solum  intelligendo  quod  quid  est."  [Sum.  i.  q.  88,  4.) 


3i8  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


agent  which  was  the  subject  of  its  two  predecessors,  and  is 
capable  of  resuscitating  them. 

Affirmation  and  denial. — It  has  been  maintained 
by  some  writers  that  the  act  of  judgment  is  something 
really  distinct  from  and  superadded  to  the  perception 
of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  subject  and 
predicate.  When  the  reasons  for  assent  are  not  strictly 
cogent,  a  voluntar}^  element  undoubtedly  enters  into 
affirmation  or  denial.  But  in  those  judgments  in 
which  the  truth  is  evident,  the  assent,  it  seems  to  us, 
is  necessaril}^  included  in  the  perception  of  the  relation 
between  subject  and  predicate.  The  mental  act  by 
which  I  apprehend  that  2  +  i  =3,  or,  that  "  snow  is  not 
warm,"  involves  the  mental  assertion  of  the  truth,  and 
this  is  the  judgment. 

Assent  and  consent. — A  far  graver  error,  however,  is  that  of 
Descartes  and  his  followers,  who  confounding  assent  with 
consent  teach  that  "affirmation,  denial,  and  doubt  are  different 
forms  of  volition."*  It  must  be  admitted  that  will  and 
intellect  act  and  react  upon  each  other  in  the  most  intimate 
manner.  Whilst  the  will  is  moved  to  desire  through  the 
apprehension  of  motives  by  the  intellect,  the  intellect  is  itself 
moved  to  observation  and  study  by  the  effort  of  the  will. 
In  many  acts  of  judgment  it  is  the  faculty  of  vohtion  which 
directs  and  concentrates  attention  upon  the  attribute  or 
relation  that  is  the  matter  of  the  judicial  act.  If  the  truth  be 
evident,  the  will  is  powerless ;  but  if  it  be  not  evident,  the 
will  may  largely  influence  assent,  either  by  withdrawing 
attention  from  the  considerations  in  favour  of  one  side  and 
focussing  it  upon  those  which  tell  for  the  other,  or  by  directly 
impelling  the  mind  to  assent  and  embrace  an  opinion  whilst 
the  evidence  is  felt  to  be  insufficient.  It  is  in  this  way  that 
the  will  is  so  often  the  cause  of  error.^ 

•*  "  Cupere,  aversari,  affirmare,  negate,  dubitare  sunt  diversi 
modi  volendi."  {Princip.  I.  §  32.) 

*'  St.  Thomas  succinctly  defines  the  influence  of  volition  upon 
intelligence  thus:  "Actus  rationis  potest  considerari  dupliciter : 
Uno  mode,  quantum  ad  exercitiiim  actus;  et  sic  actus  rationis 
semper  inipeyari  potest ;  sicut  cum  indicitur  alicui,  quod  attendat,et 
ratione  uiatur.  Alio  modo  quantum  ad  ohjectum ;  respectu  cujus 
duo  actus  rationis  attenduntur.  Prima  quidem,  ut  veritatem  circa 
aliquid  apprehendat :  ct  hoc  non  est  in  potestate  nostra  ;  hoc  enim 
contingit  per  virtutem  alicujus  luminis  vel  naturalis,  vel  super- 
naturalis,    ct   ideo  quantum   ad   hoc    actus   rationis    non    est   ni 


JUDGMENT  AND   REASONING.  319 

Further,  there  is  a  certain  affinity  in  character  betwc-tn 
the  act  of  judgment  and  vokmtary  election.  The  assent 
inchided  in  the  former  causes  the  cessation  of  intellectual 
activity  in  the  adhesion  of  the  understanding  to  the  truth 
possessed,  somewhat  as  a  voluntary  choice  results  in  the 
quiescence  of  the  appetitive  faculty  in  the  fruition  of  its 
appropriate  object.  The  sense  of  liberation  from  the  dis- 
agreeable suspense  of  doubt  by  complete  assent  is  thus  often 
akin  to  the  relief  from  the  hesitancy  which  precedes  the 
formal  act  of  consent.  Nevertheless,  judicial  activity  is  the 
immediate  function  of  the  Intellect,  not  of  the  Will.  The  act 
of  judgment  though  often,  in  scholastic  language,  imperatus 
a  voluntate, — commanded  by  the  will, — is  always  elicitus  ab 
intellectu,  exerted  by  the  intellect.  Assent  differs  essentially 
from  consent.  The  former  is  intellectual  acquiescence  in 
something  as  true :  the  latter  is  voluntary  complacency  in 
something  as  good.  The  cognitive  faculty  accepts  or  submits 
to  what  is  imposed  upon  it :  the  appetitive  faculty  stretches 
after  and  embraces  what  is  suggested  to  it.  The  end  and 
purpose  of  the  former  is  the  expression  or  representation  of 
some  kind  oi  being ;  that  of  the  latter,  the  attainment,  or  enjoy- 
ment of  some  form  of  action.  We  may  be  compelled  to  assent, 
but  consent  is  always  voluntary.  Truths  and  facts  that  are 
disagreeable  may  be  evident ;  whilst  projects  which  win  our 
approval  may  have  but  a  doubtful  chance  of  success.  When, 
however,  we  pass  from  the  speculative  to  the  practical  or 
moral  order,  assent  of  the  intellect  to  the  rightness  of  action 
imposes  special  moral  obligation  on  the  will,  whilst  our 
judgments  assume  a  distinctly  moral  character.  The  judg- 
ment that  a  certain  line  of  conduct  is  obhgatory  commands 
and  moves  us  to  embrace  it  with  our  will  and  carry  it  out 
in  action.*" 

potestate  nostra,  nee  imperari  potest.  Aliiis  autem  actus  rationis 
est,  quum  his,  quae  apprehendit,  assentit.  Si  igitur  fuerint  talia 
apprehensa,  quibus  natiiraliter  intellectus  assentiat,  sicut  prima 
principia,  assensus  talium,  vel  dissensus  non  est  in  potestate  tiostra.  .  . 
Sunt  autem  quaedam  apprehensa,  quae  non  adeo  convincunt  intel- 
lectum  quin  possit  assentire,  vel  dissentire,  vel  saltem  assensum  vel 
dissensum  suspendere  propter  aliquam  causam  :  et  in  talibus  assensus 
ipse  vel  dissensus  in  potestate  nostra  est,  et  sub  imperio  cadit.  ' 
{Sum.  1-2.  q.  17,  6  ) 

*^  Olle  Laprune,  in  his  valuable  work,  De  la  Certitude  Moyalc, 
thus  writes:  "Assentiment,  en  soi,  n'est  pas  cunscntcmcnt.  On  nu 
declare  point  une  chose  vraie  parce  qu'on  le  veut :  I'acte  de  volonte 
n'cst  pas  dans  la  decision  meme  par  laquelle  on  prononce  sur  la 
vrai  et  le  faux.  Hors  le  cas  ou  une  ccrtaine  obscurite  fait  naitre 
des  difficultes  que  la  volonte  doit  surmonter,  la  decision  ii'cct  pas, 


320  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Reasoning  defined. — Besides  conception  and 
judgment  there  remains  a  third  function  of  the 
intellect,  that  of  reasoning  or  inference.  It  may 
be  defined  as,  that  operation  by  ivhich  ivc  derive  a 
new  judgment  from  some  oilier  judgment  or  judgments 
previously  known.  When  we  pass  from  a  single 
judgment  to  another  involved  or  contained  in  it, 
the  act  is  styled  an  immediate  inference.  Thus, 
from  the  proposition,  "All  men  are  mortal,"  we 
immediately  conclude,  "  Some  mortal  things  are 
men."  When  we  proceed  from  two  or  more  judg- 
ments, to  a  new  judgment  following  from  their 
combined  force,  we  have  mediate  inference.  Mediate 
inference  is  also  defined  as,  that  mental  act  by  which 
from  the  comparison  of  two  ideas  ivith  a  third  we 
ascertain  their  agreement  or  difference. 

Analysis  of  Ratiocination. — Reasoning,  being  an 
exercise  of  judgment,  is  a  more  complex  process  of 
analysis  and  synthesis,  divisionis  et  compositionis.  From 
the  proposition  S  is  P  I  infer :  Not-P  is  not  S,  and :  At 
least  some-P  is  S,  by  deliberate  consideration  of  what  is 
contained  in  the  concepts  S  and  P.  This  is  still  more 
obvious  in  mediate  inference,  or  reasoning  strictly  so- 
called,  in  which  the  synthetic  activity  of  the  mind  is 
more  prominent.     Here  the  problem   is  to  determine 

en  soi  un  acte  libre.  C'est  la  lumiere  qui  determine  I'assentiment: 
on  affirme  ou  Ton  nie  legitimement  parce  qu'on  voit  qu'il  faut 
affirmer  ou  nier,  et  Ton  n'est  pas  libre  de  le  voir  ou  non.  On  est 
seulement  libre  de  regarder,  ce  qui  est  autre  chose.  .  .  .  Vassentiment 
est  involontaire,  mais  le  consentement  qui  s'y  ajoute,  ou  plutot  qui  y 
est  implique,  est  volontaire.  Le  consentement,  c'est  ceite  accep- 
tation de  la  verite,  dont  nous  parlions  tout  a  'heure ;  ce  n'est  point 
I'acte  meme  d'assurer  ou  de  nier,  lequel  est  dicte  pour  ainsi  dire 
par  la  verite,  mais  c'est  la  rtponse  de  I'ame  a  cette  voix  superieure." 
(p.  64.)  For  some  admirable  remarks  on  the  right  relation  of  Will 
to  Intellect  in  Philosophy,  see  also  Mr.  Wilfrid  Ward's  excellent 
little  work,  The  Wish  to  Believe. 


yVDGMENT  AND   T^EASONING.  32. 


some  relation  between  S  and  P  whilst  we  are  unable 
to  compare  them  immediately.  We  shall  attain  our 
purpose  if  we  can  find  a  suitable  middle-term — a  medi- 
ating notion — which  will  serve  to  connect  them,  some- 
what as  a  common-measure.  The  type  of  the  argument 
is:  S  is  M,  but  M  is  P,  therefore  S  is  P.  Analysis  of 
S  has  revealed  M,  whilst  further  analysis  of  M  and 
comparison  of  it  with  P  has  disclosed  a  relation  of 
identity  between  these  also.  We  now  hold  that  S  is  P 
because  it  is  M,  which  is  identical  with  P.  The  identity 
of  P  wdth  M  is  the  logical  ground  or  reason  why  we  affirm 
P  of  S.  Reasoning,  then,  in  addition  to  analysis  and 
synthesis  involved  in  all  judgments,  includes  identifica- 
tion, or  the  explicit  perception  of  an  element  implicit  in 
the  previously  known  relations.  The  synthesis  in  the 
conclusion  is  the  formal  evoking  of  this  implicit  relation 
into  consciousness.  This  perception  of  the  conse- 
quence or  logical  nexus  expressed  by  the  words  there- 
fore, since,  because,  etc.,  is  the  essence  of  reasoning,  and 
is  possible  only  to  a  rational  being. 

Logicians  have  disputed  as  to  which  of  the  laws  of 
thought  is  to  be  deemed  the  most  fundamental  and 
universal  principle  of  reasoning.  To  us  it  seems  that 
different  axioms  are  more  immediately  applicable  for 
the  justification  of  different  forms  of  inference,  whilst 
the  denial  of  any  one  of  the  laws  of  thought  would  lead 
immediately  to  the  destruction  of  all  reasoning.  Still, 
the  principle  of  identity,  which  on  its  negative  side 
involves  the  principle  of  contradiction,  has  strong  claims 
to  be  deemed  the  most  universal  and  ultimate  law  of 
rational  thinking.  That  A  is  A,  that  A  thing  is  identical 
with  itself,  that  Whatever  is,  is,  must  be  held  to  be  the 
supreme  canon  of  consistency.  Our  terms  must  retain 
the  same  meaning,  our  concepts  must  remain  unchanged, 
the  data  which  we  handle  must  persist  unaltered 
throughout  our  discourse,  or  no  conclusion  can  be 
drawn.  S  is  inferred  to  be  P  only  because,  whilst  both 
S  and  P  continue  identical  with  themselves,  they  are 
also  identical  with  the  same  M. 

Deduction  and  Induction.— If  the  movement  of 
the  mind  is  from  a  wider  to  a  narrower  truth,  from  a 


322  k  AT  ION  A  L  LIFE. 


law  to  particular  facts,  or  to  a  narrower  law,  the  mental 
operation  is  called  deductive  reasoning  ;  if  the  reverse,  it 
is  characterized  as  inductive.  Thus,  in  the  syllogism : 
All  bodies  containing  carbon  are  combustible ;  but  diamonds 
contain  carbon  ;  therefore  diamonds  are  combustible^  we  argue 
deductively.  On  the  contrary,  if  from  perceiving  that 
iron,  gold,  silver,  lead,  and  copper  sink  in  water,  I 
conclude  that  all  metals  sink  in  water,  I  am  said  to 
argue  inductively,  and  in  the  given  case  falsely.  From 
the  present  psychological  point  of  view,  however,  the 
distinction  is  unimportant.  The  reasoning  in  every 
case  is  the  establishing  of  a  relation  between  two 
notions  by  the  mediation  of  a  third  notion.  The  hitting 
upon  this  middle-term  is  the  ever-recurring  problem  of 
scientific  discover}^  as  its  accurate  determination  and 
definition  is  the  essence  of  scientific  proof.  To  isolate 
the  attribute  M,  which  constitutes  the  reason,  ground, 
or  cause  of  P,  and  is  implicit  in  the  complex  concrete 
S,  is  the  work  of  the  insight  of  the  Man  of  Genius. 
And  the  human  race  has  to  wait  for  a  Newton  to  detect 
amid  the  infinite  complexity  of  two  such  diverse 
phenomena  as  the  falling  apple  and  the  circumvolving 
moon  the  hitherto  invisible  M — the  force  of  gravitation. 
Implicit  reasoning". — Were  it  not  for  the  danger  of 
rousing  the  ire  of  the  logician,  the  psychologist  might 
define  the  syllogism  as  that  particular  form  of  reasoning 
which  mankind  do  not  use.  In  ordinar}^  literature,  in 
conversation,  or  in  his  natural  processes  of  thinking, 
man  never  formulates  an  inference  in  the  shape  of 
major,  minor,  and  conclusion.  The  most  common  form 
of  argument  is  the  enthymcme,  in  which  either  the  con- 
clusion or  one  of  the  premises  is  suppressed.  Very 
often  the  conclusion  comes  first,  and  one  of  the  premises 
is  merely  invoked  to  justify  it ;  whilst  not  infrequently 
the  inference  emerges  into  consciousness  with  so  tran- 
sient and  so  indistinct  an  apprehension  of  the  reasons 
upon  which  it  rests,  that  it  seems  doubtful  whether  they 
have  ever  been  reall}'  perceived.  Indeed,  it  is  often 
impossible  to  draw  an}^  but  an  arbitrar}'  distinction 
between  simple  external  perception,  judgment,  and 
reasoning.      Thus,    whilst     walking     on     Wimbledon 


JUDGMENT  AND   REASONING.  323 

Common,  I  observe  an  object  amongst  some  furze  at  a 
little  distance.  After  a  few  seconds  of  attentive 
observation,  I  mentally  pronounce  the  object  to  be  a 
deer  most  pvohably  escaped  from  the  neighbouring  park.  The 
judgment  that  the  object  is  a  deer,  I  call  a  perception; 
the  opinion  that  it  has  escaped  from  the  park,  I  call  an 
inference.  Yet  the  former  act  of  assent,  like  the  latter, 
is  due  to  a  process  of  reasoning  from  past  recollections 
and  present  apprehension  of  shape,  colour,  movement, 
limbs,  antlers,  etc.,  performed  sub-consciously  with  such 
rapidity  that  I  arrive  at  the  conclusion  without  being 
aware  of  the  steps  by  which  it  has  been  reached. 
Many  of  these  data  will,  however,  be  at  once  consciously 
realized  if  the  decision  is  challenged. 

Inferences  concerning  the  concrete  facts  of  life  are 
nearly  all  of  this  kind,  and  the  conclusions  which  we 
form  from  moment  to  moment  are  generally  the  result 
of  a  mass  of  reminiscences,  perceptions,  feelings, 
opinions,  facts,  and  experiences  of  every  sort,  mingled 
together  with  a  complexity  that  defies  analysis,  or  at 
all  events  renders  adequate  exposition  in  logical  form 

I  impossible.  The  diagnosis  of  a  malady  by  the  doctor, 
the  decision  of  the  authorship  of  a  painting  by  an  art 
critic,  the  prevision  of  the  market  by  the  man  of 
business,  the  divination  of  the  coming  storm  by  the 

I"  sailor,  and  our  own  appreciations  of  the  characters  of 
our  intimate  friends,  whether  we  call  such  judgments 
-  acts  of  intuition,  tact,  or  perceptions  of  common-sense, 
are  all  in  their  origin  based  on  acts  of  observation  and 
ratiocination  which  have  become  so  easy  and  rapid  that 
at  last  the  intermediate  links  and  reasons  cannot  be 
discovered  without  considerable  effort.  The  strength 
h  of  the  great  majority  of  our  beliefs  on  familiar  subjects 
so  far  outweighs  the  grounds  which  we  can  assign  for 
them,  that  when  we  attempt  to  formulate  an  argument 
m  abstract  logical  shape,  they  seem  to  be  unfounded 
prejudices.  My  conviction,  for  instance,  that  my  father 
would  not  calumniate  me,  that  England  is  an  island, 
that  the  ^neid  was  not  written  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
could  receive  no  adequate  justification  if  I  had  to 
express  the  grounds  for  it  in  syllogistic  form.     Yet  my 


324  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


assent    may    be    perfectly    rational,   and    in    no    way 
exceeding  the  evidence. 

The  Logic  of  real  life. — Newman's  Grammar. — It  is  in 
the  rare  skill  with  which  he  expounded,  and  the  clearness 
and  felicitous  richness  with  which  he  illustrated  this  wide 
field  of  our  actual  rational  life,  that  Newman's  great  contri- 
bution to  Logic  and  Psychology  lies — a  work  the  value 
and  wide-reaching  influence  of  which  have  been  but  very 
inadequately  recognized  by  English  psychologists  and 
logicians.  The  multifarious  and  complex  character  of  the 
evidence  which  underlies  our  religious  and  moral  convictions 
in  particular,  is  shown  by  the  superior  force  of  the  cumulative 
method  of  arguing  over  formal  syllogistic  proof  in  these 
departments,  especially  when  it  is  used  to  stimulate  our  own 
implicit  reasonings.  This  is  well  exemplified  by  Newman  in  a 
passage  cited  from  Pascal:  "' Consider  the  establishment  of 
the  Christian  religion,'  says  the  French  philosopher.  '  Here 
is  a  religion  contrary  to  our  nature,  which  establishes  itself  in 
men's  minds  with  so  much  mildness,  as  to  use  no  external 
force ;  with  so  much  energy,  that  no  tortures  could  silence  its 
martyrs  and  confessors ;  and  consider  the  holiness,  devotion, 
huniiUty  of  its  true  disciples ;  its  sacred  books,  their  super- 
human grandeur,  their  admirable  simplicity.  Consider  the 
character  of  its  Founder ;  His  associates  and  disciples, 
unlettered  men,  yet  possessed  of  wisdom  sufficient  to  con- 
found the  ablest  philosopher ;  the  astonishing  succession  of 
prophets  who  heralded  Him ;  the  state  at  this  day  of  the 
Jewish  people  who  rejected  Him  and  His  Religion ;  its  per- 
petuity and  its  holiness,  the  light  which  its  doctrines  shed 
upon  the  contrarieties  of  our  nature; — after  considering  these 
things,  let  any  man  judge  if  it  be  possible  to  doubt  about  its 
being  the  only  true  one.'  This  is  an  argument  parallel  in  its 
character  to  that  by  which  we  ascribe  the  classics  to  the 
Augustan  age.  .  .  .  Many  have  been  converted  and  sustained 
in  their  faith  by  this  argument,  which  admits  of  being  power- 
fully stated;  but  still  such  a  statement  is  after  all  only 
intended  to  be  a  vehicle  of  thought,  and  to  open  the  mind  to 
the  apprehension  of  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  to  trace  them  by 
their  implications  in  outline,  not  to  convince  by  the  logic  of  its 
mere  wording.  Do  we  not  think  and  muse  as  we  read  it,  try 
to  master  it  as  we  proceed,  put  down  the  book  in  which  we 
find  it,  fill  out  its  details  from  our  own  resources,  and  then 
resume  the  study  of  it."" 

The  great  mass  of  our  practical,  moral,  social  and  political 
as  well  as  scientific  faiths  have  their  sources  in  informal  and 

''  Grammar  of  Assent,  pp.  306 — 308, 


JUDGMENT  AND   REASONING.  325 


implicit  inferences  of  this  kind  ;  and  it  is  by  working  through 
such  channels  rather  than  by  formal  arguments,  that  perma- 
nent real  assents  are  obtained.  By  controversy  a  man  is 
rarely  persuaded  of  anything  except  of  the  truth  of  his  own 
view.  Philosophical  positions  rushed  by  a  logical  assault  are 
not  permanently  retained.  Intellectual  assent  extorted  at  the 
point  of  the  syllogism  soon  rebels.  It  is  by  the  gradual 
process  of  sapping  and  mining  that  convictions  are  subverted 
and  conversions  effected.  It  is  by  famine  that  beliefs  are 
starved  and  atrophied.  And  such  is  the  infirmity  of  the 
human  mind,  that  unless  it  be  frequently  reinforced,  it  will 
be  compelled  by  the  slow  but  constant  pressure  of  the  siege 
all  around  to  capitulate  and  surrender  its  most  cherished, 
perhaps  even  its  best  warranted  faiths. 

Thought  differently  viewed  by  Psychology  and  Logic. — 
Although  the  diverse  standpoints  of  the  Logician  and  the 
Psychologist  with  respect  to  mental  phenomena  in  general 
have  been  already  indicated  (pp.  7,  8)  their  different  ways  of 
regarding  thought  in  particular  seem  worthy  of  notice  here. 
Whereas  thinking  constitutes  in  the  language  of  the  Schoolmen, 
a  common  "material  object"'  for  both,  the  "  formal  object," 
that  is,  the  special  aspect  under  which  they  consider  this 
phenomenon  is  essentially  different  in  the  case  of  each.  The 
aim  of  Logic  is  primarily  practical — to  secure  truth  in  our 
judgments  and  reasonings:  that  of  Empirical  Psychology  is 
speculative — to  study  and  describe  these  operations  as  mental 
facts  interesting  in  themselves,  apart  from  their  veracity  or 
falsehood.  To  attain  its  end  Logic  seeks  to  determine  the 
various  ideal  forms  or  types  of  valid  inference.  For  this 
purpose,  by  an  act  of  abstraction  it  considers  concepts, 
judgments,  and  reasonings,  //;  facto  esse,  as  the  scholastics 
said,  that  is,  as  finished  products — portions  of  thought 
crytallized  into  solid  pieces.  It  classifies  concepts  according 
to  their  meaning,  content,  and  extent.  It  examines  the  several 
possible  forms  of  judgments,  their  import,  quantity  and 
(juaHty,  in  order  to  define  their  mutual  implications.  It 
studies  their  various  legitimate  combinations  in  which  con- 
sistency of  thought  is  maintained,  and  it  then  forinulates 
precepts — rules  of  the  syllogism  and  canons  of  induction — by 
which  fallacies  may  be  avoided  and  correctness  in  judging 
and  reasoning  preserved. 

Empirical  Pyschology,  on  the  other  hand,  is  directly  con- 
cerned only  with  the  actual  behaviour  of  the  intellect.  Its 
desire  is  to  ascertain  how  men  do  reason  ;  not  how  they  ought 
to  reason.  It  considers  our  conceptual,  judicial,  and  ratio- 
cinative  acts  not  as  solidified  abstractions,  but  as  they  really 
do  occur  in  a  fliiid  condition  forming  continuous  portions  of 


326  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


the  current  of  our  mental  life.  It  observes  them  in  fieri — in 
the  making.  It  endeavours  to  analyze  them  in  order  to 
discover  their  genesis  and  their  relations  to  emotions,  desires, 
and  other  conscious  states.  Whilst  Logic  considers  almost 
exclusively  the  objective  meaning  of  our  intellectual  acts 
Psychology  is  specially  interested  in  their  subjective  source  and 
their  inner  nature.  Whilst  the  former  science  limits  itself 
to  the  investigation  of  the  structure — the  Morphology,  as 
Bosanquet  calls  it,  of  mature  explicit  thought,  and  confines 
itself  to  judgments  characterized  by  certainty;  the  latter 
studies  the  growth  and  development  of  thinking  in  all  its  stages, 
whether  implicit  or  explicit,  and  attends  alike  to  all  forms 
and  degrees  of  assent.  Finally,  the  philosophical  or  rational 
Psychologist  is  specially  interested  in  the  functional  activities 
of  the  Intellect  as  affording  valuable  evidence  for  important 
metaphysical  conclusions  as  to  the  inner  nature  of  the  mind. 

Belief. — There  has  been  much  discussion  during 
the  past  two  centuries  as  to  the  nature  of  belief.  In 
general  the  tendency  has  been  to  exaggerate  its  claims 
at  the  expense  of  knowledge,  and  then  by  representing 
it  as  irrational  to  destroy  the  foundations  of  all  certitude. 
Belief  has  been  variously  assigned  to  the  cognitional, 
emotional,  and  volitional  faculties ;  and  its  sphere  has 
been  made  to  comprehend  all  forms  of  assurance,  from 
trust  in  human  or  divine  testimony  to  convictions 
of  the  validity  of  primary  truths.  Amongst  English 
Psychologists  at  the  present  day  it  is  generally  set  in 
simple  contrast  to  Imagination,  as  signifying  assent  to 
objective  reality. 

Historical  Sketch. — With  Hume  who,  here  as  elsewhere, 
saw  more  clearly  and  accepted  more  heroically  than  any  ot 
his  followers  the  conseauences  of  Sensism,  all  assertions, 
except  those  regarding  purely  ideal  truths,  are  expressions 
of  belief.  Although  we  may  be  said  to  knoic  that  "  equals 
added  to  equals  give  equals,"  and  all  propositions  deduced 
from  this,  we  can  only  be  said  to  believe  that  real  material 
objects  exist.  The  principle  of  causality  too,  is  not  a 
cognition,  but  a.  persuasion  or  belief.  Furthermore,  when  belief 
is  analyzed,  it  is  found  according  to  Hume  to  consist  in 
the  '*  superior  force  or  vivacity,  or  solidity,  or  firmness,  or 
steadiness  "  of  those  ideas  which  are  believed  to  be  objec- 
tively valid.  He  sometimes  speaks  in  a  vague  way  of  an 
element  of  "  sentiment  "  forming  the  essence  of  belief,  but  he 
finally  defines  the  latter  act  as  '•  a  lively  idea  related  to  or 


JUDGMENT  AND   REASONING.  327 


associated  with  a  present  impression."  With  my  present 
vision  of  a  distant  tree  there  is  associated  a  "  Hvely  idea  "  of 
tactual  and  other  sensations.  My  beUef  in  the  reahty  of  the 
object  is  merely  the  superior  vivacity  by  whicli  this  "  lively 
idea  "  surpasses  the  creations  of  fancy.  This  explanation  is 
inadequate.  Independently  of  the  fact  that  Hume  charac- 
terizes as  belief  what  should  be  properly  described  as 
knowledge,  the  resolution  of  belief  into  mere  intensity  of 
imagination  is  refuted  by  everyday  experience.  The  scientist 
is  assured  of  the  existence  of  infinitesimal  vibrations  in  an 
unimaginably  elastic  medium  ;  and  we  all,  in  fact,  believe  in 
numberless  objects  of  which  we  can  form  none  or  but  the 
faintest  ideas,  whilst  we  hold  to  be  unreal  many  things  which 
the  imagination  represents  with  the  greatest  distinctness. 

James  Mill  also  calls  cognition  of  external  reality  belief; 
and  in  a  similar  manner  would  reduce  this  mental  act  to  an 
"inseparable"  or  "  indissoluble  association"  between  ideas. 
Belief  in  the  events  of  to-morrow,  in  ghosts  during  darkness, 
in  a  real  external  world,  and  in  my  own  past  experience, 
are  all  merely  instances  of  continuous  association.  A 
present  impression  irresistibly  arouses  another  by  associa- 
tion, and  that  association  constitutes  belief.  Against  this 
view  may  be  urged  two  objections.  First,  the  assenting  act 
of  the  mind,  in  which  the  essence  of  belief  consists,  is 
confused  with  the  causes  of  that  assent.  Though  associations 
may  generate  belief,  they  are  not  thereby  the  belief  itself. 
Secondly,  in  many  cases  where  association  has  begotten  a 
deception,  the  mind  may  discover  its  error  and  disbelieve  in 
the  illusion  although  the  association  remains,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  apparent  fixity  of  the  earth. 

Dr.  Bain  formerly  identified  belief  with  readiness  to  act. 
He  held  that  belief  is  "  in  its  essential  import  related  to 
Activity  and  Will,"  and  that  in  fact  it  is  merely  a  "growth 
or  development  of  will  under  the  pursuit  of  immediate  ends."^ 
Subsequently,  however,  he  abandoned  the  old  view,  and  now 
looks  on  the  phenomenon  as  a  fact  or  "  incident  of  our  intel- 
lectual nature,  though  dependent  as  to  its  force  on  our  active 
and  emotional  tendencies."  '^  The  chief  factors  in  its 
development  are  innate  "spontaneity"  and  "primitive 
credulity."  Dr.  Bain's  attempt  merely  adds  to  the  list  of 
failures,  (i)  Readiness  to  act  may  be  sometimes,  though  it 
is  not  always,  a  test  or  indication  of  belief,  but  it  is  poor  logic 
to  confound  the  sign  with  the  thing  signified,  or  the  effect 

8  Cf.  Mental  Science,  Bk.  IV.  c.  viii.  (ist  Edit.) 
^  Cf.  Note  appended  to  last  edition  of  Mental  Science ;   see  also 
Emotions  and  Will  (3rd  Edit.),  p.  536. 


328  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


with  the  cause.  (2)  Again,  so  far  from  its  being  a  growth  of 
our  active  voHtional  power,  the  essential  feature  of  the  act 
of  beHef  is  in  many  cases  the  passive  or  recipient  attitude 
of  the  mind.  (3)  The  analysis  of  belief  into  "primitive 
credulity "  savours  suspiciously  of  the  vicious  circle.  For 
the  sensist,  who  denies  knowledge  of  aught  except  sensations, 
and  who  must  logically  reduce  the  external  world  to  an 
aggregate  of  mental  states,  the  problem  here  is  to  explain 
the  act  termed  "  belief,"  which  is  involved  in  external  per- 
ception and  memory,  but  absent  from  imagination.  Now, 
to  resolve  belief  into  a  group  of  elements  including  "primitive 
credulity,"  is  to  resolve  it  into  a  tendency  to  believe  too  easily, 
plus  some  other  factors  This  obviously  is  no  real  analysis. 
The  simple  truth  is  tnat  the  acquiescence  of  the  mind  ii: 
its  own  cognitions  cannot  be  resolved  into  any  simpler  act. 

Three  questions  concerning  Belief. — To  secure 
clearness  it  is  needful  to  separate  three  distinct 
questions :  (A)  What  mental  states  are  to  be  comprised 
under  belief?  or,  How  is  it  demarcated  from  knowledge? 
(B)  What  are  in  general  the  mental  causes,  or  conditions 
which  most  influence  belief  ?  (C)  What  are  the  usual 
psychical  effects  and  manifestations  of  belief?  ^^ 

(A)  Nature  of  Belief. — Belief  is  opposed  to  doubt 
rather  than  to  disbelief:  for  frequently  to  disbelieve  a 
statement  means  positive  belief  in  its  contradictor\\ 
If  a  proposition  is  presented  to  us  and  neither  the 
grounds  for  nor  against  it  compel  assent,  there  arises 
a  state  of  intellectual  hesitancy  in  which  the  mind  is 
unable  completely  to  adhere  to  one  side  or  the  other 
from  fear  of  the  opposite  being  true.  This  is  the 
condition  of  positive  doubt — a  mental  attitude  that  is 
generally  disagreeable,  since  the  mind  naturally  seeks 
its  appropriate  good  in  the  assured  possession  of  truth. 
When  the  motives  in  "favour  of  one  alternative  seem 
stronger  tlian  those  on  the  other  side,  the  mind  tends 
in  the  direction  of  the  former,  but  still  with  a  lurking 
fear  that  the  latter  may  be  true.  This  acceptance  of 
a  proposition  based  on  a  probability,  that  is,  on  motives 
not  excluding  all  reasonable  anxiet}'  as  to  the  possi- 
bility of  error,  is  called  an  opinion.     In   opposition   to 

"  Cf.  Professor  Adamson,  "  Belief,"  Encyd.  Brit.  (9th  Edit.) 


JUDGMENT  AND   REASONING.  320 


both  doubt  and  mere  opinion,  the  term  belief  is  used  to 
include  many  forms  of  assent. 

Belief  and  Knowledge.— (i)  In  a  very  wide  and  vague 
sense  of  the  word  belief  is  made  to  embrace  every  form  of 
cognition.  Belief  in  its  own  validity  is  in  fact  an  aspect  or 
essential  feature  of  all  knowledge.  Hamilton  takes  advantage 
of  this  usage  to  found  cognition  upon  belief — but  with  grave 
peril  to  the  certainty  of  all  knowledge.  (2)  The  word  belief 
is  also  used  to  express  the  various  degrees  of  assent,  falling 
somewhat  short  of  full  certainty,  with  which  the  mind  may 
adhere  to  a  proposition  ;  belief  is  here  equivalent  to  a  very 
probable  opinion.  (3)  Again,  from  time  immemorial,  this 
word  has  been  used  to  denote  the  acceptance  of  a  truth  on 
testimony.  (4)  Lastly,  the  term  is  also  employed  by 
psychologists  to  designate  a  large  class  of  convictions  in 
which  our  acquiescence  may  be  so  complete  as  to  exclude 
all  reasonable  doubt,  but  which  yet  in  ordinary  language  are 
frequently  distinguished  from  knowledge.  The  chief  assur- 
ances of  this  class  would  seem  to  be  firm  assents  where  the 
evidence,  though  sufficient  to  afford  certitude,  has  not  been 
analyzed  or  clearly  realized  in  consciousness.  Apart,  therefore, 
from  that  inaccurate  usage  according  to  which  we  are 
described  as  believing  axiomatic  principles  or  that  our  know- 
ledge is  true,  we  find  three  classes  of  judgments  in  which  the 
mental  state  is  called  belief.  We  are  said  to  believe  {a)  that 
a  penny  will  not  turn  up  heads  six  times  running ;  {b)  that 
there  were  two  revolutions  in  England  during  the  seventeenth 
century;  and  also  (c)  such  statements  as  that  trains  will  run, 
that  newspapers  will  be  published,  and  that  bridges  will  bear 
us  up  to-morrow.  Regarding  the  first  and  second  classes, 
there  is  no  difficulty;  probable  opinions  and  trust  in  testimony 
may  be  rightly  described  as  belief  and  easily  distinguished 
from  knowledge.  The  appropriateness  of  applying  the  term 
belief  to  the  third  class  of  assurances — a  class  roughly 
equivalent  to  what  Cardinal  Newman  calls  "  simple  assents  " 
as  opposed  to  "complex  or  reflex  assents" — is  not  so  clear. 
The  principal  objection  to  ranking  these  mental  states  as 
belief  lies  in  the  difficulty  of  determining  how  much  formal 
analysis  or  conscious  realization  of  the  grounds  of  a  conviction 
is  necessary  to  constitute  it  a  cognition.  The  chief  justifi- 
cation for  such  a  course  is  based  on  the  obscure  and 
indistinct  manner  in  which  the  evidence  is  apprehended. 

Under  Knowledge  we  would  include  (i)  all  truths  of  the 
necessary  order  seen  to  be  immediately  or  mediately  evident ; 
(2)  all  truths  of  the  physical  or  contingent  order  revealed  in 
my  own  experience,  whether  as  (c.)  facts  of  internal  conscious- 


33d  RATIONAL  LIFE. 


ness,  (b)  facts  given  in  external  perception,  or  (c)  recollections 
of  memory ;  (3)  all  truths  explicitly  inferred  by  logical 
reasoning  from  such  known  facts.  Thus  I  kuoK>  the  mathe- 
matical axioms  and  all  theorems  which  I  have  deduced  from 
them  by  formal  reasoning.  I  know  that  calumny  is  wrong. 
I  also  know  my  own  feelings.  Further,  matters-of-fact,  objects 
and  events  in  the  external  world  disclosed  to  my  own 
observation,  my  personal  identity,  and  past  experiences 
recollected  by  memory  should  be  included  within  the  sphere 
of  knowledge.  That  I  have  an  extended  body,  that  my  house 
contains  two  storeys,  that  I  am  the  same  being  who  opened 
Mill's  Logic  about  two  minutes  since,  are  all  matters  ol 
cognition.  Lastly,  I  k)ww  all  truths  which  I  have  consciously 
reasoned  out  from  these  more  immediate  cognitions.  What 
is  knowledge  to  one  man  may  therefore  be  belief  to  another. 

Both  compared. — We  do  not  imply  that  such  precision 
as  this  can  be  observed  in  everyday  language.  We  merely 
seek  to  define  a  distinction  vaguely  felt,  and  confusedly 
indicated  in  ordinary  modes  of  expression,  but  which  points  to 
real  and  important  psychological  differences.  If  we  accept 
this  defineation  of  the  fields  of  knowledge  and  belief,  or  even  if 
we  confine  belief  to  the  two  smaller  classes — probable  opinion 
and  trust  in  testimony — we  see  the  motive  for  the  frequent 
description  of  the  one  as  intelligent,  the  other  as  comparatively 
blind,  although  both  acts  pertain  to  the  intellect.  Cognition 
requires  that  the  truth  assented  to  be  mediately  or  immediately 
intrinsically  evident.  Belief,  at  least  in  the  narrower  sense, 
has  for  its  object  the  inevident,  or  what  is  but  extrinsically 
evident.'^  In  the  former  state  there  is  always  full  assent ;  in 
the  latter  acquiescence  may  at  times  be  only  partial.  In  the 
one  case  we  are  completely  determined  by  the  objective 
evidence  or  reality  of  the  fact ;  in  the  other  we  may  be 
largely  governed  by  volition,  emotion,  and  other  subjective 
dispositions  of  the  soul.  It  is  this  element  of  truth  which 
lies  at  the  root  of  Hamilton's  statement :  "  Knowledge  and 
Belief  differ  not  only  in  degree  but  in  kind.  Knowledge  is  a 
certainty  founded  upon  insight ;  belief  is  certainty  founded 
upon  feeling.  The  one  is  perspicuous  and  objective,  the 
other  obscure  and  subjective."  It  is  true  that  knowledge  is 
eminently  rational,  whilst  belief  may  be  largely  instinctive  or 
emotional ;  still,  possibility  of  error  can  at  times  be  as 
securely  excluded  in  states  of  mind  justly  called  beliefs  as  in 

^'  In  scholastic  language  a  truth  is  said  to  be  intrinsically  evident 
when  by  its  own  nature  it  enforces  assent.  It  is  cxttinsicaUv  evident 
if  necessarily  acquiesced  in  by  virtue  of  authority  or  testimony  in 
its  favour.  For  a  treatment  oi  evidence  as  the  criterion  of  certitude, 
cf.  First  Principles  of  Knoivlcdge,  c.  xiii. 


JUDGMENT  AND  REASONING.  33I 

the  clearest  knowledge.  Since,  however,  thq  essential  feature 
in  the  mental  state  of  belief  is  the  admission  by  the  intellect 
of  some  truth  impressed  upon  it,  those  psychologists  misread 
consciousness  who  ascribe  the  act  itself  to  the  voluntary  or 
affective  faculties. 

From  this  demarcation  of  knowledge  and  belief  it  will 
follow  that  truths  transcending  phenomenal  experience, 
such  as  the  existence  and  attributes  of  God,  the  nature 
of  the  soul,  the  reality  of  a  future  life,  and  the  like,  when 
demonstrated  by  strict  logical  reasoning  from  evident  facts 
and  principles,  can  be  kmnvn  as  well  as  believcdP  The  term 
faith  is  more  especially  employed  to  signify  belief  in  supra- 
sensible  things  on  the  authority  of  Divine  Revelation.  Such 
supernatural  belief  requires,  according  to  Catholic  Theology, 
the  co-operation  of  grace,  and  exceeds  in  both  reliableness 
and  dignity  the  avouchments  of  natural  intelligence. 

(B)  The  Causes  of  belief. — The  forces  which 
determine  belief  are  manifold.  Looking  from  the 
outside  at  our  beliefs  as  a  system — the  complexus  of 
views,  opinions,  and  convictions  possessed  by  each  of 
us,  on  moral,  religious,  social,  scientific,  and  political 
matters — we  are  forced  to  admit  that  they  are  very 
largely  the  result  of  our  intellectual  environment  or  what 
Mr.  Balfour  happily  styles  the  "psychological  atmos- 
phere" or  "climate"  in  which  we  live.  If  we  turn  to 
the  particular  acts  of  judgment  exercised  from  day  to 
day  throughout  our  lives,  it  is  clear  that  our  inherited 
character  as  well  as  our  acquired  habits  of  thought 
have  an  important  part  in  determining  assent  wherever 
the  evidence  is  not  conclusive.  Still  it  is  in  the  proxi- 
mate conditions  of  belief  that  the  psychologist  is  most 
interested  ;  and  these  may  be  classed  as  (i)  Intellectual, 
(2)  Emotional,  (3)  Volitional. 

(i)  Intellectual  factor.—  Amon°^st  the  causes  of  belief  must 
obviously  be  included  reasons.  A  reason  may  be  described  as 
any  motive  which  involves  an  essentially  direct  appeal  to 
intelligence.  When  a  particular  consideration  influences  the 
intellect  indirectly  through  feeling  or  will  it  is  so  far  forth  a 
non-rationa)  cause  of  belief.  But  as  the  same  object  may 
move  the  intellect  both  directly  and  indirectly,  it  is  sometimes 
difficult  to  determine  whether  a  particular  motive  is  to  be 


12 


See   Olle    Laprune's   able   treatment    of  this   subject,    De  la 
Certitude  Morale,  pp.  gi — 117. 


332  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


classed  as  a  reason  or  as  a  cause,  or  as  both  reason  and  cause 
of  belief.i^  Reasons  which  are  exphcitly  reahzed  in  conscious- 
ness, if  sufficient  to  necessitate  assent,  result  in  knowledge, 
not  mere  belief.  The  most  extensive  and  iuiportant  class  of 
our  convictions,  as  we  have  already  observed,  are  probably 
those  inferences  which  are  drawai  from  premises  abundantly 
sufficient  in  themselves  to  warrant  the  conclusion  but  not 
formally  realized  in  consciousness.  It  is  the  intellectual 
power  of  forming  such  conclusions  easily,  rapidly,  and 
surely,  which  Newman  termed  the  Illative  facility  or  the 
Illative  sense.  And  however  this  intellectual  activity  be 
best  characterized,  that  it  has  played  an  immense  part  in 
the  building  up  of  our  entire  system  of  beliefs,  he  demon- 
strated beyond  dispute.^*  Special  aptitude  for  rapid  inferences 
form  su(  h  evidence,  particularly  in  regard  to  the  effect 
upon  others  of  our  words  and  actions,  is  often  called  tact.  In 
addition  to  the  intellectual  element  of  quick  appreciation, 
this  term  also  implies  the  faculty  of  prompt  and  appropriate 
responsive  action  ;  for,  fineness  of  touch  refers  not  only  to 
the  discriminate  capacity  of  the  sense,  but  to  its  delicate 
efficiency  in   modifying  the  materials  handled.     Where  the 

^2  The  distinction  between  reasons  and  causes  of  belief  is  brought 
out  with  admirable  clearness  in  Mr.  Balfour's  Foundations  of  Belief : 
"  To  say  that  I  believe  a  statement  because  I  have  been  taught  it, 
or  because  my  father  believed  it  before  me,  or  because  everybody 
in  the  village  believes  it,  is  to  announce  what  everyday  experience 
informs  us  is  a  quite  adequate  cause  of  belief — it  is  not,  however, 
per  se,  to  give  a  reason  for  a  belief  at  all.  But  such  statements  can 
be  turned  at  once  into  reasons  by  no  process  m.ore  elaborate  than 
that  of  explicitly  recognizing  that  my  teachers,  my  family,  or  my 
neighbours,  are  truthful  persons,  happy  in  the  possession  of  adequate 
means  of  information — propositions  which  in  their  turn  of  course 
require  argumentative  support.  Such  a  procedure  may,  I  need 
hardly  say,  be  quite  legitimate ;  and  reasons  of  this  kind  are 
probably  the  principal  ground  on  which  in  mature  life  we  accept 
the  great  mass  of  our  subordinate  scientific  and  historical  con- 
victions." (p.  220.)  It  is  worthy  of  note  here  that  in  the  justilication 
of  our  beliefs,  when  we  get  back  to  first  principles,  the  reason  and 
cause  coalesce.  Thus,  the  ultimate  reason  for  the  acceptance  of 
mathematical  axioms  is  that  they  are  truths  which  revealing  them- 
selves to  the  intellect  by  their  own  evidence  inevitably  cause  or 
command  assv^nt. 

^■*  See  especially  chapters  viii.,  ix.  of  the  Grammar  of  Assent. 
The  value  of  that  contribution  to  Philosophy  is  best  estimated  by 
the  prominence  in  all  subsequent  apologetic  literature  of  the 
argument  which  justifies  our  religious  beliefs  by  showing  that  our 
most  assured  practical  and  "scientific"  convictions  are  based  on 
intellectual  data  and  processes  of  precisely  the  same  kind. 


JUDGMENT   AND   REASONING.  333 


evidence  is  not  rigorously  conclusive  it  still  may  render  a 
particular  alternative  probable  ;  and  here  either  intellect  or 
uill  may  be  the  determinant  of  the  resulting  belief.  Other 
things  equal,  the  force  of  our  conviction  tends  to  be  in  pro- 
portion to  the  weight  of  the  evidence.  Frequent  repetition 
of  contiguous  experiences  generates  an  expectation  that  the 
one  will  be  in  future  followed  by  the  other,  and  superior 
vividness  of  an  idea  often  produces  a  belief  in  its  objective 
reality.  Nevertheless  we  sometimes  disbelieve  in  those  phan- 
tasms which  are  most  vivid,  and  contrariwise  are  convinced 
of  the  objective  truth  of  faint  ones. 

(2)  Emotional  sources  of  belief  cannot  be  completely 
separated  from  those  described  as  Intellectual,  since  most 
emotions  are  based  on  intellectual  representations.  Still, 
there  is  a  sufficiently  well  marked  distinction  for  the  purposes 
of  our  classification.  Bound  up  with  the  social  instinct,  there 
is  an  innate  impulse  to  trust  human  testimony.  Children  are 
proverbially  credulous,  and  it  is  only  a  sad  experience  which 
unwillingly  forces  us  to  be  chary  of  putting  too  great  faith  in 
our  neighbour's  word.  Again,  all  emotions — especially  those 
of  hope  and  fear — which  have  the  power  of  arousing  in  us  a 
hvely  picture  of  any  event,  thereby  tend  to  create  a  belief  in 
its  occurrence.  Applied  to  our  own  actions  this  law  is 
expressed  in  the  axiom  that  "  Beliefs  tend  to  realize  them- 
selves." On  the  other  hand,  sorrow,  melancholy,  and  those 
feelings  which  depress  psychical  life  produce  despair  and 
disbelief  in  the  wished-for  good,  or  a  hopeless  conviction  of 
the  coming  ill. 

(3)  Volitional  Element. — The  effect  of  the  Will  on  belief 
has  always  been  recognized  : 

The  wish  was  father,  Harry,  to  that  thought, 

is  but  the  particular  application  of  an  adage  far  older  than 
Shakespeare.  The  emphasis  laid  on  the  merit  of  Belief  by 
all  Christian  teachers  from  St.  Paul  downwards,  impHes  that 
assent  is  largely  under  the  control  of  the  Will.  The  forces 
modifying  belief  which  have  their  root  in  the  appetitive  side 
of  our  nature  may  be  classed  as,  (a)  natural  or  indehberate, 
and  {h)  volitional  or  deliberate.  As  regards  {a),  we  readily 
believe  what  we  desire,  unless  the  wish  be  intense,  when  our 
anxiety  makes  us  over-exacting  as  regards  the  evidence  either 
for  or  against  our  hopes.  We  are  easily  convinced  that  our 
ideal  heroes  possess  every  virtue.  We  have,  partly  by 
character,  partly  by  education  and  habit,  become  possessed 
of  a  number  of  cherished  fancies  on  various  subjects.  What- 
ever conflicts  with  these,  though  the  evidence  in  its  favour 
be   strong,  we   are  impelled   to  distrust :    what  harmonizes 


334  RATIONAL    LIFE. 


with  them,  however  improbable,  we  readily  admit.  We  have 
called  these  beliefs  indeliberate,  inasmuch  as  they  come  into 
play  without  any  positive  effort  on  our  part,  but  of  course 
they  may  have  serious  responsibilities  attached  ;  and  when  in 
certain  subjects  reason  declares  that  our  beliefs  or  disbeliefs 
have  been  misplaced,  we  may  be  under  a  weighty  obligation 
to  assume  the  unpleasant  task  of  uprooting  the  prejudice. 
(b)  Belief,  as  we  have  seen,  is  often  under  the  influence  of 
Free-will  in  the  exercise  of  judgment.  A  change  in  our 
convictions  cannot  of  course  be  at  once  effected  by  a  single 
volition.  But  by  deliberately  fixing  our  attention  on  the 
arguments  favourable  to  one  side  of  a  question  and  averting 
it  from  those  on  the  other,  we  may  in  time  come  to  adhere  to 
what  we  at  first  discredited,  or  what  is  in  se  least  probable. 

(C)  Effects. — The  effects  of  Belief  are  frequently,  though 
not  always,  manifested  in  movement.  Readiness  to  act  is  a 
common  sign  of  conviction,  and  this  is  probably  the  source 
of  Dr.  Bain's  error  on  the  subject.  Nevertheless,  from  many 
of  our  beliefs,  it  requires  a  very  forced  and  artificial  inter- 
pretation of  consciousness  to  elicit  any  reference  at  all  to 
action.  Thus  my  belief  that  William  the  Conqueror  invaded 
England  a.d.  1066,  or  that  there  is  hydrogen  in  the  sun,  or 
that  I  read  a  play  of  Shakespeare  yesterday,  contains  no 
tendency  to  action  that  I  can  discover.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  acceptance  of  depressing  truths,  instead  of  originating 
movement,  often  results  in  complete  mental  and  bodily 
prostration.  Still,  in  the  larger  number  of  cases  belief  is 
followed  by  action,  and  of  course  action  must  always  pre- 
suppose belief  in  the  reality  of  the  environment.  The  active 
temperament  is  usually  sanguine.  The  energetic  man  is  not 
given  to  despair,  but  easily  acquires  confidence  in  new 
projects.  Acting  on  mere  opinions  soon  transforms  them 
into  steady  convictions,  which  conversely  strengthen  the 
impulse  to  activity.  "  Courage  is  half  the  battle,"  expresses 
the  psychological  truth  that  confidence  in  our  own  prowess 
is  eminently  calculated  to  express  itself  in  vigorous  action. 

Conscience. — The  Moral  Faculty  is  simpl}^  the 
intellect  directed  towards  the  moral  aspects  of 
action,  and  hence  styled  the  Moral  or  Practical 
Reason.  It  is  not  a  different  power  from  the 
Speculative  Intellect.  The  terms  Speculative  and 
Practical  qualify  merely  diverse  exertions  of  the 
same  faculty.      By  the  former   the    mind    discerns 


JUDGMEyiT  AND  REASONING.  335 


truth   and   falsity,  by  the    latter  the   rightncss  and 

wron^ness  of  conduct.     An    action  viewed    simply 

as  a  fact  is  the  object  of  the  intellect.   The  harmony, 

however,  of  such  an  act  with  human  nature  and  its 

relation  to  a  given  end  are  but  special  accidental 

aspects    of    the    same    reality.      Consequently,    as 

St.  Thomas   argues,    there    is   no    reason   why  the 

rational  faculty  which  apprehends  the  being  of  an 

act   cannot    consider    its    htness    for    an    end,    its 

harmony  with  nature,  or  its  moral  rightness. 

Scholastic  view  of  Conscience. — Two  elements  contained 
under  the  vague  modern  term  Conscience  are  carefully  dis- 
tinguished  by  the   sclioolmen  as  Syiidcrcsis  and  Cunscicntia. 
They  attributed  both,  however,  to  the  same  ratio  practica. 
Synderesis  denotes  the  innate  disposition  or  habit  by  which  we 
are  enabled  rapidly  and  easily   to  apprehend   the   primary 
precepts   of  the   Moral   Law,  when   the  suitable  experience 
occurs.     Thus  the  practical  maxims  that  "  Right  ought  to  be 
done,"    and  that  "  Ingratitude  is  wrong,"  when  observation 
has  enabled    us  to  comprehend   the   terms,    are    intuitively 
perceived  with  the  same  certainty  as  the  speculative  axiom 
that  "  Equals  to  the  same  are  equal  to  each  other,"  and  the 
like.     Conscicntia  is  defined  as  the  exercise  of  the  Practical 
Intellect  in  applying  the  general  precept  to  a  particular  case. 
It  is,  in  fact,  the  cognitive  activity  exhibited  in  the  ethical 
syllogism  by  which  the  moral  quality  of  any  act  is  deter- 
mined— e.g.  {Major)  To  relieve  parents  from  suffering  is  right 
(Synderesis).     (Minor)  This  act  does  so.     Ergo.     This  act  is 
right  (Conscientia).     This  doctrine  affords  an  easy  solution 
of  conflicting   moral  judgments.      For   even   if  the   general 
principle  is  fully  grasped,  there  may  be  error  in  its  appli- 
cation ;    as  when  some  barbarous  tribes  insert  as  minor  in 
the  above  syllogism,  "  To  kill  parents  in  times  of  famine  or 
sickness  is  to  relieve  them.''     Again,  the  special  aptitude  or 
disposition  by  which  we  are  inchned  to  apprehend  general 
axioms  may  be  corrupted  or  perverted  by  education,  tradition, 
evil  passions,  extreme  intellectual  and  moral  degradation  due 
to  climatic  conditions  or  to  the  severity  of  surroundings,  and 
the  like. 

Theories   concerning  Conscience.  —  The   chief 
hypotheses    on     the    subject     of    moral    cognition 


336  RATIONAL  LIFE. 


advanced  during  modern  times  are  those  of  the 
Moral  Sense,  of  Associationism,  of  Evolutionism, 
and  the  doctrine  of  Moral  Reason,  which  is  a 
return  to  the  Scholastic  view. 

Moral  Sense  doctrine. — The  theory  of  a  Moral  Sense  was 
first  advocated  by  Shaftesbury  (1671 — 1713),  and  afterwards 
in  a  more  decided  form  by  Hutcheson  (1694 — 1747).  In  this 
view,  Conscience  is  conceived  as  a  Sense  analogous  to  that 
of  taste  or  hearing.  It  is  described  as  a  special  original 
aptitude  of  the  mind  capable  of  feeling  the  moral  quality  of 
actions,  just  as  the  tongue  discerns  the  sweetness  of  sugar. 
Its  perceptions,  like  those  of  our  other  senses,  are  accom- 
panied with  pleasure  or  pain  according  to  the  goodness  or 
badness  of  the  acts.  The  peculiar  character  of  its  object, 
the  uniformity  throughout  the  race  of  its  decisions  on  the 
primary  principles  of  morality,  the  promptness  and  ease  with 
which  they  are  formed,  and  the  early  age  of  their  appearance, 
— all  these  features  point,  it  is  urged,  to  the  original  and 
native  character  of  the  endowment.  At  times,  however, 
defenders  of  the  Moral  Sense  identify  it  with  the  instinct  of 
Benevolence,  with  our  ^Esthetic  Sensibility,  or  even  with 
the  Moral  Reason  proper. 

Hume  (171 1 — 1776)  verbally  adopted  the  Moral  Sense,  view, 
but  resolved  that  power  into  two  factors,  Reason  and  Sentiment. 
Reason,  which  plays  an  inferior  part,  can  possess  no  motive 
power,  but  only  assists  in  ascertaining  the  useful  or  harmful 
consequences  of  different  acts.  The  chief  element,  then,  in 
Conscience  is  Sentiment  or  Feeling,  and  this  has  its  root  in 
Sympathy.  This  latter  principle  Adam  Smith  (1723 — 1790) 
practically  constituted  the  foundation  of  ethical  distinctions, 
and  the  source  of  all  moral  approval  or  disapproval. 

Criticism. — Although  the  Moral  Sense  school  was  right  in 
denying  the  associationist  analysis  of  moral  intuitions, 
their  description  of  Conscience  is  open  to  grave  objections, 
(i)  The  assumption  of  an  additional  new  faculty  is  gratuitous. 
The  intellect  or  reason  which  perceives  the  self-evident 
necessary  truth  that  "  Equals  added  to  equals  give  equals," 
is  the  same  power  which  cognizes  the  vaHdity  of  the  self- 
evident  moral  axiom  that  "  We  should  do  as  we  believe  we 
ought  to  be  done  by."  (2)  The  representation  of  this  special 
aptitude  as  a  sense  is  highly  objectionable.  A  sense  is 
organic ;  it  acts  instinctively,  blindly  ;  is  is  essentially  irra- 
tional. But  moral  judgments  above  all  others  claim  to  be 
the  voice  of  reason,  the  revelation  of  the  spiritual  faculty  of 


JUDGMENT  AND   REASONING.  337 


the  soul.  (3)  A  sense  or  instinct  is  essentially  a  subjective 
property  or  disposition.  Its  co^'nitions  are  relative  to  the 
constitution  of  the  organism.  It  pretends  to  no  universal 
or  absolute  validity.  Its  action  could  conceivably  be  reversed 
by  Almighty  God.  Animals  might  have  been  created  to 
relish  salt,  dislike  sugar,  and  so  on.  But  moral  perceptions 
are  not  acts  of  this  kind  ;  they,  like  the  fundamental  intel- 
lectual intuitions,  disclose  to  us  necessary,  absolute,  and 
universal    truths   which   hold    inviolable   for    God    Himself. 

(4)  The  formal  object  of  a  sense  is,  moreover,  always  a 
concrete  individual  fact.  In  relation  to  this  object  the  sense 
operates  invariably  and  infallibly,  and  it  is  not  capable  of 
transformation  by  education ;  but  the  moral  relations 
expressed  in  the  primary  ethical  principles  do  not  partake 
of  such  a  concrete  individualistic  character.  In  addition 
Conscience  is  subject  to  error  and  perversion,  and  it  requires 
I)roper  training  to  exercise  its  functions  in  a  perfect  manner. 

(5)  Finally,  the  authority  implied  in  the  decisions  of  the  Moral 
Faculty  completely  separates  it  from  all  forms  of  sensibility. 
An  ethical  sense  "might  be  the  root  of  impulses  to  certain 
kinds  of  action,  but  it  could  neither  impose  nor  disclose 
obligation. 

Ethical  terms  defined.— The  confusion  between  the  intel- 
lectual, emotional,  and  appetitive  elements  involved  in  the 
exercise  of  the  Moral  Faculty  has  been  the  cause  of  so  much 
error  that  besides  criticism  it  is  needful  to  distinguish  these 
several  factors  carefully.  Moral  Intuition  is  the  percipient 
act  by  which  the  truth  of  a  self-evident  moral  principle  is 
immediately  cognized.  The  name  is  also  apphed  to  the 
discernment  of  the  moral  quality  of  a  particular  action  ; 
perhaps  this  exertion  of  the  Practical  Intellect,  as  well  as 
moral  decisions  based  on  longer  processes  of  reasoning,  may 
be  best  designated  Moral  Judgment.  Moral  Sentiment  is  not 
an  ethical  cognition,  but  ttie  attendant  emotion— the  feehng  of 
satisfaction  or  remorse,  of  approval  or  disapproval  excited  by 
the  consideration  of  a  good  or  bad  action  by  myself  or  some- 
body else.  The  term  Moral  Instinct  is  employed  to  denote 
a  native  disposition  towards  some  class  of  socially  useful  acts, 
e.g.,  gratitude,  generosity,  &c.  Such  natural  indehberate 
tendencies  do  certainly  exist,  but  they  are  not  truly  moral 
any  more  than  the  sympathetic  impulses  of  brutes.  It  is 
only  when  approved  by  reason  and  consented  to  by  will  that 
they  become  moral  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word.  Moral 
Habits,  that  is,  dispositions  acquired  by  intelligent  free 
exercise,  are  moral  in  the  fullest  sense. 

Associationist  Theory. — The  chief  attack,  however,  on  the 
Mornl  Sense  doctrine  came  from  the  disciples  of  Hartley  and 


338  RATIONAL   LIFE. 

Bentham.  The  Sensationist  school  necessarily  adopted 
utility  as  the  foundation  of  morality,  and  sought  to  resolve 
moral  distinctions  into  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain.  Con- 
science, it  is  held,  is  not  a  simple  original  faculty,  but  a 
complex  product  derived  from  experience  of  the  agreeable 
and  disagreeable  results  of  actions.  The  child  is  1. dined  up 
to  obedience,  and  the  idea  of  external  authority  is  formed 
in  its  mind.  Certain  acts  are  associated  with  punishments, 
others  with  rewards.  Affection  towards  the  person  of  the 
superior,  social  sympathy  and  reverence  for  law,  as  well  as 
fear  of  retaliation  and  enlightened  prudence,  all  gradually 
amalgamate  to  produce  that  indefinite  mysterious  feeling, 
attached  to  the  acts  of  the  moral  faculty.  The  essential 
constituents  of  conscience  are,  therefore,  the  faint  traces  of 
pleasurable  and  painful  consequences  which  have  been 
associated  in  past  experience  with  particular  kinds  of 
action. 

Criticism. — The  objections  to  this  theory  are  numerous : 
(i)  It  does  not  account  for  the  very  early  age  at  which  moral 
judgments  are  formed,  nor  for  the  ease  and  readiness  with 
which  they  are  elicited  before  any  proper  estimate  of  the 
utility  of  various  classes  of  acts  can  be  attained.  The  child 
is  able,  while  still  very  young,  to  distinguish  between  7.7s/  and 
unjust  punishment,  and  thus  to  apply  a  moral  criterion  to  the 
very  machinery  by  which  its  moral  notions  are  supposed  to 
be  manufactured.  (2)  The  Utilitarian  hypothesis  again  does 
not  account  for  the  absolute  authority  attributed  to  moral 
decisions  by  the  fully  developed  human  mind.  (3)  Nor  does 
it  explain  the  peculiar  sanctity  attached  to  moral  precepts. 
Mere  experiences  of  utility,  mere  impulses  towards  pleasure 
or  from  pain  would  never  generate  the  axiom.  Fiat  justitia 
mat  cccluni.  (4)  It  does  not  account  for  the  universality  of 
this  reverence  in  regard  to  at  least  some  moral  distinctions ; 
nor  for  the  universality  of  ethical  notions  exhibited  in  terms 
to  be  discovered  in  every  language,  and  found  in  the  customs, 
laws,  and  religions  of  all  nations.  In  spite  of  wide  diversities 
of  opinion  as  to  ichat  is  right,  there  is  the  unanimous  con- 
^iction  that  right  ought  to  be  done.  (5)  Again,  the  notions  o' 
duty  and  utility  are  not  merely  radically  different,  but  ofter 
stand  in  opposition.  If  apparent  self-sacrifice  is  seen  tc 
be  designed  for  gain,  its  virtue  disappears.  (6)  Logically 
followed  out,  this  theory  annihilates  the  chum  to  authority 
of  conscience,  which  prescribes  the  observance  of  certain 
intrinsic  distinctions  of  human  action.  (7)  As  a  final  proof 
of  the  utter  inadequacy  of  association  and  personal  experi- 
ences of  pleasure  and  pain  to  generate  conscience,  it  may 
be   noted   that  since  the    Evolutionist  hypothesis  has  been 


JUDGMENT  AND   REASONING.  339 

invented,  the  representatives  of  Sensisni,  almost  to  a  man, 
now  admit  that  the  tlieory  nfaintained  so  confidently  by  their 
school  twenty  years  ago  is  completely  insufficient. 

Origin  and  Authority  of  Moral  Judgments. — In  connection 
with  the  associationist  theory  it  has  been  maintained  that 
the  character  of  the  moral  faculty  is  in  no  way  aft'ected  by  its 
genesis.  Dr.  Sidgwick  justly  holds  that  the  existence,  origin, 
and  validity  of  moral  cognitions  are  three  distinct  questions ; 
but  he  errs  in  teaching  that  the  two  last  are  completely  inde- 
pendent of  each  other.  He  asserts  {a)  that  the  validity  of 
any  cognition  is  not  weakened  by  its  late  appearance  in  life  ; 
{b)  that  the  mere  derivation  of  moral  perceptions  from 
simpler  elements  cannot  render  them  untrustiijorthy,  nor  their 
innate  character  establish  their  infallibility;  (t;)  that  conse- 
quently Ethical  science  is  no  more  concerned  with  the  origin 
of  Conscience  than  Geometry  with  that  of  Spatial  Percep- 
tion.i^  This  doctrine  draws  its  chief  plausibility  from  an 
ambiguity  contained  in  the  words  "validity"  and  "trust- 
worthiness." These  terms  as  predicated  of  intellectual 
cognition  mean  that  the  perception  in  question  agrees  with 
an  objective  fact  universally  admitted.  As  applied  to  moral 
cognition  they  mean  that  the  judgments  of  conscience  possess 
authority.  They  signify  that  these  acts  (a)  reveal  to  us  law  of 
a  transcendent  and  sacred  character,  and  (/3)  thereby  impose  on 
us  an  obligation  to  special  kinds  of  action  or  abstinence, 
iy)  independent  oi pleasurable  and  painful  consequences.  Obviously 
then  :  (i)  The  essence  of  genuine  analogy  with  mathematical 
knowledge  is  wanting.  (2)  The  vital  objection  is  not  to  the 
■late  date  assigned  to  the  appearance  of  moral  notions,  but  to 
the  materials  out  of  which  they  are  supposed  to  be  manu- 
factured. (3)  The  real  question  is,  whether  the  supremacy 
and  holiness  claimed  for  the  deliverances  of  conscience  are 
justified  by  genuinely  objective  moral  distinctions,  or  are 
merely  illusory  products  containing  only  sensational  and 
emotional  elements  of  a  non-moral  kind.  If  the  latter  alter- 
native be  true,  their  pretended  sovereignty  is  obviously  but 
an  illegitimate  usurpation.  If,  as  Dr.  Martineau  puts  it,  "  the 
conscience  is  but  the  dressed  dish  of  some  fine  cuisine,  if  you 
can  actually  exhibit  it  simmering  in  the  saucepan  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  the  decorous  shape  into  which  it  sets  ere  it  appears 
at  table,  cannot  alter  its  nature  or  make  it  more  than  its 
ingredients."  ^^  Similarly,  from  the  opposite  standpoint  ot" 
Physical  Ethics,  Mr.  Sidgwick's  view  has  been  attacked  on 
the  ground  that  the  pretensions  put  forward  on  behalf  ot 
conscience  are  very  different  from  those  of  the  spatial  faculty, 

1^  Methods,  lik.  III.  c.  i.  §  4.         i*^  Types,  Vol.  11.  p.  14- 


340  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


and  that  the  ultimate  grounds  of  MoraHty  are  disputed,  while 
those  of  Mathematics  are  agreed  upon. 

Evolutionist  Hypothesis. — The  Evolutionist  doctrine  of  the 
Moral  Faculty  varies  from  that  just  described  merely  by 
enlarging  the  period  during  which  the  pleasurable  and  painful 
consequences  of  conduct  have  been  at  work,  so  as  to  include 
not  the  life  of  the  individual  only,  but  also  that  of  the  race. 
Conscience  is  a  species  of  instinct  analogous  to  the  vctricviiii; 
disposition  in  a  well-bred  game  dog.  It  embodies  the  experi- 
ences of  pleasure  and  pain  felt  during  the  numberless  ages  of 
the  gradual  evolution  of  man.  These,  it  is  asserted,  have 
been  by  degrees  organized  and  accumulated  through  Natural 
Selection,  and  transmitted  by  heredity  from  parent  to  off- 
spring in  the  form  of  physiological  modifications.  The  theory 
thus  claims  to  reconcile  the  Moral  Sense  doctrine  with  that  of 
the  Benthamite  school ;  or  at  all  events  to  combine  the 
elements  of  truth  supposed  to  be  contained  in  both.  On  the 
one  hand,  it  recognizes  the  native  or  instinctive  character  ot 
moral  intuitions  and  sentiments,  whilst  on  the  other  it  ulti- 
mately bases  all  moral  distinctions  on  the  pleasurable  and 
painful  consequences  of  action,  and  teaches  that  Conscience 
is  a  complex  product  derived  from  these  latter. 

Criticism. — As  this  account  of  the  Moral  Faculty  forms 
part  of  the  general  theory  of  the  Origin  of  Necessary  Truth 
advocated  by  Evolutionist  Psychology,  we  refer  the  reader 
back  to  our  discussion  of  the  v/ider  subject.  Here,  however, 
we  may  observe  in  addition:  (i)  that  the  new  hypothesis  is 
exposed  to  all  the  most  weighty  objections  advanced  against 
the  old  Associationist  doctrine,  except  that  based  on  the 
readiness  with  which  moral  cognitions  are  elicited,  and  the 
early  age  at  which  they  appear ;  (2)  that  moral  intuition  is 
not  of  the  nature  of  a  sensitive  instinct,  but  of  an  intelligent 
apprehension ;  (3)  finally,  that  Conscience  or  ethical  notions 
are  the  most  unlikely  product  that  can  well  be  conceived  to 
arise  by  Natural  Selection.  Even  in  tolerably  civilized  stages 
of  society,  the  utility  of  moral  sensibility  to  the  individual  in 
the  stru^'glefor  life  is  very  problematical.  A  fortiori  amid  the 
ijiternecine  war  and  conflict  of  the  supposed  pre-human 
stage,  where,  in  the  words  of  Hobbes,  "  fraud  and  force  "  are 
the  "cardinal  \irtues,"  the  chances  should  be  enormously 
against  the  development  of  self-sacrifice.^'' 

^^  Concerning  the  antliority  left  to  conscience  in  this  account  t)f 
hs genesis,  Mr.  Balfour  writes  thus  ;  "  Kant,  as  we  all  know,  compared 
the  Moral  Law  to  the  starry  heavens,  and  found  them  both  sublime. 
It  would,  on  the  naturalistic  hypothesis,  be  more  appropriate  to 
compare  it  to  the  protective  blotches  on  the  beetle's  back,  and  to 
find  them  both  ingenious,    But  how,  on  this  view,  is  the  '  beauty  of 


JUDGMENT   AND   REASONING.  341 

The  fact  that  within  a  tribe  or  nation  some  of  the  moral 
virtues  are  of  evident  advantage  in  the  struj^gle  with  other 
tribes  makes  no  real  ditterence,  unless  we  assume,  against  the 
whole  teaching  of  evolution,  the  sudden  causeless  appearance 
of  the  moral  instinct  throughout  the  majority  of  the  indi- 
viduals of  the  tribe.  If  "  the  weakest  to  the  wall  "  is  the  one 
supreme  Law  of  Nature,  if  Natural  Selection  is  the  great 
foice  of  evolution,  then  the  occasional  individuals  varying 
slightly  in  the  direction  of  conscientiousness  would  be  inevit- 
ably eliminated  in  the  perpetual  struggle  for  existence  within 
the  limits  of  their  own  savage  tribe,  before  the  dubious  utility 
of  their  incipient  moral  dispositions  could  be  extended  to  the 
tribe  as  a  whole,  and  render  it  superior  to  other  less  moral 
races.  If  an  unprejudiced  mind  considers  how  intensely 
difficult  it  is,  even  at  the  present  day,  when  we  are  in  posses- 
sion of  all  the  moralizing  agencies  of  religion,  education, 
language,  literature,  public  opinion,  and  governmental 
authority,  to  quicken  the  moral  sensibility  of  the  individual 
or  of  the  nation,  he  must  surely  see  that  in  the  alleged 
pre-human  stage,  when  not  a  single  one  of  these  forces 
were  present,  and  when  the  conditions  of  existence  com- 
bined unanimously  in  the  opposite  direction,  the  natural 
growth  of  conscience  must  have  been  absolutely  impos- 
sible.i^ 

holiness '  to  retain  its  lustre  in  the  minds  of  those  who  know  so 
much  of  its  pedigree  ?  In  despite  of  theories,  mankind — even 
instructed  mankind— may,  indeed,  long  preserve  uninjured  senti- 
ments which  they  have  learned  in  their  most  impressionable  years 
from  those  they  love  best ;  but  if,  while  they  are  being  taught  the 
supremacy  of  conscience  and  the  austere  majesty  of  duty,  they  are 
also  to  be  taught  that  these  sentiments  and  beliefs  are  merely  samples 
of  the  complicated  contrivances,  many  of  them  mean  and  many  of 
them  disgusting,  wrought  into  the  physical  or  into  the  social 
organism  by  the  shaping  forces  of  selection  and  elimination,  assur- 
edly much  of  the  efficacy  of  these  moral  lessons  will  be  destroyed, 
and  the  contradiction  between  ethical  sentiment  and  naturalistic 
theory  will  remain  intrusive  and  perplexing,  a  constant  stumbling- 
block  to  those  who  endeavour  to  combine  in  one  harmonious  creed 
the  explanations  of  Biology  and  the  lofty  claims  of  Ethics."  (Op. 
cit.  pp.  18,  ig.) 

i«  Mr.  Lecky  has  justly  remarked  that,  "Whether  honesty  is  or 
is  not  the  best  policy,  depends  mainly  on  the  efficiency  of  the 
police,"  a  social  factor  seemingly  not  very  perfect  in  those  pre- 
historic times  of  which  Herbert  Spencer  aftbrds  us  such  detailed 
information.  Bain  argues  forcibly  that  "  the  Moral  Sentiment  is 
about  the  least  favourably  situated  of  all  mental  products  for  trans- 
mission by  inheritance."  The  chief  grounds  on  which  he  does  so 
are:  (i)   Comparative  infrequency  of   special   classes  of    moral   acts 


342  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Intuitionalist  Views. — Writers  of  the  Intuitionalist  school 
subsequent  to  Shaftesbury  and  Hutcheson  modified  the 
doctrine  of  the  Moral  Sense,  so  as  to  remove  its  most  obvious 
defects.  Thus  Reid  and  Stewart,  who  accept  the  term, 
describe  the  faculty  as  of  a  rational  character.  It  is  a  specie;! 
innate  power,  fi^iven  at  first  only  in  germ  and  requiring 
training  and  cultivation,  but  nevertheless  capable  of  revealing 
the  objective  moral  qualities  of  actions.  The  term  Moral 
Sense,  however,  has  been  used  in  such  a  variety  of  significa- 
tions, and  is  so  liable  to  suggest  an  erroneous  view  of  the 
nature  of  moral  perception,  that  we  believe  Conscience  will 
be  best  described  as  the  Moral  or  Practical  Reason.  It 
should  alwajs  be  borne  in  mind  that  while  on  the  one  hand 
the  moral  faculty  is  a  cognitive  power  identical  with  the 
intellect,  its  proper  object  differs  in  kind  from  mathematical 
relations  and  purely  speculative  truths. 

Kant,  identified  Conscience  with  the  Practical  or  Moral 
Reason.  It  was,  however,  conceived  by  him  not  as  a 
cognitive  faculty  making  known  to  us  an  external  law  pre- 
scribed from  without,  but  as  an  internal  regulative  force 
which  itself  imposes  commands  on  the  will.  Man  is  thus 
asserted  to  be  a  law  to  himself.  This  doctrine,  based  on  the 
so-called  autonomy  of  the  reason,  confounds  the  function  of 
promulgating  a  law  with  the  office  of  legislation,  and  gives  a 
defective  account  of  the  nature  of  authority  and  of  the 
ultimate  grounds  of  obligation.  P>ut  criticism  of  this  theory 
would  lead  too  far  into  Ethics :  and  for  a  treatment  of  this 
subject  we  must  refer  the  reader  to  the  volume  on  Moral 
Philosophy  of  the  present  series. 

Is  Conscience  a  Spring-  of  Action  ? — The  confusion  preva- 
lent in  modern  ethical  speculation  regarding  the  connexion 
between  Conscience,  Reason,  Intellect,  and  Moral  Sentiment 
has  given  rise  to  a  warm  psychological  dispute  as  to  whether 
Reason  can  be  a  spring  of  action.  Cudworth  (1617 — 88)  and 
Clarke  (1675 — 1729),  the  ultra-intellectual  moralists,  identified 
the  moral  faculty  with  Reason  in  its  narrowest  sense,  assimi- 
lating the  activity  of  Conscience  to  the  cognition  of  purely 
speculative  truths.      Interpreting    Reason  in  this  restricted 

"  We  are  moralists  only  at  long  intervals,  .  .  .  we  may  be  hours 
and  days  without  any  marked  moral  lesson."  (2)  Complexity.  "The 
moral  sentiment  supposes  a  complicated  situation  between  human 
beings  apart  from  whom  it  has  neither  substance  nor  form"  [i.e., 
in  the  Utilitarian  system).  (3)  Disagreeableiiess  of  duty.  "We  do 
not  readily  acquire  what  we  dislike,  .  .  .  mankind  being  naturall) 
indisposed  to  self-denial  are  on  that  account  slow  in  learning  good 
Moral  habits,  and  are  not  generally  in  an  advanced  state  even  at 
the  last."  (Emotions  and  Will,  3rd  Edit.  pp.  55—57  ) 


JUDGMENT  AND   REASONING.  343 


signification,  Hume  argued  that  it  c^n  have  no  influence  over! 
the  will,  and  therefore  is  not  a  spring  of  action.  He,  conse- 
quently, assigned  to  sentiment  the  chief  place  in  the  consti- 
tution of  the  moral  faculty.  Later  philosophers,  wishing 
to  defend  the  rationality  of  morality,  opposed  this  vicM 
Dr.  Sidgwick  thus  argues :  (i)  The  chief  part  of  moral  per- 
suasion appeals  to  Reason.  (2)  "  Reason  prescribes  an  end.''  , 
The  judgment,  "This  ought  to  he  done,"  stimulates  the  will 
to  action.  The  moral  sentiment  may  co-operate,  but  the 
cognition  of  Tightness  of  itself  really  impels  to  action.''-* 
Dr.  Martineau,  on  the  other  hand,  defining  a  spring  of  action, 
as  "an  impulse  to  an  unselected  form  of  action,"  excludes 
both  Prudence  and  Conscience  from  the  list  of  active  forces. 
Moral  Reason  merely  decides  which  of  two  rival  impulses  is 
the  higher,  which  is  to  be  preferred.  It  is  a  "judge,"  not  an 
"  advocate."     The  motive  power  lies  solely  in  the  impulses. 

Criticism. — There  is  an  element  of  truth  contained  in  both 
views,  and  the  dispute  seems  to  us  to  be  in  part  verbal.  Moral 
perception  is  an  act  of  the  Reason,  and  this  is  in  itself  a 
cognitive,  not  a  conative  or  appetitive  faculty.  It  is  primarily 
recipient,  not  impulsive.  On  the  other  hand,  in  apprehending 
an  action  as  right,  obligatory,  agreeable,  or  useful,  the  intellect 
stimulates  the  will  to  action,  and  thereby  becomes  a  motor 
agency.  The  propelling  force  thus  lies  primarily  in  the 
quality  of  the  object  apprehended,  and  not  in  the  intuition 
viewed  merely  as  a  cognitive  state.  A  spring  of  action  is  thus 
a  mental  state  tending  of  itself  to  issue  into  action,  while  an 
ethical  cognition  in  virtue  of  the  objective  moral  law  which  it 
reveals  is  an  apprehensive  act  which  may  originate  or  check 
such  an  impulsive  state. 

Butler's  Doctrine. — Among  English  moralists  of  last  century 
the  ablest  defender  of  the  authority  and  rationality  of  Con- 
science, and  the  writer  who  returned  most  closely  to  the 
teaching  of  St.  Thomas  and  the  great  Catholic  philosophers 
of  the  middle  ages,  was  Butler  (1692 — 1757).  The  attention 
which  had  been  devoted  to  the  empirical  study  of  the  mind 
by  his  immediate  predecessors,  however,  caused  him  to  lay 
great  stress  on  inductive  arguments.  And  we  beheve  wc 
may  suitably  close  the  present  chapter  with  a  passage  of  hi^s 
which  admirably  epitomizes  the  psychological  grounds  b 
which  the  existence  of  truly  moral  intuitions  is  established  : 
"  That  which  renders  beings  capable  of  moral  government 
is  their  having  a  moral  nature,  and  moral  faculties  of  per- 
ception and  of  action.  Brute  creatures  are  impressed  and 
actuated  by  various  instincts  and  propensities  :  so  also  are 

'9  Methods,  Bk.  I.  c.  iii.  §  i. 


344 


RATIONAL   LIFE. 


we.  But  additional  to  this  we  have  a  capacity  for  reflecting 
upon  actions  and  characters,  and  making  them  an  object  to 
our  thought  ;  and  on  doing  this  we  naturally  and  unavoidably 
approve  some  actions,  under  the  peculiar  view  of  their  being 
virtuous  and  of  good  desert,  and  disapprove  others  as  vicious 
and  of  ill  desert.  That  we  have  this  moral  approving  and 
disapproving  faculty  is  certain  from  our  experiencing  it  in 
ourselves,  and  recognizing  it  in  eaCh  other.  It  appears  from 
our  exercising  it  unavoidably,  in  the  approbation  and  dis- 
approbation of  even  feigned  characters  :  from  the  words  right 
and  wrong,  odious  and  amiable,  base  and  worthy,  with  many 
others  of  like  signification  in  all  languages.  .  .  .  It  is  manifest, 
great  part  of  common  language  and  of  common  behaviour 
over  the  world  is  formed  upon  supposition  of  such  a  moral 
faculty,  whether  called  conscience,  moral  reason,  moral  sense, 
or  Divine  reason.  Nor  is  it  doubtful  in  general,  what  action 
this  facultv,  or  practical  discerning  power  within  us,  approves, 
and  what  it  disapproves.  For,  as  much  as  it  has  been  dis- 
puted wherein  virtue  consists,  or  whatever  ground  for  doubt 
there  may  be  about  particulars,  yet,  in  general,  there  is  in 
reality  a  universally  acknowledged  standard  of  it.  It  is  that 
which  all  ages  and  all  countries  have  made  profession  of  in 
public  :  it  is  that  which  every  man  you  meet  puts  on  tlie 
show  of:  it  is  that  which  the  primary  and  fundamental  laws 
of  all  civil  constitutions  over  the  face  of  the  earth  make  it 
their  business  and  endeavour  to  enforce  the  practice  of  upon 
mankind,  namely,  justice,  veracity,  and  regard  to  the  common 
good."  (Cf.  Dissertation  on  the  Nature  of  Virtue.) 

Readings. — On  Judgment  and  Reasoning,  cf.  St. Thomas,  Sum.  i. 
q.  79.  a.  8;  Suarez,  De  Aniwa,  III.  c.  6;  Rickaby,  First  Principles, 
Pt.  I.  c.  ii. ;  Kleutgen,  op.  cit.  §§  133 — 146;  Clarke,  Logic,  Pt.  II. 
c.  iii.  On  Assent  and  Consent,  Olle  ha.prune,  De  la  Certitude  Morale, 
c.  ii. ;  Wilfrid  Ward,  The  Wish  to  Believe.  On  Implicit  Reasoning, 
Newman,  op.  cit.  cc.  viii.  ix. ;  also  Dr.  W.  G.  Ward's  Phihsophy 
of  Theism,  Essays  XV.  and  XVI.  On  Belief  and  Knowledge,  OIU- 
Laprnne,  op.  cit.  cc.  iii. — v.;  Newman,  op.  cit.  cc.  iv.  vi.  vii.; 
Rickaby,  op.  cit.  Pt.  II.  cc.  vii.  viii.  On  Conscience,  St.  Thomas, 
Sum.  I.  q.  79.  a.  9 — 13;  J.  Ming,  Data  of  Modern  Ethics  Examined, 
c.  xii. ;  Moral  Philosophy  (present  series),  Pt.  I.  c.  viii.  §§  i,  2. 


CHAPTER   XVI. 

attp:ntion  and  apperception. 

Attention. — We  have  confined  the  term  attention 
to  the  higher  order  of  mental  activity.  The  word 
is,  however,  frequently  employed  to  denote  mere 
intensification  of  sensuous  consciousness.  In  this 
sense  a  dog  or  a  cow  is  said  to  attend  when  it  is 
excited,  by  the  approach  of  some  object,  to  watch 
or  listen  ;  increased  activity  of  the  sensuous  faculties 
of  man  may  similarly  be  named  attention.  Still, 
careful  introspection  assures  us  that  in  an  act  of 
attention  proper  there  is  something  more  than 
augmentation  of  the  previous  sensation.^ 

Attention  and  Sensation. — Suppose  that  I  am 
suffering  from  toothache ;  I  can  advert  to  the  pain  or 
try  to  turn  my  attention  away  from  it.  But  this  atten- 
tion is  not  the  same  thing  as  the  feeling.  I  can  direct 
my  observation  to  the  peculiarly  aching  character  of 
the  latter.  I  can  consider  its  likeness  and  unlikeness 
to  the  sensation  of  a  burn  or  a  needle-prick ;  I  can 
estimate  its  superiority  in  intensity  over  previous  states. 
In  fact,  I  am  conscious  throughout  of  exerting  a  cosr- 
nitive  activity  distinct  from  the  mere  sensation,  and 
this  presupposes  before  it  can  operate  the  sensation 
or   its   reproduced    image.      Increased   intensity   of    a 

^  On  attention  to  sensuous  impressions,  see  pp.  232,  243 — 246. 


346  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


sensation  is  not  identical  with  tlie  act  of  attention, 
though  the  former  may  often  awake  the  latter.  For  wc 
can  attend  to  the  w^eaker  of  two  impressions,  and  the 
vividness  of  a  sensation  occasionally  obscures  the  re- 
lation or  special  aspect  which  is  at  the  time  the  formal 
object  of  the  act  of  attention. 

Attention  and  Volition. —  Neither  is  attention 
merely  a  volition  or  act  of  will.  On  the  contrary',  it  is 
that  upon  which  the  conative  act  is  exerted.  It  is 
cognitive  energy  directed  by  the  will  to  an  existing 
experience.  Thus,  in  attending  to  a  toothache,  the  act 
of  the  will  is  not,  "  I  wish  to  feci  more  pain  or  less 
pain,"  but  "  I  wish  to  turn  my  attention  towards  or 
from  this  pain,"  "  I  wish  to  have  a  clearer  and  more 
distinct  consciousness  of  this  state."  Becoming  an 
object  of  thought,  the  feeling  may  subsequently  become 
an  object  of  will ;  and,  as  a  rule,  the  increased  clearness 
and  force  of  a  conscious  state  effected  by  attention 
augments  its  motive  power  and  reacts  upon  the  conative 
activity  of  the  mind. 

Attention  interrogative.— In  becoming  attentive 
we  pass  into  an  attitude  of  inquiry  or  expectation,  and 
this  is  characteristic  of  the  mind  throughout  the  whole 
period.  Mr.  G.  Stout  accurately  describes  this  phase 
of  the  mental  state :  "  Between  a  protracted  train  of 
thought  which  lasts  for  an  hour  and  a  transient  act  of 
attention  which  lasts  for  only  a  few  seconds,  there  is  in 
this  respect  only  a  difference  of  degree,  not  of  kind. 
Whenever  we  attend  at  all,  we  attend  to  some  object, 
and  it  is  the  essence  of  the  process  that,  in  and  through  it, 
our  apprehension  of  this  object  shall  become,  or  at  least 
tend  to  become,  more  full  and  distinct.  For  this  reason 
a  certain  prospective  attitude  of  the  mind  is  charac- 
teristic of  attention.  Attendere  originally  means  to 
expect  or  await.  This  prospective  attitude  is  for  the 
most  part  interrogative.  The  interrogation  in  its  more 
primitive  phases  is  dumb,  and  to  express  it  in  language 
is  to  falsify  it  by  giving  it  a  fictitious  definiteness.  But 
with  this  reservation  we  may  say  that  it  corresponds  to 
the    question  :    What    is    that  ?    or    simply,   What  ?  "  ^ 

-  Analytic  Psvcliolooy,  Vol.  I.  p    1S4. 


ATTENTION   AND    APPERCEPTION.  347 


That  is,  literally,  in  scholastic  language,  it  is  the  con- 
centrated activity  of  the  intellect  seeking  to  apprehend 
the  Quidditas.  Accordingly  we  shall  wisely  return  to 
the  old  definition,  and  define  attention  as :  Applicatio 
cogitationis  ad  ohjecfa,  or  the  special  application  of  intel- 
lectual energy  to  any  object. 

Voluntary  and  non-voluntary  Attention. — The  phenomenon 
of  attention  takes  two  forms  according  as  the  exciting  cause 
is  the  mind  itself  or  something  presented  to  the  mind.  In 
the  former  case  we  are  conscious  of  a  certain  self-direction  ot 
the  mind  towards  a  particular  object.  We  interfere  with  the 
automatic  current  of  our  thoughts,  and  turn  them  into  a  new 
channel.  This  is  effected  by  fixing  upon  some  particular 
section  of  the  series,  and  dwelling  upon  it.  This  act  of 
attention  at  once  increases  the  force  of  the  selected  idea,  and 
raises  into  consciousness  other  ideas  of  various  kinds  with 
whivh  it  is  connected.  We  then  again  choose  which  of  these 
new  lines  of  thought  shall  be  followed,  and  so  change  the 
original  course  of  the  stream.  This  is  an  exercise  oi  voluntary 
attention.  The  completeness  of  control  over  our  own 
thoughts,  the  success  which  we  can  command  in  the  expul- 
sion or  detention  of  a  particular  mental  state,  varies  at 
different  times  and  in  regard  to  different  objects.  A  represen- 
tation of  the  imagination,  a  strong  emotion,  a  worrying  train 
of  thought,  no  less  than  some  distracting  external  stimulus, 
may  at  times  render  nugatory  repeated  efforts  to  apply  our 
minds  to  some  other  topic.  It  is  tliis  experience  of  resistance 
which  affords  us  the  most  convincing  assurance  that  we  have 
a  real  power  of  free  voluntary  attention,  for  it  reveals  to  us 
in  the  clearest  manner  the  difference  between  automatically 
drifting  with,  and  actively  struggling  against  the  natural 
current  of  thought.  It  brings  into  distinct  consciousness  the 
exertions  of  real  personal  choice.  The  conditions  influencing 
our  command  over  attention  are,  accordingly,  twofold.  On 
the  one  side  are  the  varying  degrees  of  attractiveness  per- 
taining to  the  object ;  on  the  other  is  the  energy  of  the  mind. 

Non-voluntary  Attention. — Attention,  however,  is  often  both 
awaked  and  continued  without  any  effort  of  the  mind.  Ot 
this  non-voluntary  activity  we  can  distinguish  two  grades. 
Sometimes  the  process  of  attention,  though  not  due  to  special 
volition,  flows  along  in  a  smooth,  facile  manner,  without  an}- 
consciousness  of  constraint.  This  is  spontaneous,  or  automatic 
attention.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  also  occasions  when 
we  feel  our  attention  to  he  extorted  from  us,  or  constrained 
against  our  will,   when    an  idea  forcibly  intrudes    into   our 


348  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


consciousness,  and  defies  our  best  attempts  to  eject  it.  This 
advertence  against  our  will  is  invuluntary  attention  in  the 
strict  sense.  Extreme  instances  are  the  "fixed  ideas,"  and 
hallucinations  of  the  insane.  Serious  enfeehlement  of  volun- 
tary control  of  attention  is  generally  among  the  symptoms  of 
approaching  mental  derangement. 

Laws  of  Attention. — Intensity. — The  general  con- 
ditions of  Attention  have  been  described  by  some 
psychologists  as  Laws ;  and  they  may  be  thus  briefly 
formulated:  (i)  Involuntary,  automatic,  or  reflex 
attention,  is  determined  as  regards  both  its  force  and 
direction,  by  the  comparative  attractiveness  of  the 
objects  present  to  the  mind.  (2)  Voluntar}'  attention 
is  determined  {a)  by  the  energy  of  the  mind  at  the 
time,  (h)  by  the  inherent  attractiveness  of  the  object, 
and  (f)  by  extrinsic  motives,  or  relations  of  the  object 
with  other  desirable  things  which  may  influence  the 
will.  Thus  the  student's  power  of  keeping  his  intellect 
fixed  upon  his  work  depends  on  the  nature  of  the 
subject ;  on  the  present  intensity  of  his  desire  to  pass 
his  examination  ;  on  the  fresh  and  healthy  condition 
of  his  brain ;  on  the  native  energy  of  his  mind,  and 
on  his  acquired  habits  of  steady  concentration. 

Duration.- — In  the  first  stage  of  the  exercise  of 
voluntary  attention  repeated  struggles  are  often 
necessary ;  but  when  interest  is  once  awakened  the 
activity  becomes  self-supporting,  and  further  volitional 
effort  is  needless.  Still  attention,  whether  voluntary 
or  involuntary,  is  of  an  essentially  variable  character. 
It  flows  in  waves  rather  than  in  a  constant  level  stream, 
and  soon  grows  feeble  unless  revived  b}"  a  new  effort 
or  by  a  change  of  object.  When  a  man  is  said  to  keep 
his  attention  concentrated  or  fixed  for  a  long  time  on 
a  single  object,  he  really  follows  out  a  train  of  ideas 
related  to  the  object. 

Extent. — The  force  of  attention  is  limited  in  range 
as  well  as  in  duration ;  and  another  law  supposed  to 
express  the  relation  between  extent  and  intensity  of 
attention  was  formulated  in  the  old  aphorism  :  Plurihus 
intcutns  minor  est  ad  singula  sensiiSy  or  the  intensity  of  attention 
varies   inversely  as  the  arc:i  of  objects  over  whicJi  it  ranges. 


ATTENTION  AND  APPERCEPTION.  349 


This  statement  refers  rather  to  sensuous  than  to  intel- 
lectual cognition.  In  so  far  as  it  applies  to  the  latter, 
it  defines  not  the  force  of  a  single  act  of  attention, 
but  the  general  efficiency  of  mental  energy  during  a 
longer  or  shorter  period. 

Whether  we  can  attend  simultaneously  to  more  than 
one  object  has  been  much  disputed ;  and,  as  is  usual 
in  such  cases,  the  disputants  often  differ  as  to  what 
they  mean  by  **  attend  "  and  *'  one  object."  Experiments 
like  those  of  Hamilton,  indicating  how  many  pebbles  a 
man  can  perceive  at  a  single  glance,  obviously  have  to 
do  with  the  perfection  of  eyesight,  rather  than  with 
the  range  of  attention.  It  is  clear  that  we  can  be 
sentiently  aware  of  sounds,  colours,  temperature,  and 
pressure  at  the  same  time.  But  intellectual  attention, 
even  when  engaged  in  comparison,  apprehends  its 
objects  in  the  form  of  a  unity  of  some  sort.  The  focus 
of  attention  seems  to  be  at  any  moment  a  single  thought, 
though  that  thought  may  carry  a  fringe  of  relations 
and  a  nucleus  of  elements  dimly  felt  to  be  distinct  from 
each  other ;  ^  and  in  the  process  of  analysis  the  mind 
passes  from  one  to  another  in  rapid  succession. 

Effects  of  Attention. — Intensification. — The  most 
obvious  eftect  of  an  act  of  attention  is  to  intensify  the 
mental  state  towards  which  it  is  directed,  whether  that 
state  be  a  sensation,  an  idea,  or  an  emotion.  At  any 
moment  of  our  waking  life  we  are  subject  to  a  mass 
of  impressions,  tactual,  auditory,  and  visual,  pouring 
into  the  mind  through  the  several  senses.  Most  of 
them  are  so  feeble  as  to  escape  notice  in  the  crowd. 
But  when  I  direct  my  attention,  for  instance,  to  the 
pressure  of  the  ground,  or  of  the  chair,  or  to  the  colour 
of  the  table   on  which    I    am    writing,    the   sensation 

^  This  seems  to  be  the  view  of  St.  Thomas :  "  Intellectus 
cjuidem  potest  simul  multa  intelhgere/^r  modum  unius  non  autem 
per  modum  multorum.  .  .  .  Partes,  e.g.,  domus,  simul  cognoscuntur 
suh  qiiadiim  confnsionc,  prout  sunt  in  toto."  {Sum.  i.  q.  85,  ad  3.) 
Compared  objects,  he  teaches,  are  simultaneously  apprehended 
"sub  rationc  ipsius  comparationis."  Similarly  Mr.  Stout:  "The 
essential  is  that,  however  manifold  or  heterogeneous  the  objects 
of  my  thought  may  be,  I  must,  in  thinking  of  them,  simultaneously 
think  of  some  relation  between  them."  (loc.  cit.  p.  195.) 


350  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


emerges  at  once  into  vivid  consciousness.  The  possible 
augmentation  of  the  feeling  is,  however,  limited.  We 
cannot  increase  the  blueness  of  the  sky,  nor  the  loud- 
ness of  a  sound,  nor  the  weight  of  a  pound  above  what 
corresponds  to  full  normal  stimulation.  But  it  is 
probable  that  organic  pain  may  be  increased  by  a 
certain  physical  effect  of  attention  which  seems  to 
react  on  the  nerves  and  blood-vessels  of  the  locality 
on  which  observation  is  concentrated. 

Expectant  Attention. — The  intensification  of  the  force 
of  phantasms  of  the  imagination  is  still  more  remark- 
able;  and,  as  we  have  already  indicated,  is  often  the 
cause  of  illusion.  Since  the  reproduced  images  probably 
occupy  the  same  cerebral  centres  as  the  original  motor, 
visual,  or  auditory  sensations,  revival  of  the  image 
involves  a  rehearsal  of  the  former  neural  tremor,  and 
in  proportion  as  the  representation  becomes  more  vivid 
the  nervous  excitation  grows  in  strength  until  it  may 
issue  into  an  actual  repetition  of  the  former  experience. 
This  also  explains  the  shortening  of  reaction-time  in 
psychometrical  experiments  when  a  definitely  known 
event  is  looked  for.  Thus,  if  I  am  expecting  to  per- 
ceive a  particular  colour,  the  visual  faculty  is  adjusted 
for  its  immediate  reception  and  the  appropriate  brain 
cells  under  the  action  of  the  imagination  are  in  a  con- 
dition of  nascent  excitement  ready  to  respond  like  hair- 
trigger  pistols  to  the  faintest  stimulation.  In  fact  "  pre- 
perception,"  or  the  ante-dating  of  a  phenomenon,  is  not 
an  uncommon  illusion  when  expectation  of  a  particular 
event  is  in  an  acute  stage. 

Distinctness. — But  more  important  from  an  intel- 
lectual point  of  view  is  the  increased  distinctness  which 
attention  sheds  upon  its  objects.  It  affects  this  by 
clarifying  the  relations  of  which  the  observed  phenomenon 
is  the  centre.  It  brings  under  our  notice  the  various 
threads  by  which  this  object  is  interwoven  with  the 
web  of  our  already  acquired  knowledge.  Relations  of 
similarity  and  contrast,  of  causality  and  dependence, 
of  action  and  reaction,  rational  connexions  of  every 
kind  to  which  mere  sensuous  intuition  is  blind,  reveal 
themselves    beneath    the   light    of    this   higlier    mental 


ATTENTION  AND   APPERCEPTION.  351 

energy,  and  what  was  before  a  confused  mass  of 
sensuous  impression,  becomes  now  a  consciously  unified 
object — a  well  defined  thing. 

Attention  and  Genius. — This  illuminating  power  of  atten- 
tion by  which  the  obscure  and  dimly  discerned  relations  of 
certain  ideas  are  elevated  into  vivid  consciousness  is  the  great 
parent  oi  invention  and  discovery.  By  continued  fixation  of  our 
intellectual  gaze  upon  an  object,  its  connexions  with  its 
surroundings  become  more  clearly  realized  ;  possible  explana- 
tions of  particular  facts  suggest  themselves ;  and  their  validity 
is  verified  or  disproved  b}^  reasoning  out  the  consequences. 
The  importance  of  this  faculty  in  original  work  of  all  kinds 
is  so  great,  that  in  many  celebrated  definitions  we  find  genius 
and  poii>er  of  attention  made  synonymous  with  each  other. 
Thus  Hamilton  teaches  that  "the  difference  between  an 
ordinary  mind  and  the  mind  of  a  Newton  consists  principally 
in  this,  that  the  one  is  capable  of  the  application  of  a  more 
continuous  attention  than  the  other."  {Metaph.\o\.  I.  p.  256.) 
Helvetius  defined  genius  as  "nothing  but  continued  atten- 
tion"— line  attention  suivie ;  Buff'on  as  une  tongue  patience. 
Newton  ascribed  his  own  successes  to  patient  attention  more 
than  to  any  other  talent ;  whilst  the  definition  of  genius 
by  another  great  mind  as,  "  an  infinite  capacity  of  taking 
pains,"  is  well  known.  This  complete  identification  of  the 
two  aptitudes  is  an  error.  Recent  writers  justly  insist  on 
the  spontaneous  non-voluntary  character  of  the  outpourings 
of  genius;  whilst  Mr,  F.  Myers  and  certain  German  philoso- 
phers would  connect  this  faculty  with  a  somewhat  mystic 
theory  of  a  subconscious  mental  life, — a  second  subliminal  or 
subterranean  personality  which  occasionally  emerges  above 
the  surface  of  consciousness  in  dreams,  hysteria,  and  the 
hypnotic  state.  The  truth  seems  to  be  that,  although  genius 
has  its  source  in  the  native  endowments  of  the  mind,  its 
most  impressive  and  fruitful  achievements  are  only  accom- 
plished by  the  exercise  of  a  rare  degree  of  sustained  con- 
centration, whilst  this  very  concentration  is  possible  only  to  a 
prolific  intellect  rich  and  fertile  in  ideas. 

Retention. — A  further  effect  of  attention  is  increased 
retentiveness.  Events  not  attended  to  fade  so  quickly 
from  memor}^  that,  as  in  the  case  of  automatically 
winding  one's  watch,  a  man  is  often  completely 
oblivious  of  the  action  immediately  afterwards.  If  we 
wish  to  fix  in  our  mind  a  line  of  poetry,  a  person's 
address,  or  his  face,  we  concentrate  our  attention  on 


352  RATIOXAL    LIFE. 


the  object  to  be  remembered.  In  doing  so,  we  not  only 
prolong  and  intensify  the  impression,  but  we  associate 
it  with  other  experiences,  we  assimilate  it  into  the 
general  system  of  our  mental  life.  In  Herbartian 
language,  we  apperceive  it.  Attention  thus  both  accele- 
rates mental  acquisition  and  secures  permanence. 
Twenty  repetitions  of  a  lesson  whilst  the  mind  is 
careless  and  inattentive  have  not  the  efficiency  of  one 
performed  when  our  whole  energy  is  concentrated  on 
the  subject  in  hand. 

Physiological  conditions.; — Regarding;  the  physiological 
counterpart  of  attention  there  is  much  speculation  and  little 
knowledge.  Evidence  of  a  general  character  renders  the  follow- 
ing statements  probable  :  (i)  During  periods  of  intellectual 
concentration  there  is  an  increased  flow  of  blood  to  the  brain 
and  heightened  activity  of  the  cells  which  compose  the 
cortical  substance.  (2)  The  adjustment  of  the  sense-organs 
and  the  bodily  strain  which  often  accompany  a  process  of 
attention  involve  an  innervation  of  the  cerebral  motor-centres 
subservient  to  these  particular  movements.  (3)  Direction  of 
attention  to  a  particular  sensation  seems  to  stimulate  circula- 
tion and  neural  functioning  throughout  the  portion  of  the 
organism,  central  and  peripheral,  engaged  in  the  experience. 
(4)  The  same  seems  to  hold  in  regard  to  reproduced  images 
when  they  are  the  object  of  attention.  Thus,  if  I  fix  my 
thought  on  some  particular  word,  the  appropriate  ideational 
motor  and  auditory  centres,  that  is,  the  group  of  cerebral 
cells  which  minister  to  the  production  of  this  particular  sound, 
are  probably  excited  to  greater  activity.  These  various 
physical  changes  are,  however,  the  ejfed  rather  than  the  cause 
or  neural  correlate  of  the  act  of  attention  proper.  Of  the 
latter  nothing  is  really  known  as  certain. 

Physiological  manuals  not  infrequently  indulge  in  graphic 
accounts  of  "  attention-centres,"  and  of  successive  groupings 
of  neural  currents  in  cerebral  stations  arranged  in  an  ascend- 
ing order  of  dignity  and  complexity  like  local,  provincial,  and 
city  telegraph  offices,  with  a  great  presiding  metropolitan 
centre  in  the  frontal  region  of  the  brain.  Such  descriptions 
are  purely  mythological.  They  may,  of  course,  afford  help 
to  the  imagination — like  a  coloured  picture  of  an  angel. 
But  unless  the  reader  is  reminded  that  they  are  mere  con- 
jectures without  any  evidence,  or  even  prospect  of  evidence, 
to  establish  their  truth,  they  are  sure  to  mislead.  The  sort 
of  knowledge  which  we  really  possess  concerning  the  brain 
will  be>"dicated  in  our  section  on  the  localization  of  cerebral 


ATTENTION  AND   APPERCEPTION.  353 

functions.  If  certain  areas  of  the  cerebral  matter  are  stimu- 
lated or  extirpated,  certain  corresponding  movements  and 
sensations  and  images  are  excited  or  inhibited.  Ihat  is 
almost  the  sum  total  of  present  scientific  knowledge  concerning 
the  subject. 

Pleasure  and  Pain. — The  relation  of  attention  to 
feeling  can  be  readily  gathered  from  Aristotle's  theory 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  given  in  an  earlier  chapter. 
Pleasure  accompanies  spontaneous  or  easy  volitional 
attention,  increasing  in  proportion  to  the  vigour  of  the 
activity  until  the  energy  becomes  strained  or  fatigued. 
On  the  other  hand,  forced  attention,  thwarted  attention, 
and  the  struggle  against  distraction,  monotony,  or 
weariness  are  painful  experiences.  Novelty  pleases, 
both  by  affording  pleasant  relief  and  by  awakening  a 
fresh  energy.  If  a  particular  exercise  of  attention  prove 
agreeable,  the  activity  is  stimulated  and  increased ; 
if  it  result  in  pain,  especially  of  a  monotonous  character, 
the  exertion  is  depressed.  I3ut  acute  pain  tends  to  focus 
upon  itself  the  whole  available  energy  of  consciousness 
and  thereby  to  inhibit  all  other  intellectual  operations.'* 
Such  cases,  however,  are  rather  instances  of  purely 
painful  feeling  in  which  rational  activity  proper  is 
suspended.  Fixed  ideas,  disagreeable  recollections, 
and  sharp  griefs  often  exert  a  violent  painful  fasci- 
nation on  the  mind,  which  renders  it  almost  impossible 
to  get  rid  of  the  unpleasant  thought. 

Interest. — We  attend  readily  to  some  subjects  because 
they  are  interesting;  and  they  possess  interest  because 
they  afford  us  pleasure  or  a  particular  kind  of  pain. 
Some  psychologists  would  completely  identify  interest 
and  attention,  maintaining  that  to  attend  to  an  object 
and  to  be  interested  are  the  same  thing.  Still,  ordinary 
language  recognizes  a  difference.  Whereas  attention  is 
transitory,  interest  may  be  permanent ;  thus  we  can  retain 
interest  in  a  science  to  which  we  have  not  devoted 
attention  for  a  considerable  period.  Moreover,  we 
easily  concentrate  our  attention  on  a  particular  subject 

4    "  Si    sit    dolor    intensus    impeditur    homo    ne   tunc   aliquid 
addiscere    posset.      Et    tantum   potest    intendi    quod    nee    etiam 
instanti  dolore  potest  homo  aliquid  considerare  etiam  quod  prius 
scivit."  (St. Thomas,  Sum.  1-2.  q.  37.  a.  i.) 
X 


354  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


because  it  interests  us ;  it  is  not  immediately  interest- 
ing because  we  direct  our  attention  towards  it.  Common 
thought  in  fact  seems  to  identify  interest  with  a  pecuHar 
attraction  exerted  by  certain  subjects  of  consideration 
in  virtue  of  associated  pleasurable  or  painful  experi- 
ences in  the  past.  Thus,  even  an  elementary  knowledge 
of  Botany  or  Geology  gives  a  new  "interest"  to  a 
walk  in  the  country,  and  the  fact  of  having  read  one 
of  Scott's  novels  makes  Edinburgh  quite  a  different  city 
to  the  visitor. 

Education. — From  all  this  we  see  the  importance 
of  the  mental  function  of  attention  from  an  educa- 
tionalist standpoint.  Without  some  degree  of  attention 
intellectual  acquisition  of  any  kind  is  impossible  ;  and  in 
proportion  as  this  power  is  brought  more  under  com- 
mand, so  is  progress  more  rapid  and  more  solid.  The 
child  at  first  finds  great  difficulty  in  controlling  his 
attention,  especially  for  any  length  of  time.  It  is,  there- 
fore, the  office  of  the  teacher  to  help  these  first  feeble 
efforts  by  awakening  interest  in  the  pupil's  tasks.  Skill 
in  illustrations  that  are  homely  3^et  novel,  ingenuity 
in  connecting  the  lesson,  or  parts  of  it,  with  subjects  of 
the  child's  previous  experience  or  reading — especially 
with  the  stories  in  which  he  hc.s  taken  pleasure — ^judg- 
ment in  changing  the  subject,  or  enlivening  it  by  a  joke 
or  anecdote  when  the  class  is  growing  weary,  tact  in 
utilizing  incidental  points  that  turn  up  to  enforce  some 
practical  or  moral  truth,  are  all  so  many  means  ot 
stimulating  and  sustaining  attention.  But  the  educa- 
tion of  the  faculty  of  attention  is  even  more  important 
as  a  part  of  moral  training.  It  is  by  control  of  our 
attention  that  we  can  determine  which  of  two  con- 
flicting motives  shall  prevail.  B}^  the  free  effort  of  our 
attention  we  keep  steadily  before  our  minds  the  claims 
of  dut3s  or  the  consideration  of  permanent  happiness 
when  impulse  surges  up  within,  or  seductive  pleasure 
assails  us  from  without ;  and  the  strong-willed  man  is  he 
who  can  keep  his  attention  riveted  to  some  abiding 
rational  motive  that  gives  stability  to  his  deliberately 
formed  resolve,  and  thus  remains  unshaken  by  gusts  of 
passion  or  transitory  cravings  of  sense. 


I 


ATTENTION   AND   APTERCEPTION .  355 


Are  there  Unconscious  Modifications  of  the  Mind  ? — Con- 
nected with  the  topic  of  attention,  is  that  of  latent  mental 
operations.  Notwithstanding  the  superstitions  dread  of  meta- 
physics, which  infects  all  recent  psychology,  no  really 
intelligible  answer  can  be  offered  to  this  much  discussed 
question  unless  we  know  what  is  meant  by  "  mind  "  and  by 
"  modification  of  mind ;  "  and  these  queries  inevitably  carry 
us  into  Philosophy.  If  we  start  with  the  great  majority  of 
empirical  psychologists  by  defining  the  mind  as  "the  entire 
collection  of  our  conscious  states,"  or  "  the  total  stream  ot 
our  conscious  life,"  then  obviously  an  affirmative  reply  would 
involve  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Or  even  if  prescinding  from 
the  inquiry  as  to  the  nature  of  the  soul,  we  define  a  "  mental 
modification"  as  a  "  conscious  state,"  there  can  be  no  further 
dispute.  Still  such  a  summary  disposal  of  the  question 
merely  ignores  a  very  genuine  problem.  But  if  by  mind,  or 
soul,  we  understand  a  real  beiiif^  other  than  the  series  of 
"  phenomena  "  or  "  conscious  states,"  and  if  we  then  propose 
the  inquiry  thus  :  Do  there  take  place  any  real  activities,  processes, 
or  energizings  of  the  mind  of  which  ice  are  completely  unconscious  ? 
the  question  is  no  longer  meaningless. 

In  the  first  place,  that  some  mental  operations  happen 
without  their  being  apprehended  by  the  explicitly  reflex 
activity  of  ^^'//-consciousness  is  indubitable.  For  instance, 
the  self-conscious  element  in  the  percipient  act  of  the 
spectator  who  watches  the  finish  of  an  exciting  race  is 
reduced  to  nil.  It  is  also  indisputable  that  there  enters 
into  the  texture  of  our  normal  conscious  existence  a 
multitude  of  sub-conscious,  or  obscure  mental  processes 
so  dim  and  indistinct  as  to  be  at  best  only  very  faintly 
realized.  Our  emotional  temperament  and  our  normal  moral 
disposition  is  largely  determined  by  such  sub-conscious  influ- 
ences. But  when  we  come  to  the  question  as  to  the  reality 
of  latent  activities  of  the  mind  completely  below  the  surface 
of  consciousness,  there  is  no  longer  agreement  among 
psychologists.  The  following  arguments  have  been  ad- 
vanced : 

For  Unconscious  Modifications.— (i)  The  reality  oi  minima 
visibilia,  audibilia,  etc.— the  fact  that  our  ordinary  sensations 
of  sight,  sound,  and  the  rest,  arise  out  of  an  aggregate  of 
elementary  impressions  occasioned  by  combinations  of 
stimuli  separately  unperceivable.  Thus  the  leaves  of  the 
forest,  individually  indiscernible,  each  contribute  to  the 
general  presentation  of  colour.  Neural  excitations  that  are 
iust  too  feeble  or  too  brief  to  result  in  a  sentient  state  which 
rises  above  the  threshold  of  consciousness  must,  it  is  main- 
tained, have  a  real  effect  upon  the  mind.     (2)  That  such  an 


356  RATIONAL   LIFE, 


effect  though  unconscious  is  real,  it  is  urged,  is  often  proved 
by  the  effect  of  the  sudden  cessation  of  the  unobserved 
stimulus.  Thus  the  miller,  though  unconscious  of  the  sound 
of  the  mill-wheel,  is  awakened  at  once  by  its  stopping. 
(3)  The  effect  of  a  mere  act  of  attention  in  evoking  into 
distinct  consciousness  experiences  hitherto  unnoticed,  as  for 
instance  a  headache,  or  the  pressure  of  my  back  against 
the  chair,  points  to  their  previous  reality  as  mental  impres- 
sions though  unconscious.  (4)  The  facts  of  habit,  acquired 
skill,  and  dexterity.  Complex  operations  seemingly  automatic 
which  were  originally  effected  by  conscious  effort  must,  it  is 
alleged,  be  still  performed  under  the  guidance  and  control  of 
the  mind  though  acting  unconsciously.  Similarly  unconscious 
inferences  enter  into  our  acquired  perceptions.  (5)  The 
effects  of  unconscious  trains  of  thought  by  which  reminis- 
cences of  events  long  forgotten,  or  unnoticed  at  the  timxC,  or 
the  solution  of  problems  are  suddenly  presented  to  the  mind. 
(6)  Abnormal  phenomena  of  hysterical  patients,  deferred  or 
post-hypnotic  suggestions,  somnambulistic  feats,  negative 
illusions,  or  artificially  induced  anaesthesia — in  a  word,  a 
multitude  of  actions  fulfilling  the  conditions  of  "having  all 
the  characteristics  of  a  psychological  fact  save  one — i.e.,  they 
are  always  unnoticed  by  the  agent  himself  at  the  very  time 
when  he  performs  them."^ 

Against  such  Modifications. — It  is  argued  (i)  that  the 
facts  of  minima  sensibilia  merely  prove  that  the  normal 
physical  stimulus  of  a  sensation  must  possess  a  certain  quan- 
tity of  strength  before  consciousness  is  awakened,  but  when 
that  limit  is  passed  the  eftect  produced  is  of  a  completely  new 
and  completely  different  kind.  It  is  always  unlawful,  as  Mill 
has  shown,  to  ascribe  separate  fragments  of  such  a  total 
"  heteropathic  effect "  to  separate  fragments  of  the  cause. 
Similarly,  though  successive  increments  of  heat  will  finally 
cause  ice  to  melt  and  then  to  boil,  or  dynamite  to  explode, 
we  cannot  legitimately  conceive  each  small  addition  of  heat 
as  producing  a  corresponding  small  part  in  the  liquefaction, 
evaporation,  or  explosion.  (2)  The  positive  effect  of  the 
sudden  cessation  of  a  stimulus  is  explained  by  the  consider- 
able change  thereby  wrought  in  the  tension  of  the  nervous 
mechanism,  which  has  become  adapted  to  the  regular  action 
of  the  stimulus.  (3)  Attention  can  undoubtedly  increase  our 
sensibility  to  impressions  of  all  kinds,  but  this  only  shows,  it 
is  maintained,  that  the  particular  experience  was  felt  in  a 
faint  degree  before ;  or  that  it  is  only  imder  these  new 
psychological  conditions  it  begins  to  exist.     (4)  The  pheno- 

Cf.  Pierre  Janet,  L'Automatisme  Psycliologiquc  (Edit.  1898),  p.  225 


ATTENTION  AND  APPERCEPTION.  357 


mena  of  habit,  automatic  action,  acquired  perceptions,  and 
the  hke,  may  be  ascribed  not  to  psychical,  but  to  physio* 
logical  dispositions,  which  by  frequent  repetition  of  a  series 
of  movements  become  organized  and  embodied  in  the 
nervous  system  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  able  to  bring  about 
the  final  result  without  the  concomitant  action  of  the  mind 
during  the  process.  (5)  Sudden  reminiscences,  and  dis- 
coveries, the  effects  of  seemingly  unconscious  trains  of 
thought,  and  the  like,  may  be  similarly  explained  as  due  to 
unconscious  cerebration.  The  neural  processes  in  the  brain 
being  once  set  in  motion  may  run  their  course  unconsciously 
till  the  particular  cerebral  situation  is  reached  which  forms 
the  appropriate  condition  for  the  final  mental  act.  Or,  it  may 
be  held  that  the  intermediate  mental  links  do  actually  appear 
in  consciousness,  but  that,  like  the  perceptions  of  the  sepa- 
rate letters  of  a  word,  they  are  too  fleeting  and  of  too  little 
interest  to  be  remembered.  The  phenomena  of  dreams, 
somnambulism,  hypnotism,  and  the  like,  are  similarly  ex- 
plained as  actually  felt  at  the  time,  but  lost  by  inattention  and 
rapid  obliviscence. 

These  explanations  seem  to  us  to  afford  an  intelligible 
interpretation  of  most  of  the  facts  adduced.  Nevertheless, 
provided  it  be  recognized  that  no  composition,  amalgamation, 
or  coalescence  of  unconscious  units  can  constitute  a  conscious 
state,  we  do  not  see  any  conclusive  reason  for  denying  the 
reality  of  unconscious  activities  of  the  human  mind.  Further- 
more, adopting  the  Aristotelico-scholastic  theory  that  the 
Soul  is  a  substantial  principle  at  once  the  source  of  vegetative, 
sentient,  and  rational  life — a  doctrine  which  we  will  establish 
in  Rational  Psj^chology — this  view  seems  to  be  forced  upon  us. 
Latent  modifications  of  the  mind  must  be  admitted  at  least 
as  dispositions,  habits,  or  species  impresses,  to  account  for  the 
possibility  of  recognition  and  ordinary  knowledge.  The  vital 
processes  of  the  potentics  vegetativce — the  vegetative  functions 
of  the  Soul — are  normally  unconscious ;  and  the  scholastic 
conception  of  the  nature  of  the  action  of  the  intellectiis  agens 
seems  also  iu  harmony  with  the  doctrine  of  unconscious 
mental  energies.*^ 

Apperception.— (S'rt/^;T^vo/;'  =  to   notice  with   attention.) — 

^  The  literature  on  this  subject  is  abundant.  The  modern 
scholastic  writers  who  have  treated  it  most  fully  are  Sanseverino, 
Dynam.  pp.  944—982 ;  Farges,  op.  cit.  pp.  295—307,  390—395  ; 
Mercier,  La  PsycJioIogje,  pp.  154,  seq.  ;  Gutberlet,  Die  Psychologic, 
pp.  49 — 59,  166,  seq.  See  also  Hamilton,  Metaph.  "Vol.  I.  pp.  338, 
seq.;  Carpenter,  Mental  Physiology,  c.  xiii.;  Mill,  Exam.  c.  xv. ; 
James,  op.  cit.  Vol.  I.  pp.  162 — 175  ;  Mark  Baldwin,  op.  cit.  pp. 
45 — 48;   Pierre  Janet,  L'Automatisme  Psychologique,  pp.  223 — 304. 


358  NATIONAL   LIFE. 


Historical  Sketch. — Recent  ps3'chology  dwells  much  on  the 
"apperceptive"  activity  of  the  mind  ;  and  Herbart's  disciples 
in  psedogogic  literature  are  copious  in  illustrating  the  mental 
processes  now  designated  by  that  word.  As  it  is  connected 
with  the  present  subject  we  shall  treat  it  briefly  here. 
Leibnitz,  who  seems  to  have  been  the  first  to  employ  the 
term  apperception,  understands  by  it  strong  distinct  percep- 
tions, as  opposed  to  petites  perceptions — obscure  or  unconscious 
impressions.  He  only  means  by  it  developed  self-consciousness 
or  rejlex  cognition.  Kant,  borrowing  the  term  from  Leibnitz, 
employs  it  to  signify///^  innate  unifying  activity  of  self-conscious- 
ness, which  in  his  theory  of  knowledge  plays  so  important 
a  part  in  combining  the  chaotic  manifold  impressions  of 
sense.  This  self-consciousness  he  does  not  conceive  like 
Leibnitz,  as  emerging  with  the  development  of  mental  life, 
but  as  an  original  endowment,  an  a  priori  transcendental 
condition  of  all  rational  experience.  Apperception  with 
Herbart  and  his  followers  means  the  appropriation  of  fresh 
presentations  or  perceptions  by  groups  of  similar  ideas  per- 
sisting in  the  mind  from  previous  experience.  Writers  of 
this  school  have  usefully  enforced  the  truth  that  every 
cognition  leaves  a  certain  vestige  or  residual  effect  in  the 
mind,  which  modifies  its  future  percipient  acts.  A  newly 
imported  elephant,  for  instance,  is  apprehended  quite 
differently  by  a  London  child,  a  zoologist,  an  African  hunter, 
an  ivory  dealer,  and  a  menagerie  proprietor.  The  powers 
of  vision  may  be  approximately  equal  in  all  of  these  observers, 
yet  the  total  cognition  will  be  different  in  each  case,  because 
of  the  different  mental  habits  of  each. 

This  principle  was  familiar  to  the  scholastics  in  the  well- 
known  axiom,  Umimquodqiie  recipitur  secundum  modum  reci- 
pientis  ;  but  they  did  not  consider  to  what  extent  the  recipient 
mind  may  be  accidentally  modified  by  experience, — nor  how 
much  its  percipient  powers  are  enriched  with  the  growth  of 
knowledge  from  infancy  to  manhood.  Herbart,  therefore, 
notwithstanding  his  mythological  account  of  "  masses  of 
concepts"  which  apperceive  each  other,  and  push  each  other 
above  or  beneath  the  "  surface  of  consciousness,"  did  useful 
work  for  educational  theory  in  emphasizing  the  influence  of 
pre-existing  knowledge  in  the  process  of  cognition. 

Definition. — Psychologists  are  not  at  present  agreed  as  to 
the  precise  meaning  to  be  allotted  to  the  term.  Perhaps 
amongst  the  best  definitions  of  the  process  is  that  of  Karl 
Lange :  '■''Apperception  is  that  psychical  activity  by  which  indi- 
vidual perceptions,  ideas,  or  idea-complexes  are  brought  into 
relation  to  our  previous  intellectual  and  emotional  life,  assimi- 
lated with  it,  and  thus  raised  to  greater  clearness,  activity,  and 


ATTENTION   AND   APPERCEPTION.  359 

significancey^  Apperception  is  iu  fact  equivalent  to  conscious 
assimilation  in  a  wide  sense.  It  includes  identification,  recoj;- 
nition,  classification,  understanding,  interpretation,  and  all 
forms  of  knowledge  in  which  a  new  idea  or  group  of  ideas 
is  incorporated  with  an  existing  group/^ 

Nature  of  the  process. — For  instance,  on  awaking  I  dimly 
see  a  strange  object  in  the  middle  of  my  room.  In  the 
obscurity  it  resembles  a  very  big  dog  with  an  enormous  head. 
It  might  be  a  lion  couchant,  except  that  there  are  no  wild 
[  nimals  in  the  neighbourhood.  After  straining  my  eyes  in 
vain  to  discover  what  it  can  be,  I  wearily  desist.  Suddenly 
I  recollect  having  last  night  left  my  umbrella  open  in  order 
to  dry.  I  now  look  again  and  apprehend  tho  object  quite 
distinctly,  though  the  room  is  as  dark  as  before.  The  head 
and  shoulders  of  the  monster  are  formed  by  my  umbrella  ; 
the  body  is  my  half-open  portmanteau.  I  have  identified, 
recognized,  apperceived,  the  mysterious  being.  Or  to  borrow 
another  example  cited  by  Mr.  Stout :  Robinson  Crusoe  and 
his  man  Friday  suddenly  perceive  a  ship  off  the  shore.  To 
the  savage  it  was  "  only  a  dark  and  amorphous  blur,  a 
perplexing,  frightening  mass  of  details."  To  the  old  sailor 
Crusoe,  on  the  contrary,  it  is,  in  spite  of  his  poorer  eyesight, 
"an  object."  It  is  a  unity;  all  its  parts  combine  to  make 
a  symmetric  whole  which  coalesces  with  a  representation 
latent  in  his  mind.  It  fuses  with,  or  is  subsumed  under  a 
familiar  generic   notion  :    it  is   classified   as   "  Ship."      It  is 

'  Cf.  Apperception,  p.  41.  According  to  this  view,  all  perceptions 
except  the  first  simple  sensations  involve  apperception.  The  chief 
distinction  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  latter  term  accentuates  the 
element  of  assimilation  with  previous  acquisitions.  Lange  gives  a 
useful  historical  account  of  apperception  in  Pari  III. 

^  Mr.  G.  Stout,  in  his  able  and  interesting  chapter  on  the  subject 
{Analytic  Psychology,  Vol.  II.  c.  vii.),  distinguishes  apperception  from 
mere  assimilation,  as  involving  attention  and  a  "  noetic  "  or  conscious 
appropriation  of  the  new  element  which  is  absent  from  the  latter  : 
"  Where  attention  is  not  present,  there  is  no  apperception  but  mere 
assimilation,  because  there  is  no  noetic  synthesis.  Thus,  in 
automatic  actions,  the  impressions  which  guide  us  are  all  assimi- 
lated, but  not  apperceived.  .  .  .  Unless  there  is  some  difficulty  to  be 
overcome,  mere  assimilation  and  association  fulfil  the  office  of 
apperception.  .  .  .  For  the  most  part,  the  perceptions  of  size,  shape, 
and  distance  depend  on  processes  of  relative  suggestion  which  are 
independent  of  apperception,  except  in  the  earlier  stages  of  mental 
development."  (p.  118.)  The  distinction  is  convenient  for  some 
purposes,  but  very  difficult  to  maintain  owing  to  the  imperceptible 
degrees  by  which  cognitive  appropriation  fades  into  mere  automatic 
coalescence.  If  rigidly  adhered  to,  it  would  exclude  from  apper- 
ception much  of  what  is  usually  ascribed  to  that  process. 


360  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


apperceived.  Or,  on  reading  a  work  on  Psychology,  I  find 
apperception  described  as  noetic  assimilation,  noetic  incor- 
poration of  a  new  fact.  Suppose  I  have  not  met  this 
adjective  before,  I  feel  puzzled,  probably  irritated,  as  the 
chapter  proceeds  and  sundry  possible  meanings  vaguely 
suggest  themselves  to  my  mind.  At  last  I  recur  to  my  Greek 
and  recall  that  voelv  signifies  to  perceive.  Immediately,  the 
meaning  of  noetic  as  percipient,  cognitive,  becomes  clear. 
I  understand,  I  apperceive  it,  successfully.  Guessing  a  riddle, 
solving  a  problem,  harmonizing  conflicting  evidence,  con- 
struing an  author,  are  all  illustrations  of  apperceptive  activity. 
In  fact,  every  advance  in  knowledge  in  which  the  new  fact 
is  consciously  combined  with  former  experience  is  included 
under  the  term. 

Apperception  and  Education. — The  chief  merit  of  the 
Herbartian  school  is  their  constant  insistence  on  the  metho- 
dical or  systematic  direction  of  apperception  throughout  the 
whole  course  of  education.  Each  piece  of  fresh  knowledge 
must  be  thoroughly,  consciously  incorporated  and  assimilated 
with  knowledge  already  firmly  possessed.  Mere  mechanical 
memory  is  to  be  reduced  to  a  minimum,  whilst  "cramming," 
that  is,  the  hurried  piling  into  the  mind  of  disconnected 
parcels  of  information  which  are  not  properly  digested  and 
interwoven  with  cognitions  and  ideas  already  thoroughly 
comprehended,  is  to  be  condemned  as  most  injurious  to 
mental  development. 

Readings. — Besides  the  references  given,  see  also  on  Attention, 
Balmez,  op.  cit.  Bk.  IV.  §§  7 — 11  ;  Carpenter,  o^\  cit.  c.  iii. ;  Ladd 
Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology,  pp.  534—543. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  INTELLECTUAL  COGNITION  :    SELF, 
AND    OTHER   IMPORTANT    IDEAS. 

Reflexion  and  Self-Consciousness. — Attention 
end  reflexion  have  been  sometimes  contrasted  as  the 
direction  of  cognitive  energy  outwards  and  inwards. 
The  two  terms  may  thus  be  conveniently  dis- 
tinguished for  some  purposes,  but  it  should  be 
remembered  that  they  really  denote,  not  separate 
powers,  but  diverse  functions  of  the  same  intel- 
lectual faculty.  Reflexion  is  nothing  else  than 
attention  to  our  own  states ;  and  this  operation 
constitutes  the  exercise  of  self-consciousness.  Self- 
conscionsness  may  be  defined  as  the  knowledge  which 
the  mind  has  of  its  acts  as  its  own. 

Grades  of  Consciousness.  —  We  can  discern 
different  forms  which  the  reference  of  a  state  to  a  Self 
assumes  in  the  several  stages  of  mental  life.  In  the 
merel}^  sentient  existence  of  the  infant  or  brute  animal, 
there  is  no  cognition  of  a  self.  There  is  only  conscious- 
ness of  sensations,  emotions,  and  impulses.  But  these 
states  are  not  apprehended  as  abstract  qualities.  They 
could  not  be  felt  as  states  without  a  subject  or  states  of 
no  subject.  Animals  are  pained  or  pleased,  suffer  or 
are  satisfied ;  and  this  can  only  be  because  the  pain  or 
pleasure  felt  is  theirs,  and  is  felt  by  them.  The  sentient 
being  is  conscious  that  it  is  pained ;  but  it  does  not  in 


362  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


any  way  distinguish  between  the  pain  as  a  state  and 
itself  as  a  subject  of  that  state.  It  feels  the  state  to  be 
its  own,  yet  never  formally  cognizes  it  as  its  own. 

When,  however,  we  reach  the  grade  of  intellectual 
life  we  meet  with  a  distinctly  new  fact.  We  find  an 
agent  which  not  only  is,  acts,  and  feels,  but  which 
knows  that  it  is,  which  is  aware  that  it  is  the  cause  of 
its  acts,  and  which  recognizes  that  its  feelings  are  its 
own,  though  not  itself.  But  this  final  stage  of  self- 
knowledge  and  complete  recognition  of  its  own  per- 
sonality is  probably  not  reached  by  the  child  until  its 
mind  has  attained  a  considerable  degree  of  development. 

Growth  of  the  cognition  of  Self. — The  infant  at 
first  leads  the  life  of  the  merely  sentient  animal.  The 
topography  of  even  its  own  organism  seems  to  be  onl}^ 
gradually  ascertained.  Throughout  the  first  year  the 
child  pinches,  bites,  and  strikes  its  own  body  and  other 
objects  indifferently.  Sometimes  it  continues  these  acts 
whilst  crying  from  the  pain.^  By  the  end  of  the  first 
year,  however,  its  organism  comes  to  be  pretty  sharply 
distinguished  from  other  objects.  As  experience  extends 
and  the  mental  faculties  ripen,  memory  comes  into  play; 
and  although  the  attitude  of  the  child's  mind  is  still 
mainly  objective,  awareness  of  a  Self  present  in  its 
various  states  becomes  more  and  more  completely 
awakened  into  life.  The  material  organism  is  still  the 
most  prominent  element  in  the  representation  of  Self. 
Indeed,  as  it  is  an  essential  constituent  of  the  human 
person,  the  body  always  remains  a  chief  feature  in  what 
we  may  call  the  abstract  or  quasi-objective  conception 
of  our  personality.  It  is  the  centre  of  all  the  child's 
pleasures  and  pains,  the  source  of  all  its  impulses,  and 
the  focus  of  all  impressions.  It  is,  too,  the  subject  and 
object  of  all  its  sensations  of  double  contact,  and  the 
one  enduring  figure  ever  obvious  in  the  field  of  vision. 
When  the  child,  early  in  the  third  year,  speaks  of  itself 
in  the  third  person,  it  is  probable  that  the  bodily  self 
is  still  uppermost  in  its  thought,  although  a  full  self- 
conscious  cognition  of  its  own  Ego  is  often  possessed, 
whilst    the   use   of  impersonal    language   in    regard  to 

*  Cf.  Preyer,  The  Development  of  the  Intellect,  pp.  1 89— 206. 


INTELLECTUAL   COGNITION.  363 

itself  may    be  retained,   especially  when  this  practice 
is  encouraged. 

Still,  the  child  could  never  come  to  know  that  it  is  a 
Self //'^;;/  the  outside  by  merely  elaborating  a  generalized 
conception  of  its  body  connected  with  its  past  history. 
This  may  be  a  preparatory  or  concomitant  process;  but 
the  real  discovery  of  every  Self  must  he  from  ivithin — the 
apprehension  of  the  Ego  hy  itself  and  in  its  states.  As  the 
thoughts  of  pleasures  and  pains  repeated  in  the  past 
and  expected  in  the  future  grow  more  distinct,  the 
dissimilarity  between  these  and  the  permanent  abiding 
Self  comes  to  be  more  fully  realized.  Passing  emotions 
of  fear,  anger,  vanity,  pride,  or  sympathy,  accentuate 
the  difference.  But  most  probably  it  is  the  dawning 
sense  of  power  to  exert  energy  or  to  resist  and  overcome 
rising  impulse,  and  the  dim  nascent  consciousness  ot 
responsibilit}^  which  lead  up  to  the  final  revelation, 
until  at  last,  in  some  reflective  act  of  memory  or  choice, 
or  in  some  vague  effort  to  understand  the  oft-heard  "  I," 
the  great  truth  is  manifested  to  him  :  the  child  enters, 
as  it  were,  into  possession  of  his  personality,  and  knows 
himself  as  a  Self-conscious  Being.  The  Ego  does  not 
create  but  discovers  itself.  In  Jouffroy's  felicitous  phrase, 
it  "  breaks  its  shell,"  and  finds  that  it  is  a  Personal 
Agent  with  an  existence  and  individuality  of  its  own,  standing 
henceforward  alone  in  opposition  to  the  universe.- 

The  developed  Mind's  consciousness  of  Itself. — 
Once  arrived  at  the  stage  of  formal  or  complete  self- 
consciousness — to  which  the  Scholastics  chiefly  confined 
their  attention — the  mind  habitually  becomes  cognizant 
of  itself  in  its  acts.  Cognition  of  self  is  thus  not  innate, 
as  some  have  erroneously  maintained.  Even  during 
mature  life,  in  the  absence  of  all  particular  psychical 
operations,  there  is  no  apprehension  of  self.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  mind's  cognition  of  its  existence  is  not 

2  J.  F.  Ferrier  insisted  with  much  force  upon  the  leading  part 
the  exercise  of  free-will  plays  in  the  realization  of  our  personality. 
{Introd.  to  the  Philos.  of  Consciousness,  Pt.  V.)  The  primitive  conception 
of  Self  must  be  feeble  and  obscure,  but  it  grows  in  strength  and 
distinctness.  Jean  Paul  Richter  gives  a  vivid  description  of  how 
"  the  inner  revelation,  '/  am  /,'  like  lightning  from  heaven,"  flashed 
upon  him.    But  such  infant  psychologists  are  unhappily  rare. 


364  RATIONAL  LIFE, 


of  the  nature  of  an  infeyence  from  its  activities — to  be 
formulated  in  Descartes'  Cogito  ergo  sum.  The  true 
view  was  clearly  and  concisely  stated  by  St.  Thomas. 
The  mind  apprehends  itself  and  perceives  its  existence  in  its  own 
acts.^  This  perception  is  of  a  concrete  reality.  In 
becoming  conscious  of  a  mental  state,  I  become  aware 
of  the  Self  as  the  cause  or  subject  of  the  state,  and  of  the 
state  as  a  modi^cation  of  the  Self.  Such  self-conscious 
activity  may  appear  either  as  an  implicit  concomitant 
awareness  of  self  during  a  mental  process  ;  or  it  may  be 
the  result  of  a  formal  reflective  act  in  which  the  mind 
deliberately  turns  back  on  itself.  In  the  former  case 
the  vividness  wuth  which  the  self  is  presented  varies 
much  in  different  acts.  Frequently,  when  our  interest 
is  keenly  excited  by  some  external  object,  or  when  we 
are  under  the  influence  of  certain  strong  emotions,  the 
notice  of  Self  becomes  so  faint  as  practically  to  dis- 
appear, though  memory  assures  us  that  these  acts  were 
ours.  But  there  are  other  mental  processes  in  which 
we  are  as  certainly  cognizant  of  the  Self  as  of  the  state. 
This  is  especially  the  case  in  active  operations,  whether 
of  thought  or  of  will.  In  a  difficult  effort  of  attention, 
for  instance,  I  am  distinctly  aware  that  the  act  is  mine, 
and  that  it  is  freely  elicited  and  sustained  by  me.  .  It 
is,  however,  in  the  deliberately  reflective  acts  of  self- 
consciousness  that  the  cognition  of  the  Self  and  of  the 
states  as  distinct  from  the  Self  becomes  especially  clear, 
as  is  seen  in  the  introspective  observation  of  any  mental 
phenomena. 

Still,  the  knowledge  of  the  mind  immediately  pre- 
sented in  such  internal  perception  is  ver}^  limited  and 
imperfect.  The  mind  thus  ascertains  directly  that  it 
exists,  that  it  is  a  unity,  that  it  abides,  and  that  it  is 
different  from  its  states.  But  it  cannot  in  this  way  learn 
what  is  its  inner  constitution — whether,  for  instance,  it  is 
material  or  spiritual.  Introspection  merely  furnishes 
the  data  by  diligent  study  of  which,    combined   with 

'■'  "  Quantum  igitur  ad  actualem  cognitionem  qua  aliquis  con- 
siderat  se  in  actu  animam  habere,  sic  dico  quod  anima  cognoscitur 
per  actus  suos.  In  hoc  enim  ahquis  percipit  se  animam  habere  et 
\'ivere,  et  esse,  quod  percipit  se  sentire  et  intelligere  et  alia  hujus- 
modi  vitac  opera  excrcere."  {De  Vcritatc,  q.  10,  a.  8.) 


INTELLECTUAL   COGNITION.  365 

reflexion  and  reasoning  upon  the  facts  supplied  by 
other  sciences,  we  can  define  and  determine  the  real 
nature  of  the  human  soul — the  chief  problem  of  Rational 
Psychology."* 

Abstract  Concept  of  Self. — After  the  realization  of  its 
personality  has  been  attained  in  fully  developed  self-con- 
sciousness, we  must  still  carefully  distinguish  between  the 
mind's  immediate  perception  of  itself  in  its  operations,  and  the 
abstract  quasi-objective  notion  of  his  own  personality  habitually 
possessed  by  every  human  being.  The  former  is  an  act  of 
concrete  apprehension,  in  which  I  cognize  myself  as  real 
cause,  or  subject  of  my  operations  or  states.  The  abstract  notion 
of  my  personality,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  conception  of  a  highly 
complex  character.  It  is  an  intellectual  abstraction  formed 
out  of  the  concrete  perception  of  self  combined  with  remem- 
bered experiences  of  my  past  life.  It  is  commonly  viewed  by 
me  in  a  quasi-objective  manner.  It  includes  the  self,  but 
accentuates  the  states  of  self.  It  gathers  into  itself  the 
history  of  my  past  life — the  actions  of  my  childhood,  boy- 
hood, youth,  and  later  years.  Interwoven  with  them  all  is 
the  image  of  my  bodily  organism  ;  and  clustering  around  are 
a  fringe  of  recollections  of  my  dispositions,  habits,  and 
character,  of  my  hopes  and  regrets,  of  my  resolutions  and 
failures,  along  with  a  dim  consciousness  of  my  position  in 
the  minds  of  other  "  selves." 

Under  the  form  of  a  representation  of  this  composite  sort, 
bound  together  by  the  thread  of  memory,  each  of  us  ordinarily 
conceives  his  complete  abiding  personality.  This  idea  is 
necessarily  undergoing  constant  modification  ;   and  it  is  in 

^  Here  again  St.  Thomas,  with  his  wonted  precision,  clearly 
distinguishes  the  two  questions  :  "  Non  per  essentiam  suam,  sed  per 
actum  suum  se  cognoscit  intellectus  noster.  Et  hoc  dtipliciter  :  Uno 
quidem  viodo  particulariter,  secundum  quod  Socrates  vel  Plato  per- 
cipit  se  habere  animam  intellectivam  ex  hoc,  quod  percipit  se  intel- 
ligere.  Alio  modo  in  universal!,  secundum  quod  naturam  humanae 
mentis  ex  actu  intellectus  consideramus.  .  .  .  Est  autem  differentia 
inter  has  duas  cognitiones.  Nam  ad  primam  cognitionem  de  mente 
habendam  sufficit  ipsa  mentis  praesentia,  quae  est  principium  actus, 
ex  quo  mens  percipit  seipsam  ;  et  ideo  dicitur  se  cognoscere  per 
suam  praesentiam.  Sed  ad  secundam  cognitionem  de  mente  habendam 
non  sufficit  ejus  praesentia  sed  requiritur  diligcns  et  subtilis  inquisitio. 
Unde  et  multi  naturam  animse  ignorant  ;  et  multi  circa  naturam 
animae  erraverunt.  Propter  quod  Augustinus  dicit  de  tali  inqui- 
sitione  mentis  :  Non  velut  absentem  se  quaerat  mens  cernere,  sed 
praesentem  se  curet  discernere,  id  est,  cognoscere  differentiam  suam 
ab  aliis  rebus,  quod  est  cognoscere  quidditatem  et  naturam  suam." 
{Sum.  I.  q.  87.  a.  i.) 


366  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


comparing  the  present  form  of  the  representation  with  the 
past,  whilst  adverting  to  considerable  alterations  in  my 
character,  bodily  appearance,  and  the  like,  that  I  sometimes 
say:  "I  am  completely  changed;"  "I  am  quite  another 
person,"  though  I  am,  of  course,  convinced  that  it  is  the 
same  "  I  "  who  am  changed  in  accidental  qualities.  It  is 
because  this  complex  notion  of  my  personality  is  an  abstrac- 
tion from  my  remembered  experiences  that  a  perversion 
of  imagination  and  a  rupture  of  memory  can  sometimes 
induce  the  so-called  "  illusions  or  alterations  of  personality," 
— a  subject  which  will  be  discussed  in  Rational  Psychology. 

Unity,  Continuity,  Discontinuity  of  Consciousness. — Fully 
developed  self-cognition  presents  to  us  in  its  perfect  form 
what  is  called  the  unity  of  consciousness,  but  which  might 
perhaps  be  more  accurately  described  as  the  consciousness  of 
Self  as  a  unitary  being.  This  feature  of  mental  life  should  be 
carefully  distinguished  from  continuity  of  consciousness,  with 
which  it  is  not  necessarily  connected.  When  viewed  in 
retrospect  our  past  conscious  life,  at  first  sight,  seems  to 
have  been  one  continuous  whole  without  gap  or  break.  And 
when  we  examine  recent  portions  of  our  waking  existence, 
we  find  that  there  is  a  real  continuity  between  successive 
states.  In  contrast  to  the  old  associationism  which  dwelt 
on  the  "  mental  chemistry "  by  which  originally  separate 
"impressions"  were  supposed  to  be  fused  together,  Dr. James 
Ward  insists  much  on  the  truth  that  consciousness  at  any 
given  time  is  a  "  presentation  continuum  "  of  which  the  parts 
simultaneous  or  successive  are  not  separated  "  as  one  island 
is  separated  from  another  by  the  intervening  sea,  or  one  note 
in  a  melody  from  the  next  by  an  interval  of  silence." '' 
Although  the  context  of  consciousness  is  constantly  altering, 
so  much  abides  the  same  alongside  of  the  changing  element, 
that  there  seems  to  be  no  break  or  interruption.  Accordingl}-, 
consciousness  is  frequently  likened  to  a  stream. 

We  must,  however,  not  be  misled  b_v  this  figurative 
language  into  forgetting  that  consciousness  is  not  really  con- 
tinuous. At  least  once  every  twenty-four  hours  there  is  a 
chasm — an  interval  of  something  "  disparate  from  con- 
sciousness." Our  mental  life,  as  a  whole,  is  made  up  of  parts 
separated  not  merely  as  the  notes,  but  as  the  successive 
tunes  of  an  orchestra  by  long  intervals  of  silence.  It  is  no 
more  a  continuous  stream  of  consciousness  than  a  year  is  a 
continuous  stream  of  daylight.  Further,  even  in  our  conscious 
life,  the  most  important  factor  both  in  its  intellectual  develop- 
ment and   in  its  moral  worth   lies   not   in   the  continuity  of 

^  "Psychology,"  Encycl.  Brit.  p.  ^5;  of.  G.  Stout,  Manunl  of 
Psychology,  p.  72. 


INTELLECTUAL   COGNITION.  367 


conscious  states ;  but  in  that  real  indivisible  unity  which  binds 
the  series  of  processes  into  an  individual  self.  By  this  unity 
of  consciousness  we  mean  the  fact  that  our  various  mental 
states,  simultaneous  and  successive,  continuous  or  discrete, 
present  and  past,  like  and  unlike,  are  all  apprehended  as 
combined  and  centred  in  that  one  indivisible  point  which  we 
call  Self.  Or,  from  another  point  of  view,  we  may  describe 
it  as  that  unifying  activity  of  intellect  which  refers  all  states 
to  the  conscious  self.  A  horse,  perhaps  even  a  worm, 
resembles  man  in  continuity,  but  not  in  unity  of  consciousness. 
On  the  other  hand,  were  man's  conscious  activity  broken  by  a 
hundred  complete  gaps  each  day,  provided  that  the  U7ider- 
lying  unity  were  preserved,  the  development  of  rational  Hfe 
could  proceed  as  at  present.  It  is  this  indivisible  unity  and 
not  the  continuity  of  consciousness  which  renders  possible 
comparison,  judgment,  reasoning,  and  recognition  of  identity 
between  the  present  and  the  past.  It  is  this  same  unity 
which  gives  a  meaning  to  expectation.  This  it  does  too,  as 
well  in  the  appetitive  as  in  the  cognitive  sphere  of  life.  My 
desires,  resolutions,  hopes,  and  fears  all  have  to  do  with  a 
future  in  which  this  same  indivisible  /  am  to  be  engaged.  The 
continuity  or  cessation  of  consciousness  during  the  inter- 
vening period  is  of  httle  concern,  but  the  identity  of  the 
present  self,  who  is  now  conscious  with  the  self  of  the  future 
experience,  is  felt  to  be  of  vital  interest.  The  importance  of 
this  distinction  between  unity  and  continuity,  and  the  fact 
that  mental  hfe  is  not  merely  a  stream  of  consciousness,  will 
become  evident  when  we  examine  Professor  James's  theory 
concerning  nature  of  the  mind  in  Book  II. 

Genesis  of  other  Ideas. — Besides  the  idea  of  Self, 
there  are  certain  other  conceptions  of  such  philo- 
sophical importance  that  at  least  a  brief  treatment  of 
their  genesis  is  desirable  here.  The  chief  and  the 
most  disputed  of  those  not  already  dealt  with  are 
the  notions  of  Substance  and  Accident,  Causality,  the 
Infinite,  Space  and  Time.  We  shall  have  to  recur  to 
the  cognition  of  Substance  in  Book  II.,  but  the  nature 
of  our  knowledge  of  Time,  so  much  discussed  at  the 
present  day,  we  must  examine  at  some  length  in  the 
present  chapter.  For  an  adequate  defence  of  the  trust- 
worthiness of  all  these  notions,  we  must  refer  the 
reader  to  the  volume  on  Metaphysics  belonging  to  the 
present  series.  The  questions  of  genesis  and  validity, 
though  intimately  connected,  should  here  as  elsewhere 


368  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


be  carefully  distinguished.  The  former  more  properly 
pertain  to  Empirical  Psychology,  the  latter  to  Episte- 
mology,  Metaphysics,  or  Rational  Psychology. 

Substance  and  Accident. — Substance  is  defined  as  being 
which  exists  per  se,  or,  that  which  subsists  in  itself,  whilst 
Accident  is  that  ivhich  exists  in  another  being,  as  in  a  subject  of 
inhesion.  The  most  fundamental  element,  therefore,  in  the 
notion  of  suhstance  is  subsistence,  though  it  is  the  fact  of 
change  with  the  accompanying  permanence  amid  variation  that 
stimulates  the  mind  to  distinguish  between  substance  and 
accidents.  Both  correlative  ideas  are  the  product  of  intel- 
lectual experience.  Even  very  early  in  life  I  observe  things 
around  me  subsisting  in  themselves,  and  I  am  conscious  that 
I  possess  real  independent  existence.  Further  examination 
causes  me  to  notice  greater  or  lesser  changes  taking  place 
both  in  external  objects  and  in  myself.  As  I  begin  to  reflect, 
however,  I  become  assured  that  this  change  is  not  annihi- 
lation, and  that  some  constituent  element  must  remain  the 
same  amid  the  variations.  Internal  consciousness  manifests 
to  me  my  own  substantial  sameness  amid  my  transient 
mental  states,  and  reflexion  on  the  evidence  afforded  by  my 
external  senses  enables  me  to  perceive  the  necessity  of  such 
an  enduring  identity  underlying  the  transitory  qualities  of 
material  objects.  The  reflexion  required  is  not  of  a  very 
dehberate  or  laborious  character.  It  is  a  spontaneous 
activity  of  the  rational  mind.  The  shape  and  temperature 
of  the  piece  of  wax  in  the  child's  hands,  the  position  and 
colour  of  objects  before  his  eyes  vary  from  moment  to 
moment,  but  the  substantiality  of  the  object  reveals  itself  to 
his  intellect.  Although  the  ideas  of  accident  and  substance 
were  first  wrought  out  very  slowly,  in  mature  life  the  appre- 
hension of  a  necessarily  enduring  element  amid  the  fluctuating 
phenomena  is  so  easy  and  rapid,  that  it  may  fairly  be  described 
as  an  intellectual  intuition. 

Causality. — The  notion  of  causality  is  connected  with  that 
of  substance,  and  can  be  attained  only  by  rational  free 
beings.  Sensuous  perception  acquaints  us  with  successive 
phenomena,  but  from  this  source  alone  we  could  not  derive 
the  idea  of  causation  any  more  than  that  of  substantiality. 
On  the  other  hand,  this  concept  is  not  an  innate  cognition, 
nor  a  subjective  form  of  the  mind.  It  is  the  result  of  intellec- 
tual experience,  and  it  possesses  real  extra-mental  validity. 
We  may  distinguish  several  elements  or  factors  which  normally 
co-operate  in  the  formation  of  this  idea. 

(i)  In  our  internal  experience  we  are  conscious  of  change 
among  our   mental   states.     In  some  cases  of  variation  the 


INTELLECTUAL   COGNITION.  369 

order  of  succession  seems  casual ;  or  we  at  least  are  unaware 
of  the  force  which  determines  the  course  of  our  thoughts. 
In  others  we  are  conscious  that  ive  ourselves  control  and  direct 
the  current.  We  fix  our  attention  on  particular  feelings,  we 
combine  or  separate  thoughts,  we  form  complex  ideas,  judg- 
ments, and  reasonings.  In  all  these  processes  we  apprehend 
ourselves  as  efficient  agents,  and  we  immediately  cognize  the 
results  as  products  of  our  personal  energy.  Causality  is  thus 
concretely  presented  to  the  mind  in  the  most  intimate  manner 
in  each  individual  deliberate  act. 

(2)  This  experience  alone  would  be  sufficient  to  originate 
the  conception  of  causation,  but  other  factors  assist  in  its 
elaboration.  Combined  internal  and  external  observation  is 
constantly  revealing  to  us  the  fact  that  we  control  not  only 
our  tJionglits  but  our  movements,  that  our  volitions  liberate, 
direct,  and  sustain  the  outflow  of  physical  energy — that  when 
we  will  to  move  our  limbs  they  are  moved  in  proportion  to 
the  degree  and  quality  of  the  volitional  effort.  (3)  Our  senses 
make  known  to  us  the  action  of  material  objects  upon  us. 
We  feel  the  latter  as  foreign  and  acti\'e,  ourselves  as  passive 
and  recipient.  Sensations  of  pressure  and  resistance,  in  a 
special  manner  conduce  to  make  us  aware  of  force  or  energy 
— notions  essentially  involving  the  idea  of  causal  efficiency. 
(4)  Finally,  we  observe  changes  perpetually  taking  place  in 
the  world  around  us  :  we  notice  frequent  transitions  from  not- 
being  to  being  of  various  kinds.  As  our  powers  of  reflexion 
develop  the  intellect  grows  to  apprehend  more  and  more 
clearly  that  there  must  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  rise  of 
these  new  modes  of  being.  Repeated  observation  assures  us 
that  this  reason  of  the  origin  of  particular  forms  of  reality 
must  lie  in  particular  antecedents  which  have  been  alwavs 
followed  by  these  results,  and  then  the  intellect  cognizes  the 
changes  as  the  effects  of  the  agency  of  these  antecedents.  But 
it  should  be  remembered  that  our  notion  of  causality  rests 
ultimately,  not  on  the  perception  of  the  uniformity  of  changes 
in  the  external  world,  but  on  our  own  subjective  consciousness 
of  self-activity  and  our  constant  immediate  experience  that 
the  mind  exerts  real  influence  on  bodily  movement.  For  the 
reader  will  find  later  that  many  modern  philosophers,  in  the 
name  of  this  very  notion  and  law  of  causation,  actually  deny 
to  the  mind  any  causal  influence  whatever  over  bodily  move- 
ment, maintaining  that  only  material  agents  can  move 
matter.'' 

Sensuous  perception  could  never  afford  the  notion  of 
anything   more   than   succession,  which    is   radically   distinct 

6  Cf.  Balmez,  op.  cit.  Bk.  X.  §§  50—53. 


370  RATIONAL    LIFE. 


from  that  of  causality,  efficiency,  productiveness,  or  whatever 
we  Hke  to  call  it.  When  an  effort  of  attention  combines 
two  ideas,  when  one  billiard  ball  moves  another,  when  a 
steam  hammer  flattens  out  a  lump  of  solid  iron,  when  a  blow 
on  the  head  knocks  a  man  down,  in  all  these  cases  there  is 
something  more  than,  and  essentially  different  from,  the 
mere  sequence  of  two  phenomena:  there  is  effective  force — 
causal  action  of  an  agent  endowed  with  real  energy.  But  our 
conception  of  the  reciprocal  causal  action  which  obtains 
between  external  beings  is  analogical,  being  derived  in  the 
last  resort  from  our  immediate  cognition  of  our  own  causalityJ 
The  Infinite. — The  idea  of  the  Infinite  is  the  idea  of  the 
plenitude  of  all  being,  of  a  Being  who  contains  all  perfections 
without  limit.  This  notion  is  in  part  positive,  in  part  nega- 
tive;  and,  as  a  matter  of  experience,  it  is  conceived  by  us. 
From  both  internal  and  external  observation  we  can  form  the 
concept  of  a  limit;  and  then  of  limitation  in  general.  We 
can  also  form  the  idea  of  negation ;  the  recognition  of  the 
principle  of  contradiction,  the  apprehension  of  the  distinction 
between  being  and  non-being  involves  this  conception. 
Taking  now  the  ideas  of  being,  of  negation,  and  of  limit,  we 
can  combine  them  so  as  to  form  the  complex  conception, 
being  without  limit,  that  is,  infinite  being.  The  operation  is, 
therefore,  effected  by  the  intellectual  activity  of  reflexion  and 
abstraction.  The  natural  process  will,  however,  be  better 
seen  by  taking  a  single  attribute,  for  instance,  that  of  power. 
We  are  immediately  conscious  of  effort  put  forth,  and  of 
power  exercised  by  ourselves.  We  can  conceive  this  power 
vastly  increased,  its  boundaries  pushed  farther  and  farther 
back.  We  can  imagine  an  agent  capable  of  whirling  round 
the  earth  or  the  solar  system,  just  as  we  can  swing  a  piece  of 
string  round  our  finger ;  yet  we  are  fully  aware  that  the  power 
of  such  an  agent  may  be  as  rigidly  limited  as  our  own.  But 
we  are  not  compelled  to  stop  here  ;  we  may  think  "  greater 
than  that,  and  greater  than  that,  and  greater  n'itliout  any 
limits  or  boundaries  at  all.''  Here  we  have  the  proper  notion, 
faint  and  inadequate,  but  still  truly  representing  infinite  energy. 

"'  Kant  teaches,  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  of  the  rest  of  his 
system,  that  causality  and  substantiality  are  a  priori  categories  of  the 
understanding,— innate  moulds  or  conditions  which  regulate  our 
thinking,  but  have  no  validity  as  applied  to  things-in-themselves. 
Hume  and  his  followers  have  sought  to  explain  both  ideas  as 
products  of  "  custom  "  or  association.  If  consistently  followed  out, 
the  Kantian  and  Sensist  doctrines  alike  lead  to  absolute  scepticism. 
The  real  validity  of  the  three  notions,  causality,  substance,  and 
personal  identity,  must  stand  or  fall  together;  and  if  the  last  is  an 
illusion,  there  can  be  no  truth  attainable  by  the  mind  of  mar^. 


INTELLECTUAL   COGNITION.  37I 

Wc  can  similarly  form  the  notion  of  infinite  intelligence, 
holiness,  and  the  rest  ;  and  then  combining  tliese  u-e  can 
conceive  an  omnipotent,  infinitely  intelligent,  all-holy  Being. 
We  have  now  reached  as  perfect  a  conception  of  God  as  is 
possible  to  the  finite  mind.  It  is  absurd  to  describe  this  as  a 
purely  negative  notion.  We  ascribe  to  the  Reality  which  we 
seek  to  realize  to  ourselves,  every  perfection  we  can  conceive 
in  the  intensest  form  or  degree  we  can  imagine,  and  then  we 
say :  All  that  and  more  without  any  limit.  Such  a  conception 
wants  clearness  and  distinctness,  but  it  most  certainly  is  not 
purely  negative.  The  thought  of  an  attribute  being  increased 
beyond  the  range  of  our  fancy  without  any  limit  assuredly 
does  not  thereby  annihilate  the  positive  content  of  the  idea 
already  represented  to  ourselves. 

The  Idea  of  Space. — We   have  already  more  than  once 
touched    on    our    cognition    of    Space,    so    that    but    little 
additional  treatment  is  necessary  here.     W^e  have  established 
the  fact   of  an  immediate  or  intuitive  perception  of  surface 
extension  through  at  least  two  of  the  senses — sight  and  touch. 
We  have  also  shown  the  part  played  by  vwtor  sensations  in 
experiences  of  solidity,  or  the  third  dimension  of  bodies;  and 
finally,  we  traced  the  growth  and  development  of  our  know- 
ledge of  the  m.aterial  world.     But  the  abstract  conception  of 
Space  is  not  the  same  thing  as  the  perception  of  an  extended 
object,  or  a  particular  part  of  Space.     It  is  an  abstraction 
founded  on  such  individual  acts,  but  rising  above  them ;  and 
the  same  active  supra-sensuous  power  by  which  the  ideas  of 
whiteness,  truth,  the  infinite,  &c.,  are  formed,  operates  in  the 
present  case.  The  mind  observing  a  material  object  prescinds 
from  its  other  qualities,  and  thinks  only  of  the  co-existence  of 
its  parts  outside  of  each  other :  this  is  the  notion  of  extension  in 
the  abstract.     Of  course,  however,  as  in  the  case  of  the  ideas 
of  whiteness  or  being,  long  before  the  mind  has  elaborated  this 
reflex  abstract  notion,  it  has  directly  apprehended  objects  as 
extended.     Still,  even  the  abstract  notion  of  extension  is  not 
strictly  identical  with  that  of  Space.   The  extension  of  a  body 
is  a  property  which  belongs  to  the  individual  body  itself,  and 
moves  about  with  it,  just  as  its  other  qualities.    Space,  on  the 
contrary,  we  look  upon  as  something  fixed, — that  in  which 
bodies  are  contained,  and  through  which  they  move.  The  space 
of  any  particular  object  is  the  interval  or  voluminal  distance 
lying  between  its  bounding  superficies.       Now,  the  human 
mind  having  once  cognized  the  trinal  dimensions  of  material 
bodies,  and  observed  their  motions,  inevitably  passes  to  the 
conception  of  the  successive  intervals  or  spaces  which  they 
occupy ;  it  distinguishes  between  the  extended  thing  and  the 
room  whicl    the   thing  fills.      Apprehending  these   separate 


372 


RATIONAL   LIFE. 


parts  of  space  as  immediately  juxtaposed,  it  conceives  the 
continuity  and  the  consequent  oneness  of  space.  Further 
reflexion  enables  us  to  think  of  lines  produced  in  all  directions 
beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  existing  universe,  and  we  thus 
reach  the  concept  of  ideal  or  possible  space.  Noting  that 
there  is  no  limit  to  the  possible  production  of  such  lines,  we 
conceive  possible  space  as  infinite ;  not,  however,  as  a  positive 
existence  or  reality,  but  as  an  inexhaustible  potentiality.  The 
interval  filled  up  by  the  entire  physical  universe  is  termed,  in 
opposition  to  the  imaginary  region  beyond,  actual  or  real 
space. 

Cognition  of  Time. — Whilst  ancient  materialistic 
philosophers  conceived  Time  as  an  objective  real 
entity,  a  substantial  receptacle  in  which  all  events 
happen,  Kant  makes  it  an  a  priori  or  innate  form  of 
internal  sensibility,  a  purely  subjective  condition  of 
all  human  experience  which  possesses  no  extra  mental 
validity.  The  true  view  is  that  Time  is  neither  a  real 
independent  being  nor  an  innate  form  of  conscious- 
ness preceding  all  experience,  but  an  idea  which  is  a 
genuine  product  of  intellectual  activity.  It  is  like 
other  universal  conceptions,  an  abstraction  derived  from 
concrete  cognitions  of  change,  a  generalization  which 
has  a  real  foundation  in  the  real  changes  going  on  in 
the  world,  but  is  completed  by  the  intellect.^ 

Still  the  psychological  explanation  of  this  notion 
is  attended  with  peculiar  difficulties.  All  time  is  made 
up  of  past,  present,  and  future;  but  the  past  is  for 
ever  extinct,  and  the  future  is  non-existent,  whilst  the 
present  consists  of  one  indivisible  Now — a  single  instant 
that  perishes  as  soon  as  it  is  born.  Again,  since  time, 
unlike  space,  is  presented  to  us,  not  by  one  or 
other  faculty,  but  as  an  integral  part  of  all  our  experi- 
ences, both  internal  and  external,  it  is  not  easy  to 
isolate  this  cognition  and  trace  it  to  its  sources.  Time 
has  been  defined  as  "successive  duration,"  and  though 

*  Cf.  St.  Thomas:  "  Qua^dam  sunt  quae  habent  fundamentum 
n  re,  extra  animam,  sed  complementum  rationis  eorum,  quantum 
ad  id  quod  est  formale,  est  per  operationem  animae  ut  patet  in 
universali.  .  .  .  Et  similiter  est  de  tempore,  quod  habet  funda- 
mentum in  wo/m,  scilicet  prius  et  posterius ;  sed  quantum  ad  id 
quod  est  formale  in  tempore,  scilicet  numeyatio  completur  per 
operationem  intellectus  numerantis."  (In  I.  Sent.  Dist.  19,  q.  5,  a.  i.) 


INTELLECTUAL   COGNITION.  373 


faulty  in  some  respects,  this  definition  accentuates  two 
elements  involved  in  the  notion,  change  or  successive 
movement^  and  persevering  existence. 

Development  of  the  Notion. — The  conscious  life  of  the  infant 
is  hardly  more  than  a  succession  of  changing  states.  There 
is  little  looking  forward  or  backward.  The  child  is  absorbed 
in  each  experience  as  it  occurs,  vague  and  obscure  though 
these  experiences  are.  Here  we  have  a  succession  of  conscious 
states,  but  not  the  notion  of  time.  We  have  a  series  of  ideas, 
but  not  an  idea  of  a  series.  As  memory  grows  stronger  and 
the  powers  of  observation  and  comparison  develop,  the 
child  begins  to  notice  that  certain  experiences  recur  in  certain 
conditions;  particular  sights,  sounds,  gustatory  and  tactual 
feelings  are  repeated  under  similar  circumstances,  and  the 
judgment  is  elicited  that  the  objects  which  cause  these 
conscious  states  endure,  that  they  persevere  in  existence  when 
unobserved.  The  child  at  the  same  time  begins  to  be 
consciously  aware  of  its  own  abiding  identity  and  thus  attains 
the  idea  of  sameness,  and  of  persistent  existence.  To  a  being 
unaware  of  its  own  continued  identity  the  conception  of  time 
would  be  impossible. 

The  perception  of  variation  united  with  sameness  is  not, 
however,  the  whole  of  the  cognition  of  Time.  For  this  the 
mind  must  be  able  to  combine  in  thought  two  different 
movements  or  pulsations  of  consciousness,  so  as  to  represent 
an  interval  between  them.  It  must  hold  together  two  nows, 
conceiving  them,  in  succession,  yet  uniting  them  through  that 
intellectual  synthetic  activity  by  which  we  enumerate  a  collec- 
tion of  objects — a  process  or  act  which  carries  concomitantly 
the  consciousness  of  its  own  continuous  unity.  The  conception 
of  two  such  points,  with  the  intervening  duration,  gives  us  the 
unit  of  time ;  and  in  proportion  as  an  interval  is  broken  up 
into  periods  of  this  kind  by  transitions  of  consciousness,  the 
representation  of  the  time  occupied  expands.  The  transi- 
tions of  consciousness  are  not,  however,  discrete  or  detached 
events.  Nor  is  the  course  of  mental  life  during  waking  houre 
that  ©fa  continuous  even-flowing  river,  but  rather  an  eddying 
undulating  current  with  waves  varying  in  depth  and  force. 
We  are  thus  led  back  to  Aristotle's  celebrated  definition  of 
time  as  "the  number  of  movement  estimated  according  to  its 
before  and  after.'' 

The  infant  is  probably  first  stimulated  to  this  intellectual 
operation  by  the  regular  recurrence  of  certain  agreeable 
experiences  such  as  its  food,  the  presence  of  its  nurse,  or  the 
use  of  its  toys.  Thus  a  certain  series  of  incidents,  A  B  C  D 
ending  in  X  (the  satisfaction  of  some  desire),  has  happened 


374  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


repeatedly  in  the  past.  As  memory  acquires  strength,  the 
recurrence  of  A  B,  the  first  steps  of  the  process,  re-awakens 
in  a  faint  degree  the  recollections  of  C  and  D ;  and  much  more 
vividly  the  interesting  event  X.  There  is  thus  impressed 
upon  the  child's  mind  along  with  the  consciousness  of  the 
present  Nozv,  the  representation  of  a  subsequent  Noia,  the 
future  enjoyment,  together  with  a  simultaneous  notice  of 
interjacent  events  which  force  upon  it  the  intervening 
duration.  The  period  is  then  measured  by  a  subconscious 
or  implicit  enumeration  of  the  interposing  incidents,  and  the 
notion  is  complete.'' 

Subjective  and  Objective  Time. — The  child  first  measures 
time  by  the  number  and  variety  of  its  own  conscious  states ; 
but  the  estimate  is  of  the  vaguest  and  feeblest  kind.  Looking 
drowsily  backward  and  forward  to  a  particular  incident,  it  feels 
the  interval  to  be  longer  or  shorter  as  it  is  dimly  aware  of 
more  or  fewer  intervening  possible  experiences.  The  irregular 
character  and  varying  duration  of  conscious  states,  however, 
soon  bring  home  to  us  the  unfitness  of  these  subjective 
phenomena  to  serve  as  a  standard  measure  of  time.  There 
is  indeed  a  certain  rhythm  in  many  of  the  processes  of  our 

^  The  above  analysis  coincides,  we  believe,  with  Aristotle's 
doctrine  which  is  thus  developed  by  St.  Thomas:  "  Manifestum 
est,  quod  tunc  esse  tempus  determinamus,  cum  accipimus  in  motu 
aliud  et  aliud,  et  accipimus  aliquid  medium  inter  ea.  Cum  enim 
intelligimus  extrema  diversa  alicujus  medii,  et  anima  dicat,  ilia 
esse  duo  nunc,  hoc  prius,  illud  posterius  in  motu,  tunc  hoc  dicimus 
esse  tempus.  .  .  .  Quando  sentimus  unmn  nunc,  et  non  discernimus 
in  motxi  prius  et  posterhis,  non  videtur  fieri  tempus,  quia  neque  est 
motus ;  sed  cum  accipimus  prius  et  posterius  et  numeramus 
ea,  tunc  dicimus  fieri  tempus,  quia  tempus  nihil  aliud  est 
quam  numcrus  motus  secundum  prius  et  posterius :  tempus  enim 
percipimus,  ut  dictum  est  cum  numeramus  prius  et  posterius  in 
motu."  [Comm.  Physic.  Lib.  IV.  lect.  17.)  By  "movement" 
Aristotle,  as  well  as  St.  Thomas,  understands  all  forms  of  change, 
whether  subjective  or  objective — not  merely  external  sensible  move- 
ment as  many  modern  writers  imagine.  St.  Thomas  makes  the 
point  quite  clear,  as  well  as  the  error  of  supposing  that  we  can 
immediately  apprehend  a  "pure  empty  time :  "  "  Contingit  enim 
quandoque  quod  percipimus  fluxum  temporis,  quamvis  nullum 
motum  particularem  sensibilem  sentiamus ;  utpote  si  simus  in 
tenebris,  et  sic  visu  non  sentimus  motum  alicujus  corporis  exle- 
rioris,  et,  si  nos  non  patiamur  aliquam  alterationem  in  corporibus 
nostris  ab  aliquo  exterior!  agente,  nullum  motum  corporis  sentiemus; 
et  tamen  si  fiat  aliquis  motus  in  anima  nostra,  puta  secundum  succcs- 
sionem  cogitationum  et  imaginationuin,  subito  videtur  nobis  quod  fiat 
aliquod  tempus  ;  et  sic  percipicndo  quemcumqum  motum  percipi- 
mus tempus  ;  et  simiHter  e  contra,  cum  percipimus  tempus  simul 
percipimus  motum."  (Ibid.) 


INTELLECTUAL   COGNITION. 


373 


organic  life,  such  as  respiration,  circulation,  and  the  recurrent 
needs  of  food  and  sleep,  which  probably  contribute  much  to 
our  power  of  estimating  duration;  but  the  natural  objective 
tendency  of  our  minds,  as  well  as  our  early  perception  of 
the  regularity  of  certain  changes  in  the  external  universe 
soon  suggests  to  us  a  more  easily  observable  objective  scale 
of  measurement.  Accordingly,  the  relatively  uniform  move- 
ments of  the  heavenly  bodies  and  the  orderly  changes  of 
day  and  night,  of  tides  and  of  seasons,  have  come  to  con- 
stitute the  universal  chronometer  of  the  human  race,  and  in 
the  popular  mind  to  be  identified  with  time  itself. 

Relativity  of  our  appreciation  of  Time. — A  period  with 
plenty  of  varied  incident,  such  as  a  fortnight's  travel,  passes 
ra.pid\y  at  the  time.  Whilst  we  are  interested  in  each  successive 
experience,  we  have  little  spare  attention  to  notice  the  dura- 
tion of  the  series.  There  is  almost  complete  lapse  of  the 
"  enumerating "  activity.  But  in  retrospect  such  a  period 
expands,  because  it  is  estimated  by  the  number  and  variety 
of  the  impressions  which  it  presents  to  recollection.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  dull,  monotonous,  or  unattractive  occupation, 
which  leaves  much  of  our  mental  energy  free  to  advert  to  its 
duration,  is  over-estimated  whilst  taking  place.  A  couple  of 
hours  spent  impatiently  waiting  for  a  train,  a  few  days  in 
idleness  on  board  ship,  a  week  confined  to  one's  room,  are 
often  declared  to  constitute  an  "  age."  But  when  they  are 
past  such  periods,  being  empty  of  incident,  shrink  up  into 
very  small  dimensions,  unless  their  duration  be  over-estimated 
on  account  of  their  accidental  importance,  or  for  some  other 
reason.  An  occurrence  on  which  a  weighty  issue  hangs  seems 
to  move  slowly  on  account  of  the  microscopic  attention 
devoted  to  each  successive  moment  of  the  event.  In  retro- 
spect its  gravity  leads  us  to  over-estimate  the  time  required  for 
its  accomplishment,  and  causes  it  to  divide  us  by  a  seemingly 
wide  chasm  from  our  previous  life.  Long  periods  are  under- 
estimated ;  indeed  our  conception  of  a  number  of  years  is 
purely  S3mibolical.  Very  short  periods — fractions  of  a  second 
— are  generally  over-estimated.  Similarl}-,  recent  intervals 
are  exaggerated  compared  with  equal  periods  more  remote. 
Whilst,  as  we  grow  older  and  new  experiences  become  fewer 
and  less  impressive,  each  year  at  its  close  seems  shorter  than 
its  predecessor. 

Localization  in  Time. — Memory,  or  the  knowledge  that  a 
present  mental  state  represents  an  experience  which  really 
happened  to  us  in  the  past,  is  an  ultimate  fact  incapable  of 
explanation.  But  the  process  by  which  we  refer  the  experi- 
ence to  a  particular  section  of  our  past  history  is  open  to  at 
least  partial  analysis.      The  chief  factors  in  the  operation 


376  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


seem  to  be  the  following :  (i)  Finding  that  the  memory  of  an 
impression  wanes  luith  time,  we  tend  to  refer  the  more  obscure 
of  two  representations  to  the  more  distant  date.  Though  an 
element  in  the  calculation,  this,  by  itself,  is  obviously  an 
unsafe  criterion.  (2)  The  original  order  of  the  movement  of 
attention  in  any  mental  process  leaves  a  disposition  towards 
its  own  reproduction,  as,  for  instance,  in  repeating  the 
alphabet.  Thus,  there  is  a  peculiar  feeling  attached  to  the 
utterance  of  Y  due  to  its  formerly  following  X  and  preceding 
Z  in  consciousness ;  and  this  at  least  assists  us  in  locating 
that  letter  between  the  other  two.^*^  This  peculiar  quality  of 
consciousness  belonging  to  any  mental  state  through  its 
having  succeeded  some  particular  state  and  preceded  another 
constitutes  in  fact  a  local  "colouring"  or  sign,  by  virtue  of 
which  its  relative  situation  in  the  time-series  of  our  past  life 
may  be  determined.  The  fact  that  the  mind  tends  to  repro- 
duce events  in  their  original  serial  order  is  indisputable,  and 
helps  to  explain — if  explanation  it  can  be  called — how  we 
recognize  which  was  prior  of  two  reproduced  events  that 
originally  occurred  in  immediate  succession.  But  the  question 
remains.  How  do  we  determine  priority  between  two  utterly 
disconnected  past  experiences  such  as  a  toothache  and  a 
particular  interview  ?  (3)  The  answer  given  to  this  is  that  we 
ascertain  the  time-relations  of  minor  incidents  by  consciously 
connecting  them  through  contiguous  association  tvith  more 
important  events  which  have  themselves  been  associated  with 
public  dates.  Thus,  I  recollect  that  the  toothache  experience, 
though  more  vividly  remembered  than  the  interview,  occurred 
when  I  was  staying  with  certain  people  in  the  year  1890; 
whilst  the  interview  took  place  during  a  visit  to  London  in 
1897,  the  year  of  the  Queen's  Jubilee. 

Expectation  illustrates  the  same  principles.  For  instance, 
the  mind  having  experienced  the  series  of  incidents  A  B  C  D, 
on  the  recurrence  of  any  one  of  them  tends  to  revive  in 
imagination  its  successors,  and  the  mere  vivacity  of  the 
images  tends  to  generate  an  anticipation  of  their  realization. 
Apart  from  any  reasoning  process  there  can  be  awakened  iu 
the  imagination  a  state  of  sensuous  expectancy  in  the  human 
being  as  well  as  in  the  lower  animals  by  the  preliminary 
stages  of  some  familiar  operation.  But  besides  this  species 
of  sensuous  presentiment  originating  in  previous  association, 
we  are  capable  of  a  higher  form  of  intellectual  belief  in  future 
events,  which  springs  from  inductions  based  on  conscious 
recognition  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  and  the  principle  of 
causality.  This  constitutes  expectation  in  its  most  proper  sense. 

10  See  Dr.  Ward,  "  Psychology,"  Encycl.  Brit.  p.  66. 


INTELLECTUAL   COGNITION.  377 

It  involves  memory,  the  notion  of  time,  and  inference  from 
cause  to  effect.  In  addition  to  its  reference  to  the  future, 
expectation  differs  from  memory  by  its  active  and  emotional 
character.  The  real  interest  of  our  lives  lies  in  the  experiences 
which  are  to  come,  not  in  those  which  are  gone.  Consequently, 
there  is,  especially  in  the  keener  forms  of  this  state,  a 
stretching  out  of  the  mind  towards  the  things  that  are  before, 
an  eagerness  to  ascertain  what  is  about  to  happen  which 
takes  the  form  of  hope  in  regard  to  what  is  in  conformity  with 
desire,  and  fear  or  anxiety  with  respect  to  what  is  against  our 
wishes.  Both  emotions,  by  intensifying  the  vivacity  of  the 
imagination,  augment  the  force  of  belief,  and  so  we  are 
inchned  to  over-estimate  the  probability  of  events  which  we 
like  or  dislike  much. 

Readings.— On  Reflexion  and  Self-Consciousness,  St.  Thomas, 
Sum.  I.  q.  87,  also  De  Veritate,  q.  10,  a.  8,  9;  Kleutgen,  op.  cit. 
§§  102—120;  Balmez,  op.  cit.  Bk.  IX.  cc.  vii.  viii. ;  Ladd,  Philosophy 
of  Mind,  pp.  105 — 112;  Mivart,  On  Truth,  c.  ii.  ;  Piat,  La  Personne 
humaine,  c.  i.  On  the  Idea  of  Substance,  cf.  John  Rickaby,  Meta- 
physics, Bk.  II.  c.  i.  ;  Balmez,  op.  cit.  Bk.  IX.  cc.  i.  iii.  vii. ;  Stockl's 
Lehrbuch,  §  31.  On  Causality,  Rickaby,  op.  cit.  pp.  304,  seq. ; 
Kleutgen,  §§  300—303  ;  Balmez,  Bk.  X.  cc.  iv.  v.  viii.  xi.  xii,  xvi.  ; 
Stockl,  op.  cit.  §  45.  On  the  Idea  of  the  Infinite,  Rickaby,  Bk.  I. 
c.  vi. ;  Kleutgen,  op.  cit.  Ft.  V.  cc.  ii.  iii.— especially  §§  412—419  ; 
Balmez,  Bk.  VIII.  cc.  iii.  iv.  vi.  viii.  and  xv.  ;  Stockl,  §  27.  On 
Space  and  Time,  Rickaby,  op.  cit.  Bk.  II.  c.  iv. ;  Kleutgen,  §§  342— 

3^9- 


CHAPTER     XVIII. 

RATIONAL   APPETENCY. 

Rational  Appetency. — We  have  sketched  the 
chief  manifestations  of  Appetency  or  Conation  exhi- 
bited in  the  lower  forms  of  life  (c.  x.),  and  we  there 
distinguished  various  kinds  of  action  as  automatic, 
reflex,  impulsive,  and  instinctive.  We  shall  now 
resume  our  treatment  of  this  activity  as  exercised 
in  its  higher  grades.  Amongst  the  most  important 
of  these  is  Desire.  This  term  is  not  confined 
exclusively  to  inclinations  of  the  super- sensuous 
order,  for  many  yearnings  aroused  by  the  imagi- 
nation of  sensuous  pleasures  are  so  called. 

Desire  defined  and  analyzed. — Desire  may  be 
defined  as  a  mental  state  of  longing  ov  want  aroused  by  the 
representation  of  some  absent  good.  It  is  a  form  of  conscious- 
ness superior  to  and  more  refined  than  that  of  appetite  in 
the  modern  sense.  Unlike  the  latter,  it  is  not  a  blind 
organic  craving  limited  to  a  single  mode  and  definite 
range  of  activit3\  In  common  with  appetite,  it  involves 
a  species  of  discontent  and  longing,  but  its  object  is  the 
representation  of  some  knonni  good.  The  newly-born 
infant  is  the  subject  of  appetites  and  of  reflex  or 
instinctive  movements ;  but  it  is  incapable  of  forming 
a  desire.  The  first  step  in  the  development  of  the  power 
of  desire  is  the  awakening  of  the  cognition.  Some  sense 
is  excited  by  its  appropriate  stinuilus,  and  the  resulting 
experience   is   felt    to    be    agreeable.      A    bright    colour 


RATIONAL   APPETENCY.  379 


attracts  the  child's  eye,  its  food  tastes  sweet,  some 
reflex  or  instinctive  movement  affords  rehef  or  satis- 
faction ;  in  a  word,  an  experience  is  felt  as  good — as  in 
harmony  with  the  agent's  nature  or  some  part  of  it — 
and  there  is  immediately  evoked  a  tendency  to  prolong 
that  experience,  or  to  secure  a  fuller  possession  of  the 
object.  Should  anything  re-awaken  the  idea  of  such  an 
experience,  there  will  be  excited  a  tendency  to  realize 
again  the  agreeable  activity,  and  to  reproduce  the 
movements  by  which  it  was  previously  obtained.  Here 
we  have  the  fully  developed  state. 

Analysis  of  Desire  thus  understood  reveals  to  us 
three  elements:  (1)  the  representation  of  some  object 
or  experience  not  actually  enjoyed,  (2)  the  appreciation 
of  this  object  or  experience  as  goody  and  (3)  a  resulting 
tension  or  feeling  of  attraction  towards  the  agreeable 
object.  The  two  former  elements  are  rather  the  con- 
ditions, the  last  the  essence,  of  desire.  Desire  regards  the 
future,  and  so  aims  at  the  realization  of  the  ideal.  In 
proportion  as  our  acquaintance  with  various  kinds  of 
goods  extends,  so  the  field  of  desire  widens  and  longings 
multiply.  Whilst  the  physical  appetites  have  their 
birth  in  sensation,  and  are  satiated,  at  least  for  the  time, 
by  a  definite  quantity  of  appropriate  exercise,  desire 
emerging  from  the  activity  of  the  imagination  is  practi- 
cally of  indefinite  range;  and  in  a  rational  creature  who 
can  conceive  boundless  good  it  is  incapable  of  being 
fully  satisfied  by  any  finite  object. 

Is  Pleasure  the  only  object  of  Desire  ? — It  has  been  much 
discussed  in  recent  years  whether  all  forms  of  appetency  are 
only  towards  pleasure  and  from  pain.  Mill,  Dr.  Bain,  and 
sensationists  generally,  maintain  the  affirmative.  "  Desiring 
a  thing  and  finding  it  pleasant,  aversion  to  it,  and  thinking  of 
it  as  painful,  are  phenomena  entirely  inseparable,  or  rather 
two  parts  of  the  same  phenomenon  ;  in  strictness  of  language 
two  different  modes  of  naming  the  same  psychological  fact — 
to  think  of  an  object  as  desirable  (unless  for  the  sake  of  its 
consequences),  and  to  think  of  it  as  pleasant  are  one  and  the 
same  thing ;  and  to  desire  anything  except  in  proportion  as 
the  idea  of  it  is  pleasant  is  a  physical  and  metaphysical  impos- 
sibility,'"'^   Seemingly  unselfish  impulses  arc  merely  the  effect 

^  Mill,  Utilitarianism,  p.  57, 


38o  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


of  association.  Virtue,  like  money,  originally  desired  solely 
as  a  means  to  happiness,  is  later  on  pursued  as  an  end  in 
itself.  This  doctrine  has  been  effectively  refuted  by  numerous 
philosophers  from  Butler  to  Drs.  Martineau  and  Sidgwick  : 
(i)  Appetites  proper  are  cravings  whose  primary  object  is  the 
exercise  of  an  activity,  not  the  pleasure  thence  proceeding — 
e.g.,  the  formal  object  of  hunger  is  food,  not  the  subjective 
delight  of  eating;  though  of  course  by  a  reflex  act  this 
pleasure  may  be  made  an  end.  (2)  Many  desires  proper  are 
primarily  extra-regarding,  and  not  aiming  at  the  agent's 
own  pleasure — e.g.,  the  parental  and  social  affections,  sym- 
pathy, compassion,  gratitude,  wonder,  the  desire  of  knowledge, 
and  the  mental  activities  of  pursuit.  (3)  The  aim  of  rational 
volition  is  certainly  not  always  pleasure.  We  can  choose 
right  for  its  own  sake  against  the  maximum  pleasure.  The 
formal  object  of  appetite  is  the  good,  not  solely  the  pleasant ; 
it  includes  bonuni  honestum  as  well  as  boniim  delectabile.  We 
may  further  urge  (a)  the  hedonistic  paradox,  viz.,  that  the 
deliberate  pursuit  of  pleasure — the  only  rational  end  of 
egoistic  ethics — is  suicidal.  Thus,  the  pleasures  attached  to 
benevolence,  self-sacrifice,  pursuit  of  knowledge,  field  sports, 
&c.,  are  annihilated  if  consciously  set  as  the  end  of  our  act. 
(b)  The  assertion  that  all  these  now  apparently  disinterested 
impulses  are  originally  the  creation  of  pleasant  associations 
is  an  appeal  from  consciousness  to  ignorance,  and  is  by  the 
nature  of  the  case  incapable  of  proof,  (c)  The  most  careful 
observation  of  children  confirms  the  view  that  they  are 
subjects  of  many  extra-regarding  impulses.^ 

Motive. — With  the  multiplication  of  longings  there 
inevitably  arises  conflict  of  desires.  The  attainment  of 
an  immediate  gratification  may  clash  with  more  remote 
good,  or  duty  with  interest.  The  various  objects  which 
thus  excite  desire  are  called  motives.  They  include 
whatever  moves  or  influences  in  any  degree  the  Will.  The 
apprehension  of  any  object  as  desirable,  whether  it  be 
ultimately  preferred   or  not,  thus  constitutes  a  motive. 

2  On  this  subject  see  Sidgwick,  Methods  of  Ethics,  Bk.  I.  c.  iv. ; 
Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  Pt.  II.  Bk.  I.  c.  v.  and  Bk.  II. 
c.  i.  §  3  ;  James,  op.  cit.  Vol.  II.  pp.  549,  seq. ;  Mark  Baldwin,  Hand- 
book  of  Psychology,  Vol.  II.  pp.  325,  seq. 

St.  Thomas,  insisting  on  the  notion  of  good  {conveniens  naiura)  as 
wider  and  more  ultimate  than  that  of  pleasure,  considered  and 
rejected  in  advance  the  sensationist  doctrine;  commenting  on 
Aristotle,  he  urges  that  activity  (operatio)  is  prior  as  an  object  of 
appetency  to  pleasure,  which  is  a  consequence  of  the  former.  Thus  : 
"  Non  enim  fit  delectatio  sine  operatione   neque  rursus  potest   esse 


RATIONAL   APPETENCY.  381 


Strictly  speaking,  the  motive  is  not  the  physical  being 
possessed  of  objective  existence,  but  this  being  as 
apprehended  by  the  mind,  and  represented  as  under  some 
aspect  desirable.  The  force  of  a  motive  consequently 
fluctuates,  depending  on  the  vividness  with  which  it  is 
realized  in  consciousness.  Its  attractiveness  will  depend 
partly  on  the  quality  of  the  object  itself,  partly  on  the 
general  character  of  the  man ;  but  also  more  imme- 
diately on  the  extent  to  which  he  permits  or  causes  it 
to  absorb  his  attention  at  the  time. 

Spontaneous  Action  and  Deliberation.— By  far 
the  greater  part  of  man's  daily  actions  are  determined 
by  his  habits  or  usual  modes  of  thought  and  voHtion. 
UnrefleclTve' activity,  thus  issuing  forth  as  the  resultant 
of  character  and  present  motives,  may  be  termed  sponta- 
neous. Most  of  human  conduct  is  accordingly  the  out- 
come of  the  spontaneous  tendency  of  the  will.  The 
great  majority  of  our  actions  are  in  themselves  morally 
indifferent;  and  even  were  a  man  consciously  to  analyze 
his  motives,  he  would  find  no  sufficient  reason  foi 
interfering  with  the  normal  direction  of  his  inclination 
formed  by  habitual  action.  Many  of  these  acts,  more- 
over, escape  consciousness  altogether,  as,  for  instance, 
the  separate  movements  in  the  operations  of  dressing, 
eating,  or  walking ;  but  even  in  regard  to  those  of  the 
performance  of  which  man  is  aware,  he  is  said  to  give 
a  virtual  or  implicit  consent,  rather  than  formally  to  will 
their  execution.  If  any  of  these  actions  have  a  moral 
aspect,  he  is  chiefly  responsible  for  them  indirectly, 
in  so  far  as  they  are  voluntary  in  causa — that  is,  in  so  far 
as  he  impUcitly  intended  or  accepted  them  as  effects  or 
as  part  of  an  entire  operation  freely  initiated  by  him. 

Occasions,  however,  occur  when  opposing  motives 
present  themselves,  and  the  agent  has  to  exert  more 
exphcit  volition.      Some  fresh   consideration,   running 

perfecta  operatio  sine  delectatione.  Videtur  autem  principalius  esse 
operatio  quam  delectatio.  Nam  delectatio  est  quies  appetitus  in  re 
delectante  qua  quis  per  operationem  potitur.  Non  autem  aliquis 
appetit  quietem  in  aliquo,  nisi  in  quantum  aestimat  (id)  sibi  con- 
veniens. Et  ideo  ipsa  operatio,  quae  delectat,  sicut  quoddam 
conveniens,  videtur  per  prius  appetibilis  quam  delectatio."  (Com.  in 
Ethica,  Lib,  X.  1.  6.) 


3S2  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


counter  to  the  natural  tendency  of  his  disposition, 
emerges  into  distinct  consciousness.  The  new  motive 
may  be  the  clearer  perception  of  some  moral  obligation, 
of  some  enduring  worldly  advantage,  or  of  the  oppor- 
tunity for  proximate  pleasure.  When  in  such  circum- 
stances the  agent  adverts  to  the  possibility  of  more  than 
one  course  of  action,  there  arises  deliberation;  and  the 
course  adopted  is  said  to  be  deliberately  chosen.  The 
word  deliberation  signifies  a  weighing  or  balancing.  The 
process  implies  active  consideration  of  competing  motives. 
It  is  no  longer  a  mere  struggle  of  impulses.  The  agent 
holds  the  alternatives  together  and  compares  them.  He 
dwells  on  each  in  succession,  yet  in  some  degree  retains 
both  simidtaneonsly  before  consciousness.  The  operation 
thus  involves  the  tinity  of  consciousness  possible  only  to 
a  rational  Self.  Hut  we  must  not  suppose  that  a 
protracted  pondering  of  motives  is  a  necessar}''  con- 
dition of  every  deliberate  act.  Two  alternatives  may 
be  consciously  realized  and  one  adopted  in  a  moment. 
If  I  advert  to  the  moral  quality  of  an  impulse  or  an 
action,  and  then  acquiesce  in  its  continuance,  I  thereby 
make  it  my  oivn.  It  is  henceforth  deliberately  or  •  fully 
consented  to,  and  I  am  responsible  for  it. 

Choice  or  Decision. — The  acceptance  of  some 
suggested  course  or  its  rejection  constitutes  the  act  of 
choice.  For  this  exercise  of  choice  there  must  be  the 
self-conscious  reflective  cognizance  of  at  least  two 
possible  alternatives,  though  one  may  be  mere  absti- 
nence from  action.  There  is  then  a  free  practical 
judgment  by  the  intellect :  "T/^/s  is  to  be  preferred ;  "  and 
I  embrace  one  side,  or  identify  myself  ivith  it.  I  adopt 
it,  acquiesce  in  it,  choose  it.  There  is  ajiat  or  a  veto^  and 
one  side  is  elected. 

Types  of  Election. — Different  forms  assumed  by  the  act  of 
choice  have  been  distinguished  by  psychologists  as  types  of 
election  or  decision.^  When  the  agent,  after  deliberately 
weighing  the  various  reasons,  finds  a  clear  balance  on  one 
side,  and  then  freely  decides  in  favour  of  this,  we  have  what 
has  been  called  the  type  of  ^''reasonable  decision."     At  other 

3  Professor  James  gives  an  able  and  interesting  analysis  of  some 
of  these  types.  (Op.  cit.  Vol.  II.  pp,  531—534-) 


RATIONAL   APPETENCY.  383 

times,  becoming  impatient  of  suspense,  we  seek  relief  in 
the  adoption  of  one  or  other  course  in  a  somewhat  reckless 
manner.     Here  we  have  the  impetuous  decision. 

Again,  on  other  occasions  the  spontaneous  bent  of  our 
will — our  present  inclination  as  the  resultant  of  our  character 
and  actual  motives — tends  in  a  certain  direction.  Though 
perhaps  not  in  harmony  either  with  our  moral  ideal  or  our 
general  interests,  this  way  of  acting  offers  itself  as  here  and 
now  the  pleasantest.  It  is  for  us  the  line  of  least  resistance. 
After  some  hesitation  we  consent  or  allow  our  will  to  issue 
into  the  open  channel.  Our  attitude  is  passive  and  permissive 
rather  than  active  and  selective.  This  is  an  example  of 
acquiescent  decision. 

Finally,  there  are  certain  acts  of  choice,  elicited  at  least 
occasionally  by  all  men,  but  far  more  frequently  in  the  experi- 
ence of  those  who  are  striving  after  a  higher  moral  or 
religious  life,  in  which  we  set  ourselves  in  opposition  to  the 
spontaneous  impulse  of  the  will.  There  is  a  distinct  feeling  of 
volitional  effort,  an  unpleasant  struggle  against  what  is  appre- 
hended as  the  more  agreeable  suggestion.  Some  imagined  self- 
indulgence,  or  some  angry  or  envious  thought,  emerges  into 
consciousness,  and  a.  painful  and  prolonged  endeavour  is  needed 
to  expel  or  suppress  it.  In  cases  like  these,  whilst  keenly  aware 
of  the  greater  intensity  of  the  attractions  on  one  side,  and 
whilst  absolutely  certain  that  the  easiest  course  would  be  to 
yield  to  the  enticement,  we  often  set  ourselves  to  embrace 
the  less  pleasant  alternative.  The  general  character  of  an 
act  of  choice  of  this  kind — the  sense  of  effort,  the  conscious- 
ness of  painful  struggle,  and  the  final  adoption  of  the  less 
agreeable  course — distinguishes  it  from  the  previously  men- 
tioned types  of  decision.-^  Each  of  the  other  varieties  of 
choice  reveals  to  us  our  moral  liberty,  for  even  in  the  acqui- 
escent decision  consciousness  assures  us  that  we  freely  ratify 
or  consent  to  the  stronger  impulse,  but  these  experiences  of 
struggle  against  preponderating  attraction  bring  it  home  to  us 
in  an  exceptionally  vivid  manner.  This  t3'pe  may  be  called 
anti-impulsive  decision.'^ 

^  "  The  slow  dead  heave  of  the  will  that  is  felt  in  these  instances 
makes  of  them  a  class  altogether  different  subjectively  from  all  the 
preceding  classes.  .  .  .  Here  both  alternatives  are  steadily  held  in 
view,  and  in  the  act  of  murdering  the  vanquished  possibility  the 
chooser  realizes  how  much  in  that  instant  he  is  making  himself 
lose.  It  is  deliberately  driving  a  thorn  into  one's  own  flesh."  (James, 
ibid.  p.  534.) 

^  The  proof  of  free-will  based  on  this  experience  of  "  anti- 
impulsive  effort,"  or  of  action  against  "  the  spontaneous  impulse  of 
the  will,"  is  admirably  treated  in  W,  G.  Ward's  Philosophy  of  Theism, 
Essays  IX.— XI. 


384  /RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Volition  and  Desire. — The  processes  of  delibera- 
tion and  choice  exemplify  free  or  self-determined 
volition  in  the  strictest  sense.  This  word  is  sometimes 
employed  to  denote  any  act  of  the  rational  will,  whether 
spontaneous  or  reflective.  Using  it  in  the  strict  sense  it 
implies:  (i)  the  conception  of  some  object  or  end  as 
good  or  desirable,  (2)  advertence  to  the  possibility  of 
alternative  courses  of  action  with  respect  to  it,  (3)  a 
judicial  act  of  preference,  and  (4)  the  consequent  active 
tendency  or  inclination  of  myself  to  that  side.  Volition 
is  thus  to  be  clearly  distinguished  from  mere  desire. 
The  latter  state  is  necessarily  awakened  by  the  repre- 
sentation of  a  possible  gratification,  but  the  volition 
is  originated  by«the  mind  itself,  and  remains  within  its 
control.  In  spite  of  feeling  drawn  towards  a  desired 
object  we  can  say.  No.  In  the  will's  ratification  or 
rejection  of  desire  our  moral  freedom  is  manifested.*^ 

Various  Forms  of  Conative  Activity  distinguished. — Now 
that  we  have  analyzed  the  chief  forms  of  conative  activity,  it 
may  be  convenient  here  to  call  the  student's  attention  to  the 
differences  by  which  some  of  the  more  important  of  them  are 
distinguished.  Instinct  is  described  as  unconsciously  purposive, 
impulse  aimed  towards  an  end  not  realized  in  consciousness. 
Impulse  is  a  state  of  feeling  tending  to  issue  into  any  action : 
a  striving  towards  any  end  or  satisfaction  obscurely  felt. 
Dr.  Bain's  definition  of  voluntary  action  as  "  feeling-prompted 
movement "  coincides  with  impulsive^  but  not  with  strictly /n'^ 
action.  Desire  is  a  felt  tension  towards  an  end  distinctly 
realized  in  consciousness,  a  yearning,  a  mental  state  of 
uneasiness  awakened  by  the  representation  of  an  absent 
known  good.  Motive  is  whatever  attracts  the  will,  the  appre- 
hension of  a  desirable  end,  an  agreeable  consequence  of  my 
action  viewed  as  moving  me.  Intention  etymologically  signifies 
the  act  of  tending  towards  something,  and  is  commonly  described 

^  Henri  Marion  makes  out  an  elaborate  distinction  between 
Will  and  Desire,  which,  if  not  conclusive,  is  at  least  suggestive. 
These  are  the  headings:  "  Le  desir  est  une  double  emotion;  la 
volonte  est  froide.  (2)  Le  desir  est  trouble  et  agite ;  la  volonte  est 
calme.  (3)  Le  desir  est  fatal ;  la  volonte  est  libre.  (4)  Le  desir  est 
souvent  vague,  parfois  inconscient,  la  volonte  est  precise,  determinee. 
(5)  Le  desir  a  pour  objet  des  choses  exterieures ;  la  volonte  ne  porta 
que  sur  ce  que  depend  de  nous.  (6)  II  y  a  des  degres  dans  le  desir  ; 
la  volonte  est  une."  {Lemons  de  Psychologic  appliqnce  a  V Education, 
pp.  92—95) 


RATIONAL   APPETENCY.  385 

by  the  schoolmen  as  the  tendency  of  the  Will  towards  some  end 
through  some  means.  It  is  thus  opposed  to  choice,  which  refers 
to  the  selection  of  intermediate  means.  If  we  wish  to  bring 
out  the  distinction  between  Intention  and  Motive,  perhaps 
our  best  definition  of  the  former  will  be:  the  Will's  conscious 
acceptance  of  or  consent  to  a  contemplated  action  or  total 
series  of  actions.  The  Motive  is  a  represented  good  viewed  as 
attracting  me ;  the  Intention  is  the  Will's  act  of  embracing  a 
represented  future  good.  The  intention  is  always /r^^,  while 
the  desire  or  craving  is  not,  unless  consented  to  or  ratified.^ 
Purpose  or  resolution  is  a  deliberately  formed  intention  with 
regard  to  a  future  series  of  acts  or  a  remote  end.  A  wish  is 
the  conception  of  an  end  as  good,  but  without  effort  or 
intention  towards  its  realization. 

Self-control. — The  exercise  of  choice  when  the 
agent  makes  an  effort  to  resist  the  spontaneous  tendency 
of  emotion  or  passion  is  an  example  of  Self-control,  on 
the  due  cultivation  of  which  depends  in  the  highest 
degree  the  happiness  and  well-being  of  each  of  us. 
Under  Self-control  psychologists  usually  include  the 
power  of  restraining   and  directing  thoughts,  feelings, 

''  Regnon's  acute  metaphysical  analysis  is  so  appropriate  here 
that  I  quote  it  at  length:  "  La  vie  de  la  volonte  presente  deux 
caracteres.  Elle  re^oit  tine  influence  superieure  .  .  .  et  mise  en  acte  par 
cette  influence  qu'on  appelle  une  motion,  elle  exerce  Vactiviie  qui  est 
le  propre  de  sa  nature.  A  ces  deux  caracteres  de  passivite  et 
d'activite  correspondent  le  motif  et  {'intention.  Uintention  est  un 
acte  par  lequel  la  volonte  pose  un  terme,  c'est-a-dire  decide  I'exist- 
ence  d'un  effet,  et  j'ai  prouve  que  I'intention  ne  modifie  er\  rien  son 
principe  et  sa  source.  .  .  .  Quant  au  motif,  si  on  le  considere,  non 
dans  son  objet  qui  est  un  bien  a  acquerir,  non  dans  I'intelligence  ou 
il  est  la  bonte  pergue,  mais  dans  la  volonte  qui  est  proprement  son 
siege,  le  motif  est  une  influence  qui  incline  physiquement  la  volonte, 
ou  mieux,  \2i  pousse  vers  un  bien,  de  telle  sort  que  la  volonte  est  dans 
deux  etats  physiques  differents,  lorsqu'  elle  subit  ou  lorsqu'  elle  ne 
subit  pas  I'excitation  du  motif.  Ainsi  le  motif  meut  la  faculte  qu'il 
atteint ;  I'intention  pose  un  terme  dont  elle  decide  I'existence.  Le 
motif  est  subi  par  la  volonte  en  tant  qu'elle  est  un  patient ;  I'intention 
est  Vacte  de  la  volonte  en  tant  qu'elle  est  un  agent.  Le  propre  du 
patient  est  d'etre  determine  par  autrui,  le  propre  de  I'agent  est  de 
determiner  autrui.  D'ou  la  conclusion  suivante :  La  volonte  est 
modifiee  d'une  maniere  '  determinee  '  par  le  motif;  mais  la  volonte 
'  determine  '  elle-meme  le  terme  de  son  intention;  et  cette  distinction, 
ce  me  semble,  fait  evanouir  I'antinomie  sujet  de  si  grand  debats.  .  .  . 
Le  motif  produit  une  motion  dans  la  volonte — Vacte  indelibere :  mais 
si  I'intention  se  porte  sur  cet  acte  et  decide  qu'il  soit,  cet  acte  devient 
{Ute  delibe're'  de  volonte."  [Mctaphysique  des  Causes,  p.  741.) 

Z 


386  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


and  movements,  whilst  from  another  point  of  view,  they 
have  distinguished  different  forms  of  Self-control  as 
physical,  prudential,  and  moral. 

Control  of  Expression. — (i)  Since  emotion  is 
intimately  bound  up  with  its  external  expression,  the 
suppression  of  the  physical  manifestation  often  speedily 
extinguishes  the  feeling.  Passion  is  in  many  cases 
nourished  and  strengthened  by  the  gestures  and  signs 
which  lend  it  utterance,  as  when  a  man  gives  way 
to  an  outburst  of  rage.  The  actor  by  adopting  the 
gesticulations  and  frowns  indicative  of  passion,  works 
himself  temporarily  into  the  frame  of  mind  of  the 
character  which  he  impersonates.  The  bodil}^  move- 
ments apparently  react  on  the  feelings  and  intensify 
them  partly  by  suggestion,  partly  by  augmenting  the 
general  cerebral  excitement.  Consequently,  energetic 
and  sustained  effort  to  inhibit  the  external  expression 
will  nearly  always  gradually  extinguish  the  internal 
feeling.  "Control  your  temper"  is,  as  a  rule,  merely 
another  way  of  sa3ang,  *'  Keep  down  the  manifestation 
of  it."  But  sometimes  the  inhibition  of  external  mani- 
festation only  turns  the  mind  back  on  itself,  and  leaves 
it  to  brood  over  the  irritating  cause  of  the  emotion. 
In  such  cases  superficial  suppression  of  symptoms  is 
by  itself  useless.^  An  outburst  of  tears  may  relieve 
the  pent-up  grief;  and  vigorous  phj^sical  exercise  of  a 
neutral  character  may  work  off  a  fit  of  passion. 

Control  of  Thought. — (2)  In  instances  of  this  kind. 
Control  is  best  exerted  by  attacking  the  thought  which 
is  the  root  of  the  impulse.  This  may  be  accomplished 
indirectly,  by  withdrawing  attention  from  the  exciting 
idea  and  fixing  it  upon  some  rival  object.  Thus,  when 
the  recollection  of  a  past  insult  awakens  a  feeling  of  anger 
or  a  desire  of  revenge,  it  would  generally  be  extremely 
difficult  to  conquer  the  temptation  by  a  direct  veto 
or  a  simple  "  I  will  not  be  angry."  The  most  efficacious 
means  to  restrain  the  malevolent  impulse  is  to  transfer 
the  attention  to  some  other  matter.     And  here  we  may 

^  As  when  according  to  Thackeray,  "  to  keep  your  temper  " 
means  "  to  bottle  it  up,  and  cork  it  down,  and  preserve  it  carefully 
for  a  more  violent  future  explosion." 

\ 


RATIONAL   APPETENCY.  387 


either  simply  endeavour  to  banish  the  irritating  thought 
and  engross  our  mind  in  something  else  ;  or  we  may 
advance   and    attack    the    evil    suggestion    by   concen- 
trating our  attention  on  an  opposing  motive,  such  as 
the  beauty  of  the  virtue  of  forgiveness,  the  charity  of 
Christ,    or   some    redeeming    feature    in    our   enemy's 
character.      When   the   temptation   is   of   a   seductive 
character,   or   violent,   or   of  frequent    recurrence,  the 
former  course  is  generally  the  safer.     Dr.  W.  B.  Carp- 
enter has  judiciously  observed:    "The  Will   may  put 
forth  its  utmost  strength  in  the  way  of  direct  repression 
and   may  entirely  fail ;    whilst   by  exerting   the   same 
amount  of  force  in  changing  the  direction,  complete  success 
may  be  attained.    When  the  question  is  not  of  restrain- 
ing some  sudden  impulse  of  excited   passion,   but    of 
keeping  down   an  habitual  tendency  to  evil  thoughts  of 
some  particular   class,  and   of  preventing   them    from 
gaining    a    dominant    influence,    it    does    not    answer 
to    be   continually  repeating   to    oneself,    '  I    will   not 
allow  myself  to    think   of  this,'   for  the  repetition,  by 
fixing  the  attention  on  the  very  thought  or  feeling  from 
which  we  desire  to  escape,  gives  it  an  additional  and 
even  overpowering  intensity,  as  many  a  poor  misguided 
but    well-intentioned    sufferer   has    found    to   his    cost. 
The  real  remedy  is  to  be  found  in  the  determined  effort  to 
think  of  something  else,  and  to  turn  into  a  wholesome  and 
useful   pursuit   the  energy  which,  wrongly  directed,  is 
injurious  to  the  individual  and  to  society."  ^ 

During  the  first  years  of  childhood,  the  human  being 
is  completely  the  creature  of  impulse,  and  only  poten- 
tially separated  in  respect  of  moral  action  from  the 
irrational  animal.  The  simplest,  and  probably  the 
earhest,  form  of  Self-control  consists  in  the  inhibition 
of  impulsive  movement,  in  self-restraint  freely  put  forth 
at  the  recollection  of  a  past  prohibition  or  a  painful 
experience.  The  moral  training  which  the  child  receives 
has  a  most  important  influence  in  the  rapid  develop- 
ment of  this  power  of  self-control.  Judicious  expres- 
sions   of    approval    or    disapprobation   when    he    has 

9  Mental  Physiology,  p.  335;    cf.  Jules  Payct,  VEducation   de  la 
Volonte  (1899),  Lib.  II.  c.  iii. 


3S8  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


resisted  or  yielded  to  temptation  stimulate  the  child 
to  the  use  of  his  moral  liberty ;  and  this  faculty,  like 
his  intellectual  and  physical  aptitudes,  is  gradually 
perfected  b}^  exercise. 

Order  of  development.— The  precise  date  of  the 
first  exercise  of  Free-will,  like  that  of  the  awakening 
of  Self-consciousness,  cannot  be  determined  in  any 
individual ;  but  it  implies  considerable  development 
in  the  power  of  reflexion ;  and  is  long  subsequent  to 
our  chief  locomotive  acquisitions.  In  the  order  of 
development,  then,  physical  appetites  and  instincts  as 
the  guardians  of  animal  existence  and  v^ell-being  show 
themselves  earliest  in  life.  Desire  proper,  which  is 
more  complex,  involving  a  representative  element, 
appears  at  a  later  stage.  Its  first  manifestations 
consist  in  ill-defined  cravings,  containing  only  the 
vaguest  representation  of  the  means  or  end  to  be 
attained.  As  the  child  grows  older,  unselfish  impulses, 
such  as  those  of  sympathy  and  gratitude,  together  with 
the  desire  to  renew  remembered  pleasures,  arise.  True 
self-control  and  free  volition  manifest  themselves  last. 

Habit. — The  development  of  the  power  of  voluntary 
action  proceeds  concomitantly  with  the  formation  of 
habits.  By  a  habit  is  now  commonly  understood  an 
acquired  aptitude  for  some  particular  mode  of  action.  It  is 
thus  opposed  to  instinct,  which  is  an  inherited  tendency. ^'^ 
Modern  writers  usuall}^  include  under  habit  uniform 
modes  of  both  bodily  and  mental  activity.  Habit  has 
its  explanation  in  the  great  general  fact  that  any 
operation  once  performed  by  an  agent  tends  to  _  be 
repeated  with  greater  facility.  Under  whatever  shape 
we  try  to  conceive  the  residual  effect  of  a  thought  in 
the  mind,  or  of  a  motion  in  the  nervous  substance  of 
the  organism,  it  is  indisputable  that  the  occurrence 
of  such  an  event  leaves  a  facility  for  its  reproduction, 
and  that    the  facility  increases   with   each   repetition. 

1**  The  schoolmen  signified  by  hahitiis  innate  as  well  as  acquired 
dispositions  ;  on  the  other  hand,  to  the  lower  animals  they  denied 
habits  in  the  strict  sense,  maintaining  that  only  rational  free  beings 
can  be  subject  of  habits  proper.  (Cf.  Rickaby,  Aquinas  Ethicus, 
Vol.  I.  p.  150.) 


\ 


RATIONAL  APPETENCY.  389 

"  Lines  of  least  resistance  "  in  the  nervous  tissue,  or 
"  associations "  between  groups  of  mental  states 
become  formed,  and  the  reproduction  of  any  part  of 
the  operation  tends  to  call  up  the  remainder. 

The  physiological  basis  of  habit  was  well  expressed  by 
Carpenter  in  the  principle  that  "///^  organism  gvoius  to  the 
mode  in  which  it  is  cxevciscd.''^^  Although  a  constant 
process  of  waste  and  reconstruction  is  ever  going  on  in 
the  living  being,  yet,  since  3^outh  is  the  special  period 
of  growth,  it  is  then  that  the  deeper  and  more  per- 
manent impressions  and  dispositions  are  wrought  in 
the  organism.  When  maturity  is  reached,  the  flexibility 
of  the  joints  and  muscles  and  the  plasticity  of  all  parts 
of  the  system  rapidly  diminish,  and  the  individual  con- 
stitution becomes  set  and  fixed. 

The  psychological  basis  of  habit  lies  in  the  law  of 
associatioii  by  contiguity.  Au}^  group  of  mental  states 
whicH  have^occurred  together  or  in  succession,  tend  to 
be  reproduced  simultaneously  or  in  the  original  order. 
Conscious  voluntary  action,  if  reiterated,  becomes  auto- 
matic or  reflex.  (See  p.  218.)  It  lias  been  said  that 
''habit  is  second  nature,"  and  that  "man  is  a  bundle 
of  habits,"  but  few  recognize  how  much  truth  there  is 
in  these  sa3angs.  All  the  ordinary  operations  per- 
formed by  mankind,  such  as  walking,  speaking,  reading, 
writing,  are  acquired  habits.  The  various  trades,  arts, 
professions,  methods  of  business  learned  by  men  are 
products  of  the  same  force.  All  the  knowledge  which 
a  man  gathers,  all  the  sciences  of  which  he  becomes 
master,  the  modes  of  thought  which  he  cultivates,  the 
feelings  in  which  he  indulges,  are  embodied  as  dis- 
positions in  his  being.  Every  volitional  act  which  he 
exerts,  be  it  good  or  ill,  is  registered  in  the  cells  of  his 
brain,  and  leaves  a  "  bent  "  in  his  soul  which  proves  its 
reality  by  the  increased  inclination  to  repeat  that  act.^-^ 

^^  Mental  Physiology,  p.  340. 

^-  Cf.  Payot :  "Si  c'est  sous  forme  de  souvenirs  que  se  depose 
dans  la  memoire  de  I'etudiant  une  partie  du  travail  qu'il  accomplit, 
c'est  sous  la  forme  d'habittcdes  actives  que  se  depose  en  nous  notre 
activite.  Rien  ne  se  perd  en  notre  vie  psychologique ;  la  nature  est  un 
comptable  minutieux.  Nos  actes  les  plus  insignifiants  en  appa- 
rence,  pour  peu  que  nous  les  repetions,  forment  avec  les  semaines, 


A 


390  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


"  To  him  that  hath  shall  be  given."  The  more  strength 
already  acquired  by  a  habit,  whether  physical,  intel- 
lectual, or  moral,  the  easier  to  sustain  it. 

Practical  Rules. — Hence  the  value  of  Professor  Bain's 
recommendations  with  respect  to  the  acquisition  of  moral 
habits — to  start  with  as  vigorous  and  decided  an  initiative  as 
possible,  and  to  permit  oneself  no  exceptions  till  the  new  habit 
is  firmly  rooted.  We  must  never  lose  a  battle  in  the  beginning 
of  the  campaign.  Many  victories  will  be  needed  to  com- 
pensate for  an  early  defeat ;  and  they  will  be  more  difficult  to 
win  because  of  it.  Of  even  greater  value  are  the  maxims 
formulated  by  Professor  James :  "  (i)  Make  your  nervous 
system  your  ally  instead  of  your  enemy  :  make  automatic  and 
habitual  as  early  as  possible  as  many  useful  actions  as  you 
can.  (2)  Seize  the  very  first  opportunity  to  act  on  every  resolution 
you  make.  (3)  YimWy^  Keep  the  faculty  of  effort  alive  in  you  by 
a  little  gratuitous  exercise  every  day.  Be  systematically  ascetic 
or  heroic  in  little  unnecessary  points,  for  no  other  reason  than 
that  you  would  rather  not  do  it,  so  that  when  the  hour  of  dire 
need  draws  nigh,  it  may  find  you  not  unnerved  and  untrained 
to  stand  the  test."  i^ 

Moral  Discipline. — All  ethical  training  consists  in 
the  acquisition  of  moral  habits ;  but  the  worth  of  such 
training  lies  not  less  in  the  disciplinary  exercise  of  the 
Will  than  in  the  particular  habits  acquired.  The  man 
who,  by  persevering  effort,  conquers  a  bad  temper  or  a 
laz}^  disposition,  has  not  merely  acquired  a  valuable 
disposition,  such  as  other  men  possess  by  nature.  He 
has  done  much  more.  He  has  during  the  process 
elicited  a  multitude  of  acts  of  fvee-will,  he  has  put  forth 
voluntary  effort,  he  has  on  innumerable  occasions  exerted 
self-denial;  and  this  exercise  is  the  only  means  in  his 
possession  of  strengthening  the  highest  and  most 
precious    faculty   with  which   he   is    endowed.      Order 

les  mois,  les  annees  un  total  enorme  qui  s'inscrit  dans  la  memoire 
organique  sous  forme  d'habitudes  inderaciuables."  {L'Educaticn  de  la 
Volonte,  p.  135.) 

^3  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I.  pp.  123 — 126.  This  admirable 
vindication  of  Catholic  teaching  on  Asceticism  is  specially  welcome 
from  a  writer  of  so  very  un-mediaeval  a  temper  of  mind  as  the 
distinguished  professor  of  Harvard.  His  treatment  of  volitional 
activity  contains  some  of  the  best  pieces  of  psychology  that  he  has 
written. 


RATIONAL   APPETENCY.  391 

and  regulant}^  whether  in  work  or  recreation,  are 
amongst  the  most  useful  disciplinary  agencies  for 
youth,  since  they  accustom  the  young  to  act  and  decide 
according  to  a  yixed  rule  or  plan,  instead  of  vacillating 
and  changing  with  the  impulse  of  the  moment.  One  of 
the  greatest  advantages  of  public  school  life  is  that  of 
the  discipline  and  regularity  which  the  organization 
of  a  large  body  necessitates ;  and  perhaps  amongst  the 
best  parts  of  the  discipline  is  that  afforded  by  the 
general  games,  such  as  cricket  and  football.  Where 
played  with  a  good  spirit,  they  make  constant  demands 
on  the  virtues  of  obedience,  self-restraint,  unselfishness, 
good-temper,  patience,  pluck,  and  perseverance  ;  and, 
better  still,  this  discipline  is  self-imposed. 

Its  importance. — The  chief  conclusion,  then,  which  we 
would  draw  from  a  consideration  of  this  subject  is  the 
transcendent  importance  of  moral  training  in  early  life. 
If  the  culture  of  the  memory,  of  the  imagination,  and 
of  the  understanding  form  integral  parts  of  education, 
more  essential  still  is  the  training  of  the  will.  Even 
confining  our  view  to  temporal  interests,  upon  a  man's 
moral  habits  depend  the  happiness  of  himself  and  those 
around  him  far  more  than  upon  his  intellectual  capabi- 
lities. A  mind  possessed  of  due  self-control  may  lead 
a  peaceful  contented  life  amid  many  trials,  whilst  even 
genius,  if  ill-regulated,  will  be  miserable  amidst  the 
most  prosperous  surroundings.  But  if  moral  training 
is  of  importance  to  the  individual,  it  is  of  still  more 
vital  interest  to  society.  In  the  private  morals  of  its 
citizens  the  robust  and  healthy  life  of  the  State  has  its 
source.  If  the  former  are  corrupt,  diffusion  of  intel- 
lectual culture  may  only  increase  the  rapidity  of  national 
decay.  The  need  of  insisting  on  the  importance  of  the 
moral  element  in  education  is  especially  grave  at  the 
present  day. 

Character. — The  total  collection  of  a  man's  acquired 
moral  habits  grafted  into  his  natural  temperament 
make  up  his  Character.  Character  is  thus  partly 
inherited,  partly  formed  by  experience.  That  there  is 
given  to  each  by  nature  a  certain  original  disposition, 
a  certain  fund  of  qualities,  both  intellectual  and  moral, 


392  RATIONAL  LIFE. 


varying  in  different  individuals,  is  evident  from  the 
differences  which  in  later  life  mark  the  personality  of 
members  of  the  same  family  and  of  individuals  reared 
under  very  similar  circumstances.  On  the  other  hand, 
what  we  have  just  said  regarding  the  growth  of  habits 
shows  how  much  of  the  formed  character  is  acquired. 
The  formation  of  the  character,  however,  is  not  merely 
a  process  of  moulding  wrought  into  the  original  tempera- 
ment by  the  impress  of  external  agencies.  Under  the 
same  trials  and  temptations,  one  man  by  persevering 
resistance  becomes  strong,  self-reliant,  and  solidly 
virtuous;  whilst  another  by  yielding  becomes  weak, 
vacillating,  and  vicious.  From  the  earliest  acts  of 
free-volition  there  is  constant  reaction  between  personal 
will  on  the  one  side,  and  the  force  of  motives  on  the 
other.  Each  solicitation  conquered,  each  impulse  to 
immediate  gratification  resisted  by  building  up  habits 
of  self-control,  goes  to  form  a  strong  will,  and  the 
stronger  a  man's  will  grows,  the  greater  the  facility 
with  which  he  can  repress  transitory  impulses,  and  the 
more  firmly  can  he  adhere  to  a  course  once  selected 
in  spite  of  obstacles. 

Types  of  Character. — If  such  a  man  is  wont  to 
make  his  decisions  on  sound  reason,  we  have  the 
highest  type  of  strong  character.  When,  however,  this 
firmness  of  adhesion  attaches  to  decisions  based  not  on 
reason  but  on  impulse,  or  when  the  mere  fact  of  having 
once  made  a  decision  closes  the  intellect  to  the  appre- 
hension of  all  opposing  considerations,  we  have  the 
obstinate  character. 

Again,  there  are  some  men  who  quickly  form 
judgments  on  transient  impulse  or  slight  grounds,  but 
as  readily  change  or  reverse  their  choice.  There  are 
others,  too,  who  though  slow  and  hesitating  in  coming 
to  a  conclusion,  even  after  they  have  made  the  election, 
timidly  shrink  back  into  the  previous  state  of  doubt  on 
the  appearance  of  a  new  motive.  Both  of  these  forms 
are  types  of  the  K>eak  or  vacillating  character.  Accord- 
ingly, narrowness  and  rigidity  are  the  dangers  for  the 
strong-willed,  whilst  excessive  indecision  and  vacilla- 
tion are  liable  to  beset  the  large  and  liberal-minded. 


NATIONAL    APrRTENCY.  393 


Temperaments. — IMan's  character,  then,  is  partly 
inherited,  partly  acquired, — due,  as  recent  writers  say, 
in   part   to   nature,    in    part    to   nuriure.      The   original 
element,   in   so   far  as   it   is   determined  by  his  bodily 
constitution,  was  called  his  temperament  by  the  ancients. 
P^our  great  types  of  temperament  w^ere  recognized  by 
Aristotle  and  Galen,  and  ascribed  to  the  quality  of  the 
mixture  of  the  chief  humours  of  the  bod3^     They  are  : 
(i)  The    cliokric    temperament,    which    typifies    the 
energetic  disposition.     INIen  of  this  class  were 
held    to   be   prompt   and    vigorous    in    action, 
liable    to    strong    passions,    and    inclined    to 
ambition  and  pride  as  well  as  anger. 
^      (2)  The  sanguine,  indicating  the  light-hearted,  imagi- 
native,  vivacious.     Persons  of  this  class   are 
alleged     to    be    brilliant    rather    than    solid, 
enthusiastic  rather  than  persevering. 

(3)  The  phlegmatic,  or  those  of  slow  and  somnolent 

disposition,  tardy  in  judgment,  of  tranquil 
mind,  devoid  of  strong  passions  and  incapable 
of  great  actions,  whether  good  or  evil. 

(4)  The  melancholy,  signifying  those  prone  to  sadness, 

env}^  and  suspicion ;  of  a  brooding  intro- 
spective disposition ;  of  obstinate  will,  and  of 
persevering  dislikes. ^^  The  ancient  physio- 
logical explanation  is  long  since  abandoned, 
but  the  classification  has  been  generally 
retained,  especially  in  Germany,  where  Kant 
insisted  strongly  on  the  fourfold  division. 

^^  See  Pesch,  Insiitnfiones  Psychologicce,  §§  1078,  1079;  Hoft'ding, 
Outlines  of  Psychology,  pp.  349,  350  ; .  Herbart,  Text-Booh  of  Psychology 
(Eng.  Trans.),  pp.  100 — 102;  Kant,  Anthropologic,  pp.  318—324. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

FREE-WILL    AND    DETERMINISM. 

Free-will  and  Philosophy. — We  have  now 
reached  one  of  the  most  important  theses  in  the 
present  volume — the  Freedom  of  the  Will.  This 
doctrine  ramifies  into  all  departments  of  Meta- 
physics, and  the  view  adopted  on  the  question  must 
logically  determine  the  theory  of  life  and  morality 
which  is  the  practical  outcome  of  rational  specu- 
lation. Ethics,  Natural  Theology,  Ontology,  and 
Cosmolog}^  all  meet  the  phenomenon  of  the  human 
Will  in  one  connexion  or  another ;  and  all  these 
sciences  are  compelled  to  harmonize  their  general 
conclusions  with  their  creed  upon  this  point. 

Free-will  and  Psychology. — Many  writers  on 
Psychology  maintain  that  the  discussion  of  Free-will 
should  be  excluded  altogether  from  this  science,  and 
relegated  to  Ethics  or  some  other  branch  of  Philosophy. 
Provided  the  subject  be  adequately  treated,  it  seems  to 
us  of  minor  interest  where  this  shall  be  done.  Still  the 
claims,  na}'  the  obligations,  of  the  psychologist  to  face 
this  problem  are  obvious.  The  facts  of  volition,  choice, 
self-control,  character,  the  feeling  of  remorse  and  of 
responsibility,  are  all  important  mental  phenomena 
which  can  hardly  be  ignored  \nXhe  Science  of  the  Mind. 
Indeed  no  adequate  treatment  of  voluntar}-  activity  is 
possible  v/ithout  assuming  some  view  on  the  question  of 


FREE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM,  ;    395 

moral  freedom  ;  and  those  English  psychologists  who 
profess  the  most  rigid  doctrine  as  to  the  purely  positive 
or  phenomenal  character  of  the  science  of  Psychology, 
invariably  adopt  one  side — usually  that  of  determinism 
— in  their  account  of  volition.  As  we  take  a  larger  view 
of  the  subject,  and  conceive  Psychology  to  be  a  philo- 
sophical science,  it  is  our  duty  not  to  shirk  the  question. 

Free-will    defined.— Will,  or  Rational  Appetency  Ij 
in  general,  may   be  described  as  the  faculty  of  inclining  |j 
towards  or  striving  after  some  object  intellectually  apprehended 
as  good  ;  but  viewed  strictly  as  a  free  power,  it  may  be 
defined  as  the  capability  of  self-determination.     By  self  is     ^^i 
meant  not  the  series  of  my  mental  states,  nor  the  conception    ' 
of  that  series,  but  the  abiding  real  being  which  is  subject  of 
these  states.     By  Free-will  or  Moral  Freedom,  then,  we     > 
understand  that  property  in  virtue  of  which  a  rational 
agent,  when  all  the  conditions  required  to  elicit  a  voli- 
tion  are  present,  can  either  put  forth  or  abstain  from 
that  volition. 

Scholastic  Terminology. — The  schoolmen  here,  as  usual, 
distinguished  terms  with  more  accuracy  and  precision  than 
their  successors.     They  defined  spontaneous  acts,  as  all  those 
which  have  their  source  ivithin  the  agent,  e.g.,  the  movements  of 
the  roots  of  a  plant,  as  well  as  the  impulsive  or  the  fully 
deliberate  actions  of  men.    Such  acts  merely  exclude  coaction. 
The  schoolmen  further  distinguished  two  forms  of  voluntary 
action.      Voluntary   acts    in    a   wider  sense  they  defined    as 
"those   proceeding   from    an   internal   principle    {i.e.,   spon- 
taneous) with  the  apprehension  of  an  end.""      Only  voluntary 
acts  in  the  strict  sense  were  held  to  be  free,  or  deliberate.  These 
latter  imply  not  only  an  apprehension  of  the  object  sought, 
but  a  self-conscious  advertence  to  the  fact  that  we  are  seeking 
it,  or  acquiescing  in  the  desire  of  it.     The  spontaneous  or 
impulsive  acts  of  man  which  are  the  outcome  of  his  nature 
are  voluntary   in  the   lax    sense,   but   non-voluntary   in   the 
stricter  signification.    The  term  actus  hunianus — human  action 
— was  confined  to  free  or  deliberate  acts  :  actus  hominis  desig- 
nated all  indeliberate  actions  of  man.      Further,  the  term 
liberty   was    carefully   distinguished.     Physical  liberty    means 
imm.unity  from   physical  compulsion   or   restraint    {necessitas      ''''^"    ^ 
coactionis).     The  unbridled  horse  is  in  this  sense  free,  whilst 
the  prisoner  in  a  cell  is  not.     Moral  Liberty,  or  Freedom  of 
Will  {libertas  arbitvii)  signifies  immunity  from  necessitation 


3o6  RATIONAL   LIFE. 

by  the  agent's  nature  {necessitas  natiircr).  In  this  latter  sense 
the  prisoner  is  free,  but  the  horse  is  not.  When  Locke 
defines  free-will  as  the  power  to  do  what  I  choose,  he  confounds 
moral  and  ph3^sical  liberty.  The  latter  in  the  case  of  human 
beings  is  also  cdXled  personal  fveedoni. 

\jj\i^  Problem  stated. — Now  the  question  at  issue  is  not 

"^        '        whether  man   can   choose  or   will  without  any  motive 
r  \  whatsoever.     Such   a   choice  would   be  irrational   and 

'  impossible,  because  volition   implies  the  embracing  of 

an  object  intcUednally  apprcJiended  as  a  good.  But  an}' 
object  of  thought  apprehended  as  good  or  desirable  is 
thereby  a  motive  soliciting  the  will — whether  it  be  ulti- 
mately preferred  or  not.  Attacks  of  determinists 
on  "  the  theory  of  motiveless  volition  "  are  therefore 
completely  irrelevant.  No  accredited  defender  of  Free- 
will teaches  that  man  can  choose  or  will  without  any 
motive.  St.  Thomas  would  have  described  such  a  view 
as  self-contradictory  and  absurd.  A^/7///  eligitur  nisi  sub 
specie  boni — "  Nothing  is  willed  except  under  the  appear- 
ance of  good,"  was  a  universally  received  axiom  in  the 
schools.  Free-will  implies  not  choice  luithont  motive, 
but  choice  betiveen  motives.  If  there  be  but  one  motive 
within  the  range  of  intellectual  vision,  the  volition  in 
such  circumstances  is  not  free,  but  necessary.  Equally 
unjustifiable  is  it  to  represent  the  doctrine  of  Indeter- 
minism  as  a  theory  of  causeless  volition.  The  mind  or  the 
self  is  the  cause.  Again,  the  question  is  not  whether  all 
actions  of  man  are  free,  but  whether  any  action  is  so. 
In  the  words  of  Dr.  H.  Sidgwick :  **  Is  my  voluntary 
action  at  any  (every)  moment  determined  by  (i)  my 
character  (a)  partly  inherited,  (b)  partly  formed  by  past 
feelings  and  actions,  and  (2)  my  circumstances  or  the 
external  influences  acting  on  me  at  the  moment  ?  or 
not?"  Or,  in  those  of  Dr.  Martineau :  "In  exercises 
of  the  will  {i.e.,  in  cases  of  choice)  is  the  mind  wholly 
determined  by  phenomenal  antecedents  and  external 
conditions ;  or  does  itself  also,  as  active  subject  of  these 
objective  experiences,  play  the  part  of  determining 
Cause?"  Or  to  put  it  otherwise:  Given  all  the  pre- 
requisites for  a  volition  except  that  act  itself,  does  it 
necessarily   follow  ?      Or   finally,   in   the    language   of 


FREE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM.  397 

Professor  James :  "  Do  those  parts  of  the  universe 
already  laid  down  absolutely  appoint  and  decree  what 
the  other  parts  shall  be  ?  ^  Dcterminists  or  Necessarians 
answer  in  the  affirmative ;  Liheytarians,  or  Anti-deter- 
minists  or  Indeterminists  say,  No. 

We  allow  most  readily,  first,  that  a  very  large  part 
of  man's  daily  action  is  indeliberate,  and  therefore  merely 
the  resultant  of  the  forces  playing  upon  him  :  secondly, 
that  even  where  he  acts  deliberately,  and  exerts  his 
power  of  free  choice,  he  is  influenced  by  the  weight  of 
the  motives  attracting  him  to  either  side  ;  and  finally,  as 
a  consequence  of  this,  we  grant  that  a  being  possessed  )  ^\j^^ 
of  a  perfect  knowledge  of  all  the  forces  operating  on  a  ]  ^ 
man  would  be  able  to  prophesy  with  the  greatest  pro-  \  ^  ^ 
bability  what  course  that  man  will  take.  But  on  they  ».  p«,H 
other  hand,  we  hold  that  there  are  many  acts  of  man 
which  are  not  simpl}^  the  resultant  of  the  influences 
working  upon  him  :  that  he  can,  and  sometimes  does 
set  himself  against  the  aggregate  balance  of  motive, 
natural  disposition,  and  acquired  habit ;  and  that, 
consequently,  prediction  with  absolute  certainty  con- 
cerning his  future  free  conduct  would  be  impossible 
from  even  perfect  knowledge  of  his  character  and 
motives.  Such  is  the  thesis  we  defend.  Whether  it 
be  called  the  doctrine  of  free-will,  of  moral  liberty,  oi 
indetcrniinism ,  or  of  contingent  choice,  seems  to  us  of  little 
moment.  But  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the 
precise  point  of  the  dispute  should  be  understood,  and 
the  gravity  of  the  issue  realized.  For  this  reason  we 
have  formulated  the  question  in  so  many  ways. 

Fatalism  and  Determinism. — There  is  a  marked  tendency 
among  recent  opponents  of  Free-will  to  shrink  from  the  use 
of  such  "  hard "  terms  as  necessity,  fatality,  and  the  like, 
adopted  by  their  more  courageous  and  more  logical  prede- 
cessors. We  have  now-a-days,  as  James  says,  "  a  soft  deter- 
minism which  says  that  its  real  name  is  freedom."  (Op.  cit. 
p.  149.)  These  efforts  to  change  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
employed  in  the  controversy  can  only  confuse  the  student 
by  obscuring  the  fundamental  difference  between  the  rival 
doctrines,  which  involve  profoundly  opposed  conceptions  of 

1  Cf.  Sidgwick,  op.  cit.  p.  46;  Martineau,  op.  cit.  p.  188  ;  James, 

The  Will  to  Believe  (i8y8),  p.  150. 


398  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


v> 


-> 


the  universe.  Mill  (Logic,  Bk.  VI.  c.  ii.  §  3,  n.  3)  sought  to 
make  a  distinction  between  Determinism  and  Fatalism.  The 
latter  doctrine  holds,  he  teaches,  that  all  our  acts  are  deter- 
mined by  fate  or  external  circumstances,  independently  of  our 
feelings  and  volitions.  Determinism,  on  the  contrary,  main- 
tains that  action  is  determined  by  feeling.  In  practice,  then, 
they  will  certainly  differ.  The  determinist  may  seek  to  arouse 
good  desires  in  himself  or  others :  the  fatalist  will  abandon 
the  attempt  as  useless.  But  logically  fatalism  flows  from 
determinism.  In  connexion  with  this  point  Mill  falls  into 
one  of  his  frequent  inconsistencies,  teaching  that  "  our 
character  is  in  part  amenable  to  our  will."  {Exam.  p.  511.) 
Our  character  is,  of  course,  merely  the  result  of  inherited 
tf"  constitution  and  personal  acts.  The  former  is  obviously 
beyond  our  control,  and  according  to  Mill  the  latter  have 
all  been  inevitably  predetermined  by  antecedent  character 
and  external  influences,  until  we  reach  infancy,  where  of 
course  there  was  no  freedom  at  all.  The  desire  to  "  alter 
my  character"  or  to  improve  myself  must  in  the  determinist 
theory  have  ever  been  as  independent  of  me,  as  completely  given 
to  me,  as  the  shape  of  my  nose. 

The  arguments  usually  adduced  to  establish  the 
Freedom  of  the  Will  are  threefold.  They  have  been 
called  the  psychological,  the  ethical,  and  the  meta- 
physical proofs  respectively.  The  first  of  these  appeals 
to  the  direct  testimony  of  consciousness.  The  second 
is  indirect  in  character,  being  based  on  the  analysis  of 
certain  mental  states — ethical  concepts.  The  third  is 
a  more  complex  deduction  from  the  nature  of  higher 
mental  activity.  We  shall  begin  with  the  second  as 
its  demonstrative  force  is  to  some  minds  clearest. 

Argument  from  Ethical  Notions :  Obligation. — 
"  Thou  canst  for  thou  oughtst."  The  inference  which 
Kant  thus  draws  is  perfectly  just;  though  he  erroneously 
interprets  it,  and  confines  liberty  to  the  noumenal  world, 
whilst  conceding  the  "empirical  self"  and  the  pheno- 
mena of  experience  to  the  rule  of  a  rigid  determinism. 
If  I  am  reall}^  bound  hie  et  nunc  to  abstain  from  an  evil 
deed,  then  it  must  at  some  moment  be  really  possible 
for  me  that  this  deed  shall  not  occur.  The  existence 
of  moral  obligation  is  at  least  as  certain  as  the  uniformity 
of  nature — the  assumption  or  postulate  on  which  all  the 
propositions  of  physical  science  rest.     The  conviction 


FREE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM.  399 

that  I  am  bound  to  abstain  from  evil  is  not  a  generaliza- 
tion from  an  imperfect  and  limited  experience,  but  an 
immediate  and  universal  judgment  of  mankind.  The 
moral  law  lies  at  the  foundation  of  practical  social  life. 
Right  conduct  is  not  merely  a  beautiful  ideal  which  attracts  me. 
It  commands  me  with  an  absolute  authority.  It  obliges  me 
unconditionally.^  Whatever  be  my  own  feelings  or 
desires,  I  remain  in  each  act  categorically  bound  to  do 
right  and  to  avoid  wrong.  At  the  same  time  it  is  a 
patent  fact  that  the  moral  law  is  not  always  observed. 
But  if  the  moral  law  obliges  me  at  all  times  it  must  be 
really  within  my  power  on  those  occasions  when  I 
disobey  it.  To  suppose  that  I  can  be  really  and  uncon- 
ditionally bound  to  perform  an  act  which  is  now,  and 
has  ever  been,  for  me  absolutely  impossible,  is  utterly 
irrational.  For  instance,  a  dishonest  director  or  pro- 
moter of  a  bubble  company,  is  elaborating  a  plan  to 
amass  a  fortune  by  the  plunder  of  several  hundred  poor 
people.  Suppose  his  moral  sensibility  is  not  as  yet 
altogether  obliterated,  and  that  he  adverts  to  the  fact 
that  his  evil  scheme  is  a  piece  of  cruel  and  nefarious 
swindling.  He  feels  that  it  is  wicked  and  wrong — that  he 
ought  not  to  proceed  with  it.  Involved  in  this  conscious- 
ness of  the  present  obligation  is  the  conviction  that  he 
can  abstain  from  his  evil  course.  Are  both  the  persuasion 
that  he  ought  and  that  he  can  an  illusion  ?  In  the  deter- 
minist  theory  no  other  volition  or  choice  than  those 
actually  elicited  were  really  possible  to  that  man 
throughout  his  entire  past  life,  and  the  present  criminal 
choice  is  inexorably  determined  by  the  equally  inevitable 
choices  that  have  gone  before. 

"  Leon  Noel  states  this  argument  well :  "  Si  nous  n'etions  pas 
libres,  le  bien  nous  apparaitrait  comma  un  ideal  nous  manifestant  sa 
beaute  et  sollicitant  notre  amour.  II  serait  le  terme  d'une  tendance 
analogue  a  I'admiration  esthetique.  .  .  .  Ce  n'est  pas  ainsi  que  Ic 
bien  s'offre  a  nous.  Il  ne  nous  presente  pas  un  ideal,  attendant,  pour 
nous  entrainer  a  Taction,  qu'il  lui  reponde  un  attrait  assez  puissant. 
II  nous  apparait  sous  la  forme  austere  du  devoir,  nous  imposant  una 
loi  a  accomplir  toujoiirs,  quelles  que  soient  nos  dispositions  et  nos 
tendances.  Pour  qu'un  sentiment  pareil  ne  soit  pas  absurde,  il  faut 
que  nous  soyons  libres.  L'imperatif  absolu  du  devoir  suppose  una 
puissance  superieura  a  toutes  les  circomstances,  n'ayant  besoin  que 
d'elle-meme  pour  lui  obeir."  {La  Conscience  du  Libre  Arbitre,  p.  165.) 


400  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Remorse  and  Repentance. — Let  us  now  examine  the 
character  of  another  mental  state :  If  I  have  voluntarily 
yielded  to  some  evil  temptation,  or  knowingly  done  a  wrong 
act;  if  I  have  been  deliberately  unjust,  unkind,  or  dishonest, 
especially  if  I  believe  my  act  to  have  been  grievously  sinful ; 
when  I  reflect  upon  it  I  am  keenly  conscious  that  my  conduct 
was  blameuorthy.  I  condemn  myself  for  it,  I  feel  remorse  for  it, 
I  judge  thati  I  ought  to  regret  it,  that  I  am  bound  to  repent  it. 
But  for  acts  that  have  not  been  thus  deliberately  performed 
I  do  not  in  this  way  blame  myself,  even  though  they  may 
have  resulted  in  far  more  serious  injury  to  others  or  to 
myself.  Of  course  I  wish  that  even  involuntary  actions  of 
mine  which  may  have  occasioned  harm  had  not  happened  ; 
but  I  do  not  deem  them  culpable/  and  I  judge  that  I  am  not 
bound  to  repent  them.  The  sentence  of  self-condemnation 
and  the  pain  of  remorse  present  in  the  former  and  absent 
from  the  latter  cases  are  due  to  the  assurance  that  the  former 
were  mine  in  the  strictest  sense,  that  I  freely  did  them — that, 
unlike  the  latter,  they  were  not  the  inevitable  outcome  of  my 
nature  and  circumstances,  that  I  could  have  done  otherwise. 
Furthermore,  this  clear  distinction  is  confirmed  by  the 
universal  judgment  of  mankind,  which  asserts  that  it  is  right 
to  have  remorse  and  to  blame  myself  for  the  evil  deliberately 
done  zc'hich  I  could  have  avoided,  but  not  for  those  acts  which 
were  not  deliberate,  and  therefore  not  in  my  power.  But  if 
determinism  be  true,  both  classes  of  acts  were  equally  the  inevit- 
able outcome  of  my  nature  and  circumstances.  If  the  reader 
will  think  out  the  strictly  logical  consequences  of  deter- 
minism he  will  see  that,  according  to  that  theory,  it  is  just  as 
rational  to  indulge  in  remorse  and  self-condemnation  for  an 
attack  of  heart-disease  or  for  being  caught  in  a  railway 
accident  as  for  having  committed  an  act  of  perjury. 

The  determinist — who  invariably  claims  exclusive  mono- 
poly of  the  scientific  attitude  of  mind — refuses  to  think;  and 
instead  vehemently  insists  that  injustice  is  done  his  theory, 
that  there  is  a  profound  difference  between  the  two  cases, 
that  feelings  of  sorrow,  desires,  and  purposes  of  amendment, 
are  useful  to  prevent  future  perjuries,  but  not  for  the  avoid- 
ance of  railway  collisions.  This  is  very  true,  but  equally 
irrelevant  to  the  point  at  issue — the  rationality  of  remorse  and 
self-condemnation  for  our  past  voluntary  acts.  If  all  my  past 
acts,  whether  deliberate  or  indehberate,  alike  inevitably 
resulted  from  my  nature  and  circumstances,  it  is  not  virtue 
but  irrational  folly  to  indulge  in  remorse  for  sin,  and  it  is 
mendacious  to  teach  that  it  is  right  and  reasonable  to  repent 
of  a  crime  which  we  believe  to  have  been  as  unavoidable  as 
an  earthquake.    Professor  James  writes  on  this  topic  with  his 


FREE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM.  401 


wonted  vigour.     "  Some  regnts  are  pretty  obstinate  and  hard 
to  stifle, — regrets  for  acts  of  wanton  cruelty  or  treachery,  for 
example,   whether    performed    by   others    or    by   ourselves. 
Hardly  any  one  can  remain  entirely  optimistic  after  reading 
the  confession  of  the  murderer  at  Brockton  the  other  day ; 
how,   to    get    rid    of    the    wife    whose   continued   existence 
bored   him,  he   cnveigled   her   into  a  desert  spot,  shot  her 
four  times,  and   then   as  she  lay  on  the   ground   and   said 
to   him,   '  You    didn't    do    it   on   purpose,  did   you,   dear  ? ' 
replied,    '  No,    I   didn't    do    it    on    purpose,'  as    he    raised 
a  rock  and  smashed  her   skull.      Such    an  occurrence   with 
the    mild    sentence    and    self-satisfaction    of    the    prisoner, 
is    a    field    for    a    crop    of    regrets,   which    one    need    not 
take  up  in  detail.     We  feel  that  though  a  perfect  mechanical 
fit  for  the   rest   of  the   universe,  it  is  a  bad  moral  fit,  and 
that  something  else  would  have  been  really  better  in  its  place. 
But  for  the  deterministic  philosophy  the  murder,  the  sentence, 
and  the  prisoner's  optimism  were  all  necessary  from  eternity; 
and  nothing  else  for  a  moment  had  a  ghost  of  a  chance  of 
being  put  into   their  place.    To   admit   such   a  choice,  the 
determinists  tell  us,  would  be  to  make  a  suicide  of  reason  ;^  so 
we   must   steel   our  hearts   against   the   thought.  .  .  .    (Yet) 
Determinism  in  denying  that  anything  else  can  be  instead 
of  the  murder,  virtually  defines  the  universe  as  a  place  in 
which  what  ought  to  be  is  impossible:'  (Op.  cit.  p.  61.)     But  it 
is  in  the  name  of  reason — in  order  to  conceive  the  universe  as 
a  rational  whole— to  satisfy  the  postulate  of   uniformity  of 
causation,  that  determinists  deny  free  volition  ! 

Merit  and  Desert— Closely  related  to  the  mental 
states  just  discussed  are  the  conceptions  of  merit  smd 
desert — notions  embodied  in  all  languages,  and  engrained 
in  the  moral  consciousness  of  mankind.  When  I  have 
struggled  perseveringly  against  a  difticult  temptation, 
or  made  some  deliberate  sacrifice  in  the  cause  of  virtue, 
I  feel  that  my  act  is  mentorioiis,  that  I  have  deserved  a 
reward.  I  may  see  no  prospect  throughout  my  life  of 
receiving  the  recompense.  But  I  am  none  the  less 
assured  that  1  have  established  a  right  to  it,  that  such 
a  recompense  is  just.  iVnd  this  I  judge  to  be  so  because 
I  believe  the  act  to  have  been  free.  For  if  not,  even 
though  the  ar ';  had  been  far  more  painful  to  myself,  and 
far  more  useful  to  mankind,  I  deem  that  I  have  not 
this  claim.  The  good  accomplished  unwittingly  or 
involuntarily,  however  useful,  is  not  meritorious  on  the 

AA 


402  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


part  of  the  agent;  praise  or  esteem  which  I  may  receive 
for  it  I  recognize  in  my  heart  to  be  undeserved.''^  Now 
this  judgment  is  primarily  inward.  It  is  a  retrospective 
sentence  pronounced  by  my  reason  on  my  deliberate 
actions — or  rather  on  myself  as  exerting  them.  I  do 
not,  as  some  determinists  seem  to  imply,  esteem  these 
acts  because  they  are  evidence  to  me  of  the  valuable 
character  which  I  possess.  The  very  reverse  is  often 
conspicuously  the  case,  as  when  the  drunkard,  striving 
to  reform,  measures  the  merit  of  his  painful  resistance 
by  the  very  badness  of  that  formed  character  which  the 
violence  of  his  temptation  reveals.  Still  less  is  the 
sense  of  merit  due  to  the  experience  that  good  actions 
have  been  rewarded  and  evil  acts  punished  in  the  past. 
From  a  very  early  age  the  child  shows,  in  its  feeble 
way,  that  it  can  clearly  distinguish  between  deserved  and 
undeserved  punishment.  "  I  could  not  help  it,"  is  the 
invariable  excuse  ;  and  when  the  child  really  believes  that 
this  was  the  case,  he  is  convinced  that  the  punishment 
is  unjust.  This  same  retrospective  judgment  as  to  the 
merit  or  demerit  of  free  action,  and  their  absence  from 
actions  similar  in  effects  but  involuntary  in  origin,  is 
confirmed  by  the  general  sense  of  mankind  both  cultured 
and  uncultured. 

Retribution. — The  truth  is,  the  idea  of  moral  retribution 
is  incompatible  with  Determinism.  That  theory  is 
compelled  to  maintain  that  the  notion  of  the  restitution 
of  violated  fight  order  through  expiatory  suffering  is  a  childish 
delusion.  Punishment  is  purely  preventive.  Praise 
and  blame  are  not  Just  awards  for  self-sacrifice  in  the 
past,  hut  judicious  incentives  for  anticipated /?/i'«f^  services. 
Gratitude  is,  not  in  jest  but  in  earnest,  "  a  delicate 
sense  of  favours  to  come."  _ 

Responsibility.  —  For     acts     done     by    me    with 

3  Cf.  G.  L.  Fonsegrive  :  "  Quand  on  dit,  en  effet,  qu'on  a  merite 
une  recompense  ou  une  punition,  on  veut  dire  non  pas  seulement 
que  necessairement  il  resultera  de  I'acte  accompli  un  plaisir  ou  une 
douleur,  mais  qu'on  s'est  cree  des  droits  soi-meme  a  ce  plaisir  ou  a 
cette  douleur.  Cela  est  si  vrai  que  nous  regarderions  tons  comma 
injustes  une  recompense  ou  une  punition  qui  seraient  les  conse- 
quences d'une  action  accomplie  par  nous  sans  notre  assentiment 
int^rieur."  {Essai  sur  U  Libre  Arbitre,  p.  509.) 


FREE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM.  403 


advertence  to  the  fact  that  I  was  doin<:^  them,  and 
with  a  consciousness  of  their  moral  qiiahty,  I  judge 
myself  accountable.  Their  goodness  or  badness  I  consider 
to  be  rightly  imputed  to  me.  If  good  the  pyaise,  if  evil 
the  blame  is  mine.  But  actions  performed  by  me 
inadvertently,  or  without  cognizance  of  their  moral 
quality,  I  pronounce  with  equal  certainty  not  to  be 
justly  imputable  to  me.  They  are  not  truly  mine ;  and 
it  is  not  right  that  I  should  have  to  answer  for  them. 
The  meaning  and  ground  of  this  distinction  is  that  I  am 
convinced  the  former  acts  viere  free  in  the  strict  sense  ; 
that  I  had  real  power  to  have  chosen  the  other  course  ; 
whilst  the  latter  were  there  and  then  ine\itable — the 
necessary  resultant  of  my  character  and  the  forces 
playing  on  me.  This  ethical  conception  is  so  important 
that  it  is  desirable  to  scrutinize  it  closely : 

Notion  of  Responsibility  analyzed. — Responsibility  in  the 
fullest   sense   pre-supposes :    (i)    A  justly  binding  authority. 
(2)  Knowledge  in  the  agent  of  the  just  will  of  this  authority — 
of  the  Tightness  or  wrongness  of  the  act.    (3)  Power  either  to 
perform  or  abstain  from  the  act.     If  any  of  these  be  absent, 
responsibihtv  in  the  full  sense  no  longer  exists.     Be  it  noted 
that  the  rea'lity  of  my  responsibility  or  of  my  duty  does  not 
rest  ultimately  on  the  mere  fact  that  the  badness  or  goodness 
of  the  deed  actually  moves  my  will.     Even  were  my  will  hard- 
ened by  crime  so  as  to  become  insensible  to  the  charms  of 
virtue  or  the  foulness  of  vice,  both  obligation  and  responsi- 
bility would  remain  real,  so  long  as  I  intellectually  apprehended 
the  act  to  be  my  duty.     But  most  important  of  all,  the  act 
must  be  really  mine — really  within  my  power  to  perform  or  to 
omit.     If  not,  my  reason  affirms,  I  cannot  be  answerable  for 
it.     Imperfect  knowledge,  fear,  sudden  passion — in  so  far  as 
these   conditions  were  themselves  outside   of   my  control — 
all  diminish  responsibility,  precisely   in  proportion   as   they 
diminish  freedom.     I  may  have  communicated  the  plague  to 
an  entire  city,  or  poisoned  my  father  and  mother,  and  though 
plunged  in  grief  over  the  terrible  misfortune,  I   may  retain 
the   clearest   conviction   that    I    am   not   responsible  for   the 
calamity,  that   I   am  not  morally  guilty  of   the   act,  that   I 
cannot  be  justly  punished  for  it,  because  I  know  it  was  not  my 
free  act,   because   I   am  sure  that  /  could  not  have  helped  it. 
I  apply  this  same  criterion  to  the  conduct  of  other  men,  and 
I  am  quite  certain  that  mankind  at  large  would  endorse  my 
judgment.     I  may  of  course  have  been   guilty  of  voluntary 


404  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


carelessness,  or  imprudence  which  resulted  in  the  act.  If  so, 
I  am  accountable  just  in  so  far  as  this  final  act  was  voluntary 
or  free  in  causa — in  its  original  cause.  That  is,  my  responsi- 
bility is  measured  by  the  distinctness  with  which  the  final 
disastrous  act  could  have  been  foreseen  by  me  as  likely  to 
result  from  my  earlier  faults,  and  the  facility  with  which 
these  could  have  been  avoided.  It  is  because  the  maniac 
and  the  somnambulist  are  inevitably  determined  by  their  nature 
and  the  forces  acting  on  them,  that  we  judge  them  unac- 
countable for  any  harm  which  they  may  have  caused.  We 
take  measures  to  prevent  their  innocently  doing  further 
evil ;  and  we  may  even  apply  painful  remedies  to  deter  them 
in  the  future  ;  but  we  do  not  judge  them  deserving  of  hlame  or 
moral  censure.  We  deem  them  irresponsible  agents.  Respon- 
sibility is  therefore  not  the  "  consciousness  of  the  solidarity  of 
our  mental  life,"  that  is,  the  conviction  that  certain  acts,  as  a 
wfl//^;' c»//ac^  physically  entail  certain  painful  consequences; 
nor  the  knowledge  that  the  laiv  visits  certain  transgressions 
with  particular  penalties.  It  implies  that  I  SiiTi  justly  punish- 
able for  a  past/r^^  act,  and  only  for  Sifree  act.^ 

Justice. — Finally,  the  idea  ot  Justice  involved  in 
nearly  all  other  ethical  conceptions  is  completely  sub- 
verted. Justice  is  volition  and  action  according  to  Law. 
But  if  determinism  be  true,  all  volitions  are  equally 
predetermined  according  to  the  laws  of  the  universe. 
Each  human  choice  is  as  inflexibly  fore-ordained  as  the 
daily  ebbing  tide.  Of  course  it  still  remains  true  that 
we  can  infancy  picture  other  imaginar}^  conditions,  and 

*  Professor  Alexander,  who  attacks  the  doctrine  of  Free-will  in 
his  Chapter  on  Responsibility,  writes  :  "  Responsibility  depends  on 
two  things.  First  that  a  man  is  capable  of  being  influenced  by 
what  is  right,  that  he  can  feel  the  force  of  goodness ;  and  second 
that  whatever  he  does  is  determined  by  his  character.'"  (Moral  Order  and 
Progress,  p.  335)  Now  if  every  human  act  is  thus  absolutely  deter- 
mined by  character,  how  can  I  justly  pronounce  the  Brockton 
murderer,  mentioned  above,  to  be  worthy  of  reprobation  rather  than 
pity ;  or  the  man  who  perseveringly  struggles  against  temptation  to 
be  meritorious  ?  The  character  and  every  volition  of  each  throughout 
his  life  were  alike  inexorably  predetermined  for  him  by  his  inherited 
organism  and  environment.  Neither  of  these  men  have  ever  had 
for  a  second  in  their  lives  the  real  poiver  of  making  a  different  choice 
than  that  which  they  have  made.  Again,  Mill's  statement  that 
responsibility  means  "the  knowledge  that  if  we  do  wrong  we  shall 
deserve  punishment,"  is  plausible  only  because  it  explains  one  free- 
ivill  term  by  another.     With  the  latter  we  have  already  dealt. 


P REE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM.  405 


construci;  moral  ideals  fairer  to  contemplate  than  the 
actual  facts  of  human  life.  But  these  conceptions 
themselves  are  merel}'  particular  manifestations  of  the 
same  universal  iron  necessity.  Moral  law  is  identical 
with  physical  law,  and  wliatcvcr  is  is  rigJit. 

Determinism  distorts  Moral  Conceptions. — In 
brief,  then,  the  notions  and  sentiments  which  constitute 
the  moral  consciousness  of  mankind,  and  are  embodied 
in  the  laws  and  literatures  of  all  nations,  and  in  the 
ethical  terms  of  all  languages,  imply  the  freedom  of  the 
Will.  *'  On  the  Determinist  theory,"  as  Dr.  Sidgwick 
justly  remarks,  "  ought,  responsibility,  desert,  and  similar 
terms,  should  be  used,  if  at  all,  in  new  significations." 
The  universal  illusion  was  indeed  profitable  to  society 
in  the  past,  but  its  day  is  over.  Dr.  Maudsley  frankly 
tells  us :  "  The  doctrine  of  free-will,  like  some  other 
doctrines  that  have  done  their  work  and  then,  being  no 
longer  of  any  use,  have  undergone  decay,  .  .  .  was 
necessary  to  promote  the  evolution  of  mankind  up  to  a 
certain  stage."  ^  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  point  out 
that  a  psychological  or  metaphysical  hypothesis  which 
is  contradicted  by  the  actual  moral  consciousness  of  the 
human  race  is  not  in  a  very  satisfactory  condition.  The 
determinist  does  not  save  his  position  by  asserting  that 
he  can  provide  intelligible  or  useful  meanings  for  our 
ethical  terms.  The  problem  for  him  is  to  harmonize 
his  theory  with  the  actual  character  and  genuine  significance 
of  our  leading  moral  emotions  and  sentiments.  The 
business  of  science  is  to  accept  facts  as  thy  are  and  to 
examine  them,  not  to  manufacture  them — to  interpret,  not  to 
transform  them. 

Free-will  and  Ethics. — It  has  been  argued  by  Dr.  Sidgwick 
that  the  question  of  Free-will  has  little  or  no  bearing  on 
Systematic  Ethics.  (Op.  cit.  c.  v.  §§  4,  5.)  The  whole  con- 
troversy comes  to  this  :  If  we  mean  by  the  Science  of  Ethics 
merely  the  exposition  of  a  code  of  judicious  rules  of  indi- 
vidual conduct,  a  psychological  account  of  the  formation  of 
habits,  and  a  scheme  of  useful  social  sanctions;  then,  perhaps, 
the  problem  of  Free-will  might  be  ignored  in  such  a  "  syste- 
matic "  treatise.  But  if  by  the  Science  of  Ethics  we  mean, 
not  a  body  of  precepts  to  attain  an  end  somehow  or  other 

5  Sidgwick,  op.  cit.  Bk.  I.  c.  v.  §  2;  Maudsley,  op.  cit.  p.  415, 


4c6  RATIONAL  LIFE. 


assumed,  but  a  Moral  PhilusopJiy,  i.e.,  a  philosophical  deter- 
mination of  the  right  end  of  human  action,  an  analysis  of  the 
grounds  of  Duty  or  Moral  Obligation,  a  rational  account 
of  the  moral  convictions  of  man  universally  embodied  in 
the  leading  ethical  terms  and  ideas — responsibility,  merit, 
approval,  remorse,  &c.,  and  an  adequate  treatment  of  the 
most  wide-i caching  of  all  ethical  virtues — Justice ;  then — and 
such  is  of  course  the  only  study  worthy  of  the  name  of  the 
Science  of  Ethics — the  Freedom  of  the  Will  is  not  merely  not 
a  side  issue ;  it  is  a  most  vital  and  all-important  question 
penetrating  to  the  very  foundations  of  Moral  Philosophy. 
The  fact  that  leading  determinists  such  as  Mr.  Spencer  and 
Dr.  Maudsley,  as  a  logical  consequence  of  their  doctrine 
reduce  morality  to  natural  action  makes  the  significance  of  the 
problem  clear.  (Cf.  Martineau,  op.  cit.  Vol.  11.  pp.  311 — 324.) 

Argument  from  Consciousness. — We  now  return 

to  a  more  strictly  psychological  argument — the  intro- 
spective anal3/sis  of  volition.  We  shall  study  different 
phases  of  this  activity ;  and  we  invite  the  reader  to 
make  experiments  and  observe  for  himself. 

Attention. — We  have  already  indicated  the  con- 
nexion of  volnntavy  attention  with  the  present  question  ; 
but  it  will  be  well  to  notice  some  special  aspects  of  this 
mental  function  here.  If  I  study  by  introspection  any 
process  of  voluntary  attention,  such  as  that  involved  in 
recalling  a  forgotten  incident,  or  in  guessing  a  riddle, 
I  observe  that  /  myself  deliberatel}^  guide  the  course  of 
my  thoughts.  I  am  conscious  that  I  do  this  by 
fostering  the  strength  of  some  ideas,  and  starving 
others.  I  am  conscious  too  that  those  which  I  select 
and  detain  are  often  among  the  feeblest  and  least 
attractive;  and  that  by  my  preferential  diiienX.\on  I  cause 
them  to  prevail.  I  determine  not  only  what  repre- 
sentations, but  what  aspects  of  these  representations  shall 
occupy  my  consciousness.  In  such  cases  I  am  conscious 
of  exerting  free  volition.  Further,  throughout  this  process 
I  apprehend  myself  as  causing  my  mental  activity — I  am 
immediately  conscious  of  my  attention  as  the  exercise 
of  free  causal  energy  put  forth  by  nte. 

It  is  this  power  of  the  mind  to  modify  through 
selective  attention  the  relative  strength  of  rival  motives 
that  renders  so  futile  all  comparison  of  the  will  with  a 


FREE-IVILL   AND   DETERMINISM.  407 


balance  Inevitably  drawn  in  the  direction  of  the  heaviest 
weight :  "  Pull  a  body,"  says  Professor  Alexander,  "to 
the  right  with  a  force  of  twelve  pounds,  and  to  the  left 
with  a  force  of  eight ;  it  moves  to  the  right.  Imagine 
that  body  a  mind  aware  of  the  forces  which  act  upon 
it ;  it  will  move  in  the  direction  of  that  which,  for  what- 
ever reason,  appeals  to  it  most  ;  and  in  doing  so  it  will, 
just  because  it  is  conscious,  act  of  itself,  and  will  have 
the  consciousness  of  freedom.  A  true  explanation  of 
this  consciousness  turns  the  flank  of  indeterminism." 
(Op.  cit.  p.  340.)  "  Flanking  "  movements  are  some- 
times perilous  to  the  flanking  party.  Imagine  that 
body  not  merely  aware  of  the  forces  acting  upon  it,  but 
also  self-conscious  of  the  active  po-wev  of  selective  attention  b}^ 
which  it  increases  the  force  of  the  eight  pounds  or 
diminishes  that  of  the  twelve,  and  the  example  will 
accurately  represent  what  introspection  assures  us 
takes  place  in  our  minds  when  we  exert  our  free-will 
to  overcome  the  strongest  motive.  The  illustration 
thus  merely  makes  clear  the  radical  misconception  of 
the  actual  character  of  our  mental  life  required  by  the 
determinist  theory.^ 

Or,  the  argument  may  be  put  in  the  converse  form  : 
Suppose  that  I  was  free,  could  consciousness  affirm  that  fact 
more  clearly  than  it  does  now  ?  "Let  us  ask  what  the  effort 
to  attend  would  effect  if  it  were  an  original  force.  It 
would  deepen  and  prolong  the  stay  in  consciousness  of 
innumerable  ideas  which  else  would  fade  more  quickly 
away.  The  delay  thus  gained  might  not  be  more  than 
a  second  in  duration — but  that  second  might  be  critical; 
for,  in  the  constant  rising  and  falling  of  considerations 
in  the  mind,  where  two  associated  systems  of  them  are 
nearly  in  equilibrium  it  is  often  but.  a  matter  of  a 
second  more  or  less  of  attention  at  the  outset,  whether 

^  Cf.  Leon  Noel:  "La  predominance  de  Vidce  qui  triomphe 
s'obtient  precisement  par  le  fait  de  ractivite  voHtive  qui  la  soutenait 
et  commandait  le  jeu  des  representations.  Cette  meme  activite, 
maintenant,  se  tourne  definitivement  vers  elle,  de  tout  son  poids,  et 
c'est  ce  qui  constitute  la  volition.  Elle  ne  surgit  pas  soudainement, 
par  Taction  de  I'idee  et  des  motifs;  depuis  longtemps  elle  se  trouvait 
preparee  dans  la  conscience,  par  une  force  maitresse  de  I'idee  et  des 
motifs."  (Op.  cit.  p.  194.) 


4o8  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


one  system  shall  gain  force  to  occupy  the  field  and 
develop  itself,  and  exclude  the  other,  or  be  excluded 
itself  by  the  other.  When  developed,  it  may  make  us 
act ;  and  that  act  may  seal  our  doom.  .  .  .  The  whole 
drama  of  the  voluntary  life  hinges  on  the  amount  of 
attention,  slightly  more  or  slightl}^  less,  which  rival 
motor  ideas  may  receive.  But  the  whole  feeling  of 
realit3%  the  whole  sting  and  excitement  of  our  voluntary 
life,  depends  on  our  sense  that  in  it  things  are  really 
being  decided  from  one  moment  to  another,  and  that  it  is 
not  the  dull  rattling  off  of  a  chain  that  was  forged 
innumerable  ages  ago."  •" 

Deliberation. — Let  us  take  another  experience.  Suppose 
two  alternative  courses  are  suggested  to  me  in  regard  to  some 
projected  action,  as  for  instance  the  investment  of  a  sum  of 
money ;  or  the  selection  of  a  servant.  I  set  myself  to  reflect 
on  the  merits  of  two  claimants.  I  question  each  of  them 
about  their  capabilities.  I  examine  their  testimonials,  and 
make  what  inquiries  I  can  about  them.  I  then  ponder  on  the 
motives  against  and  in  favour  of  each.  I  consider  the  matter  on 
different  occasions ;  and  finally  at  the  end  of  a  week  select 
one  of  the  candidates.  Now  what  is  to  be  noticed  here  is  that 
the  process  of  deliberation  itself  is,  on  the  testimony  of  internal 
consciousness,  an  exercise  of  free  volition.  I  have  freely 
reflected,  inquired,  and  examined  the  reasons  for  each  side. 
As  I  dwelt  on  the  arguments  for  one  of  the  candidates,  I  felt 
drawn  to  decide  in  his  favour,  but  I  freely  deferred  decision. 
I  voluntarily  abstained  from  what  I  there  and  then  felt  to  be 
the  easier  and  more  agreeable  cor.rse.  It  is  of  no  avail  to 
assert  that  I  had  some  motive  for  these  acts  of  reflecting", 
comparing,  refraining,  and  finally  electing.  In  order  that  the 
process  may  have  been  intelligent  and  not  blindly  impulsive, 
there  must  have  been  some  reason  present  to  the  mind — and 
so  far  forth  a  motive.  What  determinism  has  to  show  is  that 
that  reason  so  inexorably  pre-determined  mc  there  and  then  to 
reflect,  to  compare,  and  to  abstain,  that  any  other  act  was 
impossible  to  me.  But  this  is  what  no  man — even  the  deter- 
minist — in  the  act  of  deliberating  can  believe.  The  conviction 
irresistibly  borne  in  on  me  by  introspective  consciousness  is 
just  the  opposite — that  it  is  / — the  indivisible  abiding  subject  I — 
who  freely  recall  and  detain  that  reason  or  motive  before 
my  consciousness,  and  confer  upon  it  Avhatevcr  strength  it 
possesses. 

'  James,  Viiniiplcs  of  rsycholo^y^  Vol.  I.  p.  45J, 


FREE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM,  409 

Finally,  this  conviction  oi  my  freedom  throughout  the 
process  was  founded  not  on  ignorance  of  what  was  determining 
my  action,  but  on  the  immediate  and  positive  knowledge  that 
/  myself  was  causally  determining  my  action.  For  I  have  had 
plenty  of  experience  of  action  of  the  opposite  kind — of  oscil- 
lating passively  under  the  pressure  of  rival  impulses,  of  the 
intrusion  of  uninvited  motives,  of  unvvelcomed  ideas  forced 
upon  the  mind,  and  even  of  agreeable  spontaneous  activity 
that  was  indeliberate.  This  important  fact  is  constantly  over- 
looked in  attacks  on  the  argument  from  introspection.  Were 
I  free  in  nil  my  actions  perhaps  my  knowledge  of  moral 
freedom  would  not  be  so  clear.  Were  a  man  always  hungry 
his  conception  of  hunger  would  be  imperfect.  I  have  learned 
what/rtv,  self-determined,  conative  activity  is  by  having  been 
repeatedly  the  subject  of  conative  activity  that  was  not  free 
or  determined  by  myself,  but  the  spontaneous  and  necessary 
outcome  of  my  character  and  the  motives  playing  upon  me.^ 

Decision  or  Choice. — Deliberation  is  free,  but 
the  act  of  choice  is  the  culmination  of  the  exercise  of 
freedom.  Let  us  take  an  ethical  choice.  A  temptation 
to  an  immoral  act  suggests  itself — to  excuse  a  fault  by 
a  lie,  to  commit  some  small  dishonesty,  to  reveal  some- 
thing to  my  neighbour's  discredit.  The  evil  thought 
may  have  been  present  for  some  time  before  I  awake  to 
its  immoral  quality.  So  far  it  has  been  non-voluntar3s 
and  I  am  not  responsible  for  it.  Now,  however,  I 
advert  to  its  sinfulness,  and  there  is  at  once  forced 
upon  me  a  deliberate  choice — to  resist  or  to  consent  to 
the  temptation.  Suppose  that  I  now  deliberately  decide 
either  to  consent  or  resist.  I  am  irresistibly  con- 
vinced duving  that  act  of  decision  that  the  election  is  freely 
made  by  me — that  1  am  not  inevitably  determined  by 
habit  and  present  motive  to  this  course — that  the 
opposite  alternative  is  really  in  my  power.  This  con- 
viction that   I   have  chosen   freely — that    the  situation 

^  "  II  y  a  entre  rhesitation  et  la  deliberation  una  difierence 
importante.  lUsitcr,  c'est  proprement  subir  passivement  des  impul- 
sions motrices,  osciller  tantot  dans  un  sens,  tantot  dans  I'autre  ; 
deliherer  c'est  ne  subir  aucune  impulsion,  mais  les  soumettre  toutes 
au  jugement  actif  de  I'esprit,  aiin  de  juger  de  la  valeur  de  leurs 
resultats.  ...  Or  les  seuls  actes  vraiment  volontaires,  les  seuls 
qu'on  appelle  libres,  sent  ceux  qui  sont  precedes  d'une  deliberation; 
et  ils  sont  d'autant  plus  volontaires  que  la  deliberation  a  cte  plus 
attentive."  (Fonsegrive,  op.  cit.  p.  423.) 


410  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


being  precisely  the  same  I  might  have  freely  elected  the 
opposite — remains  afterwards,  and  is  the  ground  for  my 
sense  of  remorse  or  self -approval.  Professor  Sidgwick 
assuredly  does  not  exaggerate  the  testimony  of  con- 
sciousness, yet  even  he  writes  :  "  Certainly,  in  the  case 
of  actions  in  which  I  have  a  distinct  consciousness  of 
choosing  between  alternatives  of  conduct,  one  of  which 
I  conceive  as  right  or  reasonable,  I  find  it  impossible 
not  to  think  that  I  can  now  choose  to  do  what  I  so 
conceive,  however  strong  may  be  my  inclination  to  act 
unreasonably,  and  however  uniformly  I  may  have 
yielded  to  such  inclinations  in  the  past."^ 

Or,  take  an  instance  of  prudential  decision.  Whilst 
reading  for  an  examination,  I  receive  an  invitation  to  some 
pleasant  entertainment.  The  spontaneous  impulse  of  my 
will  is  to  consent  at  once  :  but  I  freely  resist  this  inclination. 
I  reflect  on  the  pros  and  cons ;  and  then  I  deliberately  choose. 
Here  again  the  conviction,  both  during  and  after  the  election, 
that  my  election  is  free  is  irresistible.  Consciousness  affirms 
that  it  is  I  who  freely  initiated  the  act  of  reflexion.  It  is 
the  same  abiding  indivisible  I — not  alternating  groups  of 
feelings — who  have  deliberated,  who  have  actively  considered 
each  motive  in  turn,  who  have  decided  which  shall  prevail. 
This  Ego,  introspection  also  assures  me,  is  not  a  mere 
conscious  arena  wherein  rival  propensities  conflict :  it  is  not 
a  mere  mass  of  ideas  and  desires  with  the  more  frequent  of 
the  latter  personified  into  a  character;  it  is  not  a  mere  abstract 
notion  of  my  life,  past,  present,  and  future.  It  is,  on  the 
contrary,  the  real  being  who  has  this  notion,  the  permanent 
subject  of  my  states,  the  true  cause  of  my  deliberations  and 
vohtions.  To  the  suggestion  that  this  Self  which  thus  seems 
to  decide  is  perhaps  merely  my  formed  character,  it  has  been 
effectively  replied :  "  Besides  the  motives  felt,  and  besides 
the  formed  habits  or  past  self,  is  there  not  a  present  self  that 
has  a  part  to  perform  in  reference  to  both  ?  Is  there  not  a 
causal  self,  over  and  above  the  caused  self,  or  rather  the  caused 
state  and  contents  of  the  self  (the  character)  left  as  a  deposit 
from  previous  behaviour  ?  Is  there  not  a  judging  self  that 
knows  and  weighs  the  competing  motives,  over  and  above  the 

'•*  Methods  of  Ethics,  p.  64.  What  we  are  directly  and  positively 
conscious  of  is  not  that  we  are  able  to  move  our  limbs— that  we 
know  by  past  experience — nor  yet  that  kt  5//^//  be  able  to  choose  in 
the  next  second  ;  this  also  is  an  inference  and  may  be  falsified  by 
death,  &c.  The  affirmation  of  consciousness  is  that  iiotu  in  the 
iioment  of  consent  or  refusal  I  freely  elect. 


FREE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM.  411 


agitated  self  that  feels  them  ?  The  impulses  are  but  phenomena 
of  your  experience  ;  the  formed  habits  are  but  a  condition  and 
attitude  of  your  consciousness,  in  virtue  of  which  you  feel 
this  more  and  that  less  ;  both  are  predicates  of  yourself  as 
subject,  but  are  not  yourself,  and  cannot  be  identified  with 
your  personal  agency.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  objects  of 
your  contemplation  ;  they  lie  before  you  to  be  known,  com- 
pared, estimated;  they  are  your  data  ;  and  you  have  not  to 
let  them  alone  to  work  together  as  they  may,  but  to  deal 
with  them  as  arbiter  among  their  tendencies.  In  all  cases 
of  self-consciousness  and  self-action  there  is  necessarily  this 
duplication  of  the  Ego  into  the  objective,  that  contains  the 
felt  and  predicated  phenomena  at  which  we  look  or  may  look, 
and  the  subjective  that  apprehends  and  uses  them.  It  is  with 
the  latter  that  the  preferential  power  and  personal  causality 
resides ;  it  is  this  that  we  mean  when  we  say  that  '  it  rests 
with  us  to  decide,'  that  our  impulses  are  not  to  be  our 
masters,  that  guilty  habit  cannot  be  pleaded  in  excuse  for 
guilty  act."  i" 

Adhesion  to  resolution  under  temptation. — Let 

us  now  take  the  case  of  a  moral  choice  freely  sustained 
in  the  face  of  severe  pressure.  Suppose  an  angry 
impulse,  a  feeling  of  envy,  or  an  impure  image  presents 
itself  to  me.  As  soon  as  I  advert  to  its  sinfulness,  I 
deliberately  reject  the  evil  thought  and  endeavour  to 
direct  my  attention  to  something  else.  But  the  tempta- 
tion recurs  again  and  again  in  spite  of  my  efforts  to 
banish  or  suppress  it ;  and  the  victory  is  only  finally 
secured  after  a  long  and  painful  struggle. ^^  Now  the 
most  careful  introspective  observation  of  my  mental 
processes  assures  me  here  that  I  am  exerting  and 
sustaining  volitional  activity  against  the  preponderant 
impulse.  Further,  it  forces  upon  me  at  each  instant  the 
absolutely  overwhelming  conviction  that  the  alternative 
choice  is  hie  et  nunc  in  my  power — that  I  can,  alas ! 
only  too  easily  surrender.  It  is  only  by  painful, 
constantly  renewed,  energetic  volition  that  I  can  inhibit 
the  sinful  inclination.  The  alternative  choice  would  require 
no  positive   act.      Mere    cessation    from    this    sustained 

^"  Martinean,  A  Study  of  Religion,  pp.  214,  215. 

^'  The  Volitional  effort  should  be  carefully  distinguished  from 
Muscular  effort.  James  does  this  well,  Principles  of  Psychology, 
Vol.  II.  p.  562  ;  cf.  also  Noel,  op.  cit.  pp.  229 — 234. 


~\ 


412 


RATIONAL   LIFE. 


volitional  effort  would  permit  the  evil  impulse  to  take 
possession  of  my  consciousness — would  involve  acquie- 
scence or  consent.  The  motive  of  doing  right  undoubtedly 
attracts  me ;  but  the  assertion  that  the  cognition  of 
the  rightness  of  resistance  converts  such  resistance  into 
the  pleasantest  course,  or  constitutes  a  motive  of  such 
force  as  to  draw  me  inevitably  to  the  side  of  virtue,  is 
extravagantly  untrue.  It  is  /  myself  who,  by  continuous 
painful  effort  of  volitional  attention,  keep  this  evane- 
scent idea  of  duty  before  my  mind  and  give  it  what 
power  it  possesses.  Moral  conduct  of  this  kind  is,  as 
Professor  James  truly  says,  action  in  the  line  of  greatest 
resistance.  It  is  not  merely  one  original  momentary  act 
of  choice  against  what  seemed  to  be  the  strongest 
motive ;  it  is  a  series  of  volitions  in  opposition  to  what 
consciousness  continuously  assures  me  is  the  strongest 
motive.  But  according  to  the  determinist,  not  only  the 
original  decision,  but  each  subsequent  volition  was 
inexorably  determined  by  the  preponderant  attraction, 
and  no  other  alternative  was  ever  possible  to  me.^'^ 

An  objection. — To  these  various  arguments  one  general 
objection  is  urged :  "The  conviction  of  freedom  is  an  illusion." 
"  Men,"  says  Spinoza,  "  deceive  themselves  in  thinking  that 
they  arc  free.  On  what  is  this  opinion  based  ?  On  this 
alone,  that  they  are  conscious  of  their  acts,  but  ignorant  of 
the  causes  which  determine  them.  The  idea  which  men  form 
of  their  liberty  arises  then  from  this,  that  they  do  not  know 
the  causes  of  their  actions/' i''     '•  Which  motive  is  chosen," 

1-  Cf.  M.  Piat :  "II  existe  une  profonde  difference  entre  mes 
representations  et  mes  volitions  morales.  Mes  representations  viennent 
de  je  ne  sais  quelle  region  de  men  etre  et  s'imposent  a  ma  conscience. 
Elles  se  font  en  moi  sans  moi.  Je  ne  les  produis  pas  ;  Je  les  subis. 
II  en  va  tout  autrement  des  actes  que  j'accomplis  pour  me  con- 
former  a  la  loi  morale.  Ces  actes  ne  se  passent  pas  en  moi  sans 
mon  concours ;  je  ne  suis  seulement  spectateur  de  leur  evolution  ; 
je  les  tire  de  mon  propre  fond  et  par  un  effort  qui  ne  depend  que  de 
moi.  Quand  je  lutte  centre  une  passion,  je  sens  bien  la  sollicitation 
de  I'idt-al  et  le  charme  du  bien  qui  m'appellent  en  haut ;  rnais  ce 
que  je  sens  avec  non  moins  de  nettete,  c'est  que  cette  sollicitation 
et  ce  charme  n'ont  rien  d'analogue  a  une  force,  si  subtile  et  delicate 
fju'on  la  suppose,  qui  me  tire  et  m'entraine  a  sa  suite.  C'est  par 
un  effort  qui  m'est  propre,  par  une  tension  de  mon  energie,  que 
j'opine  pour  lui  centre  la  passion."  {La  Liberie,  Vol.  II.  p.  94) 

^^  Cited  by  Maudsley,  op.  cit.  p.  409. 


FREE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM.  413 


says  Professor  Alexander,  ''  is  perfectly  fixed  and  dependent 
upon  the  character,  which  cannot  choose  otherwise  than  it 
does."  The  mistaken  notion  that  "  I  was  free  to  do  other- 
wise "  is  due  simply  to  the  fact  that :  "  Given  any  act,  a 
different  act  is  conceivable,  there  is  a  logical  alternative  to 
everything.  But  so  far  as  the  agent  believes  that  he,  with  his 
character  and  under  his  circumstances,  could  have  acted 
otherwise,  he  confuses  the  feeling  that  he  chooses  with  this 
mere  logical  possibility."^*  The  reply  is  already  furnished  in 
the  analysis  of  the  examples  of  conative  activity  just  given. 
My  assurance  of  freedom  in  voluntary  attention,  deliberation, 
and  effort  against  temptation  is  founded,  not  on  ignorance  of 
the  causes  which  have  determined  my  volition,  but  on  the 
knowledge  that  /  am  that  cause — the  certainty  that  it  is  / 
who  have  originated,  developed,  guided,  and  sustained  my 
volitional  activity.  I  can  clearly  distinguish  certain  free 
volitions  from  conative  activity  which  is  not  free.  I  can 
recognize  with  not  less  clearness  the  wide  difference  between 
the  conception  of  some  abstractly  possible  action  and  the 
conviction  that  an  alternative  course  is  or  was  really  in  my 
power.  And  the  assertion  that  whilst  I  was  painfully  struggling 
against  a  violent  and  protracted  temptation  consent  was 
there  and  then  never  really  possible  to  me,  is  simply 
incredible.  If  ugly  facts  are  to  be  got  rid  of  by  calling  them 
"  illusions,"  no  psychological  or  metaphysical  hypothesis, 
however  absurd,  could  be  effectually  disproved. 

Metaphysical  Argument. — The  third  form  of 
proof  used  in  establishing  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  is 
sometimes  called  the  Metaphysical  Argument.  The 
distaste  for  metaphysical  speculation,  which  has  held 
such  complete  sway  in  this  country  during  the  last  two 
centuries,  has  virtuall}?'  ostracized  this  argument  from 
English  philosophical  literature.  It  is  indeed  of  very 
little  use  for  the  purpose  of  converting  a  man  who  is 
not  convinced  of  the  existence  of  Free-will  by  the 
preceding  lines  of  reasoning.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  has  the  advantage,  which  they  do  not  possess,  of 
showing  the  cause  of  our  freedom,  and  the  natural  con- 
tinuity of  that  freedom,  as  long  as  reason  remains  to  us 
in  this  life.  We  do  not  of  course  mean  by  this,  that 
there  is  moral  liberty  involved  in  every  use  of  reason. 
We  have  already  pointed  out  that  freedom  is  limited  to 

i-*  Op.  cit.  p.  340. 


h 


414  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


those  states  of  mind  in  which  we  advert  to  thoughts 
and  desires  that  have  occurred  to  us,  and  in  which  we 
are  thus  in  a  reflex  manner  concomitantly  aware  of  the 
character  of  these  thoughts — of  their  real  or  apparent 
worth,  of  their  value  estimated  from  a  moral,  a  pru- 
dential, or  a  hedonistic  standpoint.  As  often  as  the 
mind  is  in  such  a  condition — and  ever}^  man's  experience 
assures  him  of  its  frequency — we  are  free  to  indulge  or 
resist  the  thought,  to  foster  or  struggle  against  the 
desire. 

The  cause  of  this  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  Will  is  a 
rational  appetite  :  an  appetite  which  embraces  nothing 
of  necessity,  except  what  is  apprehended  as  desirable  in 
every  respect.  The  Rational  Will  can  be  irresistibly 
drawn  only  by  that  which  reason  proposes  as  so  univer- 
sally attractive  that  it  contains  no  dissatisfactory 
feature.  As  long  as  the  thought  of  an  object  reveals 
any  disagreeable  aspect,  the  Will  has  not  that  which  it 
is  naturally  longing  for — perfect  happiness — and  it  is 
able  to  reject  this  object.  The  Will  is  moved  to  desire 
an  object  only  in  so  far  as  that  object  is  good.  Appe- 
tency is  in  truth  merely  tendency  towards  good, 
whatever  form  that  good  may  take ;  and  an  object 
which  contains  any  deficiency  is  the  reverse  of  desirable 
so  far  as  that  feature  is  concerned.  If,  then,  attention 
is  concentrated  on  this  undesirable  feature,  and  with- 
drawn from  those  which  are  attractive,  the  object  loses 
its  enticing  force.  But  during  this  present  life  no  object 
presents  itself  to  the  intellect  as  attractive  under  all 
aspects  when  ive  advert  to  its  vahie, — that  is,  in  the  mental 
situation  for  which  liberty  is  claimed.  As  regards /zw^Y*? 
goods  it  is  obvious  that,  either  in  the  difficulty  of  their 
acquisition,  or  in  the  uncertainty  of  their  possession,  or 
in  their  possible  incompatibility  with  our  highest  good, 
there  is  always  something  on  account  of  which  they  are 
undesirable,  and  for  which  man  may  turn  away  from 
them  to  seek  the  infinite  good — God  Himself.  At  the 
same  time  it  is  equally  clear  that  man  is  not  at  present 
drawn  inevitably  in  this  latter  direction.  The  inade- 
quate and  obscure  notion  of  God  possessed  in  this  life, 
the  difficulty  of  duty,  the  conflict  of  man's  pride  and 


FREE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM  415 

sensLialit}'  with  virtue,  all  make  the  pursuit  of  our  true 
good  disagreeable  in  many  respects  to  human  nature, 
so  that  we  can  only  too  easily  and  freely  abandon  it. 
The  clear  apprehension  of  an  Infinite  Good,  such  as  is 
given  in  the  Beatific  Vision  of  the  blessed  in  Heaven, 
would,  theologians  teach,  remove  this  freedom.  The 
blessed  cannot  help  loving  God  above  all  things ;  we, 
however,  though  necessitated  to  seek  after  good  in  some 
shape  or  other,  are  at  libert}'  to  reject  any  particular 
form  of  it  presented  to  us.  Our  Freedom,  accordingly, 
lies  in  our  power  of  choosing  between  the  manifold  kinds 
of  good  which  are  ever  conceivable  by  the  Intellect  ;  it 
is,  in  fact,  a  free  acceptance  of  intellectual  judgments 
concerning  the  desirability  of  thoughts  and  external 
actions.  Free-will  is,  therefore,  a  result  of  man's 
possession  of  a  spiritual  faculty  of  cognition  whose 
object  is  the  universal,  and  which  can  conceive 
unlimited  and  unalloyed  good.  Consequently,  where 
such  a  power  does  not  exist,  as  in  the  case  of  brute 
animals,  moral  liberty  is  absent. 

The  establishment  of  Free-will  by  the  two  former 
arguments  demonstrates  that  independently  of  the 
intellect  we  are  endowed  with  a  spiritual  faculty,  an 
activity  superior  to  matter,  and  not  completely  con- 
trolled in  its  operations  by  the  physical  organism.  This 
in  truth  is  the  rock  of  offence.  If  the  Will  is  free,  then 
there  is  more  in  man  than  an  organized  frame. 

Objections  against  Free-will. — We  shall  now  handle  briefly 
the  leading  objections  urged  against  Free-will.  Since  many 
of  these  claim  to  be  the  outcome  of  modern  science,  we  shall 
treat  them  under  the  heads  of  the  several  branches  of  know- 
ledge to  which  they  belong.  We  shall  start  with  those  which 
are  asserted  to  proceed  from  the  study  of  the  mind  itself. 

Psychological  Difficulties. — i.  Many  determinists  devote  a 
considerable  quantity  of  abuse  to  the  doctrine  of  Free-will, 
as  a  fitting  exordium  to  prepare  the  reader's  mind  to  make 
proper  estimate  of  the  pros  and  cons.  Thus,  Dr.  Bain 
characterizes  his  opponent's  view  as  incomprehensible  and 
unintelligible.  Free-will,  he  tells  us,  is  "  a  power  that  comes 
from  nothing,  has  no  beginning,  follows  no  rule,  respects  no 
time  or  occasion,  operates  without  impartiality;"  and  reason- 
ably enough  he  looks  on  such  a  conception  of  voluntary 


4i6  RATIONAL   LIFE, 


action  as  "repugnant  alike  to  our  intelligence  and  to  our 
moral  sentiment."  ^^  In  the  same  strain  Dr.  Maudsley  :  "A 
self-determining  will  is  an  unmeaning  contradiction  in  terms 
and  an  inconceivability  in  fact."^«  Such  rhetorical  devices 
are  to  be  met  by  simple  denial.  That  the  mind  possesses 
at  times  the  power  of  free  choice,  of  freely  yielding  to  or 
resisting  the  most  agreeable  attractions,  that  it  is  not  always 
inevitably  determined  in  the  direction  of  the  greatest 
pleasure 'is  at  least  as  intelligible  a  proposition  as  its  contra- 
dictory. Moreover,  since  it  expresses  what  is  practically  the 
universal  conviction  of  mankind,  it  cannot  be  self-evidently 

absurd. 

Similarly,  when  Professor  Stout  compares  free  volition  in 
the  libertarian  view  to  "a  Jack-in-the-box,"  and  says  that 
"contingent  choice"  in  that  theory  "  springs  into  being  of 
itself  as  if  it  were  fired  out  of  a  pistol,"  ^'  the  anti-determinist 
can,  of  course,  at  once  retort  the  illustration  and  reply  that, 
on  the  contrary,  it  is  in  Professor  Stout's  theory  human  choice 
resembles  the  pistol-bullet— is  just  as  free,  meritorious,  or 
blameworthy,  and  that  the  Brockton  murderer  is  just  as 
responsible  and  worthy  of  reprobation  as  the  revolver  with 
which  he  shot  his  wife  ! 

2.  It  is  affirmed  that  our  own  internal  experience  is  in 
favour  of  the  necessarian  view.  Introspection  tells  us  that 
we  are  always  determined  by  motives  ;  and  it  is  denied  "  that 
we  are  conscious  of  being  able  to  act  in  opposition  to  the 
strongest  present  desire  or  aversion."  ^^  By  "  strongest,"  is 
meant  strongest  estimated  in  quantity  of  pleasure  or  pain. 
Now,  here  we  come  to  the  point  of  assertion  and  denial  about 
an  ultimate  fact  of  consciousness  which  is  incapable  of 
demonstration,  and  which  each  must  examine  for  himself. 
We  hold  that  each  man's  own  internal  experience  reveals 
the  fact  that  he  can  at  times  resist  the  strongest  desire  or 
aversion,  and  we  believe  that  most  men,  at  least  occasionally, 
do  so.  In  involuntary  acts  we  admit  also  that  we  are  inevit- 
ably necessitated  by  our  character  and  the  motives  operating 
upon  us.  Even  in  deliberate  choice  we  are  influenced  by  the 
greater  weight  of  motive  on  one  side,  but  we  are  not  inexorably 
determined  thereby. 

3.  "The  strongest  motive  always  prevails."  This  is 
either  a  tautological  statement,  or  it  is  untrue.  If  strength 
of  motive  is  to  be  determined  by  its  final  prevalence,  then  it 
is  an  identical  proposition  affirming  the  undeniable  truth  that 
the  motive  which  prevails,  does  prevail.     This  seems  to  be 

15  Emotions  and  Will  (3rd  Edit.),  pp.  483,  492,  500. 

w  Op.  cit.  p.  412.  1^  Manual  of  Psychology,  pp.  590,  614. 

^8  Mill,  Exam.  (2nd  Edit.),  p.  505. 


P REE- WILL   AND   DETERMINISM.  417 


Bain's  viewJ^  Mill,  however,  says,  by  strongest  is  meant 
most  pleasurable.-'^  In  this  sense  the  statement  must  be 
denied,  and  appeal  made  to  the  illustrations  given  above. 

4.  Some  determinists  find  misrepresentation  the  most 
convenient  method  of  demolishing  the  case  for  Free-will. 
"  That  every  one  is  at  liberty  to  desire,  or  Jiot  to  desire,  which 
is  the  real  proposition  involved  in  the  dogma  of  Free-will,  is 
negatived  as  much  by  the  analysis  of  consciousness  as  by  the 
contents  of  the  preceding  chapters."  ^^  The  question  is  not 
whether  desire  be  free,  or  whether  action  in  opposition  to  wish 
be  possible.  G.  H.  Lewes  is  here  less  unfair  towards  his 
opponents.  "No  one,"  he  says,  "  supposes  that  our  desires 
are  free."--  Desire  is  an  ambiguous  term.  Primarily,  as  we 
have  already  indicated,  it  means  a  consciousness  of  want  or 
insufficiency  to  be  satisfied  by  some  represented  object. 
Such  a  state  is,  of  course,  not  a  volition  or  free  act  of  the 
will.  The  latter  consists  in  the  rejection  of,  or  consent  to, 
this  feeling — in  the  act  of  permitting  or  resisting  the  spon- 
taneous movement  of  the  appetite  towards  the  desired  object. 
We  certainly  can  at  times  put  forth  an  act  of  will  to  restrain 
this  spontaneous  desire.  The  word  desire  is,  however,  also 
used  to  designate  the  movement  of  the  appetite,  when  this 
motion  has  been  accepted  or  adopted  by  the  will,  and  of 
course  in  this  sense  it  is  impossible  not  to  will  or  desire  what 
we  freely  desire. 

5.  One  of  the  difficulties  most  frequently  urged  is,  that 
experience  of  our  neighbour's  actions  shows  that  they  are 
ever  determined  by  character  and  motives.  "  We  always 
explain  the  voluntary  action  of  all  men  except  ourselves  on 
the  principle  of  causation  by  character  and  circumstances. 
Indeed,  otherwise  social  life  would  be  impossible,  for  the  life 
of  man  in  society  involves  daily  a  mass  of  minute  forecasts 
of  the  actions  of  other  men  founded  on  experience."  ^^  "All 
the  massive  evidence  to  be  derived  from  human  conduct, 
and  from  our  interpretation  of  such  conduct,  pomts  to  the 
conclusion  that  actions,  sensations,  emotions,  and  thoughts, 
are  subject  to  causal  determination  no  less  rigorous  than  the 
movements  of  the  planets."  2*  ,, 

This   objection,  however,  really   proves   nothing   against         -^      -  -s/t^ 
our  doctrine.     For,  (a)  such  predictions  and  judgments  deal    f*^  «^^^^**^^ 
mainly  with  external  acts  of  which  a  large  part  are  inde-      ^^*^ 
liberate,  and  so  necessitated  by  nature   and  circumstances. 

^9  Emotions  and  Will  (2nd  Edit.),  p.  409.  ^o  Exam.  p.  519. 

21  H.  Spencer,  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  219. 

22  The  Study  of  Psychology,  p.  109. 

23  Sidgwick,  op.  cit.  Bk.  I.  c.  v.  n.  2.     '^^  Lewes,  op.  cit.  p.  102. 

BB 


4i8 


RATIONAL   LIFE. 


1 


{b)  Even  in  deliberate  actions,  unless  their  moral  quality  be 
very  marked,  men  follow  freely  the  spontaneous  impulse  of 
the  will,  which  is  the  resultant  of  character  plus  motives. 
The  most  thorough-going  libertarian  allows  that  man's  will 
is  influenced,  though  not  inexorably  constrained,  by  these  forces; 
and  hence  Christian  teachers  of  all  times  have  laid  the 
greatest  stress  on  the  formation  of  virtuous  habits,  (c)  Even 
where  the  morality  of  an  act  becomes  prominent,  it  is  only 
men  aiming  at  a  virtuous  life  who  frequently  resist  the  solici- 
tations of  pleasure,  (d)  That  in  an  unreflective  mood  we 
should  thus  seem  to  consider  other  men's  acts  to  be  com- 
pletely determined  by  character  and  motives,  is  quite 
explicable  on  the  principles  of  mental  association.  Character 
and  motives  have  admittedly  great  influence,  and  they  are 
the  only  factors  of  the  case  which  come  within  our  cognizance. 
Accordingly,  the  unknown  element  of  the  will  being  always 
neglected,  the  observed  agents  impress  themselves  vividly  on 
our  mind,  especially  in  connexion  with  successful  predictions, 
and  so  cause  the  existence  of  the  unseen  element  to  be  for- 
gotten, {e)  Finally,  when  we  reflect  upon  the  deliberate 
moral  acts  of  others,  we  most  certainly  do  not  believe  them 
to  be  the  inevitable  outcome  of  their  circumstances,  as  is 
shown  by  our  allotment  of  praise  and  blame. 

6.  The  fiction  of  Free-will,  it  is  said,  has  its  root  in  the 
illusion,  that  the  mind  is  at  any  moment  not  merely  the 
aggregate  of  conscious  states  then  present,  but  something 
persisting  amid  these  changing  phases.  "  The  collective  '  I,' 
or  '  self,'  can  be  nothing  different  from  the  feelings,  actions, 
and  intelligence  of  the  individual."  ^^  "  Considered  as  an 
internal  perception,  the  illusion  consists  in  supposing  that  at 
each  moment  the  ego  is  something  more  than  the  aggregate 


26 


and  fundamental 
ego   is   merely  an 


of  feelings  and  ideas,  actual  and  nascent,  which  then  exists." 
Here,  of  course,  we  again  reach  ultimate 
differences  of  view.  We  deny  that  the 
aggregate  or  a  series  of  states.  The  unity  of  consciousness 
refutes  such  a  doctrine.  If  there  were  not  a  permanent 
abiding  principle  or  subject,  underlying  our  transient  con- 
scious states,  then  memory,  reflexion,  deliberation,  and 
reasoning  would  be  impossible. 


7.  Herbert   Spencer   urges :    "  Either   the 


Ego 


which   is 


supposed  to  determine  or  will  the  action  is  present  in  con- 
sciousness, or  it  is  not.  If  it  is  something  which  is  not  present 
in  consciousness,  it  is  something  of  which  we  are  unconscious 
— something  therefore  of  whose  existence  we  neither  have  nor 


25  Dr.  Bain,  Mental  Science,  p.  402. 
^'^  Spencer,  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  219. 


Pn£E-wiLL  And  determlvis.v.  4i<^ 


can  have  any  evidence.  If  iL  is  present,  then,  as  it  is  ever 
present,  it  can  be  at  each  moment  nothing  else  than  the 
state  of  consciousness,  simple  or  compound,  passing  at  that 
moment."-^ 

From  neither  of  the  alternatives  does  the  alleged  con- 
clusion follow,  and  the  legitimate  inference  from  the  second 
is  actually  the  direct  contradictory  of  that  conclusion. 
Although  the  Ego  were  not  presented  in  the  consciousness 
of  successive  states,  yet  the  possibility  of  memory  and  reflexion 
would  afford  irresistible  evidence  of  such  a  permanent 
subject.     But  if  the  Ego  were   continually  present   in   con-  \ 

sciousness,  if  amid  the  transient  mental  states  which  form  J^ 
the  current  of  our  psychical  life  we  were  conscious  of  the  ■  ^ 
Self  as  ever  present,  then  assuredly  it  could  not  be  any  mere  ' 
passing  state,  simple  or  compound.  Surely  the  fact  of  being 
conscious  of  a  permanent  self  cannot  demonstrate  that  it  is 
merely  transitory.  Yet  this  is  literally  Mr.  Spencer's  con- 
clusion. The  syllogism,  however,  involves  other  fallacies. 
Suppose  the  Self  to  determine  our  volitions,  it  does  not 
necessarily  follow  that  the  Ego  must  be  always  distinctly 
realized  in  consciousness.  At  most  this  need  only  be  on  the 
occasions  of  the  exercise  of  free  or  deliberate  volition.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  vividness  with  which  the  Ego  is  appre- 
hended varies  in  different  mental  attitudes  ;  but  the  mere 
possibility  that  any  past  act  can  be  recalled  and  identified, 
that  we  can  by  any  reflex  act  cognize  a  mental  state  as  a 
state  of  Self,  demonstrates  that  the  Ego  is  something  over  and 
above  the  "passing"  states. 

Metaphysical  Objections.— i.  "  Nothing  can  begin  without 
a  cause;  but  a  free  volition  has  no  cause;  therefore  it  is 
impossible."  We  grant  the  major  premiss,  but  deny  the 
minor.  The  Ego,  or  Self,  is  the  cause,  and  a  free  cause. 
I  can  choose  which  motive  is  to  prevail.  Though  I  follow  the 
weaker  attraction,  my  voUtion  is  neither  motiveless  nor 
causeless. 

2.  Free-will  is  asserted  to  be  in  conflict  with  the  Lazv 
of  Causation.  The  law  of  causation  is  thus  expressed  by 
Dr.  Bain :  "  Every  event  is  uniformly  preceded  by  another 
event ;  or,  To  every  event  there  is  some  antecedent  which 
happening  it  happens."  ^8 

27  Ibidem,  §  2ig. 

28  Dr.  Bain's  Logic,  Vol.  I.  p.  27.  Cf.  also  p.  226,  and  Mill's 
Logic,  Bk.  III.  c.  V.  §  2.  Mill  endeavoured,  and  as  is  now  admitted 
unsuccessfully,  to  prove  this  law.  Dr.  Bain  abandoned  the  attempt 
as  hopeless.  On  the  confusion  of  the  principle  of  causality  with 
the  uniformity  of  nature,  cf.  Fowler's  Liductive  Logic,  pp.  24—26; 
also  Knight's  Hume,  pp.  161— 163. 


420  UATtONAL  UrU. 


In  the  phenomenalist  account  of  tliis  law  there  is  a 
lamentable  confusion  of  two  distinct  truths  of  quite  different 
orders.  The  one  is  the  principle  of  causality — "  nothing  can 
begin  to  exist  without  a  cause;"  the  other  is  the  law  of  the 
iinifovuiily  of  nature — "the  same  causes  produce  the  same 
effects,"  or,  "the  laws  of  nature  are  constant."  The  former 
is  a  necessary  metaphysical  principle ;  and  we  have  explained 
its  bearing  on  free  volitions  in  the  previous  answer.  The 
latter  generalization  is  a  contingent  truth  which  we  can  easily 
conceive  subject  to  exceptions.  Suppose  now  that  uniformity 
was  proved  from  experience  in  the  region  of  physical  science 
• — a  task  which  the  Empirical  Philosophy  is  utterly  unable  to 
accomplish.  There  would  yet  not  have  been  made  any 
advance  towards  the  demonstration  of  uniformity  within  the 
sphere  of  mind,  where  the  phenomena  are  of  an  utterly 
opposite  character.  Again,  if  within  the  total  assemblage  of 
mental  states  we  find  the  law  to  pTeva.il  generally,  the  inference 
as  to  its  universality  may  be  more  or  less  probable,  until  our 
internal  experience  brings  before  us  a  distinct  exception. 
As  soon  as  this  occurs — and  our  illustrations  we  consider 
have  established  the  fact — a  priori  probability  becomes 
worthless,  and  our  induciio  per  enumerationeni  simplicem  falls 
to  the  ground.  The  student  should  always  remember  that 
physical  science  simply  assumes  the  law  of  uniform  causation  ; 
that  its  universality  is  merely  a  postulate  to  be  justified  only 
in  metaphysics ;  and  that  the  metaphysician,  who  recognizes 
moral  convictions  to  be  not  less  real  nor  less  weighty  facts 
than  those  of  physical  science,  is  bound  to  qualify,  limit,  or 
interpret  the  law  when  applied  to  moral  actions  in  accordance 
with  his  wider  and  more  comprehensive  view  of  experience. 
The  truth  is,  that  though  the  law  of  uniformity  is  fulfilled  in 
the  subsequent  series  of  events  proceeding  from  an  originat- 
ing cause,  it  does  not  apply  in  an  absolute  unqualified  manner 
to  the  primary  originating  cause  itself. '^^ 

Objections  from  Physiology,  Physics,  and  Statistics. — 
Physiology. — According  to  certain  physiologists,  e.g.,  Dr. 
Maudsley,  G.  H.  Lewes,  and  Luys,  Physiology  has  disproved 
the  freedom  of  the  Will.  This  science,  it  is  asserted,  has 
established  that  the  connexion  between  bodily  and  mental 
states  is  so  intimate  and  continuous  that  each  modification 
of  the  mind  is  inexorably  conditioned  by  some  definite  mole- 
cular change  in  the  substance  of  the  organism.  But  since 
the  uniformity  is  rigid  among  the  corporeal  changes^  it  must 
be  equally  so  among  the  mental  correlates.     To  this  we  may 


-3  See  an  admirable  article  by  Father  H.  Lucas  in  The  Month, 
February,  1S77,  pp.  248,  seq. 


FREE-WILL   AND   DETERMINISM.  421 


reply,  that  equally  distinguished  authorities  on  physiological 
science  deny  any  such  conflict  as  is  alleged  between  Free- 
will and  that  science.^^  As  regards  the  facts  asserted,  we 
admit,  ot  course,  a  very  close  dependence  of  mind  on  body, — 
the  scholastic  doctrine  that  the  soul  is  the  form  of  the  body 
always  laid  stress  on  this  truth, — but  we  emphatically  deny 
that  anything  approaching  to  the  shadow  of  a  proof  that 
every  act  of  the  former  is  conditioned  and  determined  by  the 
latter  has  been  made  out. 

Physics. — The  establishment  of  the  Law  of  the  Conser- 
vation of  Energy  is  asserted  to  have  disproved  Free-will. 
This  argument  applies  not  merely  to  free-volition,  but  to  all 
conscious  states,  and  would  prove,  if  valid,  that  no  bodily 
movement  has  ever  been  influenced  by  any  mental  act  in  the 
history  of  the  world  1     We  shall  examine  the  difficulty  later. 

Statistics. — It  is  alleged  that  Free-will  is  disproved  by  the 
existence  of  the  Moral  sciences.  Buckle,  who  used  to  be 
the  classical  author  on  this  line  oi  attack,  maintains  that  the 
actions  of  men  "  vary  in  obedience  to  the  changes  in  the 
surrounding  society,  .  .  .  that  such  variations  are  the  result 
of  large  and  general  causes  which,  working  upon  the  aggre- 
gate of  society,  must  produce  certain  consequences  without 
regard  to  the  volition  of  those  particular  men  of  whom  the 
society  is  composed."  He  concludes  that  "suicide  is  merely 
the  product  of  the  general  conditions  of  society,  and  the 
individual  felon  only  carries  into  effect  what  is  a  necessary 
consequence  of  preceding  circumstances."  This  is  proved  by 
the  evidence  of  statistics,  "  a  branch  of  knowledge  which, 
though  still  in  its  infancy,  has  already  thrown  more  light 
on  the  study  of  human  nature  than  all  the  sciences  put 
together."  31     fhe  same  objection  adopted  by  Mill,  Bain,  and 

^^  See  the  writings  of  Beale,  Carpenter,  and  Ladd.  Carpenter's 
Mental  Physiology  is  replete  with  excellent  observations  on  this 
subject.  Ladd  writes:  "Nothing  of  scientific  value  which  Physio- 
logical Psychology  has  to  offer,  throws  any  clear  light  on  the 
problem  of  the  'freedom  of  the  will.'  .  .  .  When  M.  Luys,  for 
example,  maintains  that  to  imagine  '  we  think  of  an  object  by  a 
spontaneous  eftbrt  of  the  mind  is  an  illusion,''  and  that,  in  fact,  the 
.  object  is  only  forced  on  us  by  the  cunning  conjurer,  the  brain, 
'because  the  cell-territory  where  that  object  resides  has  been 
previously  set  vibrating  in  the  brain,'  he  is  controverting  a  plain 
and  universal  dictum  of  consciousness  by  his  private  and  unveri- 
fiable  hypothesis  on  a  question  of  cerebral  Physiology  where 
experts  and  novices  are  alike  ignorant.  Physiology  neither  dis- 
proves nor  verifies  the  postulate  of  free-will ;  accordingly  this 
postulate  must  be  raised  and  discussed  on  other  grounds."  {Physio- 
logical Psychology,  p.  544.) 

31  History  of  Civilization  in  England,  pp  24,  30. 


422  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


most  other  determinists,  is  evidently  considered  by  them  to 
be  one  of  their  most  irresistible  arguments.  Let  us  first  recall 
the  precise  point  at  issue.  The  defenders  of  moral  freedom 
maintain  that  within  a  certain  limited  sphere  man's  volition, 
and  consequently  his  action,  is  not  inevitably  predetermined 
by  his  character  and  surroundings.  They  admit  :  (a)  that  his 
spontaneous  or  indeliberate  acts  are  merely  the  outcome  of 
motive  and  disposition  ;  (b)  that  he  can  never  act  without 
some  motive — the  most  common  forms  of  which  being  im- 
mediate pleasure,  permanent  self-interest,  and  duty ;  (c)  that 
even  in  deliberate  or  free  actions  he  is  largely  influenced, 
though  not  inevitably  determined,  by  superior  force  of  attrac- 
tion. Thus,  a  man  accustomed  to  give  way  to  a  particular 
temptation,  will  very  probably  yield  again — though  freely — 
when  it  recurs.  It  is  now  at  once  evident  how  easily  general 
uniformity,  even  in  individual  conduct,  is  reconcilable  with 
the  libertarian  view.  Furthermore,  statistics  deal  with 
societies  of  men,  not  with  the  particular  human  being,  and 
there  is  no  contradiction  in  the  existence  of  regularity  among 
actions  of  the  community  taken  as  a  whole,  while  the 
members  freely  vary.  "  It  is  precisely  because  individual 
actions  are  not  reducible  to  any  fixed  law,  or  capable  of 
representation  by  any  numerical  calculation,  that  statistical 
averages  acquire  their  value  as  substitutes." -^^ 

32  Mansel,  Prolegomena  Logica,  p.  343.  The  inefficiency  of  the 
statistic  objection  is  well  shown  from  two  widely  opposed  views  of 
Causation  by  Dr.  Venn  and  Dr.  Martineau.  Dr.  Venn  points  out  : 
(i)  That  there  is  a  certain  illegitimate  gain  in  the  apparent  force  of 
the  difficulty  by  the  selection  of  sensational  cases,  such  as  the 
regularity  of  suicides,  misdirected  letters,  and  the  like.  The 
emotional  shock  of  surprise  aroused  by  such  discoveries  makes  us 
mistake  their  logical  value,  which  does  not  exceed  that  of  regularity 
in  meals,  or  in  wearing  clothes.  (2)  Mere  uniformity  of  an  average 
proves  nothing  as  to  invariable  determination  of  the  individual 
action.  Were  there  a  purely  random  or  chance  factor  among  the 
agencies  at  work,  this  would  not  affect  deductions  from  the  theory 
of  Probability.  If  a  sufficiently  large  number  of  observations  were 
taken  we  would  be  justified  in  expecting  that  the  random  occurrences 
on  the  positive  and  negative  sides  would  be  approximately  equal. 
Thus  in  tossing  a  collection  of  pennies,  whether  they  were  com- 
pletely necessitated  or  partly  free  we  should  expect  a  uniform 
average  of  heads  and  tails  in  the  long  run.  (3)  "The  antecedents 
and  consequents  in  the  case  of  our  volitions  must  clearly  be 
supposed  to  be  very  nearly  immediately  in  succession,  if  anything 
approaching  to  causation  is  to  be  established."  But  nothing  of  the 
kind  is  or  can  be  attempted  in  statistical  averages.  It  is  probable 
that  no  two  of  the  three  hundred  suicides  in  London  last  year  were 
precisely  alike  in  antecedents;   and  very  few,  if  any,  of  this  year 


FREE-WILL   AND  DETERMINISM.  423 


Theological  Objection  :  Divine  Prescience  and  Free-will. — 
It  is  argued  that  God  could  not  foresee  with  certainty  our 
actions   were   they   free.      This    is    properly    a    theological 
difficulty ;  and  for  an  adequate  answer  we  refer  to  the  volume 
of  this  series  on  Natural  Theology.     We  may,  however,  point 
out  that  it  is  not  strictly  accurate  to  speak  of  Godi  foreseeing 
events  to  come.     With  Him  it  is  a  question  of  actual  insight, 
of  intuitive  vision.     The  past  and  future  are  both  alike  ever 
present  to  His  infinite  changeless  intelligence.     Not  only  all 
that  has  been  and  all  that  will  be,  but  even  all  events  that 
would  occur  under  any  conceivable  circumstances  lie  unfolded 
before  His  omniscient  mind.  It  is  true  that  we  cannot  imagine 
the  nature  of  such  an  eternal  intelligence,  any  more  than  the 
snail  which  takes  a  week  to  cross  a  field,  can  conceive  the 
human  vision  that  simultaneously  apprehends  in  the  flash  of 
a  single  glance  leagues  of  a  landscape  ;  but  this  does  not 
disprove  the  fact.     Logical  dependence  in  the  order  of  knoidedge 
is  not  the  same  thing  as  causal  dependence  in  the  ontological 
order,  that  of  being.     Our  certainty  regarding  past  or  present 
volitions   of    ourselves   or   of    others   does   not    affect   their 
freedom  ;  neither  does  God's  vision  of  our  future  free  actions. 
He  sees  them  because  they  will  occur ;  but  their  occurrence 
is  not  necessitated  by  the  certainty  of  His  knowledge. 

Finally,  it  is  asserted  that  if  volition  is  not  as  rigidly 
ruled  by  the  law  of  Uniform  Causation  as  other  events, 
then  a  science  of  Psychology  is  impossible.  The  objec- 
tion possesses  about  equal  force  with  that  which  alleges 
that  if  some  miracles  are  admitted  to  have  occurred  in  the 
life  of  our  Lord,  or  of  His  Saints,  all  physical  science  is 
thereby  annihilated.  Mr.  Spencer  sums  up  the  whole  case 
thus  :  "  To  reduce  the  general  question  to  its  simplest  form  : 
Psychical  changes  either  conform  to  law,  or  they  do  not. 
If  they  do  not  conform  to  law,  this  work,  in  common  with  all 
works  on  the  subject,  is  sheer  nonsense :  no  science  of 
Psychology  is  possible.      If  they  do  conform  to  law,  there 

resembled  in  all  details  these  of  last  year.  If  it  could,  for  instance, 
be  shown  that  three  hundred  individuals  of  last  year,  and  again  of 
this  year,  under  the  action  of  three  hundred  precisely  similar  sheaves 
of  motives  put  an  end  to  their  lives,  then  the  determinist  would  have 
made  some  progress.  The  statistician  does  not  attempt  to  show  such 
similarity.  "  In  fact,  instead  of  having  secured  our  A  and  B  (motive 
and  volition)  here  in  closest  intimacy  of  succession  to  one  another, 
we  find  them  separated  by  a  considerable  interval,  often  indeed  we 
merely  have  an  A  or  a  B  by  itself."  (Venn,  Logic  of  Chance,  c.  ix. 
§§  16 — 21.)  Cf.  Martineau,  op.  cit.  pp.  255 — 272.  We  need  scarcely 
say  that  with  his  theological  explanation  later  on  of  the  relation  of 
God's  foreknowledge  to  our  free  volitions,  we  do  not  agree. 


424  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


cannot  be  any  such  thing  as  Free-will."  ^^    Xhe  alternative     J 
is,    of    course,    especially   as   regards    Mr.  Spencer's    portly     | 
volumes,  awful  to  contemplate.      Such    a   calamity   is   not,     ! 
however,  inevitable.     It  is  a  misconception  of  the  doctrine  to 
afiirm  that  the  reality  of  Free-will  can  seriously  affect  the 
scientific   character   of  Empirical    Ps3'chology.      The   inter- 
ference of  free  volition,  though  ethically  momentous,  may  be     | 
psychologically  very  small.  There  still  may  remain  sensibility, 
imagination,  memory,  intellectual  cognition,  sensuous  appetite, 
automatic  or  involuntary  movement,  habit,  and  the  emotions, 
as  law-abiding  as  ever.     With  such  wide  dominions  under 
the  sway  of  uniformity,  and  with  the  Free-will  itself  subject 
to  the  conditions  we  have  enumerated,  all  anxiety  as  regards 
the   reconciliation   of  Freedom   with    Psychological    science 
disappears. 

Readings  on  the  IF///.— St.  Thomas,  Sum.  i.  qq.  82.  83.;  W.  G. 
Ward,  Philosophy  of  Theism,  Essays  6,  7,  10,  11,  17;  Martineau, 
A  Study  of  Religion,  Vol.  II.  pp.  195 — 328 ;  Carpenter,  Mental 
Physiology,  Introduction  to  4th  Edit,  and  c.  ix.  ;  Father  Lucas, 
Essays  in  The  Month,  1877;  Ladd,  Physiological  Psychology,  pp.  524 — 
544.  French  literature  is  much  richer  on  this  subject.  A  good 
compact  work  is  Leon  Noel's  La  Conscience  du  Libre  Arbitre  (Louvain, 
1899);  G.  Fonsegrive's  exhaustive  £55^/  sur  le  Libre  Arbitre  (2nd 
Edit.  Paris,  1896),  contains  much  valuable  matter;  Abbe  Piat's 
La  Liberie  (Paris,  1895),  Vol.  I.  contains  useful  historical  matter; 
Vol.  II.  has  a  good  chapter  on  the  argument  from  consciousness. 
J.  Gardair,  Les  Passions  et  la  Volonte  (1892),  pp.  300 — 440,  expounds 
the  scholastic  doctrine  well.  See  also  T.  de  Regnon's  able  work, 
Metaphysique  des  Causes.  The  German  reader  will  find  a  good  treat- 
ment of  the  whole  subject  in  Dr.  Gutberlet's  D/t  WiUensfreiheit  und 
ihre  Gegner  (Fulda,  1893). 

33  Principles  of  Psych.  I.  §  220. 


t 
.1. 


CHAPTER   XX. 

THE    EMOTIONS.      EMOTIONAL   AND    RATIONAL 

LANGUAGE. 

Feeling  and  Emotion. — We  have  already  (c.xi.) 
investigated  the  nature  and  conditions  of  Feehng, 
understood  as  the  agreeable  or  disagreeable  tone 
of  mental  activity — what  recent  writers  call  the 
phenomenon  of  pleasiire-pain.  We  shall  now  briefly 
treat  of  Feeling  as  synonymous  with  the  Emotions. 
This  latter  term,  which  literally  means  a  movement 
or  perturbation  of  the  soul,  is  commonly  employed 
to  denote  certain  complex  forms  of  cognitive  and 
appetitive  consciousness  in  which  the  latter  element 
is  predominant.  This  is  especially  observable  in  the 
connotation  of  the  term  passion  which,  although  the 
usage  is  not  rigidly  fixed,  generally  signifies  in 
English  either  a  violent  actual  emotion  or  a  deep- 
seated  permanent  tendency  to  some  particular  species 
of  emotion.  The  latter  sense  is  exemplified  in  the 
principle  that  passion  is  sharpened  and  intensified, 
whilst  emotion  is  dulled  and  enfeebled  by  re-iterated 
or  prolonged  stimulation.^ 

1  Cf.  Hoffding :  "By  Emotion  {Ajfekt)  is  understood  a  sudden 
boiling  up  of  feeling  which  for  a  time  overwhelms  the  mind  and 
prevents  the  free  and  natural  combination  of  the  cognitive  elements. 
Passion,  sentiment,  or  disposition  {Leidenschajt),  on  the  other  hand, 
is  the  movement  of  feeling  become  second  nature,  deeply  rooted  by 


426  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Scholastic  View  of  Emotion. — The  schoolmen,  who  were 
interested   in  the  emotions  on  ethical  rather  than  psycho- 
logical  grounds,   discussed   these   states,   in   so  far  as  they 
handled  them  at  all,  in  their  treatment  of  the  Passions.  These 
latter  they  defined  as  intense  excitations  of  the  appetitive 
faculty.      The    passiones    seusibiles    vel    animales,   which   they 
especially  studied,  are  acts  of   sensitive   appetency.      They 
recognized  eleven  chief  forms,  which  they  divided  into  two 
great   classes,    called    the    passiones  concupiscibiles    and    the 
passiones  irascibiles.     In  the  former  class  the   object  of   the 
mental   state   acts   directly   on  the   faculty  as   agreeable  or 
repugnant  in  itself;  whilst  the  object  of  the  irascible  appetite 
is    apprehended   subject  to   some   condition  of  difficulty  or 
danger.     In  scholastic  phraseology  the  object  of  the  appetitus 
or  passio  concupiscihilis  is    boniun  vel  malum  simpliciter :  that 
of  the  appetitus  irascibilis  is  bomim  vel  malum  arduum.      Six 
passiones  concupiscibiles  were  enumerated, — joy  or  delight  and 
sadness,  desire  and  aversion  or  abhorrence,  love  and  hatred. 
These  are  the  affections  of  the  appetitive  faculty  viewed  as 
present,  future,  and   absolute,  or  without  any  reference  to 
time.      The  five  passiones  irascibiles   are   hope  and    despair, 
courage  and  fear,  and  anger.     The  first  pair  of  emotions  are 
the  acts  elicited  by  the  appetitive  side  of  the  mind  in  presence 
of  arduous  good,  according  as  the  difficulty  of  attainment  is 
apprehended  as  slight  or  insuperable.     Courage  and  fear  are 
the  feelings  awakened  by  threatening  evil  viewed  as  more  or 
less  avoidable  ;  whilst  anger  is  aroused  by  present  evil. 

Whatever  view  be  taken  in  regard  to  this  scheme  as 
a  scientific  classification,  but  little  reflexion  is  required  to  see 
that  the  several  emotions  mentioned  are  really  phenomena  of 
the  appetitive  faculty  of  the  mind  emerging  out  of  cognition. 
Appetency  embraces  the  conscious  tendency /row  evil,  as  well 
as  towards  good  ;  for  these  two  inclinations  are  only  negative 
and  positive  phases  of  the  same  energy.  But  this  faculty 
must  also  be  the  root  of  the  mental  states  arising  in  the 
actual  presence  of  good  or  ill.  The  words  desii  e  and  appetite, 
indeed,  bring  more  prominently  before  us  the  notion  of  an 
absent  good,  since  it  is  in  striving  after  such  an  object  this 
power  most  impressively  manifests  itself.  Still,  it  cannot  be 
maintained  that  it  is  by  a  diffeirent  faculty  we  stretch  after,  or 
yearn  for  a  distant  joy,  and  take  complacency  in  its  actual 

custom.  .  .  .  '  Emotion,'  says  Kant,  '  takes  effect  as  a  flood  which 
bursts  its  dam  ;  passion  as  a  stream  which  wears  for  itself  an  ever- 
deepening  channel ;  emotion  is  like  a  fit  of  intoxication  which  is 
slept  off ;  passion  as  a  madness  brooding  over  one  idea,  which  sinks 
in  ever  deeper.'  .  .  .  Feeling  begins  as  emotion,  and  passes — if  it 
finds  sufficient  food— into  passion."  (Outlines,  p.  283.) 


THE  EMOTIONS.  427 


possession.  It  is  not  by  three  separate  powers,  but  by  one 
and  tlie  same,  that  we  dishke  evil  in  general,  shrink  from  its 
approach,  and  are  sad  in  its  presence.  Hope  is  similarly  a 
desire  to  attain  an  arduous  good,  unsteadied  by  a  cognitive 
element  of  doubt ;  whilst  despair  is  a  painful  prostration 
resulting  from  a  negative  phase  of  the  same  activity.  The 
affinity  of  courage  ^ndfear  to  the  two  former  states,  and  their 
like  derivation  from  the  positive  and  negative  forms  of 
appetitive  activity,  are  obvious.  Both  involve  intellectual 
appreciation  of  the  threatening  danger,  but  whilst  in  the  one 
case  the  will  is  strong  and  determined,  in  the  other  it  shrinks 
back  in  feeble  irresolution.  Anger  implies  at  once  dislike  and 
desire  of  revenge. 

Chief  forms  of  Emotion. — Amongst  the  feelings 
which  have  attracted  most  psychological  interest  are 
the  following:  (i)  Self-regarding  emotions.  (2)  Those 
of  an  altruistic  character.  (3)  Feelings  attached  to 
intellectual  activity.  (4)  ^Esthetic  feelings.  (5)  Moral 
sentiment.     These  classes  are  not  mutually  exclusive. 

Self-regarding  Emotions. — Emotions  with  respect 
to  Self  take  a  variety  of  shapes.  Though  sometimes 
termed  Egoistic,  they  may  be  ethically  either  good  or 
bad.  The  pleasurable  forms  appear  as  self-esteem,  self- 
complacency,  self-commiseration,  and  the  like ;  whilst 
among  painful  feelings  are  remorse,  self-condemnation, 
and  shame.  They  are  all  different  phases  of  self-love ; 
and  so  products  of  the  Appetitive  Faculty.  There  is 
in  man  an  instinctive  desire  of  his  own  happiness ;  and 
consequently  satisfaction  in  contemplating  the  possession 
of  whatever  increases  it.  Every  excellence  possessed, 
every  good  attained,  every  praiseworthy  action  done, 
forms  agreeable  food  for  self- reflexion. 

Pride  and  Vanity. — The  special  form  of  self-love 
exhibited  in  an  inordinate  desire  of  our  own  excellence 
is  termed  pride.  This  vice  is  not  self-confidence,  nor 
the  consciousness  of  any  virtue  we  may  happen  to 
possess,  nor  even  the  confession  to  others  that  we  do 
possess  such  virtues.  These  may  indeed  be  symptoms  ; 
but  the  essence  of  the  vice  lies  in  the  craving  for  undue 
superiority.  Closely  related  to  pride  is  vanity,  or  vain- 
glory. The  primary  meaning  of  this  term  is  inordinate 
desire  for  glory,  that  is,  for  fame  or  esteem  among  men. 


428  RATIONAL   LIFE. 

In  ordinary  language  vanity  usually  signifies  either  the 
seeking  of  praise  on  account  of  some  trifling  or  paltry 
performance  not  really  worthy  of  honour,  or  the  act  of 
setting  an  exaggerated  value  on  the  varying  standard 
of  human  approbation.  Vanity  is  thus  incompatible 
with  true  greatness,  which  must  be  capable  of  rightly 
estimating  both  personal  gifts  and  the  fickle  judgments 
of  other  men.  In  self-commisevation  we  indulge  in  a 
sweet  feeling  of  pity  over  the  injustice  of  our  position, 
or  the  unfortunate  circumstances  in  which  we  have 
been  placed.  There  is  a  peculiar  joy  in  the  possession 
of  a  grievance  which  often  causes  its  removal  to  leave 
an  "  aching  void."  But  the  trial  must,  in  such  cases, 
have  been  of  a  nature  to  be  easily  appreciated  by  our 
neighbours.  The  explanation  of  the  state  would  seem 
to  be,  that  the  satisfaction  derived  from  the  imagined 
interest  or  importance  our  particular  trouble  gives  us 
in  the  eyes  of  others,  with  the  agreeable  and  inexhaus- 
tible fund  of  conversation  it  supplies,  more  than  counter- 
balance the  inconvenience. 

Remorse  and  Shame. — In  remorse  and  sliame  we 
have  painful  species  of  self-reflexion.  In  the  former 
there  is  both  sovroiv  and  self-condemnation  for  our  past 
action.  It  may,  or  may  not,  be  mingled  with  shame. 
The  most  important  element  in  this  latter  state  is  the 
pain  caused  by  the  representation  of  the  disapproval 
or  contempt  of  others.  As  their  admiration  is  agree- 
able, their  dis-esteem  is  mortifying.  It  should  be 
noticed  that  shame  is  in  itself  essentially  different  from 
moral  self-condemnation.  Our  contrition  for  sinful 
action  may  indeed  be  mingled  with  shame  at  the 
appearance  our  conduct  presents  in  the  eyes  of  our 
fellow-men;  but  those  writers  who  would  resolve  the 
moral  sentiment  into  mere  shame  ignore  most  important 
facts.  A  man  ma}'  experience  the  keenest  self-con- 
demnation on  account  of  an  action  such  as  a  duel,  in 
v/hich  social  approval  was  completely  with  him,  whilst 
he  suffers  a  torturing  consciousness  in  consequence  of 
some  involuntary  act  or  some  trifling  piece  of  ill- 
manners,  which  he  knows  has  not  the  faintest  shadow 
of  moral  taint  about  it. 


The  emotions.  429 


The  Sense  of  Power. — Among  the  self-regarding  emotions 
may  be  also  classed  a  feeling  concerning  which  much  has  been 
written  by  modern  psychologists — the  sense  of  power.  The 
term  "  sense  "  is  of  course  not  here  used  in  the  strict  signifi- 
cation of  cognitive  faculty,  but  as  equivalent  to  an  emotional 
form  of  consciousness  of  an  abstract  character.  We  must 
distinguish  two  elements  or  grades  in  this  sentiment, —  the 
desire  of  power,  and  the  complacent  pleasure  in  its  actual  pos- 
session. It  is  in  this  latter  stage  that  we  have  the  complete 
emotion ;  and  the  luxury  of  the  state  consists  in  the  conscious 
satisfaction  of  a  desire  of  wide  range. 

The  longing  for  power  first  exhibits  itself  in  the  simple 
shape  of  the  impulse  towards  the  exercise  of  our  physical 
faculties.  We  have  already  shown  it  to  be  a  universal  law  of 
our  being  that  appropriate  action  of  our  various  energies  is 
agreeable.  Consequentl}-,  although  the  original  instinct  is  of 
the  nature  of  a  spontaneous  impulse  towards  activity  without 
the  representation  of  any  pleasure  to  be  attained,  yet,  after- 
wards, the  memory  and  idea  of  this  resulting  gratification 
come  to  reinforce  the  impulse.  The  child  shows  this  active 
instinct  in  the  constant  and  vigorous  exercise  of  its  limbs  and 
voice.  It  evidently  rejoices  in  its  power  of  exerting  its 
members  and  creating  surprising  effects  in  the  world  around. 

Every  advance  in  the  efficiency  of  our  command  over  our 
faculties  means  enlarged  potentialities  of  satisfaction,  and 
the  consciousness  of  such  increased  efficiency  is  agreeable. 
As  the  bat,  gun,  or  horse  become  parts  of  our  personality,  its 
special  perfections  curiously  afford  a  joy  similar  to  that 
generated  by  the  knowledge  of  our  own  physical  or  intellec- 
tual superiority  over  our  neighbours.  Even  the  fact  that  our 
tailor  has  cut  our  coat  in  a  particular  way,  that  a  pet  rabbit 
winks  one  of  his  eyes  in  an  eccentric  manner,  or  that  a  pig 
which  we  have  purchased  surpasses  in  fatness  those  of  our 
less  fortunate  acquaintances,  carries  with  it  in  our  imagi- 
nation an  undefinable  dignity,  which,  blending  with  our 
other  excellences,  helps  to  swell  this  grateful  emotion  of  self- 
importance.  When,  instead  of  material  implements,  other 
men  become  the  instruments  of  our  will,  the  range  of  our 
power  is  at  once  indefinitely  extended.  It  is  too  in  the  desire 
to  gain  sway  over  our  fellow-creatures,  whether  by  intellectual 
labour,  by  eloquence,  by  literary  work,  or  by  military  force, 
that  the  passion  is  seen  in  its  most  striking  forms ;  and  it  is 
in  success  in  these  directions  that  the  emotion  assumes  its 
most  luxuriant  and  its  most  dangerous  character. 

Fear   and   Anger   are  ordinarily   classed   as  self- 
regavding  emotions ;  but  may  be  aroused  in  behalf  of 


V, 


430  RATIONAL   LIFE 


other  beings.  Both  are  manifested  throughout  the 
entire  animal  kingdom.  Both  seem  to  be  instinctive, 
at  least  in  a  vague  form,  in  the  infant;  and  both  exhibit 
themselves  at  a  very  early  age.  Their  general  utility 
for  the  protection  of  the  individual  is  obvious ;  but 
when  excessive  they  are  directly  injurious.  Fear  is 
purely  painful.  It  may  be  defined  as  the  pain  of  anti- 
cipated pain.  Anger  may  be  in  part  pleasant.  It  includes 
both  the  pain  of  felt  injury  and  the  agreeable  con- 
sciousness of  reacting  against  the  cause  of  our  pain. 
The  intensity  and  power  of  the  evil  pleasure  of  revenge 
are  only  too  well  known.  Physically,  fear,  apart  from 
the  exertion  of  flight,  which  it  may  excite,  causes 
depression,  lowering  of  vitality,  derangement  of  the 
digestive  organs.  If  the  fear  be  great  the  imagination 
is  excited,  impressions  are  exaggerated,  the  faculty  of 
judgment  and  reasoning  is  disordered,  and  control  ot 
attention  is  impaired.  Consequently,  from  an  educa- 
tionalist standpoint,  fear,  though  at  times  a  necessary 
instrument,  is  always  an  imperfect  motive.  Its  efficiency 
is  deterrent  from  evil  rather  than  promotive  of  genuinely 
good  effort ;  and  especially  in  the  very  young  it  may 
conflict  with  the  very  self-composure  and  steady  con- 
centrated energy  needed  for  study. 

Anger  is  amongst  the  most  exciting  of  the  emotions. 
It  stirs  up  activity  and  arouses  to  energetic  action. 
It  seeks  relief  by  injuring  the  cause  of  its  pain.  Like 
fear,  though  in  a  different  way,  it  heightens  the 
sensibility  of  the  imagination  and  obscures  the  power 
of  judgment  and  reflexion.  Wlien  combined  with  fear, 
anger  if  fostered  rapidly  passes  into  hatred.  In  the 
form  of  virtuous  indignation  it  may  be  an  elevated 
moral  force ;  but  it  is  always  a  dangerous  impulse,  and 
needs  watchful  control  from  the  earliest  stages. 

Altruistic  Emotions:  Sympathy.  —  The  most 
marked  form  oi  unseljish  or  benevolent  emotion  is  that  of 
sympathy.  Sympathy  literally  mea.ns  feeling  luith  others  ; 
benevolence  wishing  ivcll  to  others.  That  there  are 
naturally  in  man  non-selfish  impulses  is  shown  especi- 
ally by  his  possession  of  benevolent  and  sympathetic 
instincts.     liobbcs,  indeed,  who  defines///^  as,  grief  for 


THE   EMOTIONS.  43 ^ 


the  calamity  of  another,  arising  from  the  imagination  of  the 
like  calamity  befalling  one's  self  attempted  to  reduce  even 
these  to  far-sighted  selfishness  ;  but  the  general  tendency 
of  the  present  representatives  of  his  school  is  to  admit 
naturally  altruistic  inchnations.  That  sympathy  is  an 
innate  unselfish  impulse,  or  rather  a  native  disposition, 
is  shown  by  the  prompt  manner  in  which  the  feeling 
arises  on  the  contemplation  of  another's  suffering ;  by 
the  entire  absence  of  any  prospect  of  gain  to  ourselves 
in  return  for  our  compassion ;  by  the  real  self-sacrifice 
to  which  it  often  successfully  urges ;  and  by  the  univer- 
sality of  its  range, — moving  us  to  compassionate  the 
pains  of  brute  animals,  the  sorrows  of  strangers  and 
historical  personages,  and  even  the  imaginary  woes  of 
the  creations  of  the  dramatist  and  novelist. 

Analysis. — The  two  chief  features  of  the  state  of 
Sympathy  are  a  lively  representation  and  an  active 
appropriation  of  the  feelings  of  others.  There  is  both 
a  projection  of  self  into  the  situation  of  the  sufferer, 
and  a  voluntary  acceptance  of  his  grief.  In  compassion 
there  is  a  free  affectionate  adoption  of  the  pain  as  our 
own,  not  a  shrinking  dislike  for  it  through  fear  of  its 
infliction  on  us.  We  can  sympathize  with  the  trials 
and  joys  of  those  differing  from  us  in  age,  sex,  or  condi- 
tion, which  it  is  absolutely  impossible  should  occur  to 
ourselves.  At  the  same  time,  since  sympathy  involves 
the  realization  of  the  feelings  of  another  being,  some 
experience  of  a  kindred  nature  is  presupposed.  And 
herein  lies  the  cognitive  factor  in  the  emotion.  The 
intensity  of  our  sympathy  will  thus  be  conditioned  both 
by  the  range  of  our  actual  knowledge,  and  by  our 
capacity  of  imagination.  Consequently,  its  force  dimi- 
nishes when  the  feeling  is  of  a  kind  remote  from  our 
experience.  We  can  all  commiserate  physical  pain ; 
but  the  keen  sufferings  of  refined  or  scrupulous  minds 
are  often  incomprehensible  to  ruder  natures. 

Equally  important  with  the  element  of  cognition 
involved  in  the  act  of  compassion  is  that  of  affection. 
The  accepted  signification  of  the  term  antipathy,  as 
equivalent  to  dislike,  shows  this.  Anger  and  hatred 
suspend  for  the  time  our  power  of  pity.     The  intensity 


43i  RATIONAL   LIFJl. 


of  sympathy  is,  ceteris  paribus,  in  proportion  to  our  love 
for  the  object  of  the  emotion.  This  fine  susceptibility 
of  human  nature  would  also  seem  to  be  less  in  unison 
with  the  energetic  than  with  the  reflective  or  contem- 
plative character ;  though  the  former  disposition  is 
more  fertile  in  the  practical  fruits  of  benevolence. 
Since  the  Christian  era,  the  faculty  has  grown  both 
in  range  and  depth  along  with  the  mental  and  moral 
development  of  the  race.  The  increase  in  the  exercise 
of  the  imagination  arising  from  the  universal  habit  of 
reading,  so  new  in  the  history  of  mankind,  must  have 
an  important  effect  in  enlarging  the  normal  power  of 
the  fancy.  To  this  cause,  perhaps,  ought  to  be  traced 
the  present  popular  indignation  against  various  forms 
of  cruelty  towards  which  men  seemed  almost  insensible 
a  few  centuries  ago.  Sympathy  in  the  full  sense  com- 
prehends fellow-feeling  in  the  joy  of  another,  as  well 
as  compassion  over  his  pain.  The  former  is  a  more 
completely  disinterested  state,  and  far  harder  to  attain, 
as  the  neutralizing  action  of  jealousy  and  envy, 
even  in  a  faint  form,  is  able  to  destroy  this  truly 
unselfish  feeling.  This  does  not  occur  in  the  case  of 
pity. 

Feelings  attached  to  Intellectual  Activity. — 
The  mental  states  of  novelty,  surprise,  and  wonder,  called 
by  Dr.  Bain,^  feelings  of  relativity ,  also  play  an  important 
part  in  this  department  of  the  mind.  The  agreeable 
feeling  of  novelty  is  a  particular  instance  of  the  pleasure 
due  to  exercise  of  the  mental  energies  in  general.  The 
enjoyment  of  any  activity  is  highest  whilst  fresh,  and 
gradually  tones  down  as  the  faculty  becomes  habituated 
to  the  action  of  the  stimulus.  According^,  transition 
from  the  exertion  of  one  power  to  that  of  another ; 
or  even  variation  in  the  quality  of  a  mental  state  must, 
ceteris  paribus,  be  agreeable.  Since  the  number  of  pos- 
sible experiences  is  limited  and  the  list  of  absolute 
novelties  soon  exhausted,  the  advantage  of  change  in 
employments  is  obvious.  The  recurrence  of  a  former 
mental  state  after  an  interval  of  time  may  be  attended 
with  almost  as  much  pleasure  as  that  of  its  first  appear- 

2  Bain's  description  of  some  of  the  Emotions  is  among  the  best. 


THE   EMOTIONS.  433 


ance  ;  and  occasionally,  as  in  the  case  of  old  familiar 
tunes,  previous  acquaintance  enriches  the  emotion. 

Suvprise  contains  something  in  addition  to  novelty. 
In  the  latter  state  there  is  change :  in  the  former  there 
is  besides  a  certain  shock  of  unexpectedness.  Prac- 
tically, of  course,  the  two  feelings  shade  into  each 
other— marked  novelties  producing  surprise;  but  the  r^^ 
characteristic  feature  of  the  latter  state  is  the  temporary  \ — ^ 
perturbation  of  the  movement  of  thought,  owing  to  the 
sudden  appearance  of  an  unlooked-for  idea  which  does 
not  at  once  coalesce  with  the  existing  current.  In  itself 
such  a  dislocation  would  be  disagreeable  rather  than 
the  reverse,  but  the  pleasure  springing  from  ^  a  fresh 
energy  prevents  surprise  being  classed  as  a  universally 
painful  state.  Dr.  Bain  allots  it  to  his  group  of  so-called 
"  neutral "  feelings. 

Wonder  (which  Aristotle  deems  to  be  the  beginning 
of  Philosophy)  is  a  more  complex  emotion  than  surprise. 
It  requires  a  certain  magnitude  or  greatness  as  well  as 
strangeness  in  the  new  event,  which  causes  a  failure  of 
the  effort  to  understand  or  classify  that  event  with  our 
past  experiences.  When  the  novel  object  is  of  such  a 
completely  unfamiliar  kind  as  to  convince  us  that  it 
is  beyond  our  comprehension,  the  mind  is  thrown  into 
a  condition  of  conscious  stupefaction,  which  is  the 
purest  form  of  astonishment.  The  soul,  however,  cannot 
long  persist  in  such  an  attitude,  and  the  natural  incli- 
nation of  the  intellect  impels  it  to  try  and  bring  this 
occurrence  into  harmony  with  others  which  we  have 
observed.  The  native  tendency  of  the  mind  to  exert 
its  powers  when  thus  stimulated  by  the  enigmatic,  is 
the  essentially  rational  attribute  of  curiosity.  It  is 
scarcely  too  much  to  say  that  this  impulse  holds  a 
similarly  important  position  in  the  domain  of  knowledge 
with  that  possessed  by  the  instinct  of  self-preservation 
in  the  kingdom  of  physical  life. 

The  Logical  Feelings  of  consistency  and  contradiction 
are  closely  related  to  the  emotions  just  described. 
These  states  are  essentially  cognitional ;  but  pleasure 
or  pain  forms  such  a  very  important  ingredient,  that 
the  term  feeling  is  frequently  applied  to  them.  They 
CC 


434  RATIONAL   LIFE, 


afford  the  best  example  of  strictly  intellectual  senti- 
ments, and  are  of  a  spiritual  or  supra-sensuous  char- 
acter. The  consciousness  of  the  irreconcilability  of 
apparently  independent  cognitions  is  distinctl}^  dis- 
agreeable. We  are  dimly  aware  of  an  internal  state 
of  strain  or  contention ;  and  we  cannot  rest  till  we 
effect  agreement  between  the  discordant  forces.  The 
discovery  of  new  truth,  the  bringing  of  fresh  facts 
under  old  generalizations,  at  once  satiates  the  intel- 
lectual yearning  for  unity  and  gratifies  our  sense  of 
power.  There  is  a  very  real  joy  in  detecting  hitherto 
unperceived  relations  of  similarity,  whether  it  be  in 
the  solution  of  a  mathematical  problem,  the  discovery 
of  a  law  of  physics,  the  invention  of  a  happ)^  metaphor, 
or  the  guessing  of  a  riddle. 

This  kind  of  enjoyment  is  one  of  the  main  elements 
in  the  higher  species  of  those  pleasures  which  constitute 
the  Emotions  of  Pursuit.  This  term  has  been  employed 
to  denote  the  agreeable  excitement  attendant  on  certain 
kinds  of  out-door  sport,  games  of  chance,  and  interest 
in  the  plot  of  a  novel.  There  is  in  such  exercises 
novelty,  the  satisfaction  due  to  the  play  of  our  faculties, 
and  a  pleasing  interest  aroused  by  the  uncertainty  of 
the  result,  which  gives  much  food  to  imagination  and 
intellect.  If  the  stake  is  very  heavy  the  agreeable 
character  of  the  excitement  disappears,  and  the  state 
of  doubt,  resulting  in  anxiety  and  fear,  may  become 
extremely  painful.^ 

^  Rivalry  or  Emulation. — Closely  connected  with  the  emotions  of 
pursuit  and  the  sense  of  power  is  the  passion  of  emulation — one  of  the 
most  important  psychological  forces  both  for  good  and  evil  in  the 
economy  of  human  life.  Amongst  the  ordinary  constituents  of  this 
feeling  are:  (i)  The  pleasure  of  activity — though  sometimes, 
especially  when  excessive,  the  activity  may  not  be  pleasant ;  (2)  the 
agreeable  interest  of  the  chance  element — the  excitement  of  hope 
and  expectancy  ;  (3)  the  sense  of  power ;  (4)  the  anticipated  gratifi- 
cation of  triumph ;  (5)  the  pleasure  of  the  imagined  admiration  of 
the  spectator;  (6)  the  pleasure  of  conflict  itself,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
distinct  from  the  factors  just  mentioned.  That  the  excitement  of 
contest,  when  not  counterbalanced  by  some  positive  pain,  such  as 
fear  or  fatigue,  is  per  se  agreeable,  seems  to  be  established  by  the 
enjoyment  which  mimic  combat  in  so  many  forms  affords  both  to 
man  and  to  the  young  of  all  animals.     It  is  an  essential  element  in 


THE   EMOTIONS. 


435 


iEsthetiC  Emotions. — Another  interesting  class 
of  feelings  are  the  esthetic  emotions.  The  chief  of  these 
are  the  sentiments  awakened  by  the  contemplation  oi 
the  Beautiful  and  the  Sublime.  Ontology  is  the  branch 
of  Philosophy  to  which  the  problem  of  the  nature  and 
objective  conditions  of  Beauty  properly  belongs.  But 
since  the  middle  of  last  century  discussion  on  this 
subject  has  been  so  continuous,  that  there  has  grown 
up  a  portentous  body  of  speculation  claiming  the  title 
of  the  Science  of  Esthetics. '^  Here  we  can  only  analyze 
briefly  the  feelings  aroused  by  the  perception  of  the 
Beautiful,  the  Sublime,  and  the  Ludicrous,  and  point 
out  the  chief  features  in  these  realities  themselves. 

The  Beautiful. — The  epithet  beautiful  is  applied  to 
such  widely  different  things  as  a  sunset,  a  human  face, 
a  flower,  a  landscape,  a  musical  symphony,  a  grey- 
hound, a  poem,  a  piece  of  architecture ;  and  there  may 
be  awakened  pleasing  emotions  by  the  consideration  of 
any  of  these  objects.  The  first  and  essential  property, 
then,  of  beauty  is  that  it  pleases.  In  most  cases  the 
satisfaction  aroused  involves  two  elements — the  one 
sensuous,  the  other  intellectual.  The  lower  is  the  result 
partly  of  the  harmonious  action  of  an  external  organic 
faculty,  such  as  sight  or  hearing,  partly  of  that  of  the 
imagination.  Thus,  we  describe  particular  hues  as 
beautiful,  certain  sounds  as  charming,  and  in  many 
of  the  examples  just  mentioned,  the  important  part 
played  by  the  quality  of  the  organic  stimulus  is  evident. 

most  of  our  field  sports.  The  above  analysis  shows  that  this  spring 
of  action  which  has  done  so  much  for  social  progress  contains  both 
useful  and  dangerous  elements — that  like  all  other  passions  it  may 
be  productive  of  both  good  and  evil.  The  aim  of  the  Teacher  must 
be  to  extract  from  its  use  the  maximum  of  good,  with  the  minimum 
of  evil.  The  pleasure  of  activity,  interest,  increased  power  of 
faculty,  and  even  the  desire  of  esteem,  may  be  all  neutral  or  good. 
But  the  desire  to  triumph  over  another,  if  it  includes  the  wi§h  to  inflict 
pain,  or  if  it  be  so  intense  that  failure  invokes  envy  or  hatred  of  the 
successful  rival,  is  obviously  bad.  But  that  emulation,  when  limited 
and  safeguarded  under  normally  wholesome  conditions,  does  not 
necessarily  result  in  these  evil  effects,  seems  to  be  abundantly 
established  by  the  innumerable  forms  of  competition  which  have 
been  sanctioned  by  moralists  of  all  ages. 

^  Cf.  ^sthetik,  by  J.  Jungmann,  S.J.  (Freiburg). 


436  RATIONAL  LIFE. 


Along  with  this  satisfaction  due  to  sensation,  there 
is  also  usually  an  element  of  gratification  depen- 
dent on  the  exercise  of  the  imagination.  We  have 
alread}'  shown  in  our  chapter  on  the  development  of 
sensuous  perception,  what  a  large  part  the  reproduc- 
tive activity  of  consciousness  plays  even  in  seemingly 
simple  cognitions,  such  as  those  of  a  house  or  of  a  tree. 
Consequently,  the  pleasure  of  the  effect  must  be  attri- 
buted to  the  agreeable  operation  of  both  the  presenta- 
tive  and  the  representative  faculties  of  the  lower  order. 
The  combined  energies  of  the  external  and  internal 
senses  are  thus  of  themselves  capable  of  accounting 
for  much  of  the  delight  aroused  by  the  contemplation 
of  beautiful  objects  ;  and  we  think  those  writers  in  error 
who  would  deny  or  minimize  the  realit}^  of  sensible 
beauty.  Visual,  auditory,  and  motor  sensations,  both 
actual  and  ideal,  conspire  according  to  their  quality, 
their  intensity,  and  their  harmonious  combinations  to 
enrich  the  pleasurable  sentiment  of  admiration. 

Unity  amid  Variety. — Nevertheless,  human  appreciation 
of  Beauty  is  essentially  rational ;  and  the  importance  of 
intellect  in  this  department  of  cognition  is  shown  by  the 
absence  of  aesthetic  tastes  in  irrational  animals.  The 
most  universal  feature  in  the  various  kinds  of  beautiful 
or  pleasing  objects,  the  generality  of  philosophers  have 
held  to  consist  oi  7inity  amid  variety;  and  the  apprehen- 
sion of  this  perfection  is  an  intellectual  act.  Symmetr3^ 
order,  fitness,  harmon}'-,  and  the  like,  are  but  special 
forms  of  this  unit3\  The  suitable  proportions  of  the 
lineaments  of  the  face,  of  the  limbs  of  an  animal,  and 
of  the  constituent  portions  of  a  building  ;  the  admirable 
co-ordination  of  the  several  parts  of  a  flower  ;  and  the 
unity  of  idea  which  should  run  through  a  musical  air, 
a  poem  or  a  drama,  are  all  only  varying  expressions  of 
the  one  amid  the  manifold.  Monotony  is  painful ;  same- 
ness wearies  the  faculties.  On  the  other  hand,  chaotic 
multiplicity,  disorderl}^  change  overpowers  and  prevents 
us  from  getting  a  coherent  grasp  of  the  confused  mass 
before  us.  When,  however,  our  energies  are  wakened 
into  life  by  a  rich  variety  of  stimulus,  whilst,  at  the 
same  time,  the  presence  of  some  central   unity  enables 


THE  EMOTIONS.  437 

us  to  hold  the  several  parts  together  with  ease,  there 
is  produced  in  the  mind  a  luxurious  feeling  of  delight.^ 

Utility. — A  particular  manifestation  of  this  unity  of 
thought  in  a  work  of  art  is  utility.  The  mind  is  gratified 
by  seeing  how  an  object  is  adapted  to  the  purpose  for 
which  it  is  intended.  The  structure  of  the  greyhound 
thus  embodies  the  idea  of  speed  :  the  English  dray- 
horse  that  of  strength.  The  charm  of  a  pillar  in  a  piece 
of  architecture  depends  as  much  on  its  obvious  utility 
and  fitness,  as  on  its  own  beauty  ;  and  the  fundamental 
rule  of  Gothic  art,  that  no  ornament  is  to  appear  for  the  sake 
of  ornament,  is  but  a  practical  application  of  this  psycho- 
logical law.  Objects  which  please  indirectly  as  in  this 
way  subservient  to  some  ulterior  end  are  said  to  exhibit 
relative  or  dependent  beaut}^ ;  those  which  charm  of  them- 
selves exemplify  absolute,  intrinsic,  or  independent  beauty.  A 
flower,  taken  as  a  whole,  may  be  described  as  absolutely 
beautiful,  whilst  the  delight  awakened  by  contemplating 
the  fitness  of  its  parts  is  an  effect  of  dependent  beauty. 

Association. —The  extent  and  importance  of  this 
second  kind  of  beauty  gave  occasion  at  the  end  of  last 
century  to  the  advocates  of  Associationism  to  attempt 
the  explanation  of  all  forms  of  beauty  by  that  principle. 
A  plain  of  ripe  waving  corn  is  beautiful  in  this  view 
because  it  suggests  peace  and  plenty;  a  ruined  castle 
because  it  recalls  deeds  of  chivalry  and  prowess  in  past 
times.  The  influence  of  Association  in  awakening 
agreeable  emotions,  and  in  giving  an  accidental  charm 
to  indifferent  objects  is  undoubtedly  very  great.  The 
scenes  of  our  childhood,  familiar  tunes,  the  rise  and  fall 
of  fashions,  and  the  rules  of  etiquette,  all  exhibit  the 
beautifying  force  of  this  agency.  Still,  it  is  a  mistake 
to  push  the  principle  too  far,  and  a  sea-shell,  a  feather, 
or  a  landscape  must  often  win  the  approval  of  the 
severest  iesthetic  judgment,  apart  from  any  extrinsic 
relation  which  it  may  possess. *5 

^  The  picturesque  wants  the  unity  of  beauty  proper,  but  the  dis- 
agreeable effect  of  mere  disorder  is  prevented  by  the  beauty  of  the 
separate  elements ;  certain  harmonies,  too,  usually  pervade  the 
irregularities. 

^  Ruskin  thus  concisely  states  the  flaw  in  the  case  of  the  advo- 
cates of  Associationism :   "Their   arguments  invariably  involve  one 


438  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Sight  and  bearing  are  the  principal  senses  in  the 
appreciation  of  beauty ;  but  the  experiences  of  the 
other  faculties  when  represented  in  imagination  can 
contribute  much  to  the  general  effect,  as  is  especially 
seen  in  poetic  description.  A  consequence  of  beauty 
being  mainly  apprehended  by  the  two  higher  senses 
is  the  disinterested  character  of  the  emotions  aroused, 
and  the  communistic  or  shareable  nature  of  aesthetic 
pleasures  in  general.  The  delight  of  admiration, 
though  it  may  stimulate  the  desire  of  personal  appro- 
priation as  a  means  to  ulterior  advantage,  is  not  itself 
an  egoistic  affection.  The  joy  awakened  by  the  con- 
templation of  a  picture  or  a  landscape,  by  a  poem  or  a 
concert,  is  not  diminished  but  increased  by  the  partner- 
ship of  other  minds. 

The  Sublime. — The  emotion  of  the  Sublime,  though  an 
agreeable  consciousness,  differs  from  that  of  the  Beautiful. 
The  object  of  the  former  feeling  is  some  kind  or  other  of 
grandeur.  Physical  magnitude,  immensity  in  force,  space, 
or  time,  moral  excellence  displayed  in  searching  trial,  may 
all  be  characterized  as  sublime,  and  awaken  the  corres- 
ponding sentiment.  The  emotion  involves  admiration,  fear, 
or  awe,  and  a  certain  sympathy  with  the  power  manifested. 
Mere  size  is  usually  not  sufficient  to  constitute  sublimity. 
There  must  be  a  certain  degree  of  perfection  of  form  to  give 
contemplation  an  agreeably  stimulating  character ;  and  in 
this  respect  the  emotion  aroused  is  related  to  our  enjoyment 
of  the  beautiful.  But  yet  it  is  in  the  grandeur  of  the  object 
that  the  chief  element  of  sublimity  consists,  and  this  feature 
is  so  essential  that  even  ugliness  and  wickedness  of  trans- 
cendent magnitude  may  sometimes  generate  a  feeling  of  an 
almost  admiring  awe.  The  mind  becomes  aware  of  its 
feebleness  and  incapacity  in  the  presence  of  immensity,  whilst 
at  the  same  time  it  is  stimulated  to  endeavour  to  comprehend 
the  object.  Sublimity,  like  Beauty,  is  a  revelation  of  the 
Divine  attributes,  but  in  the  former  the  infinite  incompre- 
hensibility of  God  is  brought  more  home  to  us.  In  our 
admiration  of  the  sublime  in  human  action  little  introspection 
is  required  to  discover  a  thrill  of  sympathy  with  the  agent. 

of  these  two  syllogisms:  Either  Association  gives  pleasure,  and 
Beauty  gives  pleasure,  therefore  Association  is  Beauty  ;  or,  the 
power  of  Association  is  stronger  than  the  power  of  Beauty,  there- 
fore the  power  of  Association  is  the  power  of  Beauty."  {Modern 
Painters,  Vol.  II.  31.) 


TitE  AMOTIONS.  43^ 


Although  in  the  sentiment  aroused  by  the  contemplation  of 
a  piece  of  wild  scenery,  or  of  a  storm  at  sea,  this  ingredient 
of  feUow-feehng  is  not  so  easily  detected,  yet  if  we  carehilly 
reflect  on  the  fact  that  what  properly  impresses  us  in  these 
phenomena  is  the  manifestation  of  a  Power,  we  shall  find  that 
in  the  effort  to  realize  to  ourself  such  an  energy  we  experience 
a  faint  vibration  of  sympathetic  consciousness.'' 

The  Ludicrous. — The  mental  state  aroused  by  contem- 
plation of  the  Liuiicroiis  is  in  striking  contrast  to  that  of  the 
Sublime.  In  place  of  admiring  awe  and  fear,  we  have 
joyous  elation  ;  instead  of  a  shrinking  consciousness  of  our 
own  diminutiveness  we  explode  in  a  burst  of  exuberant  mirtli. 
Though  the  emotion  is  eminently  rational,  the  fit  of 
laughter,  is,  of  course,  only  a  physical  movement  which  may 
be  excited  by  purely  physical  stimuli,  just  as  well  as  by  the 
intellectual  perception  of  the  ridiculous. 

There  has  been  much  discussion  as  to  what  are  the 
essential  features  of  the  ludicrous.  According  to  Aristotle, 
the  laughable  is  to  be  found  in  what  is  deformed  or  mean, 
yet  incapable  of  producing  pity,  fear,  anger,  or  any  otiier 
strong  emotion ;  and  Herbert  Spencer  has  not  advanced  the 
psychological  analysis  of  this  state  much  further.  Incon- 
gruity, the  latter  writer  teaches,  is  a  prime  constituent  of  the 
ridiculous,  but  this  incongruity  must  not  give  rise  to  other 
powerful  feelings.  To  see  a  fop  tumble  into  the  mud  may 
cause  us  to  laugh,  whilst  the  fall  of  an  old  man  whom  we 
love  arouses  quite  a  different  emotion.  Hobbes  defined 
laughter  as  "  a  sudden  glory  arising  from  the  conception  of 
some  eminency  in  ourselves  by  comparison  with  the  infirmity 
of  others  and  with  our  own  formerly."  This  view  would 
place  the  essence  of  the  ludicrous  in  a  degradation  of  the 
object.  It  is  true  that  the  point  of  wit  often  consists  in 
making  others  seem  contemptible,  and  there  is  awakened  a 
pleasurable  consciousness  of  elation  in  ourselves  by  the 
contrast;  but  such  a  theory  is  very  one-sided,  and  does  not 
account  for  good-natured  laughter,  or  for  many  forms  of 
humour.  Release  from  restraint  is  undoubtedly  a  very 
general    condition    of   mirth,   and   the    facility   with   which 

'  Hamilton  thus  distinguishes  the  character  of  these  emotions  : 
"  The  Beautiful  awakens  the  mind  to  a  soothing  contemplation ; 
the  Sublime  arouses  it  to  strong  emotion.  The  Beautiful  attracts 
without  repelling,  whereas  the  Sublime  at  once  does  both  ;  the 
Beautiful  aftords  us  a  feeling  of  unmingled  pleasure  in  the  full  and 
unimpeded  activity  of  our  cognitive  powers,  whereas  our  feeling  of 
sublimity  is  a  mingled  one  of  pleasure  and  pain — of  pleasure  in  the 
consciousness  of  strong  energy,  of  pain  in  the  consciousness  that 
this  energy  is  vain."  {Metaph,  Vol.  II.  pp.  512,  513.) 


440  NATIONAL   LIFS. 


laughter  can  be  excited  by  any  unusual  event  when  we  have 
been  for  a  time  sustaining  a  dignified  or  solemn  demeanour 
has  often  been  noted.  The  cheapness  of  the  wit  directed 
against  holy  things  which  have  been  long  held  in  reverence 
by  mankind  is  thus  obvious. 

The  Moral  Sentiments.— Under  this  term  are 
included  the  feelings  of  moral  obligation,  responsibility, 
approbation,  disapproval,  remorse,  and  self-commen- 
dation. As  we  have  already  dwelt  at  length  on 
Conscience,  we  must  be  brief  here.  We  have  seen 
that  conscience  is  not  a  special  faculty  or  sense,  but 
the  ordinary  judicial  activity  of  the  intellect  which 
discerns  zvhat  actions  are  right  and  zvrong.  The  cognition 
of  Tightness  or  wrongness  includes  or  results  in  the 
consciousness  of  obligation — the  feeling  of  ought.  It  is 
this  latter  frame  of  mind  which  is  more  especially 
termed  the  moral  sentiment.  As  a  mental  state  it  is  sui 
generis,  and  though  capable  of  rational  explanation,  it 
cannot  be  analyzed  into  mere  sensations.  It  manifesto 
itself  as  a  certain  consciousness  of  pressure  or  constraint 
on  the  will  differing  in  kind  alike  from  the  motive  force 
of  pleasure  or  pain  and  the  compulsion  of  known  truth. 
We  feel  impelled  towards  duty  though  it  be  disagreeable : 
we  can  refuse  to  embrace  it  though  it  be  evident.  It 
involves  a  sense  of  subjection  to  an  authority  with  which 
we  are  brought  into  immediate  contact.  It  presents 
to  the  mind  a  categorical  imperative  which  binds  absolutely  ; 
and  from  which  there  is  felt  to  be  no  appeal.  It 
contains  the  germ  of  the  notion  of  holiness. 

The  objects  to  which  the  moral  sentiment  attaches 
are  not,  like  those  of  the  aesthetic  feeling,  lifeless  things, 
but  voluntary  actions,  and  primarily  my  own  ;  secondarily 
those  of  others.  It  essentially  implies  the  notion  oi  free 
choice,  becoming  meaningless  if  human  volitions  are 
reduced  to  the  category  of  natural  events  uniformly 
determined  by  necessary  law.  This  consciousness  of 
obligation  is,  moreover,  universal  throughout  mankind, 
although  the  influences  of  education  and  the  social 
environment  may  alter  considerably  the  classes  of 
action  to  which  it  is  affixed.  The  intellect  may  doubt 
or  even  err  in  determining  what  particular  conduct  is 


THE   EMOTIONS.  44 1 


I 


right ;  but  that  which  he  judges  to  be  right  each  man 
feels  bound  to  do.  Further,  the  perception  of  the  obli- 
gatoriness or  wrongness  of  contemplated  conduct 
carries  in  its  train  all  the  other  forms  of  the  moral 
sentiment.  The  action  apprehended  to  be  wrong 
evokes  the  feeling  of  disapprobation.  This  is  judged  to 
be  rightly  transferred  to  the  agent.  The  action  I  know 
to  be  mine:  its  moral  quality  I  feel  to  be  justly  ascribed 
to  me.  I  am  conscious  of  responsibility  for  it.  When 
after  its  accomplishment  the  act  is  considered  retros- 
pectively, the  combined  feelings  of  violated  obligation, 
disapprobation,  and  responsibility  result  in  the  painful 
consciousness  of  remorse. 

These  various  phases  of  ethical  feeling  all  contain 
a  distinctly  moral  element  as  original  and  as  incapable 
of  analysis  as  that  of  the  feehng  of  ought.  Finally,  there 
is  in  the  background  present  in  them  all  a  common 
feature  oi  reverential  fear — well  insisted  upon  by  Newman : 
*'  Conscience  leads  us  to  reverence  and  awe,  hope  and 
fear,  especially  fear.  .  .  .  No  fear  is  felt  by  any  one 
who  recognizes  that  his  conduct  has  not  been  beautiful, 
though  he  may  be  mortified  at  himself,  if  perhaps  he 
has  thereby  forfeited  some  advantage  ;  but  if  he  has 
been  betrayed  into  any  kind  of  immorality,  he  has  a 
lively  sense  of  responsibility  and  guilt,  though  the  act 
be  no  offence  against  society, — of  distress  and  appre- 
hension, even  though  it  may  be  of  present  service  to 
him, — of  compunction  and  regret,  though  in  itself  it 
be  most  pleasurable, — of  confusion  of  face,  though  it 
may  have  no  witnesses.  These  various  perturbations 
of  mind, — self-reproach,  poignant  shame,  haunting 
remorse,  chill  dismay  at  the  prospect  of  the  future — 
and  their  contraries,  .  .  .  these  emotions  constitute  a 
specific  difference  between  conscience  and  other  intel- 
lectual senses."^  These  moral  sentiments,  however, 
be  it  remembered,  are  developed,  refined,  strengthened, 
and  perfected,  in  proportion  as  man  acts  up  to  the 
dictates  of  conscience  :  they  can  be  weakened,  perverted, 
all  but  extinguished  by  continuous  violation  and  abuse. 


I 
I 


^  Granunar  of  Assent,  p.  io8. 


442  RATIONAL    LIFE. 


No  distinct  Faculty  of  Feeling. — Having  now  treated  o. 
the  chief  emotions,  we  would  recall  once  more  the  truth  on 
which  we  have  often  insisted,  that  these  states  are  not  acts 
of  a  third  radically  distinct  faculty,  but   complex  products 
of  appetency  varying  in  character  with  the  quality  of  the 
cognitive  consciousness  out  of  which  they  emerge.     No  satis- 
factory attempt  has  been  made  to  show  that  such  states  as 
anger,  hope,  shame,  curiosity,  pride,  are  all  reducible  to  a 
third  ultimate  mental  aptitude,  distinct  alike  from  conation 
and  cognition.     Yet  if  such  a  third  faculty  is  to  be  assumed, 
or  if  it  is  to  be  identified  with  the  mere  capacity  for  pleasure 
or  pain,  reason  should  be  assigned  why  the  various  emotions 
are  to  be  grouped  under  it  rather  than  under  the  other  two. 
But  the  more  carefully  these  states  are  analyzed,  the  clearer 
will  it  become  that  they  are  only  complex  forms  of  appetitive 
and  cognitive  consciousness.     Desire  and  aversion  are  princi- 
ples  of    wide   range,   and   when   they  have    been   carefully 
applied  to  the  explanation  of  every  feeling,  very  little  that 
is  not  an  act  of  a  cognitive  power  will  remain.     We  may 
appropriately  complete  our  treatment  of  these  states  with  a 
citation  jFrom  the  work  of  Jungmann,  devoted  to  the  special 
subject  of  Feeling :  "  Modern  Psychology  is  accustomed  to 
treat  of  several  species  of  Feeling  and  Feelings  in  its  theory 
of    the    third   Faculty.     We    accordingly   have    discussions 
regarding  the  sympathetic,  intellectual,  aesthetic,  moral,  and 
rehgious  emotions ;  and  also  of  the  feeling  or  sense  of  right, 
of  the  beautiful,  of  the  noble,  and  of  moral  good,  or  of  sesthetic, 
moral,  and  religious  feeling.     If  we  admit  no  special  Feeling- 
power,   besides  the    faculties    of    Cognition    and   Conation, 
where   shall   we   dispose   of  these   states  ?      It  is   not   very 
difficult  to  find  the  right  place  for  them,  if  we  only  get  a 
clear  notion  of  what  is  meant  by  these  names.     The  sympa- 
thetic emotions  are,  in  general,  joy  or  sorrow  over  the  weal 
or   woe   of  others.      Those   feelings   are   styled   '  ^Esthetic ' 
which   are   awakened   in   the    soul  in  the   presence   of  the 
sesthetic  excellence  of  the  creations  of  human  genius.     Under 
the  phrase  '  Intellectual  FeeHngs '  are  signified  those  agree- 
able or  disagreeable  affections  the  cause  and  object  of  which 
is  an  activity  of  our  inteUigence  in  harmony  or  conflict  with 
that  intelligence.     Finally,  Moral  and  Rehgious  Feelings  are 
the  appetencies  of  the  soul  in  the  presence  of  ethical  good 
and  ill  with  reference  to  the  supernatural  order.  .  .  .  The 
sense  of  the  Beautiful  and  the  Good,  or  yEsthetic  and  Moral 
sentiment,  is   not  a   (special)   energy,  not  a   faculty  of  the 
soul,  but  simply  the  first  attribute  of  every  created  spirit — 
rationality.     Rationality  embraces   a  two-fold  element.     Our 
soul  is  rational  on  the  one  hand  because  its  understanding 


THE   EMOTIONS.  443 


is  necessarily  determined  by  Eternal  Wisdom's  laws  of  know- 
ledge ;  on  the  other,  because  there  is  impressed  upon  its 
appetency  a  natural  bent  towards  what  agrees  with  these 
laws  of  knowledge  and  with  Uncreated  Goodness,  that  is, 
towards  the  physically  perfect  and  the  ethically  good  ;  and 
therefore  towards  the  Beautiful.  This  rationality,  for  reasons 
assigned  elsewhere,  does  not  manifest  itself  in  all  rnen  in 
equal  perfection,  but  in  its  essence  it  is  present  in  all. 
Accordingly,  in  so  far  as  no  other  agencies  interfere,  every 
man  naturally  knows  and  recognizes  the  Good,  the  Right, 
the  Noble,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Great;  towards  these  he 
is  impelled,  these  he  embraces,  these  he  loves,  these  he 
enjoys.  On  the  other  hand.  Wickedness,  Meanness,  Ugliness, 
are  for  every  man  the  object  of  aversion  and  displeasure."^ 

Genesis    of   Feelings. —  What    is    the   proximate    cause    of 
Emotion  ? — Professor  James   writes  :    "  Our  natural   way   of 
thinking  about  the  '  coarser '  emotions  is  that  the  mental  per- 
ception of  some  fact  excites  the  mental  affection  called  the 
emotion,  and  that  this  latter  state  of  mind  gives  rise  to  the 
bodily  expression.     My  theory,  on  the  contrary,  is  that  the 
bodily  changes  follow  directly  the  perception  of  the  exciting  fact,  and 
that  our  feeling  of  the  same  changes  as  they  occur  is  the  Emotion. 
Common  sense  says,  we  lose  our  fortune,  are  sorry  and  weep  ; 
we  meet  a  bear,  are  frightened  and  run.     The  hypothesis 
here   to   be   defended    says   that   this   order   of  sequence  is 
incorrect,   that   the    one    mental    state   is   not   immediately 
induced  by  the  other,  that  the  bodily  manifestations  must 
be   interposed   between   them,   and   that   the   more  rational 
statement  is  that  we  feel  sorry  because  we  cry,  angry  because 
we  strike,  afraid  because  we  tremble  and  not  that  we  cry, 
strike,  or  tremble,  because  we  are  sorry,  angry,  or  fearful,  as 
the  case  may  be.     Without  the  bodily  states  following  on  the 
perception  the  latter  would  be  purely  cognitive  in  form,  pale, 
colourless,  destitute  of  emotional  warmth.     We  might  then 
see  the  bear,  and  judge  it  best  to  run,  receive  the  insult,  and 
deem  it  right  to  strike,  but  we  should  not  actually  feel  afraid 
or  angry."  (Op.  cit.  p.  450.)     Although  James  makes  a  distinc- 
tion   between    the    "coarser"   and    "subtler"    emotions,    he 
accounts  for  both  classes  in  practically  the  same  way.     The 
theory  seems  to  be  accepted  in  substance  by  Lange,  Lloyd 
Morgan,  and  others.     The  chief  evidence  urged  in  its  favour 
are  the  following  alleged  facts:  (i)  Particular  perceptions  do 
excite  diffused  bodily  effects  antecedent  to  emotions.  (2)  Many 
pathological  cases  in  which  the  emotion  is  "  objectless  "  are 
thus  easily  explained.     The  numerous  instances  of  unmotived 
fear,  melancholy,  anger,  and  the  like,  which  are  frequently  met 

"  Das  Gemiith  tuid  das  Gejiihlsvermogen,  §  99. 


444  RATIONAL  LIFE. 


with  in  asylums,  are  thus  easily  accounted  for  as  due  to  a 
morbid  condition  of  those  parts  of  the  nervous  mechanism 
by  which  the  emotion  in  question  is  usually  expressed.  Thus 
an  organic  malady  which  occasions  trembling  is  felt  as  fear. 
(3)  "  The  vital  point :  If  we  fancy  some  strong  emotion,  and 
then  try  to  abstract  from  our  consciousness  of  it  all  the 
feelings  of  its  bodily  symptoms,  we  find  we  have  nothing  left 
behind;  no  'mind-stuff'  out  of  which  the  emotion  can  be 
constituted,  and  that  a  cold  and  neutral  state  of  intellectual 
perception  is  all  that  remains."  (Op.  cit.  p.  451.) 

Criticism.— Although  its  chief  thesis  is  erroneous,  this 
theory  seems  to  us  to  contain  grains  of  truth  frequently  over- 
looked by  its  opponents,  i.  An  emotion  is  not  a  momentary, 
atomic  conscious  state  of  pure  quality  ;  but  a  complex  form  of 
mental  excitement  always  lasting  for  some  time,  and  generally 
constituted  of  sundry  elements  both  cognitive  and  appetitive, 
sensuous  and  spiritual.  The  class  of  "  coarser"  emotions— 
which  roughly  correspond  to  the  passiones  sensibiles  vel  animales 
of  the  schoolmen— more  especially  include  as  an  essential 
component  the  consciousness  of  motor  nervous  activity  and 
general  bodily  disturbance.  What  we  understand  by  an 
emotion  of  anger  or  fear,  is  thus  not  a  simple  act  of  an 
ultimsite  feeling-faculty,  but  a  process  of  consciousness  com- 
prising a  cognition  of  some  object,  a  resulting  appetitive  or 
impulsive  state,  and  a  feeling  of  organic  excitement.^'^  This 
latter  ingredient  is  probably  the  incoming  perception  of  the 
reverberation  of  neural  discharges  diffused  throughout  the 
system.  Consequently,  if  we  abstract  the  feeling  of  bodily 
symptoms,  a  very  substantial  constituent  of  the  coarser 
emotions  is  thereby  ehminated.  Still  the  remnant  is  not 
merely  a  neutral  "  state  of  perception."  There  will  remain 
also  an  element  of  appetency  or  conation.  Of  course  the 
latter  factor  may  Hkewise  be  abstracted;  but  surely  this  is 
deliberately  das  kind  mit  deni  Bade  auszuschiitten — "  to  empty 
out  the  baby  along  with  the  bath."  In  the  subtler  emotions 
—passiones  spirituales — the  rational  appetitive  element  of  com- 
placency or  dissatisfaction  is  at  least  as  important  as  the  act 

^^  The  organic  commotion — tvansmutatio  coyporalis — is  made  an 
essential  part  of  the  "coarser"  emotions  by  St.  Thomas.  Thus: 
"  Passio  propria  invenitur  ubi  est  tvansmutatio  coyporalis,  quK  quidem 
invenitur  in  actibus  appetitus  sensitivi."  {Sum.  1-2.  q.  22.  a.  3.)  "Ad 
actum  appetitus  sensitivi  per  se  ordinatur  hujusmodi  transmutatio  : 
unde  in  definitione  motuum  appetitivae  partis  materialiter  ponitur 
aliqua  naturalis  transmutatio  organi,  sicut  dicitur,  quod  ira  est  accensio 
sanguinis  circa  cor,  unde  patet  quod  ratio  passionis  magis  invenitur 
in  actu  sensitive  virtutis  appetitive  quam  in  actu  sensitivae  virtutis 
apprehensiva."  {Ibid.  a.  2.  ad  3.) 


THE  EMOTIONS.  445 


of  intellectual  appreciation  ;  but  it  is  quite  true  that  if  we 
abstract  all  the  sensible  effects,  the  passional  element  of  the 
emotion  disappears.^^ 

2.  Nevertheless,  the  impulsive  or  appetitive  element  in 
emotion — whether  "  coarse"  or  "  subtle,"  is  not  merely  the 
apprehension  of  the  reverberation  of  the  neural  disturbance. 
This  disturbance  is  the  effect  either  of  the  impulse  or  of  the 
physical  correlate  of  the  latter.  The  fact  that  mankind  at 
large — including  psychologists — have  hitherto  so  interpreted 
the  conscious  process  affords  at  least  a  strong  presumption 
in  its  favour.  Furthermore,  there  are  many  experiences 
which  cannot  otherwise  be  rationally  explained.  For  example, 
an  officer  at  the  mess-table  hears  the  word  "liar"  or 
"coward"  incidentally  pronounced,  and  remains  unaffected. 
But  let  him  understand  that  the  term  is  addressed  to  himself, 
and  the  state  of  consciousness  immediately  awakened  is 
totally  different.  The  sound,  the  physical  impression  is  sub- 
stantially the  same  in  both  cases ;  and  it  is  not  easy  to  see  on 
the  physiological  theory  why  the  motor  reverberation  should 
be  so  enormously  different.  The  common  sense  theory,  on 
the  other  hand,  answers  intelhgibly  that  though  the  act  of 
perception  may  be  almost  the  same  in  both  cases — or  even 
more  intense  in  the  former — yet  the  rational  meaning  is 
completely  different.  This  difference  of  meaning  can  account 
for  the  enormous  difference  in  the  subsequent  mental  state — 
the  violent  impulsive  feeling  which  has  as  its  physical  corre- 
late an  outgoing  nervous  process.  This  expresses  itself  in  the 
bodily  commotion  which  is  felt  as  organic  sensation.  The 
same  holds  true  of  the  feeling  of  fear,  moral  approval, 
aesthetic  admiration  and  the  sentiment  of  the  sublime  or  the 
ludicrous,  which  are  awakened  not  by  the  impressions  of 
particular  stimuli,  but  by  intellectual  appreciation  of  relations 
which  give  its  meaning  and  worth  to  the  object.  The  closing 
words  of  Lotze  in  another  connexion  are  to  the  point  here : 
"  The  shudder  in  presence  of  the  sublime,  and  the  laughter 
over  comical  incidents  are  unquestionably  both  produced 
not  by  a  transference  of  the  physical  excitations  of  our  eyes 
to  the  nerves  of  the  skin  or  the  diaphragm,  but  by  what  is 
seen  being  taken  up  into  a  world  of  thought  and  estimated  at 
the  value  belonging  to  it  in  the  rational  connexion  of  things. 
The  mechanism  of  our  life  has  annexed  this  corporeal  expres- 
sion to  the  mood  of  mind  thence  evolved,  but  the  bodily  expression 

^1  "  Amor,  et  gaudium,  et  alia  hujusmodi,  cum  attribuuntur  Deo 
vel  angelis,  aut  hominibus  secundum  appetitum  intellectivum,  signi- 
ficant simplicem  actum  voluntatis  cum  similitudine  effectus  absque 
passione."  [Ibid.  a.  3.  ad  3.) 


446  RATIONAL    LIFE. 


would  never  of  itself  without  the  understanding  of  ivhat  it  presents 
give  rise  to  the  mood."  (Microcosmus,  Vol.  I.  Bk.  III.  c.  3,  §  4.) 
The  physical  act  of  tickling  may  excite  laughter  similar  in 
kind  to  that  awakened  by  a  humorous  story,  yet  the  frame  of 
mind  evoked  is  totally  different ;  and  on  the  other  hand, 
what  is  substantially  the  same  strong  emotion  may  manifest 
itself  in  quite  unlike  motor  effects.  Thus  intense  sorrow  may 
result  in  violent  outbursts  or  tearless  silence. 

3.  The  various  facts  cited  in  favour  of  the  physiological 
theory  can  be  accounted  for  just  as  well  on  the  psychological 
or  common-sense  view.  Emotion  and  emotional  movements, 
whatever  was  the  original  order  of  their  occurrence  when 
connected  by  association  reciprocally  suggest  each  other. 
The  awaking  of  emotion  in  the  actor  by  counterfeit  expression 
is  thus  easily  explained.  The  pathological  cases  of  objectless 
emotion  can  be  similarly  accounted  for.  The  recurrence  of 
any  part  of  a  total  emotional  mood  tends  according  to  the 
ordinary  law  of  mental  association  to  reinstate  the  remainder; 
even  though  the  recurring  element  be  organic  sensation 
abnormally  excited  by  the  morbid  instability  of  the  nervous 
mechanism  of  expression.  But  it  is  at  least  as  probable  that 
these  pathological  cases  are  due  to  disordered  cerebral  idea- 
tional centres  which  pervert  the  emotion  at  its  source. ^^ 

Classification  of  the  Emotions. — We  have  ab- 
stained in  the  present  chapter  from  all  attempt  at  a 
systematic  classification  of  the  emotions.  We  believe 
such  an  undertaking  to  be  impossible;  and  we  think  that 
a  scheme  falsely  pretending  to  effect  a  scientific  division 
of  these  mental  states  will  do  more  harm  than  good. 
Most  of  the  emotions  are  extremely  complex  states. 
Few  of  them  are  of  well-defined  character  ;  and  the 
Quality  even  of  these  is  rarely  pure.  Feelings  are  in- 
variably mingled  or  tinged  with  others  of  a  different 

^2  The  constitution  of  a  total  emotional  process,  e.g.,  a  fit  of 
anger,  seems  to  us  to  include  these  psychical  and  physical  elements: 
(i)  Cognitive  state  (a),  with  its  physical  correlate,  a  nervous  change  in 
cerebral  centres  (a) ;  (2)  a  conscious  appetency  or  impulse  [b],  excited  by 
(fl),  and  having  as  physical  correlate  a  diffused  otitgoing  process  along 
motor  nerves  ()8)  ;  (3)  expressive  bodily  commotion  {transmiitatio 
corporalis)  {7),  caused  by  (i)(/3),  and  presenting  itself  to  consciousness 
through  organic  sensation  (c).  Psychically  the  emotion  is  composed 
of  (fl)  (b)  (c) ;  the  physical  counter-part  consists  of  (a)  (&)  (7).  On  the 
general  question  cf.  also  Mark  Baldwin,  Feeling  and  Will,  pp.  252 — 
257;  and  Stout,  Manual,  pp.  287 — 297. 


THE   EMOTIONS.  447 


nature.  They  also  shade  into  each  other  by  impercep- 
tible transitions.  Moreover,  they  continually  change  in 
tone  with  the  varying  age,  circumstances,  and  dispo- 
sitions of  man.  As  a  consequence  of  all  these 
properties,  no  sa.tisia.ctory  fundanientum  divisionis  can  be 
selected  ;  no  table  of  memhva  excludentia,  no  arrangement 
exhibiting  degrees  of  intrinsic  affinity — in  a  word,  no 
scheme  embodying  the  rules  or  attaining  the  ends  of 
logical  classification,  can  be  drawn  up. 

Certain  writers,  starting  from  some  very  unimportant 
extrinsic  feature  have  elaborated  plans  possessing  a 
degree  of  external  S3mimetry,  but  lending  no  real  assist- 
ance to  the  analytical  study  of  the  emotions.  Others, 
on  the  contrary,  adopting  some  hypothetical  principle, 
which  claims  to  penetrate  to  the  root  of  mental  life, 
have  subjected  many  mental  states  to  the  most  violent 
handling  in  order  to  squeeze  them  into  the  prescribed 
compartments.  We  thus  find  feelings  which  are  closely 
akin  in  nature  widely  separated,  and  vice  versa;  because 
the  particular  principle  chosen,  however  suitable  in  the 
division  of  other  states,  is  utterly  inappropriate  when 
applied  to  these.  In  such  a  situation  it  seems  to  us 
decidedly  the  best  course  frankly  to  accept  the  facts ; 
and  so  we  have  merely  taken  up  the  chief  feelings  and 
pointed  out  their  most  prominent  characteristics.  But 
in  order  to  establish  completely  the  justice  of  our 
method,  we  shall  indicate  a  few  of  the  schemes  which 
have  been  advocated : 

Spinoza  recognizes  as  the  three  great  primary  types  of 
passion  :  Desire,  Joy,  and  Sadness.  They  form  the  three  first 
on  the  ordinary  scholastic  list,  which  we  have  already  given, 
and  did  he  but  add  the  fourth — aversion  or  abhorrence — the 
scheme  of  the  Dutch  philosopher  would  have  been  at  least 
as  good  as  that  of  any  of  his  successors.  If  he  marks  off  joy 
from  desire,  he  ought  to  separate  aversion  from  sadness. 
Desire  aims  at  future  or  absent  good,  the  fruition  of  which  is 
joy;  the  object  of  abhorrence  or  aversion  is  absent  evil,  and 
its  presence  creates  sadness. 

Thomas  Brown's  classification  of  emotions  runs  thus  : 

I.  Immediate — cheerfulness,  melancholy,  wonder,  moral 
feeling,  love,  etc. 

II.  Retrospective — anger,  gratitude,  regret,  gladness. 


L 


448  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


III.  Prospective — the  desires  of  knowledge,  power,  fame, 
etc. ;  also  hopes  and  fears. 

The  principle  of  division  here — that  of  time,  is  of  very 
little  importance  from  a  psychological  point  of  view.  What 
is  fundamentally  the  same  feeling — e.g.,  the  moral  sentiment 
— may  be  evoked  by  the  contemplation  of  an  object  as  future, 
present,  or  past.  It  is  obviously  unwise  to  separate  these 
phases  of  the  same  emotion  from  each  other,  and  to  group 
them  with  feelings  to  which  they  have  no  affinity. 

Herbert  Spencer,  assuming  the  theory  of  Evolution,  seeks 
to  classify  the  emotions  according  to  degree  of  development 
and  complexity.  This  he  considers  to  be  determined  by  the 
order  of  their  manifestation  in  the  ascending  grades  of  the 
animal  kingdom,  in  different  stages  of  human  civilization, 
and  in  different  periods  of  the  individual's  life.  He  accord- 
ingly divides  all  feelings  into  four  great  classes  : 

I.  Presentative  feelings. — Sensations  considered  as  pleasur- 
able or  painful. 

II.  Presentative-Representative. — The  majority  of  emotions 
so  called.  They  are  due  to  inherited  experience :  our 
sensations  arouse  vague  representations  of  pleasurable  or 
pai  nful  sensations  experienced  by  our  ancestors,  e.g.  terror. 

III.  Representative. — Ideas  of  feeling  of  the  previous  class, 
excited  in  the  imagination  apart  from  external  stimulus,  e.g., 
the  pleasures  of  poetry. 

IV.  Re-Representative. — The  most  abstract,  complex,  and 
refined  sentient  states.  Representations  of  representations 
of  sensuous  impressions.  The  sentiments  of  justice,  of 
property,  and  the  moral  sentiment  are  illustrations. 

Criticism. — In  the  first  place  the  assumption  on  which  his 
scheme  is  based — that  all  our  emotions  are  evolved  out  of 
sensuous  impressions — may  be  simpl}^  denied.  Proof  of  such 
a  thesis  would  be  a  very  big  undertaking  indeed,  and 
Mr.  Spencer  does  not  seriously  attempt  it.  The  emotions 
of  curiosity,  surprise,  the  ludicrous,  shame,  logical  consis- 
tency, and  moral  approval,  are  certainly  not  reducible  to 
sensuous  elements.  Again  :  stage  of  development,  though 
possibly  a  consideration  of  much  use  for  educational  purposes, 
is  not  an  appropriate  ground  of  division  from  the  standpoint 
of  psychological  analysis.  What  is  needed  is  a  systematic 
grouping  of  the  several  distinct  species  of  emotion,  such  as 
love,  wonder,  hope,  anger,  fear,  and  the  like,  according  to 
their  mutual  affinities,  and  as  far  as  possible  in  their  purest 
forms  in  the  hope  of  discovering  some  underlying  general 
principle  which  rationally  connects  them.  If  we  wish  to 
study  the  characteristics  of  the  various  human  races,  we 
class  them  as   Caucasian,  Mongolian,  American  Indian,  and 


THE  EMOTIONS.  449 


the  other  large  divisions,  and  then  subdivide  these  groups 
into  smaller  famihes,  the  Indo-Germanic,  the  Semitic,  and 
the  rest.  We  do  not  take  as  our  divisions :  man  up  to  the 
age  of  three ;  from  three  to  ten  ;  from  ten  to  twenty.  A 
fatal  defect  of  this  development  method  of  classification  is 
that  it  distracts  our  attention  from  most  of  the  very  affinities 
and  differences  which  it  is  our  primary  object  to  discover. 
The  characteristic  features  of  the  elementary  distinct  types 
of  emotion  are  ignored,  and  widely  opposed  qualities  of 
consciousness  are  grouped  together,  whilst  what  is  funda- 
mentally the  same  activity  in  successive  stages  of  growth  is 
split  up  and  assigned  to  different  categories.  Thus  curiosity, 
indignation,  and  admiration  for  the  beautiful  should  appear 
in  nearly  all  the  four  compartments.  The  error  of  this 
classification  is,  in  a  word,  the  substitution  of  differences  of 
decree  for  differences  of  kind. 


^ii' 


The  Expression  of  the  Emotions. — In  the  final 
analysis  we  always  have  to  be  satisfied  with  the  state- 
ment that  a  definite  neural  movement  is  de  facto  the 
immediate  antecedent  or  consequent  of  a  given  psy- 
chical act.  The  one  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  other ; 
and  why  God  created  mind  and  body  thus  cannot  be 
explained.  But,  though  a  vast  region  of  mystery  will 
ever  surround  the  small  field  of  human  knowledge,  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  scientist  to  seek  to  push  back  the 
circumference  of  his  circle  as  far  as  he  can.  At  this 
object  theories  of  emotional  expression  aim  ;  and, 
although  the  subject  lies  on  the  border-land  of  both 
Physiology  and  the  Science  of  Mind,  it  seems  here 
appropriate  to  give  a  short  account  of  what  has  been 
done  with  a  view  to  explaining  why  particular  actions 
are  connected  with  certain  emotions. 

Sir  Charles  Bell,  the  distinguished  physiologist,  in  his 
essays  on  the  Anatomy  and  Pliilosophy  of  Expression  (1806 — 
1844),  was  practically  the  first  to  attempt  an  accurate  scientific 
treatment  of  emotional  expression.  He  devoted  himself 
solely,  however,  to  describing  in  detail  the  muscular  move- 
ments engaged  in  the  manifestations  of  the  various  feelings ; 
and  he  makes  no  pretence  to  explain  why  the  particular 
gestures  are  connected  with  the  corresponding  mental  state. 

Bain  seeks  to  go  a  step  further  in  the  line  of  explanation 
in  attempting  to  formulate  a  principle  which  will  account  for 
the  difference  in  character  of  the  movements  accompanying 
DD 


450  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


broadly  different  kinds  of  feeling.  This  he  does  in  his  "  Law 
of  Self-conservation:"  States  of  pleasure  are  concomitant  with 
an  increase,  and  states  of  pain  with  an  abatement  of  some  or  all  of 
the  vital  functions.  Pleasurable  feelings — ^joy,  laughter,  hope 
— express  themselves  in  augmented  vigour  of  the  vegetative 
functions,  and  also  in  the  stimulation  of  various  muscles,  facial, 
respiratory,  and  the  like.  On  the  contrary,  painful  feelings 
— sadness,  fear,  sorrow,  result  in  depression  of  organic  life, 
.and  in  the  general  diminution  of  motor  activity.  This 
generalization  embraces  a  considerable  number  of  facts,  but 
it  is  subject  to  so  many  limitations  that  its  claims  to  be  styled 
a  law  are  very  doubtful.  As  a  principle,  too,  it  is  so  vague 
that  it  helps  us  very  little  in  accounting  for  particular  forms 
of  emotional  expression. 

Evolutionist  theory. — Attempts  have  been  made  by  Darwin 
and  Herbert  Spencer  to  account  for  emotional  expression  on 
the  hypothesis  of  Evolution.  Darwin's  theory  is  embodied  in 
three  laws : 

1.  The  principle  of  the  preservation  of  serviceable  associated 
habits. — Movements  which  at  an  earlier  period  in  the  history 
of  the  race  were  instrumental  in  the  relief  or  gratification  of 
particular  mental  states,  tend  to  survive  when  no  longer  of 
use.  The  phenomena  of  frowning  and  weeping  are  thus 
explained  as  being  effects  on  the  eyebrows  and  lachrymal 
glands  of  the  contraction  of  certain  ocular  muscles.  This 
contraction  was  the  result  of  prolonged  fits  of  screaming, 
very  frequent  during  infancy  in  the  early  history  of  the  race. 
At  present  though  the  scream  be  voluntarily  suppressed,  and 
the  cause  removed,  painful  mental  states  will  still  produce 
the  frown  or  the  tears.  Scratching  the  head  was  serviceable 
for  the  relief  of  cutaneous  irritation  during  long  years  of 
pre-human  existence,  and  still  persists  as  a  gesture  aroused 
by  intellectual  distress.  Similarly,  grinding  the  teeth  and 
clenching  the  fists,  formerly  useful  actions  in  conflict,  now 
accompany  angry  feelings  when  apparently  purposeless. 

2.  The  principle  of  antithesis. — Opposite  impulses  of  will 
tend  to  urge  us  in  opposite  directions.  In  the  same  wa}', 
given  certain  states  of  mind  leading  to  habitual  actions  under 
the  previous  principle,  opposite  states  of  mind  will  tend  to 
set  up  movements  of  a  directly  contrary  nature,  though  they 
be  of  no  particular  use.  The  fJexuons  movements  of  a  joyful 
affectionate  dog  are  thus  accounted  for  as  the  antithesis  of 
the  rigid  attitude  of  angry  dislike. 

3.  The  principle  of  actions  due  to  the  constitution  of  the 
nervous  system  independently  from  the  first  of  the  zcill,  and 
independently  to  a  certain  extent  of  habit. — To  this  class  are 
assigned  all  expressive  movements  not  accounted  for  by  the 


THE   EMOTIONS.  451 


other  two  laws.  Such  are  the  trembHng  of  the  muscles, 
modifications  of  the  secretions,  and  other  changes  effected 
by  particular  emotions. 

Criticism. — As  regards  the  first  law,  if  the  doctrine  of 
descent  were  already  established,  the  explanation  thus  given 
of  a  few  instinctive  gestures,  such  as  clenching  the  fists  and 
grinding  the  teeth,  would  certainly  be  plausible.  Still,  the 
application  of  the  law  in  a  large  majority  of  cases  would  be, 
to  say  the  least  of  it,  very  improbable.  To  take  the  example 
of  weeping,  cited  by  Darwin,  there  is  no  real  evidence  to 
show  that  screaming  of  itself  is  productive  of  tears,  for  the 
screams  of  both  infants  and  adults  are  often  strongest  when 
tearless ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  tears  may  flow  from  joy 
or  pity,  although  these  states  cannot  have  been  associated 
with  infantile  screaming.  Similarly  the  connexion  between 
irritation  of  the  scalp  and  intellectual  anxiety  is  very  faint. 

A  most  important  point,  however,  usually  overlooked  by 
advocates  of  Evolution,  is  the  fact  that  emotional  expression 
must  have  often  been  disadvantageous,  not  beneficial,  to  the 
individual.  If  Talleyrand's  saying,  "  Speech  is  given  man  to 
conceal  his  thoughts,"  possesses  an  element  of  truth  in  any 
condition  of  human  society,  assuredly  the  manifestation  of 
his  feelings  and  desires  must  have  been  detrimental  to  the 
agent  in  the  earlier  stages  of  animal  existence.  The  pre- 
monitory disclosure  of  hatred  or  fear,  for  instance,  would 
have  been  invariably  unprofitable.  It  would  in  fact  seem 
that  many  instinctive  modes  of  expression  ought,  as  a  rule, 
to  have  been  extinguished  almost  as  soon  as  they  appeared. 

Darwin's  second  principle  has  met  with  but  little  accept- 
ance even  amongst  his  disciples.  When  we  endeavour  to 
realize  precisely  what  is  meant  by  contrary  feelings  tending 
to  produce  movements  of  an  opposite  nature,  we  discover  that 
the  conception  of  contrariety  involved  s  extremely  vague. 
"  What  is  meant,  it  may  be  asked,  by  opposition  between  the 
impulses  of  the  will  to  turn  to  the  right  and  to  the  left,  over 
and  above  the  contrariety  of  direction  in  the  resulting  move- 
ment ?  And  even  supposing  there  were  such  mysterious 
contrast  in  our  volitions,  with  which  contrariety  of  move- 
ment had  become  instinctively  associated,  one  might  still 
inquire  how  we  should  be  able  to  determine  the  proper 
antithesis  in  the  case  of  any  given  emotion.  Why,  for 
example,  should  the  movements  of  a  dog  during  an  outburst 
of  affection  be  regarded  as  the  antithesis  of  movements 
which  accompany  anger,  rather  than  of  those  which  charac- 
terize terror  ?  As  states  of  feeling,  one  suspects  terror 
before  a  threatening  look  and  the  pleasurable  elation  at 
friendly  symptoms,  have  quite  as  many  elements  of  contrast 


452 


RATIONAL    LIFE. 


as  the  feelings  said  to  be  in  antithesis  by  Mr.  Darwin ;  and 
so  far  from  the  movements  of  these  opposite  feeUngs  being 
unhke,  they  very  closely  resemble  one  another  in  many 
respects,  as  may  be  seen  in  the  fawning  and  crouching 
attitudes."  ^^ 

Darwin's  third  principle  is  sufBciently  comprehensive,  but 
it  suffers  from  the  disadvantage  of  explaining  virtually 
nothing.  It  merely  tells  us  that  the  character  of  certain 
expressive  movements  resulting  from  the  excessive  generation 
of  nerve  force  by  strong  feeling  is  determined  by  the  consti- 
tution of  the  nervous  system.  This  is  undoubtedly  the  case, 
and  Darwin's  whole  theory  would,  we  believe,  have  approxi- 
mated more  to  actual  truth,  though  thereby  losing  the  charm 
of  ingenuity  and  originality,  if  it  had  assigned  a  considerably 
larger  share  of  the  phenomena  to  this  cause. 

Herbert  Spencer  accounts  for  emotional  expression  thus : 
Nervous  energy  is  aroused  by  feeling,  and  tends  to  express 
itself  in  the  discharge  of  motor  activity.  This  discharge 
exhibits  itself  partly  in  a  general  effect  diffused  throughout 
the  entire  system y  partly  in  special  excitement  within  a  restricted 
field.  An  attack  of  coughing  exempHfies  both.  The  disturb- 
ance produced  will  be  directly  as  the  intensity  of  the 
feeling,  and  inversely  as  the  size  of  the  muscles  acted  upon. 
Thus,  a  faintly  pleasurable  feeling  may  excite  a  slight  lateral 
oscillation  in  a  dog's  tail,  whilst  stronger  em.otion  sets  him 
barking  and  capering  around.  Movement  first  takes  hold 
of  the  smaller  and  more  easily  moved  muscles,  afterwards  of 
the  heavier  parts,  and  finally  of  the  whole  body.  This  may 
be  seen  by  tracing  the  external  manifestations  of  a  fit  of 
anger  or  merriment.  In  the  incipient  stages  slight  feelings 
act  upon  the  lips  and  eyebrows,  but  as  the  passion  grows  in 
strength,  the  lungs,  head,  limbs,  and  finally  the  entire  organism 
may  be  set  in  violent  motion.  The  particular  movements 
within  the  restricted  field,  however,  are  those  which  specifi- 
cally express  the  several  qualities  of  emotion.  These 
movements  are,  in  Mr.  Spencer's  view,  inherited  ancestral 
actions  by  which  feehngs  similar  in  kind  to  those  now  aroused 
were  formerly  satisfied.^* 

Spencer's  law  of  restricted  discharges  is  substantially 
identical  with  Darwin's  principle  of  associated  serviceable 
actions  ;  and  the  remarks  we  have  made  above  are  again 
applicable   here.      Spencer,   too,   illustrates   his   law   by   an 

^^  Sully,  Sensation  and  Intuition,  p.  29. 

14  Darwin's  theory  is  expounded  in  his  book,  The  Expression  of 
the  Emotions  in  Man  and  Animals,  1872.  Spencer's  treatment  of  the 
subject  is  given  in  his  Essay  on  the  Physiology  of  Laughter,  and  in 
his  Principles  of  Psychology,  Ft.  VIII.  c  iv. 


THE   EMOTIONS.  45J 


account  of  the  genesis  of  that  important  emotional  expression 
— the  frown ;  and  the  divergence  between  his  explanation 
and  that  of  Darwin,  affords  an  instructive  comment  on  the 
worth  of  the  doctrine  common  to  both.  The  corrugation  ol 
the  eyebrows,  Spencer  tells  us,  is  useful  in  protecting  the 
eyes  from  the  rays  of  the  vertical  sun.  This  act  would  there- 
fore have  afforded  an  advantage  in  tropical  regions  during 
the  combats  of  the  animals  from  whom  we  are  more  imme- 
diately descended.  Accordingly,  those  individuals  in  whom 
the  nervous  discharge  accompanying  the  excitement  of 
combat  chanced  to  cause  an  unusual  contraction  of  the 
corrugating  muscles  of  the  forehead  "  would  be  more  likely 
to  conquer  and  leave  posterity — survival  of  the  fittest 
tending  in  their  posterity  to  establish  and  increase  this 
peculiarity."^^  The  recurrence  of  angry  feelings  or  non- 
pleasurable  states  of  any  kind  would,  therefore,  after  a  time, 
by  association  tend  to  excite  the  frown,  where  its  utility  as 
a  sunshade  has  ceased.  Darwin,  as  we  have  already  men- 
tioned, showed  in  an  equally  conclusive  manner  that  frowning 
is  an  inheritance  from  the  distortion  of  the  facial  muscles 
during  long  ages  of  infantile  screaming.  Both  hypotheses 
exhibit  the  fertile  imagination  possessed  alike  by  the  philo- 
sopher and  the  naturalist,  but  the  conflict  in  their  conclusions 
ought  to  warn  us  of  the  exceedingly  precarious  character  of 
their  theory. ^'^ 

Spencer's  law  of  general  diffusion  corresponds  to  Darwin's 
third  principle,  but  is  a  far  more  definite  and  satisfactory 
description  of  the  course  of  neural  disturbance.  It  appears 
to  us  to  contain  much  truth.  It  gives  a  natural  account  of 
the  gradual  development  ot  the  external  manifestation  of 
feeling,  and  embraces  many  curious  facts.  Unfortunately, 
however,  the  author  at  times  does  not  seem  to  distinguish 

15  Principles  oj  Psychology,  %  498.  For  Darwin's  account  of  the 
gesture,  cf.  op.  cit.  pp.  225,  226. 

1^  The  distension  of  the  nostrils  by  indignation,  Mr.  Spencer 
similarly  traces  to  the  accidental  advantage  gained  by  those  of  our 
ancestors  in  whom  the  diffused  discharge  chanced  to  dilate  the 
nostrils  during  conflict,  especially  when  influenced  by  non-pleasur- 
able feelings  their  mouths  were  occupied  in  holding  on  to  part  of  an 
antagonist's  body!  The  force  of  this  ingenious  explanation  is  some- 
what seriously  shaken  by  the  fact,  that  the  nostrils  are  also  dilated 
in  certain  pleasant  states  ;  and  we  find  Wundt  classing  this  gesture 
under  the  general  tendency  to  extend  the  mouth,  eyes,  nostrils,  &c., 
in  order  to  increase  agreeable  sensations.  The  act  of  blushing  and 
several  other  phenomena  are  also  differently  accounted  for  by  these 
three  writers.  The  simple  truth  is  that  once  we  get  into  the  regions 
of  pare  imagination,  there  is  no  limit  to  fanciful  hypotheses. 


454  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


clearly  between  the  mental  state  and  its  physical  concomitant. 
He  frequently  appears,  especially  in  his  article  on  Laughter^ 
to  speak  as  if  the  emotion  were  itself  identical  with,  or  trans- 
formable into,  the  accompanying  discharge  of  nervous  energy; 
although  he  elsewhere  recognizes  the  transcendent  difference 
which  separates  them. 

Wundt  also  formulates  a  theory  in  three  general  laws: 
I.  The  principle  of  the  direct  alteration  of  innervation.  This 
signifies  that  intense  emotions  generate  their  external  expres- 
sion by  exerting  an  immediate  reaction  on  centres  of  motor 
innervation,  paralyzing  or  stimulating  the  action  of  many 
groups  of  muscles — e.g.,  in  the  trembling  of  limbs  and  con- 
traction or  enlargement  of  blood-vessels,  2.  The  principle 
of  the  association  of  analogous  sensations.  This  means  that 
different  species  of  sensations  in  which  there  is  a  certain 
community  of  tone  or  quality  tend  more  easily  to  combine 
and  strengthen  each  other.  The  muscles  of  the  jaws  thus 
assume  an  attitude  of  tension  under  energetic  feelings ;  ol 
agreeable  ease  in  quiet  satisfaction ;  and  of  unpleasant  dis- 
tortion under  contrary  emotions.  The  movements  of  the 
mouth  and  tongue  under  the  action  of  sweet,  bitter,  sour,  or 
disgusting  tastes,  are  also  excited  by  the  idea  of  such  sensa- 
tions, and  then  transferred  to  analogous  feelings  or  emotions. 
3.  The  principle  of  the  relation  of  movement  to  the  perceptions  of 
sense.  This  law  embraces  all  gestures  and  expressive  motions 
not  included  under  the  other  two.  Movements  of  the  eyes, 
head,  and  limbs  accompany  our  thoughts  and  words.  As  our 
language  or  feelings  become  excited  we  point  towards  distant 
objects,  clench  our  fists,  raise  our  arms,  erect  our  head,  and 
the  like.  We  smilingly  nod  assent,  or  deprecatingly  draw 
back  our  head  from  the  imagined  object.  This  theory,  though 
less  imaginative  than  either  of  those  just  mentioned,  deter- 
mines more  accurately  the  relations  between  many  classes  ol 
feelings  and  their  expression.^'' 

The  Origin  of  Language. — Rational  language 
may  be  described  as,  a  system  of  conventional  signs  vepve- 
sentative  of  thought:  or  we  may  define  oval  language  in 
more  precise  fashion  as,  a  system  of  articulated  ivords  repve- 
sentative  of  thought.  The  primary  object  of  language  is 
the  communication  of  ideas ;  but  it  serves  in  addition 
as  a  record  or  register  of  past  intellectual  acquisitions, 
and  also  as  a  mechanical  aid  to  thinking.  (See  p.  302.) 
The  origin  of  language  thus  understood,  has  formed  a 

"  For  a  synopsis  of  Wundt's  theory,  of.  Ladd,  op.  cit.  p.  531. 


THE  EMOTIONS.  455 

prolific  subject  of  speculation.  It  is  the  function  of 
Theology,  not  Philosophy,  to  interpret  the  passages  of 
Scripture  bearing  on  this  matter,  and  to  explain  in 
what  manner  and  to  what  extent  this  gift  was  communi- 
cated to  the  first  human  beings.  Apart,  however,  from 
the  decision  of  these  points  there  remains  for  Philosophy 
the  question :  Could  language  have  been  invented  by 
man,  and,  if  so,  by  what  agencies  and  laws  would  its 
development  be  governed  ?  The  latter  investigation, 
moreover,  is  not  purely  hypothetical  in  character. 
Whatever  interpretation  of  Scripture  be  adopted,  the 
subsequent  history  of  language  will,  in  accordance  with 
God's  usual  providence,  have  been  governed  by  natural 
laws.  Abstracting  then  from  Revelation,  could  language 
have  arisen  in  a  natural  manner  ?  and,  however  origi- 
nated, what  are  the  principles  which  have  determined 
its  evolution  ? 

Its  Nature. — For  rational  speech  the  name  must  be  used 
consciously  with  a  meaning ;  that  is,  as  a  sign  of  an  object  of 
thought.  The  parrot  articulates  words,  and  the  dog  un- 
mistakably manifests  feelings  of  joy  or  anger  ;  but  neither  of 
these  animals  is  capable  of  language  in  the  proper  sense  of 
the  term.  Even  the  most  pronounced  advocates  of  Material- 
ism are  constrained  to  admit  that  no  other  creature  but  man 
has  ever  attached  a  name  to  an  object.^^  For  such  an 
operation,  a  supra-sensuous  power  of  abstraction  and  reflexion 
is  absolutely  necessary.  Accordingly,  language  could  not 
have  preceded  the  existence  of  intellect  or  reason.  Manifesting 
thought,  if  must  be  subsequent  to  thought.  It  presupposes  the 
formation  of  general  concepts,  and  in  its  simplest  employment 
of  a  word  as  a  sign,  language  involves  that  apprehension  of 
universal  relations  which  is  the  characteristic  feature  of 
supra-sensuous  intelligence.  Still,  the  invention  of  language 
does  not  require  a  previous  fund  of  elaborate  notions. 
Looking  on  human  nature  as  we  find  it  at  present,  the 
accumulation  of  a  considerable  collection  of  intellectual 
products,  and  any  but  the  most  meagre  cultivation  of  the 
rational  faculties  seems  naturally  impossible  without  the 
assistance  of  words.  But  given  men  created  with  both 
the  reflexive  activity  of  thought  and  the  physical  power  of 
making  signs,  and  they  will  inevitably  soon  learn  to  com- 
municate their  ideas  to  each  other. 

^8  Cf.  Maudsley,  op.  cit.  p.  502.  On  the  other  hand,  no  tribe  of 
men  has  yet  been  discovered  devoid  of  the  attribute  of  speech. 


456  RATIONAL   LIFE. 


Development. — Starting  with  the  social  mbtinct,  men  tend 
to  congregate  together.  In  the  next  place,  their  nature  is 
such  that  lively  emotions  are  expressed  not  merely  in  facial 
changes,  but  in  cries  and  movements.  There  is  also  exhi- 
bited in  man,  especially  in  early  life,  a  curious  mimetic 
impulse,  which  leads  him  to  reproduce  in  his  actions  and 
utterance  the  phenomena  of  external  nature,  whether  animate 
or  inanimate,  that  most  interest  him.  Cries  thus  elicited  in 
sympathy  or  fright,  having  been  both  felt  and  heard  by  the 
individual  in  the  presence  of  the  external  object,  will  be 
associated  with  it,  and  tend  to  be  reproduced  on  other 
occasions,  according  to  the  laws  of  suggestion.  Moreover, 
living  in  community  and  being  of  like  nature  and  disposition, 
men  would  be  impelled  to  similar  manifestations,  and  would 
soon  grow  to  associate  their  neighbour's  utterances  as  well 
as  their  own  with  the  appropriate  external  event.  We  have 
not,  how'ever,  yet  reached  rational  language  ;  we  are  still  in 
the  plane  of  sense  and  instinct.  These  are  preliminary 
steps ;  still,  gregarious  brutes  would  get  thus  far.  But  in 
addition  to  these  aptitudes,  man  is  endowed  with  the  faculty 
of  abstraction  and  reflexion,  and  this  power  would  now 
inevitably  lead  him  to  conceive  and  employ  these  expressions 
as  signs  of  the  corresponding  objects — to  mean  things  by 
words ;   and  at  once  we  have  rational  speech. 

Agencies. — To  the  iirst  query,  then,  we  must  answer  :  Yes. 
Apart  from  any  special  Divine  intervention,  man,  with  his 
present  nature,  by  use  of  the  faculties  which  God  has  given 
him,  would  have  invented  a  language.  The  materials 
employed  for  signs  will  be  in  part  the  exclamations  emitted 
as  interjections,  in  part  mimetic  utterances  by  which  he  seeks 
to  suggest  to  the  hearer  the  object  imitated. ^'-^  The  indirect 
action  of  the  onomatopoeic  tendency  is,  however,  probably 
far  more  influential  than  its  immediate  results.  Not  only 
are  analogies  observed  between  the  sensuous  impressions 
and  the  sounds  or  feelings  of  efl"ort  put  forth  in  the  responsive 
vocal   expression,   but   kindred    utterances   involving   a  like 

^9  The  hypotheses  which  lay  chief  stress  on  the  interjectional 
and  onomatopoeic  impulses  have  been  respectively  styled  by  Max 
Miiller  the  ''Pooh-pooh  and  Bow-ivow  theories."  {Lectures  on  the 
Science  of  Language,  First  Series,  p.  344.)  He  holds  that  the 
efficiency  of  these  principles  is  extremely  limited,  many  apparent 
instances  of  onomatopoeia  not  being  really  so,  e.g.,  thunder  from  the 
same  root  as  the  Latin  tenuis,  tender  and  thin.  Squirrel  not  from  the 
rustling  whirling  of  the  little  animal,  but  from  the  Greek  Skioiiros= 
shade,  tail ;  the  French  siicre  from  the  Indian  sarkhara,  &c.  He  does 
not  however  seem  to  have  considered  sufficiently  the  mediate  or 
indirect  agency  of  onomatopoeia. 


THE   EMOTIONS.  457 


tone  of  consciousness  are  used  to  designate  analogous, 
though  very  unlike  experiences.  Still,  by  far  the  most 
impo'rtant  part  of  all  languages,  it  has  been  forcibly  argued, 
is  reducible  by  the  science  of  Comparative  Philology  to  a 
small  collection  of  generic  roots  representative  of  universal 
ideas  though  applied  to  particular  objects.  These  root- 
sounds,  it  is  asserted,  cannot  be  onomatopoeic;  they  are 
indicative  of  characteristic  actions  or  attributes  of  the  object, 
and  so  are  expressive  not  of  particular  impressions,  but  of 
general  notions.  For  this  reason  they  are  fruitful  and  capable 
of  forming  part  of  the  names  of  many  things  possessing  this 
feature  in  common.  These  four  hundred  or  five  hundred 
ultimate  roots,  which  remain  as  the  generic  constituent 
elements  in  the  different  families  of  languages,  are  neither 
interjectional  nor  mimetic  sounds,  but  phonetic  types  produced 
by  a  power  inherent  in  human  nature.  There  is,  in  fact,  a 
species  of  natural  harmony  between  the  rudimentary  oral 
expression  and  the  corresponding  thought,  just  as  there  is 
between  the  latter  and  the  external  reality.^'- 

Very  little  original  capital  would  have  been  required,  and 
however  this  was  obtained,  whether  in  the  form  of  casual 
sounds  accompanying  appropriate  gestures,  or  as  a  spon- 
taneous product  of  human  nature,  or  as  a  collection  of 
suitable  utterances  elicited  by  Divine  intervention,  the  start 
once  effected,  progress  was  comparatively  easy.  New  sur- 
roundings, new  wants,  the  inventive  energy  of  intellect,  the 

20  Cf.  Max  Miiller,  op.  cit.  Lect.  ix.  Apart  from  the  question  of 
the  original  fund  of  root-sounds — which  is  equally  a  difficulty  to  all 
purely  rational  theories— Miiller's  general  doctrine  seems  plausible. 
The  fierce  conflict,  however,  which  still  prevails  on  most  funda- 
mental questions  of  the  science  of  Comparative  Philology  makes 
one  feel  that  beyond  the  limited  region  of  common  agreement  even 
the  most  attractive  hypotheses  are  extremely  hazardous.  Schleicher, 
for  instance,  the  leading  Darwinian  in  this  field,  whose  confidence 
in  his  views  is  always  in  direct  proportion  to  the  obscurity  of  the 
subject-matter,  asserts  that  language  is  a  natural  organism,  the 
growth  and  decay  of  which  is  governed  by  fixed  and  immutable 
laws.  Language  is  as  independent  of  the  will  of  the  individual  as 
the  song  of  the  nightingale.  Opposed  equally  to  both  Max  Miiller 
and  Schleicher  is  the  chief  American  philologist.  Professor  Whitney. 
With  him  language,  which  separates  man  from  the  brute,  is 
essentially  a  voluntary  invention,  an  "  institution  "  hke  government, 
and  "is  in  all  its  parts  arbitrary  and  conventional."  {Life  and  Groivth 
of  Langxiage,  p.  282.)  Steinthal's  teaching  increases  the  novelty ; 
and  Heyse,  who  stands  to  Hegel  as  Schleicher  to  Darwin,  evolved 
a  mystical  creed  on  the  subject,  in  unison  with  the  spirit  of  his 
master's  philosophy.  An  account  of  the  various  theories  is  given 
in  Sayce's  Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Language,  Vol.  I.  c.  i. 


458  RATIONAL  LIFE. 


force  of  analogy,  multiplied  and  perfected  the  materials  in 
use.  Diversities  of  climate,  food,  and  exercise,  acting  on  the 
organism,  modify  the  vocal  machinery.  Special  occupations 
develop  particular  groups  of  words  earlier  in  one  district 
than  in  another.  Variety  of  classes,  trades,  and  professions 
within  the  same  nation  fosters  the  simultaneous  growth  of  a 
multiplicity  of  terms.  The  onomatopoeic  and  interjectional 
tendencies  continue  to  make  small  contributions  from  time  to 
time,  but  the  great  force  which  enriches  our  vocabulary  is 
analogy.  The  old  roots  representing  generic  attributes  merely 
require  recombination  to  express  a  novel  object.  Growth  of 
language  and  intellectual  power  will  proceed  concomitantly, 
for  they  act  and  react  upon  each  other. 

Readings. — On  Emotional  Activity,  see  Das  Gemidh  tend  das  Gefuhls- 
vermogen  der  neuren  Psychologie,  von  J.  Jungmann,  S.J.  Dr.  Gutberlet 
handles  the  matter  from  a  different  point  of  view,  op.  cit.  pp.  igg — 
229;  On  Language  and  Emotional  Expression,  ibid.  116 — 128; 
J.  Gardair's,  Les  Passions  et  la  Volonte,  pp.  6 — 250,  contains  a  good 
exposition  of  the  scholastic  doctrine.  Portions  of  Dr.  M'Cosh's 
Emotions  are  useful. 


PSYCHOLOGY. 


Book  II. 
Rational  Psychology. 

CHAPTER   XXI. 

SUBSTANTIALITY,    IDENTITY,    SIMPLICITY,    AND 
SPIRITUALITY   OF   THE    HUMAN    SOUL. 

Scope  of  Rational  Psychology. — We  have 
hitherto  been  chiefly  studying  the  character  of  our 
several  mental  activities,  and  the  modes  of  their 
exercise  ;  we  now  pass  on  to  inquire  into  the  nature 
of  the  principle  from  which  they  proceed.  The 
aim  of  Rational,  Metaphysical,  or  Philosophical 
Psychology,  is  to  penetrate  to  the  source  of  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness.  It  endeavours  to 
ascertain  the  inner  constitution  of  the  subject  ot 
our  psychical  states,  and  to  discover  the  relations 
subsisting  between  this  subject  and  the  body.  In 
a  word,  Philosophical  Psychology  seeks  to  learn 
what  may  be  gathered  by  the  light  of  reason 
regarding  the  nature,  origin,  and  destiny  of  the 
human  soul. 


46o  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

Its  Importance. — The  importance  of  such  a  study 
is  evident.  What  are  we  ?  Whence  come  we  ?  How 
ought  we  to  hve  ?  What  is  there  to  hope  for  ?  These 
have  ever  been  questions  of  transcendent  interest  to  man- 
kind ;  and  never  more  so  than  at  the  present  day.  Beside 
these  problems,  unless  in  so  far  as  they  may  throw 
light  on  them,  the  discussions  of  Empirical  Ps3^chology 
sink  into  comparative  insignificance.  Yet  the  great 
majority  of  recent  English  text-books  on  Psychology 
affect  to  ignore  these  matters  altogether.  Or,  if  they 
allude  to  them,  the}^  do  so  \vith  a  shame-faced  profuse- 
ness  of  apology  which  is  not  a  little  amusing.  The 
naturalist,  the  physiologist,  the  ph3^sicist,  ma}^  speculate 
at  length  about  the  nature  and  future  destiny  of  man's 
soul ;  but  if  a  writer  on  the  Science  of  the  Human 
Mind  ventures  to  touch  on  topics  so  alien  to  his  subject 
and  so  unbecoming  his  character,  unless,  indeed,  in 
order  to  show  that  there  is  no  soul  and  no  future,  his 
reputation  as  a  psychologist  is  at  once  ruined,  and  he  is 
stigmatized  as  a  "  metaphysician"!  The  unsatisfactori- 
ness  of  such  a  course  ought  now  to  be  plain  to  our 
readers.  The  first  part  of  this  work,  whatever  be  its 
positive  value,  ought  to  have  at  least  proved  that  it  is 
impossible  to  separate  the  investigation  of  our  mental 
activities  from  Philosophy — that  an  unphilosophical  psy- 
chology is  necessarily  an  inconsistent,  and  therefore  an 
unscientific  psychology.  Our  views  concerning  the  exist- 
ence of  an  external  world,  the  nature  of  the  higher 
faculties  of  the  soul,  human  responsibility,  causalit}', 
and  the  final  question  of  materialism  or  spiritualism, 
must  inevitably  be  determined  by  the  view  of  the 
character  of  mental  life  adopted  in  the  empirical  portion 
of  Psychology.  Once  more  we  are  forced  to  choose, 
not  between  a  metaphysical  psychology  and  psychology 
without  any  metaphysics ;  but  between  a  psycholog}^ 
annexed  to  an  inconsistent,  half-concealed,  clandestine 
metaphysics,  and  one  that  forms  part  of  a  philosophical 
system  which,  whatever  be  its  difficulties,  is  at  any  rate 
openly  professed  and  frankly  declared. 

Method. — Our  method  of  procedure  here  will  be 
both    inductive    and     deductive,     both     analytic    and 


THE  SUBSTANTIALITY   OF  THE  SOUL.  461 

synthetic.  We  start  from  truths  and  facts  already 
possessed  to  reach  others  not  yet  known.  We  argue 
from  the  effect  to  the  cause.  From  the  character  of 
those  mental  activities,  which  we  have  analyzed  with 
so  much  care,  we  shall  now  be  able  to  perfect  our  con- 
ception of  the  subject  to  which  they  belong.  We 
believe  that  no  doctrine  concerning  the  nature  of  the 
soul  can  be  satisfactorily  established  in  the  face  of 
modern  criticism,  based,  as  it  now  is,  on  most  acute 
and  elaborate  analyses  of  our  conscious  states,  unless 
that  doctrine  rest  upon  an  analysis  of  these  states  not 
less  thorough  and  painstaking.  And  it  is  for  this  reason, 
we  have  begun  this  work  by  so  laborious  and  detailed 
an  investigation  into  the  character  of  our  mental 
activities,  especially  those  of  thought  and  volition. 
From  what  the  mind  does,  we  shall  now  seek  to  learn 
what  it  is.  From  the  spiritual  nature  of  our  rational 
and  voluntary  operations,  we  shall  show  that  the  soul 
is  endowed  with  the  attributes  of  simplicity  and 
spirituality ;  or  rather,  that  in  its  nature  it  is  a  simple 
spiritual  substantial  being.  When  this  all-important 
truth  has  been  firmly  established,  we  shall  deduce 
certain  other  conclusions  regarding  the  soul's  origin 
and  destiny.  It  will,  however,  be  most  convenient 
to  begin  by  proving  the  soul  to  be  a  substantial  prin- 
ciple. We  shall  then  establish  its  persisting  indivisible 
identity  through  life  ;  next  its  simple  nature  ;  and  after- 
wards its  spirituality.  Each  of  these  propositions,  taken 
by  itself,  may  afford  but  little  positive  information  ;  and 
even  when  they  have  been  all  combined,  the  synthetic 
concept  of  the  nature  of  the  soul  thus  reached  will  still 
necessarily  be  very  imperfect  and  inadequate ;  never- 
theless, it  will  constitute  knowledge  real  and  valid,  so 
far  as  it  goes. 

Substantiality  of  the  Human  Mind  or  Soul. — 
By  the  word  Mind  or  Soid,  we  here  understand  the 
siibject  of  our  mental  life,  the  ultimate  principle  by  which  we 
feel,  think,  and  will.  A  principle  is  that  from  which  some- 
thing proceeds,  and  by  ultimate  principle  is  here  meant 
the  last  ground  or  source  of  the  mental  activit}^  within 
us.     Our  immediate  task,  therefore,  is   to  prove  that 


462  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

this  ultimate  principle  of  our  individual  conscious  life 
is  of  a  substantial  nature.  The  notion  of  Substance  has 
been  so  violently  attacked  in  modern  philosophy  that  it 
is  desirable  in  entering  upon  the  present  question  to 
add  some  further  remarks  to  the  account  already  given 
of  this  idea  when  deaUng  with  its  genesis.  (See  p.  368.) 
But  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  subject  we  must 
refer  to  the  volume  of  this  series  on  Metaphysics, 

Validity  of  Notion  of  Substance. — AH  being  is 
divided  into  substance  and  accidents.  Substance  is  that 
which  exists  per  se — that  which  subsists  in  itself ;  as 
contrasted  with  accident,  that  which  of  its  nature 
inheres  in  another  as  in  a  subject  of  inhesion.  The 
primary  element  therefore  in  the  concept  of  Substance 
is  not  permanence  amid  change,  although  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  notion  this  feature  plays  an  important  part. 
Still  less  is  the  essential  note  of  substance  the  idea  of 
a  secret  substratum,  concealed  like  ''the  core  of  an  onion  " 
beneath  a  rind  of  changing  accidents  really  distinct 
from  itself.  The  Divine  Being,  though  devoid  of  all 
accidents  and  immutable  from  all  eternity,  is  a  perfect 
Substance ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  an  atom  or  an 
angel  created  to  be  destroyed  the  next  instant,  would 
have  been  a  genuine  substance,  even  if  it  underwent 
no  change  during  its  brief  existence.  The  assault  of 
modern  philosophy  upon  the  conception  of  substance 
has  been  almost  entirely  directed  against  this  secret 
substratum  or  noumenon  which  is  supposed  never  to  reveal 
itself  to  cognition.  Accordingly,  when  we  recall  and 
insist  upon  the  old  definition — id  quod  per  se  stat, — the 
most  plausible  objections  which  have  been  raised  against 
this  notion  lose  their  force. ^ 

^  "The  chief  attack  on  substance  is  made  precisely  on  the 
misconception,  that  the  inmost  essence  of  the  notion  is  a  substratum, 
hidden  away  under  quaHties  really  distinct  from  itself,  a  fixed 
unchangeable  thing  clothed  in  attributes,  some  variable,  some 
constant,  but  all,  as  was  just  said,  really  distinct.  Such  is  the 
interpretation  of  the  scholastic  theory  by  most  opponents ;  while 
the  schoolmen  themselves  have  held  up  existence  per  sc  as  the 
fundamental  notion  of  substance.  For,  first  it  is  clear  that  they 
could  apply  no  other  definition  to  God.  Moreover,  even  with 
regard   to  created   substance,   they  were  aware  of  the  enormous 


THE   SUBSTANTIALITY  OF  THE  SOUL.  463 

The  Mind  is  a  Substantial  Principle. — Every 
form  of  reality  must  in  the  last  resort  either  subsist  in 
itself,  that  is,  exist  per  se,  or  inhere  in  another  being. 
Sphericity,  colour,  pain,  for  instance,  cannot  subsist  in 
themselves ;  neither  can  there  be  an  infinite  series  of 
such  accidents,  each  being  only  a  mode  or  attribute 
of  another;  there  must  ultimately  be  something  which 
exists  per  se.  Furthermore,  substances  really  act,  and 
by  their  action  make  themselves  known  to  us.  Now 
the  last  ground  of  our  mental  life,  the  ultimate  basis 
of  our  psychical  activities  must  be  a  substantial  principle. 
States  of  consciousness,  mental  modifications,  necessarily 
presuppose  a  subject  to  which  they  belong.  Even 
assuming  that  they  ma}'  turn  out  to  be  functions  of 
the  nervous  system,  or  phases  or  aspects  of  cerebral 
processes,  they  must  still  have  their  origin  in  a  substantial 
principle.  Motion  is  unthinkable  without  something 
that  is  moved.  A  feeling  necessarily  implies  a  being 
which  feels.  Cognitions  and  passions  cannot  inhere  in 
nothing.  Desires  cannot  proceed  from  nothing ;  they 
must  have  a  source  or  a  subject  from  which  they  flow. 
So  far  even  the  materialist  must  agree  with  us. 

Internal  Experience. — Or  we  may  appeal  directly  to  the 
testimony  of  internal  consciousness.  That  I  am  a  real  being, 
subsisting  in  myself;  that  I  am  immediately  aware  of  myself 
as  the  subject  of  sensations,  feelings,  and  thoughts,  but  not 
any  one  of  them,  or  all  of  them  ;  that  I  am  the  cause  of  my 
own  volitions ;  that  I  am  distinct  from  other  beings ;  that 
there  is  in  me  a  Self — that  I  am  an  Ego  which  is  the  centre 
and  source  of  my  acts  and  states,  the  ultimate  ground  and 
subject  of  my  thoughts  and  affections,  is  forced  upon  me  by 
constant,  intimate,  immediate  self-experience,  with  the  most 
irresistible  evidence.  If  it  be  an  illusion,  there  is  no  beUef, 
no  cognition,  however  clear  and  certain,  that  can  claim  assent. 

philosophic  difficulty  in  the  proof  of  what  are  sometimes  called 
'absolute  accidents  that  are  more  than  merely  modal,'  for  the 
demonstration  of  which  they  relied  not  on  arguments  from  reason, 
but  upon  consequences  which  they  thought  to  be  involved  in  the 
Church's  doctrine  about  the  Holy  Eucharist."  (John  Rickaby, 
Metaphysics,  p.  254.)  "Permanence  is  not  of  the  essence  of  substance, 
any  more  than  non-permanence  or  succession  of  accidents  is  of 
their  essence ;  Kant,  therefore,  and  Green  are  wrong  in  the  leading 
position  which  they  assign  to  permanence."  [Ihid.  p.  259.) 


464  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

Notwithstanding  his  own  erroneous  view  as  to  the  nature 
of  Substance,  Lotze  rightly  insists  that  the  cognition  of  a 
substantial  self,  is  a  fact  of  immediate  experience :  "  It  has 
been  required  of  any  theory  which  starts  without  presupposi- 
tions and  from  the  basis  of  experience,  that  in  the  beginning 
it  should  speak  only  of  sensations  and  ideas,  without  mention- 
ing the  soul  to  which,  it  is  said,  we  hasten  without  justi- 
fication to  ascribe  them.  I  should  maintain,  on  the  contrary, 
that  such  a  mode  of  setting  out  involves  a  wilful  departure 
from  that  ivhich  is  actually  given  in  experience.  A  mere  sensation 
without  a  subject  is  nowhere  to  be  met  with  as  a  fact.  It 
is  impossible  to  speak  of  a  bare  movement  without  thinking 
of  the  mass  whose  movement  it  is  ;  and  it  is  just  as  impossible 
to  conceive  a  sensation  existing  without  the  accompanying 
of  that  which  has  it, — or  rather,  of  that  which  feels  it,  for 
this  also  is  included  in  the  given  fact  of  experience  that  the 
relation  of  the  feeling  subject  to  its  feeling,  whatever  its  other 
characteristics  may  be,  is  in  any  case  something  different 
from  the  relation  of  the  moved  element  to  its  movement. 
It  is  thus  and  thus  only,  that  the  sensation  is  a  given  fact ; 
and  we  have  no  right  to  abstract  from  its  relations  to  its 
subject  because  this  relation  is  puzzling,  and  because  we 
wish  to  obtain  a  starting-point  which  looks  more  convenient, 
but  is  utterly  unwarranted  by  experience."  (Metaphysic,  §  241.) 

Abiding  Identity  of  the  Mind. — Having  insisted 
on  the  truth  that  the  primary  note  in  the  concept  of 
substance  is  not  the  idea  of  a  permanent  secret  immu- 
table substratum;  we  now  proceed  to  prove  that,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  substantial  being  of  the  human  mind 
does  endure  throughout  our  mental  life — that  the  soul  is  a 
real  unitary  being  ivhich  abides  the  same  during  all  the  varying 
modes  of  consciousness.  And,  although  permanence  amid 
changing  accidents  is  not  necessarily  implied  in  the 
notion  of  substance,  the  establishment  of  the  present 
proposition  will  undoubtedly  tend  to  render  still  more 
evident  the  substantial  nature  of  the  Mind.  The  proof 
rests  on  the  evidence  of  internal  consciousness,  under- 
standing this  term  in  a  broad  sense,  so  as  to  include 
reflective-cognition  and  self-conscious  memory. 

Reflexion  and  Memory. — Any  process  of  reflec- 
tive observation  of  our  experiences  brings  into  the  most 
vivid  contrast  the  distinction  between  the  mind  as  an 
abiding  subject  and  its  transitory  modifications,  whilst  it 
forces  upon  us  the  real  sameness  of  that  subject  with  an 


THE  ID  ENTITY  OF  THE  SOUL.  465 

evidence  that  is  irresistible.  The  simplest  act  of  jiidg- 
nient,  the  briefest  process  of  conscious  reasoning  is 
possible  only  to  a  being  that  persists  unchanged  during 
the  interval  required  to  pass  from  subject  to  predicate, 
from  premisses  to  conclusions.  But  the  necessary  con- 
tinuity of  the  agent  becomes  more  obvious  in  the 
exercise  of  deliberate  recollection.  Memory,  in  a  certain 
sense,  is  involved  in  every  retrospective  operation  ; 
indeed,  it  is  an  essential  condition  of  every  act  of 
knowledge  which  extends  beyond  the  mere  present 
sensation  ;  but  the  assurance  it  affords  concerning  some 
past  experiences  is  not  less  than  that  which  we  possess 
in  regard  to  present  events.  I  am  indubitably  certain 
that  I  rose  from  bed  this  morning,  that  I  breakfasted, 
that  I  have  written  the  first  words  of  the  sentence 
which  I  am  now  continuing,  that  I  was  in  Liverpool 
last  winter,  and  the  like.  When  I  now  turn  to  analyze 
introspectively  these  remembrances,  I  perceive  that 
they  all  imph'citly  involve  the  identification  of  my 
present  self  with  the  self  of  these  past  experiences. 
But  this  would  be  impossible  were  the  mind  merely 
a  succession  of  states,  or  were  the  material  organism 
the  substantial  principle  in  which  these  states  inhere. 
The  constituent  elements  of  the  latter,  it  is  a  well- 
established  physiological  fact,  are  completely  changed 
in  a  comparatively  short  time  ;  and  fleeting  mental  acts 
which  did  not  inhere  in  a  permanent  subject,  could  as 
little  result  in  this  self-conscious  recollection,  as  could 
the  disconnected  cognitions  of  successive  generations  of 
men.  The  unity  of  consciousness  establishes  an  essential  unity 
of  being.  It  is  only  a  real  unitary  being,  persisting  the 
same  amid  transitory  states,  that  can  afford  an  adequate 
basis  for  the  fact  of  remembrance.  Margerie,  therefore, 
rightly  maintains  :  "  The  condition  necessar}^  for  the 
act  of  recollection,  is  the  identity  of  the  being  who 
remembers,  with  that  being  whose  former  states  are 
recalled  by  memory.  To  remember  experiences  of 
another  would  be  to  remember  having  been  somebody  else : 
in  other  words,  to  simultaneously  affirm  and  deny  one's 
own  identity,  a  pure  and  absurd  contradiction."^ 

'^  Philosophie  Contemporaine,  p.  140. 
EE 


466  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

Apart,  however,  from  memory,  self-consciousness,  strictly 
understood,  discloses  to  me  only  the  present  existence  of  the 
Ego  in  my  various  operations.  It  does  not  reveal  my  past 
history,  nor  assure  me  of  the  identity  of  the  man  sitting  here 
with  the  boy  who  was  at  a  certain  school  many  years  ago. 
Mistake  is  therefore  possible  with  respect  to  some  past  events 
owing  to  accidental  aberrations  of  memory.  But  this  in  no 
way  invalidates  our  argument.  A  single  certain  recollection 
would  be  siijficient  to  prove  the  persisting  identity  of  the  mind  as  a 
real  being.  Lotze  has  written  well :  "  We  come  to  understand 
the  connexion  of  our  inner  life  only  by  referrmg  all  its  events 
to  the  one  Ego  lying  unchanged  alike  beneath  its  simultaneous 
variety  and  its  temporal  succession.  Every  retrospect  of  the 
past  brings  with  it  this  image  of  the  Ego  as  the  combining 
centre  ;  our  ideas,  our  feelings,  our  efforts  are  comprehensible 
to  us  only  as  its  states  or  energies,  not  as  events  floating 
unattached  in  a  void.  And  yet  we  are  not  incessantly  making 
this  reference  of  the  internal  manifold  to  the  unity  of  the 
Ego.  It  becomes  distinct  only  in  the  backward  look  which  we 
cast  over  our  life  with  a  certain  concentration  of  collective 
attention.  ...  It  is  not  necessary  and  imperative  that  at 
every  moment  and  in  respect  to  all  its  states  a  Being  should 
exercise  the  unifying  efficiency  put  within  its  power  by  the 
unity  of  its  nature.  ...  If  the  soul,  even  if  but  rarely,  but 
to  a  limited  extent,  nay,  but  once  be  capable  of  bringing 
together  variety  into  the  unity  of  consciousness,  this  slender 
fact  is  sufficient  to  render  imperative  an  inference  to  the 
indivisibility  of  the  Being  by  which  it  can  be  performed."  ** 

Simplicity  of  the  Soul. — In  establishing  the  per- 
manent identity  of  the  mind  we  have  proved  that  it  is 
not  composed  of  a  series  of  successive  events  or  states. 
By  affirming  its  simplicity  we  mean  to  affirm  that  it  is 
not  composed  of  separate  parts  or  diverse  principles  of 
any  kind ;  consequently  that  it  is  not  extended.*     The 

3  Microcosnms,  Bk.  II.  c.  i.  §  4.  The  student  must  be  careful  not 
to  conceive  the  tuiity  of  consciousness  in  this  sense  as  opposed  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  ultimate  duality  of  consciousness  in  External  Percep- 
tion. (Cf.  p.  106.) 

^  The  schoolmen  expressed  this  attribute — absence  of  extension 
or  composition  of  integrant  parts — by  the  term  quantitative  simplicity. 
The  fact  that  the  soul  is  not  the  result  of  a  plurality  of  principles 
coalescing  to  form  a  single  nature  (as  e.g.,  in  their  view  the  formal 
and  material  principles  of  all  corporeal  objects)  they  signified  by 
asserting  that  it  is  essentially  simple — simplex  quoad  essentiam.  Our 
proof  equally  excludes  all  forms  of  composition,  that  of  extended 


THE   SIMPLICITY   OF   THE   SOUL.  467 

method  of  proof  is  the  same — from  the  indivisible  unity 
of  consciousness  ;  and  the  present  proposition  is  really 
demonstrated  by  the  last  argument.  But  the  impossi- 
bility of  the  ultimate  source  of  our  conscious  life  being 
a  composite  substance  will  become  clearer  if  we  con- 
sider the  character  of  some  particular  mental  acts,  and 
try  to  realize  what  is  involved  in  the  supposition  that 
they  proceed  from  such  a  substance. 

(i)  The  Simplicity  of  Intellectual  Ideas. — Our  experience 
teaches  us  that  we  can  form  various  abstract  ideas, 
such  as  those  of  Being,  Unity,  Truth,  Virtue,  and  the 
like,  which  are  of  their  nature  simple  indivisible  acts. 
Now,  acts  of  this  sort  cannot  proceed  from  an  extended 
or  composite  substance,  such  as,  for  instance,  the  hvain. 
This  will  be  seen  by  a  little  reflexion.  In  order  that 
the  indivisible  idea  of,  say,  Truth,  be  the  result  of  the 
activity  of  this  extended  substance,  either  different 
parts  of  the  idea  must  belong  to  different  parts  of  the 
brain,  or  each  part  of  the  brain  must  be  subject  of  an 
entire  idea,  or  the  whole  idea  must  pertain  to  a  single 
part  of  the  brain.  The  first  alternative  is  clearly 
absurd.  The  act  by  which  the  intellect  apprehends 
virtue,  being,  and  the  like,  is  an  indivisible  thought.  It 
is  directly  incompatible  with  its  nature  to  be  allotted 
or  distributed  over  an  aggregate  of  separate  atoms. 
But  the  second  alternative  is  equally  impossible.  If 
different  parts  of  the  composite  substance  were  each 
the  basis  of  a  complete  idea,  we  should  have  at  the 
same  time  not  one,  but  several  ideas  of  the  object. 
Our  consciousness,  however,  tells  us  this  is  not  the  case. 
Lastly,  if  the  whole  idea  were  located  in  one  part  or 
element  of  the  composite  substance,  this  part  should 
itself  be  composite  or  simple.  If  the  latter,  then  our 
thesis — that  the  ultimate  subject  of  thought  is  indi- 
visible— is  estabhshed  at  once.  If  the  former,  then  the 
old  series  of  impossible  alternatives  will  recur  again 
until  we  are  finally  forced  to  the  same  conclusion. 

parts  as  well  as  that  of  separate  unextended  principles,  whether 
homogeneous  or  heterogeneous.  The  unity  of  consciousness  is  in- 
compatible with  a  multiplicity  of.  component  elements,  of  whatever 
kind. 


468  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

(2)  The  Simplicity  of  the  Intellectual  Acts  of  Judgment  ami 
Inference. — A  similar  line  of  reasoning  applies  here.  The 
simplest  judgment  supposes  the  comparison  of  two  distinct 
ideas,  which  must  be  simultaneously  apprehended  by  one 
indivisible  agent.  Suppose  the  judgment,  "  Science  is  useful," 
to  be  elicited.  If  the  Subject  which  apprehends  the  two 
concepts  "  science  "  and  "  useful  "  is  not  indivisible,  then  we 
must  assume  that  one  of  these  terms  is  apprehended  by  one 
part  and  the  other  by  a  second  ;  or  else  that  separate 
elements  of  the  divisible  Subject  are  each  the  seat  of  both 
ideas.  In  the  former  case,  however,  we  cannot  have  any 
judgment  at  all.  The  part  a  apprehends  "  science, "_  the 
different  part  h  conceives  the  notion  "  useful,"  but  the  indi- 
visible act  of  comparison  requiring  a  single  agent  who 
combines  the  two  ideas  is  wanting,  and  we  can  no  more  have 
the  affirmative  predication  than  if  one  man  thinks  "  science," 
and  another  forms  the  concept  "  useful."  In  the  second 
alternative,  if  a  and  h  each  simultaneously  apprehended  both 
"science"  and  "  useful,"  then  we  should  have  not  one  but 
a  multiplicity  of  judgments.  The  simplicity  of  the  inferential 
act  by  which  we  seize  the  logical  sequence  of  a  conclusion, 
is  still  more  irreconcilable  with  the  hypothesis  of  a  composite 
Subject.  The  three  judgments — Every  y  isz  ;  every  x  is  y  ; 
therefore,  every  x  is  z — could  no  more  constitute  a  syllogism 
if  they  proceeded  from  a  composite  substance  than  if  each 
proposition  was  apprehended  alone  by  a  separate  man. 

This  good  old  argument  has  also  been  adopted  by  Lotze : 
"  Any  comparison  of  two  ideas,  which  ends  by  our  finding 
their"  contents  like  or  unlike,  presupposes  the  absolutely 
indivisible  unity  of  that  which  compares  them  ;  it  must  be 
one  and  the  same  thing  which  first  forms  the  idea  of «,  and 
then  that  of  h,  and  which  at  the  same  time  is  conscious  of  the 
nature  and  extent  of  the  difference  between  them.  Then 
again  the  various  acts  of  comparing  ideas  and  referring  them 
to  one  another  are  themselves  in  turn  reciprocally  related ; 
and  this  relation  brings  a  new  activity  of  comparison  to 
consciousness.  And  so  our  whole  inner  world  of  thoughts 
is  built  up,  not  as  a  mere  collection  of  manifold  ideas  existing 
with  or  after  one  another,  but  as  a  work  in  which  these 
individual  members  are  held  together  and  arranged  by  the 
relating  activity  of  this  single  pervading  principle.  This  is 
what  we  mean  by  the  Unity  of  Consciousness.  It  is  this  we 
regard  as  sufficient  ground  for  assuming  an  indivisible  soul."^ 
'  (3)  TJie  Indivisibility  of  Volition. — The  same  line  of  argument 

5  Metaphysics,  §  241.     Cf.  Balmez.  op.  cit.  Bk,  XI.  c.  ii. ;  also  our 
:itation,  pp.  245—247. 


THE  SPIRITUALITY   OF  THE  SOUL.  469 


as  in  the  case  of  judgment  establishes  the  simplicity  of  the 
soul  from  the  unity  of  consciousness  presented  in  acts  of 
will.  An  indivisible  act  of  choice  cannot  be  elicited  by  an 
assemblage  of  distinct  parts  or  principles.^  But  we  may 
leave  the  development  of  the  proof  to  the  reader. 

We  have  thus  shown  that  the  soul  cannot  be  formally 
extended,  tliat  it  cannot  have  parts  outside  of  parts  after  the 
manner  of  a  material  substance.  But  this  does  not  exclude 
the  possibility  of  what  is  sometimes  termed  virtual  extension — 
that  attribute  in  virtue  of  which  an  energy  indivisible  in  itself 
may  yet  exert  its  influence  throughout  an  extended  sphere. 

The  Spirituality  of  the  Soul. — We  now  pass  on 
to  demonstrate  that  the  soul  is  spiritual  or  immaterial. 
The  attribute  of  spirituality  is  sometimes  confounded 
with  that  of  simplicity,  but  they  ought  to  be  carefully 
distinguished.  By  saying  that  a  substance  is  simple  we 
mean  that  it  is  not  a  resultant  or  product  of  separate 
factors  or  parts.  By  affirming  that  it  is  spiritual  or 
immaterial^  we  signify  that  in  its  existence,  and  to  some 
extent  in  regard  to  its  operations,  it  is  independent  of 
matter.  The  principle  of  life  in  the  lower  animals  was 
held  by  the  schoolmen  to  be  in  this  sense  an  example  of 
a  simple  principle  which  is  nevertheless  not  spiritual, 
since  it  is  altogether  dependent  upon  the  organism,  or, 
as  they  saXd,  completely  immersed  in  the  body.  St.  Thomas, 
accordingly,  speaks  of  the  corporeal  souls  of  brutes. 

The  Human  Soul  is  a  Spiritual  Substance. — 
The  proof  may  be  stated  briefly  thus  :  The  human  soul 
is  the  subject  or  source  of  various  spiritual  activities ; 
but  the  subject  or  source  of  spiritual  activities  must 
be  itself  a  spiritual  being ;  therefore  the  soul  must  be 
a  spiritual  being.  The  minor  premiss  is  merely  a 
particular  application  of  the  axiom,  that  the  operation 
of  an  agent  follows  its  nature — actio  sequituv  esse.  As  the 
being  is,  so  must  it  act.  The  establishment  of  the 
general  truth  of  this  principle  is  a  problem  for  Meta- 
physics ;  but  all  that  is  necessary  for  our  purpose 
becomes  evident  on  a  little  careful  consideration  of  the 
axiom.  An  effect  cannot  transcend  its  cause  :  no  action 
can  contain  more  perfection  or  a  higher  order  of  reality 

*>  Cf.  Margerie,  pp.  15,  seq. ;  and  Balmez,  op.  cit.  Bk.  IX.  §  76. 


470  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

than  is  possessed  by  the  being  which  is  the  entire 
source  of  that  action.  If.  then,  a  mental  activity  can 
be  shown  not  to  be  exerted  by  a  material  organ,  or  to 
be  in  any  degree  independent  of  a  material  organ,  the 
principle  from  which  that  activity  proceeds  must  be 
similarly  independent.  It  is  positively  unthinkable  that 
whilst  the  soul  depended  as  regards  its  whole  being  on 
the  organism,  it  should  still  in  some  of  its  exercises  be 
in  any  way  independent  of  the  organism.  If,  accord- 
ingly, any  activities  of  the  soul  are  spiritual,  then  the 
soul  itself  is  spiritual."  For  the  proof  of  the  propo- 
sition that  we  are  endowed  with  activities  of  a  spiritual 
or  immaterial  kind  we  have  only  to  refer  to  the  results 
established  in  chapters  xii.  and  xix.  where  we  showed 
both  Intellect  and  Will  to  be  intrinsically  independent 
of  the  body.  We  shall,  however,  here  recall  some  of 
the  facts  which  manifest  the  truth  of  our  thesis  : 

I.  The  Spirituality  of  TJionght. — We  are  capable  of 
apprehending  and  representing  to  ourselves  abstract 
and  universal  ideas,  such  as  justice,  unity,  man, 
triangle  ;  we  can  form  notions  of  spiritual  being,  e.g., 

"'  Cf.  Coconnier :  "  U operation  suit  I'etre  et  liii  est  proportionnee 
.  .  .  M.  Biichner  reconnait  formellement  la  valeur  de  cette  formule, 
quand  il  ecrit :  '  La  theorie  positiviste  est  forcee  de  convenir  que 
/  'ejfet  doit  repondre  a  la  cause,  et  qu'ainsi  des  effets  compliques  doivent 
supposer,  a  un  certain  degre,  des  combinaisons  de  matieres  com- 
pliquees.'  M.  Karl  Vogt  .  .  .  quand  il  dit :  '  Kncore  faut  il  pourtant 
que  la  fonction  soit  proportionclle  a  Vorganisation  et  mesuree  par  clle.' 
M.  Wundt  .  .  .  quand  il  dit :  '  Nous  ne  pouvons  mesurer  directe- 
ment  ni  les  causes  productrices  des  phenomenes,  ni  les  forces 
productrices  des  mouvements,  ?;/a?s  nous  pouvons  les  mesurer  par  leurs 
effets.'  C'est  a  dire  qu'aujourd'hui  comme  autrefois  tout  le  monde 
reconnait  qu'on  peut  juger  de  la  nature  d'un  etre  par  son  operation. 
Telle  operation,  telle  nature ;  tel  effet,  telle  cause ;  telle  fonction 
tel  organe ;  tel  mouvement,  telle  force;  telle  maniere  d'agir,  telle 
maniere  d'etre.  Ainsi  parlent,  dans  tons  les  siecles  et  par  tout  pays, 
la  raison  et  la  science.  Done,  si  un  etre  a  une  operation  a  laquelle 
seul  il  s'eleve,  a  laquelle  seul  il  puisse  atteindre,  qu'il  accomplisse 
comme  agent  isole,  degage  libre,  transcendant,  cet  etre  doit  avoir 
une  existence  transcendante  libre  degagee  et  qui  appartienne  en 
propre  a  sa  nature.  Or,  en  regardant  I'ame  humaine,  je  lui  trouve 
une  semblable  operation ;  je  lui  vois,  a  un  moment,  cette  maniere 
d'agir  libre,  transcendante  degagee  de  la  matiere.  .  .  .  C'est  quand 
I'ame  humaine  pense,  et  quand  elle  prend  conscience  d'elle-meme  et 
de  sa  pensee."  (L'Aiue  humaine,  Existence  et  Nature,  pp.  123 — 125.) 


THE   SPIRITUALITY  OF  THE   SOUL.  471 

of  God ;  we  can  understand  necessary  truths ;  we  can 
comprehend  possibilities  as  such  ;  and  we  can  perceive 
the  rational  relations  between  ideas,  and  the  logical 
sequence  of  conclusion  from  premisses.  But  we  have 
shown  that  such  operations  as  these  are  spiritual 
phenomena,  which  must  accordingly  proceed  from  a 
spiritual  faculty.  They  could  not  be  states  of  a  faculty 
exerted  through,  or  intrinsically  dependent  on,  a  bodily 
organ.  A  power  of  this  kind  can  only  react  in  response 
to  physical  impressions,  and  can  only  form  representa- 
tions of  a  concrete  character,  depicting  contingent 
individual  facts.  But  universality,  possibility,  logical 
sequence,  general  relations,  do  not  constitute  such  a 
physical  stimulus,  and  consequently  could  not  be  appre- 
hended by  an  organic  faculty.  Accordingly,  these 
higher  mental  functions  must  be  admitted  to  be  of  a 
spiritual  character ;  they  thus  transcend  the  sphere  of 
all  actions  depending  intrinsically  or  essentially  by  their 
nature  on  a  material  instrument. 

This  same  argument  is  recently  adopted  by  as  competent  an 
authority  on  cerebral  physiology  as  Professor  Ladd.  He  thus 
writes :  "  The  existence  which  we  call  '  the  mind '  is  never 
known — even  when  observed  in  its  most  exalted  states  and  in 
the  exercise  of  its  most  spiritual  activities — as  released 
wholly  from  bodily  functions.  ...  At  the  same  time,  in  all 
forms  of  knowledge,  and  especially  in  self-knowledge,  with 
its  equipment  of  realized  aesthetical  and  ethical  sentiments, 
and  of  self-conscious  choices,  the  mind  manifests  and  knows 
itself  as  manifesting  an  existence  in  some  sort  independent  of 
the  bodily  organism.  With  no  mere  figure  of  speech  we  are 
compelled  to  say,  every  mind  thus  transcends  completely,  not 
only  the  powers  of  the  cerebral  mechanism  by  springing  into 
another  order  of  phenomena,  but  also  the  very  existence,  as 
it  were,  of  that  mechanism  by  passing  into  regions  of  space, 
time,  causality,  and  ideality,  of  various  kinds,  uiieie  the  terms 
that  apply  to  the  existence  and  activity  of  the  cere[)ral 
centres  have  absolutely  no  meaning  whatever.  For  example, 
the  human  mind  anticipates  the  future  and  predicts,  on  a 
basis  of  experience  in  the  past,  the  occurrences  which  lanll 
be  but  are  not  now.  Into  this  future,  which  is  itself  the 
product  of  its  own  imagining  and  thinking,  it  projects  its  own 
continued  and  yet  characteristically  altered  existence,  as  well 
as  the  continued  similar  existence  of  things.  But  the  existence 
of  the  brain,  and  of  its  particular  forms  of  nerve  commotion, 


472 


RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


is  never  other  than  a  purel}^  here-and-now  existence.  This 
physical  existence  is,  therefore,  transcended  in  an  absolnte 
way  by  every  such  activity  of  the  mind.  Moreover,  all  supra- 
sensuous  knowledge,  as  such,  enforces  the  same  conviction  as 
to  a  potential  independency  of  the  mind,  inferred  upon  the 
basis  of  an  actual  experience  with  mental  activities  in  the 
way  of  transcending  the  sphere  of  the  correlated  being  and 
activities  of  the  brain.  For  all  (supra-sensuous  ?)  knowledge  is 
of  the  universaL  In  knowing,  the  mind  moves  in  the  sphere 
of  so-called  '  law,'  of  '  genera,'  and  '  species,'  of  '  relations 
common  '  to  many  individuals,  of  the  '  categories,'  of  the  true 
for  all  spaces  and  all  times  and  all  circumstances.  But  the 
existence  of  the  brain  is  never  more  than  concrete  and 
individual ;  its  being  is  at  every  instant  precisely  such  and 
no  other — so  many  countless  atoms  of  oxygen,  hydrogen, 
nitrogen,  &c.,  combined  in  precisely  such  proportions."^ 

2.  Self-Consciousness. — The  reflex  operation  exhibited  in 
the  act  of  self-consciousness,  is  also  of  a  spiritual  or  supra- 
organic  order,  and  cannot  be  the  activity  of  a  faculty 
essentially  dependent  on  a  corporeal  agent.  The  peculiar 
nature  of  this  aptitude,  so  fundamentally  opposed  in  kind  to 
all  the  properties  of  matter,  has  been  already  gone  into  at 
such  length  (pp.  23S — 242),  that  we  can  afford  but  little  space 
for  the  subject  here.  We  shall,  however,  call  attention  to 
that  aspect  of  this  familiar  phenomenon  which  has  often  been 
recognized  by  thoughtful  minds  to  be  the  most  wonderful  fact 
in  the  universe.  In  the  act  of  self-consciousness  there  occurs 
an  instance  of  the  complete  or  perfect  reflexion  of  an  indi- 
visible agent  back  on  itself.  I  recognize  an  absolute  identitj' 
between  myself  thinking  about  something,  and  myself 
reflecting  on  that  thinking  Self.  The  Ego  reflecting  and  the 
Ego  reflected  upon  is  the  same :  it  is  at  once  subject  and  object. 
An  action  of  this  sort  is  not  merely  nnlike  the  known  qualities 
of  bodies :  it  stands  in  direct  and  open  conflict  with  all  the 
most  fundamental  characteristics  of  matter.  It  is  in  absolute 
contradiction  with  the  essential  nature  of  matter.  One  part 
of  a  material  substance  may  be  made  to  act  upon  another, 
one  atom  may  attract,  repel,  or  in  various  ways  influence 
another,  but  the  assumption  that  one  atom  can  act  upon  itself 
— that  precisely  the  same  portion  of  matter  can  be  agent  and 
patient  in  its  own  case — is  repugnant  to  all  that  either 
common  experience  or  physical  science  teaches  us.  If  then 
this  unity  of  agent  and  patient,  of  subject  and  object,  is  so 
contrary  to  the  nature  of  matter,  assuredly  an  activity  every 
element  of  which  is  intrinsically  dependent  on  a  corporeal 
organ  cannot  be  capable  of  self-reflexion. 

8  Philosopliy  of  Mind,  pp.  400,  401. 


THE   SPIRITUALITY   OF   THE   SOUL.  473 

_ .  .      .  _ _^ 

3.  The  Will. — The  interest  attached  to  the  discussion 
of  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  chiefly  due  to  the  bearin.i^ 
of  that  doctrine  on  the  nature  of  the  human  mind.  If 
any  of  man's  vohtions  are  free,  if  tlie}'  are  not  the  out- 
come of  the  forces  playing  upon  him,  then  there  must 
be  within  him  an  inner  centre  of  causahty,  an  internal 
agent,  a  nucleus  of  energy,  enjoying  at  least  a  limited 
independence  of  the  organism.  The  argument  based 
on  voluntary  action  may,  however,  start  from  two  dis- 
tinct points   of  view : 

(a)  A  merely  sentient  agent — one  whose  whole 
being  is  immersed  in  material  conditions — can  onl}'" 
desire  sensible  goods.  It  can  only  seek  what  is  pro- 
portioned to  its  nature,  and  this  is  always  reducible  to 
organic  pleasure  or  avoidance  of  pain.  On  the  other 
hand,  to  a  spiritual  creature  which  is  endowed  also 
with  inferior  faculties,  both  sensuous  and  supra- 
sensuous  good  is  adapted.  Therefore,  the  aspirations 
of  the  latter  are  unlimited,  while  those  of  the  former 
are  confined  within  the  sphere  of  material  well-being. 
But  our  own  consciousness,  history,  biography,  and  the 
existence  of  poetry  and  romance,  all  overwhelm  us  with 
evidence  of  the  fact  that  man  is  moved  by  supra- 
sensible  good.  Love  of  justice,  truth,  virtue,  and  right 
for  its  own  sake,  are  motives  and  impulses  which 
have  inspired  some  of  the  greatest  and  noblest  works 
chronicled  in  the  narrative  of  the  human  race.  Con- 
sequently, there  must  be  in  man  a  principle  not 
completely  subject  to  material  conditions. 

(/;)  Again :  we  are  free ;  we  are  capable  of  self- 
determination  ;  but  no  organic  faculty  can  determine 
itself.  Such  an  action,  as  we  have  already  insisted, 
is  repugnant  to  the  essential  nature  of  matter.  On  the 
other  hand,  were  our  volitions  not  spiritual,  were  they, 
as  our  opponents  allege,  merely  subjective  phases  or 
mental  states  inseparably  bound  up  with  organic  pro- 
cesses ;  did  they  not  proceed  from  a  principle  in  some 
degree  independent  of  matter,  their  moral  freedom  would 
be  impossible ;  and  man  would  be  devoid  of  responsi- 
bility and  incapable  of  moralit}'. 


CHAPTER   XXII. 

FALSE    THEORIES    OF   THE    EGO. 

Since  the  unity  of  consciousness  exhibited  in  the 
mind's  reflex  cognition  of  itself  as  a  real  abiding 
indivisible  being  plays  so  important  a  part  in  the 
theses  which  we  have  just  estabhshed  concerning 
the  nature  of  the  soul,  this  seems  to  be  the  most 
appropriate  place  to  examine  some  of  the  chief 
attacks  which  have  been  made  in  modern  times 
upon  the  doctrine  which  we  defend. 

Kant's  Theory  of  the  Ego.— We  have  already  (pp.  267— 
269)  indicated  and  criticized  the  nature  of  Kant's  attack  on 
rational  psychology — his  attempted  distinction  between  a 
noumenal  and  phenomenal  Ego,  his  doctrine  that  we  have 
no  knowledge  of  the  mind  as  a  thing-in-itself,  that  we  are 
merely  aware  of  the  formal  unity  of  consciousness,  and  that 
this  phenomenal  Ego  is  not  a  real  subject,  certainly  not  a 
substance  subsisting  in  itself.  Here  we  have  space  to  make 
but  one  or  two  additional  observations.  The  appUcation  to 
the  mind's  perception  of  itself  of  the  hypothesis  of  an  illusory 
subjective  formal  element  in  cognition,  and  the  attempt  to 
distinguish  the  empirical  Ego  of  conscious  experience  from  a 
supposed  unknowable  noumenal  Ego,  are  untenable.  Even 
were  the  Kantian  distinction  between  noumenon  2ind  phenomenon 
valid  with  respect  to  objects  of  the  extra-mental  world,  it  is 
only  by  misconceiving  the  character  of  the  knowledge  derived 
from  self-consciousness  that  this  distinction  can  be  extended 
to  the  mind's  cognition  of  itself  or  of  its  states.  The  external 
thing,  which  is  different  in  kind  from  the  mind,  is  known 
by  the  latter  through  a  mental  modification  which  might 
conceivably  mislead  as  to  the  nature  of  its  cause.     But  con- 


FALSE   THEORIES   OF   THE   EGO  475 


scionsness  affords  at  all  events  an  immediate  knowledge  both 
of  my  states  and  of  myself  in  those  states.  There  is  no  room 
for  appearances  or  phenomena  here ;  the  mind,  the  object 
of  knowledge,  is  really  immediately /'r^s^n^  to  itself.  I  do  not 
merely  apprehend  transitory  mental  states  which  I  am  led 
to  ascribe  to  an  unknown  substance  or  cause.  I  am  conscious 
that  I  originate,  direct,  and  inhibit  my  mental  activity. 
I  am  immediately  cognizant  of  my  own  causality — of  my 
concrete  self  as  energizing  or  suffering  in  my  thought.  More- 
over, although  I  never  can  have  an  intuition  of  a  naked 
"  pure  Ego  "  stripped  of  all  particular  forms  of  behaviour, 
yet  by  careful  repeated  internal  observation  of  how  the 
concrete  self  behaves,  combined  with  rational  deduction  from 
evident  principles,  I  can  establish  certain  truths  concerning 
the  nature  of  this  self  of  which  I  am  directly  cognizant  in 
the  concrete.  I  can,  for  instance,  prove — under  the  sanction 
of  scepticism — that  it  must  be  a  real,  abiding,  indivisible 
being,  not  wholly  evanescent ;  that  some  of  its  activities 
cannot  have  their  ultimate  source  in  an  extended  material 
thing,  and  the  like.  I  do  not  pretend  to  demonstrate  any- 
thing, nor  do  I  feel  much  concern,  about  any  unknowable 
noumenon  which  never  reveals  itself  in  my  consciousness. 
If  there  be  in  existence  an  inscrutable  "  transcendental  Ego  " 
eternally  screened  from  my  ken  by  this  self-asserting 
"  empirical  Ego,"  I  confess  I  feel  very  little  interest  either  in 
the  nature  or  the  welfare  of  the  former.  The  only  soul  about 
which  I  care  is  that  which  immediately  presents  itself  in  its  acts, 
which  thinks,  wills,  remembers,  believes,  loves,  repents,  and  hopes.^ 

Empiricist  Theory. — The  chief  assault,  however,  on 
the  conscious  unity  of  the  mind,  as  a  real  abiding  being, 
especially  in  English  philosophical  literature,  is  that  of 
Hume  and  the  Associationist  school.  Moreover,  since 
the  doctrine  of  these  writers  in  a  slightly  modified  form 
has  been  recently  adopted  by  Professor  James,  at  least, 
as  an  adequate  psychological  account  of  the  facts, 
and  then  converted  into  a  metaphysical  basis  of  opera- 
tions whence  to  attack  the  traditional  belief  in  a  sub- 
stantial spiritual  soul,  it  is  incumbent  on  us  to  examine 
these  views  at  some  length. 

Hume,  having  reduced  all  known  reality  to  a 
succession  of  transitory  feelings,  was  logically  forced  to 
deny  the  presence  of  any  real  abiding  mind,  persisting 

1  For  some  useful  criticism  of  Kant's  theory,  of.  Balmez,  op.  cit. 
Book  IX.  CO.  9 — 12 ;  and  Lotze,  Metaphysic,  §  244. 


476  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


the  same  amid  varying  states.  The  idea  of  a  permanent 
self,  he  argues,  is  not  derived  from  any  sensuous 
impression,  therefore  it  is  a  "fiction"  of  the  imagi- 
nation ;  for,  on  Sensist  principles,  the  only  ideas  which 
can  pretend  to  any  validity  are  those  derived  from 
impressions :  '*  I  venture  to  affirm  of  the  rest  of  mankind 
that  they  are  nothing  but  a  bundle  or  collection  ot 
different  perceptions  which  succeed  each  other  with  an 
inconceivable  rapidity  and  are  in  a  perpetual  flux  and 
movement.  The  mind  is  a  kind  of  theatre  where 
several  perceptions  successively  make  their  appearance. 
.  .  .  There  is  properly  no  simplicity  in  it  at  one  time, 
nor  identity  in  different ;  whatever  natural  propension 
we  may  have  to  imagine  that  simplicity  and  identity. 
The  comparison  of  the  theatre  must  not  mislead  us, 
they  are  the  successive  perceptions  only  that  constitute 
the  mind."-  Hume  is  the  frankest  as  well  as  the 
ablest  representative  of  sensationalist  phenomenism ; 
but  Mill,  Bain,  Ribot,  Taine,  and  the  rest  of  the  school 
accept  this  conclusion,  and  are  unanimously  agreed 
that  the  mind  is  nothing  more  than  a  succession  of 
conscious  states. 

Criticism. — That  this  dissolution  of  the  Ego  into 
a  procession  or  series  of  phenomena  constitutes  a 
nductio  ad  ahsnrdiim  of  Sensism,  will,  we  trust,  be  evident 
to  the  reader  who  has  followed  our  reasoning  in  the 
last  chapter.  The  argument  may  be  summarized  in 
a  few  words.  If  the  mind  were  but  a  succession  of 
evanescent  states,  judgment,  reasoning,  self-conscious 
reflexion  would  be  absolutely  impossible.  The  judicial 
act  requires  the  indivisible  unity  of  the  agent  who 
juxtaposes  the  terms;  reasoning  is  not  possible  unless 
the  premisses  successively  apprehended  be  combined 
by  one  and  the  same  simple  energy ;  and  lastly,  self- 
conscious  reflexion  and  rational  memory  impl}-  the 
persistence  of  a  real  abiding  subject  which  can  compare 
the  past  state  with  the  present.  (See  pp.  464 — 466.) 

Mill  felt  this  difficulty.  He  saw  that  in  rejecting 
the  doctrine  that  the  Ego  is  something  more  than  a 
succession   of  states    he   was    forced    to    accept    "the 

-  Treatise  op  Human  Nature,  Part  IV.  §  6. 


FALSE   THEORIES  OF   THE   EGO.  477 


paradox  that  something  which  ex  hypothesi  is  but  a  series 
of  feehngs  is  aware  of  itself  as  a  series.'''^  He,  however, 
abandons  the  hopeless  attempt  to  remove  the  "■  paradox," 
naively  counselling  us  that  "  by  far  the  wisest  thing  we 
can  do  is  to  accept  the  fact." 

Criticism. — The  term   "  paradox  "  is  here  abused, 
''paroxysmal    unintelligibility " — the   phrase   in  which 
Professor    James    so    energetically   describes    another 
theor}^ — is    scarcely  too    strong  for   the   doctrine    that 
the  mind  is  merely  a  series  of  feelings  which  are  aware 
of  themselves  as  a  series.     We  must  not  deceive  our- 
selves with  words.     What  is  a  series  ?    It  is  a  succession 
of  distinct  events,  or  several  separate  events  succeeding 
each  other.     The  terms,  a  "  thread  of  consciousness," 
and  a   "  series  "   of  mental   states,  seem   to  indicate  a 
unity  of   some   sort  to  which,  loose   though  it  be,  the 
self  of  the  Empiricist  Psychology  has  no  claim.     The 
moment   we  attempt    to    conceive   accurately  what    is 
meant    by   a  mere  succession   of  conscious   states,   we 
perceive  that   a  conviction  of  personal  identity,  and  a 
memory   of    past    actions,    such    as    each    man's    own 
experience  assures  him  he  is  possessed  of,  is  absolutely 
impossible  to  it.-^      On  the  other  hand.   Mill  is  again 
wrong  in  representing  his  opponents  as  teaching  that 
"  the   mind  or    Ego   is    something   different   from    any 
series    of    feelings    or    possibilities    of    them,"    if    by 
"  different  "     is    meant    that    the     Ego    is    something 
separate,    standing    out    of   all    relation    to    its    states. 
The  states  are  nothing  but  modifications  of  the  Ego  ; 
and  the  true  mind  is  the  subject  plus  its  states ;  or  the 
subject  present  in  its   states.     It  is  "  an  abiding  exist- 
ence with  a  series  of  feelings."^ 

W.     James's     Theory.  —  Though    characterizing 
Mill's  treatment  of  the  subject  as  "the  definitive  bank- 

'^  Exam,  cxxii.  ad  fin. 

■*  As  Mr.  Courtney  urges,  "Such  a  series  could  never  be  summed." 
{Metaphysics  of  Mill,  p.  70.)  Similarly  Professor  Knight,  "  A  succes- 
sion of  states  of  mind  has  no  meaning  except  in  relation  to  the 
substrate  of  self  that  underlies  the  succession,  giving  it  coherence, 
identity,  and  intelligibility.  The  states  are  different,  but  the  self — 
whose  states  they  are — is  the  same."  {Hume,  p.  177.) 

^  Cf.  M'Cosh's  Exam,  of  Mill,  c.  v. 


478  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

ruptcy  of  the  associationist  description  of  the  con- 
sciousness of  self," "^  Professor  James  advocates  the  same 
doctrine  in  but  sHghtly  modified  shape.  He  disapproves 
of  the  associationist  account,  which  represents  personal 
identity,  as  formed  "  by  successive  thoughts  and  feelings 
in  some  inscrutable  way  '  integrating '  or  gumming 
themselves  together  on  their  own  account.""  Instead, 
he  teaches  that  the  Self  consists  of  "  a  stream  of  con- 
sciousness," in  which  each  "  section  "  knows  the  pre- 
vious section,  and  in  it  all  which  went  before.  He 
summarily  discards  the  notion  of  an  abiding  indivisible 
substantial  soul  connecting  past  states  with  present,  as 
needless  and  useless  to  the  Psychologist.^  For  him 
"  The  passing  Thought  is  itself  the  thinker,  and 
psychology  need  not  look  beyond."  "  The  I  or  Self 
is  a  Thought  at  each  moment  different  from  the  last 
moment,  but  appvopviative  of  the  latter,  together  with  all 
the  latter,  called  its  own."^  It  is  true,  that  "  common 
sense  insists  there  must  be  a  real  proprietor  in  the  case 
of  these  selves  (successive  thoughts),  or  else  their  actual 
accretion  in  a  personal  consciousness  would  never  take 
place.  .  .  .  This  proprietor  is  the  present,  remembering 
'judging  thought'  or  the  identifying  'section'  of  the 
stream.  .  .  .  This  is  what  collects  and  owns  some 
of  the  facts  which  it  surveys  and  disowns  the  rest." 
To  help  us  to  understand  how  this  interesting  "  appro- 
priation "  of  the  past  self  or  total  collection  of  thoughts 
by  the  present  Thought  is  effected  in  the  absence  of  any 
real  connecting  being,  he  continues  :  "  We  can  imagine 
a  long  succession  of  herdsmen  coming  rapidl}'  into  pos- 
session of  the  same  cattle  by  transmission  of  an  original 
title  by  bequest.  May  not  the  '  title  '  of  a  collective 
self  be  transmitted  from  one  Thought  to  another  in 
some  analogous  way  ?  It  is  a  patent  fact  of  conscious- 
ness that  a  transmission  like  this  actually  occurs.  .  .  . 
Each  Thought  dies  away  and  is  replaced  by  another. 
The  other  knows  its  own  predecessor.  Each  later 
Thought,  knowing  and  including  thus  the  Thoughts 
which  went  before,  is  the  final  receptacle — and  appro- 
priating them  is  the  final  owner — of  all  they  contain  and 
«  Principles,  vol.  i.  p.  359.     '  P.  338.     ^  pp  ^j^._^^,^^     y  p  ^qi. 


FALSE   THEORIES   OF  THE  EGO.  479 

own.  Eacli  Thought  is  thus  born  an  owner  and  dies 
owned,  transmitting  whatever  it  reahzed  as  its  Self  to 
its  later  proprietor." ^^ 

Criticism. — The  suggested  emendations  on  the  associ- 
ationist  "  gumming "  hypothesis  are :  (i)  The  likening  of 
conscious  life  to  a  "  stream  "  rather  than  to  "  a  series  of 
states;"  (2)  the  substitution  of  the  statement  that  "the  last 
section  of  consciousness  cognizes  its  predecessor,  and  in  that 
predecessor  every  previous  cognition,"  instead  of  the  state- 
ment that  the  "  series  is  aware  of  itself  as  a  series  ;  "  (3)  the 
suggested  method  of  "  inheritance  "  or  "  appropriation  "  of 
past  selves  or  states  by  the  present  state,  instead  of  their 
gumming  themselves  by  association. 

As  regards  (i),  it  may  be  fairly  objected  from  the  stand- 
point of  experience,  on  which  Mr.  James  himself  insists  so 
much,  that  the  representation  of  conscious  life  as  "  a  series  of 
states  "  is,  in  one  important  respect,  more  accurate  than  the 
conception  of  it  as  a  "  stream."  It  is  not  continuous,  but 
interrupted  by  periods  of  unconsciousness.  (See  p.  366.)  This 
objection  is  not  merely  verbal :  its  force  will  become  more 
evident  as  we  proceed.  But  we  maintain  that  actual  psycho- 
logical experience  presents  to  us  more  than  thoughts  or  states  of 
consciousness,  whether  as  a  series  or  as  a  stream — that  we 
have  an  immediate  apprehension  of  a  real  self  in  some 
thoughts  and  states  which  is  not  those  thoughts  or  states. 
(See  pp.  463,  464.) 

(2)  The  assertion  that  "the  present  Thought  knows  and 
appropriates  its  predecessor,"  is  more  plausible  at  first  sight 
than  the  proposition  that  "  the  series  knows  itself  as  a  series." 
For  a  series  evidently  has  not  the  unity  needful  to  a  Knower 
or  an  Owner  ;  whilst  the  Thought  possesses  the  unity  of  a 
single  act  by  which  an  agent  ma}^  cognize  a  previous  thought. 
(a)  Still,  even  supposing  that  the  present  thought  could, 
without  a  connecting  subject  or  agent,  cognize  in  some  degree 
its  predecessor,  it  is  not  true  that  that  predecessor  really 
knew  and  included  all  that  went  before.  It  can  hardly  be 
maintained — especially  by  Mr.  James,  who  is  so  emphatically 
opposed  to  the  admission  of  any  unconscious  state  of  mind — 
that  every  mental  state  can  really  know  a  vast  multitude  of 
things  of  which  it  is  absolutely  unconscious.  In  what 
intelligible  sense  can  it  be  alleged  that  the  section  of  the 
"  stream  "  of  my  consciousness  extending  back  over  the  last 
half-minute  really  contained  The  Charge  of  the  Six  Hundred, 
which  I  possibly  could  now  repeat,  though  I  have  not  recited 


10 


Pp-  3^8.  339. 


48o  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

it  for  ten  years  past  ?  Were  my  present  passing  Thought  the 
only  thinker  within  me,  even  if  it  could  apprehend  and 
appropriate  all  contained  "  in  the  pulses  of  my  cognitive 
consciousness "  for  the  last  three  months,  the  Greek  and 
Mathematics  I  learned  in  early  life  would  be  lost  for  ever. 

(b)  But  the  statement  that  the  mere  "  present  Thought  " 
is  the  Thinker,  the  Owner  who  recognizes  identity  between 
the  present  state  of  consciousness  and  its  ininiediate  but 
extinct  predecessor  is  also  exposed  to  all  the  main  difficulties 
which  have  proved  fatal  to  Hume  and  Mill.  "  Pulses  of 
cognitive  consciousness  "  as  like  as  successive  images  of  a 
man  in  a  lookmg-glass  might  follow  one  after  another  in  the 
same  brain  without  one  state  being  able  to  identify  itself 
with  the  antecedent  state.  Whether  they  succeed  each  other 
immediately  like  passengers  in  an  omnibus,  or  at  intervals  like 
lodgers  in  the  same  bed  of  a  hotel,  makes  no  difference.  In 
order  that  any  one  "  pulsation ''  be  recognized  as  like  or 
unlike  even  its  immediate  predecessor,  the  two  pulsations 
must  be  apprehended  by  one  indivisible  agent,  who  abiding 
the  same,  cognizes  both,  and  assimilates  or  dissociates  them. 
The  necessity  of  this  permanent  subject  for  even  the  simplest 
acts  of  intellectual  judgment  has  been  shown  already  (p.  465). ^^ 

(c)  The  insufficiency  of  this  theory  which  claims  to  "  find 
place  for  all  the  experiential  facts  unencumbered  by  any 
hypothesis  save  that  of  passing  states  of  mind,"  becomes 
still  clearer  when  brought  face  to  face  with  the  "  experiential 
fact  "  of  periods  of  sleep,  swooning,  epileptic  attacks,  and 
the  like.  When  I  av/oke  this  morning,  the  last  previous 
"  pulse  of  my  cognitive  consciousness "  in  possession  of 
Mr.  James's  doctrine  had  been  extinct,  dead,  and  buried  for 
over  six  hours,  yet  I  speedily  became  aware  that  the  TJiinker 
who  had  laboured  on  the  subject  was  still  present  and  alive 
within  me.  It  would  be  interesting  to  learn  by  what  "  verifiable 
experience  "  it  can  be  shown  that  there  was,  during  my  sleep, 
a  continuous  stream  of  "judging  Thoughts  "  or  "  pulsations 
of  cognitive  consciousness,"  each  before  it  died  handing  over 
to  its  successor  the  contents  of  Mr.  James's  hundred  pages. 
This  difficulty  is  still  further  increased  by  the  phenomena  of 
"  double  consciousness  "  to  which  we  shall  return. 

(3)  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  criticize  the  analog}^  sug- 
gested with  respect  to  the  "  inheritance  "  or  "  appropriation  " 

^1  James  admits  that  his  theory  "  must  beg  memory."  (p.  539.) 
But  this  is  precisely  what  it  has  no  right  to  beg ;  especially  when,  as 
we  shall  see  presently,  this  psychologist  attacks  the  pcymaiient  soul  as 
needless,  on  the  ground  that  his  own  theory  gives  a  suffieient  account  of 
the  facts  !  The  truth  is,  consistent  phenomenism  is  just  as  impossible  in 
empirical  psychology  as  it  certainly  is  in  physical  science. 


FALSE   THEORIES   OF   THE   EGO.  4S1 


of  past  "  selves  "  by  the  present  Thought.  The  reader  can 
easily  think  out  for  himself  the  impossibilities  involved.  The 
transmission  of  "  ownership  "  of  a  herd  of  cattle  through  a 
succession  of  herdsmen  is  possible,  because  the  cattle  are 
permanent  objects  which  exist  during  the  transmission, 
because  they  are  distinct  and  separable  from  their  dying 
owners,  and  because  the  ownership  in  virtue  of  which  a  man 
can  legally  buy  and  sell  his  cows  is  different  in  kind  from  his 
"  ownership  "  of  his  own  past  existence. 

(4)  Finally  to  compare  the  theories  of  Mill  and  James  : 
In  a  psychological  analysis  of  the  cognition  of  our  personal 
identity  an  account  has  to  be  given  of  two  things — the 
knowing  agent  and  the  object  known.  Mill's  proposition  that 
the  knowing  agent  is  "  a  series  of  states,"  James  easily  shows 
to  be  absurd ;  whilst  his  own  statement  that  each  single  act 
of  knowledge  is  the  knowing  agent,  possesses,  as  we  have 
observed,  a  certain  superficial  plausibility.  But  when  we  turn 
to  the  account  of  the  object  known — the  entire  past  experi- 
ence of  the  agent — the  situation  is  completely  reversed. 
That  the  whole  collective  existence  of  a  person  is  reahzed 
and  known  by,  or  rather  in  the  course  of,  his  entire  series  of 
conscious  states  is,  it  might  be  urged,  "verified  by  experience." 
But  the  doctrine  that  each  "pulse  of  cognitive  conscious- 
ness," whether  waking  or  sleeping,  appropriates,  contains, 
and  possesses  the  life  history  of  the  individual,  Mill  could 
fairly  retort,  is  one  of  those  hypotheses  which  its  own  author 
elsewhere  describes  as  "  paroxysmal  unintelligibilities."  _ 

Conclusion. — After  reflecting  on  these  two  empiricist 
theories  of  personal  identity,  the  reader  will  probably  con- 
clude that  the  vulgar  "  common-sense"  account  of  the  matter 
is  not  to  be  so  summarily  disposed  of  as  Professor  James 
implies.  That  account,  which  has  survived  the  attacks  of 
many  centuries,  maintains  that  the  same  real,  abiding,  indi- 
visible being,  the  "  soul  "  which  was  the  subject  of  my  past 
experiences,  still  exists  within  me;  and  that  owing  to  the 
modifications  it  underwent  in  those  experiences,  it  possesses 
the  power  to  reproduce  many  of  them — not  all  simultaneously, 
but  in  succession — and  to  recognize  them  along  with  its  own 
identity  in  successive  thoughts. 

James's  attack  on  the  Soul.— Having  examined 
the  adequacy  of  the  Harvard  professor's  account  of 
our  mental  experience,  it  will  now  be  easier  to  estimate 
the  worth  of  his  objections  against  the  vulgar  "common 
sense"  doctrine.  For  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
the  force  of  these  difficulties  depends  mainly  on  the 
FF 


482  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

sufficiency  of  the  rival  explanation  of  the  unity  of 
consciousness.  The  psychologist — even  the  scientific 
psychologist — must  choose  some  coherent  theory  of  con- 
scious life.  The  question  to  be  decided  is :  Which  is 
the  most  rational  interpretation  of  the  facts  ? 

1.  In  the  first  place,  then,  James  argues,  the 
hypothesis  of  a  substantial  soul  is  quite  unnecessary  in 
Psychology.  "  /^  is  needless  for  expressing  the  actual  subfeciive 
phenomena  of  consciousness  as  they  appear.  We  have  formu- 
lated them  all  without  its  aid  by  the  supposition 
of  a  stream  of  thoughts,  each  substantially  different 
from  the  rest,  but,  cognitive  of  the  rest  and  appro- 
priative  of  each  other's  content.  .  .  .  The  unity,  the 
identity,  the  individuality,  and  the  immateriality  that 
appear  in  the  psychic  life  are  thus  accounted  for  as 
phenomenal  and  temporal  facts  exclusively,  and  with 
no  need  of  reference  to  any  more  simple  or  substantial 
agent  than  the  present  Thought  or  *  section '  of  the 
stream."  (Op.  cit.  p.  344.) 

Assuredly  if  "  the  unity,  individuality,  and  identity  " 
of  our  mental  life  are  all  adequately  expressed  and 
satisfactorily  accounted  for  by  James's  theory,  the 
doctrine  of  a  Soul  may  be  dismissed  as  gratuitous. 
If  concepts,  judgments,  reasonings,  emotions,  and 
recollections  can  be  intelligibly  conceived  and  described 
without  the  implication  of  their  inhering  in  or  pertain- 
ing to  anything  more  permanent  or  substantial  than 
themselves,  whether  material  or  immaterial,  then  the 
psychologist  has  no  need  of  the  hypothesis  of  a  Soul. 
But  we  trust  we  have  advanced  sufficient  reasons  to 
show  that  this  is  not  the  case,  and  that  neither  the 
''unity,  individuality,  nor  identity"  of  a  man's  mental 
life  can  be  conceived  or  expressed  without  the  impli- 
cation of  some  more  permanent  unitary  being  within 
him  which  is  its  root  and  source. 

2.  Further,  he  urges,  even  if  a  metaphysical  hypothesis  be 
needed  by  the  psychologist,  that  of  a  substantial  spiritual 
soul  is  worthless.  It  affords  no  help  in  rendering  intelligible 
anything  which  needs  accounting  for.  "The  bald  fact  is 
that  when  the  brain  acts,  a  thought  occurs.  .  .  .  What 
positive   meaning    has   the   Soul   when    scrutinized,   but   the 


FALSE   THEORIES   OF  THE   EGO.  483 


ground  oj  the  possibility  of  thought.  .  .  .  And  what  is  the 
meaning'  of  this  ( — the  statement  that  brain  action  excites 
or  determines  this  possibihty  to  actuahty)  .  .  .  but  giving 
a  concrete  form  to  one's  behef  that  the  coming  of  the  thought 
when  brain-processes  occur,  has  some  sort  of  ground  in  the 
nature  of  things?  If  the  word  Soul  be  understood  merely 
to  express  that  claim,  it  is  a  good  word  to  use.  But  if  it  be 
held  to  do  more,  to  gratify  the  claim,— for  instance,  to  connect 
rationally  the  thought  which  comes,  with  the  (cerebral) 
processes  which  occur,  and  to  mediate  intelligibly  between 
their  two  disparate  natures, — then  it  is  an  illusory  term." 
It  may  be  used  as  a  provisional  term  like  that  of  Substance 
to  express  the  belief  that  there  is  more  in  reality  than  a  mere 
phenomenon,  "  more  than  the  bare  fact  of  co-existence  of  a 
passing  thought  with  a  passing  brain-state.  But  we  do  not 
answer  the  question  '  What  is  that  more  ?  '  when  we  say 
that  it  is  a  '  Soul '  which  the  brain-state  affects.  This  kind 
of  more  explains  nothing."  (P.  346.) 

To  this  objection  we  would  reply  that  the  formulation  of 
the  problem  needing  solution,  given  in  the  proposition  "  the 
bald  fact  is  that  when  the  brain  acts,  a  thought  occurs," 
ignores  the  very  nodus  of  the  difficulty  which  the  Soul — or  at 
all  events,  the  Soul  viewed  as  an  abiding  substantial  being 
— is  invoked  to  account  for.  That  nodus  is  the  unity  of  con- 
sciousness throughout  the  whole  series  of  thoughts  zvhich  go  to  make 
up  our  psychic  existence.  The  soul  is  not  invented  as  a  sort 
of  plastic  medium  to  explain  the  connection  between  a 
transitory  thought  and  the  concomitant  brain-change.  Belief 
in  a  permanent  substantial  Mind  existed  long  before  men 
knew  of  the  existence  of  such  cerebral  processes.  It  is  m 
order  to  give  a  rational  account  of  the  connexion  of  thought 
with  thought,  of  the  past  thought  which  has  perished  with 
the  present  which  is  living  and  the  future  unborn  thought ; 
it  is  to  render  the  consciousness  of  our  persisting  identity 
intelHgible  that  spiritualist  philosophers  have  insisted  on 
the  fact  of  an  abiding  substantial  soul.  And  the  permanence 
of  such  a  real  individual  immaterial  being  as  basis  of  our 
consciousness,  does  provide  at  any  rate  a  coherent  account 
of  each  man's  internal  experience.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
venture  to  assert,  first,  that  the  notion  of  thoughts  and 
feehngs  inhering  in  nothing  is  absurd  and  unthinkable ;  and 
secondly,  that  even  were  a  succession  of  such  psychological 
monsters  possible,  they  could  never  constitute  that  enduring 
self-conscious  personality  which  each  of  us  calls  "  I." 

Furthermore,  we  readily  admit  that  the  proposition, 
"  Thought  is  an  activity  of  the  Soul,"  like  any  other  merely 
verbal  statement,  "  explains  nothing,"  unless  its  terms  have 


484  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

been  defined  or  are  already  understood.  But  when,  after  a 
careful  examination  of  all  the  relevant  data  furnished  by 
experience,  the  Soul  is  defined  by  the  psychologist  as  A  real 
being,  immaterial  and  indivisible  in  its  nature,  abiding  in  duration, 
individual  in  character,  the  agent  and  source  of  sensation  and 
vital  activity  as  well  as  of  thought  and  volition,  the  word  Soul 
is  assuredly  not  an  "  illusory  term  "  vaguely  expressive  of  the 
belief  that  there  is  more  in  reality  than  the  mere  phenomenon. 
And  when  the  psychologist  has  shown  that  the  application 
of  these  predicates  to  the  agent  and  subject  of  our  mental 
activities  is  justified  and  necessitated  by  the  analysis  of  these 
activities,  he  has  provided  us  not  with  "  an  explanation  which 
explains  nothing,"  but  with  the  proof  of  the  objective  validity 
of  that  conception  which  alone  renders  "  the  unity,  the 
identity,  the  individuality,  and  the  immateriality,  that  appear 
in  our  psychic  life"  intelhgible. 

3.  The  argument  for  a  spiritual  soul  deduced  from  the 
Freedom  of  the  Will,  Professor  James  disposes  of  in  summary 
fashion.  At  best  "it  can  only  convince  those  who  believe 
in  free-will ;  and  even  they  will  have  to  admit  that  spontaneity 
is  just  as  possible,  to  say  the  least,  in  a  temporary  spiritual 
agent  like  our  Thought,  as  in  a  permanent  one  like  the 
supposed  Soul."  {Ibid.  p.  346.) 

The  first  statement  is  quite  true,  and  the  second  partially 
so.  The  rejection  of  Free-Will  undoubtedly  involves  the 
repudiation  of  one  of  the  chief  arguments  for  the  spirituality 
of  the  soul;  whilst  by  subverting  the  notions  of  personal 
merit  and  responsibility  as  universally  accepted,  it  destroys 
the  principal  rational  ground  for  belief  in  a  future  life ;  and 
deprives  of  their  meaning,  as  we  have  seen,  many  of  the 
chief  ethical  notions  of  mankind.  Moreover,  since  presum- 
ably God  could  create  and  then  immediately  destroy  a 
spiritual  being  endowed  with  free-will,  it  does  not  seem 
impossible  that  "  a  temporary  spiritual  agent  "  might  enjoy 
"  spontaneity."  We  may  also  speak  of  a  volition  or  voluntary 
election  as  being  "free."  Nevertheless  the  argument  from 
free-will  retains  all  its  force.  A  volition,  or  an  act  of  choice,  is 
not  "  an  agent,"  but  ''the  act  of  an  agent,''  and  its  own  freedom 
consists  in  its  being  freely  exerted  by  that  agent.  Now, 
because  an  action  without  an  agent  is  unthinkable,  spiritualist 
philosophers  may  postulate  the  soul  as  the  cause  of  the  action. 
Further,  the  doctrine  of  Free-will  teaches  that  our  conscious- 
ness reveals  to  us  something  more  than  "Thoughts"  endowed 
with  "  spontaneity."  It  dwells  on  the  reality  of  deliberation, 
reflexion,  sustained  resistance  to  temptation,  on  responsibihty 
for  past  conduct — and  especially  on  the  rationality  of  remorse. 
But   these   experiences — on    some    of   which   James   himself 


FALSE   THEORIES   OF  THE   EGO.  485 

elsewhere  so  admirably  insists  (see  p.  401) — are  just  the  facts 
for  which  there  is  no  room  in  the  theory  that  makes  each 
passing  Thought  the  "  Self."  If  the  Soul  of  each  man  be  a 
real  individual  being  persisting  throughout  life,  which  has 
freely  acted  and  formed  good  or  bad  habits  in  the  past,  there 
is  an  intelligible  foundation  for  the  moral  convictions  of 
mankind.  But  if  "  the  only  verifiable  Thinker  "  be  the  passing 
Thought,  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to  see  the  justice  of  chas- 
tising the  present  "  pulsation  of  consciousness "  in  the 
Brockton  murderer,  for  a  malevolent  "  pulsation  "  long  since 
extinct ;  nor  why  the  present  "  pulsation  "  ought  to  repent  for 
its  wicked  predecessor  from  which  it  is  "  substantially 
different."  1=^ 

4.  Fortunately,  Professor  James  has  indicated  his 
own  metaphysical  creed  as  to  the  constitution  of  that 
something  *'  more  "  which  lies  behind  our  mental  states. 
This  helps  us  better  to  compare  the  value  of  the  doctrine 
of  a  spiritual  substantial  soul  with  other  final  explana- 
tions of  the  basis  of  our  mental  life.  "  For  my  own 
part,"  he  tells  us,  *'  I  confess  that  the  moment  I  become 
metaphysical  and  try  to  define  the  more,  I  find  the  notion 
of  some  sort  of  an  anima  mundi  thinking  in  all  of  us  to 
be  a  more  promising  hypothesis,  in  spite  of  all  its 
difficulties,  than  that  of  a  lot  of  absolutely  individual 
souls."  (Ibid.  p.  346.) 

Amongst  the  "  difficulties  "  of  this  "  more  promising 
hypothesis  "  we  would  suggest  the  following :  [a)  The 
complete  absence  of  all  evidence  whatsoever  of  the 
existence  of  such  an  anima  mimdi  or  world-soul.  Con- 
sciousness assures  us  of  the  reality  of  some  sort  of 
anima  or  mind  within  ourselves ;  and,  arguing  from 
analogy,  we  ascribe  a  similar  anima  to  other  organisms 
like  our  own.  But  obviously  in  the  case  of  the  material 
world  the  parity  totally  fails.  Nothing  more  unlike  a 
human  brain  or  a  living  organism  than  the  physical 
universe  could  well  be  conceived,  {b)  Again,  the  notion 
of  such   an  anima  mtmdi  is  incoherent  in  itself  and  in 

^2  James's  use  of  the  term  "verifiable,"  seems  at  times  to  imply 
that  nothing  is  to  be  admitted  as  real  by  the  psychologist  which  is 
not  apprehended  and  "verified"  by  some  particular  sense.  This 
was  Hume's  doctrine,  and  leads  to  absolute  scepticism  alike  in 
physics,  psychology,  and  metaphysics. 


486  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

conflict  with  all  that  we  actually  know  of  the  nature  of 
mind.  This  anima  mundi  is  vaguely  described  as  a 
universal  consciousness  thinking  in  each  one  of  us.  Of 
a  personal  consciousness  we  know  something ;  of  a 
universal  or  impersonal  consciousness  which  is  unaware 
of  itself,  or  of  the  various  persons  whom  it  may 
constitute,  we  can  frame  no  conception.  The  most 
essential  features  of  the  mind,  at  least  as  gathered  from 
experience,  are  its  tmity  and  individualistic  character.  It 
reveals  itself  to  us  as  ens  indivisum  in  se  sed  divisum  ab  omni 
alio — a  being  undivided  in  itself  but  separated  off  from 
all  other  beings.  What  kind  of  a  mind  or  soul  then  is 
that  which,  unconscious  of  itself,  is  split  up  into  a 
number  of  other  selves  each  unconscious  of  the  rest  ? 
{c)  The  h3^pothesis  which  interprets  our  conscious 
existence  as  merely  a  fragment  of  a  universal  mind, 
would  seem  to  be  a  formal  acceptance  of  Pantheism. 
It  implies  that  our  individuality  is  only  apparent.  It 
would  logically  be  forced  to  transfer  to  this  universal 
soul  the  responsibility  for  all  our  thoughts  and  volitions. 
Indeed,  in  this  theory  we  would  seem  to  have  little 
more  reality  or  personality  of  our  own  than  the  modes 
of  the  Divine  Substance  of  Spinoza.  But  we  must  not 
be  unjust  to  Professor  James.  We  feel  sure  from  his 
other  writings  that  he  would  repudiate  these  conclusions. 
He  believes  in  the  freedom  of  the  will ;  and  in  his  essay 
on  Human  Immortality,  he  seeks  to  find  place  for  a  future 
life;  though  we  fanc}^  few  will  be  satisfied  with  the  meta- 
physical speculations  by  which  it  is  supported. ^^ 

^^  His  view,  as  expressed  in  that  work,  seems  to  be  that  there 
exists  throughout  the  universe,  or  rather  behind  the  veil  of  matter, 
a  reservoir  of  universal  consciousness,  which  trickles  or  streams 
through  the  brain  into  living  beings,  somewhat  as  water  through  a 
tap,  or  light  through  a  half-transparent  lens.  Each  tap,  or  lens, 
shapes  or  colours  the  incoming  flow  of  thought  with  its  various 
individualistic  peculiarities,  "and  when  finally  a  brain  stops  acting 
altogether,  or  decays,  that  special  stream  of  consciousness  which  it 
subserved  will  ^'anish  entirely  from  this  natural  world.  But  the 
sphere  of  being  that  supplied  the  consciousness  would  still  be 
intact ;  and  in  that  more  real  world  with  which  even  whilst  here  it 
was  continuous,  the  consciousness  might,  in  ways  unknown  to  us, 
continue   still."   [Ibid.  pp.  37,   38.)     In  addition  to  the  difficulties 


PALSE   THEORIES  OF  THE  PGO.  487 

^H     11        M.i.        ■-■         -  ■         -  ■■        ■—  —  ■  ■  ■■-■.■■■■  ■  »        ■        ■■-■I-  .  .,.  „-  _         .1..—   -—  ,  .  -,. 

Double  Consciousness. — Mental  pathology,  fre- 
quently styled  Psychiatry,  has  recently  brought  into 
prominence  certain  abnormal  phenomena  of  memory 
and  self-consciousness,  which  from  their  connection 
with  the  philosophical  problem  of  personal  identity  have 
attracted  much  interest.  In  these  cases  of  so-called 
"double-consciousness"  or  "altered  personality,"  the 
unity  of  psychic  life  is  ruptured  and  two  or  more 
seemingly  dissociated  mental  existences  present  them- 
selves, sometimes  in  alternating  sections,  sometimes — it 
is  alleged — simultaneously  in  the  same  individual. 

The  celebrated  case  of  Felida  X.,  methodically  observed 
during  several  years  by  Dr.  Azam  of  Bordeaux,  will  illustrate 
the  general  character  of  the  phenomena.^^  Born  in  1843,  of 
hysterical  tendency,  she  enjoyed  normal  health  until  1857. 
During  that  3^ear  she  fell  into  a  swoon  which  lasted  only  a 
few  minutes ;  on  recovering  consciousness,  however,  her 
whole  character  seemed  changed.  The  original  Felida  is 
described  as  serious,  of  somewhat  morose  and  obstinate 
disposition,  unobservant,  and  of  mediocre  abilities,  but  excep- 
tionally industrious.  Felida  2,  on  the  contrary,  was  gay  and 
boisterous,  very  sensitive  and  pliant,  idle  yet  observant,  and 
of  seemingly  more  than  average  talents.  In  her  secondary 
state  Felida  could  remember  the  experiences  of  her  previous 
life,  and  otherwise  appeared  quite  normal.  After  some  months 
in  this  condition,  another  attack  restored  her  to  her  original 
state.  The  dulness,  sullenness,  and  habits  of  work  all 
suddenly  returned ;  but  there  was  complete  forgetfulness  of 
every  incident  which  had  occurred  since  her  former  fit.  For 
over  thirty  years  she  has  now  passed  her  life  in  alternate 
periods  of  her  primary  and  secondary  states.  In  the  "  second  " 
condition  she  retains  the  memory  of  both  states ;  but  during 

above  indicated  in  regard  to  the  absence  of  evidence,  and  the  inco- 
herence of  the  notion  of  such  a  universal  consciousness,  it  is 
sufficient  here  to  repeat  Mr.  James's  complaint  against  the  doctrine 
of  his  opponents  that  "  it  guarantees  no  immortahty  of  a  sort  we 
care  for."  It  is  in  the  perpetuity  of  our  own  personal  individual 
consciousness  that  each  of  us  is  primarily  interested,  not  in  that  of 
"  the  sphere  of  being  "  which  originally  provided  the  supply. 

^^  See  Revue  Scientifique,  May,  1876.  Felida's  history  down  to 
1887  is  also  given  by  Binet,  Alterations  of  Personality  (1892),  pp.  6 — 
21.  For  other  cases  see  also  Pierre  Janet,  L'Automatisme  psycholo- 
gique   (Edit.    1899),   pp.   70—130,  300—350;    and    James,   op.   cit, 

PP-  375—400- 


4^8  kATIO^^AL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

--  ■  —  —  -  -        -  ■  -  - 

the  "primary"  epochs  there  is  complete  amnesia  respecting 
the  "second."  Thus  Fehda  i  was  quite  unaware  of  even 
such  events  as  the  First  Communion  of  her  children  and  the 
death  of  her  sister-in-law,  which  occurred  during  the  "reign" 
of  Felida  2.  The  "  primary "  periods  are  consequently 
inconvenient  and  disagreeable  to  her,  and  as  time  has  gone 
on  the  duration  of  the  "  secondary "  intervals  has  come 
gradually  to  predominate.  They  now  form  her  normal  con- 
dition. Felida  has  thus  been  endowed  with  hvo  consciousnesses, 
one  of  which  is  "split  off"  from  the  other.  ]\I.  Binet's 
argument  runs  thus:  "Two  fundamental  elements  constitute 
personality — memory  and  character,"  but  in  Felida  there  is 
a  change  of  character  and  memory,  therefore  "  Felida  is 
really  two  moral  persons ;  she  has  really  two  Egos."  ^^ 

In  hypnotism  a  similar  phenomenon  is  produced  when  a 
"personality"  is  artificially  created  by  suggesting  to  the 
subject  that  he  or  she  is  some  other  personage.  Occasionally 
the  part  is  remembered  and  consistently  maintained  through- 
out successive  hypnoses,  although  the  experiences  of  the 
suggested  character  are,  it  is  alleged,  often  completely 
forgotten  during  the  waking  state.  In  fact,  the  deeper  forms 
of  the  hypnotic  trance  constitute  such  a  "secondary"  psychic 
existence  "  split  off"  from  the  main  current.  Natural  or 
spontaneous  somnambulism  gives  us  illustrations  of  the  same 
phenomenon. 

Besides  this  dnaMty  of  successive  consciousnesses  the  theory 
of  the  Doppel  Ich  advocated  by  Max  Dessoir  and  others, 
insists  upon  the  reality  of  at  least  two  simultaneous  conscious- 
nesses, each  held  together  by  its  own  chain  of  memories,  but 
"  split  off "  from  each  other.  Various  actions  usually  styled 
automatic  or  reflex  are  maintained  to  be  the  outcome  of  the 
"  secondary  consciousness."  The  power  of  distractedly 
following  a  consecutive  train  of  thought  whilst  reading  aloud, 
or  playing  an  instrument,  or  performing  other  complex  opera- 
tions, the  working  of  the  involuntary  inspiration  of  the  poet, 
abnormal  "  automatic  writing,"  the  struggle  between  reason 
and  appetite,  the  "  higher  "  and  "  lower  "  self,  as  well  as  all 
forms  of  sub-conscious  mental  activities  have  been  claimed  as 
evidence  of  the  reality  of  a  genuine  current  of  consciousness 
"split  off"  from  the  main  stream  and  lost  to  normal  memory. 
It  is  argued  from  these  various  groups  of  facts  that  the  old 
philosophic  conception  of  a  single  unchanging  Self  in  man 
must  be  abandoned,  that  self-consciousness  instead  of  being 
a  unity  is  really  multiple,  or  at  least  double  in  its  ultimate  con- 
stitution, and  that  our  seemingly  indivisible  personal  identity  is 

i^  Cf.  Binet,  op.  cit,  p.  So  and  p,  20. 


FALSE   THEORIES  OF   THE  EGO.  489 


merely  Si  fusion  of  diverse  factors.  As  M.  Binet  urges  :  "  What 
is  capable  of  division  must  be  made  up  of  parts.  If  a 
personality  becomes  double  or  triple  it  is  a  grouping  or 
resultant  of  many  elements. "^^ 

Criticism. — We  would  first  observe  that  the  more 
remarkable  cases  like  that  of  Felida  are  extremely  rare, 
and  that  theories  built  on  such  abnormal  and  obscure 
phenomena  are  necessarily  very  frail.  At  the  same 
time  we  allow  that  the  difficulty  is  not  solved  by  merely 
calling  such  cases  "  abnormal ;  "  and,  whilst  admitting 
the  obscurity  of  the  problem,  it  seems  to  us  that  the 
psychologist  is  bound  to  indicate  what  explanation  his 
principles  offer  for  such  facts,  when  these  are  duly 
authenticated.  Unfortunately  the  temptation  to  make 
such  histories  startling  by  exaggerating  their  abnormal 
aspect  betrays  itself  even  in  "  scientific "  reports. 
Thus  it  is  often  asserted  that  all  the  events  of  one  state 
are  completely  forgotten  in  the  other,  yet  further 
inquiry  discloses  that  a  mass  of  common  experience 
such  as  knowledge  of  the  meaning  of  language, 
familiarity  with  persons,  objects,  localities,  and  the  like, 
are  retained  in  both.  On  the  whole,  increased  care  in 
the  observation  of  these  cases  goes  to  connect  the  most 
extraordinary  with  the  normal,  and  also  seems  to  prove 
that  in  at  least  one  of  the  psychic  existences  portion 
of  the  experiences  of  the  other  are  remembered._  This 
fact  alone  would  prove  real  identity  of  the  person  in  both 
conditions.!'^ 

2.  With  respect  to  the  alleged  alterations  of  the 
"  self,"  we  must  recall  the  important  distinction  between 
the  abstract  notion  of  my  personality  and  the  perception 
of  my  concrete  self  already  dwelt  upon.  (P.  365.)  We 
there  pointed  out  that  besides  the  immediate  appre- 
hension of  self  as  present  in  our  mental  activities,  each 
of  us  possesses  a  habitual  representation  of  hiniself  in  the 
form  of  a  complex  conception  elaborated  by  intellectual 

i6  Op.  cit.  pp.  348,  349.  Similarly  Ribot :  "The  unity  of  the 
Ego  is  the  cohesion  of  the  states  of  consciousness."  {Les  Maladies  de 
la  Personalite,  ad  fin.) 

17  Cf.  Ladd,  Philosophy  of  Mind,  pp.  164—168. 


490  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

abstraction.  This  idea  presents  to  me  a  quasi  objective 
view  of  m3^self,  emphasizing  the  states,  experience,  and 
character  by  which  the  total  Ego  is  externally  dis- 
tinguished from  other  persons  rather  than  the  subject 
as  distinguished  from  these  states  themselves.  This 
objective  concept  of  self  as  an  individual  history  is 
based  on  memory.  Consequently  a  dislocation  of 
memory  will  mutilate  the  conception.  If,  then,  owing 
to  some  cerebral  malady  a  considerable  section  of  my 
past  life  is  lost  to  remembrance,  or  if  the  present  vivid 
pictures  of  the  imagination  are  confounded  with  recol- 
lections, the  habitual  representation  of  my  personality 
will  naturally  be  perverted.  This  truth  is  abundantly 
illustrated  in  patients  subject  to  "fixed  ideas,"  and  in 
incipient  stages  of  insanity.  In  such  cases  the  invalid 
interweaves  part  of  his  own  history  into  that  of  an 
imaginary  character,  yet  is  quite  sane  on  other  points, 
or  even  realizes  the  erroneous  character  of  his  delusion. 

3.  Variations  in  the  representation  of  our  personality  would 
thus  be  mainly  occasioned  by  perturbations  of  memory  ;  and 
the  mind's  power  of  remembrance  depends  on  the  state  of  the 
organism.  The  recurrence,  in  fact,  of  a  particular  set  of 
cerebral  conditions  may  either  re-instate  or  exclude  a  par- 
ticular group  of  recollections.  The  mental  changes  observed 
in  Feiida  and  hypnotized  subjects  may  therefore  be  accounted 
for  as  due  to  alterations  in  the  functioning  of  the  brain 
occasioned  during  the  transition.  Concerning  the  nature  of 
this  change  in  the  brain's  action  nothing  is  known.  Forty 
years  ago  it  was  conjectured  that  the  two  cerebral  hemi- 
spheres may  work  independently,  and  it  has  been  held  that 
the  functioning  of  one  side  corresponds  to  the  normal  Ego, 
whilst  that  of  the  other  is  correlated  with  the  "  secondary  " 
self.  This  hypothesis  has  been  especially  urged  with  respect 
to  the  curious  phenomenon  of  intelligent  unconscious  "  auto- 
matic "  writing.  This  rare  "  gift  "  has  been  ascribed  to  a 
"  subliminal "  or  sub-conscious  Ego  ;  but  seems  to  us  to  be 
more  scientifically  explained  as  the  product  of  semi-conscious 
and  reflex  action.  Post-mortem  examinations  have  undoubt- 
edly proved  that  one  half  of  the  brain  has  sometimes  sufficed 
for  normal  mental  life  ;  and  it  has  also  been  suggested  that 
other  particular  areas  of  the  brain  may  be  alternately  isolated 
or  inhibited ;  or  that  the  blood  supply  is  somehow  varied,  and 
so  sets  the  nervous   mechanism  in  different  gear.     Though 


FALSE   THEORIES   OF  THE  EGO.  491 


destitute  of  proof,  these  hypotheses  have  a  certain  plausibiUty. 
Something  of  the  kind  probably  happens  in  falHng  asleep  ; 
and  the  stories  of  dreams  and  somnambulistic  performances 
resumed  and  continued  during  successive  nights,  fit  in  with 
the  same  explanation.  In  fact,  several  of  the  chief  difficulties 
of  "double-consciousness"  have  been  always  familiar  to 
mankind  in  our  dream  experienced^ 

4.  Changes  of  character  are  of  various  degrees,  and  often 
seemingly  sudden.  They  are  simply  variations  in  the  abiding 
frame  of  mind  ;  and  are  consequently  much  influenced  by 
bodily  conditions.  The  complete  alteration  of  mental  tone 
by  bad  news,  by  a  bilious  attack,  or  by  a  couple  of  glasses  of 
champagne,  are  well  known.  In  cases  of  sudden  insanity  the 
change  in  moral  disposition  is  often  extraordinary ;  and  that 
the  alternate  set  of  cerebral  conditions  which  presumably 
succeed  each  other  in  FeUda  should  occasion  a  different 
emotional  and  volitional  tone  seems  natural  enough.  If  then 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  psychologist  to  seek  to  harmonize  irregular 
phenomena  with  normal  facts,  these  rare  specimens  of  mental 
Hfe  afford  no  justification  for  departing  from  the  old  universal 
conception  of  a  single  continuous  personality  in  man. 

5.  Professor  James  devotes  much  space  to  these  "  muta- 
tions "  of  the  Ego,  yet  overlooks  the  fact  that  they  are 
peculiarly  fatal,  not  to  his  adversaries,  but  to  his  own  theory 
that  "the  present  thought   is    the    only  thinker,"  and  that 

18  Hypotheses  of  locally  separated  brain  processes— attractive 
because  easy  to  the  imagination — seem  to  us  too  simple  and  crude 
for  the  facts.  The  physiological  concomitants  of  all  higher  mental 
operations  must  be  extremely  complex;  those  of  any  total  mental 
mood  must  be  both  complex  and  widely  diffused.  Organic  sensations 
are  important  factors  in  all  emotional  moods  ;  and  these  are  certainly 
conditioned  by  widely  diffused  neural  processes.  Further,  these 
alleged  multiple  "psychic  existences"  in  the  same  individual  in- 
variably overlap  and  fade  into  each  other.  According  to  Janet, 
Leonie  and  Lucie  have  three  "personalities"  and  Rose  "at  least 
four."  These  assuredly  cannot  be  all  isolated  and  distinct.  Conse- 
quently they  cannot  be  dependent  on  nervous  functionings  in 
anatomically  separate  regions  of  the  brain.  The  established  psycho- 
logical principle  that  a  total  frame  of  viiiid  fosters  recollections  and 
feelings  related  to  it  by  contiguity  or  congniity  inhibiting  those  not  so 
related  may  explain  much  if  we  conceive  these  alternating  "  person- 
alities "  as  cases  of  extremely  marked  "frames  of  mind"  exerting 
exceptionally  despotic  selective  power.  Such  abnormally  distinct 
and  enduring  mental  moods  would  involve  sets  of  neural  conditions 
of  unusually  distinct  character ;  but  we  think  their  mutations  are 
determined  by  alteration  in  the  quality  rather  than  in  the  locality  of 
nervous  processes, — that  the  basis  is  physiological  not  anatomical. 


492  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


seeming  identity  is  sufficiently  preserved  by  each  thought 
"  appropriating"'' and  "inheriting"  the  contents  of  its  pre- 
decessor. The  difficulties  presented  to  this  process  of 
inheritance  by  such  facts  as  sleep  and  swooning  have  been 
already  dwelt  upon  ;  but  here  they  are  if  possible  increased. 
The  last  conscious  thought  of,  say,  Felida  2  has  to  transmit 
its  gathered  experience  not  to  its  proximate  conscious 
successor,  which  is  Felida  i,  but  across  seven  months  of 
vacuum  until  on  the  extinction  of  Felida  i  the  next  conscious 
thought  which  constitutes  FeHda  2  is  born  into  existence.  If 
single  personality  is  hard  for  Mr.  James  to  explain,  "  double- 
personality  "  at  least  doubles  his  difficulties. 

6.  As  regards  the  asserted  duality  of  simultaneous  conscious- 
nesses ;  morahsts  from  St.  Paul  downward  have  insisted  upon 
the  reality  of  the  struggle  between  opposing  conscious 
activities  within  us — between  the  "  higher  "  and  the  "  lower  " 
self.  The  statements  that  "  reason  ought  to  rule  in  man," 
that  "  will  can  resist  appetite,"  that  "  man  is  in  great  part  an 
automaton,"  emphasize  the  two-fold  factor  in  conscious  life. 
Still  they  do  not  justify  or  make  intelligible  the  conception  of 
a  "  secondary  unconscious  consciousness  "  or  of  a  state  of 
consciousness  "  split  off  from  consciousness."  A  rivulet 
detached  from  the  main  current  of  a  river  remains  still  a 
stream  of  water ;  but  a  "  thread  of  consciousness"  excluded 
from  consciousness  is  no  longer  a  "thread  of  conscious- 
ness ; "  a.nd  such  phrases  if  intended  to  be  more  than 
a  loose  figurative  expression  are  misleading  and  unjusti- 
fiable. The  various  operations  ascribed  to  this  "  secondary 
consciousness "  are  best  accounted  for  as  either  faintly 
conscious  activities  or  reflex  and  automatic  processes  of  the 
animated  organism. 

Readings.— On  chapters  xxi.  xxii.,  cf.  St.  Thomas,  Sim.  i.  q.  75. 
On  scope  and  method,  cf.  Coconnier,  L'Anie  hiimaine,  c.  i.  ;  Ladd, 
Philosophy  of  Mind,  cc.  i.  ii.  On  substantiality  of  soul,  Rickaby, 
Metaphysics,  pp.  245—260;  Balmez,  Bk.  IX.  cc.  11,  12;  Kleutgen, 
op.  cit.  §§  791 — 807.  On  simplicity  and  spirituality,  Coconnier, 
ibid.  c.  iii. ;  Mercier,  Psychologic,  Pt.  III.  Art.  2,  sect,  i  ;  Farges, 
Le  Cerveau  et  VAme,  pp.  57 — 108.  On  double-consciousness,  Piat, 
La  Personne  humaine,  cc.  2,  3,  Farges,  op.  cit.  pp.  luS — 136;  Ladd, 
op.  cit.  c.  v. 


CHAPTER   XXIII. 

MONISTIC     THEORIES. 

Dualism  and  Monism. — Psychological  theories 
concerning  the  nature  of  man  and  the  relations  of 
body  and  mind  are  classed  as  Dualistic  and  Monistic. 
Dualism  teaches  that  Mind  and  Body  are  two  really 
distinct  principles;  whilst  Monism  maintains  that 
both  mental  and  corporeal  phenomena  are  merely 
different  manifestations  of  what  is  really  one  and 
the  same  Reality.  According  to  the  character  of  the 
opposition  and  mutual  independence  ascribed  to  the 
two  principles  by  different  thinkers  of  the  former 
school,  we  have  Ultra-Dualism  and  Moderate 
Duahsm.  To  the  previous  class  belong  Plato  and 
Descartes;  to  the  latter  Aristotle  and  the  leading 
Scholastics.  As  both  forms  of  dualism  agree  in 
teaching  the  spirituality  of  the  soul,  we  shall  defer 
further  comparison  of  them  for  the  present. 

Monism. — Of  Monistic  theories  there  are  three 
chief  types:  Monistic  Spintitalism  ox  Idealism;  Materialism; 
and  a  third  doctrine  which  has  been  variously  described 
as  the  Double-aspect  Theory,  the  Identity -Hypothesis,  the 
New  Spinozism,  and  also  simply  Monism,  There  is  rooted 
in  the  intellectual  nature  of  man  a  craving  for  the 
unification  of  knowledge,  for  the  reduction  of  facts  and 
truths  to  the  fewest  and  most  general  principles.  And 
we  ourselves  maintain  that  the  only  truly  satisfactory 
account  of  the  Universe  as  a  whole  is  Monistic — that 


494 


RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 


philosophical  system  which  derives  the  multiplicity  of 
the  world  from  a  single  indivisible  spiritual  principle, 
God.  But  the  present  question  is  not  the  origin  of  the 
Universe,  but  the  inney  constitution  of  the  individual 
human  being ;  and  the  attempts  to  ignore  the  essentially 
disparate  character  of  mind  and  matter,  and  to  reduce 
either  to  the  other,  or  to  identify  them  both  in  some 
inconceivable  tertium  quid  seem  to  us  among  the  most 
lamentable  perversions  of  a  rational  instinct  which  the 
history  of  philosophy  has  to  show. 

Spiritualist  Monism  or  Idealism.— This  theory 
overcomes  all  difficulties  as  to  the  relations  between 
body  and  mind  or  the  possibility  of  inter-action  between 
them  by  boldly  denying  the  reality  of  any  material 
substance  existing  in  itself  without  the  mind.  It  holds 
that  our  consciousness  of  mental  states  is  immediate  and 
primary,  whilst  our  assurance  as  to  the  reality  of  matter 
is  at  best  mediate  and  secondary.  It  insists  on  the  fact 
that  our  notions  of  substance,  cause,  energy,  and  the  like, 
are  all  in  the  first  place  derived  from  the  consciousness 
of  our  own  mental  activities,  and  that  in  the  final 
analysis  we  can  never  know  anything  about  the  nature 
of  matter  except  what  is  given  in  our  psychical  states. 
It  assumes  that  matter  could  not  act  upon  mind  ;  and 
finally  concludes  that  the  most  philosophical  course  is 
to  deny  all  extra-mental  reality  to  matter,  and  to  look 
upon  the  seemingly  independent  material  world  as  an 
illusory  creation  or  emanation  of  mind  itself.  But  the 
Monist  does  not  stop  here.  In  his  desire  for  unity  he 
does  not  merely  deny  real  being  to  matter,  he  asserts 
that  all  minds  are  in  realit}^  one — all  individual  conscious 
existences  being  but  w^avelets  surging  on  the  one 
ocean  of  Universal  Consciousness. 

Criticism. — As  opposed  to  the  Materialist  tlie 
Idealist  seems  to  us  impregnable.  Our  reasons  for  the 
rejection  of  Idealism,  which  are  not  available  by  the 
Materialist,  we  have  already  stated  (pp.  loo,  113 — 117)  ; 
so  we  can  merely  refer  the  reader  back  to  them 
here.  Against  the  Monistic  aspect  of  the  theory,  which 
denies  the  real  plurality  of  minds,  we  would  urge  in 
addition  :  (i)  The  complete  absence  of  proof — nay,  of 


MONISTIC  THEORIES.  495 


the  possibility  oi  proof.  (2)  Its  direct  conflict  with  our 
immediate  internal  experience.  My  own  individuality, 
my  real  oneness,  the  complete  insulation,  the  thorough 
exclusiveness  of  my  personality  are  the  best  attested 
and  the  most  fundamental  convictions  of  my  life.  If  I 
admit  the  existence  of  other  men  in  any  form,  I  must 
accept  their  testimony  to  the  same  experience  in  their 
own  case.  To  reject  this  clear  evidence  of  universal 
experience  for  the  sake  of  some  obscure  a  priori  postulate 
of  unity  is  irrational.  (3)  It  is  inconsistent  with  freedom 
and  responsibility.  If  all  finite  minds  are  but  phases 
or  moments  of  the  Absolute  Spirit,  possessing  no 
substantial  reality  of  their  own,  it  seems  impossible  that 
such  finite  spirits  can  be  guilty  or  the  Infinite  Spirit 
innocent  of  sin.  Some  idealistic  monists — Lotze,  for 
instance,  if  we  do  not  misunderstand  him — believe  they 
can  adopt  Monism  yet  evade  these  consequences.  Such 
a  course  seems  to  us  impossible.  It  is  only  by  changing 
the  meaning  of  words  and  inconsistently  allowing  real 
plurahty  of  beings  that  they  can  reconcile  their  systems 
with  the  ethical  convictions  of  mankind. 

Materialism.— Conveniently  assuming  that  experi- 
ence establishes  the  existence  of  the  brain  as  a 
permanent  extended  substance,  but  affords  no  evidence 
respecting  the  abiding  reality  of  the  mind,  the  materialist 
seeks  to  show  that  the  cerebral  substance  is  the  sole 
and  ultimate  cause  or  ground  of  all  our  conscious  states. 
Consciousness,  he  teaches,  is  a  property  of  matter, 
or  the  resultant  of  sundry  properties  of  material 
elements  combined  in  a  complex  manner.  The  pro- 
gress of  physiological  science  proves,  he  alleges,  more 
and  more  clearly  every  day  the  dependence  of  intel- 
lectual processes  on  neural  functions.  Moreover,  it 
is  impossible  to  imagine  how  conscious  states  can  act 
upon  matter  or  cause  bodily  movements  ;  whilst  the 
doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy  and  the  law  of  inertia 
are  incompatible  with  the  view  that  the  mind  is  an 
immaterial  being  exerting  a  real  agency  in  the  niaterial 
universe.  Such  is  the  general  argument  of  materialism  ; 
but  it  will  conduce  to  clearness,  if  we  examine  its  chief 
tenets  in  detail. 


496  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 


Thought  is  not  a  Secretion  of  the  Brain. — In  expositions  of 
the  coarser  forms  of  materialism  such  assertions  as  the  follow- 
ing have  been  boldly  put  forth:  "  Lrt  pensee  est  une  secretion 
du  cerveau:'  (Cabanis.)  "  There  subsists  the  same  relation 
between  thought  and  the  brain,  as  between  bile  and  the 
liver."  (Vogt.)  Moleschott  describes  thought  as  "  a  motion 
in  matter,"  and  also  as  a  "phosphorescence"  of  the  brain.i 
Other  philosophers  of  like  metaphysical  acumen  have  been 
found  to  proclaim  the  existence  of  the  soul  to  be  disproved, 
because  anatomy  has  not  revealed  it — the  "dissecting  knife  " 
having  never  yet  laid  it  bare. 

Writers  of  this  calibre  scarcely  deserve  serious  refutation. 
To  speak  of  thought  as  a  "secretion"  or  "movement"  of 
cerebral  matter  is  to  talk  deliberate  nonsense.  Thought  is 
essentially  unextended.  The  idea  of  virtue,  the  judgment  that 
two  and  two  must  equal  four,  the  emotion  of  admiration,  are 
by  their  nature  devoid  of  all  spatial  relations.  The  various 
secretive  organs  effect  movements  and  material  products.  Their 
operations  occupy  space;  and  the  resulting  substance  is 
possessed  of  resistance,  weight,  and  other  material  properties. 
The  process  and  the  product  can  be  apprehended  by  the 
external  senses ;  and  they  continue  to  exist  when  un- 
perceived.  Conscious  states  are  the  exact  reverse  in  all 
these  features.  The  microscope  has  never  detected  them. 
They  cannot  be  weighed,  measured,  or  bottled,  \yhen  not 
perceived  they  are  non-existent;  their  only  esse  is  percipi. 
Even  Herbert  Spencer  is  forced  to  admit,  "That  a  feeling 
has  nothing  in  common  with  a  unit  of  motion  becomes  more 
than  ever  manifest  when  we  bring  them  into  juxtaposition."  ^ 
Tyndall  acknowledged  the  same  truth  in  a  paragraph  often 
cited:  "The  passage  from  the  physics  of  the  brain  to  the 
corresponding  facts  of  consciousness  is  unthinkable.  Granted 
that  a  definite  thought  and  a  definite  molecular  action  in  the 
brain  occur  simultaneously,  we  do  not  possess  the  intellectual 
organ,  nor  apparently  any  rudiments  of  the  organ,  which 
would  enable  us  to  pass  by  a  process  of  reasoning  from  one 
to  the  other.  They  appear  together,  but  we  do  not  know 
why.  Were  our  minds  and  senses  so  expanded  as  to  enable 
us  to  see  and  feel  the  very  molecules  of  the  brain,  were 
we  capable  of  following  all  their  motions,  all  their  groupings 
and  electric  discharges,  if  such  there  be,  and  were  we 
intimately    acquainted    with    the    corresponding    states    of 

1  For  an  account  of  modern  German  Materialism,  cf.  Janet, 
Materialism  of  the  Present  Day,  c.  i.  ;  also  Margerie,  Philosophie  Con- 
temporaine,  pp.  191 — 226. 

''  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I.  §  62. 


MONISTIC   THEORIES.  497 


thought  and  feeHiig,  we  should  be  as  far  as  ever  from  the 
sohition  of  the  problem — '  How  are  these  physical  processes 
connected  with  the  facts  of  consciousness  ?  '  The  chasm 
between  the  two  classes  remains  still  intellectually  impas- 
sable." ^ 

Thought  is  a  not  a  Function  of  the  Brain. — In  a  scarcely  less 
crude  way  consciousness  is  sometimes  described  as  a.  function 
of  the  brain:  "There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  conscious- 
ness is  a  function  of  nervous  matter,  when  that  matter  has 
attained  a  certain  degree  of  organization,  just  as  we  know  the 
other  actions  to  which  the  nervous  system  ministers,  such 
as  reflex  action,  and  the  like,  to  be."  *  "  Thought  is  as  much 
a  function  of  matter  as  motion  is."  ^  The  use  of  the  term 
"function,"  however,  does  not  better  the  materiahst's  position 
with  any  reader  not  contented  with  payment  in  obscure  words. 
What  is  a  "  function  of  matter  "  ?  The  only  "  functions  "  of 
matter  of  which  physical  science  is  cognizant  consist  of 
movements  or  changes  in  matter.  Now,  thought,  as  we  have 
just  pointed  out,  is  nothing  of  this  sort.  If  we  employ  this 
word  at  all,  we  must  speak  of  intellectual  activity  as  a  function 
of  something  utterly  opposed  in  nature  to  all  known  subjects 
of  material  force.  When  mental  processes  are  at  work, 
movements  indeed  take  place  in  the  nervous  substance  of 
the  cerebrum,  and  it  is  accordingly  true  that  the  brain 
"functions"  and  expends  energy  whilst  we  think.  But 
neither  this  functioning  nor  the  energy  expended  constitutes 
thought.  As  Tyndfll  says,  the  "chasm"  between  the  two 
classes  of  facts  still  remains  "  intellectually  impassable." 

Thought  is  not  a  Resultant  of  material  forces. — Biichner, 
by  comparing  the  organism  with  the  steam-engine,  seeks  to 
prove  that  mental  life  is  merely  the  result  of  the  complexity 
and  variety  of  the  material  forces  and  properties  at  work  in 
the  former.  "Thought,  spirit,  soul,  are  not  material,  not  a 
substance,  but  the  effect  of  the  conjoined  action  of  many 
materials  endowed  with  forces  or  qualities.  .  .  .  In  the  same 
manner  as  the  steam-engine  produces  motion,  so  does  the 
organic  comphcation  of  force-endowed  materials  produce  in 
the  animal  body  effects  so  interwoven  as  to  become  a  unit, 
which  is  then  by  us  called  spirit,  soul,  thought.     The  sum 

3  Address  to  the  British  Association  at  Norwich.  Professor  Huxley 
has,  in  one  of  his  better  moments,  endorsed  this  doctrine.  (Cf. 
"  INIr.  Darwin  and  his  critics,"  Contcmp.  Rev.  Nov.  1871.)  But  the 
passage  tells  equally  against  the  "function"  view  of  the  ne.\t 
objection,  advocated  at  times  by  Mr.  Huxley  himself. 

■*  Prof.  ll\i\\ey,Cont£mp.  Rev.  Nov.  1871. 

^  Huxley,  Macmillan's  Magazine,  J^.Iay,  1S70. 

GG 


49S  NATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

of  these  effects  is  nothing  material ;  it  can  be  perceived  by 
our  senses  as  Uttle  as  any  other  simple  force,  such  as  magnet- 
ism, electricity,  etc.,  merely  by  its  manifestations.'"^ 

This  is  a  fair  example  of  the  random  methods  of  reasoning 
employed  by  materialists.  What  is  the  resultant  of  the 
aggregate  of  forces  accumulated  in  the  steam-engine  ?  It  is 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  movements  of  portions  of  matter, 
all  perceptible  by  the  external  senses.  If  the  engine  drags  a 
train,  we  may  speak  of  the  motion  of  the  latter  as  being  a 
single  effect,  but  the  occurrence  has  only  a  moral  or  meta- 
phorical unity.  It  is  really  a  series  of  events,  a  vast 
assemblage  of  parts  of  matter  moving  other  parts.  When 
we  turn  to  the  living  organism,  we  find,  indeed,  a  similar  set 
of  movements  and  displacements  of  matter,  but  we  find  also 
in  addition  to  these  physical  occurrences,  and  differing  from 
them,  as  Mr.  Spencer  says,  "  by  a  difference  transcending  all 
other  differences,"  the  very  phenomenon  to  be  explained, 
"  spirit,  soul,  thought."  Granting,  then,  for  the  sake  of  argu- 
ment, similarity  between  the  material  forces  collected  in  the 
steam-engine  and  in  the  human  body,  at  most  the  legitimate 
inference  would  be  that  the  various  movements  and  organic 
changes  observable  in  the  body  were  the  outcom.e  of  its 
material  energy ;  but  there  is  not  a  shadow  of  a  reason  for 
attributing  the  distinctly  new  phenomenon  of  consciousness 
to  that  energy.  In  the  final  sentence  another  piece  of  con- 
fused and  inconsistent  thinking  is  introduced.  Thought  is 
there  likened  to  the  *^  simple  forces,  magnetism  and  electricity." 
But  the  only  known  manifestations  of  electricity  and  magnet- 
ism consist  in  the  production  of  movement.  Consciousness, 
however,  is  revealed  in  a  different  way.  Of  the  nature  of 
electricity  or  magnetism  as  a  simple  force  we  know  nothing. 
The  word  is  merely  an  abstract  term  to  denote  the  unknown 
cause  of  a  certain  species  of  movements  coming  under 
external  observation.  On  the  other  hand,  of  mental  states 
we  have  immediate  internal  experience;  and  that  experience 
discloses  conscious  life  as  centred  in  one  single  being,  in  a 
peculiar  indivisible  unity  utterly  repugnant  to  the  composite 
nature  of  a  material  subject.^ 


♦*  Kraft  iind  Stojf  (Trans.),  pp.  135,  136. 

''  "  Fifty  million  molecules,  even  when  they  are  highly  complex 
and  unstable  phosphorized  compounds,  gyrating  in  the  most 
wonderful  fashion  with  inconceivable  rapidity,  certainly  do  not 
constitute  one  thing.  They  do  not,  then,  by  molecular  constitution 
and  activities,  constitute  a  physical  basis  conceivable  as  a  represen- 
tative or  correlate  of  one  thing."  (Ladd,  Phys.  Psychology,  p.  595.) 


/ 


MONISTIC  THEORIES.  499 

Unknown    Properties  of  Matter.— Against  the 

spirituality  of  the  principle  of  thought,  it  was  objected 
by  Locke  that  matter  has  a  great  variety  of  wonderful 
and  unlike  properties,  that  our  knowledge  of  these  is 
still  very  limited,  and,  consequently,  that  we  are  not 
justified  in  asserting  that  matter  could  not  be  the 
subject  of  intellectual  activity.  He  also  says  this  state- 
ment is  derogatory  to  the  Divine  power,  implying  that 
God  Himself  could  not  endow  matter  with  the  faculty 
of  thought.  We  most  readily  admit  our  knowledge  of 
matter  to  be  still  very  inadequate ;  and  we  allow  that 
matter  possesses  many  unlike  qualities.  But  it  is  not 
from  mere  dissimilarity  in  character  subsisting  between 
mental  and  material  phenomena — although  this  dis- 
similarity "  transcends  all  other  differences" — that  we 
infer  a  distinct  principle.  It  is  from  the  absolute 
contrariety  in  nature  which  sets  them  in  opposition. 
In  spite  of  the  imperfect  condition  of  our  acquaintance 
with  matter,  we  can  affirm  with  absolute  certainty  that 
some  new  properties,  e.g.,  self-motion,  can  never  be  dis- 
covered in  it.  It  is,  too,  no  reflexion  on  the  power  of 
God  to  say  that  He  cannot  effect  a  metaphysical  im- 
possibility, such  as  the  endowment  of  an  extended 
substance  with  the  indivisible  spiritual  activity  of  self- 
consciousness  would  be. 

Dependence  of  Mind  on  Body. — The  spirituality 
of  the  soul,  it  is  said,  is  disproved  by  the  absolute 
dependence  of  mental  life  on  bodily  conditions — a 
dependence  more  effectively  established  by  Physiology 
and  Pathology  each  succeeding  year.  We  find,  it  is 
asserted,  that  intellectual  abihty  varies  in  proportion  to 
the  size  of  the  brain,  its  weight,  the  complexity  of  its 
convolutions,  and  the  intensity  of  its  phosphorescent 
activity.  Mental  powers  develop  concomitantly  with 
the  growth  of  the  brain,  and  similarly  deteriorate  with 
its  decay  or  disease  :  "  The  doctrine  of  two  substances, 
a  material  united  with  an  immaterial,  .  .  .  which  has 
prevailed  from  the  time  of  Thomas  Aquinas  to  the 
present  day,  is  now  in  course  of  being  modified  at  the 
instance  of  modern  Physiology.  The  dependence  of 
purel}^    intellectual    operations    such    as    nicinory   upon 


k 


500  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

material  processes  has  been  reluctantly  admitted  by  the 
partisans  of  an  immaterial  principle,  an  admission  in- 
compatible with  the  isolation  of  the  intellect  in  Aristotle 
and  Aquinas.  .  .  .  Of  the  mind  apart  from  the  body  we 
have  no  direct  experience  and  absolutely  no  knowledge. 
...  In  the  second  place,  we  have  every  reason  to 
believe  that  there  is  in  company  with  all  our  mental 
processes  an  nnhvoken  material  succession.'"^  This  argu- 
ment in  behalf  of  Materialism  gains  much  of  its  weight 
with  many  minds  from  the  belief  that  those  who 
formerly  defended  the  spirituality  of  the  soul  conceived 
it  as  an  independent  entity  standing  out  of  all  relations 
to  the  body.  The  allusion  to  St.  Thomas  in  the  passage 
just  quoted  is  an  expression  of  this  belief.  Recent 
advances  in  physiological  knowledge,  it  is  imagined, 
have  disproved  this  supposed  mutual  isolation  of  the 
two  substances,  consequently  the  inference  is  that 
modern  science  has  rendered  untenable  the  spirituality 
of  the  soul. 

Criticism. — Now,  in  the  first  place,  this  historical  theory  is 
utterly  false.  It  is  mainly  since  the  rebellion  against  Scholas- 
ticism, inaugurated  by  Descartes,  that  this  exaggerated 
antagonism  between  soul  and  body  has  been  advocated  by 
anti-materialist  thinkers.  The  central  idea  of  the  Peripatetic 
Psychology,  as  expounded  by  every  leading  writer,  from 
Albert  the  Great  to  Suarez,  is  the  conception  of  the  soul  as 
substantial  form  of  the  body — a  view  which  implies  tlie  most 
intimate  union  and  interdependence  between  these  two  co- 
efficient principles  of  man. 

Consequently,  so  far  from  ignoring  or  admitting  "  with 
reluctance"  the  influence  of  bodily  conditions  on  mental 
operations,  the  greatest  emphasis  is  laid  upon  the  fact,  as 
any  one  possessed  of  an  elementary  acquaintance  with 
the  writings  of  St.  Thomas  or  any  other  scholastic,  on  the 
appetites,  imagination,  sense-perception,  memory,  and  the 
passions,  must  know.  Mediseval  philosophers  were  just  as 
well  aware  as  our  wise  men  of  to-day  that  age,  bodily  fatigue, 
the  processes  of  digestion,  disease,  stimulants,  and  the  like, 
affect  our  mental  operations ;  and  in  taking  these  into  account 
they  had  to  meet  by  anticipation  every  difficulty  that  has  or 
can  be  raised  from  the  physiological  quarter.  Pliysiology  ha& 
brought  to  light  no  facts  of  essentially  novel  significance  in 

^  Bain,  Mmd  and  Body,  p,  130 ;   cf.  ISIaudsley,  op.  cit.  c.  ii. 


MONISTIC  THEORIES.  501 


their  bearing  on  this  problem.  It  has,  indeed,  given  us  a 
better  knowledge  of  the  material  structure  of  the  brain  and 
nervous  system,  and  of  the  occurrence  of  special  processes 
there  in  conjunction  with  mental  states;  but  the  general 
principle  of  interdependence  between  mind  and  bod}',  illus- 
trated in  such  facts,  was  forced  on  the  human  intellect  in  its 
very  earliest  attempts  at  psychological  speculation.  Moreover, 
it  ill  becomes  Cerebral  Physiology,  which  is  still  in  a  very 
backward  state,  to  dogmatize  in  this  fashion.'-^ 

In  the  next  place,  assuming  for  the  moment  that  all  the 
assertions  regarding  the  intimate  relations  between  neural 
conditions  and  mental  life  were  accurately  true,  and  in  no 
way  exaggerated,  how  would  this  prove  more  than  an  extrinsic 
dependence  of  the  soul  on  the  body  which  it  enlivens  ?  "  For, 
suppose  for  an  instant  that  human  thought  was  of  such  a 
nature  that  it  could  not  exist  without  sensations,  without 
images  and  signs  (I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  no  kind  of 
thought  other  than  this  is  possible) ;  suppose,  I  repeat,  that 
such  were  the  conditions  of  human  thought,  is  it  not  evident 
that  a  nervous  system  would  be  then  required  to  render 
sensation  possible,  and  a  nervous  centre  to  render  possible 
the  concentration  of  sensations,  the  formation  of  signs  and  of 
images  ?  According  to  that  hypothesis,  the  brain  would  be 
the  organ  of  imagination  and  of  language,  without  which 
there  would  be  no  thought  for  the  human  mind."^*^  In  such  a 
case — and  this  is  precisely  the  theory  of  St.  Thomas — what- 
ever affects  the  organ  or  instrument  of  the  mind  will  naturall}' 
modify  mental  operations.     Now  we  have  shown  (c.xiv)  how 

^  Of  the  theory  of  certain  scientists,  "that  all  mental  pheno- 
mena, whatever  their  varied  characteristic  shading,  have  exact 
equivalents,  as  it  were,  in  specific  forms  of  the  nerve-commotion  of 
the  living  brain,"  Professor  Ladd  remarks:  "  Our  first  impression 
on  considering  the  foregoing  way  of  accounting  for  mental  pheno- 
mena is  that  of  a  certain  surprising  audacity.  The  theory,  standing 
on  a  slender  basis  of  real  fact,  makes  a  leap  into  the  dark  which 
carries  it  centuries  in  advance  of  where  the  light  of  modern  research 
is  now  clearly  shining."  He  shows  that  even  in  such  comparatively 
simple  problems  as  the  determination  of  the  physiological  con- 
ditions of  variations  in  the  quantity,  quality,  and  time-rate  of 
sensation,  "  almost  everything  needed  for  an  exact  science  of  the 
relations  of  the  molecular  changes  in  the  substance  of  the  brain 
and  the  changes  in  the  states  of  consciousness  is  lamentably 
deficient ;  "  whilst  as  regards  the  neural  conditions  of  spiritual  acts, 
such  as  the  conviction  of  the  principle  of  causality,  or  the  idea  of 
substance,  he  shows  that  science  must  remain  in  absolute  ignorance. 
(Cf.  Physiological  Psychology,  pp.  592 — 597.) 

^^  Janet,  Materialism  of  the  Present  Day,  p.  134. 


502  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

intellect  requires  as  an  essential  condition  the  operations  of 
sense  and  imagination,  and  is  therefore  extrinsically  dependent 
for  its  materials  on  these  organic  faculties.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  study  of  the  character  of  its  activity  (c.  xii.)  has  also 
proved  to  us  that  the  spiritual  power  transcends  the  material 
order,  and  that  this  power  is  in  its  nature  essentially  and 
intrinsically  independent  of  matter.  The  continuity  of  the 
organic  process,  if  proved,  would  be  accounted  for  by  the 
exercise  of  the  imaginative  faculty,  which  the  intellect  requires 
as  a  condition  of  its  operation.  That  neither  imagination  nor 
organic  memory  are,  as  Bain  implies,  intellectual  activities, 
must  have  been  evident  frorri  the  earlier  part  of  this  work. 

In  answer  to  the  sage  observation  that  we  never  find  mind 
apart  from  the  body,  it  is  sufficient  to  reply  that  concomitance 
does  not  prove  identity,  and  that  at  all  events  we  often  find 
body  without  mind.  Whenever  we  meet  with  a  new  group  of 
properties  or  effects  incapable  of  being  accounted  for  by 
previously  known  causes,  we  are  bound,  according  to  the 
universally  recognized  canons  of  physical  science,  to  assume 
a  new  cause  for  these  phenomena.  As  regards  the  part  of  the 
difficulty  which  lays  stress  on  the  relations  between  the 
character  of  the  brain  as  a  whole  and  intellectual  ability, 
whilst  we  readily  admit  that  the  vastly  superior  mental 
faculties  of  man  would  lead  us  to  anticipate  in  his  case  a 
more  perfect  instrument  than  is  to  be  found  in  the  brute 
kingdom,  it  is  worthy  of  notice  that  science  has  as  yet 
completely  failed  to  assign  any  distinct  property  of  man's 
brain  by  which  his  intellectual  superiority  is  marked. ^^ 

11  "  Since  evidently  the  absolute  weight  of  the  brain  cannot  be  the 
measure  of  intelligence,  because  if  so  the  elephant  and  the  whale 
ought  to  excel  the  greatest  human  genius,  therefore  refuge  has  been 
taken  in  greater  relative  weight.  .  .  .  Since  again  in  this  respect  man 
is  surpassed  by  several  of  the  smaller  birds  {e.g.,  the  titmouse),  and 
the  adult  by  the  child,  the  multiplicity,  complexity,  and  thickness 
of  the  convolutions  on  the  surface  of  the  brain  are  to  afford  the 
solution.  But  since  on  this  principle  the  ox  ought  to  distinguish 
itself  by  mental  capacity,  appeal  is  made  to  the  chemical  constitution 
of  the  cerebral  substance,  and  the  excellence  of  man's  intellect 
attributed  to  the  richress  of  his  brain  in  phosphorus  ;  but  here  again 
the  superiority  of  the  human  cerebrum  is  disputed  by  two  pro- 
verbially stupid  animals,  the  sheep  and  the  goose."  (Gutberlet, 
Psychologie,  p.  255.)  On  the  relative  weight,  size,  etc.,  of  brains, 
cf  Ladd,  op.  cit.  Pt.  II.  c.  i.  ;  also  Surbled,  Le  Cerveau,  cc.  iv. — xii. 
The  latter  writer  gives  some  very  interesting  statistics  on  this  point. 
Thus,  the  average  cubic  capacity  of  Parisian  skulls — which  are 
larger  than  those  of  most  European  nations — is  estimated  to-day 
at  about  i,559ec,  whilst  six   skulls  of  "Cave-men,"  assigned  to  the 


MONISTIC   THEORIES.  503 


Man  not  a  Conscious  Automaton. — All  Material- 
ists necessaril)^  teach  that  conscious  states  can   never 
condition  or  determine  bodily  movements,  but  Dr.  Shad- 
ivorth  Hodgson  was,  we  believe,  the  first  frankly  to 
admit  the  still  more  incredible  consequence  that  states 
of  consciousness  never  condition,  determine,  or  modify 
£ach  other.     "  There  is  real  action  and  reaction  between 
organs  and  parts  of  organs  in  a  nervous  system,  as  well 
as  between  nerve  and  other  parts  of  the  organism  and 
between  nerve  and  external  stimuli ;  but  there  is  no  real 
reaction  of  consciousness  upon  nerve,  and  no  real  action  and 
reaction  of  states  of  consciousness  npon  each  othev.''^-     Again, 
^'  Process-contents  of  consciousness  do  not  stand  in  any 
relation  of  real  conditioning  to  one  another.     It  is  not 
pleasure  or  pain^  for  instance,  which  conditions  desire  or 
aversion ;    nor   is   it   desire  which   conditions    volition    or 
reasoning  ;  but  the  neural  or  cerebral  actions  which  condition 
the  antecedents  condition  in  their  continuation  the  con- 
sequents also."^^     To  make   his  meaning   quite  clear, 
Mr.  Hodgson  takes  the  example  of  a  man  turning  aside 
to   avoid    a   wheelbarrow.     The  old-fashioned   view  is 
•*' that  the  state  of  consciousness  is   a  really  operative 
link  in  the  chain  of  events."     This  is  a  delusion.     The 
true  positive  explanation  is  that  the  physical  impression 
on  the  retina  determines  the  nervous  processes  which 
result  in  the  appropriate  movement.     The  mental  state 
is  a  mere  epiphenonienon.     "  Throughout  the  process  con- 

Pala2olithic  period,  average  i,6o5cc,  and  a  collection  of  skulls  of 
ancient  Gauls  reach  i,592cc-  This  does  not  seem  very  favourable 
to  Evolution.  Again,  as  regards  the  weight  of  the  brain  :  Cuvier 
used  to  be  triumphantly  cited  by  materialists,  as  an  example  of 
great  intellect,  due  to  a  very  heavy  brain — 1,830  grammes  (about 
4  lbs.).  The  average  British  brain  is  about  1,400  grammes  (3  lbs.). 
But  in  recent  times  cases  of  brains  exceeding  that  of  Cuvier  have 
been  found  combined  with  very  moderate  abilities.  A  still  more 
surprising  fact  is  that  Gambetta,  whose  mental  gifts  French  mate- 
rialists, at  all  events,  will  be  the  last  to  deny,  was  possessed  of 
actually  only  1,160  grammes  (aj^  lbs.)  of  cerebral  material,  an 
endowment  inferior  to  that  of  the  lowest  tribes  of  savages.  Un- 
doubtedly, great  intellectual  power  is,  as  a  rule,  accompanied  by 
a  large  brain,  but  there  are  very  serious  exceptions  to  the  law. 

J2  Cf.  The  Metaphysic  of  Experience  (189S),  Vol.  II.  p.  283. 

13  Op.  cit.  Vol.  I.  p.  446. 


504  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

sciousness  is  initiated  by  and  depends  on  nerve-motion 
and  not  vice  versa.  .  .  .  (The  opposite  view)  would 
involve  the  assumption  that  at  some  point  or  other  of 
the  process,  either  consciousness  began  to  act  as  a  real 
condition  (having  previously  been  a  conditionate  onl}'),. 
or  an  immaterial  agent,  which  had  previously  been 
dormant,  was  roused  to  activity.  But  neither  alterna- 
tive is  positively  conceivable  ;  neither  of  them  has  any 
observed  facts  in  its  favour.  On  the  other  hand,  we  can 
render  all  the  phenomena  positively  intelligible  on  the 
hypothesis  of  neural  action  above  set  forth. "^^ 

Dr.  Hodgson  is  the  ablest  and  most  consistent  exponent 
of  psychological  materialism  at  the  present  day ;  but  his 
candid  acceptance  of  the  consequences  of  that  theory  seems 
to  us  to  provide  as  perfect  a  reductio  ad  absiirdtim  as  we  need 
desire.  Were  the  avoiding  of  present  visible  obstacles  the 
only  operations  to  be  accounted  for,  the  comparatively 
simple  psychical  and  physical  processes  involved  mighty 
perhaps,  as  in  the  case  of  reflex  action,  be  thus  mechanically 
explained.  But  a  little  reflexion  suggests  problems  which  it 
will  require  considerable  courage  to  solve  in  this  fashion. 
Thus  :  When  the  novelist  is  thinking  out  his  plot,  or  the 
detective  is  striving  to  piece  together  the  fragmentary  clues 
of  a  hidden  crime,  does  no  idea,  feeling,  or  desire  which  wakes 
up  within  him  exert  any  influence  on  his  subsequent  mental 
states  ?  Do  his  thoughts  never  "  stand  in  any  relation  of  real 
conditioning  to  one  another  ?  "  When  we  say  that  the  con- 
sciousness of  having  received  a  deliberate  insult  has  excited 
anger  and  hatred  which  generated  an  implacable  desire  of 
revenge,  and  that  this  motive  instigated  the  plotting  and  com- 
mitting of  a  cunningly  contrived  murder,  is  our  language 
throughout  purely  mythological  ?  Is  it  possible  to  believe  that 
the  feeling  of  the  insult  has  itself  contributed  nothing  towards 
arousing  the  hatred,  nor  this  passion  towards  planning  of  the 
revenge  ?  Does  the  apprehension  of  the  premisses  of  a 
syllogism  play  no  real  part  in  eliciting  the  inference  ?  If 
materialism  be  true,  Dr.  Hodgson's  conclusion  is  inevitable; 
the  neural  antecedents  and  they  alone  condition  the  neural 
consequents,  the  incidental  phenomena  of  a  conscious  state 
which  happened  to  accompany  the  former  have  no  influence 
upon  the  incidental  phenomena  accompanying  the  latter. 
Unless  we  accept  this  conclusion,  we  are  told  we  must  admit 
that  consciousness  is  really  active  or  that  "  an  immaterial 

1^  Vol.  II.  pp.  315—318. 


MONISTIC   THEORIES.  505 


agent  which  had  previously  been  dormant  was  roused  to 
activity."  We  are  glad  to  see  the  inevitable  alternative  so 
clearly  and  so  candidly  stated.  The  doctrine  of  an  immaterial 
soul  is  surrounded  with  obscurities  and  difficulties  which  it 
would  be  foolish  to  ignore  or  to  seek  to  conceal.  We 
certainly  cannot  picture  a  soul  by  the  imagination  ;  still  less 
can  we  imagine  Jioii'  it  acts  on  the  body,  or  Jww  mental  acts 
and  nervous  processes  influence  each  other.  But  it  is 
indifferent  logic  to  deny  the  reality  of  an  event  because  we 
cannot  imagine  the  mode  of  its  occurrence ;  and  the  inability 
of  our  imagination  to  conceive  the  nature  of  immaterial 
agency  is  a  frail  reason,  indeed,  upon  which  to  reject  the 
doctrine  of  a  spiritual  soul  and  embrace  a  system  of 
materialism  that  makes  such  astounding  demands  upon  our 
powers  of  faith. 

Monism. — The  most  serious  assault,  however, 
which  at  present  is  being  directed  against  the  doctrine 
of  a  spiritual  soul  and  luture  life  is  that  of  Monism 
proper.  In  its  best  known  forms  this  metaphysical 
h3'pothesis,  for  it  is  essentially  a  metaphysical  conception, 
has  been  styled  the  Double- A  sped  Theory  and  the  Identity- 
hypothesis,  because  of  its  maintainmg  that  mental  states 
and  the  concomitant  nerve-changes  are  simply  different 
"  aspects "  of  one  and  the  same  being.  It  has  been 
called  the  Ne7£>  Spinozism  from  its  affinity  to  the  meta- 
physical theory  of  the  father  of  Modern  Pantheism  ; 
and  it  has  also  been  termed  the  doctrine  of  Psycho- 
physical parallelism  from  its  denial  of  all  interaction 
between  the  psychical  and  the  physical  processes  which 
take  place  in  the  living  being.  This  doctrine  of 
pavallelisvi  might,  of  course,  be  united  with  a  meta- 
physical theory  of  Dualism,  as  in  the  systems  of  Descartes 
and  Leibnitz  ;  indeed,  it  is  to  Dualism  it  naturally 
points,  but  now-a-days  it  is  generally  employed  in  the 
interests  of  Monism  for  the  purpose  of  describing  the 
supposed  relations  of  bodily  and  mental  states.  Marked 
by  important  differences  in  the  hands  of  its  various 
exponents,  Monism,  in  all  its  forms,  adheres  to  the 
cardinal  tenet  that  Mind  and  Body  are  not  two  distinct 
realities  hut  merely  two  ''aspects,'"  ''sides,"  or  " phases"  of 
one  being,  and  that  there  is  no  real  interaction  betivcen  mental 
cind   bodily   states.     W.    K.    Clifford,    A.    Bain,    Herbert 


5o6  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

Spencer,  Huxley,  and  among  recent  psychologisls,  Pro- 
fessor Hoffding,  are  among  the  best  known  advocates  ot 
this  theory  ;  so  we  shall  sketch  and  briefly  examine 
their  views. 

The  term  Mind-stuff  was  invented  by  Clifford  to 
denote  the  material  out  of  which  he  asserts  that  human 
minds  are  formed.  According  to  him  there  is  attached 
to  every  particle  of  matter  in  the  universe  a  bit  of 
rudimentary  feeling  or  intelligence.  When  the  molecules 
of  matter  come  together  in  certain  forms  and  propor- 
tions, the  attached  atoms  of  mental  life  fuse  into  a 
complete  self-conscious  mind.^^  Neither  the  molecules 
of  matter,  however,  nor  the  appended  morsels  of  mind 
can  have  any  influence  on  the  other.  At  least,  this  is 
Clifford's  doctrine  at  times:  "The  physical  facts  go 
along  by  themselves,  and  the  mental  facts  go  along  by 
themselves.  There  is  a  parallelism  between  them,  but 
there  is  no  interference  of  one  with  the  other."  ^"^ 

The  only  arguments  suggested  in  defence  of  these 
doctrines  are  the  assertions:  (i)  that  Physiology  has 
established  an  absolute  and  complete  parallclisni  between 
psychical  and  physical  facts  ;  (2)  that  physics  has  proved 
the  impossibility  of  any  mutual  interaction  between  them  ; 
and  (3)  lastly,  the  fact  that  Clifford's  view  is  essential 
to  the  theory,  that  all  of  us,  both  mind  and  body,  have 
been  developed  out  of  inferior  organic  forms  and 
ultimately  out  of  inorganic  matter.  Thus  in  his  own 
words:  "The  only  thing  that  we  can  come  to,  if  we 
accept  the  doctrine  of  Evolution  at  all,  is  that,  even  in 
the  very  lowest  organisms,  even  in  the  amoeba  w^hich 
swims  in  our  own  blood,  there  is  something  or  other 

15  ..  When  molecules  are  so  combined  as  to  form  the  film  on 
the  under-side  of  a  jelly-fish,  the  elements  of  mind-stuff  which  go 
along  with  them  are  so  combined  as  to  form  the  faint  beginnings  of 
sentience.  When  the  molecules  are  so  combined  as  to  form  the 
brain  and  nervous  system  of  a  vertebi-ate,  the  corresponding 
elements  of  mind-stuff  are  so  combined  as  to  form  some  kind  of 
consciousness.  .  .  .  When  matter  takes  the  complex  form  of  the 
living  human  brain,  the  corresponding  mind-stuff  takes  the  form  of 
human  consciousness,  having  intelligence  and  volition."  [Lectures 
and  Essays,  2nd  Edit.  p.  284  ;  also  Mind,  Vol.  III.  pp  64,  65.) 

^8  Op.  cit.  p.  262. 


MONISTIC   THEORIES.  507 

inconceivably  simple  to  us,  which  is  of  the  same  nature 
with  our  consciousness,  although  not  of  the  same  com- 
plexity, that  is  to  say  (for  we  cannot  stop  at  organic 
matter,  hnoivins^  as  we  do  that  it  must  have  arisen  by 
continuous  physical  processes  out  of  inorganic  matter), 
we  are  obliged  to  assume,  in  order  to  save  continuity  in 
our  belief,  that  along  with  every  motion  of  matter, 
whether  organic  or  inorganic,  there  is  some  fact  which 
corresponds  to  the  mental  fact  in  ourselves."  (Op.  cit. 
p.  266.) 

Defenders  of  a  spiritual  philosophy  are  not  necessarily 
opposed  to  Evolution,  when  that  hypothesis  is  properly 
limited  and  defined :  but  Clifford's  statement  that  -we 
know  all  living  beings  "  must  have  arisen  by  continuous 
physical  processes  out  of  inorganic  matter,"  is  almost 
amusing  for  its  audacity.  It  is,  of  course,  simply  the 
reverse  of  the  truth.  An  overwhelming  weight  of 
scientific  evidence  and  authority  establishes  the  fact 
that  life  is  never  evolved  from  inorganic  matter.  Even 
scientists  as  unlikely  to  be  prejudiced  against  the 
doctrine  of  abiogenesis  as  Huxley  and  Tyndall  are 
forced  to  confess  that  evidence  of  a  single  case  of 
spontaneous  generation  has  never  yet  been  adduced. 
As  regards  the  other  arguments,  we  may  for  the  present 
merely  call  attention  to  the  truth  that  even  were  com- 
plete parallelism,  in  the  sense  of  reciprocal  correspond- 
ence between  every  form  of  mental  state  and  definite 
neural  processes,  fully  demonstrated — hopeless  though 
the  prospect  of  this  result  be — nothing  would  have  yet 
been  effected  towards  the  reduction  of  mental  activity 
to  a  mere  appendage  of  such  nervous  changes.  As  for 
the  statement,  that  science  has  proved  the  non-inter- 
ference of  the  two  sets  of  phenomena,  it  is  both  false  in 
itself  and  in  conflict  with  Clifford's  own  teaching  on 
other  occasions,  and  with  that  of  the  school  to  which  he 
belongs.  The  majority  of  that  school  teach  that  bodily 
processes,  at  all  events,  determine  changes  in  our 
mental  states. 

Dr.  Bain  does  not  appear  to  go  quite  so  far  as  Clifford. 
Mental  life  in  man  he  considers  to  be  a  "  subjective  aspect " 
of  bodily  changes ;    but  that  there  are  *' subjective  aspects" 


5o»  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

attached  to  all  movements  of  every  kind  of  matter  he  has  not 
the  courage  to  assert.  This  position,  of  course,  leaves  on 
liis  hands  the  awkward  difficult}- — why  should  this  very  curious 
"  vSubjective  aspect,"  of  which  there  is  no  trace  in  the  rest  of 
the  material  world,  suddenly  manifest  itself  in  the  case  of 
those  portions  of  the  universe  which  we  call  living  beings  ? 
To  atone,  however,  for  the  deficiency  just  mentioned,  he  is 
vigorous  enough  in  insisting  that  mental  life  is  but  an 
"aspect"  or  "side"  or  "face"  or  "phase"  of  neural 
changes,  and  that  therefore  it  has  no  reahty  independent  of 
such  changes,  and  no  power  of  affecting  their  course.  He 
strongly  objects  to  the  phrase,  "  Mind  and  body  act  upon 
each  other."  There  is  merely  a  continuous  series  of  physical 
events  with  inactive  subjective  "aspects."  "We  have,"  he 
assures  us,  "every  reason  for  believing  that  there  is  in 
company  with  all  our  mental  processes,  an  unbroken  material 
succession.  From  the  ingress  of  a  sensation,  to  the  out-going 
responses  in  action  the  mental  succession  is  not  for  an  instant 
dissevered  from  a  physical  succession."  ^''  The  neural 
changes  are  determined  solely  by  neural  antecedents :  the 
niaterial  sequence  carries  with  it  the  mental  sequence,  but 
cannot  in  the  slighest  degree  be  modified  by  the  latter. 
Nevertheless  :  "  The  only  tenable  supposition  is,  that  mental 
and  physical  proceed  together  as  tcndivided  twins.  When 
therefore  we  speak  of  a  mental  cause,  a  mental  agency,  we 
have  always  a  two-sided  cause;  the  effect  produced  is  not  the 
effect  of  mind  alone,  but  of  mind  in  company  with  body. 
That  mind  should  have  operated  on  the  body  is  as  much  as 
to  say,  that  a  two-sided  phenomenon,  one  side  being  bodily, 
can  influence  the  body ;  it  is  after  all  body  acting^  upon  body. 
.  .  .  The  line  of  mental  sequence  is  thus,  not  mind  causing 
body,  and  body  causing  mind,  but  mind-body  giving  birth  to 
mind-body  :  a  much  more  intelligible  position."  ^^ 

Herbert  Spencer  seems  to  hold  approximately  the  same 
view  as  Dr.  Bain,  though  his  general  system  of  Evolution 
would  appear  to  lead  on  to  Clifford's  doctrine  of  mind-stuff. 
Mental  states,  he  allows,  cannot  be  identified  with  nervous 
processes.  The  two  sets  of  facts  are  separated  by  "  a 
difference  which  transcends  all  other  differences."  All  forms 
of  consciousness  are,  he  teaches,  resolvable  into  elementary 
units  of  feeling  akin  to  electric  shocks.  These  correspond  to 
pulses  of  molecular  motion  transmitted  through  the  sentient 
nerves.  But  the  sensation  of  shock  made  known  through  our 
inner  consciousness  can  never  be  analyzed  into  the  physical 
movements  observable,  if  at  all,  by  our  external  senses.  These 

17  Mind  and  Body,  p.  131.  ^^  Op.  cit.  pp.  131,  132. 


MONISTIC   THEORIES.  509 


are  his  words :  "  When  the  two  modes  of  Being  which  we 
distinguish  as  subject  and  object  have  been  severally  reduced 
to  their  lowest  terms,  any  further  comprehension  must  be  an 
assimilation  of  these  lowest  terms  to  one  another :  and,  as 
we  have  already  seen,  this  is  negatived  by  the  very  distinction 
of  subject  and  object,  which  is  itself  the  consciousness  of  a 
difference  transcending  all  other  differences.  So  far  from  helping 
us  to  think  of  them  as  of  one  kind,  analysis  serves  but  to 
render  more  manifest  the  impossibility  of  finding  for  them  a 
common  concept — a  thought  under  which  they  can  be  united. 
Let  it  be  granted  that  all  existence  distinguished  as  objective 
may  be  resolved  into  the  existence  of  units  of  one  kind 
(material),  .  .  .  and  let  it  be  further  granted,  that  all  existence 
distinguished  as  subjective  is  resolvable  into  units  of  con- 
sciousness, similar  in  nature  to  those  which  we  know  as 
nervous  shocks,  .  .  .  can  we  think  of  the  subjective  and 
objective  activities  as  the  same  ?  Can  the  oscillation  of  a 
molecule  be  represented  in  consciousness  side  by  side  with 
a  nervous  shock  and  the  two  be  recognized  as  one  ?  No 
effort  enables  us  to  assimilate  them.  That  a  unit  of  feeling  has 
nothing  in  common  witli  a  unit  of  motion  becomes  more  than  ever 
manifest  when  we  bring  the  two  into  juxtaposition.'''  ^^  In  spite, 
however,  of  the  incompatible  character  of  physical  and 
mental  processes,  Spencer  finally  concludes  that  both  are 
but  ''  faces  "  or  "  aspects  "  of  one  and  the  same  substratum  : 
"  Mind  (i.e.,  conscious-states)  and  nervous  action  are 
subjective  and  objective  faces  of  the  same  thing."  ^°  The 
ground  for  this  unification  of  mental  and  physical  pheno- 
mena is  the  same  as  that  urged  by  Clifford  and  Dr.  Bain 
—the  intimate  correspondence  between  the  two  series.  As 
to  the  nature  of  this  one  ultimate  reality,  of  which  mental  and 
bodily  activities  are  but  diverse  aspects,  Spencer  assures  us 
that  it  is  unknoivable. 

Criticism  of  Monism. — Each  form  in  which  the  Double- 
Aspect  theory  has  been  advocated,  stands  exposed  to  number- 
less special  difficulties,  but  here  we  have  room  to  touch  only 
on  a  few  of  the  most  general  objections,  which  tell  universally 
against  every  representation  of  the  doctrine. 

I.  Dilemma. — The  advocate  of  the  new  system  must  accept 
either  of  two  alternatives.  He  must,  with  Clifford,  look  upon 
this  "double-aspectedness"  as  a  universal  property  of  matter; 
or  he  must,  with  Dr.  Bain,  limit  it  to  living  beings.  In  the 
first  case  he  has  to  make  an  absolutely  incredible  assumption 
without  a  scrap  of  evidence  in  its  favour.  In  order  to  do 
away   with    the   souls   of  a   few   living   beings,   who  do   not 

^  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I.  §  62.  ''^  Op.  cit,  p.  140. 


5IO  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


constitute  the  one-hundred-millionth  part  of  the  mass  of  the 
physical  world,  he  has  to  assign  a  mental  hfe  to  every  grain 
of  sand  and  drop  of  water  on  the  earth.  He  has  to  ascribe 
to  every  molecule  of  matter  in  the  universe  something  the 
nature  of  which  cannot  be  imagined,  and  of  the  existence  of 
which  neither  the  experiments  of  science  nor  the  observation 
of  mankind  has  ever  discovered  the  shghtest  trace.  Such  is 
the  modest  demand  on  our  powers  of  faith  made  by  scientists 
— who  can,  when  it  suits  them,  be  so  exacting  in  their 
demands  for  proof.  Even  Tyndall,  sympathetic  though  he  be 
with  such  views,  is  forced  to  declare :"  It  is  no  explanation 
to  say  that  objective  and  subjective  are  two  sides  of  one  and 
the  same  phenomenon.  Why  should  the  phenomenon  have 
two  sides  ?  There  are  plenty  of  molecular  motions  which  do 
not  exhibit  this  two-sidedness.  Does  water  think  or  feel 
when  it  rises  into  frost  ferns  upon  a  window-pane  ?  If  not, 
why  should  the  molecular  motions  of  the  brain  be  yoked  to 
this  mysterious  companion  consciousness  ?"^i 

Should  he  adopt  the  second  alternative,  the  defender  of 
this  double-faced  theory  has  to  explain  the  unaccountable 
appearance  of  the  subjective  aspect  where  it  presents  itself 
in  conscious  beings.  It  is  a  new  phenomenon,  differing  from 
all  previously  existing  phenomena  by  "  a  difference  that 
transcends  all  other  differences."  Whence  does  it  come  ? 
Physicists  will  not  admit  creations  out  of  nothing,  and  neither 
will  they  allow  that  consciousness  is  merely  a  new  form  of 
the  material  energy  of  the  universe,  even  were  such  a  trans- 
formation conceivable.  If  material  force  is  transmuted  into 
mental  states,  then,  unless  the  law  of  the  conservation  of 
energy  be  abandoned,  the  reverse  operation  must  alsohold, 
and  mental  states  must  be  capable  of  issuing  forth  in  the 
form  of  physical  action.  Conscious  mental  states  would  thus 
be  capable  of  acting  upon  matter :  but  this  is  precisely  what 
advocates  of  Monism  declare  to  be  impossible.  That  mental 
acts  cannot  affect  material  processes  is  the  most  fundamental 
article  of  their  creed.  Accordingly,  whichever  of  the  two 
necessary  alternatives  he  accepts,  the  anti-spirituahst  finds 
himself  in  an  equally  unsatisfactory  position.^"-^ 

2.  Mental  States  not  Composite.— If  we  inquire  more  closely 
into  the  nature  of  this  hypothetical  "  stuff,"  out  of  which 
intelligence,  emotion,  and  volition  are  alleged  to  be  manu- 
factured, the  absurdity  of  the  doctrine  is  brought  still  more 
closely  home  to  us.    What  is  this  material  ?     Is  it  conscious  ? 

21  Cf.  Mallock,  Is  Life  ivorth  Living?  p.  180. 

2-  Cf.  Herbert,  Modern  Realism  Examined,  p.  71.  Sects.  7—12 
contain  some  very  good  criticism  of  this  theory. 


MONISTIC  THEORIES.  511 


Most  supporters  of  the  theory,  we  beheve,  would  answer,  No. 
How  then  is  it  Uke  our  mental  life  ?  Does  a  multiplicity  of 
unconscious  acts  constitute  an  act  of  conscious  intelligence  ? 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  ascribe  real  but  incipient  conscious- 
ness to  the  molecules  of  matter,  and  if  mental  life  is  the 
outcome  of  their  combination,  it  would  seem  that  a  mental 
existence  ought  to  belong  to  all  material  objects  with  which 
experience  presents  us.  Have  plants,  or  their  leaves,  or  the 
various  parts  of  the  human  body  minds  of  their  own  ?  Is  a 
new  steam-tug  a  thing  of  joy  to  itself?  What  are  the 
emotions  of  a  deserted  coal-mine?  Or  is  it  only  very  s;;/a// 
lumps  of  coal  that  have  minds  ?  Is  the  soul  of  carbon  different 
in  kind  from  that  of  nitrogen  or  oxygen  ? 

But  even  were  it  granted  that  such  allotments  of  subjective- 
aspect  were  attached  to  all  molecules  of  matter,  they  would 
not  solve  the  problem.     We  have  already  demonstrated  the 
spirituality  of  man's  intellect  and  will,  and  we  have  shown 
the  peculiar,   indivisible  character    of   supra-sensuous   acts, 
such  as  conception,  judgment,  reasoning,  and  self-conscious- 
ness ;  but  in  doing  so  we  have  disproved  the  double-aspect 
theory.     The  unity  of  consciousness  cannot  be  an  amalgam 
of    morsels   of   subjective-aspect    essentially   dependent    on 
extended  molecules.     Simple  abstract  ideas,  judicial  acts  and 
free  volitions,  cannot  be  a  mere  compound  of  electric  shocks 
or  of  unconscious  units.     They  are  indivisible  acts,  and  they 
must  pertain  to  an  indivisible  agent  other  than  matter.     As 
Lotze  argues,  analogical  inferences   from   the   combinations 
of  physical  forces  to  the  fusion  of  mental  states  mislead,  not 
only  from  the  dissimilarity  of  the  two  classes  of  events,  but 
from  inaccuracy  in  describing  the  operations  of  the  former. 
In  nature  two  abstract  '  forces  '  or  '  motions  '  never  coalesce 
to  form  a  resultant.     What  really  happens  is  that  two  bodies, 
moving  or  at  rest,  produce  a  motion  of  a  body  or  bodies.    Now 
movements  or  forces  existing  in  this  concrete  way  are  not 
simple,  but  divisible  into  parts  seated  in  the  various  molecules 
of  the  body.     But  in  thought,  especially  in  the  unity  of  con- 
sciousness involved  in  judgment  and  self-knowledge,  we  have 
a  real  concrete,  indivisible  activity,  which  accordingly  must 
pertain,  not  to  an  assemblage  of  separate  molecules,  but  to  a 
single  simple  agent.^^     Somewhat  similarly  James  writes  : 

"The  theory  of  mental  units  'compounding  with  them- 
selves,' or  '  integrating '  is  logically  uninteUigible.  It  leaves 
out  the  essential  feature  of  all  the  *  combinations '  we 
actually  know.  All  the  combinations  which  we  actually  know 
are  effects  wrought  by  the  units  said  to  be  combined  upon  some 


23 


Cf.  Mctaphysic,  §  241,  and  Microcosmns,  Bk,  II.  c.  i.  §§  5,  6. 


512  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

ENTITY  other  than  themselves.  Without  this  feature  of  a  medium 
or  vehicle,  the  notion  of  combination  has  no  sense.  In  other 
words,  no  possible  number  of  entities  (call  them  as  you  like, 
whether  forces,  material  particles,  or  mental  elements)  can 
sum  themselves  together.  Each  remains  in  the  sum  what  it 
was ;  and  the  sum  itself  exists  only  for  a  bystander  who 
happens  to  overlook  the  units  and  to  apprehend  the  sum  as 
such ;  or  else  it  exists  in  the  shape  of  some  other  effect  on  an 
entity  external  to  the  sum  itself.  .  .  .  '  A  statue  is  an  aggregation 
of  particles  of  marble;  hut  as  such  it  has  no  unity.  For  the 
spectator  it  is  one  ;  in  itself  it  is  an  aggregate  ;  just  as  to 
the  consciousness  of  an  ant  crawling  over  it,  it  may  again 
appear  a  mere  aggregate.'  (Royce.)  .  .  .  Musical  sounds  do  not 
combine  per  se  into  concords  or  discords.  Concord  and 
discord  are  names  for  their  combined  effects  on  that  external 
medium  the  ear.  Where  the  elemental  units  are  supposed 
to  be  feelings  the  case  is  in  no  wise  altered.  Take  a  hundred 
of  them,  shuffle  and  pack  them  as  close  together  as  you  can 
(whatever  that  may  mean),  still  each  remains  the  same  feeling 
it  always  was,  shut  in  its  own  skin,  windowless,  ignorant  of 
what  the  other  feelings  are  and  mean.  There  would  be  a 
hundred-and-first  feeUng  there,  if  when  a  group  or  series  of 
such  feelings  were  set  up  a  consciousness  belonging  to  the  group 
as  such  should  emerge.  And  this  hundred-and-first  feeling 
would  be  a  totally  new  fact;  the  hundred  original  feelings 
might,  by  a  curious  physical  law,  be  a  signal  for  its  creation, 
when  they  came  together ;  but  they  would  have  no  sub- 
stantial identity  with  it,  nor  it  with  them,  and  one  could 
never  deduce  the  one  from  the  others,  or  (in  any  intelligible 
sense)  say  that  they  evolved  it.  Take  a  sentence  of  a  dozen 
words,  and  take  twelve  men  and  tell  to  each  one  word.  Then 
stand  the  men  in  a  row  or  jam  them  in  a  bunch,  and  let  each 
think  of  his  word  as  intently  as  he  vvill ;  nowhere  will  there 
be  a  consciousness  of  the  whole  sentence.  We  talk  of  the 
'  spirit  of  the  age  '  and  the  '  sentiment  of  the  people,'  and 
hypostatize  public  '  opinion.'  But  we  know  this  to  be 
symbohc  speech,  and  never  dream  that  the  '  spirit,'  '  senti- 
ment,' etc.,  constitute  a  consciousness  other  than  and 
additional  to  that  of  the  several  individuals  whom  the  words 
'  age,'  or  '  people,'  or  '  public  '  denote.  The  private  minds 
do  not  agglomerate  into  a  higher  compound  mind.  This  has 
always  been  the  invincible  contention  of  the  spiritualists 
against  the  associationists  in  Psychology."  ^'^ 

2i  Op.  cit.  pp.  158—60.  The  italics  and  capitals  are  those  of 
Professor  James  himself.  His  argument  here  is,  it  seems  to  us, 
perfectly  sound,  but,  notwithstanding  his  disclaimer  (p.  162),  fatal 
to  his  own  ihjory.     How  can  "  the  present  section  of  conscious- 


MONISTIC   THEORIES.  513 

Absurd  consequences.  —  Advocates  of  psycho- 
physical parallelism  as  well  as  of  all  forms  of  materialism 
agree  at  least  in  this,  that  mental  states  cannot  act  on 
the  body.  The  main  object  in  describing  conscious 
activity  as  parallel  to,  or  as  an  aspect,  or  phase  of  a 
nervous  process,  is  to  emphasize  its  incapacity  for  the 
production  of  any  physical  change.  If  it  be  once 
admitted  that  mental  agency  is  really  operative  ad 
extra,  that  conscious  states  do  really  originate  bodily 
movements,  then  the  one  great  excellence  claimed  for 
the  monistic  theories  v^ith  which  we  are  here  engaged  is 
abandoned. 25  The  existence  of  an  efficient  energy 
distinct  from  material  force  is  admitted,  and  the  chief 
tenet  of  the  spiritualist  philosopher  is  granted.  It  is 
to  guard  against  such  a  contingency  that  Bain  and 
Hoffding  insist  ''  that  there  is  no  rupture  of  nervous 
continuity;"  and  Clifford  that  "the  physical  facts  go 
along  by  themselves,"  and  "the  mental  facts  go  along 
by  themselves."  The  admission  of  a  second  real 
agent  capable  of  interfering  with  or  modifying  in  the 
most  infinitesimal  degree  the  course  of  material  events 
is  absolutely  fatal  to  all  monistic  anti-spiritualist 
systems.  But  we  venture  to  doubt  whether  the 
astonishing  consequences  in  regard  to  most  of  our 
beliefs — scientific  as  well  as  vulgar — which  inevitably 
proceed  from  the  denial  of  mental  efficiency  have  been 
adequately  realized  by  these  writers. 

Mind's  efficacy  in  Evolution. — The  theory  of  Evolution,  for 
instance,  will  have  to  wear  a  somewhat  altered  appearance  as 
a  rational  explanation  of  facts,  if  it  be  true  that  conscious 
states   never  influence   bodily  movement.     The  doctrine    of 

ness,"  the  merely  "  passing  thought"  act  as  "bystander"  to  sum 
up  the  series  of  long  past  states  into  the  unity  of  a  Self  ?  Or  if 
James  chooses  the  other  alternative  and  says  that  the  present 
thought  in  which  I  cognize  the  unity  of  my  past  states,  is  "an 
cj^ect  on  an  entity  external  to  the  sum  itself"  (of  these  states) ;  is  not 
this  "entity"  after  all  very  like  the  vulgar  common-sense  soul 
contemptuously  discarded  because  it  "explains  nothing  and 
guarantees  nothing."     On  this  question  see  also  pp.  47,  48,  above. 

2'  The  idealist  may  maintain  the  real  efficiency  of  mind,  but  he 
does  so  by  denying  the  independent  reality  of  matter — with  the 
disastrous  results  already  indicated,  (pp.  113 — 116.) 

nil 


514  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

natural  selection  in  the  animal  kingdom  is  built  on  the 
assumption  of  serviceablencss  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  the 
struggle  for  life.  Herbert  Spencer  never  wearies  of  expatiat- 
ing on  the  utility  of  both  the  agreeable  and  the  disagreeable 
qualities  of  action  in  the  contest  for  existence.  Pleasure  and 
pain  are  according  to  him  not  merely  the  foundations  of 
morality,  but  the  prime  agents  in  the  development  and 
perfecting  of  all  sentient  life.^''  Darwin  is  still  more  copious 
in  showing  how  accidental  actions,  qualities,  and  experiences 
which  afford  satisfaction,  in  consequence  of  that  satisfaction, 
emerge  triumphant  from  among  innumerable  variations,  and 
thus  secure  their  own  preservation.  The  beautiful  colours 
and  songs  of  several  species  of  birds,  for  example,  are  held 
to  be  the  result  of  long  gradual  evolution  under  the  constant 
action  of  sexual  selection — individuals  inheriting  richer 
attractions  more  easily  securing  mates.  But  what  "  utility  " 
or  "  serviceablencss"  can  fine  colours  or  pleasant  or  painful 
feelings  possess  in  the  struggle  for  life  if  they  never  determine 
or  modify  bodily  activity  ?  If  conscious  states  and  cerebral 
processes  are  merely  parallel  series  of  events  which  never  act 
on  each  other,  how  can  the  preference  for  agreeable  feelings 
favour  the  production  of  the  movements  to  which  the  feelings 
are  attached  ?  How  can  pleasure  or  pain  exert  a  selective 
influence  in  favour  of  certain  kinds  of  physical  action  ? 

Other  Minds  non-existent? — Again,  if  thought  never  really 
influences  action,  what  proof  have  we  that  other  minds  than 
our  own  exist  ?  We  at  present  infer  other  minds  because  we 
look  on  certain  actions  and  expressions  of  our  fellow-men  as 
effects  of  certain  feelings  and  volitions  akin  to  our  own,  and 
deem  them  incapable  of  happening  except  in  consequence  of 
such  mental  states.  But  according  to  tiie  new  theory  these 
actions  are  nothing  of  the  sort.  They  are  merely  the  effects 
of  previous  neural  groupings  ;  and  might  have  taken  place 
just  the  same  whether  the  mental  states  accompanied  them 
or  not.  The  latter  are  merely  appended  inactive  "  phases," 
or  "  epiphenomena,"  which  can  occasion  "  no  rupture  oi 
nervous  continuity."  We  may  still,  perhaps,  infer  the  exist- 
ence of  other  brains,  but  logically  the  gestures,  words,  and 


2**  "  Sentient  existence  can  evolve  only  on  condition  that  pleasure- 
giving  acts  are  life  sustaining  acts."  [Data  of  Ethics,  p.  83.)  "  During 
the  evolution  of  life  pleasures  and  pains  have  necessarily  been  the 
incentives  to,  and  deterrents  from,  actions  which  the  conditions  of 
existence  demanded  and  negatived.  .  .  .  The  pleasures  of  sympathy 
exceeding  its  pains  lead  to  an  exercise  of  it  which  strengthens  it," 
(Ilnti.  p.  245.) 


MONISTIC   THEORIES.  515 

actions   of    our   neighbours   might   have  been   precisely  the 
same  \i  consciousness  had  no  existence. 2'' 

But  reflexion  discovers  consequences  still  more  surprising. 
The  whole  past  history  of  the  world,  the  building  of  cities, 
the  invention  of  machinery,  the  commerce  of  nations,  the 
emigrations  of  peoples,  the  rise  and  fall  of  civilizations,  all 
that  has  been  done  on  this  planet  by  human  beings,  might 
have  happened  in  precisely  the  same  way  if  there  had  never 
awoke  to  consciousness  a  single  human  mind  !  All  the  pain 
and  sorrow,  all  the  joy  and  gladness,  all  the  love  and  anger 
that  we  suppose  to  have  governed  the  world's  history  might 
never  have  been,  and  that  history  might  have  run  exactly  the 
same  course  !  The  neural  groupings,  the  cerebral  movements, 
which  were  the  true,  ultimate,  and  only  causes  of  the  various 
actions  of  human  beings,  have  never  once  been  interrupted, 
modified,  or  interfered  with  by  those  "  aspects  "  or  "  phases  " 
which  constitute  the  "parallel"  series  of  conscious  states, 
since  the  first  man  appeared  on  the  earth.  Given  the  original 
collocation  of  the  material  atoms  from  which  the  present 
cosmos  has  been  evolved,  and  every  event,  down  to  the  least 
incident  of  our  daily  life,  was  therein  rigidly  and  sufficiently 
determined,  even  though  no  single  act  of  intelligence  or 
volition  had  ever  wakened  into  life  !  ^^ 


-^  "  It  is  admitted  that  the  feelings  of  others  cannot  themseh^es 
be  perceived  by  any  sense ;  certain  bodily  movements  only  are 
perceived,  which  are  supposed  to  indicate  feelings.  It  is  admitted, 
further,  that  these  movements  proceed  with  the  strictest  physical 
sequence  ;  in  other  words,  that  in  the  absence  of  feelings  they  would 
take  place  just  as  they  do.  It  follows  that  mind  leaves  no  trace  of 
its  presence  in  the  movements  by  which  alone  it  is  revealed.  What  is 
this  but  to  say  it  is  a  pure  supposition,  without  a  single  vestige  of 
evidence  ?  The  only  evidence  science  can  have  of  anything  is  that 
it  is,  or  effects  some  change,  some  movement.  Whatever  effects  no 
change,  makes  no  sign  in  the  material  world,  is  to  physical  science 
non-existent."  (Herbert,  op.  cit.  p.  113.) 

28  This  argument  is  stated  with  much  force  by  Herbert.  {Ibid. 
p.  133.)  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  present  argument  does  not 
involve  any  particular  metaphysical  theory  of  causality.  Accepting 
even  Mill's  definition  of  causation  as  invariable  succession,  our  con- 
tention would  still  retain  its  force.  The  defender  of  the  double- 
aspect  doctrine  may  of  course  instinctively  attribute  minds  to  other 
human  bodies,  but  he  has  no  rational  grounds  for  believing  in  such 
minds ;  consequently  he  cannot  maintain  mental  states  to  be 
constant  concomitants  or  conditions  of  physical  actions.  The  latter,  he 
asserts,  are  unaffected  by  the  former,  and  so  might  have  occurred 
precisely  as  well  without  them.  If  the  mind  cannot  modify  or 
influence  bodily  movements,  then,  clearly,  it  contributes  nothing  to 


5i6  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

4.  Meaningless  Terms. — Finally,  the  entire  vocabulary  used 
in  the  exposition  of  the  theory,  is  a  veritable  museum  of  non- 
sensical and  sophistical  terms.  Hyphens,  ambiguous  epithets, 
and  cloudy  metaphorical  language  are  profusely  employed  in 
pretended  explanations  of  facts  of  which  no  real  account  is 
given.  What  idea  is  really  conveyed  to  the  mind  by  such 
words  as  "  double-aspect,"  "  mind-stuff,"  "  two-sided  cause," 
"  subjective  and  objective  sides  of  the  same  fact,"  "  undivided 
twins,"  "  double-faced  unity"  ?  We  know  what  is  meant  by 
"  stuff"  when  we  talk  of  the  materials  out  of  which  a  table  or 
a  suit  of  clothes  is  made,  but  the  word  becomes  absolutely 
unmeaning  when  spoken  of  an  intellectual  idea,  like  that  of 
Being,  or  of  the  simple  cognitive  act  of  self-consciousness. 
"  Double-aspect  "  signifies,  or  ought  to  signify,  two  views  or 
points  of  viewing  what  is  known  to  be  one  and  the  same 
thing;  but  here  we  have  two  sets  of  facts  or  things  "  differing 
by  a  difference  that  transcends  all  other  differences."  Surely, 
then,  to  speak  of  the  unextended  mind  and  the  material  brain 
as  "  aspects  "  of  the  same  fact,  is  merely  a  childish  attempt 
to  deceive  ourselves  with  half-understood  words. 

Similarly,  the  terms,  "  objective  side  of  a  feeling "  and 
*'  subjective  side  of  a  nervous  current,"  when  intended  to  be 
taken  as  a  philosophical  explanation,  and  not  as  mere 
metaphorical  phrases  expressive  of  ignorance,  are  a  perversion 
of  language.  "  The  expression,  '  a  two-sided  cause,'  is  one  of 
those  figures  of  speech  which  are  the  crutches  of  Metaphysics, 
and  enable  halting  theories  to  make  progress.  We  find  the 
same  difficulty  in  realizing  in  our  mind  the  conception  of  a 
two-sided  cause  as  we  have  in  realizing  a  blue-sound  or  a  three- 
sided  motion." -9  A  Cause  is  defined  in  Dr.  Bain's  own  Logic, 
as  "  the  entire  aggregate  of  conditions  or  circumstances 
requisite  to  the  production  of  the  effect."  But  if  mental 
states  form  part  of  the  aggregate  of  conditions  required  to 
effect  a  given  movement,  then  mind  is  no  longer  a  mere 
"aspect"  of  physical  processes:  it  is  a  really  efficient  agent 
which  occasionally  "ruptures  the  nervous  continuity,"  and 
Mr,  Bain's  doctrine,  in  company  with  all  other  forms  of 
materialistic  monism,  at  once  falls  to  the  ground.  If  mental 
states  do  not  co-operate  in  the  production  of  physical  changes, 
then  they  must  not  be  described  as  past-causes,  or  the  "  side  " 
of  a  cause,  without  self-contradiction. 

the  wonderful  works  of  civilization,  and,  so  far  as  these  latter  are 
concerned,  might  never  have  been.  This  is  one  of  those  curious 
but  strictly  logical  consequences  of  this  theory,  which  its  supporters 
do  not  care  to  obtrude  on  public  attention. 

-9  Cf.  M.  Guthrie,  On  Mr.  Spencer's  Unification  o/Knozvlcdge,  p.  248. 


MONISTIC   THEORIES.  517 

Monism:  Conservation  of  Energy  and  Law  of 
Inertia. — To  many  minds  the  most  serious  attack  in 
recent  years  on  the  spirituahty  of  the  Soul  is  that  based 
on  the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  etiergy.  Though 
sometimes  specially  directed  agSiinst  free-will,  the  objec- 
tion, if  valid  at  all,  disproves  the  possibility  of  any 
influence  of  mind  upon  body.  Physical  energy,  defined 
as  capacity  for  doing  ivork,  may  be  either  kinetic,  e.g.,  that 
of  the  flying  bullet,  or  potential,  e.g.,  that  of  an  elevated 
weight.  Numerous  experiments  in  chemistry  and  physics 
go  to  show  that  in  the  transmutations  of  energy  from 
one  form  to  another  none  is  lost  or  gained ;  and  the 
results  have  been  formulated  in  the  statement :  The  sum 
of  the  kinetic  and  potential  energies  of  any  isolated  system  of 
bodies  remains  constant.  This  conclusion  has  been  still 
further  generalized  in  the  form  of  the  Law :  The  sum 
total  of  energy  in  the  universe  always  remains  the  same.  From 
this  generalization  the  positivist  psychologist  passes  to 
a  further  inference,  the  doctrine  of  "psychophysical, 
parallelism  " — mental  and  bodily  changes  never  affect  each 
other ;  and  then  by  one  more  logical  leap  to  Monism — 
mind  and  body  are  mere  diverse  phenomenal  manifesta- 
tions of  one  substratum. 

It  has  also  been  maintained  that  this  final  con- 
clusion is  confirmed,  if  not  independently  proved  by 
the  principle  of  inertia,  Newton's  first  law  of  motion: 
"  Every  body  continues  in  its  state  of  rest  or  uniform 
motion  in  a  straight  line  except  in  so  far  as  it  may  be 
compelled  by  impressed  forces  to  change  its  state." 

Harald  Hoffding  is  perhaps  the  ablest  exponent  of  this 
argument,  so  we  shall  cite  from  his  Outlines  of  Psychology. 
The  italics  are  ours  : 

"  Materialphenomenaappearin  the  form  of  space.  .  .  .  This 
characteristic  distinguishes  them  from  states  of  consciousness, 
yet  does  not  contain  anything  by  which  the  material  is 
sharply  defined  and  closed  off  as  a  world  in  tself.  Fur  we 
might  conceive  these  spatial  movements  as  brought  about  by  some- 
thing non-spatial.  The  material  world  would  in  that  case  lie 
open  to  influences  from  without.  But  scientific  research 
makes  such  a  possibility  always  more  inadmissible.  It  now 
applies  in  all  departments  the  principle  that  every  tnaterial 
movement  must  be  explained  by  another  material  movement.    The 


5i8  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

very  first  principle  (the  law  of  inei'tia)  on  which  natural 
science  is  based,  is  that  the  state  of  a  material  point  (rest  or 
movement  in  a  straight  line)  can  be  altered  only  through  the 
influence  of  another  material  point ^^^.  .  .  This  principle  cannot 
from  its  nature  admit  of  rigid  proof.  It  is  the  fundamental 
assumption  with  which  natural  science  comes  into  existence. 
.  .  .  The  like  holds  true  of  a  more  special  principle,  namely, 
of  the  conservation  of  matter  and  energy.  Modern  chemistry  is 
based  on  the  assumption  confirmed  by  numerous  experiments 
that  in  all  changes  of  matter  the  sum  of  the  material  atoms 
remains  the  same."  (pp.  30,  31.)  Living  beings,  Hoffding 
assures  us,  are  in  no  way  an  exception  to  this  law.  The  old 
notion  of  a  "  vital  force  "  governing  the  growth  and  reproduc- 
tion of  the  living  organism  is  illusory.  "  This  doctrine  is  really 
only  a  mythological  way  of  expressing  the  amazement  which 
the  unique  character  of  organic  phenomena  excited."  (p.  34.)^^ 
Still  less  does  the  mind  act  upon  the  body  or  vice-versa. 
"There  is  no  justification  for  maintaining  as  a  fact  that  a 
bodily  process  causes  a  menial  process  or  the  reverse.  .  .  .  The 
supposition  that  a  causal  relation  may  exist  between  the 
mental  and  the  material  is  contrary  to  the  doctrine  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  energy,  for  at  the  point  where  the  material  nerve  process 
should  be  converted  (sic)  into  a  mental  activity  a  sum  of 
physical  energy  would  disappear  without  being  made  good  by 
a  corresponding  sum  of  physical  energy."  (p.  55.)  "  It  will  be 
easily  seen  that  it  avails  nothing  to  say  that  the  mind  may  not 
be  able  to  increase  the  sum  of  physical  energy,  but  that 
it  can  alter  the  direction  of  the  applied  energy.  A  physical 
movement  does  not  change  its  direction  except  under  the 
influence  of  a  physical  force  of  a  certain  strength.  So  that  this 
subterfuge  also  of  necessity  makes  the  energv  of  consciousness  a 
physical  energy.'"  (p.  56.)"'^   As  there  is  a  perfect  correspondence 

"<^  The  laii)  of  inertia  is  here  mis-stated.  As  given  above  (p.  517)  in 
Newton's  words,  it  does  not  assert  that  the  movement  of  a  body  can 
be  affected  only  by  the  influence  of  another  material  agent.  Newton 
himself  would  never  have  admitted  such  a  principle.  Yet  it  may  be 
conceded  that  physical  science  prescinds  from  all  but  material 
agencies. 

^1  Were  Ilotfding  not  committed  to  this  view  we  doubt  if  he 
would  write  thus  to-day.  The  best  authorities  in  biological  science 
now  admit  that  the  attempt  to  explain  life  mechanically — so  much 
in  vogue  twenty-five  years  ago — has  failed  all  along  the  line ;  and 
that  the  present  tendency  is  universally  back  towards  vitalism.  Cf. 
Prof.  Haldane,  "Vitalism,"  Nineteenth  Century  (Sept.  1S98). 

=*-  Here  is  a  truly  naive  petitio  principii.  After  copiously  proving 
universally  admitted  facts,  the  writer  slurs  over  the  crucial  question, 
and  devotes  just   tivo  lines,  plus  an  abusive  epithet,  to  establish 


MONISTIC   THEORIES.  S^O 

between  mental  and  neural  processes,  whilst  the  hi2i.'  of  the 
conservation  of  energy  precludes  real  interaction  between  them, 
the  only  satisfactory  scientific  conception  of  their  relations  is 
that  "  Mind  and  body,  consciousness  and  brain  are  evolved 
as  different  forms  of  expression  of  one  and  the  same  being." 
(54.)  "  Both  the  parallelism  and  the  proportionality  between 
the  activity  of  consciousness  and  cerebral  activity  point  to  an 
identity  at  bottom.  .  .  .  We  have  no  right  to  take  mind  and 
body  for  two  beings  or  substances  in  reciprocal  interaction." 
(64.)^^  In  fine,  "  the  Identity-hypothesis  regards  the  mental  and 
material  worlds  as  two  manifestations  of  one  and  the  same 
being  both  given  in  experience."  (66.)  Still,  lest  the  reader 
might  begin  to  suspect  that  the  scientiiic  psychologist  has 
after  all  lapsed  into  Metaphysics,  he  is  reassured  and  com- 
forted  by  the   statement :    "  Concerning  the    inner   relation 

the  fundamental  thesis  on  which  his  attack  upon  dualism  rests ! 
The  two  lines  are  either  a  puerile  and  irrelevant  truism,  or  a  formal 
begging  of  the  whole  question  in  dispute.  The  assumption  that  a 
physical  movement  is  modified  only  by  a  physical  force  is  a  truism  for  the 
astronomer,  chemist,  physicist,  &c.,  who  abstract  from  all  but  physical 
forces  ;  but  it  is  the  precise  point  to  be  proved  in  regard  to  the  vioral 
sciences,  ethics,  economics,  aesthetics,  psychology,  which  all  assume, 
and  find  the  same  sort  of  verification  for  the  assumption,  that  7ion-physical 
forces — motives  and  volitions — direct  physical  movements.  What 
the  Mofiist  has  to  prove  is,  e.g.,  that  the  ideas  of  "  Independence"  or 
"  British  supremacy  "  have  had  no  real  influence  in  originating  or 
in  directing  that  special  commotion  of  material  particles  and  trans- 
mutation of  physical  energy  called  "the  Boer  war."  For  this,  neither 
a  question-begging  epithet,  nor  an  irrelevant  truism  will  suffice. 
Assuredly  the  fact  that  the  physical  scientist  may  justly  assume  this 
law  of  inertia  with  only  approximate  proof  in  regard  to  lifeless  matter 
does  not  compel  the  moral  scientist  to  admit  it  without  any  proof, 
rigid  or  approximate,  regarding  living  conscious  beings. 

'^'■^  Surely  the  parallelism  of  two  activities  would  point  not  to  one 
but  to  two  distinct  substrata.  Again  :  are  they  parallel  in  space,  or  in 
time  ?  Or  how  ?  Are  both  continuous  ?  Experience  affirms  mental 
states  accompany  only  a  fraction  of  neural  processes  ;  and  present 
science  professes  profound  ignorance  of  the  character  of  the  cerebral 
correlate  of  the  higher  rational  activities.  What,  then,  is  the 
precise  signification  of  this  "parallelism"  of  the  activities,  except 
their  incapacity  to  meet — which  is  scarcely  a  reason  for  their  identifica- 
tion ?  Does  the  "proportionality" — e.g.,  of  a  reasoning  process  to 
its  concomitant  nerve-commotion — refer  to  variation  in  intensity, 
or  spatial  area,  or  rapidity,  or  duration  ?  Or  has  this  half-conceived 
metaphor — on  which  the  whole  weight  of  the  monistic  inference  here 
rests — any  consistent  intelligible  meaning  whatsoever  ?  This  is  a 
specimen  of  the  clearness  and  accuracy  of  thought  of  that 
"  scientific  "  psychology  which  contemns  the  "metaphysician." 


520  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


between  mind  and  matter,  we  teach  nothing ;  we  suppose  only 
that  one  being  works  in  both.  But  what  kind  of  being  is  this  ? 
Why  has  it  a  double  form  of  manifestation,  why  does  not  one 
suffice  ?  These  are  questions  which  lie  beyond  the  region  of 
our  knowledge."  (Op.  cit.  p.  67.) 

Criticism:  Metaphysics  inevitable.— It  niay  be 
justly  urged  that  any  positivistic  attempt  to  disprove 
the  interaction  or  the  real  duality  of  mind  and  body 
based  on  the  Conservation  of  Energy,  viewed  as  a  generali- 
zation of  physical  science  and  prescinding  from  all 
metaphysics,  is  necessarily  illegitimate  and  worthless. 
Every  interpretation  of  this  Law  involves  some  meta- 
physical theory.  The  doctrine  can  certainly  not  be 
invoked  as  an  established  truth  of  positive  science 
incompatible  with  real  interaction  between  mind  and 
body,  whilst  its  own  philosophical  significance  is 
altogether  ignored.  The  notions  of  causality,  action, 
energy,  and  the  like,  are  derived,  in  the  first  instance, 
from  the  mind's  own  real  activity  and  its  immediate 
experience  of  exerting  real  influence  over  thoughts  and 
bodily  movements,  (pp.  368,  seq.)  All  our  conceptions  of 
energy,  causality,  interaction  between  material  agents  pre- 
suppose the  experience  of  personal  causality — of  the 
real  influence  of  mind  on  body.  If  it  be  an  illusion  to 
think  that  the  mind  really  influences  the  body,  it  must  be 
equally  erroneous  to  suppose  that  any  one  body  really 
influences  another.  What  then,  is  the  precise  meaning 
of  the  "  first  principle  of  exact  science  "  that  "  the  state 
of  a  material  point  can  be  altered  only  through  the 
influence  oi  another  material  point?"  It  will  not  avail 
the  positivist  to  turn  round  now,  and  say  that  by 
"  causal  action"  or  "influence"  of  material  agents  on 
each  other,  he  only  means  constant  succession  or  concomitance. 
For  such  constant  succession  or  concomitance  cannot 
be  denied  to  obtain  with  respect  to  the  mental  and 
bodily  processes.  The  truth  is,  the  positivist  Psycho- 
logist, by  professing  to  abjure  all  metaphysics,  evades 
the  obligation  of  defining  those  metaphysical  concep- 
tions with  which  all  real  science  is  saturated,  and  then 
employs  them  alternately  in  the  sense  ascribed  to  them 


MONISTIC   THEORIES.  521 


by  Hume  or  by  Reid,  by  phenomenism  or  by  common 
sense,  as  he  finds  convenient  for  his  argument.^^ 

2.  Constancy  of  Energy  not  a  Necessary  Truth.-— The  law  is 
not  a  necessary  a  priori  axiom,  but  a  generalization  from 
experience.  Now  many  writers  urge  that  the  law  is  not 
demonstrated  to  hold  accurately  for  any  living  organism; 
and  that  there  is  no  possibility  of  its  ever  being  rigidly  proved 
respecting  the  universe  as  a  whole.  The  experiments  establish- 
ing the  exactness  of  the  law,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  have 
been  fully  satisfactory  only  in  reference  to  portions  of 
inanimate  matter;  whilst  the  very  point  in  dispute  is  its 
applicability  to  living  sentient  beings.  The  animal  structure  is 
an  extremely  delicate  machine,  in  which  the  action  of  a 
relatively  small  force  may  liberate  or  transform  a  very  large 
quantity  of  latent  energy,  pretty  much  as  the  faintest  pressure 
of  a  hair-trigger  pistol  may  explode  a  powder-magazine.^-^ 
In  such  a  case  the  pouvoir  decrochant — the  force  which  frees  the 
stored-up  energy — is  so  infinitesimally  small  as  to  be  quite 
inappreciable  when  incorporated  in  the  total  result.  In  this 
view  the  law  is  admitted  to  possess  approximate  but  not 
absolute  accuracy  in  regard  to  sentient  or  rational  beings.^^ 
Consequently  there  always  remains  room  for  the  interaction 
of  mind  and  body,  though  the  total  quantity  of  energy  in  the 
universe  should  thereby  undergo  infinitesimal  variations. 

3.  Mathematical  Solutions. — Distinguished  mathemati- 
cians, however,  have  professed  to  reconcile  the  modification 
of  bodily  movement  by  the  mind  with  the  most  rigid  fulfil- 
ment of  the  law.  One  of  the  simplest  solutions  advanced  is 
thus  stated  :  "  It  is  a  principle  of  mechanics  that  a  force 
acting  at  right  angles  to  the  direction  in  which  a  body  is 
moving  does  no  work,  although  it  may  continually  alter  the 
direction  in  which  the  body  moves.  No  power,  no  energy,  is 
required  to  deflect  a  bullet  from  its  path,  provided  the  deflect- 
ing force  acts  always  at  right  angles  to  that  path.  ...  If 
Mind  or  Will  simply  deflect  matter  as  it  moves,  it  may  produce 
all  the  consequences  claimed  by  the  Wilful  School,  and  yet  it 
will  neither  add  energy  nor  matter  to  the  universe."^^ 

3-»  Cf.  Ladd,  Philosophy  of  Mind,  pp.  209—219. 

3*  "As  far  as  we  can  j  udge,  life  is  always  associated  with  machinery 
of  a  certain  kind,  in  virtue  of  which  an  extremely  delicate  directive 
touch  is  magnified  ultimately  into  a  very  considerable  transmutation 
of  energy."  (Balfour  Stewart,  On  the  Conservation  of  Energy,  p.  163.) 

36  G.  Fonsegrive,  Le  Libre  Arbitre  (1896),  pp.  315 — 326. 

37  Cited  by  Tait  and  Stewart,  The  Unseen  Universe,  p.  180.  These 
eminent  physicists,  however,  prefer  a  different  solution.  [Ibid.  §§ 
III,   112.)      M.M.    Cournot,  de   Saint-Venant,  Boussinesque,  and 


522  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

4.     True   Solution. — The   notion    underlying  most  of  the 
answers   suggested — that   the  Mind    or   Will   merely   directs, 
applies,  or  disposes  of  the    energy   stored   in   the   organism- 
contains,  at  least,  part  of  the  explanation  ;  but  their  advocates 
seem  to  us  frequently  to  err  in  representing  the  Mind  as  in  a 
condition  of  excessive  isolation  from  or  independence  of  the 
body.     Indeed,  much  of  the  strength  of  this  difficulty  is  due 
to  the  erroneous  conception  of  the  mutual  relations  of  soul 
and  body  prevalent  among  spiritualist  writers  since  Descartes. 
In  his  theory  (see  above,  p.  257),  if  the  soul  initiated  or  modified 
a  series  of  bodily  movements,  it  would  do  so  after  the  manner 
of  Si  foreign  agent,  and  would  therefore  seem  inevitably  to  alter 
the  quantum  of  energy  possessed  by  the  alien  material  system 
with  which  it  is  supposed  to  interfere.     But  if,  rejecting  this 
ultra-dualism,    we    return    to    the     Aristotelian     conception 
according  to  which  soul  and  body  constitute  one  complete 
substantial  living  being  of  which  the  soul  is  the  animating, 
actuating,    or  determining  principle— the  formal  cause,  whilst 
the  body  is  the  determinable,  material,  quantitative  principle, 
the   difficulty  at  once  loses  more  than  half  its  force.     The 
question  is  now  no  longer  whether  a  spiritual  agent  can  excite 
or  modify  the  movements  of  a  foreign  material  system  without 
augmenting   or   diminishing  the  energy  of  that  system,  but 
whether  the  conscious  states  of  a  sentient  being  can  determine 
the  actualization  and  direction  of  the  latent  physical  energy 
of  that  being  without  changing  its  amount.     For,  in  this  view, 
the  material  energy  manifested  in  movement  was  previously 
stored    in   the   living   organic  tissues;    feelings  and  volitions 
merely  determine  the  form  it  shall  assume.     Mental  acts  thus 
modify  not  the  quantity,  but  the  quality  of  the  energy  contained 
in  the  system.     The  distinction  between  quality  and  quantity 
in  all  forms  of  energy  is  the  key  to  the  solution  of  the  difficulty. 

This  is  admirablyinsisted  upon  by  P.  Couailhac  in  his  recent 
able  monograph  on  the  problem.^^  Quantity  and  movement 
are  the  special  object  of  the  exact  sciences ;  but  they  do  not 
exhaust  the  content  of  the  universe.  In  every  transition  from 
potential  to  actual  energy,  the  qualitative  element,  he  rightly 
urges,  is  as  real  and  influential  as  the  quantity.  Direction,  which 
is  the  qualitative  element  of  movement,  is  as  real  and  important 

others,  have  also  invented  various  ingenious  solutions  based  on 
more  or  less  abstruse  mathematics.  To  our  mind,  however,  the 
chief  value  of  these  attempts  is  that  they  make  prominent  the  com- 
plexity, obscurity,  and  uncertainty  of  the  assumptions  involved  in 
applying  the  doctrine  of  Conservation  to  the  living  organism,  and 
prove  the  groundlessness  of  the  dogmatism  of  Monism. 

»8  La  LibertJ  ct  la  Conservation  dc  VEncrgie  (Paris,  1897),  Livre  IV. 


MONISTIC  THEORIES.  523 


as  velocity  and  duration.    In  order  that  a  material  particle  may 
move,  it  must  take  a  definite  path  in  space.     But  the  quantity 
of  energy— the  velocity  and  the  mass— being   given,  an   in- 
definite variety  of  such  paths  conceivably  lie  open  to  it.     It 
does  not  dispose  of  quality  to  say  that  the  direction  of  the  moving 
body  is  due  to  the  intensity  of  "the  forces  playing  on  it.     This 
merely  pushes  the  question  back.     The  effect  of  these  forces 
is  due  as  much  to  their  quality  as  to  their  quantity,  and  so  the 
qualitative  element  must  ultimately  be  traced  back  to  a  directive 
principle  distinct  from  quantity.     Passing  to  the  more  complex 
movements  of  Uving  organisms  which  start  from  a  germ  cell 
and   develop   into   an   animal   of    a   particular    species,   the 
qualitative  efficiency  of  the  energy  which  determines  the  lines 
along  which  the  embryo  is  to  evolve  becomes  still  more  promi- 
nent.    Whilst  the  quantity  of  the  energy  of  the  Uving  organism 
at  any  time  is  the  resultant  of  the  material  elements  borrowed 
from  external  nature,  the  form  of  this  energy  is  determined  by 
the  organizing  force  of  the  germinal  principle;  though  the 
action   of  the   latter  is   again  conditioned  by  the  nutriment 
absorbed.    Finally,  in  the  living  conscious  being  this  qualitative 
determining  factor  takes  a  still  higher  form,  its  range  of  activity 
is  wider,  its  power  of  applying,  directing,  and  disposing  of  the 
energy  stored  in  the  organism  is  more  varied  and  more  flexible, 
but  it  cannot  alter  the  quantity  of  the  capital  funded  in  the 
self-moving  machine.     If,  then,  it  be  the  quality  of  the  forces 
distributed  in  the  nervous  system  which  the  directive  power  of 
the  soul  inmiediately  determines,  the  liberation  and  control  of 
a  man's  physical  activity  by  his  thoughts  and  volitions  need 
not  necessarily  conflict  with  even  the  most  rigid  fulfilment  of 
the  Law  of  the  constancy  of  the  quantity  of  energy.^'-^ 

The  Law  of  Inertia,  however,  cannot  be  admitted 
to  apply  to  conscious  movements.  Amongst  the  reasons 
for  denying  its  validity,  are  these:  (i)  It  is  admittedly 
not  self-evident.     (2)  It  cannot   be   proved.     (3)  It  at 

39  "La  volonte  pent  eveiller  et  tirer  de  leur  torpeur  les  forces 
disponibles  de  rorganisme,  auquel  elle  est  unie.  Ella  ne  peut  les 
accroitre.  Ces  forces  ont  une  limite,  quand  elle  est  atteinte,  elles 
s'arretent  ou  flechissent.  Et  il  n'y  a  pas  de  tension  de  la  volonte 
qui  puisse  les  porter  en  avant  ou  les  soutenir.  ...  La  fonction  de 
la  vie  est  de  placer  les  forces  physico-chimiques  dans  les  conditions 
ou  peuvent  se  produire  les  combinaisons  d'ou  resulte  le  tourbillon 
vital,  La  vie  est  directrice.  Majs  elle  ne  peut  ni  alterer  ni  per- 
fectionner  les  elements  qui  sont  mis  a  sa  disposition  par  la  nature." 
(Couailhac,  op.  cit.  p.  226.) 


524  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 


least  seems  to  be  directly  contradicted  by  the  internal 
experience  of  all  men.  (4)  It  would  involve  the  in- 
credible absurdities  already  dwelt  upon,  (pp.513 — 516.) 
It  is  the  unwarrantable  application  of  this  principle — not 
that  of  the  constancy  of  energy — which  is  incompatible 
with  dualism  and  the  efficacy  of  mental  action. 

Agnosticism. — The  final  outcome  of  Monism  is 
Agnosticism.  As  in  establishing  our  own  doctrine,  we 
have  indirectly  refuted  this  creed — for  since  it  profes- 
sedly reposes  not  on  reason  but  on  faith,  creed  it  is — we 
cannot  dwell  on  the  subject  further  here.  Indeed,  since 
the  Unknowable  declines  to  recognize  the  laws  of  logic, 
rational  criticism  would  be  obviously  futile.  In  its  dark 
continent  the  identification  of  thought  and  matter  may 
be  peacefully  accomplished  without  the  disturbing 
interference  of  either  the  profane  scientist  or  the  imper- 
tinent philosopher.  Screened  off  from  the  inconveniences 
of  public  discussion,  rebellious  facts,  and  repugnant 
principles  can  there  be  silently  suppressed.  The 
freedom,  responsibility,  abiding  identity  and  indi- 
viduality to  which  conscious  experience  testifies  can 
be  rejected  as  irrelevant  evidence — because,  of  course, 
no  evidence  is  accepted  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Unknowable.  The  difficulties  of  the  theory  which  main- 
tains that  human  thought  has  never  influenced  human 
civilization,  are  easily  overcome — the  resources  of  the 
Unknowable  being  equal  to  all  emergencies.  Enjoying 
the  hospitality  of  its  ample  territory,  the  most  violent 
contradictions  and  implacable  inconsistencies  can  rest 
in  tranquil  repose.  Its  frontiers  once  crossed,  the 
Monist  has  reached  a  hallowed  asylum,  into  which 
even  the  most  relentless  persecution  of  logic  or  common 
sense  cannot  follow  him.  There,  at  last,  all  objections 
are  answered,  all  difficulties  are  solved,  all  doubts  are 
assuaged  by  the  one  great  axiom  so  well — if  not  wisely — 
expressed  by  Dr.  Hodgson:  "  Whatever  you  are  totally 
ignorant  of,  assert  to  be  the  explanation  of  everything  else." 

Additional  Readings. — Coconnier,  ib.  c.  ii.;  Farges,  ib.  pp.  136 — 106; 
Ladd,  ib.  cc.  9,  10. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

IMMORTALITY    OF    THE    SOUL. 

Immortality  and  Psychology. — We  have  now 
proved  that  the  soul  is  a  simple,  spiritual,  sub- 
stantial principle  ;  and  we  have  criticized  at  some- 
length  the  chief  counter  theories.  The  truths  thus 
far  established,  though  interesting  in  themselves, 
derive  their  main  importance  from  their  bearing  on 
the  question  of  a  future  life.  This  topic,  however, 
cannot  be  isolated  and  kept  strictly  within  the 
boundaries  of  psychology  proper,  for  it  is  inseparably 
bound  up  with  problems  of  other  branches  of 
philosophy.  Immortality  of  the  human  soul  pre- 
supposes the  existence  of  God  ;  and  the  most  con- 
vincing arguments  of  a  future  life  are  deduced  from 
ethics.  But  this  fact  merely  evinces  the  solidarity 
of  the  great  metaphysical  questions,  whilst  the 
philosophical  science  of  the  human  mind  seems 
clearly  to  be  the  place  where  the  discussion  of  its 
destiny  ought  to  be  undertaken. 

Immortality  and  Theism.— Moreover,  although 
rigid  demonstration  of  a  future  life  presupposes  the 
existence  of  a  Divine  Ruler, — for  were  there  no  God, 
the  present  question  would  be  idle  and  meaningless, — 
still  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  some  of  the  proofs  of 
Immortality  are  amongst  the  most  forcible  arguments 


^26  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 


for  the  existence  of  the  Deity.  Anyhow,  the  considera- 
tions to  be  advanced  here  are  of  a  purely  rational 
•character,  and  prescind  altogether  from  the  assured 
certaint}^  of  an  everlasting  life  which  we  have  guaranteed 
by  Revealed  Religion. 

Teleological  Argument. — Our  first  proof  will  be 
that  deduced  from  the  nature  of  the  faculties,  aspira- 
tions, and  yearnings  of  the  human  mind,  and  the 
manner  in  which  they  point  to  another  sphere  of  exist- 
ence in  which  they  are  designed  to  enjoy  their  appro- 
priate objects.  Notwithstanding  the  seeming  success 
which  temporarily  marked  the  first  assault  of  the  theory 
of  natural  selection  on  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  it  is 
now  becoming  more  and  more  evident  every  day  that 
the  attempt  to  explain  the  universe  and  all  it  contains 
in  a  purely  mechanical  fashion,  as  the  fortuitous  out- 
come of  the  collision  of  blind  forces,  has  completely 
failed ;  and  that  the  theory  of  Evolution  is  hopelessly 
incompetent  to  solve  even  the  simplest  biological 
problems  without  ultimately  falling  back  on  a  teleo- 
logical conception  of  the  world.  At  all  events,  evolu- 
tionists themselves  are  fully  as  insistent  as  pre-Darwin 
ph3'siologists  on  the  axiom  that  there  is  no  organ  ivithout 
its  function,  that  no  activity  or  faculty  is  to  be  found  in 
the  kingdom  of  organic  life  which  has  not  its  fitting 
object,  its  appropriate  end  to  serve.  The  e^'c  would 
never  have  been  developed  unless  there  were  in  exist- 
ence light  and  material  objects  to  be  seen.  The 
mechanism  of  the  ear  would  never  have  been  evolved 
save  to  operate  in  a  universe  of  sound.  The  senses  of 
smell  and  taste  exist  only  because  there  are  real  stimuli 
to  exercise  them.  And  each  instinct  discovered  in  the 
animal  kingdom  points  infallibly  to  some  real  object  by 
which  it  is  to  be  gratified.  "  Everywhere  in  nature 
there  is  evident  the  law  of  correlation,  of  finality  of 
harmonious  reciprocity,  of  appeasement  of  real  needs, 
and  satisfaction  of  natural  tendencies."  ^  Even  the 
rudimentary  organ  is  held  to  establish  conclusively  the 
reality  of  the  past  or  future  occupation  for  which  the 

^  Cf.  J.  Knabenbauer,  S.J.,  Das  Zcugniss  des  Menschengeschlechtes 
juY  die  Unsterblickkcit  der  Seek,  p.  5. 


IMMORTALITY   OF   THE   SOUL.  527 

member  was  made.  In  fact,  all  the  evidence  gathered 
in  behalf  of  Evolution,  when  impartially  viewed  from 
a  larger  and  higher  standpoint,  merely  confirms  the 
main  thesis  of  Natural  Theology  that  the  Author  of 
the  world  is  a  Being  of  infinite  wisdom  who  governs  it 
in  harmony  with  reason  and  according  to  law.  If  we 
now  turn  to  Psychology  for  an  accurate  account  of  our 
mental  aptitudes  and  tendencies,  we  shall  learn  that 
the  Mind  is  the  subject  of  activities  and  powers  rising 
altogether  above  the  needs  of  the  present  life ;  and  that 
it  exhibits  talents  and  aspirations  which  find  not  their 
proper  satisfaction  here,  but  stretch  out  beyond  the 
present  existence,  demanding  a  future  state  in  which 
they  may  attain  adequate  realization. 

Aspirations  of  the  Intellect. — Man  alone,  of  all  creatures 
upon  earth,  has  the  power  of  looking  back  into  the  past  and 
forward  into  the  future.  His  mind,  by  the  indwelling  energy 
of  its  peculiar  nature,  strains  and  gazes  out  across  distant 
epochs  of  time.  Unlike  that  of  the  mere  animal,  its  interest 
is  not  confined  to  the  present  Now.  It  naturally  rises  to  the 
concept  oi endless  duration.  The  mystery  which  surrounds  this 
notion  has  ever  been  a  stimulus  to  thought  and  speculation. 
It  lies  at  the  source  of  man's  most  universal  and  deep-seated 
intellectual  cravings ;  whilst  the  most  ardent  admirers  of  the 
sagacity  of  the  lower  animals  do  not  venture  to  suggest  that 
the  idea  of  a  never-ending  future  exercises  their  intelligence 
or  troubles  their  peace  of  mind.  There  is  a  similar  attraction 
for  the  intellect  in  the  notion  of  space.  Thought  is  conscious 
of  the  power  and  the  impulse  to  transcend  the  physical 
boundaries  and  impediments  which  fetter  the  bodily  frame. 
It  feels  that,  unlike  material  energies,  it  can  in  an  instant 
reach  out  and  soar  beyond  the  utmost  frontiers  of  the  created 
universe.  The  conception  of  the  possible,  the  necessary,  the 
universal,  as  the  schoolmen  insisted,  is  the  special  fruit  of  man's 
intellect.  The  more  the  human  mind  is  developed  and  per- 
fected, the  more  it  feels  its  affinity  with  realities  which  lie' 
behind  and  beyond  sensible  experience.  (See  pp.  471,  472.)' 

2  Cf.  Piat :  "  Notre  pensee  n'est  pas  close,  comme  celle  des 
betes,  dans  una  portion  determinee  du  temps  et  de  I'espace ;  son 
elan  natif  remporte  plus  loin  :  de  quelque  maniere  qu'elle  s'exercc, 
de  quelque  cote  qu'elle  se  tourne,  c'est  toujours  de  I'Eternel  qu'elle 
a  en  perspective.  Or  il  y  a  quelque  chose  de  significatif  dans  cette 
excellence  de  notre  esprit.  En  face  de  I'eternite  le  temps  ne  compte 
pour  rien.     Si  longtemps  que  nous  ayons  vecu,  tout  nous  a  encore 


528  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Higher  rational  activity,  in  fact,  proclaims  that  the  true  and 
sufficient  object  of  the  yearnings  of  the  soul  must  lie  beyond 
the  confines  of  this  life  circumscribed  by  corporeal  conditions. 
If  every  organ  has  its  fitting  function,  and  every  instinct  its 
appropriate  object,  it  is  incredible  that  the  highest  aspirations 
of  reason  should  be  aimless,  and  the  noblest  energies  of  man 
should  be  ever  emptying  themselves  into  a  void. 

This  same  line  of  reasoning  is  accepted  by  as  thorough- 
going an  evolutionist  as  A.  R.  Wallace.  He  has  written  thus: 
"Those  faculties  which  enable  us  to  transcend  time  and  space, 
and  to  realize  the  wonderful  conceptions  of  mathematics  and 
philosophy,  or  which  give  us  an  intense  yearning  for  abstract 
truth  (all  of  which  were  occasionally  manifested  at  such  an 
early  period  of  human  history  as  to  be  far  in  advance  of  any 
of  the  few  practical  applications  which  have  since  grown 
out  of  them),  are  evidently  essential  to  the  perfect  develop- 
ment of  man  as  a  spiritual  being,  but  are  utterly  inconceivable 
as  having  been  produced  through  the  action  of  that  law  (of 
Natural  Selection)  which  looks  only,  and  can  look  only,  to  the 
immediate  material  welfare  of  the  individual  or  the  race. 
The  inference  I  would  draw  from  this  class  of  phenomena,  is 
that  a  superior  intelligence  has  guided  the  development  of 
man  in  a  definite  direction  and  for  a  special  purpose."  {On 
Natural  Selection,  p.  359.) 

Yearning  of  the  Will  :  Insatiate  desire  of  Happiness. — But 
the  intellect  is  not  the  only  faculty  which  speaks  to  us  of 
another  life  ;  the  conative  side  of  man's  being  insists  not  less 
urgently  on  the  same  truth.  In  each  living  creature  the 
collective  tendencies  which  issue  from  its  internal  constitution 
form  the  complete  expression  of  its  nature  or  essence,  and 
manifest  the  end  which  it  is  designed  to  realize.  The  specific 
tendency  of  the  human  being  is  rational  appetency.  This  is 
the  characteristic  outpouring  of  man's  being  ;  through  it,  his 
true  self-reaHzation  is  to  be  accomplished.  But  since  rational 
appetency  follows  upon  intellectual  cognition,  and  since  this 
latter  activity  tends  towards  the  universal  and  the  infinite, 
ever  insatiably  conceiving  better  and  more  perfect  objects 
than  those  presented  by  experience,  so  rational  desire  can 
never  rest  content  with  the  goods  and  pleasures  of  this 
life. 

manque  lorsque  nous  venons  a  mourir,  si  nous  mourons  tout 
entiers.  Quand  nous  sortons  de  la  vie,  Tadaptation  de  notre  pensee 
a  son  milieu  connaturel  n'a  pas  commence  ;  il  reste  entre  notre 
ideal  et  nous  une  disproportion  radicale.  II  faut  done,  pour  que  la 
finalite  soit  satisfaite,  que  notre  existence  se  prolonge  a  I'indefini." 
{Destinee  de  I'Homme,  p.  159.    Paris,  1898.) 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL.  529 

We  are  not  dependent,  however,  on  abstract  reasoning  for 
the  establishment  of  this  fact.  Our  own  consciousness,  along 
with  the  sages,  poets,  and  philosophers  of  every  age,  all 
iterate  the  same  truth.  There  is  implanted  in  our  nature  a 
yearning  for  happiness  which  can  never  be  satisfied  in  our 
present  sphere.  This  rational  instinct  exhibits  itself  in  the 
lowest  and  hardest  conditions  of  human  existence  ;  but  the 
wealth,  the  comforts,  the  luxuries,  the  art  and  the  science 
which  civilization  brings,  are  impotent  to  appease  it.  The 
power  of  conception  ever  exceeds  the  present  reality.  With 
each  successive  stage  of  mental  development  the  craving 
becomes  more  and  more  conscious  of  itself,  and  it  grows  and 
expands,  proclaiming  ever  more  clamorously  that  it  is  not  to 
be  satiated  with  any  finite  creature.  The  brute  animal  lives 
normally  in  a  state  of  content.  Its  faculties  and  instincts  find 
their  proper  nutriment,  and  it  is  satisfied.  But  for  man  "the 
eye  is  not  satisfied  with  seeing,  nor  the  ear  filled  with  hearing." 
Though  master  of  the  rest  of  creation,  he  is  condemned 
throughout  this  life  by  the  very  constitution  of  his  rational 
nature  to  be  ««-satisfied  with  his  lot !  Is  it  possible,  that  of 
all  living  beings  on  earth,  man  alone — and  in  his  highest 
powers — is  to  be  aimlessly  dis-proportioned  and  mis-adapted 
to  his  environment  ?  Is  this  highest  of  rational  instincts 
destined  to  be  universally  frustrated  ?  Are  the  loftiest  and 
best  yearnings  of  the  noblest  and  best  work  in  this  rational 
universe  to  be  for  ever  vain  and  illusory  ?  and  more  vain  and 
dissLppointing  precisely  in  proportion  as  by  moral  and  intellectual 
culture  he  developes  and  perfects  his  highest  faculties  ?^ 

Ethical    Argument. — It    is,    however,    from    the 
department  oi  Ethics  that  reason  puts  forth  the  most 

*  "  II  faut  done  ou  que  rhomme  soit  dans  la  nature  un  monstre 
incomprehensible  ou  qu'il  y  ait  pour  lui  quelque  chose  de  plus  que 
la  nature.  II  faut  ou  que  la  vie  de  I'homme  n'ait  aucun  sens  et  n'en 
puisse  jamais  avoir  .  .  .  qu'elle  devienne  de  plus  en  plus  intolerable 
au  fur  et  a  mesure,  que  se  deployant  davantage,  elle  enferme  plus  de 
raison  ;  il  faut  que  la  vie  de  I'homme  soit  impossible  en  droit  ou  v 

qu'on  la  con9oive  comme  la  premiere  etape  d'une  evolution  com- 
mencee  qui  doit  s'achever  ailleurs.  Si  tout  finit  avec  le  dernier 
soupir,  rhomme  est  un  etre  manqu^ ;  il  est  tel  par  nature  ;  il  Test 
d'autant  plus  qu'il  touche  de  plus  pres  a  son  point  de  maturity.  Or 
il  n'est  pas  rationnel  de  croire  a  une  antinomic  aussi  profonde  : 
on  ne  peut  admettre  que  cette  meme  finality  qui  s'accuse  si  visible- 
ment  dans  toutes  les  especes  inferieures,  s'arrete  brusquement  au 
plus  haut  degre  de  la  vie  et  y  fasse  a  jamais  defaut."  (Piat,  op.  cit. 
pp.  192,  193.     Cf.  Martineau,  A  Study  of  Religion,  Bk.  IV.) 

II 


530  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

irresistible  demand  for  a  future  life.^  Morality  is  an 
essentially  rational  phenomenon.  The  reality  of  right 
and  wrong,  of  duty  and  virtue,  of  merit  and  responsi- 
bility, are  amongst  the  most  certain  convictions  of  our 
rational  nature.  That  what  is  seen  to  be  clearly 
wrong  nmst  not  be  done,  notwithstanding  the  temporal 
disadvantages  which  may  ensue,  is  an  axiom  to  which 
the  intellect  gives  complete  assent,  however  feeble  the 
will,  may  be  in  actual  practice.  But  in  the  judgment 
that  conduct  entailing  a  sacrifice  ought  to  be  pursued, 
there  is  implied  the  further  judgment  that  it  cannot  be 
ultimately  worse  for  the  agent  himself  to  do  that  which  is 
right.  Our  intellect,  in  fact,  affirms  that  right  conduct 
is  always  reasonable.  The  supposition  that  virtue  can 
finally  result  in  a  maximum  of  misery  for  the  agent  ;  or 
that  wickedness  may  effect  an  increase  in  the  total 
quantity  of  his  personal  happiness  is  seen  to  be  in 
conflict  with  reason,  and  to  be  destructive  of  all 
morality.  It  is  impossible  that  perfect  and  fully 
enlightened  reason  can  recommend  us  to  do  that  which 
conscience  categorically /?y^/(is.  But  if  so,  our  perma- 
nent real  interests  cannot  be  injured  by  right  conduct. 
Duty  cannot  be  in  irreconcilable  war  with  rational  self-love. 

In  the  concrete. — The  issue  becomes  clearer  when 
we  face  the  question  in  the  concrete.  Can  it  be 
equally  well  in  the  end  for  the  successful  swindler  who 
amasses  a  fortune  by  the  plunder  of  his  clients,  and  for 
the  upright  man  who  honestly  struggles  through  a  life 
of  poverty,  and  resisting  temptation,  dies  in  want  ? 
Can  it  be  ultimately  the  same  for  the  forger  or  slanderer 
and  the  innocent  man,  whose  life  he  has  ruined  ?  Is 
there  to  be  no  difference,  when  the  last  breath  is 
breathed,  between  the  murderer  and  his  victim,  the 
adulterer  and  the  chaste,  the  martyr  or  the  saint  and 
his  malicious  persecutor  ?  History  affords  plent}'  of 
examples  of  bad  men,  with  hardened  conscience, 
prosperous  to  the  end  of  their  lives,  and  of  virtuous 
men  who,  owing  to  their  honesty,  have  died  with  the 
stamp  of  failure  on  their  earthly  career.     Our  whole 

*  The  ethical   proof,  resting  on  divine  purpose  in  the  world,  is 
itself  teleological,  but  is  conveniently  separated  from  the  former  proof. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL.  531 

rational  moral  nature  affirms  that  this  cannot  be  the 
final  outcome  of  things :  that  it  cannot  in  the  last 
resort  be  as  well  or  better  for  those  who  violate  the 
principles  of  justice,  and  those  who  faithfully  observe 
the  moral  law  seeking  to  conform  their  conduct  to  the 
ideal  of  right  and  holiness.  The  first  postulate  of  physical 
science  is  that  the  universe  is  rational.  Its  most  fundamental 
axiom,  the  law  of  uniformity ,  is  based  on  this  assumption. 
Would  it  he  a  rational  universe  if  vice  is  to  be  rewarded  and 
virtue  to  he  punished  in  the  end  ?  Is  it  a  rational  universe 
if  the  moral  life  of  mankind  be  founded  on  an  illusion  ? 
Can  the  holiness  of  the  world's  saints,  the  virtues  of  its 
best  heroes,  the  moral  life  of  the  mass  of  mankind  have 
had  their  source  and  origin,  their  never-failing  food 
and  support  in  one  huge  hallucination  ? 

Professor  Sidgwick  merely  expressed  this  truth  in 
the  most  moderate  terms  when,  after  all  decorous 
hesitations  and  qualifications  and  sub-qualifications, 
he  conceded  that  "the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being 
who  will  adequately  reward  me  for  obeying  this  rule  of 
duty  or  punish  me  for  violating  it,"  is  "  a  matter  of  life 
and  death  to  the  Practical  (Moral)  Reason,"  and  finally 
concluded  with  the  truest  philosophical  statement  in 
his  work.  "  The  whole  system  of  our  beliefs  as  to  the 
intrinsic  reasonableness  of  conduct  must  fall,  .  .  . 
without  a  belief  in  some  form  or  other  that  the  Moral 
Order  which  we  see  imperfectly  realized  in  the  actual 
world  is  yet  actually  perfect.  If  we  reject  this  belief, 
we  may,  perhaps,  still  find  in  the  non-moral  universe 
an  adequate  object  for  the  Speculative  Reason  capable 
of  being  in  some  sense  ultimately  understood.  But  the 
Cosmos  of  Duty  is  reduced  to  a  Chaos,  and  the  pro- 
longed effort  of  the  human  intellect  to  frame  a  perfect 
ideal  of  rational  conduct  is  seen  to  be  foredoomed  to 
inevitable  failure."^ 

Immortality  makes  Morality  always  reasonable. 
— On  the  other  hand,  if  the  present  life  be,  as  the 
Schoolmen  taught,  only  the  antechamber  to  eternity  ;  if 

5  Methods  of  Ethics  (Edit.  1874),  Bk.  IV.  c.  vi. ;  cf.  also  Balfour, 
Foundations  of  Belief,  pp.  339 — 354 ;  and  Mallock,  /5  Life  ivorth 
Living  ?  c.  ix. 


532  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  happiness  of  Heaven  means  the  perfection  of  man's 
highest  powers  and  the  satisfaction  of  his  highest 
aspirations  in  a  bHssful  union  with  the  infinite  source  of 
all  beauty  and  all  good  by  contemplation  and  love ;  and 
if  a  life  of  virtue  here  consists  in  the  perfecting  of  our 
nature  and  the  preparation  of  it  for  that  union  with  God, 
then  we  have  an  adequate  foundation  for  all  our  ethical 
notions.  And  we  are  provided  with  an  ideal  of  moral  life 
and  a  conception  of  man's  end,  which  explain  and 
harmonize  our  ethical  conceptions  among  themselves, 
and  their  relations  with  the  facts  of  our  temporal  life. 

Actual  sanctions  imperfect. — It  is  true,  of  course,  that  the 
present  life  is  not  devoid  of  moral  sanctions,  that  extreme 
courses  of  vice  generally  meet  with  retribution,  and  that,  as  a 
rule,  honesty  is  the  best  policy — at  least  where  the  police 
system  is  efficient.  But  it  cannot  be  seriously  pretended  that 
this  is  always  the  case ;  and  still  less  that  each  individual  act 
of  virtue,  and  every  noble  sacrifice  for  the  sake  of  duty  gains 
its  just  recompense.  It  is  indisputable  that  in  the  lives  of  the 
great  majority  of  men  a  certain  judicious  mixture  of  unscrupu- 
lousness  would  secure  to  the  agent  an  increase  in  the  dividend 
of  the  sources  of  happiness.  It  is  urged  also  that  the 
sanctions  of  conscience  and  of  public  opinion,  compensate  for 
all  other  deficiencies.  We  should  be  very  sorry  to  unduly 
depreciate  the  value  of  a  good  conscience  :  but  the  assertion 
cannot  stand  the  test  of  experience.  It  is  generally  only  in 
the  virtuous  that  conscience  is  sensitive ;  and  good  men 
probably  suffer  sharper  pangs  for  smaller  faults  than  the 
wicked  do  for  grievous  crimes.  Indeed,  the  more  abandoned 
the  criminal,  the  fainter  the  internal  moral  chiding  becomes ; 
whilst  agreeable  elation  or  complacent  self-satisfaction  over 
his  meritorious  performances  is  not  a  kind  of  pleasure  in 
which  the  truly  virtuous  man  is  wont  to  indulge.  Finally,  if 
belief  in  a  future  retribution  be  recognized  as  illusory,  both 
the  menace  and  the  promise  which  make  up  the  chief  part  of 
the  sanction  of  conscience  are  annihilated.  The  claim  put 
forward  on  behalf  of  public  opinion  as  an  adequate  sup- 
plementary sanction  is  equally  invalid.  For,  firstly,  the 
censure  of  society  cannot  reach  secret  sins  and  a  very  large 
part  of  man's  moral  life  ;  whilst  it  is  extremely  likely  to  err 
regarding  motives  on  which  the  goodness  or  badness  of  conduct 
essentially  depends.  Secondly,  the  only  public  opinion  for 
which  the  individual  cares  is  that  of  his  own  class  or  neigh- 
bourhood ;  and  this  not  infrequently  is  opposed  rather  than 
favourable  to  virtuous  actions. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL.  533 

Formal  Theistic  Proof. — Formally  assuming  the 
existence  of  God  as  independently  established  in 
Natural  Theology,  the  argument  for  a  future  life  may 
now  be  thus  enunciated :  An  infinitely  wise  and 
benevolent  God  could  not  have  implanted  in  all  men 
a  yearning  for  happiness  whilst  intending  this  natural 
desire  to  be  necessaril}^  finally,  and  universally  frus- 
trated. Nor  could  He  as  a  just  and  holy  legislator 
have  imposed  upon  mankind  His  Moral  Law  whilst 
leaving  it  incomplete  and  imperfect  through  defective 
sanction.  But  if  there  be  no  future  life  for  man,  God 
has  done  this :  hence  v/e  are  bound  to  conclude  that 
God  has  designed  to  continue  the  soul's  conscious 
existence  after  death. 

Argument  from  Universal  Belief. — Another  argu- 
ment upon  which  much  stress  has  always  been  laid  is 
the  practical  universality  of  the  belief  in  a  future  life. 
Such  a  conviction  in  opposition  to  all  sensible  appear- 
ances must  spring,  it  was  urged,  from  man's  ritional 
nature,  and  must  be  allowed  to  be  true  unless  we  are 
prepared  to  hold  that  man's  rational  nature  inevitably 
leads  him  into  error  in  a  matter  of  fundamental  import- 
ance to  his  moral  life.  To  admit  this,  it  was  argued, 
logically  leads  to  scepticism.  Adequate  treatment  of 
this  argument  would  require  considerable  space. 

Scholastic    Metaphysical    or    Ontological    Arg-ument. — In 

addition  to  the  arguments  just  given,  the  schoolmen  deduced 
a  proof  of  the  soul's  future  preservation  from  its  nature  as  a 
simple  spiritual  being.  This  ontological  demonstration,  it  must 
be  admitted,  has  not  the  persuasiveness  with  the  modern  mind 
which  it  possessed  in  the  schools.  Nevertheless,  when  properly 
understood,  its  defensive  value  is  considerable.  It  enables 
the  spiritualist  to  meet  all  materialistic  attacks  by  showing 
that  the  subject  of  our  conscious  life  is  constructed  to  resist 
the  destructive  agencies  which  corrupt  material  beings ;  and 
it  furnishes  a  conception  by  which  a  future  life  becomes  more 
intelligible.     We  shall  briefly  state  it  in  its  scholastic  shape. 

By  death  is  understood  cessation  of  life  in  living  beings. 
Such  cessation  of  life  might  conceivably  be  brought  about  by 
either  of  two  causes  :  annihilation  of  the  living  being,  or 
corruption  of  its  vital  principle.  Anniliilation  means  the 
reduction  of  the  object  into  absolute  nothingness.     A  creature 


534  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

is,  strictl}'  speaking,  annihilated  only  when  it  so  ceases  to  be 
that  no  element  of  it  remains.  A  being  is  said  to  be  incor- 
ruptible when  it  is  incapable  of  perishing  either  by  dissolution 
into  the  constituent  parts  or  elements  which  may  compose  it, 
or  by  destruction  of  the  subject  in  which  it  inheres  or  upon 
which  it  depends  for  its  existence.  Corruption  from  the 
philosophical  point  of  view  may  thus  in  scholastic  language 
be  of  either  of  two  kinds,  corriiptio  per  se,  essential  corruption, 
or  corriiptio  per  accidens,  accidental  corruption.^  In  corruption 
per  se  there  is  a  dissolution  of  the  being  into  its  component 
principles,  as  in  the  death  of  a  man  and  the  combustion 
of  firewood.  A  being  was  said  to  suffer  corruption  per 
accidens  when  put  an  end  to  indirectly  by  the  destruction  of 
the  subject  on  which  it  depends.  An  accident  perishes  in  this 
way  when  the  subject  in  which  it  inheres  is  broken  up  or 
changed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  no  longer  a  fit  support  for 
it,  as  in  the  case  of  the  disappearance  of  the  shape  and 
colour  from  a  ball  of  melting  snow  or  butter.  According  to 
the  opinion  most  commonly  received  among  the  schoolmen, 
the  extinction  of  the  vital  activity  of  brute  animals  and  plants 
is  an  instance  of  corriiptio  per  accidens. 

Now  the  Ontological  argument  claims  to  prove  three 
propositions  :  (A)  that  the  human  soul  is  both  per  accidens  and 
per  se  incorruptible  ;  (B)  that  it  can  be  annihilated  neither  by 
itself  nor  by  any  other  creature  ;  (C)  that  no  sufficient  reason 
can  be  assigned  for  supposing  that  God  will  ever  annihilate  it. 
It  should  be  clearly  understood  that  Almighty  God  could  by 
an  exercise  of  His  absolute  power''  annihilate  the  human 
soul  or  any  other  creature.  For  every  creature  continues  to 
exist  and  act  only  in  virtue  of  the  constant  conservation  and 
concurrence  of  God.     But  the  argument  proves  that  the  soul 


^  "  A  Being  is  incorruptible  if  it  does  not  contain  within  itself  a 
principle  of  dissolution  ;  it  is  indestructible  if  it  can  resist  every 
external  power  tending  to  destroy  or  annihilate  it.  If  the  indestruc- 
tible and  incorruptible  Being  is  endowed  with  life,  it  is  called 
immortal."  (Kleutgen,  op.  cit.  §  844.)  The  signification  of  these 
terms  varies  slightly  with  different  writers.  Kleutgen  points  out 
that  annihilation  is  always  possible  to  God  by  the  mere  withdrawal 
of  His  conserving  act. 

"^  The  phrase  potentia  absoluta  denotes  the  range  of  the  Divine 
Power  abstracting  from  all  self-imposed  degrees.  Within  its  sphere 
is  included  the  production  of  anything  not  involving  a  contradiction, 
such  as  would  be,  e.g.,  a  square  circle.  Potentia  ordinata  signifies  the 
range  of  God's  power  as  conditioned  by  His  free  decrees.  Thus,  if 
God  has  once  promised  a  particular  reward  on  the  fulfilment  of  a 
certain  condition,  He  cannot  henceforward  retract. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL,  535 

is  fitted  in  its  nature  to  survive,  and  that  God  is  the  only 
Agent  by  whom  its  destruction  could  be  accomplished. 

(A)  The  Soul  is  incorruptible. — It  has  been  already  demon- 
strated (i)  that  the  soul  is  a  substantial  bein^,  (2)  that 
it  is  simple  or  indivisible,  (3)  that  it  is  spiritual  or  not 
intrinsically  dependent  on  the  body  for  its  action  or  existence, 
(c.  xxi.)  But  a  simple  substantial  being  is  incapable  of 
corruption  per  se,  for  it  is  not  composed  of  distinct  parts  or 
principles  into  which  it  might  be  resolved  ;  and  a  spiritual 
substance  is  exempt  from  corruption /^^r  accidens,  since  it  does 
not  intrinsically  depend  on  the  body  for  its  existence. 
Therefore  the  human  soul  is  incapable  of  corruption  in  either 
of  these  alternative  ways.  Incorruptibility  is  thus  a  conse- 
quence of  immateriality.  If  the  mind  were  a  function  of  the 
brain,  or  an  aspect  of  nervous  processes,  then  dissolution  of 
the  organism  would  necessarily  involve  destruction  of  the 
soul.  The  refutation  of  these  hypotheses  in  our  first  three 
chapters  has,  consequently,  removed  the  chief  argument 
against  the  possibility  of  a  future  life. 

(B)  The  Soul  cannot  be  annihilated  either  (i)  by  itself  or  (2)  by 
any  creature. — Annihilation  is  the  reduction  of  something  to 
nothing.  But  this  result  cannot  be  the  effect  of  any  positive 
action  ;  for  every  positive  action  must  terminate  in  a  positive 
reality.  A  positive  act,  other  than  that  of  creation,  can  only 
change  the  state  of  the  materials  upon  which  it  operates.  It 
cannot  make  them  disappear  altogether.  Any  action  accord- 
ingly, whether  of  the  soul  itself  or  of  another  creature,  could 
at  most  effect  merely  a  change  or  modification  in  the  soul. 
Annihilation  is  possible  only  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  con- 
serving or  creative  power  which  has  sustained  the  being  in 
existence.  Now,  as  creation  and  conservation  in  existence 
pertain  to  God  alone.  He  only  can  cease  to  preserve;  and, 
therefore,  He  alone  can  annihilate.  The  argument  has  been 
thus  concisely  stated  :  "  Inasmuch  as  it  is  a  simple  spiritual 
substance,  the  soul  can  come  into  existence  only  through  the 
creative  act  of  God  ;  and,  therefore,  only  through  annihilation 
by  God  can  it  perish.  Annihilation  consists  in  the  refusal 
of  any  further  creative  conservation  :  accordingly,  He  alone 
who  preserves  and  sustains  a  being  can  let  it  sink  back  into 
nothing.  In  fact,  no  created  force  can  subdue  Omnipotence 
exercising  creative  conservation,  so  as  to  reduce  into  nothing- 
ness that  which  God  preserves  in  existence.  Divine  creation 
and  conservation  consists  merely  in  the  effective  volition  that 
something  be.  Now,  either  God  wills  that  the  soul  exists 
longer,  or  He  does  not  will  it.  If  He  wills  it,  then  His  will 
can  be  overcome  by  no  finite  power.  If  He  does  not  will  it, 
then  it  ceases  of  itself  to  exist  without  any  other  agency  beine 


536  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


cause  of  its  cessation.  Consequently,  the  soul  can  in  no  way 
be  destroyed  by  any  finite  power."  ^ 

(C)  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  Soul  will  ever 
perish. — It  has  been  now  proved  by  the  ethical  and  teleological 
arguments  that  the  soul  will  not  perish  at  death,  and  by 
this  ontological  argument  that  it  is  of  its  own  nature 
incorruptible,  and  that  it  can  be  destroyed  neither  by  itself 
nor  by  any  created  being ;  it  only  remains  to  be  shown  that 
there  is  no  ground  for  supposing  that  God  will  ever  annihilate 
it.  The  ultimate  end  and  purpose  for  which  the  Almighty 
conserves  the  soul  in  existence  is  His  own  extrinsic  glory, 
both  objective  and  formal.''  But  this  end  remains  for  ever; 
therefore  the  act  of  conservation  ought  to  be  everlasting. 

The  only  conceivable  grounds  which  can  be  suggested  for 
the  cessation  of  God's  preserving  action  are,  (a)  the  incapacity 
of  the  soul  to  act  when  separate  from  the  body,  with  its 
consequent  inability  to  apprehend,  to  praise,  or  to  love  God, 
and  (b)  the  unworthiness  of  the  souls  of  the  wicked  to  exist. 
As  regards  (a),  the  ethical  argument  proves  that  the  soul  must 
live  at  least  for  a  time  after  death,  and  be  capable  of  experi- 
encing reward  or  punishment.  It  must,  therefore,  be  endowed 
with  intelligence  and  will,  and  so  be  capable  of  contributing 
to  the  formal  glory  of  God.  The  mode,  however,  of  its  action, 
following  the  mode  of  its  existence,  must  be  different  from 
that  of  its  present  state,  (b)  As  for  the  wicked,  it  is  at 
least  possible  that  they  may  be  preserved  for  ever  to  vindicate 
by  their  punishment  the  justice  and  offended  majesty  of  God  ; 
though  that  this  is  a  fact  cannot  be  proved  by  philosophy  alone. 
For,  absolute  certainty  of  eternal  punishment,  as  of  everlast- 
ing reward,  is  afforded  us  only  by  the  infallible  testimony  of 
Holy  Writ.  The  congruity  of  such  unending  punishment  was 
deduced  by  scholastic  theologians  from  consideration  of  the 
infinite  majesty  of  the  Person  offended,  and  the  infinite  claims 
which  He  possesses  over  His  creatures.  The  rebellion  and 
ingratitude  of  the  creature  constituting  an  offence  under  a 
certain  aspect  infinite  was  held  to  be — even  in  the  light  of 
pure  reason — not  unfittingly  punished  by  a  penalty  finite  in 

^  Gutberlet,  Die  Psychologie,  pp.  314,  315. 

'-^  The  extrinsic  or  external  glory  of  God  is  that  given  to  Him  by 
His  creatures  ;  intrinsic  or  internal,  is  that  aftbrded  by  Himself  The 
former  is  finite,  the  latter  infinite.  Both  kinds  may  be  either 
objective  or  formal.  The  objective  glory  of  God  is  that  conferred  by 
the  mere  existence  of  His  perfections,  whether  manifested  in  Him- 
self or  in  His  works.  The  latter  is  compared  to  that  reflected  on 
the  painter  by  his  pictures.  The  formal  glory  of  God  consists  in 
the  recognition  and  acknowledgment  of  the  Divine  excellences, 
whether  by  Himself  or  by  created  intelligences. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL.  537 

intensity  but  unlimited  in  duration.  The  adequate  treatment, 
however,  of  this  difficulty  would  lead  us  into  the  territory  of 
dogmatic  theology. 

Objections  against  the  doctrine  of  a  Future 
Life. — As  the  proofs  of  Immortality  are  nowadays 
attacked  from  various  standpoints,  it  is  most  desirable 
to  define  accurately  how  much  each  can  reall}^  estab- 
lish. A  want  of  clearness  and  precision  on  this  point 
is  not  infrequently  exhibited  by  defenders  of  a  future 
life ;  and  they  sometimes  forget  that  the  use  of  an 
unsound  argument,  or  the  misuse  of  a  sound  one,  has 
often  seriously  damaged  a  good  cause.  To  us  it  seems 
best  to  admit  frankly  that  whilst  each  of  the  ordinary 
proofs  has  some  special  merit,  it  is  also  subject  to 
some  particular  defect  or  limitation  ;  and  that  it  is  only 
by  their  collective  combination  that  the  complete 
doctrine  can  be  satisfactorily  established. 

(i)  The  ethical  argument  demonstrates  that  there  must 
be  a.  future  co7iscioiis  existence ;  but  it  hardly  proves  that 
this  must  last  for  ever.  For  it  would  be  difficult  to  show 
that  God  could  not  adequately  reward  and  punish 
virtue  and  vice  in  a  finite  period.  (2)  The  teleological 
argument  also  proves  a  future  conscious  existence  in 
which  the  higher  aspirations  of  Intellect  and  Will  can 
be  satisfied.  And  although  it  may  not  rigidly  demon- 
strate that  the  future  life  must  be  endless^  it  points  to 
that  conclusion,  at  least  in  the  case  of  the  good.  But  it 
is  more  complex  than  the  previous  argument :  it  pre- 
supposes the  formal  establishment  of  the  law  of  finality 
by  Natural  Theology  or  Science ;  and  so  its  persuasive 
power  is  less.  Further,  respecting  the  future  existence 
of  the  wicked,  its  logical  force  is  distinctly  weaker. 
(3)  The  argument  from  universal  belief  is  subject  to  these 
same  limitations.  All  three  proofs  merely  establish  the 
fact  of  a  future  existence.  None  of  them  suggest  how 
this  is  to  be  reconciled  with  the  tendency  to  decay 
witnessed  in  all  living  organisms.  They  simply  leave 
us  with  the  antinomy  or  seeming  conflict  between  experi- 
ence and  reason  unsolved.  (4)  Here  the  ontological 
argument  comes  to  our  aid.  It  removes  the  conflict  by 
showing  that  the  objections  based  on  the  corruption  of 


538  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


material  beings  lose  their  force  when  directed  against 
the  subject  of  thought  and  self-consciousness.  It  also 
shows  that  continuity  of  existence  is  natural  to  the  soul ; 
that  is,  that  the  soul  is  apt  to  endure,  and  that  it  is  not 
liable  to  destruction  by  any  created  agency.  But  since 
this  continuity  of  existence  is  a  contingent  fact,  depend- 
ing on  the  free-will  of  God,  the  simplicity  or  spirituality 
alone  cannot  prove  that  this  continuity  will  be  certainly 
realized.  To  secure  this  recourse  must  be  had  to  some 
form  of  the  teleological  argument.  Further,  since  in  our 
experience  consciousness  is  liable  to  interruptions  ;  and 
since,  as  far  as  our  knowledge  goes,  mental  states  are 
always  accompanied  by  cerebral  changes,  the  ontologi- 
cal  argument,  without  still  further  help  from  teleology, 
would  be  unable  to  prove  that  the  soul  will  be  capable 
of  eliciting  conscious  acts  when  separate  from  the  body. 

I.  The  answer  to  sundry  difficulties  will  now  be 
comparatively  easy.  Thus,  for  example,  Professor 
James  writes :  "  The  substance  (of  the  soul)  must  give 
rise  to  a  stream  of  consciousness  continuous  with  the 
present  stream,  in  order  to  arouse  our  hope,  but  of  this 
the  mere  persistence  of  the  substance  pev  se  offers  no 
guarantee.  Moreover,  in  the  general  advance  of  our 
moral  ideas,  there  has  come  to  be  something  ridiculous 
in  the  way  our  forefathers  had  of  grounding  their  hopes 
of  immortality  on  the  simplicity  of  their  substance. 
The  demand  for  immortality  is  nowadays  essentially 
ideological.  We  believe  ourselves  immortal  because  we 
believe  ourselves _^2^  for  immortality."  (Op.  cit.  p.  348.) 

It  may  be  replied  that  the  demand  for  immortality 
was  teleological  eight  centuries  ago  in  the  time  of 
Aquinas,  and  long  before  in  that  of  Plato.  The 
philosophers  of  the  middle  ages  insisted  much  upon  the 
contmgent  character  of  all  created  things.  Not  one  ot 
them  would  have  put  forward  the  simplicit}^  of  the  soul 
as  an  argument  for  continuity  of  existence  except  on 
teleological  gronnds — as  indicative  of  the  intention  of  a 
wise  and  good  God.  It  is  an  essential  tenet  of  the 
scholastic  philosophy  (i)  that  the  continuous  existence 
of  every  creature  depends  on  its  free  conservation  by  Gotl 
and  (2)  that  all  its  operations  require  the  free  efficient 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL.  539 

concurrence  of  the  Divine  Being.  But  all  inferences  as  to 
the  future  free  actions  of  God  must  necessarily  be  based  on  the 
doctrine  of  finality.  For  the  persistence,  then,  both  of 
"  the  stream  of  consciousness  "  and  of  the  substance  of 
the  soul,  the  schoolmen  had  to  argue  from  the  "  provi- 
dentia  divina "  or  the  "consilium  Dei,"  which  is 
merely  the  Latin  for  theistic  teleology.  But  in  proving 
the  soul  to  be  a  simple  immaterial  being,  and  thus 
exempt  from  corrupting  agencies,  they  believed  they 
showed  its  conservation  to  be  natural  or  in  harmony 
with  reason ;  whilst  to  them  it  would  be  evidently 
incompatible  with  Divine  Wisdom  to  preserve  in  exist- 
ence an  inert  soul  devoid  of  action  and  consciousness.^^ 

2.  The  same  answer  destroys  the  force  of  Kant's  famous 
objection  based  on  what  he  calls  "  the  intensive  quality  "  of  the 
soul,  which  he  thus  stated  :  "  The  supposed  substance  (of  the 
soul)  if  not  by  decomposition  may  be  changed  into  nothing 
by  gradual  loss  {remissio)  of  its  powers,  consequently  by 
elanguescence.  For  consciousness  itself  has  always  a  degree 
which  may  be  lessened,  consequently  the  faculty  of  being 
conscious  may  be  diminished,  and  so  with  all  the  other 
faculties."  11 

1"  As  an  "encyclopaedic  ignorance"  of  scholastic  philosophy 
widely  prevails  in  English  psychological  literature  of  the  present 
day,  a  few  citations  may  be  useful  to  show  that  the  teleological 
argument  was  appreciated  by  St.  Thomas.  That  all  creatures  are 
contingent  he  proves  thus :  "  Hoc,  igitur,  quod  Deus  creaturae  esse 
communicat,  ex  Dei  voluntate  dependet ;  nee  aliter  res  in  esse 
ccnservat,  nisi  inquantum  eis  continue  influit  (infundit)  esse,  ut  dictum 
est ;  sicut  ergo  antequam  res  essent,  potuit  eis  non  communicare 
esse,  et  sic  eas  non  facere;  ita  postquam  jam  factae  sunt,  potest  eis 
non  influere  esse ;  et  sic  esse  desinerent,  quod  est,  eas  in  nihilum 
redigere."  {Sum.  i.  q.  104.  a.  3.)  But  the  soul  is  designed  to  exist 
for  ever :  "  Unumquodque  naturaliter  suo  modo  esse  desiderat ; 
desideriura  autem  in  rebus  cognoscentibus  sequitur  cognitionem  ; 
sensus  autem  non  cognoscit  esse,  nisi  sub  hie  et  nunc :  sed  intel- 
lectus  apprehendit  esse  absolute,  et  secundum  omne  tempus  ;  unde 
omne  habens  intellectum  naturaliter  desiderat  esse  semper  ;  naturale 
autem  desiderium  non  potest  esse  inane;  omnis  igitur  intellectualis 
substantia  est  incorruptibilis."  {lb.  q.  75.  a.  6.)  Again  :  "  Impossibile 
est  naturale  desiderium  esse  inane ;  natura  nihil  facit  frustra.  Sed 
quodhbet  intelligens  naturaliter  desiderat  esse  perpetuum,  non 
solum  ut  perpetuetur  secundum  speciem,  sed  etiam  individuum." 
{Cont,  Gent.  Lib.  II.  c.  55.     Cf.  Ibid.  c.  79.  ad  4.) 

^1  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (Meiklejohn's  Translation),  p.  246. 


540  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Undoubtedly  if  God  ceased  to  conserve  the  soul  it  would 
at  once  cease  to  exist;  and  whether  this  happened  suddenly 
or  after  a  gradual  waning  of  its  activity,  matters  not  a  whit. 
But  it  would  be  in  conflict  with  the  wisdom  of  God  to  suppose 
that  He  could  conserve  the  soul  in  an  inert,  unconscious 
condition,  devoid  of  all  activity.  Further,  the  argument  from 
Ethics,  and  the  desire  of  happiness,  in  so  far  as  they  establish 
anything,  prove  that  the  future  existence  must  be  conscious. 
Kant  seems  to  suppose  that  continuous  conscious  existence 
is  deduced  by  the  ontological  argument  as  a  necessary  result 
of  the  simplicity  of  the  soul,  apart  from  and  independently  of  the 
divine  conservation  and  concurrence.  The  argument  may  have 
been  employed  in  this  illegitimate  way  by  deists — certainly 
not  by  the  schoolmen.  For  them  the  aspirations  of  the  intel- 
lect, the  desire  of  happiness  and  the  simple  immaterial 
constitution  of  the  soul,  which  secures  its  immunity  from 
corruptive  agencies,  were  all  so  much  teleological  evidence  of 
God's  design  to  continue  the  soul's  existence  and  to  supply  His 
efficacious  concurrence  requisite  for  its  conscious  activity  in 
the  future. 

3.  A  disembodied  spirit,  it  is  affirmed,  cannot  be  pictured 
by  the  imagination.  "  A  spirit  without  a  body,"  Biichner 
assures  us,  "  is  as  unimaginable  as  electricity  or  magnetism 
without  metallic  or  other  substances."  Science  also  refutes 
our  doctrine.  "  Physiology,"  says  Vogt,  "  decides  definitely 
and  categorically  against  individual  immortality,  as  against 
any  special  existence  of  the  soul."  Again  Biichner  :  "  Experi- 
ence and  daily  observation  teach  us  that  the  spirit  perishes 
with  its  material  substratum."  To  observations  of  this  sort 
we  may  reply  that  {a)  as  far  as  imagination  goes  we  cannot 
picture  the  soul  with  the  body.  Neither  can  we  imagine  God, 
nor  the  ultimate  atoms  of  matter,  {h)  The  comparison  of  the 
soul  to  bodiless  electricity  is  a  complete  misrepresentation  of 
our  knowledge  of  mind.  Electricity  and  magnetism,  as  we 
have  already  pointed  out,  are  presented  to  us  only  through 
sensible  movements,  whilst  v/e  have  an  immediate  conscious- 
ness of  the  simple  nature  of  mental  energy,  (c)  Vogt's 
assertion  is  simply  as  false  as  his  other  dictum,  borrowed 
from  Cabanis,  that  "  thought  is  a  secretion  of  the  brain." 
Physiology  can  say  nothing  more  than  that  the  action  of  the 
soul  during  this  life  is  affected  by  the  condition  of  the  brain. 
{d)  The  final  statement  cited  from  Biichner  is  equally  untrue. 
We  most  certainly  cannot  observe  or  experience  the  death 
of  the  soul ;  and  we  trust  our  arguments  have  shown  that 
we  may  infer  the  contrary. 

4.  "  The  soul  is  born  with  the  body,  it  grows  and 
decays    with    the    body,    therefore     it    perishes    with    the 


IMMORTALITY   OF   THE  SOUL.  541 

body."^^  Modern  science  has  added  very  little  to  the  argument 
stated  with  so  much  power  by  the  Latin  poet.  Now,  we  have 
repeatedly  pointed  out  that  in  the  Scholastic  system  the 
human  soul  is  extrinsically  dependent  on  the  body  which  it 
informs.  Such  a  condition  would  completely  account  for  all 
the  correspondence  observed,  whilst  intrinsic  or  essential 
independence  remains.  Such  intrinsic  independence  com- 
bined with  extrinsic  dependence  is  thus  advocated  by  Ladd  : 
"That  the  subject  of  the  states  of  consciousness  is  a  real 
being,  standing  in  certain  relations  to  the  material  beings 
which  compose  the  substance  of  the  brain,  is  a  conclusion 
warranted  by  all  the  facts.  That  the  modes  of  its  activity 
are  correlated  under  law  with  the  activities  of  the  brain- 
substance  is  a  statement  which  Physiological  Psychology 
confirms :  one  upon  which,  indeed,  it  is  largely  based.  .  .  . 
Ail  physical  science.,  however^  is  based  upon  the  assumption  that 
real  beings  may  have  an  existence  such  as  is  sometimes  called 
*  independent,'  and  yet  be  correlated  to  each  other  under  known  or 
discoverable  laws.  If  this  assumption  could  not  be  made  and 
verified,  all  the  modern  atomic  theory  would  stand  for 
nothing  but  a  vain  show  of  abstractions.  Upon  what  grounds 
of  reason  or  courtesy — we  may  inquire  at  this  point — does 
MateriaUsm  decline  to  admit  the  validity  of  similar  assump- 
tions as  demanded  by  mental  phenomena  ?  "  {Physiological 
Psychology,  p.  607.) 

The  soul,  moreover,  as  will  be  proved  in  a  later  chapter, 
is  created,  not  derived,  like  the  body,  from  the  parents.  It 
does  not  grow  in  the  sense  of  being  quantitatively  increased  ; 
but,  conditioned  by  the  efficiency  of  the  brain  and  sensory 
organs,  it  gradually  unfolds  its  capabilities.  It  does  not 
really  decay  with  bodily  disease,  although  since  its  sensuous 
operations  are  immediately  dependent  on  the  instrumentality 
of  the  organism,  it  must  naturally  be  affected  by  the  health 
of  the  latter.  The  argument  can  also  be  inverted.  In  many 
instances  the  mind  is  most  powerful  and  active  in  the 
decrepit  frame  of  the  old  ;  and  at  times,  in  spite  of  dreadful 
havoc  from  bodily  disease,  intelligence  may  survive  in 
brilliant  force  to  the  last. 

5.  The  argument  from  universal  belief  has  been  attacked 
on  the  ground  that  some  peoples,  and  many  individuals,  both 
philosophers  and  non-philosophers,  do  not  judge  there  is  any 
future  life.  It  may  be  observed  in  answer,  that  whenever 
the  proof  from  universal  consent  is  invoked,  it  only  pre- 
supposes a  moral  universality.  As  regards  the  nations  or 
tribes  who  have  been  asserted  to  believe  in  no  future  life, 

1^  Lucretius,  De  Rerum  Natnra,  Lib.  III.  vv.  446,  seq. 


542  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

advancing  knowledge  does  not  confirm  such  a  statement. 
The  greatest  care  is  required  in  interrogating  savages  regard- 
ing their  rehgious  opinions.  Inaccuracy  in  this  respect  has 
often  caused  the  ascription  of  atheism  to  tribes  later  on 
proved  to  possess  elaborate  systems  of  religion  and  hier- 
archies of  gods.  Future  annihilation,  asserted  to  be  a  cardinal 
doctrine  of  Buddhism,  is  by  the  vast  majority  of  the  disciples 
of  that  sect  understood  to  be  not  a  return  to  absolute  nothing, 
but  an  ecstatic  state  of  peaceful  contemplation.^^ 

Final  Objection. — There  remains  one  sweeping 
objection  which  strikes  at  all  the  proofs  alike.  The 
insatiate  desire  for  happiness,  the  intellectual  demand 
for  final  equity,  the  seeming  aptitude  of  an  immaterial 
soul  to  survive,  it  is  roundly  asserted,  afford  no  guarantee 
that  they  will  be  realized.  The  mind's  inferences  to  the 
ultimate  perfecting  and  setting  right  of  things  need 
not  be  valid  ;  our  intellectual  craving  for  completeness, 
harmony,  or  symmetry  in  the  universe  does  not  prove 
their  objective  reality. 

The  answer  is  that  the  postulate  here  is  not  merely 
the  satisfaction  of  some  particular  impulse.  If  those 
exigencies  of  our  reason  which  demand  a  future  life 
are  doomed  to  disappointment,  then  there  is  an  utter  and 
enormous  failure  which  involves  radical  perversity  in 
the  constitution  of  things.  Science  and  Natural  Theology 
alike  assume  as  first  principle  and  starting-point  the 
nationality  of  the  universe.  But  if  there  be  no  future 
life,  then  the  fundamental  principles  of  morality  are  in 
irredeemable  conflict  with  the  just  claims  of  reason : 
the  fount  of  seeming  law,  order,  and  finality  is  hopeless 
discord  and  senseless  strife :  the  most  imperious 
affirmation  of  our  rational  moral  nature  is  one  prolonged 
fraud:  the  ethical  life  of  man,  all  that  is  highest  and 
greatest  in  this  world — that  which  alone  is  truly  good — 
is  a  meaningless  chaos.  Intrinsic  contradiction,  absolute 
irrationality  is  the  last  answer  both  of  science  and 
philosophy  ! 

It  is  true  that  some  naturalistic  writers  adopt  a  lofty 
tone  on  this  subject.  The  old-fashioned  view  of  life  and 
morality,  they  assure  us,  was  base  and  ignoble.   Virtue, 

13  On  this  argument,  see  Knabenbauer,  op.  cit. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL.  543 


we  are  told,  is  its  own  sufficient  reward.  Profound 
contempt  is  expressed  for  "  the  pains  and  penalties 
argument"  of  Christian  philosophy.  The  doctrine  of 
rewards  and  punishments  is  an  ''immoral  bribe." 
Right  conduct,  we  are  informed  with  an  unctuous 
austerity,  ceases  to  be  worthy  of  approval  if  the 
prospect  of  thereby  attaining  everlasting  happiness  is 
allowed  to  enter  as  a  motive. 

The  academic  philosopher  from  the  university 
professorial  chair — enjoying  a  comfortable  income  and 
agreeable  occupation — may  sneer  at  the  moral  convic- 
tions of  human  nature  :  but  to  the  thoughtful  man  who 
gravely  looks  the  stern  realities  of  actual  life  in  the 
face  and  contemplates  the  suffering  of  multitudes  of 
mankind,  such  language  must  seem  the  most  flippant 
and  unworthy  trifling.  If  this  life  be  but  a  passing 
period  of  probation,  and  if  there  be  a  future  state  and 
an  infinitely  good  and  just  God  who  will  there  apportion 
to  all  their  just  award,  then  difficult  and  obscure  though 
the  problem  of  existence  be,  a  rational  solution  is  possible. 
But  if  instead  the  universe  be  naught  but  an  iron 
mechanism — whether  idealistic  or  materialistic  matters 
little — aimlessly  and  remorselessly  grinding  out  tears, 
and  pain,  and  sorrow ;  and  if,  when  once  this  frail 
thread  of  conscious  life  is  cut,  all  is  over  ;  then,  for 
vast  numbers  of  human  beings  hopeless  pessimism  is 
the  only  creed — and  often  and  often  suicide  the  most 
rational  practical  conclusion  ! 

Here  is  a  picture  :  "  I  think,"  says  the  poor  dying 
factory  girl,  "  if  this  should  be  the  end  of  all,  and 
if  all  I  have  been  born  for  is  just  to  work  my  heart  and 
life  away,  and  to  sicken  in  this  dree  place,  with  those 
mill-stones  always  in  my  ears,  until  I  could  scream  out 
for  them  to  stop  and  let  me  have  a  little  piece  of  quiet, 
and  with  the  fluff  filling  my  lungs,  until  I  thirst  to  death 
for  one  long  deep  breath  of  the  clear  air,  and  my  mother 
gone,  and  I  never  able  to  tell  her  again  how  I  loved  her, 
and  of  all  my  troubles, — I  think,  if  this  life  is  the  end, 
and  that  there  is  no  God  to  wipe  away  all  tears  from  all 
eyes,  I  could  go  mad."^* 

"  Cited  in  the  Grammar  of  Assent,  p.  312. 


CHAPTER   XXV. 

SOUL   AND    BODY. 

Individuality  of  the  Human  Soul. — There  still 
remain  sundry  problems  concerning  the  relations 
of  soul  and  body,  but  the  limits  of  our  space  compel 
us  to  compress  our  treatment  of  them  into  the 
smallest  possible  compass.  On  the  individuality  of 
the  soul  there  is  little  to  be  added  to  what  has  been 
already  urged  in  establishing  its  persisting  identity 
(pp.  464,  465),  and  in  criticizing  James's  view 
(pp.  485,  486).  The  conviction  that  I  have  an 
individual  mind,  insulated  and  complete  in  itself, 
distinct  and  separate  from  all  other  minds,  rests  on 
the  testimony  of  self-consciousness,  corroborated  by 
the  witness  of  other  men  concerning  their  own 
similar  experiences.  To  those  who  reject  this  argu- 
ment we  can  only  put  the  question  :  By  what  other 
conceivable  kind  of  evidence  could  the  fact  be 
better  demonstrated  ? 

Pantheism  of  mediaeval  Arabs.— Aristotle's  obscure  language 
concerning  the  nature  of  the  vovs  ttoitjtlkos  or  httelledus  agens, 
afforded  occasion  to  a  philosophical  heresy  already  alluded 
to  (p.  309),  which  prevailed  widely  amongst  Arabian  philoso- 
phers of  the  middle  ages.  Aristotle  speaks  of  this  faculty  as 
being  "separate"  from  the  body.  The  explanation  of  the 
paragraph  offered  by  St.  Thomas  is,  that  the  Intellectus 
separatiis  is  held  by  Aristotle  to  pertain  only  to  the  spiritual 


SOliL   AND   BODY.  545 

soul,  and  so,  unlike  the  sensuous  powers,  is  understood  to  be 
intrinsically  independent  of  the  organism.  The  Arab  philo- 
sophers interpreted  the  epithet  "  separate "  literally,  and 
assumed  the  existence  of  one  common  or  universal  Intellect 
superior  to  all  men,  which  in  some  mysterious  way  operates 
in  the  mind  of  each,  and  illuminates  or  excites  it  to  intelli- 
gence. Only  the  Intellectus  agens  is  made  separate  by 
Avicenna,  but  both  Intellectus  agens  and  patiens  seem  to  be 
viewed  as  extrinsic  by  Averrhoes.  Strange  and  fantastic  as 
this  doctrine  appears,  it  has  affinity  to  modern  forms  of 
Pantheism.  Thus  Spinoza  taught  that  our  minds  are  only 
modes  of  one  infinite  mind,  which  is  itself  but  one  of  an 
infinite  number  of  attributes  that  go  to  constitute  the  one, 
infinite,  all-embracing  Substance.  Hegel  held  that  all  human 
consciousnesses  are  but  transient  moments  or  stages  of  the 
Absolute  Spirit.  According  to  Cousin,  we  know  all  things  in 
the  Universal  Reason.  Even  the  Vision  en  Dieu  of  Pere 
Malebranche,  and  the  Hyperphysical  Idealism  of  Bishop 
Berkeley,  bear  some  relationship  to  the  Arabian  conception. 
In  this  last  view,  what  seem  to  be  our  intellectual  operations 
are  really  the  result  of  the  working  of  the  one  common 
eternal  Active  Intellect.  In  the  theory  of  the  French  Abbe, 
our  mental  acts  are  really  our  own,  though  their  immediate 
objects  are  ideas  in  the  one,  all-embracing  Divine  Mind. 
Berkeley  stands  opposed  to  both  in  denying  the  extra-mental 
existence  of  material  objects ;  he  also  looks  on  God  as  the 
cause,  and  apparently  the  external  cause  of  all  our  cognitive 
states,  sensations,  as  well  as  intellectual  ideas.  A  common 
objection  to  all  monistic  theories  is  that  they  reject  or  distort 
the  clear,  distinct,  and  immediate  testimony  of  experience 
for  the  sake  of  some  dubious  and  obscure  postulate  of  unity, 
or  of  some  even  more  dubious  a  priori  assumption  that  it  is 
impossible  for  mind  and  matter  to  interact. 

Unicity  of  the  Soul  in  Man.— Plato  allotted  to 
the  human  body  three  really  distinct  souls, — the  vor?,  in 
the  head,  the  Ovfxos,  within  the  breast,  and  the  kTnOv/xta^ 
in  the  abdomen.  Some  modern  authors  teach  that 
there  is  in  man  distinct  from  the  rational  sentient  soul 
a  vital  principle,  the  source  of  vegetative  life.  This 
theory  used  to  be  styled  Vitalism,  though  that  term 
now  includes  Animism  and  all  doctrines  which  maintain 
the  reality  of  a  vital  principle  superior  to  the  chemical 
and  physical  properties  of  matter.  Others  make  the 
rational  soul   numerically  different  from  the  common 

JJ 


54G  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY, 


subject  of  sentient  and  vej^etative  activities.  In  oppo- 
sition to  these  various  hypotheses  the  Peripatetic 
doctrine,  sometimes  called  Animism,  holds  that  in  man 
there  is  hut  one  actuating  principle,  the  rational  soul,  which  is, 
however,  capable  of  exerting  the  inferior  modes  of 
energy  exhibited  in  sensuous  and  vegetative  life.  In 
this  view  the  plant  possesses  merely  a  "vegetative 
soul,"  the  brute  a  *'  sentient  soul,"  containing  virtually, 
however,  the  faculties  of  the  vegetative  principle.  It 
is  hardly  necessary  to  remind  the  reader  here  that  the 
proof  of  a  spiritual  principle  in  man  is  independent  of 
all  theories  regarding  the  nature  of  vegetative  "  souls." 

In  Man  the  rational  and  the  sentient  soul  are 
one. — This  is  proved  by  various  considerations,  (i)  We 
have  the  testimony  of  consciousness  to  the  most  perfect 
identity  between  the  mind  which  thinks  and  the  mind 
which  feels.  Introspection  assures  us  that  it  is  the 
same  being  who  understands  or  reasons,  and  is 
subject  of  sensations.  (2)  I  can  compare  intellectual 
operations  with  sensitive  states,  and  affirm  the  former 
to  be  more  painful,  more  pleasant,  more  exhilarating, 
more  depressing,  more  enduring,  or  more  transitory 
than  the  latter.  But  this  can  only  be  effected  by  the 
two  compared  states  being  apprehended  as  modifica- 
tions by  one  and  the  same  indivisible  subject.  (3)  The 
intimate  interdependence  of  thought  and  sensation  is 
inexplicable  if  they  are  activities  of  diverse  subjects. 
In  particular,  no  reason  can  be  assigned  why  it  is  of 
objects  apprehended  through  sense  that  the  first  intel- 
lectual concepts  are  elaborated  by  the  understanding. 

The  principle  of  vegetative  life  in  man  is 
identical  with  this  rational  sentient  soul.— This 
doctrine  involves  two  theses  :  (a)  That  there  is  in  man 
an  active  principle,  which  is  the  root  of  the  vegetative 
functions ;  (b)  That  this  active  principle  is  not  really 
different  from  the  rational  soul.  We  will  begin  with 
the  former : 

(a)  The  vegetative  principle  in  man,  and  in  fact  in  all 
living  organisms,  is  a  special  force  or  energy  superior  to  the 
chemical  and  mechanical  properties  of  matter.  This  pro- 
position is  established  by  examination  of  the  character- 


SOUL   AND   BODY.  547 


istic  differences  which  separate  the  animate  from  the 
inanimate  world.     These  are  amongst  the  cliicf : 

Origin  and  Reproduction. — '' Omm  vivum  a  vivo:''' 
The  whole  weight  of  scientific  authority  in  recent  times 
confirms  Harvey's  dictum  that  life  proceeds  only  from 
life.  Formerly,  owing  to  the  imperfect  means  of 
experiment,  it  was  generally  supposed  that  spontaneous 
or  equivocal  generation  was  a  matter  of  every-day 
occurrence.  Improvements,  however,  in  the  microscope, 
and  advance  in  the  science  of  Chemistry  have  com- 
pletely discredited  such  a  view.  We  now  find  scientists, 
like  Tyndall  and  Huxley,  affirming  that  living  beings  are 
produced  only  by  living  bein;s.  The  property  of  life 
comes  only  from  a  living  a  ;ent,  and  such  agents  con- 
tinue their  race  by  the  generation  of  other  beings 
specifically  like  unto  themselves.  In  lifeless  matter 
nothing  of  this  sort  tak^s  place,  but  new  bodies  may  be 
formed  by  the  accidental  or  artificial  combination  of 
almost  any  kind  of  stuff.^ 

2.  Nutrition,  Growth,  Conservation,  and  Decay. — The  living 
heing  from  conception  to  death  passes  through  a  fixed  cycle 
of  clianges  constituting  its  life-nistory,  and  generically  distin- 
guishing it  from  all  forms  of  inanimate  matter.  Starting 
from  a  single  germ-cell  the  animate  organism  builds  itself 
up  after  a  regular  process  which  is  practically  the  same 
throughout  the  animal  kingdom.  By  its  peculiar  inherent 
•energy  the  iertilized  ovum  appropriates  and  adapts  to  its 
own  use  the  surrounding  nutritive  matter.     Assimilating  this 

1  "  I  affirm  that  no  shred  of  trustworthy  experimental  testimony 
exists  to  prove  that  hfe  in  our  day  has  ever  appeared  independently 
of  antecedent  Hfe."  (Professor  Tyndall,  Niuctecnth  Century,  1S78, 
p.  507.)  Huxley  declares  that  the  doctrine  of  biogenesis,  or  life 
only  from  life,  is  "  victorious  along  the  whole  line  at  the  present 
day."  [Critiques  and  Addresses,  p.  239.)  Elsewhere  he  asserts  that 
"  the  present  state  of  knowledge  furnishes  us  with  no  line  between 
the  living  and  the  non-living."  (Art.  "  Biology,"  iTwo'^"^-  ■^''''^-  O^h 
Edit.)  Virchow  describes  the  doctrine  of  abiogenesis  as  "  utterly 
•discredited."  (The  Freedom  of  Science  in  the  Modern  State.)  Balfour 
Stewart  and  Tait  state  that  "all  really  scientific  experience  tells  us 
that  life  can  be  produced  from  a  living  being  only."  (The  Unseen 
Universe,  p.  229.)  Tyndall,  Floating  Matter  in  the  Air,  p.  84.  shows 
clearly  the  fallacy  involved  in  every  argument  for  abiogenesis 
hitherto  advanced.  Huxley  gives  a  brief  history  of  the  question 
in  his  Critiques  and  Addresses. 


548  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLCGY. 

substance  it  grows,  and  then  divides  into  two  distinct  though 
connected  cells.  Each  of  these  subdivide  and  by  repetition. 
of  the  process  the  number  of  cells  soon  becomes  enormous. 
But  this  multiplication  of  cells  speedily  begins  to  reveal  that 
the  energy  of  the  primitive  germ  is  throughout  all  the 
operations  working  after  a  systematic  plan.  The  embryo 
commences  to  take  a  definite  shape.  The  new  masses  ot 
cells,  so  rapidly  being  manufactured,  are  gradually  formed 
into  spinal  chord,  viscera,  heart,  sense-organs,  etc. ;  and 
as  time  goes  on  the  specific  type  becomes  more  and  more 
distinct  until  we  can  recognize  the  well-marked  form  of  the 
particular  animal — the  fish,  the  bird,  the  elephant,  or  the 
man.  It  used  to  be  maintained  by  the  older  advocates  ot 
Organicism  against  Vitalists  that  life  is  merely  the  result  of 
the  organization  of  the  living  being;  and  it  was  believed  that 
the  future  organization  was  contained  in  some  way,  "  en- 
cased "  or  "  pre-formed  "  in  the  primitive  germ,  and  required 
merely  to  be  evolved.  But  the  progress  of  science  and  the 
establishment  of  the  fact  that  the  living  body  is  built  up  by 
the  accretion  of  a  vast  number  of  cells  has  rendered  such  a 
\iew  untenable.  Indeed  every  advance  in  science  makes  it 
more  and  more  certain  that  organization  is  the  effect  not  the 
cause  of  the  vital  energy.  The  fertilized  ovum  is  not  a  ready- 
made  miniature  organism  with  differentiated  members  merely 
needing  to  be  unfolded  and  magnified.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
a  microscopic  ball  of  protoplasm  containing  no  rudiment  oi 
any  organ.  But  this  tiny  spherical  mass  of  living  matter 
possesses  the  marvellous  power  of  dominating  the  physical 
and  chemical  properties  and  affinities  of  other  matter,  of  con- 
verting this  into  cells  like  itself,  and  of  multiplying  these  and 
arranging  and  distributing  them  until  it  has  built  up  the 
complete  fully  developed  animal.  The  germ-cell  thus  makes 
its  own  organism.  Throughout  life  a  process  of  metabohsm, 
of  waste  and  repair  is  continued  ;  and  according  as  one  or 
other  is  more  active,  we  have  growth  or  degeneration.  The 
living  being  is  ever  actively  adapting  itself  to  changes  in  its 
environment.  If  any  part  of  the  organism  accidentally 
suffers  injury,  this  vital  energy  which  compenetrates  the 
entire  mass  at  once  lays  a  levy  upon  the  remaming  parts  and 
combines  their  forces  to  repair  the  evil ;  and  they  all  show 
sympathy  and  contribute  out  of  their  resources,  or  lessen 
their  own  demands  till  the  damage  is  made  good  or  the 
wound  healed.  This  cycle  of  life  has  absolutely  no  counter- 
part in  inanimate  matter.  The  conservation  of  the  latter 
is  effected  by  a  state  of  changeless  repose.  If  increased 
it  is  by  mere  external  addition  or  juxtaposition  of  similar 
substance.      A   mass   of  lifeless    matter    possesses    no    real 


SOUL   AND   BODY.  549 


unity — no  part  having  more  than  an  accidental  connexion 
wither  influence  upon  any  other  part.  Even  the  crystal,  on 
which  advocates  of  physico-chemical  theories  of  life  have  so 
much  insisted,  is  a  mere  aggregate  of  molecules,  the  well- 
being  or  ill-being  of  any  of  which  affects  not  the  rest.- 

These  various  features  mark  off  by  an  impassable 
barrier  the  living  organism  from  dead  matter :  and 
constitute  against  Ovganicism  a  cogent  proof  of  the 
existence  in  living  beings  of  a  special  dominating  prin- 
ciple or  energy  superior  to  the  properties  and  forces  of 
inanimate  substances.  The  several  processes  of  nutrition, 
growth,  conservation,  and  reproduction  constitute  a  group 
of  operations  completely  transcending  the  chemical  and 
mechanical  powers  of  matter.  The  innate  tendency  to 
build  itself  up  according  to  a  specific  type,  to  restore 
injured  or  diseased  parts,  to  conserve  itself  against  the 
agencies  perpetually  working  for  its  dissolution,  and  to 
reproduce  its  kind,  manifest  an  internal  principle  which 
unifies,  dominates,  and  governs  the  entire  existence  of 
the  being.  On  the  strength  of  the  axiom  that  every 
effect  must  have  an  adequate  cause,  we  must  admit  a 
special  ground  for  vital  phenomena  in  those  material 
substances  which  possess  life.  It  is  true,  of  course,  that 
life  is  subject  to  the  conditions  imposed  on  its  existence 
by  the  chemical  and  mechanical  properties  of  matter ; 
and  that  many  processes  which  take  place  in  the  living 
organism  illustrate  laws  of   chemical  and   mechanical 

2  "  L'acquisition  de  la  forme  chez  le  cristal  n'est  en  rien 
comparable  a  racquisition  de  la  forme  dans  I'etre  organise.  Dans 
le  premier  cas,  et  ce  point  est  capital,  il  n'y  a  pas  evolution,  acquisition 
graduelle,  creation  progressive  de  la  forme  typique  definitive  :  non, 
cette  forme  existe,  complete,  parfaite  des  I'origine,  des  la  premiere 
apparition  du  cristal,  alors  qu'il  est  microscopique.  Cette  forme 
pent  croitre  par  juxtaposition  de  cristaux  ;  mais  quelque  accrue 
qu'elle  soit,  elle  demeure  absolument  semblable  a  elle-meme  dans 
tout  le  cours  de  son  accroissement.  Le  cristal  en  partie  brise  se 
repare  mais  de  la  meme  fagon  qu'il  s'est  forme  :  les  cristaux  sub- 
sistants  servent  d'appel,  de  centre  de  cristallisation  ;  de  sorte  que 
la  partie  detruite  se  retablit  par  juxtaposition.  La  reparation 
du  cristal  n'amene  done  pas,  comme  celle  de  I'etre  vivant,  une 
modification  plus  ou  moins  notable  de  forme  et  de  structure :  elle 
n'est  jamais  imparfaite  et  relative ;  elle  est  jetee  dans  le  moule 
absolu  du  cristal  primitif."  (Dr.  Chauffard,  La  Vie,  p.  358.  Cited 
by  Coconnier,  loc.  cit.  p.  186.) 


550  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

action  ;  but  this  is  quite  a  different  thing  from  saying 
that  Hfe  is  only  the  result  of  these  properties.  The  more 
we  know  of  chemistry  and  physics  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  better  we  understand  the  nature  of  ceUular 
activity  on  the  other,  the  more  hopeless  do  physico- 
chemical  theories  of  life  become.^  We  are  justified, 
then,  in  assuming  a  new  internal  energy,  a  directing 
force  which  determines  and  governs  the  stream  of 
activities  described  as  the  phenomena  of  life.  This 
force  is  what  is  meant  by  the  so-called  '^vegetative  sour' 
or  '^  vital  principle :''  and  all  the  arguments  proving  its 
presence  in  the  lower  animals  a  fortiori  demonstrate 
its  existence  in  man. 

We  can  now  establish  our  second  proposition : 
(b)  In  man  this  vital  principle  is  identical  ivith  the  ratioftal 
setitietit  soul.  The  intimate  union  and  mutual  inter- 
dependence subsisting  between  the  sensuous  and  vegeta- 
tive activities  cannot  be  accounted  for  on  the  supposition 
that  two  distinct  agents  or  principles  are  at  work. 
Organic  changes  and  sensations  arise  simultaneously, 
and  the  extinction  of  vegetative  life  puts  an  end  to 
consciousness.  The  vital  principle  is  the  force  which 
governs  the  evolution  and  development  of  the  organs 
of  sensibility  from  the  primordial  germ  cell ;  and 
pleasurable  or  painful  excitations  of  these  organs  react 
on  the  vigour  of  the  vegetative  activities.  Fear,  hope, 
joy,  anger,  may  instantaneously  affect  the  action  of  the 
heart,  stomach,  liver,  lungs,  or  the  state  of  the  nervous 
system  generally ;  whilst  conversely  the  atmosphere, 
narcotics,  the  action  of  the  stomach,  of  the  liver, 
circulation,  and  indeed  nearly  all  physiological  functions 
may  modify  the  colour  of  our  mental  life. 

^  Cf.  Professor  Haldane:  "To  any  physiologist  who  candidly 
reviews  the  progress  of  the  last  fifty  years  it  must  be  perfectly 
evident  that,  so  far  from  having  advanced  towards  a  physico- 
chemical  explanation  of  life,  we  are  in  appearance  very  much 
farther  from  one  than  we  were  fifty  years  ago.  We  are  now  far 
more  definitely  aware  of  the  obstacles  to  any  advance  in  this 
direction,  and  there  is  not  the  slightest  indication  that  they  will  be 
removed,  but  rather  that  with  further  increase  of  knowledge,  and 
more  refined  methods  of  physical  and  chemical  investigation  they 
will  only  appear  more  and  more  difficult  to  surmount."  {Nineteenth 
Century,  1S98,  p.  403.) 


SOUL   AND   BODY.  551 


In  a  word,  the  arguments  put  forward  to  reduce  the 
rational  sentient  soul  to  the  condition  of  an  aspect  or 
function  of  the  organism  contain  this  much  truth,  that 
the  ultimate  root  of  physical  life  is  identical  with  the 
subject  of  intelligence,  and  that  the  two  classes  of 
activities  consequently  condition  each  other.  Finally, 
if  the  rational  soul  in  man  were  a  new  entity  superadded 
to  the  living  being  already  animated  by  a  sentient  or 
vegetative  soul,  man  would  not  be  a  single  individual. 
He  would  be  no  longer  essentially  one,  but  two  beings. 

The  facts  concerning  the  origin  of  life,  to  which 
reference  has  been  made  in  the  present  chapter,  furnish 
another  decisive  argument  against  materialistic  evolution. 
There  is  an  impassable  chasm  between  living  and  in- 
animate substances ;  there  is  another  similar  division 
between  sensation  and  all  purely  physical  phenomena; 
and  lastly,  there  is  a  still  greater  gulf  between  the 
spiritual  activities  of  self-consciousness  and  free-volition 
on  the  one  side,  and  all  merely  sensuous  states  on  the 
other.  The  attitude  of  men  like  Huxley  and  Tyndall 
on  the  problem  of  life,  is  an  interesting  psychological 
phenomenon.  These  writers  vehemently  insist  upon 
experience  as  the  only  legitimate  foundation  for  belief. 
They  allow  that  experience  does  not  afford  a  shred  of 
evidence  to  indicate  that  life  ever  arises  except  from  a 
living  being.  And  then  they  conclude  that  life  did  arise 
spontaneously  from  dead  matter  in  the  distant  past  ! 
The  theistic  alternative  would,  of  course,  be  intolerable. 

Scholastic  Definition  of  Life. — The  scholastics  defined  Hfe 
as,  activitas  qua  ens  seipsum  movet — the  activity  by  whicli  a 
being  moves  itself.  The  word  move,  however,  was  understood 
in  a  wide  sense  as  equivalent  to  all  forms  of  change  or 
alteration,  including  the  energies  of  sentiency  and  intellectual 
cognition  as  well  as  local  motion.  The  feature  insisted  on  as 
essential  is  the  immanent  character  of  the  operations.  An 
immanent  action  is  one  which  proceeding  from  an  internal 
principle  does  not  pass  into  a  foreign  subject,  but  perfects  the 
agent.  All  effects  of  non-living  agents  are,  on  the  contrary, 
transitive.  Notwithstanding  the  multitude  of  atteuipts  made 
by  successive  philosophers  and  biologists,  the  definition  of  the 
schoolmen  has  not  been  as  yet  much  improved  upon.* 

*  Bichat's  definition  is  well  known:  "Life  is  the  sum  of  the 
functions  which  resist  death."     This  is  not  a  very  great  advance  if 


552  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


Difficulties. — The  solution  to  an  objection  often  raised  in 
various  forms  against  the  doctrine  of  the  last  chapter,  as  well 
as  against  that  of  the  present  or  of  the  next,  may  also  be 
indicated  here.  It  is  argued  that  a  corruptible  principle  must 
be  really  distinct  from  an  incorruptible  one  ;  but  sentient  and 
vegetative  principles  are  admittedly  corruptible;  therefore  the 
rational  spirit  in  man  cannot  be  identical  with  the  root  of 
inferior  Hfe.  Or,  if  it  is,  then  it  must  be  mortal.  To  this  it  may 
be  answered  that  a  soul  or  vital  principle  capable  of  merely 
sentient  or  vegetative  activity  perishes  on  the  destruction  of 
the  subject  which  it  informs,  and  is  accordingly  corruptible ; 
but  that  this  is  not  the  case  with  the  root  of  the  inferior  species 
of  Hfe  in  man.  Sentiency  and  vegetation  are  not  in  him 
activities  of  a  merely  sentient  subject.  They  are,  on  the 
contrary,  phenomena  of  a  rational  soul  endowed  with  certain 
supra-sensuous  functions,  but  also  capable  of  exerting  lower 
forms  of  activity.  There  can  be  no  reason  why  a  superior 
principle  cannot  virtually  include  such  inferior  faculties. 
Scholastic  philosophers  have  always  taught  that  the  virtue  of 
exerting  organic  functions  is  inherent  in  the  human  soul,  but 
that  these  activities  are  suspended  when  the  soul  is  separate 
from  the  body  after  death.  In  the  case  of  man,  therefore,  the 
root  of  sentiency  and  vegetative  life  is  not  corruptible. 

It  is  sometimes  urged,  that  the  existence  of  a  struggle 
between  the  rational  and  sensitive  powers  shows  that  both 
proceed  from  diverse  roots.  The  true  inference,  however,  is 
the  very  opposite.  The  so-called  "struggle"  is,  of  course, 
not  a  combat  between  independent  beings  within  a  supposed 
arena  of  the  mind.  It  is  one  indivisible  mind  which  thinks, 
feels,  desires,  and  governs  the  vegetative  processes  of  the 
living  being.  But  precisely  because  the  subject  of  these 
several  activities  is  the  same  they  mutually  impede  each 
other.  Violent  excitement  of  any  one  land  naturally 
diminishes  the  energy  available  for  another. 


death  can  only  be  described  as  the  cessation  of  life.  "Life  is  the 
sum  of  the  phenomena  peculiar  to  organized  beings."  (Beclard.) 
"  Life  is  a  centre  of  intussusceptive  assimilative  force  capable  of 
reproduction  by  spontaneous  fission."  (Owen.)  "Life  is  the  two- 
fold internal  movement  of  composition  and  decomposition  at  once 
general  and  continuous."  (De  Blainville,  Comte,  and  Robin.)  These 
definitions,  starting  from  the  physiological  point  of  view,  aim 
merely  at  summing  up  the  phenomena  of  vegetative  life,  and  exclude 
intellectual  activity.  Mr.  Spencer  with  his  wonted  lucidity,  defines 
life  as  "the  continuous  adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  external 
relations." 


SOUL   AND  BODY.  553 


Union  of  Soul  and  Body. — We  have  criticized  at 
some  length  (c.  xxiii.),  the  accounts  of  the  union  of  mind 
and  body  furnished  by  Monism  :  we  must  now  turn  to 
those  of  Duahsm.  Of  spirituaHst  theories  the  most 
celebrated  are  :  (i)  that  of  Plato,  (2)  Occasionalism, 
(3)  Pre-established  harmony,  (4)  the  doctrine  of  Matter 
and  Form.  The  first  three  are  all  forms  of  exaggerated 
Dualism  ;  the  last  alone  recognizes  the  essential  unity 
of  man. 

Ultra-dualistic  Theories. — (i)  The  rational  soul, 
according  to  Plato,  who  historically  comes  first,  is  a  pure 
spirit  incarcerated  in  a  body  for  some  crime  committed 
during  a  former  life.  (p.  255.)  Its  relation  to  the  organism 
is  analogous  to  that  of  the  rider  to  his  horse  ;  or  of  the 
pilot  to  his  ship.  Since  it  is  not  naturally  ordained  to 
inform  the  body,  the  soul  receives  nothing  but  hindrance 
from  its  partner.  This  fanciful  hypothesis,  it  is  needless 
to  say,  does  not  receive  much  favour  at  the  present  day. 
There  is  no  real  evidence  of  such  a  pre-natal  existence; 
and  the  doctrine  would  make  man  not  one,  but  two 
beings  accidentally  conjoined. 

(2)  Geulincx  and  Malebranche,  logically  developing 
Descartes'  doctrine  of  the  mutual  independence  of  soul 
and  body  (pp.  256 — 259),  explain  their  union  by  the 
theory  of  Occasionalism  or  Divine  Assistance.  Soul 
and  body  are  conceived  in  this  system  as  two  opposed 


and  distinct  beings  between  whom  no  real  interaction 
can  take  place.  It  is  God  alone  who  effects  changes 
in  either.  On  the  occasion  of  a  modification  of  the 
soul  He  produces  an  appropriate  movement  in  the 
body  ;  and  vice  versa.  All  our  sensations,  thoughts,  and 
volitions  are  immediate  results  not  of  the  impressions  of 
material  objects  upon  us,  but  of  God  Himself;  and 
similarly  our  actions  are  due  not  to  our  own,  but  to  the 
Divine  Will.  W'e  have  here  the  theory  oi psycho-physical 
parallelism  plus  the  Divine  Agency.  The  doctrine  of 
Occasionalism,  however,  is  not  confined  by  Malebranche 
to  the  interaction  of  soul  and  body.  No  created  things 
have,  in  his  view,  any  real  efficiency.  The  First  Cause 
is  the  only  operative  cause. 

The  establishment  of  the  genuine  activity  of  secondary 


554  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

causes  in  general,  we  leave  to  the  volume  on  Meta- 
physics ;^  here  it  is  enough  to  point  out  the  errors  of 
Occasionalism  within  the  sphere  of  Psychology.  This 
theory  is  superior  to  those  criticized  in  chapter  xxiii.,  at 
least  in  this,  that  it  certainly  provides  an  adequate  cause 
for  the  events  of  life.  But  in  doing  so  it  renders 
purposeless  the  ingenious  machinery  of  the  various 
sense-organs.  It  makes  illusory  the  testimony  of  con- 
sciousness to  personal  causality  in  the  exercise  of 
volition  and  self-control.  It  conflicts  with  the  irre- 
sistible conviction,  based  on  the  experience  of  our 
whole  life,  that  our  sensations  are  really  excited  by  the 
impressions  of  external  objects,  and  that  our  volitions 
do  really  cause  our  physical  movements.  Finally, 
Occasionalism  involves  the  gratuitous  assumption  of  a 
continuous  miracle,  removes  responsibility  from  man, 
and  makes  God  the  author  of  sin. 

(3)  The  theory  of  Pre-established  Harmony,  in- 
vented by  Leibnitz,  substitutes  for  the  never-ceasing 
miracles  of  Occasionalism  a  single  miraculous  act  at 
the  beginning.  Soul  and  body  do  not  really  influence 
one  another,  but  both  proceed  like  two  clocks  started 
together  in  a  divinely  pre-arranged  correspondence.  Leibnitz's 
system  is  the  most  thorough  and  consistent  reasoning 
out  of  the  theory  of  psycho-physical  parallelism ;  and  it 
excels  the  hypotheses  of  Clifford  and  Hoffding  in  that  it 
offers  an  intelligible  explanation  of  the  parallelism,  whilst 
they  give  7wne  at  all.  But  it  does  so  by  invoking  a 
miracle.  Our  objections  to  this  theory  are  substantially 
the  same  as  to  the  last.  In  both,  the  union  between 
mind  and  body  is  accidental,  not  essential ;  and  we 
have  in  man  really  two  beings  instead  of  one. *^ 

^  Cf.  Rickaby,  pp.  308—313. 

^  See  also  pp.  262 — 264.  Another  theory,  that  of  "Physical 
Influx,"  constitutes  the  union  of  soul  and  body  in  their  mutual 
interaction.  This  account,  however,  is  either  merely  a  statement 
of  the  fact  that  they  do  influence  each  other,  or  an  explanation 
which  would  dissolve  the  substantial  union  into  an  accidental 
relation  between  two  juxtaposed  beings.  Cudworth  invoked  the 
assistance  of  a  plastic  medium — an  entity  intermediate  between 
matter  and  spirit — to  solve  the  problem.  But  this  would  merely 
double  the  difficulties. 


SOUL   AND   BODY.  555 


The  Aristotelico-Scholastic  Doctrine.— The  most 
satisfactory  theory  is  the  old  Peripatetic  doctrine.  This 
explanation  was  formulated  by  Aristotle,  and  later  on 
adopted  by  St.  Thomas  and  all  the  leading  Scholastic 
philosophers.  The  soul  is  described  by  these  writers 
as  the  substantial  form  of  the  living  being.  This  being  is 
conceived  as  the  resultant  of  two  factors, — the  one 
active  and  determining,  the  other  passive  and  deter- 
minable. The  first  is  called  the  Form,  the  second  the 
Matter  of  the  being.  The  general  problem  of  the  nature 
and  relations  of  Matter  and  Form,  which  runs  through 
the  entire  Scholastic  system  of  Philosophy,  belongs 
especially  to  Cosmology.  Here  we  shall  merely  offer  a 
few  brief  words  on  the  question,  and  refer  the  English 
reader  desirous  of  obtaining  a  thorough  grasp  of  the 
subject  to  Father  Harper's  Metaphysics  of  the  School, 
especially  Book  V.  chapters  ii.  iii. 

Aristotle's  four  Causes. — Aristotle  resolves  all  kinds  of 
causes  into  four  great  classes  ;  the  final  cause,  the  efficient 
cause,  the  formal  cause,  d.nd  the  material  cause.  The  last  two 
are  intrinsic,  the  first  two  extrinsic  to  the  effect.  The  final 
cause  is  the  end  in  view — the  good  for  the  sake  of  which  a 
thing  is  done.  An  efficient  cause  is  a  being  by  the  real  activity 
of  which  another  being  is  brought  into  existence.  The 
material  cause  is  the  reality  out  of  which  the  complete  bodily 
substance  is  made.  The  form  or  formal  cause  is  that  reality  in 
the  complete  bodily  substance  which  gives  to  it  its  proper 
being  or  essential  nature.  These  four  species  of  causes  are 
easily  distinguished  in  the  production  of  a  statue.  The 
material  principle  is  the  iron,  bronze,  or  stone — the  stuff  out 
of  which  the  particular  statue  is  wrought.  The  formal  prin- 
ciple is  the  determining  figure  or  shape,  by  which  the  statue 
is  made  to  represent  Napoleon  or  Nelson."  The  efficient 
cause  is  the  sculptor,  his  hammer,  chisel,  etc.  The  final 
cause  is  the  satisfaction,  fame,  or  money  which  the  artist  has 
in  view  in  the  production  of  the  w^ork. 

Scholastic  development. — Now,  all  things  are  created  by 
God  for  His  own  greater  glory.  They  are  manifestations  of 
His  excellence,  exhibitions  of  His  power  and  wisdom  ;  or,  in 

''  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  materia  prima  never  exists  as 
such ;  there  is  no  matter  which  is  in  the  Scholastic  sense  actually- 
devoid  of  all  form.  The  bronze,  for  instance,  which  stands  in  the 
relation  of  matter  to  the  Nelsonic  form,  is  conceived  as  distinguished 
from  iron  or  carbon  by  its  own  specific  form. 


556  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

the  case  of  intelligent  beings,  they  both  manifest  and  recognize 
His  excellence.  We  have  thus  in  God  the  first  efficient 
cause,  and  the  ultimate  final  cause  of  every  creature.  Further- 
more, in  the  Scholastic  system  all  material  beings  are  viewed 
as  the  product  of  two  con-created  constituent  factors — the 
one  passive  and  recipient,  the  other  active  and  determining. 
The  first  is  styled  the  matter,  the  second  the  form,  and  both 
are  called  substantial  principles  inasmuch  as  by  their  coales- 
cence they  constitute  one  complete  substantial  being. ^  The 
form  is  the  factor  which  determines  the  essential  7iature  of 
each  being.  Thence  proceed  all  its  specific  activities.  As  in 
Aristotle's  view  the  prima  materia,  the  ultimate  substratum,  is 
alike  in  all  substances,  their  specific  differences  are  due  to 
dissimilarities  of  kind  in  the  actuating  co-efficient.  The  dis- 
tinctive properties  of  iron,  carbon,  and  gold  have  thus  their 
root  in  the  different  formal  elements  entering  into  the  consti- 
tution of  each. 

The  Soul  the  "Form"  of  the  living  being. — In  living 
organisms  the  vital  principle  is  the  substantial  form.  It  is  this 
determining  factor  which  defines  the  essential  nature  of  the 
plant  or  animal ;  and  from  it  proceed  the  activities  by  which 
the  being  is  separated  from  other  species  of  things,  whether 
animate  or  inanimate.  A  substantial  form  is  accordingly  defined 
as  a  determining  principle  which  by  its  union  with  the  subject  that 
it  actuates  constitutes  a  complete  substance  of  a  determinate  species. 
It  should,  however,  be  clearly  understood  that  the  proposition, 
"  The  soul  is  the  form  of  the  body,"  stands  on  a  quite  different 
footing  from  the  general  doctrine  of  "  Matter  and  Form  "  as 
applied  to  inanimate  substances. 

Argument. — It  has  already  been  proved  that  there  must 
be  in  each  living  being,  and  therefore  a  fortiori  in  man,  a 
vegetative  soul,  or  vital  principle,  to  which  is  due  the  natural 
unity  of  activity  comprising  the  phenomena  of  his  life.  And 
it  has  been  also  shown  that  this  principle  must  be  different 
from,  and  superior  to,  the  properties  or  forces  of  inanimate 
matter.  But  such  a  principle  must  be  the  substantial  form  of 
the  living  human  being.  For,  since  actio  sequitur  esse— since 
every  action  of  an  agent  flows  from  the  being  of  that  agent — 
the  principle  which  is  the  root  of  the  natural  activity  of  a 
substance  must  be  the  determinant  of  its  being  and  nature. 
Consequently,  as  the  vegetative  soul  is  the  source  of  all  vital 
activities,  it  must  bs  the  determining  or  actuating  principle  of 

8  The  substantial  form  differs  from  the  accidental  form  in  the 
fact  that  the  one  is  an  essential  constituent,  the  other  a  mere 
accidental  mode  or  determination  which  conceivably  might  be 
removed  without  affecting  the  nature  of  the  substance,  e.g.,  heat. 


SOUL   AND  BODY.  557 


the  living  being ;  but  this  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  it  is  the 
substantial  form  of  the  living  being. 

Or  the  question  may  be  approached  otherwise  thus  :  The 
vital  principle  is  really  different  in  nature  from  its  material 
co-efficient.  Furthermore,  the  vital  principle  is  not  a  mere 
accidental  determination  capable  of  removal  whilst  the  sub- 
stance remains  complete.  On  its  extinction  the  nature  of  the 
creature  is  destroyed,  and  the  living  being  is  changed  into  a 
lifeless  aggregate  of  matter — a  substance  or  substances  of 
completely  different  species.  The  vegetative  soul  is  thus  a 
substantial  principle  upon  which  the  very  being  of  the  sub- 
stance depends.  In  other  words,  by  its  union  with  its  material 
co-efficient  the  vegetative  soul  constitutes  the  active  living 
being.  That  is,  the  vegetative  soul,  or  vital  principle,  is  the 
substantial  form  of  the  living  body. 

If  the  vegetative  soul  in  living  beings  is  the  form  of  the 
body,  it  follows  at  once  that  in  man,  since  the  vegetative  and 
rational  soul  are  identical,  the  latter  nmst  be  the  substantial 
form  of  the  human  body.  The  rational  soul  must  also  be  the 
only  substantial  form  in  man.  For  man  is  one,  complete 
individual  being,  specifically  distinct  from  all  other  beings. 
Were  the  human  body,  however,  actuated  by  more  than  one 
substantial  form,  man  would  be,  not  one,  but  an  aggregate  of 
individuals,  since  each  substantial  form  would  constitute 
with  its  subject  a  complete  substantial  being  of  determinate 
species. 

The  Form  is  source  of  Unity  and  Identity. — It  is  on  the 
permanence  of  the  substantial  form  that  the  identity  of  the 
individual  depends.  The  material  constituents  of  the  living 
body  are  nearly  all  changed,  as  we  have  before  stated,  in  the 
course  of  a  few  years,  yet  we  affirm  that  the  man  of  sixty  is 
identical  with  the  boy  of  six :  the  soul  has  persisted 
unchanged.  It  is  the  same  simple  informing  principle  which 
reduces  the  different  parts  and  organs  of  the  body  to  the 
unity  of  a  single  being.  Neither  a  bale  of  cotton  nor  a 
bucket  of  water  forms  one  being ;  each  is  but  a  mere  aggregate 
of  parts.  Even  a  watch  or  a  steam-ship — although  the  parts 
are  unified  by  its  end  or  purpose — wants  the  unity  of  being 
which  is  exhibited  in  man,  in  the  brute,  and  in  the  plant. 
Though  working  towards  a  common  end,  all  the  parts  of  the 
machine  retain  their  chemical  and  physical  properties  in 
complete  vigour  and  mutual  independence.  In  the  living 
being,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  such  isolation.  The 
various  parts  are  compenetrated  by  the  informing  principle, 
their  individuaUty  is  merged,  their  several  tendencies  unified, 
their  natural  properties  transformed  and  subordinated  by  this 
dominating  and  enlivening  force. 


558  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

Complete  and  incomplete  Substances. — Both  Matter  and 
Form  are  sometimes  called  substances  by  the  Schoolmen, 
inasmuch  as  their  coalescence  results  in  a  substantial  being. 
Except  the  human  soul,  however,  no  forma  or  materia  prima 
can  exist  per  se  apart.  The  epithet  incomplete  is  occasionally- 
used  of  inferior  forms  to  express  this  circumstance ;  this 
adjective  more  properly,  however,  connotes  the  fact  that  the 
union  of  these  factors  gives  rise  to  one  complete  composite 
substance.  Even  the  human  soul,  though  capable  of  subsist- 
ing in  itself  apart  from  the  body,  is  styled  an  incomplete 
substance,  since  it  possesses  a  natural  aptitude  to  form  with  the 
body  a  single  complete  substance.  An  integral  part  of  one 
complete  being,  e.g.,  a  man's  hand,  is  also  spoken  of  as  an  in- 
complete substance.  The  terms  constituent  principle,  or  substantial 
principle,  seem  less  likely  to  mislead  now-a-days  than  the 
word  substance  if  employed  to  designate  the  essential  co- 
efficients of  composite  substances. 

Soul  and  Body  combined  into  one  Nature. — 

Moreover,  the  union  of  soul  and  body  results  in 
a  single  nature.  The  nature  of  a  being  is  simply  its 
essence  viewed  as  the  source  of  its  actions.  But  in  the 
living  animal  the  various  processes  of  growth,  sleep, 
motion,  and  sensation,  are  not  operations  of  the  soul  or 
body  alone,  but  of  the  being  as  a  whole.  They  are 
activities  of  one  nature.  An  individual  nature  conceived 
as  a  complete  being  subsisting  in  itself,  and  not  com- 
municated to  or  coalescing  with  another,  is  called  by  the 
Schoolmen  a  suppositum  or  hypostasis.  The  stippositum  is, 
therefore,  the  entire  and  ultimate  source  of  all  opera- 
tions. Hence  the  axiom:  Actiones  sunt  suppositonim. 
When  the  suppositium  is  endowed  with  intelligence  it  is 
termed  a  person. 

Soul  and  Body  one  Person. — Since  introspection 
and  external  observation  establish  that  our  vegetative, 
sensitive,  and  rational  activities  have  their  source  in 
and  belong  to  one  and  the  same  Self,  they  prove  that 
body  and  soul  are  combined  in  a  personal  union.  A 
Person  is  defined  in  scholastic  language  as  a  suppositum 
of  a  rational  nature,  or  an  individual  and  incommunicable 
substance  of  a  rational  nature.  Some  modern  writers 
frequently  speak  as  if  the  Mind  or  Soul  were  the 
human  person  ;  others  as  if  self-consciousness,  or 
memory,  or  continuity  of  consciousness  and  character 


SOUL   AND   BODY.  559 

(p.  488)  constituted  personality.  It  is,  indeed,  not 
practicable  in  ordinary  language  to  distinguish  con- 
stantly between  the  mind's  consciousness  of  itself  and  the 
person  s  consciousness  of  self — nor  is  it  desirable,  since 
it  is  by  the  rational  mind  that  the  living  composite  person  is 
capable  of  self-consciousness.  But  the  theories  which 
identify  the  soul  and  the  person,  or  worse,  conscious 
activity  and  the  person,  are  seriously  erroneous.  Locke's 
definition  of  a  Person  a.s  a  self-conscious  substance  is  also  in- 
accurate. Strictly  interpreted  this  would  render  a  sleep- 
ing man  or  an  infant  not  a  person,  and  an  interruption 
of  consciousness  would  break  up  the  personality  of  the 
individual.  J.  F.  Ferrier's  language  is  similarly  ex- 
aggerated when  he  asserts  that  "a  being  7nakes  itself  I 
by  thinking  itself  I,"  and  that  "  self-consciousness 
creates  the  Ego ;  "  and  Professor  Ladd  seems  to  us  to 
fall  into  the  same  error  when  affirming,  as  he  frequently 
does,  that  the  mind  is  its  own  conscious  activity;  that 
"  where  there  are  no  mental  states  there  we  cannot 
speak  of  the  real  existence  of  mind."  (op.  cit.  p.  145.) 
Memory  and  self-consciousness  reveal  but  do  not  con- 
stitute  personal  identity  ;  and  the  true  human  person  is 
neither  consciousness,  nor  soul,  nor  body,  but  the 
complete  Ego — the  living  rational  being  arising  out  of 
the  substantial  union  of  both  principles.^ 

The  reasoning  in  the  present  question  may  have  been 
grasped  with  some  difficulty  by  the  reader  unacquainted  with 
the  Scholastic  system.  Fortunately,  however,  the  problem  of 
the  exact  nature  of  the  relations  between  Soul  and  Body  is  of 

^  For  a  complete  treatment  of  the  notions,  persona,  suppositmn, 
etc.,  see  Rickaby,  Metaphysics,  Bk.  II.  c.  2.  The  terms  substance, 
essence,  nature,  severally  denote  the  same  object,  but  connote  more 
especially  different  features.  Substance  points  to  the  general  fact 
of  existence  per  se ;  essence  points  to  the  reality  of  which  the  being  ts  con- 
stituted;  nature  signifies  the  essence  as  principle  of  activity.  Supposition 
implies  that  the  substance,  essence,  or  nature  subsists  in  itself  in 
possession  of  such  complete  individuality  as  to  be  incommunicable  or 
incapable  of  being  assumed  into  another  being.  The  invention  of 
the  term  is  due  to  the  dogma  of  the  Incarnation.  In  Christ,  the 
Church  teaches,  there  is  one  Person,  one  rational  "  suppositmn,'''  but  two 
natures.  The  Human  Nature  of  our  Lord  does  not  of  itself  con- 
stitute a  Person,  or  subsist  in  se,  but  by  the  subsistence  of  the  Divine 
Nature. 


56o  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY, 

ver}^  secondary  importance  from  a  philosophical  point  of  view, 
as  compared  with  the  vital  questions  :  Is  there  an  Immaterial 
Soul  at  all  ?  and,  Is  there  reason  for  supposing  that  such  a 
Soul  will  have  a  future  life  ? 

Change  in  meaning  of  terms. — The  terms  Matter  and  Form, 
with  their  derivatives,  have  had  as  varied  and  extensive  an 
application  as  any  words  in  the  language.  The  importance 
of  what  is  signified  by  each  has  been  so  changed  that  the 
original  usage  is  almost  completely  inverted.  The  Scholastic 
followers  of  Aristotle  used  these  words  as  equivalent  to 
Potentia  and  Actus.  Potentia  signified  possibility — the  potential, 
the  unrealized,  the  incomplete  or  indeterminate.  Forma  and 
Actus,  on  the  contrary,  connoted  full  actuality — the  last  com- 
plement of  reality,  the  final  determination,  or  complete  realization 
of  being.  Now-a-days  we  speak  of  meveXy  formal  observance, 
unreal/orms,  and  irWial formal itics ;  whilst  material  is  equivalent 
to  important.  The  transition  has  been  going  on  for  a  long 
time  ;  but  in  strictly  philosophical  literature,  Kant  has  done 
most  to  bring  about  the  change.  Whereas  with  Aristotle, 
Matter  and  Form  are  ontological  or  extra-mental  principles 
of  real  things,  with  Kant  they  are  constituents  of  subjective 
knowledge.  The  German  philosopher,  as  we  have  already 
pointed  out,  uses  the  term  "  form  "  to  denote  a  purely  mental 
mould  or  character,  which  the  mind  imposes  on  the  "  matter  " 
of  knowledge.  The  latter,  though  of  course  a  mental 
activity,  is  supposed  to  be  excited  or  contributed  from 
without.  Formal  is  thus  equivalent  to  unreal,  or  objectively 
non-existent.  Material  truth  is  real  truth,  or  agreement  with 
extra-mental  reality  as  far  as  that  is  possible ;  formal  truth  is 
mere  subjective  consistency.  Kant,  however,  retains  some- 
thing of  the  ancient  application  of  the  term  in  as  far  as  he 
conceives  the  "  material  "  element  in  cognition  to  be  in  itself 
of  a  chaotic  indeterminate  nature,  requiring  to  be  perfected 
and  wrought  into  rational  intelligibility  by  the  imposition  of 
the  subjective  determining  factor.  In  addition  to  Kant's 
influence,  popular  experience  of  the  unimportant  character 
of  accidental  forms,  e.g.,  the  shape  as  contrasted  with  the 
contents  of  a  pudding,  has  also  contributed  to  the  change  in 
the  meaning  of  the  word. 

Aristotle's  definition  of  the  Soul. — We  ought  now  to  have 
rendered  intelligible  and  justified  Aristotle's  celebrated 
definition  :  rj  "^vx^j  ccttlv  evreXex^ta  rj  Trpcorrj  aroofiaTos  (pvcriKoii  ^coi]v 
i'xovTOS  dvudfiet,  or  ly  Trpcorj;  eWfXe;^6ta  acofxaTos  (fwaiKoij  opyaviKOv 
— "  the  soul  is  the  first  entelechy  of  a  natural  organized 
body  potentially  having  life,"  or  "  the  first  entelechy  of  a 
natural  body  capable  of  life."  By  entelechy  is  meant  in  the 
Peripatetic  philosophy  an  actualizing  or  determining  principle, 


SOUL   AND   BODY.  561 


as  opposed  to  a  recipient  or  determinable  subject — form  as 
contrasted  with  matter.  The  epithet,  first,  impHes  that  the 
soul  is  the  primary  form  by  which  the  nature  or  specific 
substance  of  the  creature  receives  its  determination  in  the 
order  of  being.  It  is  contrasted  with  secondary  or  accidental 
forms,  e.g.,  heat,  colour,  motion,  which  may  supervene  when 
the  prim um  esse,  the  first  complete  substantial  being  of  the 
object,  is  constituted.  A  natural  or  physical  body,  signifies 
that  the  subject  of  the  soul  is  not  a  mere  artificial  aggregate. 
The  adjective,  organized,  expresses  the  fact  that  the  body  is 
composed  of  heterogeneous  or  dissimilar  parts  adapted  for 
separate  functions.  The  last  words  of  the  definition  mean 
that  the  soul  is  united  not  with  an  actually  living  being,  but 
with  an  organism  capable  of  exercising  vital  activities  when 
informed  by  the  soul. 

Readings. — St.  Thomas,  Sum.  i.  q.  76;  Father  Harper,  Meta- 
physics of  the  School,  Bk.  V.  cc.  ii.  iii.  ;  Regnon,  op.  cit.  Livre  IV. ; 
Coconnier,  op.  cit.  cc.  iv.  v.  ;  Farges,  Matiere  et  Forme  ;  Kleutgen, 
op.  cit.  §§  80S— 842 ;  Mercier,  La  Psychologic,  Pt.  III.  art.  3. 


KK 


CHAPTER   XXVI. 

SOUL  AND  BODY  {continued.)     other  problems. 

Locus  of  the  Soul. — There  has  been  much  dis- 
cussion among  philosophers,  Ancient  and  Modern, 
regarding  the  precise  part  of  the  body  to  be  assigned  as 
the  "  seat "  of  the  souL  Some  have  located  it  in  the 
heart,  others  in  the  head,  others  in  the  blood,  others  in 
various  portions  of  the  brain.  The  natural  inference 
from  such  a  diversity  of  opinions  is  that  no  special  area 
of  the  organism  is  the  exclusive  dwelling-place  of  the 
vital  principle.  The  hopelessly  conflicting  state  of 
opinion  on  the  question  would  seem  to  be  due  to  the 
erroneous  but  widely  prevalent  view,  that  the  simplicity 
of  essence  or  substance  possessed  by  the  soul  is  a 
spatial  simplicity  akin  to  that  of  a  mathematical  point. 
As  a  consequence,  fruitless  efforts  have  continually  been 
made  to  discover  some  general  nerve-centre,  some  focus 
from  which  lines  of  communication  radiate  to  all  dis- 
tricts of  the  body.  The  indivisibility,  however,  of  the 
soul,  just  as  that  of  intelligence  and  volition,  does  not 
consist  in  the  minuteness  of  a  point.  The  soul  is  an 
immaterial  energy  which,  though  not  constituted  of 
separate  principles  or  parts  alongside  of  parts,  is  yet 
capable  of  exercising  its  virtue  throughout  an  extended 
subject.  Such  a  reality  does  not,  like  a  material  entity, 
occupy  different  parts  of  space  b}^  different  parts  of  its 
own  mass.  In  scholastic  phraseology  it  was  described 
as  present  throughout  the  body,  which  it  enlivens,  not 
circninscripiive,  but  dejinitive ;  not  per  contactum  qiiantiiatis, 
but  per  contactum  virtntis.  Its  presence  is  not  that  of  an 
extended  object  the  different  parts  of  which  fill  and  are 


SOUL   AND   BODY.  563 

circumscribed  by  corresponding  areas  of  space,  but  of  an 
immaterial  energy  exerting  its  proper  activities  ubiqui- 
tously throughout  the  living  body.  As  it  does  not 
possess  extension,  it  is  not  susceptible  of  contact  after  a 
quantitative  manner,  yet  it  puts  forth  its  peculiar 
virtue,  and  acts  with  the  same  efficiency  as  if  it 
possessed  a  surface  capable  of  juxtaposition  with  that 
of  a  material  body. 

The  Soul  is  not  confined  to  any  particular  spot  within  the 
organism. —  The  argument  may  be  formulated  thus:  The  site 
or  locus  assigned  must  be  conceived  either  as  extended  or 
unextended.  If  the  latter,  then  :  (i)  all  hope  of  any  physio- 
logical justification  of  the  selected  spot  must  be  abandoned, 
since  the  smallest  cell,  and  a  fortiori  every  general  nervous 
ganglion,  must  occupy  an  extended  space  ;  and  (2)  no  parti- 
cular unextended  point  has  better  claims  than  any  other ; 
therefore  on  this  hypothesis  the  soul  might  with  equal  reason 
be  located  in  almost  any  part  of  the  body.  If  the  site  allotted 
be  extended,  then  the  chief  merit  claimed  for  this  view  is 
abandoned.  If  the  simple  soul  is  allowed  to  be  capable  of 
inhabiting  a  really  extended  locality,  the  exact  area  of  the 
district  is  of  little  philosophical  importance  :  the  soul's  indi- 
visibility is  equally  unaffected  whether  the  space  be  a  cubic 
inch  or  a  cubic  foot. 

The  Soul  is  present,  though  in  a  non-quantitative  manner, 
throughout  the  whole  body. — It  is,  moreover,  so  present  every- 
where in  tlie  entirety  of  its  essence,  although  it  may  not  be  capable 
of  ubiquitously  therein  exercising  all  its  faculties.  The  proof  of  the 
previous  proposition  implicitly  establishes  our  present  doctrine; 
but  reflexion  on  the  thesis  defining  the  union  of  soul  and 
body  recently  proved,  completes  the  argument.  The  soul, 
since  it  is  the  substantial  form  of  the  body,  vivifying  and 
actuating  all  parts  of  its  material  subject  so  as  to  constitute 
one  complete  living  being,  must  by  its  very  nature  be 
ubiquitously  present  in  the  body.  For  it  is  only  by  the 
immediate  communication  of  itself  that  it  can  so  actuate  and 
vitalize  its  co-efficient  as  to  constitute  a  single  substance. 
Again :  since  the  soul  is  an  indivisible  essence  or  being, 
whenever  it  is  present  it  must  be  there  in  the  entirety  of  that 
essence  or  being;  consequently,  the  entire  soul  is  present  in 
the  whole  body  and  in  each  part — tola  in  toto  corpore  ct  tota  in 
qualibet  parte. 

Difficulties. — Tlie  chief  objections  urged  against  the  present 
thesis  seem  to  be  the  following :  (i)  The  soul  is  the  subject 
of  sensations,  but  these,  it  is  asserted,  are  originally  felt  only 


564  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

in  the  brain,  and  by  experience  thence  transferred  to  the 
peripheral  extremity  of  the  irritated  nerve ;  consequently  the 
soul  exists  only  in  the  brain.  (2)  It  is  impossible  to  imagine 
how  a  simple  or  indivisible  Being  can  be  simultaneously 
present  in  several  parts  of  an  extended  space.  (3)  If  the  soul 
is  thus  diffused  throughout  the  body,  it  must  be  capable 
of  increase  and  diminution  with  growth ;  and  also  of 
occasional  amputation  of  portions  of  its  substance. 

We  may  observe  in  reply:  (i)  Even  if  the  brain  alone  be 
the  centre  of  sentiency,  yet  the  entire  organism  is  the  subject 
of  vegetative  life,  and  must  be  throughout  animated  by  the 
energy  which  dominates  the  continuous  processes  of  waste 
and  repair.  (2)  Imagination  is  no  test  of  possibility;  we 
have  experience  only  of  the  modes  of  action  of  things  condi- 
tioned by  space  of  three  dimensions,  and  so  cannot  picture 
the  being  or  action  of  an  agent  free  from  such  limitations. 
We  are  similarly  unable  to  imagine  how  unextended  volitions 
can  move  extended  limbs,  or  how  spatial  pressure  can  excite 
any  mental  slate,  but  we  have  shown  the  absurd  consequences 
which  follow  from  the  denial  of  the  universal  conviction  of 
mankind  on  these  last  points.  (3)  The  soul  is  not  diffused 
throughout  the  body  like  water  in  a  sponge.  It  must  be 
conceived  as  an  indivisible  essence,  without  mass  or  quantity, 
exerting  energy  and  putting  forth  its  virtue  throughout  the 
animated  organism.  Those  activities,  however,  which  require 
a  special  organ  are  limited  to  the  district  occupied  by  the 
bodily  instrument.  In  so  far  as  the  material  subject  by  the 
lim.its  of  which  vital  activity  in  general  is  defined  and  condi- 
tioned, increases  or  diminishes,  the  soul  may  be  said  in 
figurative  language  to  experience  virtual  increase  or  diminu- 
tion— an  expansion  or  contraction  in  the  sphere  and  range  of 
its  forces;  but  there  is  no  real  quantitative  increase  in  the 
substance  of  the  soul  itself. 

Phrenology. — In  the  early  part  of  this  century,  the 
physicians  Gall  and  Spurzheim  elaborated  a  "  Physiog- 
nomical system,"  which  pretended  to  determine  precise 
localities  on  the  surface  of  the  brain  where  various 
mental  powers  are  situated.  Gall  marked  out  the  skull 
into  twenty-six,  and  Spurzheim  into  thirty-five  divisions, 
each  of  which  was  supposed  to  cover  a  definite  field  of 
the  brain  constituting  the  **  organ  "  of  some  particular 
mental  aptitude.  The  theory  thus  assumed  above  two 
dozen  primary  faculties  or  propensities,  such  as  those 
of  homicide,  property,  theft,  wit,  number,  secretiveness, 


SOUL   AND   BODY.  565 


etc.,  lodged  in  separate  compartments  in  the  surface  of 
the  brain.  Consequently,  by  measurement  of  human 
skulls,  the  relative  vigour  of  the  several  propensities 
could  be  easily  discovered,  since  special  "bumps"  or 
protuberances  indicated,  it  was  supposed,  greater  or 
less  endowment  in  the  corresponding  faculty. 

Phrenology,  Craniology,  or  Cranioscopy,  as  this 
pseudo-science  was  called,  has  long  since  fallen  into 
complete  discredit,  under  the  destructive  criticism  of 
both  Psychology  and  Physiology.  The  scheme  of 
"  primary  "  faculties  was  arbitrary  and  artificial  in  the 
highest  degree.  The  powers  and  aptitudes  enumerated 
are  not  isolated  or  independent  in  the  manner  implied. 
Many  of  them  are  complex  capabilities  involving  varied 
forms  of  mental  activity.  Moreover,  intellectual  facul- 
ties cannot  be  conceived  as  located  in  organs  in  the 
way  represented.  The  progress  of  physical  science,  on 
the  other  hand,  has  proved  the  erroneous  character  of 
the  views  of  the  phrenologists  concerning  the  physiology 
of  the  brain. 

Localization  of  Cerebral  Functions.— Neverthe- 
less, though  Phrenology  in  its  originally  ambitious 
character  is  now  generally  acknowledged  to  have  been 
exploded,  Cerebral  Physiology  has  for  some  twenty  years 
past  been  working  diligently  at  the  kindred  question  of 
the  localization  of  brain  functions.  The  leading  scientific 
authorities  in  the  second  quarter  of  this  century  unani- 
mously declared  themselves  against  the  hypothesis  of 
localization  in  any  form.  Flourens,  Magendie,  Longet, 
and  other  distinguished  writers  pronounced,  on  the 
strength  of  numerous  experiments  and  observations, 
that  scarcely  any  particular  portion  of  the  cerebral 
substance  is  essential  to  the  performance  of  any  parti- 
cular psychical  operation. 1     Consequently,  the  classical 

1  "On  peut  retrancher,  soit  par  devant,  soit  par  derriere, 
soit  par  en  haut,  soit  par  cote,  une  portion  assez  etendue  des  lobes 
cerebraux,  sans  que  leurs  fonctions  soient  perdues.  Uue  poytion 
assez  restreinte  de  ces  lobes  suffit  done  a  I'exercisc  de  leurs  fonctions.  A 
mesure  que  ce  retranchement  s'opere,  toutes  les  fonctions  s'affai- 
blissent  et  s'eteignent  graduellement.  .  .  .  Enfin,  des  qu'une  per- 
ception est  perdue,  toutes  le  sont ;  des  qu'une  faculte  disparait, 
toutes  disparaissent."  (Flourens.)  Cf.  Bastian,  Brain  as  an  Organ 
of  Mind,  p.  520. 


566  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 


Ph3^siology  from  1820  to  1870  proclaimed  that  the  brain 
as  a  whole  was  the  single  organ  of  the  mind,  that  the 
quantity^  not  the  locality  of  the  brain  which  is  destroyed 
affects  mental  activities,  and  that  the  degree  of  imbeci- 
lity induced  is,  roughly  speaking,  in  proportion  to  the 
amount  of  cerebral  matter  removed. ^ 

Some  experiments,  however,  of  the  German  physio- 
logists Fritsch  and  Hitzig,  in  1870,  threw  serious  doubts 
on  the  then  prevalent  doctrine,  and  a  new  movement  of 
research,  which  still  continues,  was  initiated,  with  the 
result  of  completely  overthrowing  the  old  teaching. 
By  a  series  of  elaborate  experiments  on  the  brains  of 
dogs,  monkeys,  and  other  animals,  Ferrier,  Hitzig, 
Munk,  Luciani,  and  more  recently  Flechsig  and  Von 
Bechterew,  have  established  a  fairly  definite  theory  of 
localization  of  "  motor-centres  " — that  is,  of  areas  in 
the  cortex  of  the  brain  the  irritation  of  which  produces 
movements  in  particular  limbs.  The  cerebral  areas 
corresponding  to  some  of  the  senses  have  also  been 
made  out  with  tolerable  accuracy,  others  with  less 
definiteness.  Of  the  physiological  concomitants  of 
particular  intellectual  activities  nothing  is  at  present 
known,  though  some  progress — how  much  is  as  yet 
uncertain — has  been  made  towards  the  determination  of 
"  association-centres.'' 

Method  of  research. — In  the  study  of  cerebral  functions 
three  chief  lines  of  investigation  present  themselves :  {a)  Ex- 
periment by  stimulation  and  extirpation  of  particular  portions 
of  the  brains  of  the  lower  animals  ;  (b)  Cerebral  Pathology, 
or  the  science  which  deals  with  brain  diseases  in  human 
beings;  and  (c)  Comparative  Anatomy  and  Histology,  which 
examine  the  structural  connexions  of  different  parts  of  the 
brain  and  nervous  system  throughout  the  animal  kingdom. 
Thus,  the  stimulation   by  electricity  of  certain  areas  in  the 

-  "  Sur  des  chiens,  des  chats  et  des  lapins,  chez  un  grand 
nombre  d'oiseaux,  j'ai  eu  occasion  d'irriter  mecaniquement  la 
substance  blanche  des  hemispheres  cerebraux  ;  de  la  cauteriser  avec 
la  potasse,  I'acide  azotique,  le  fer  rouge,  etc. ;  d'y  faire  passer  des 
courants  electriques  en  diver  sens,,  sans  parvenir  jamais  a  mcttre  en 
jcu  la  contractilitc  musculaire  :  meme  resultat  negatif  en  dirigeant  les 
mcmes  agents  sur  la  substance  grise  des  lobes  cerebraux."  (Longet.) 
Cf.  Surbled,  Le  Ccrvcau,  p.  149. 


SOUL   AND   BODY  567 


cortex  of  the  brain  of  dogs,  monkeys,  and  other  animals,  is. 
found  to  excite  movements  in  the  neck,  arms,  fingers,  legs, 
tongue,  etc.  Conversel}',  the  extirpation  or  destruction  of 
these  same  portions  of  the  brain  temporarily  suspends  the 
power  of  movement  in  the  corresponding  limb.  Again,  post- 
mortem examinations  often  show  that  atrophy  and  disease  of 
the  cerebral  substance  of  these  areas  have  been  concomitant 
with  paralysis  of  the  appropriate  limb.  Moreover,  several 
cures  of  such  local  paralysis  have  also  been  effected  by  the 
venturesome  remedy  of  trepanning  the  skull  and  removing 
tumours  found  to  exist  where  anticipated.'^  Finally,  com- 
parative study  of  the  structure  of  the  brain  in  different  species 
of  animals  tends  to  establish  the  identity  of  the  "areas" 
constituting  the  "motor-centres"  of  the  several  limbs;  and  it 
also  shows  that  the  number  and  definiteness  of  such  "  areas" 
increase  in  proportion  as  we  rise  in  the  animal  kingdom  and 
examine  more  highly  specialized  brains.  And  quite  recently 
the  study  of  embryonic  anatomy  has  enabled  Flechsig  to 
reach  valuable  results  by  determining  the  date  at  which 
certain  neural  connexions  are  completed,  and  nerve-fibres 
attain  maturity  and  are  capable  of  functioning. 

Results. — By  these  various  methods  of  research  Ferrier 
succeeded  in  mapping  out  on  the  surface  of  the  brain  above  a 
dozen  "  motor-centres."  Successive  explorers  have  subdivided 
and  largely  increased  the  number  of  these  areas.  They  are 
mostly  situated  in  the  vicinity  of  the  summit  of  the  cerebrum, 
about  midway  between  the  top  of  the  forehead  and  the  back 
of  the  head — technically  in  the  neighbourhood  oi  the  fissure- 
of  Rolando  and  the  calloso-marginal  fissure.  (See,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  book,  Fig.  vi.  and  Fig.  vii.,  i,  2,  3,  5,  6,  and 
a,  b,  c,  d.)  The  cortical  areas  on  which  visual  impressions 
are  "  projected,"  that  is,  the  spaces  in  the  surface  of  the 
brain  with  which  the  images  of  sight  are  believed  to  be 
directly  connected,  are  located  mainly  in  the  occipital  lobes, 
in  the  hind  portion  of  the  cerebral  hemispheres.  (Fig.  vii. 
13,  13'.)  Injuries  here  cause,  it  is  alleged,  not  merely  blind- 
ness, as  in  the  case  of  retinal  disease,  but  actual  derangement 
of  the  faculty  of  visual  imagination.  {Scelenblindheit.)  The 
auditory  area  is  allotted  to  the  upper  convolution  of  the  temporal 
tobc  (Fig.  vii.  14) ;  and  "word-deafness,"  "  auditory  asphasia,"' 
or  inability  to  image,  and  consequently  to  understand  articu- 
late sounds,  even  whilst  general  hearing  remains,  was  shown 
by  Wernicke  to  be  occasioned  by  lesions  in  this  district. 
Previous  to  Wernicke,  in  1861  Broca  had  found  that  motor- 
asphasia,  or  the  disorganization  of  the  faculty  of  intelligent 

*  Cf.  Surbled,  Le  Cervcau,  pp.  239,  seq. 


5G8  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


articulate  speech,  was  caused  by  injuries  in  the  third  frontal 
convolution,  which  hes  a  httle  to  the  front  of  the  subsequently- 
discovered  hearing-area.  (Fig.  vii.  9.)  The  difficulty  of  ascer- 
taining the  nature  of  the  sensations  of  taste  and  smell  of 
animals  when  subjected  to  experiments  has  made  the  localiza- 
tion of  the  cerebral  correlates  of  these  latter  senses  much 
more  dubious.  Indeed,  we  are  warned  by  some  of  our  best 
physiologists  to  receive  with  considerable  caution  even  the 
most  confident  assurances  of  enthusiastic  observers,  especially 
when  once  they  pass  beyond  the  comparatively  simple 
problem  of  determining  motor-areas.'* 

Notwithstanding  the  considerable  progress  made  in  ex- 
ploration, much  of  the  brain,  especially  in  the  frontal  region, 
being  "  silent,"  or  not  responsive  to  stimulation,  its  precise 
functions  have  remained  unknown.  For  this  reason  there 
has  been  a  constant  tendency  among  physiologists  to  assume 
that  this  unoccupied  cerebral  territory  is  "  the  seat  of  general 
intelligence,"  without,  however,  venturing  to  explain  clearly 
what  they  mean  by  this  \ague  phrase.  We  have  already 
shown  the  absurdity  of  attempting  to  conceive  the  higher 
rational  activities  as  spatially  situated  in  or  exerted  by  bodily 
organs ;  but  as  we  suggested  in  the  first  edition  of  the  present 
work,  these  unclaimed  districts  may  supply  the  material  basis 
for  memory,  imagination,  and  those  internal  sensuous  facul- 
ties upon  which  intellect  is  more  immediately  dependent. 
We  now  find  that  the  progress  of  cerebral  physiology  during 
the  last  few  years  tends  to  confirm  this  conjecture — which  is 
indeed  as  old  as  St.  Thomas.^' 

^  Thus  Professor  Foster,  in  the  latest  edition  of  his  able  Tcxt- 
.hook  of  Pliysiologv,  reminds  us  that  the  cessation  of  particular  sensa- 
tions occasioned  by  lesions  in  particular  parts  of  the  cortex  of  the 
cerebral  hemispheres  "  does  not  prove  that  the  cortex  of  the 
hemispheres  is  the  '  seat '  of  the  sensation,  ...  it  only  proves  that 
in  the  complex  chain  of  events  by  which  sensory  impulses  give  rise 
to  full  conscious  sensations  the  events  in  the  cortex  furnish  an 
indispensable  link."  (Pt.  III.  p.  1094.)  -^"cl  elsewhere:  "The 
interpretation  of  the  results  in  which  we  have  to  judge  of  sensory 
effects,  are  far  more  uncertain  than  wheii  we  have  to  judge  of  motor 
effects.  We  have  to  judge  of  signs  our  interpretation  of  which  is 
based  on  analogies  which  may  be  misleading."  {Ibid.  p.  1077.) 

•^  Mediaeval  cerebral  anatomy  was  naturally  in  a  rudimentary 
stage,  and  some  of  the  reasons  assigned  by  the  Schoolmen  for 
allotting  faculties  to  particular  localities  are  quaint ;  but  St.  Thomas's 
theory  of  localization — borrowed,  however,  from  the  Arabian  physio- 
logists— is  still  of  interest:  "  Est  ergo  (interior)  Sensus  Communis  a 
<luo  omnes  sensus  proprii  derivantur,  et  ad  quern  omnis  impressio 
-eorum    rcnuntiatur,  et   in   quo   omnes   conjunguntur.     Ejus   enim 


SOUL   AND   BODY.  569 


Thus  the  recent  contribution  of  Flechsi^  Hes  in  the 
advance  he  has  made  towards  the  estabUshment  and  closer 
definition  of  what  he  calls  "association-centres"  as  distin- 
guished from  the  previously  acknowledged  "projection- 
centres" — the  motor  and  sensory  areas  in  direct  connexion 
with  sense-impressions  and  movements.  To  the  former  he 
allots  quite  two-thirds  of  the  cortical  substance  of  the 
human  brain,  reserving  only  one-third  for  the  latter,  whilst  in 
most  of  the  lower  animals  the  distribution  is  reversed.  Of 
these  higher  centres  he  affirms  that  "  they  are  apparatus 
which  combine  the  activities  of  the  various  special  senses, 
inner  and  outer,  into  higher  unities.  They  are  association- 
centres  of  sense-impressions  of  different  qualities,  visual, 
auditory,  etc.  They  make  their  appearance  accordingly  as 
subject  of  a  'co-agitation,'  as  the  Latin  language  had  pro- 
phetically characterized  thought,  and  they  may  therefore  be 
specially  termed  "  association  or  co-agitation  centres."^ 

organwn  est  prima  concavitas  cerebri,  a  quo  nervi  sensuum  particulariiim 
oriiintur,  .  .  .  Secunda  vis  interior  est  Phantasia  .  .  .  et  hujus  organum 
est  post  organum  sensus  communis  in  parte  cerebri  quae  sic  non 
abundat  humido  sicut  prima  pars  cerebri  in  qua  situm  est  organum 
sensus  communis  et  ideo  melius  potest  retinere  formas  sensibiles  re 
absente.  (Nam  humidum  bene  recipit,  et  male  retinet  :  siccum  vero 
e  contrario  bene  retinet  et  male  recipit.)  .  .  .  Tertia  vis  sensitiva 
est  ALstimativa  (vel  Cogitativa).  .  .  .  Organum  autem  hujus  potentiae 
ponitur  in  hrntis  \\\  posteriori  parte  mediie  partis  cerebri.  In  hominibus 
autem  ejus  organum  ponitur  in  media  cellula  cerebri,  quae  syllogistica 
appellatur  .  .  .  (et  hccc  facultas)  quae  in  aliis  animalibus  dicitur 
astimativa  naturalis,  in  homine  dicitur  cogitativa,  quae  per  quamdam 
collationem  hujusmodi  intentiones  adinvenit.  Quae  etiam  ratio 
particularis  dicitur,  quia  scilicet  est  collativa  intentionum  individua- 
lium  sicut  ratio  universalis  intentionum  universalium  .  .  .  Quarta 
vis  sensitiva  interior  est  Memorativa.  .  .  .  Organum  autem  hujus 
potentiae  est  in  posteriori  concavitate  cerebri."  {Be  Potentiis  Anima, 
c.  iv.) 

^  Gehirne  tend  Seek,  pp.  22 — 24.  Cf.  the  scholastic  doctrine  on 
the  Sensus  Communis  and  Vis  Cogitativa,  p.  93,  above  ;  also  the  last 
note.  Although  judging  from  the  stormy  past  history  of  cerebral 
physiology,  Flechsig's  theory  of  association-centres  is  not  likely  to 
remain  long  unchallenged,  his  methods  of  investigation  are  sound. 
But  he  needlessly  damages  the  value  of  good  scientific  obserx-ation 
and  experiments  by  mixing  facts  with  dubious  metaphysics  and 
crude  materialistic  hypotheses,  when  he  lapses  into  language  of  this 
sort :  "  Man  is  indebted  for  his  spiritual  superiority  in  the  first 
degree  to  his  association-neuron.  Anatomy,  comparative  anatomy, 
and  clinical  experience  combined  show  decisively  that  these  associa- 
tion-centres are  the  chief  subjects  of  the  spiritual  life,  and  that 
consequently   they   may   and   ought   to    be  designated   '  spiritual- 


570  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


As  the  chain  of  reasoning  by  which  the  reahty  of  these 
liigher  centres  is  determined  is  necessarily  more  complex,  and 
the  evidence  more  fragile  than  that  by  which  the  "  projection  " 
motor  and  sensory  areas  are  defined,  we  must  be  cautious 
in  assenting  too  easily  to  the  facts  claimed  to  be  established, 
before  they  are  thoroughly  confirmed — and  even  then  care 
will  be  needed  for  their  correct  interpretation.  The  circum- 
stance, too,  that  serious  lesions  involving  the  destruction  of 
large  quantities  of  brain  in  this  region  without  appreciably 
affecting  any  mental  operations  are  frequently  met  with,  ought 
to  warn  us  of  the  precarious  character  of  even  the  most 
plausible  inferences  in  this  subjects 

The  "  motor-centre  "  is  usually  found  on  the  side  of  the 
head  opposite  to  the  bodily  member  to  which  it  is  specially 
related  ;  but  speech,  and  other  psychical  operations  not  belong- 
ing definitely  to  either  side  of  the  organism  are  generally 
dependent  on  physical  processes  in  the  left  hemisphere, 
except  in  the  case  of  left-handed  persons,  who,  it  is  said,  are 
"' right-minded  "  or  rather  "right-brained."  The  disease  of 
aphasia  in  right-handed  persons  is,  as  a  rule,  accompanied  by 
a  lesion  in  the  left  frontal  convolution.  It  seems  also  fairly 
proven  that  symmetrical  portions  of  the  brain  in  the  right 
and  left  hemispheres  are  capable  of  performing  similar 
functions ;  and  ft  is  chiefly — though  not  exclusively — in  the 
relations  subsisting  between  these  corresponding  parts  that 
we  find  exhibited  the  law  of  substitution,  which  has  constituted 
such  a  serious  objection,  or  at  all  events  hmitation,  to  the 
value  of  all  theories  of  localization. 

Objections. — On  this  general  fact,  together  with  negative 
instances  presented  by  Pathology,  the  case  of  the  opponents  of 
locaHzation  mainly  rested.  It  is  true,  said  they,  that  irritation 
of  a  motor-area  excites  movement  in  the  corresponding  limb, 
and  conversely,  the  extirpation  or  destruction  of  this  part  of 
the  brain  temporarily  extinguishes  or  enfeebles  the  power  of 
movement ;  but,  nevertheless,  if  the  animal  be  kept  alive,  it 
may  after  a  few  days  recover  complete  use  of  the  member 
again.     In  other  words,  some  new  portion  of  the  cerebrum  is 

centres,'  'organs  of  thought'  (das  sie  somit  ah  geistige  Centren  als 
Denhorgane  bezeichnete  werden  d'urfen  und  milssen)."  {Ibid.  p.  6i.)  After 
what  we  have  already  urged  (pp.  240 — 246,  466—472),  we  trust  it  is 
unnecessary  to  dwell  further  on  the  ineptitude  of  describing  any 
mass  of  cerebral  matter — whether  frontal  or  occipital,  cortical 
or  sub-cortical,  as  a  "  spiritual  centre"  or  an  "organ  of  thought." 
Higher  intellectual  activity  may  presuppose  as  a  condition  certain 
concomitant  sensuous  and  cerebral  processes,  but  the  agent  or 
subject  of  such  spiritual  activity  must  be  an  indivisible  being. 
7  Cf.  Ladd,  Physiological  Psychology,  pp.  265— 26S,  296,  297. 


SOVL   AND   BODY.  571 


capable  of  adopting  the  suspended  function.^  The  part  most 
fitted  to  do  so  seems  to  be  in  the  first  place  the  symmetrically 
corresponding  area  on  the  other  hemisphere,  and  then  the 
cerebral  substance  immediately  surrounding  the  damaged 
centre.  In  addition  to  this  difficulty  post-mortoit  examinations 
have  revealed  several  cases  in  which  a  very  large  part  of  one 
side  of  the  brain,  and  even  a  not  inconsiderable  portion  of 
both  were  atrophied  or  decayed,  although  no  derangement 
in  psychical  operations,  or  in  the  action  of  the  corresponding 
limbs,  had  been  noticed  during  life. 

These  objections  admonish  us  how  imperfect  our  know- 
ledge of  the  relations  between  the  brain  and  psychical  action 
still  is,  and  they  also  show  how  little  foundation  there  is  for 
materialistic  dogmatism.  At  the  same  time  we  do  not  think 
they  are  conclusive  against  the  doctrine  of  localization  in 
evoy  form.  They  indisputably  demonstrate  that  the  "  centres" 
are  not  instruments  of  an  absolutely  fixed  and  permanent 
character  like  the  external  sense-organs.  But  they  do  not 
disprove  the  statement  that  the  various  sentient  and  motor 
operations  of  the  soul,  both  presentative  and  representative, 
are,  in  ordinary  conditions,  specially  dependent  on  particular 
parts  of  the  brain  ;  whilst  the  evidence  on  the  other  side 
makes  this  latter  assertion  well-nigh  incontrovertible.  They 
establish,  however,  that  the  principle  which  dominates  the 
living  organism  has,  within  certain  limits,  the  power  of  adapt- 
ing to  its  needs  and  employing  as  its  instruments  other  than 
the  normal  portions  of  the  cerebrum.^ 

^  According  to  Goltz  :  "It  is  not  possible,  by  extirpating  any 
amount  of  the  substance  of  the  cortex  on  either  side,  or  on  both 
sides,  to  produce  a.  permanent  laming  of  any  muscle  of  the  body,  or 
a  total  loss  of  sensibility  in  any  of  its  parts.  It  is,  however,  possible 
thus  to  reduce  an  animal  to  a  condition  of  almost  complete  idiocy. 
.  .  .  No  part  of  the  cortex  of  the  brain  can,  then,  be  called  the 
exclusive  organ  or  centre  of  intelligence  or  feeling  ;  but  the  psychical 
functions  are  connected  with  all  of  its  parts."  (Cf.  Ladd,  op.  cit. 
p.  298.)  Goltz's  chief  experiments  were  performed  on  three  dogs, 
one  of  which  he  succeeded  in  keeping  alive  for  eighteen  months 
deprived  of  nearly  all  the  brain  substance.  The  extirpation  was 
effected  gradually  in  small  pieces  at  considerable  intervals.  The 
psychical  effects,  however,  seem  to  be  quite  different  when  the 
removal  of  cerebral  material  is  rapidly  executed,  though  in  such 
cases  the  animal  speedily  perishes.  See  W.  von  Bechterew, 
Bewusstsein  unci  Hirnlokalisation,  pp.  38 — 45. 

9  The  original  researches  of  Dr.  Ferrier  on  this  subject  are  to 
be  found  in  his  work,  The  Functions  of  the  Brain.  Bastian's  volume, 
The  Brain  as  an  Organ  of  Mind,  c.  x.  contains  a  history  of  theories  of 
Phrenology  and  Localization.  Cf.  also  the  article  "Brain"  in 
Chambers'  Encyclopedia  (Edit.  1888) ;   "  Physiology,"  Encyc.  Brit.  (9th 


572  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

Although  from  a  strictly  methodical  standpoint  this  topic 
would  have  been  more  appropriately  dealt  with  at  the 
beginning  of  this  volume,  we  have  preferred  to  handle  it  here 
at  the  end  of  Rational  Psychology.  We  believe  that  its 
philosophical  significance,  or  insignificance,  can  be  better 
estimated,  and  the  precise  worth  of  materialistic  deductions 
drawn  from  the  doctrine  of  localization  more  accurately 
measured  at  the  present  stage  of  our  work.  The  statement 
that  the  progress  of  Physiology  has  discredited  or  disproved 
the  doctrine  of  the  spirituality  of  the  soul,  is  so  frequently  to 
be  met  with  that  it  is  extremely  desirable  the  student  should 
have  at  least  a  general  notion  of  the  character  and  value  of 
the  most  recent  investigations  in  Cerebral  Physiology.  Vague 
sweeping  assertions,  especially  when  uttered  by  men  dis- 
tinguished in  Physical  sciences,  often  give  rise  to  a  com- 
pletely mistaken  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  "  recent  advances 
in  Physiology."  We  trust  that  our  sketch  of  the  subject  will 
assist  the  reader  to  appreciate  the  true  worth  of  such 
materialistic  declarations. 

Mode  of  Origin  of  the  Soul. — Of  philosophers 
holding  erroneous  ideas  regarding  the  origin  of  the 
human  soul,  some  have  conceived  it  as  arising  by 
einanatioji  from  the  Divine  substance  ;  others  as  derived 
from  the  parents.  The  former  theory  starts  from  a 
Pantheistic  conception  of  the  universe,  and  is  in 
conflict  with  the  simplicity  and  absolute  perfection  of 
God.  The  hypothesis  that  the  soul  is  transmitted  to 
the  offspring  by  the  parents — and  hence  called  the 
theory  of  Traditcianism — has  taken  a  variety  of  forms. 
Some  writers  have  maintained  that  the  soul,  like  the 
body,  proceeds  from  the  parental  organism :  others  that 
it  comes  from  the  soul.  This  latter  opinion  v/as  advo- 
cated in  Germany,  in  the  earl}^  part  of  this  century,  b}'- 
Frohschammer,  under  the  title  of  Generationism.  The 
soul  in  this  view  is  generated,  or  perhaps  more  accu- 
rately speaking,  created  by  the  parents.  Rosmini  taught 
that    the    sentient    principle    arises    by   generation   or 

Edit.  1885)  ;  Caldervvood's  Relations  of  Mind  and  Brain,  pp.  77 — 122; 
Ladd,  op.  cit.  Ft.  II.  cc.  i.  ii.  (1887)  ;  Foster,  Text-book  of  Physiologv 
(1895),  Ft.  III.  c.  ii.  §§  7 — 9;  Surbled,  Le  Cerveau  (Paris:  Retaux- 
Bray,  1890);  and  W.  von  Bechterew,  Bewnsstsein  und  Hirnlokalisatiou. 
(Leipsic,  1898.)  The  most  considerable  recent  original  work,  how- 
ever, is  F.  Flechsig's  Gehirne  und  Seek.  (Leipsic,  1896.) 


SOUL   AND   BODY.  573 


traduction,  and  is  afterwards  converted  into  the  rational 
soul  by  a  mysterious  illuminative  act  of  God,  through 
which  the  intellect  is  awakened  to  the  idea  of  being. 

Traducianism,  whether  understood  of  a  corporeal 
or  incorporeal  seminal  element,  is  an  inadmissible 
theory.  As  regards  the  derivation  of  the  rational  soul 
of  the  child  from  the  body  of  a  parent,  it  is  obvious 
that  such  a  supposition  is  based  on  a  materialistic 
conception  of  the  nature  of  the  mind.  Nemo  dat  quod 
non  hahet :  a  spiritual  substance  cannot  proceed  from  a 
corporeal  principle.  The  derivation,  however,  of  the 
rational  soul  from  the  soul  of  a  parent  is  equally 
untenable.  Every  human  soul  is  at  once  a  simple  and 
an  immaterial  substance.  Consequently,  the  hypothesis 
of  any  sort  of  seminal  particle  or  spiritual  germ  being 
detached  from  the  parental  soul  is  absurd.  If  the  soul 
of  the  child,  moreover,  were  generated  or  evoked  out  of 
the  potencies  of  matter,  it  could  not  be  a  spiritual 
being  endowed  with  intellect  and  free  will,  and  intrinsi- 
cally independent  of  matter. 

Creation. — Opposed  to  these  various  theories  stands 
the  doctrine  according  to  which  each  human  soul  is  pro- 
duced from  nothing  by  the  creative  act  of  God.  The  accept- 
ance of  this  thesis  is  a  logical  consequence  of  the 
rejection  of  the  previous  views.  By  creation  is  meant 
the  calling  of  a  being  into  existence  from  nothing,  the 
production  of  an  object  as  regards  its  entire  substance. 
The  material  things  which  we  meet  around  us  are  a 
result  of  transformation  or  change,  not  of  creation — 
though  of  course  their  ultimate  constituents  must  have 
been  originally  created.  A  spiritual  being,  however, 
cannot  be  effected  by  any  such  process  of  transforma- 
tion. If  produced  at  all,  it  must  be  formed  from 
nothing.  Now,  the  human  soul  is  a  spiritual  substance, 
whilst  at  the  same  time  it  is  of  finite  capacity,  and 
therefore  a  contingent  being.  But  because  of  its  con- 
tingent and  limited  nature  it  cannot  be  self-existing  ; 
it  must  have  received  its  existence  from  another  being. 
On  the  other  hand,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  spiritual  being 
intrinsically  independent  of  matter,  it  cannot  have 
arisen  by  any  process  of  transformation ;  for,  if  it  did 


574  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

so  arise  it  would  necessarily  depend  as  to  its  whole 
being  on  its  subject.  Finally,  since  God  alone,  who 
exists  of  Himself,  and  who  alone  possesses  infinite 
power,  can  exert  the  highest  form  of  action,  calling 
creatures  into  existence  from  nothing,  the  production  of 
the  human  soul  must  be  due  immediately  to  Him.^^ 

Difficulties.— The  chief  objections  urged  against  the 
doctrine  of  creation  are  the  following:  (i)  The  sentient- 
vegetative  soul  in  man  is  of  the  same  genus  as  that  which 
informs  the  brute  ;  consequently,  since  the  latter  is  generated 
by  substantial  transformation,  so  is  the  former.  (2)  Like  end 
must  have  like  origin;  but  the  human  soul  is  immortal; 
therefore  it  must  never  have  had  a  beginning.  (3)  The  theory 
of  creation  involves  continuous  exercise  of  miraculous  power 
on  the  part  of  God.  To  these  difficulties  the  following 
answers  may  be  given :  (i)  If  the  root  of  sentiency  and 
vegetative  life  in  man  were  an  organic  principle  completely 
and  intrinsically  dependent  on  the  body,  as  it  is  in  the  lower 
animals,  then  there  would  be  no  ground  for  affirming  a 
special  mode  of  origin  in  the  case  of  human  beings.  But, 
although  man's  soul  is  generically  related  to  that  of  the 
brute,  it  is  separated  from  the  latter  by  a  specific  distinction 
which  involves  this  different  mode  of  genesis.  (2)  The  second 
objection  has  seemed  very  forcible  to  some  minds,  and  we 
find  even  Dugald  Stewart  ^^  holding  that  it  destroys  the  argu- 
ment for  everlasting  life  based  on  the  simplicity  and  incor- 
ruptibility of  the  soul.  Yet  when  we  reflect  and  demand 
proof  of  the  assumption  on  which  the  objection  is  based  none 
is  forthcoming;  and  it  is  certainly  not  self-evident.  God 
alone  is  without  beginning,  but  He  can  will  to  exist  whatever 
is  not  intrinsically  impossible,  and  He  may  will  it  to  last 
for  ever.  Consequently,  there  can  be  no  absurdity  in  His 
creating  from  nothing  a  simple  incorruptible  being  which  He 
designs  never  to  perish.     (3)  A  miracle  is   an   interference 

^0  The  proof  of  this  is  based  on  the  fact  that  in  creation  the 
effect  depends  solely  on  the  efficient  cause.  It  is,  therefore,  the 
highest  and  noblest  mode  of  action,  and  consequently  must  proceed 
from  an  agent  endowed  with  the  highest  form  of  being — self-exist- 
ence. A  creature  cannot  even  play  an  instrumental  part  in  creation  ; 
for  the  function  of  an  instrument  is  to  dispose  and  arrange  the  pre- 
existing materials,  but  antecedently  to  the  creative  act  there  are  no 
such  materials.     Cf.  Boedder,  Natural  Theology,  pp.  126,  seq. 

11  Lotze's  defective  view  as  to  the  nature  of  substance  leads  him 
into  a  similar  error.  Dr.  Martineau's  work,  A  Study  of  Religion, 
p.  334  (2nd  Edit.),  has  some  good  observations  on  this  point. 


SGUL   AND   BODY.  575 


with  the  laws  cf  nature,  but  in  the  given  case  creation  of 
souls,  when  the  appropriate  conditions  are  posited  by  the 
creature,  is  a  law  of  nature. 

Time  of  its  Origin. — When  does  the  human  soul 
begin  to  exist  ?  Plato  taught  that  previous  to  its 
incarceration  in  the  body  the  soul  had  from  all  eternity 
resided  among  the  gods  in  an  ultra-celestial  sphere, 
(p.  255.)  The  theory  of  metempsychosis  or  Trans- 
migration of  souls,  has  been  held  under  one  shape  or 
another  by  many  Eastern  thinkers.  It  is,  however,  in 
all  its  forms,  a  gratuitous  hypothesis.  It  is  based  on 
the  false  view  which  conceives  body  and  soul  as 
accidentally  and  not  substantially  or  essentially  united 
in  man,  and  it  possesses  not  a  vestige  of  real  argument. 

Among  modern  philosophers,  Leibnitz  has  considered 
human  minds  along  with  all  the  other  "monads"  to  have 
been  created  simultaneously  by  God,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  world.  All  souls  were  conserved  in  a  semi- 
conscious condition  inclosed  in  minute  organic  particles 
ready  to  be  evoked  into  rational  life  when  the  fitting 
conditions  are  supplied.  Proof  or  disproof  is  here  out 
of  the  question.  If  a  writer  asserts  that  his  own  soul, 
or  that  of  anybody  else,  existed  centuries  ago  in  an 
unconscious  state,  we  cannot  demonstrate  that  the 
proposition  is  false  ;  we  can  only  point  out  that  there 
is  no  evidence  for  such  a  statement.  It  is  simply  a 
gratuitous  assumption.  No  sufficient  end  can  be  con- 
ceived for  the  sake  of  which  such  an  unconscious 
life  coidd  be  vouchsafed  to  the  soul,  and,  consequently, 
it  may  be  rejected  as  an  unwarrantable  hypothesis. 

The  Schoolmen  taught  that  the  rational  soul  is 
created  precisely  when  it  is  infused  into  the  new 
organism.  The  doctrine  took  two  forms.  Following 
the  embryological  teaching  of  Aristotle,  St.  Thomas 
held  that  during  the  early  history  of  its  existence  the 
human  foetus  passes  through  a  series  of  transitional 
stages  in  which  it  is  successively  informed  by  the 
vegetative,  the  sentient,  and,  finally,  by  the  rational 
soul.  Each  succeeding  form  contains  eminently  and 
virtually  in  itself  the  energies  and  faculties  of  that  upon 
which  it   is   consequent.     The  advent  of  the  rational 


576  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


soul  only  occurs,  St.  Thomas  maintained,  when  the 
embryo  has  been  sufficiently  developed  to  become  the 
appropriate  material  constituent  of  the  human  being ; 
and  this  rational  soul  itself  subsequently  exhibits  a 
gradual  development  in  the  manifestation  of  its  powers, 
exerting  at  first  merely  the  inferior  forms  of  vital 
activity,  later  on  sentiency,  and  only  long  after  birth  its 
higher  rational  faculties.  The  embryonic  history  of 
man  is,  then,  in  this  view,  that  of  a  progressive  evolu- 
tion in  the  course  of  which  the  future  rational  being 
passes  through  a  series  of  transitory  stages  not  unlike 
the  various  grades  of  life  to  be  found  on  the  earth. i- 

The  rival  theory,  which  seems  to  have  much  in  its 
favour,  held  that  the  rational  soul  is  created  and  infused 
into  the  new  being  in  the  originating  of  life  in  con- 
ception ;  and  that  it  is  this  rational  soul  which  by 
the  exertion  of  its  inferior  vegetative  functions  directs  the 
growth  and  development  of  the  embryo  throughout  its 
course. 

Doctrine  of  Lotze  and  Ladd.— On  this  question  of  the 
origin  of  the  soul,  Professor  Ladd,  to  whom  we  have  frequently 
been  able  to  refer  in  terms  of  agreement,  seems  neither  very 
satisfactory  nor  very  clear.  "  Whence  comes  the  mind  of  every 
man  ?  "  he  tells  us,  "  is  a  question  with  which  metaphysics — 
especially  in  the  crude  form  in  which  it  is  found  in  theological 
(Why  not  add  '  and  scientific  '  ? )  circles — naturally  busies 
itself."  Having  rejected  the  traducianist  and  evolutionist 
hypotheses,  he  asserts  that  "  the  creationist  theory  of  the 
origin   of  the   mind   in  the   form   in   which   it   is  popularly 

1-  See  Harper's  Metaphysics  of  the  School,  Vol.  II.  pp.  553— 5f'i- 
Having  shown  that  St.  Thomas's  teaching  of  a  "  progressive  develop- 
ment of  being"  in  all  embryonic  life  is  in  harmony  with  the  most 
recent  physiological  science,  he  urges  that  "this  theory  serves 
to  throw  light  on  the  perfection  of  the  cosmic  order.  .  .  .  For,  the 
truth  of  the  teaching  lor  which  we  are  contending  once  admitted, 
not  only  must  we  acknowledge  a  gradual  evolution  of  the  whole 
complex  and  multiform  universe  of  material  substances  from  a  few 
simple  elements  created  in  the  beginning;  but  it  is  also  manifest 
that  this  wondrous  evolution  is,  so  to  say,  more  or  less  epitomized 
in  the  germ-history  of  each  living  individual  in  that  universe. 
Successive  Forms  march  through  the  captive  Matter  gradually 
evolved  from  the  predisposed  Subject ;  till  they  reach  their  climax 
where  the  potentiality  of  Matter  fails,  and  the  creative  power  of 
God  supplies  the  needed  Form."  (p.  560.) 


SOUL  AND  BODY.  577 


conceived  is  no  less  unwarrantable  or  even  nnintelli,i:;ible." 
He  deems  the  doctrine  that  "  God  produces  an  entity  called 
the  soul,  and  puts  it  ready-made,  as  it  were,  into  the  body," 
to  be  absurd.  His  own  view  is  that  "  the  origin  of  every 
mind,  so  far  as  such  origin  is  knowable  or  conceivable  at  all, 
must  be  put  at  the  exact  point  of  time  when  the  mind  begins 
to  act  (consciously) ;  its  origin  is  in  and  of  these  first  conscious 
activities.  Before  this  first  (conscious)  activity  the  mind  is 
not.  But  even  thus  it  cannot  be  admitted  that  any  mind 
springs  into  full  being  at  a  leap,  as  it  were.  For  the  origin 
of  every  mind  is  in  a  process  of  development."^^  In  brief, 
the  soul's  conscious  "  activities  are  its  existence."  This  is 
virtually  Lotze's  conclusion  {Metaphysics,  §  244) ;  and  flows 
from  his  theory  that  a  being  is  merely  what  it  does. 

Criticism. — This  view,  which,  maintaining  the  soul  to  be  a 
"  real  being,"  distinct  from  the  body,  yet  constitutes  the 
essence  of  the  soul  in  conscious  activity,  is  in  the  first  place 
exposed  to  serious  difficulties  based  on  the  facts  of  periods  of 
unconsciousness.  The  objection  of  the  "  naive  metaphysics  " 
of  common  sense  is  not  precisely  that  which  Professor  Ladd 
suggests  :  "  Where  then  is  the  mind  in  deep,  dreamless  sleep  ?  " 
(loc.  cit.  p.  386.)  But :  "  Does  the  mind  in  its  entire  reality 
cease  to  exist  every  time  that  conscious  activity  ceases  ?  or, 
Has  a  man's  soul  no  more  reality  during  a  state  of  coma  from 
which  he  recovers,  than  it  had  a  thousand  years  before  he 
was  born  ?  "  The  logical  consequence  of  the  doctrine  that 
the  human  soul  begins  to  exist  only  at  the  first  moment  of 
consciousness — or  rather,  if  we  understand  Professor  Ladd 
rightly,  at  the  dawn  of  self-consciousness — would  seem  to  be 
that  the  human  infant  is  without  a  soul. 

The  objection  to  creation  as  implying  the  insertion  of  a 
"  ready-made  "  soul  is  based  on  an  unfair  representation  of 
the  doctrine.  All  spirituaHsts  who,  like  Ladd  and  Lotze, 
maintain  the  existence  in  the  adult  being  of  a  soul  really 
distinct  from  the  organism  must  necessarily  admit  its  primary 
origin  to  have  been  abrupt — the  first  appearance  of  a  parti- 
cular being  of  a  totally  new  order,  and  so  even  the  "  modified 
creation  "  which  Ladd  accepts  inevitably  involves  this  same 
distasteful  notion  of  "  ready-madeness."  The  truth  is  that 
the  most  rational  view  and  that  least  exposed  to  difficulties  of 
this  kind,  is  that  form  of  the  scholastic  doctrine  which  teaches 
that  in  the  origin  of  the  new  human  being  the  creative  action 
is  exerted  according  to  universal  law  prescribed  by  divine 
wisdom,  in  the  act  and  at  the  instant  in  which  the  incipient 
vital  principle  is  evoked  in  the  germinating  cell. 

13  Philosophy  of  the  Mind,  pp.  363,  364. 

LL 


578  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


Origin  of  the  First  Human  Soul— Darwinian 
Theory. — The  modern  doctrine  of  Evolution  ramifies 
into  a  large  number  of  sciences,  and  its  satisfactory 
discussion  involves  a  multitude  of  questions  pertaining 
to  Biology,  Geology,  Physical  Astronomy,  Rational 
Theology,  and  Scriptural  Theology.  The  business  of 
the  rational  psychologist,  fortunately  for  us,  is  neither 
the  Theology  nor  the  Philosophy  of  the  Evolution 
hypothesis,  as  applied  to  the  animal  species  or  even  to 
the  body  of  man :  our  official  concern  is  with  the  Soul. 

The  Human  Soul  cannot  be  the  result  of  the 
gradual  evolution  of  a  non-spiritual  principle. — This 
proposition  is  the  logical  outcome  of  the  chief  doctrines 
on  which  we  have  insisted  throughout  the  volume. 
The  argument  by  which  we  have  established  that  each 
individual  rational  soul  owes  its  origin  to  a  Divine 
creative  act,  proves  a  fortiori  that  the  first  of  such  souls 
must  have  thus  arisen.  Since  even  the  spiritual  soul  of 
a  human  parent  is  incapable  of  itself  effecting  a  spiritual 
soul  in  its  offspring,  it  is  evident  that  the  merely  sentient 
soul  of  a  brute  could  still  less  be  the  cause  of  such  a 
result.  Again:  the  human  soul,  as  we  have  shown, 
possesses  the  spiritual  powers  of  Intellect  and  Will,  and 
is  therefore  itself  a  spiritual  principle,  intrinsically 
independent  of  matter  ;  but  such  a  being  could  never 
arise  by  mere  continuous  modifications  of  a  vital  energy 
intrinsically  dependent  on  matter.  Self-consciousness, 
Free-will,  Conscience,  are  all  facts  siii  generis  which  could 
never  have  been  produced  by  the  gradual  transmutation 
of  irrational  states.  In  a  word,  all  the  proofs  by  which 
we  established  the  spirituality  of  the  higher  faculties, 
and  of  the  soul  itself,  demonstrate  the  existence  of 
an  impassable  chasm  between  it  and  all  non-spiritual 
principles,  whether  of  the  amoeba  or  the  monkey.  The 
special  intervention  of  God  must,  therefore,  have  been 
necessary  to  introduce  into  the  world  this  new  superior 
order  of  agent — even  if  He  had  previously  directed  the 
gradual  development  of  all  non-spiritual  creatures  by 
physical  laws, 


SUPPLEMENT   A. 

ANIMAL    PSYCHOLOGY. 

Comparative  Psychology.— The  aim  of  a  "com- 
parative" science  is  to  examine  and  compare  the 
varying  manifestations  of  some  phenomenon,  or  group 
of  phenomena,  in  different  classes  of  objects.  Compam- 
five  Anatomy  thus  seeks  to  ascertain  the  Hkenesses  and 
differences  exhibited  in  the  structure  of  different  species 
of  animals.  Comparative  Philology  in  the  same  way 
endeavours  to  trace  the  history  of  cognate  words  by 
contrasting  the  various  forms  which  they  have  assumed 
in  different  languages.  The  science  of  Compavative 
Psychology — were  anything  deserving  the  name  of 
science  on  the  subject  attamable — would  similarly 
investigate  the  nature  of  mind  by  comparing  its  mani- 
festations in  man  and  the  various  species  of  animals. 

Some  recent  writers  seem  to  expect  that  immense 
benefits  will  accrue  to  Psychology  by  the  employment 
of  this  method  of  comparative  study,  which  has  un- 
doubtedly done  much  to  illuminate  obscure  facts  in 
other  branches  of  knowledge.  Now,  premising  that 
in  our  view  Human  Psychology,  or  Psychology  proper, 
ought  to  base  its  doctrines  on  a  careful  study  and 
comparison  of  the  mental  phenomena  of  human  beings 
of  all  races,  of  all  ages,  and  of  all  stages  of  intellectual 
and  moral  cultivation ;  and,  further,  admitting  that 
assistance  may  be  derived,  especially  in  the  investiga^ 
tion  of  the  lower  appetitive,  emotional,  and  cognitive 
activities  from  the  observation  of  animal  life,  we  must, 
nevertheless,  frankly  confess  our  belief  that  in  the  science 
of  the  Mind  the  comparative  method  will  never  be 
very  fruitful  in  positive  results. 


58o  ANIMAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


Difficulties  of  Animal  Psychology.— It  must  not 
be  forgotten  that  Psychology  differs  essentially  in 
character  from  all  these  other  departments  of  know- 
ledge in  which  the  new  method  has  proved  so  effective; 
and,  moreover,  the  difference  is  of  a  kind  which  tells 
directly  against  the  application  of  that  method.  In  the 
other  comparative  sciences  we  can  directly  examine  the 
specimens  selected  from  different  groups ;  here  we 
cannot.  Nay,  as  acute  a  thinker  as  Descartes  was 
found  to  deny  that  there  are  any  such  specimens  in 
existence  at  all.  The  anatomist  can  study  with  as 
much  ease  and  security  the  vertebral  column  of  a  fish, 
or  an  elephant,  as  that  of  a  human  body.  The  philolo- 
gist can  investigate  withfas  much  confidence  the  growth 
of  a  word  in  a  foreign  'language  as  in  his  own.  But 
real  knowledge  of  the  mental  states  of  the  dog  or  the 
bee  is  utterly  impossible  to  the  psychologist.  This 
difficulty  can  never  be  effectually  bridged  over.  Careful 
reflexion  must  convince  us  that,  no  matter  what  pains 
and  industry  be  devoted  to  observation  of  the  actions 
of  the  lower  animals,  our  assurance  regarding  the 
genuine  character  of  their  subjective  states  can  never 
be  more  than  a  remote  conjectural  opinion. 

Knowledge  of  other  Minds. — The  existence  of  any  other 
human  mind  than  our  own,  it  should  be  remembered,  is 
believed  not  on  the  strength  of  direct  intuition,  but  of  a 
mediate  analogical  inference.  By  a  process  of  percep- 
tion, which  we  have  described  in  chapter  vii.,  we  come 
to  know  the  existence  and  character  of  our  own  body, 
and  of  the  material  objects  which  act  upon  us.  Of 
prominent  interest  amongst  external  things  are  certain 
bodies  strikingly  similar  to  our  own.  In  our  ov/n  case 
we  find  that  the  impressions  of  some  of  the  external 
agents  cause  particular  mental  states  within  us,  which, 
in  turn,  give  rise  to  definite  physical  actions  observable 
by  our  external  senses.  Noticing  the  similarity  of  ante- 
cedent and  consequent  in  the  case  of  organisms  like  our 
own,  we  insert  in  them  an  intermediate  conscious  link 
as  effect  of  the  former  and  cause  of  the  latter.  The 
essential  elements  in  the  argument  are  the  similarity  of 
organisms   and    the    like    character   of    the    resulting 


KNOWLEDGE   OF  OTHER  MINDS.  581 


actions.  Of  these  latter,  language  is  incalculably  the 
most  important,  especially  in  indicating  to  us  the  quality 
or  nature  of  the  consciousness  of  these  other  beings.  It 
is  at  once  a  measure  of  intellectual  development,  and 
the  great  medium  of  intercommunication.  Conse- 
quently, its  absence  is,  on  both  grounds,  fatal  to 
scientific  inductions  regarding  the  minds  of  brutes. 1 

The  value  of  the  other  factor  in  the  argument  clearly 
depends  on  the  degree  of  likeness  subsisting  between 
the  compared  organism  and  our  own,  especially  as 
regards  the  brain  and  nervous  system.  We  know  from 
experience  that  slight  modifications  in  the  conditions 
of  the  brain  affect  gravely  the  character  of  human  con- 
sciousness. But  the  profound  differences  which  separate 
man's  brain  from  that  of  the  nearest  allied  animal,  are 
sufficiently  insisted  on  by  our  adversaries  when  this 
course  suits  the  special  question  in  hand.  Accordingly, 
if  we  obey  the  oft-repeated  advice  of  Herbert  Spencer 
on  other  subjects,  and  freeing  ourselves  from  the 
*'  crude  anthropomorphism  of  the  child  and  the 
savage,"  impartially  estimate  the  strictly  scientific 
value  of  the  evidence,  we  shall  be  speedily  forced  to 
admit  that  the  grounds  for  the  analogical  inference  to 
the  character  of  the  intellectual  or  emotional  states  of 
the  monkey,  the  dog,  or  the  elephant,  are  very  slender 
indeed,  whilst  our  conjectures  as  to  the  quality  of  the 
mental  activity  of  insects  are  utterly  worthless.-^ 

^  "The  total  absence  of  language  makes  our  best  inferences 
but  feeble  conjectures.  ...  It  is  clear  that  we  cannot  ascertain 
the  precise  bearing  of  articulate  speech  on  thought  and  feeling 
until  we  are  capable  of  directly  observing  a  type  of  consciousness 
in  which  this  instrument  is  wanting  ;  and  this  is  a  sufficiently 
remote  possibility.  Yet  one  may  roughly  infer  that  the  absence 
of  language  implies  the  lack  of  many  of  the  familiar  properties 
of  our  own  conscious  life.  .•  .  .  Is  it  not  probable  that  the  most 
rudimentary  idea  of  self  follows  by  a  long  interval  the  degree  of 
intelligence  involved  in  linguistic  capacity  ?  "  (J.  Sully,  Sensation  and 
Intuition,  pp.  16,  17.) 

^  Careful  and  acute  observer  of  the  physical  habits  of  animals 
as  Darwin  was,  there  is  scarcely  an  author  of  any  importance  who 
has  erred  more  seriously  in  theorizing  about  the  nature  of  the 
mental  faculties  of  beasts.  Even  a  psychologist  as  sympathetio 
with  evolutionism   as  Dr.  Sully  cannot  ignore  the  mistakes  of  the 


5$2  ANIMAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


Descartes'  theory :  Animals  machines. — Were  this  fact 
realized,  the  Cartesian  doctrine,  which  appears  so  strange 
and  absurd  to  the  unreflecting  mind,  would  probably  have 
commanded  a  much  larger  following  than  it  has  ever  received. 
In  Descartes'  view,  the  lower  animals  are  merely  machines  so 
ingeniously  constructed  that  the  various  impressions  always 
meet  with  appropriate  responsive  movement,  although  no 
conscious  state  intervenes.  The  fact  that  elaborate  and 
complicated  operations  such  as  walking,  writing,  playing  the 
piano,  handling  tools,  are  often  carried  on  without  making 
themselves  felt,  has  been  urged  in  favour  of  this  hypothesis. 
Moreover,  recent  experiments  on  the  bodies  of  animals  from 
which  the  brain  or  head  had  been  removed,  go  to  prove  that 
complicated  movements  requiring  the  co-ordination  of  several 
muscles  may  sometimes  be  performed  by  the  organism  without 
sensation.  Nevertheless,  we  hold  the  Cartesian  theory  to  be 
unsound,  and  accordingly  we  proceed  to  the  establishment  of 
our  thesis,  that : 

At  least  the  higher  Animals  are  endowed  with  Sentiency. — 
(i)  Many  of  the  movements,  of  the  cries,  and  of  the  expres- 
sive acts  of  brutes  are  inexplicable  in  regard  to  their  origina- 
tion, direction,  continuation,  and  cessation,  as  the  result  of 
unconscious  forces.  Such  complicated  operations,  for  instance, 
as  the  search  for  suitable  twigs  by  the  bird  in  the  construc- 
tion of  her  nest,  the  movements  of  a  terrier  at  the  sound  of 
his  invisible  master's  voice,  the  eager  way  in  which  the  dog 
bounds  towards  him  and  barks,  and  the  manner  in  which 
beasts  of  prey  capture  their  victims,  completely  transcend 
the  capabilities  of  merely  physically  co-ordinated  forces. 
(2)  The  ediicability  of  the  lower  animals  is  incompatible  with 
the  purely  mechanical  theor}'.  We  can  train  dogs,  horses, 
lions,  and  bears  to  respond  to  words  or  arbitrary  signs  by 

naturalist  in  this  field,  (cf.  loc.  cit.)  Romanes  begins  bis  work  on 
Animal  Intelligence  (pp.  i — 6)  with  an  account  of  the  nature  of  the 
inference  by  which  we  attribute  consciousness  to  animals,  but 
immediately  lapses  into  the  vulgar  anthropomorphism  of  the 
unreflecting  mind,  as  soon  as  he  proceeds  to  describe  and  discuss 
the  character  of  brute  intelligence.  It  is  interesting  to  note  how 
this  writer  can  here,  when  it  suits  his  object,  appeal  to  "Common 
Sense  "  against  the  "  Sceptic."  This  sudden  reverence  for  vulgar 
prejudice  is  a  little  odd.  G.  H.  Lewes'  statement,  that  "  tlie 
researches  of  the  various  eminent  writers  who  have  attempted  an 
Animal  Psychology  have  been  further  biassed  by  a  secret  desire  to  establish 
the  identity  of  animal  and  human  nature  "  (A  Study  of  Psychology,  p.  122), 
receives  abundant  and  forcible  illustration  in  both  Romanes'  works, 
as  well  as  in  Darwin's  chapters  on  this  subject. 


ANIMALS  SENTIENT\  ^  583 


definite  movements  of  a  complicated  character, — an  impos- 
sible process  if  they  were  merely  machines.  (3)  Finally,  the 
ingenious  construction  of  the  various  sense-organs,  and  their 
similarity  in  many  of  the  superior  species  of  brutes  with  those 
possessed  by  men,  confirm  the  doctrine  that  brutes  are 
endowed  with  a  faculty  of  sensuous  apprehension.  It  would 
appear  also  from  such  facts  as  the  barking  of  dogs  in  their 
sleep,  the  flight  of  defenceless  animals  at  the  sound  of  an 
enemy's  voice,  and  the  resort  of  most  brutes  to  particular 
places  for  food,  that  they  possess  some  of  the  internal 
sensuous  faculties,  such  as  organic  memory  and  imagination. 
How  far  these  powers  in  animals  resemble  tlie  corresponding 
faculties  in  man,  we  are  unable  to  determine.  The  most 
striking  of  these  internal  aptitudes  is  that  directive  principle 
of  action  which  in  common  language  is  called  instinct.  Its 
character,  however,  will  be  better  understood  when  we  have 
distinguished  between  animal  and  rational  intelligence. 

Animals  are  devoid  of  Intellect  or  Reason. — We  have  (c.xii.) 
exhibited  at  length  the  nature  of  this  faculty,  the  essential 
characteristic  of  which  consists  in  the  apprehension  of  the 
universal.  The  ground  for  our  present  proposition  lies  in  the 
fact  that  the  brute  creation  do  not  exhibit  various  signs  which 
would  inevitably  be  manifested  by  sentient  beings  endowed 
with  intellectual  faculties : 

I.  Mode  of  Action. — The  lower  animals  do  not  show  that 
individual  free  variation  in  method  and  plan  of  action,  and 
that  intellectual  progress  which  ought  to  mark  the  presence 
of  personal  intelligence.  Thus,  animals  of  the  same  species, 
when  in  similar  circumstances,  exhibit  a  striking  specific 
uniformity  in  their  operations.  They  all  seek  their  prey, 
build  their  nests,  and  foster  their  young  in  the  same  way. 
Amongst  rational  beings,  on  the  contrary,  we  find  in  every- 
thing the  signs  of  individual  personality.  The  ants  and  bees 
in  the  time  of  Moses  or  of  Aristotle  worked  as  perfectly  as 
their  descendants  of  to-day ;  and  geese  and  sheep  acted  not 
more  awkwardly.  There  is  no  evidence  that  during  all  the 
time  brutes  have  existed  upon  the  earth,  they  have  invented 
a  single  mechanical  instrument,  lit  a  fire,  or  intelligently 
transferred  a  useful  piece  of  information  from  one  generation 
to  another.  The  few  trivial  instances  cited  here  and  there 
of  some  animal  seizing  a  club  or  other  rude  implement  that 
fell  in  its  way,  only  establish  the  more  clearly  the  enormous 
chasm  which  separates  the  brute  from  the  rational  being. 

The  certainty  possessed  by  us  that  animals  are  incapable 
of  the  most  elementary  inventive  activit}'',  is  clearly  shown  by 
the  fact  that,  on  the  discovery  of  a  few  rough  but  similarly 


584  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

pointed  flint  stones  in  Palaeolithic  strata,  those  writers  who 
manitain  the  specific  identity  of  animal  and  human  faculties 
were  the  very  first  to  assert  that  these  rude  contrivances  are 
the  work,  not  of  an  intelligent  beast,  but  of  a  rational  man. 
The  division  which  separates  the  simplest  exercises  of  reason 
from  the  highest  forms  of  animal  intelligence,  is  thus  felt  to 
be  impassable.  But  if  any  species  of  animals  were  endowed 
with  intellect  or  reason,  they  could  not  have  remained  all 
these  ages  in  the  condition  in  which  we  find  them.  Sentient 
beings  possessed  of  reason  or  personal  intelHgence  would  be 
certain  to  make  use  of  their  intellect  in  attending  to,  compar- 
ing, reflecting  upon,  and  reasoning  about  the  various  pleasant 
or  painful  impressions  by  which  they  were  affected.  They 
would  in  this  way  be  led  to  introduce  modifications  and 
improvements  into  their  methods  of  work,  they  would  invent 
tools  and  try  changes  to  suit  their  surroundings;  and,  stimu- 
lated by  curiosity — the  most  primitive  and  useful  form  of  the 
desire  of  knowledge — they  would  inevitably  make  intellectual 
progress.  It  is  absolutely  incredible  that  beings  capable  of 
universal  ideas,  or  of  the  simplest  acts  of  generalization  and 
inference,  should  have  been  unable  during  all  these  thousands 
of  years  to  invent  such  a  rude  tool  as  the  stone  arrow-head  of 
the  Palaeolithic  age.  In  spite,  therefore,  of  the  occasional 
performance  of  apparently  ingenious  or  complicated  actions, 
we  must  conclude  that  the  lower  animals  have  not  intellect. 

2.  Rational  Language. — No  beast  yet  discovered  is  capable 
of  making  use  of  a  system  of  rational  signs,  whilst  all  races 
and  tribes  of  men  are  found  to  be  endowed  with  intelhgent 
speech.  Both  man  and  brute  are  capable  of  expressing  feel- 
ing ;  and  some  animals,  such  as  the  magpie  and  the  parrot, 
can  be  trained  to  utter  articulate  sounds :  but  rational 
language,  which  is  radically  distinct  in  kind  from  these 
phenomena,  is  possessed  by  man  alone.  The  essence  of 
rational  speech  is  the  expression  of  thought,  the  communica- 
tion of  universal  ideas.  Thus  in  the  utterance  of  the  pro- 
position, "  This  water  is  cool,"  there  are  involved  the 
universal  ideas  of  cool,  and  of  water,  as  well  as  the  most 
abstract  notion  of  all,  that  of  being,  which  is  expressed  in  the 
copula.  Similarly^the  phrases,  "  Milk  hot  nice,"  and  "  Big 
Bow-wow"  (horse),  of  the  infant  just  learning  to  speak, 
presuppose  intellectual  abstractive  operations  of  a  grade 
immeasurably  beyond  that  to  which  the  most  intelligent 
animal  has  ever  attained.^ 

Whether  thoughts  be  manifested  by  vocal  or  visual  signs 

2  Cf  chapter  xvi.,  Mivart,  On  Truth  ;  also  his  Lessons  from  Nature, 
C,  iv. ;  and  Max  Miiller,  Science  of  Thought,  c.  iv. 


ANIMALS  SENTIENT.  585 


is  unimportant ;  but  bein,2:s  endowed  with  reason  and  asso- 
ciated together  could  not  remain  without  inventing  some 
means  of  rational  interconnnunication.  The  reflective  activity 
of  intellect  combined  with  the  social  instinct  would  inevitably 
lead  these  beings  to  manifest  their  ideas  to  each  other,  were 
such  ideas  in  existence.  The  cries  of  one  animal,  of  course, 
often  serve  to  awaken  the  rest  of  the  flock  to  threatening 
danger  or  prospective  enjoyment,  but  these  utterances  diff"er 
in  nature  from  rational  language.  They  are  merely  indicative 
of  concrete  experiences,  and  the  whole  process  is  easily 
explicable  by  the  well-known  action  of  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion. There  is  no  ground  for  supposing  that  such  sounds 
differ  in  kind  from  the  emotional  expressions  of  man.'*  Parrots 
have  organs  capable  of  uttering  all  the  sounds  in  the  alphabet, 
and  they  can  be  trained  to  articulate  short  phrases  with 
wonderful  distinctness,  but  this  fact  shows  only  the  more 
conspicuously  the  absence  of  real  intelligence.  No  bird  has 
yet  been  produced,  which  combines  even  the  most  familiar 
words  in  new  ordevs  so  as  to  form  other  intelligible  proposi- 
tions. The  most  accomplished  parrot  is  separated  from  the 
child  by  an  immeasurable  distance  in  this  respect.^ 

^  Deeper  study  of  the  history  of  language  shows  so  clearly  the 
immensity  of  the  chasm  between  man  and  brute  that  students  of 
Philology  are  inclined  even  to  exaggerate  its  importance  as  com- 
pared with  the  other  differentia.  Thus,  Max  Miiller  asserts  that : 
"The  one  great  barrier  between  man  and  brute  is  Language.  Man 
speaks,  and  no  brute  has  ever  uttered  a  word.  Language  is  our 
Rubicon,  and  no  brute  will  dare  to  cross  it."  {Lectures  on  the  Science 
of  Language.  First  Series,  p.  340.)  Professor  Whitney  is  also  very 
emphatic  at  times  on  this  point:  "Moreover,  man  is  the  sole 
possessor  of  language.  It  is  true  that  a  certain  degree  of  power  of 
communication  ...  is  exhibited  also  by  some  of  the  lower  animals. 
.  .  .  But  these  .  .  .  (acts  such  as  the  dog's  bark,  etc.)  .  .  .  are  not 
only  greatly  inferior  in  their  degree  to  human  language ;  they  are 
also  so  radically  diverse  in  kind  from  it  that  the  same  name  cannot 
justly  be  applied  to  both."  {Life  and  Growth  of  Language,  pp.  2,  3.) 

^  "  Animals  and  infants  that  are  without  language  are  alike 
without  reason,  the  great  difference  between  the  animal  and  infant 
being  that  the  infant  possesses  the  healthy  germ  of  speech  and 
reason,  only  not  yet  developed  into  actual  speech  and  actual  reason, 
whereas  the  animal  has  no  such  germs  or  faculties  capable  of 
development  in  its  present  state  of  existence.  .  .  .  We  cannot  allow 
them  (brutes)  a  trace  of  what  the  Greeks  called  logos,  i.e.,  reason, 
literally,  gathering,  a  word  which  most  rightly  and  naturally 
expresses  in  Greek  both  Speech  and  Reason."  (Max  Miiller,  op.  cit. 
Second  Series,  p.  62.)  "  The  animal  without  Language  is  as  in- 
capable of  abstraction  and  of  what  we  specially  designate  Intellect, 
as,  without  wings,  it  is  incapable  of  flight."  (G.  H,  Lewes,  A  Study 
of  Psychology,  p.  123.) 


586  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

3.  Moral  Notions. — Again,  if  the  lower  animals  possess 
intellect,  they  must  be  moral  beings  capable  of  notions  of 
right  and  wrong,  merit  and  desert,  justice  and  injustice;  and 
they  must  be  accountable  for  their  acts.  But,  in  spite  of  our 
anthropomorphic  tendencies,  the  universal  judgment  of  man- 
kind has  ever  refused  to  attribute  morality  or  responsibility 
to  beasts.  We  may,  indeed,  at  times  inflict  pain  on  them 
in  order  to  attach  unpleasant  recollections  to  the  performance 
of  certain  actions,  and  we  may  apply  moral  epithets  to  them 
in  a  metaphorical  way,  somewhat  as  the  farmer  describes  a 
particular  soil  or  pasture  as  kind  or  ungrateful;  but  a  moment's 
reflexion  will  always  speedily  assure  us  that  we  never  really 
consider  the  lower  animals  to  be  free  responsible  creatures. 
We  make  a  very  clear  distinction  in  our  mind  between  the 
moral  character  of  the  act  by  which  a  horse  kicks  a  man  to 
death,  and  that  by  which  one  man  murders  another. 

4.  Absurd  consequences. — Finally,  if  the  ingenious  opera 
tions  performed  at  times  by  the  lower  animals  are  to  be 
assigned  to  a  personal  intelligence  similar  in  kind  to  that  of 
man,  then,  to  several  species,  notably  ants  and  bees, 
admittedly  very  low  down  in'  the  scale  of  life,  there  must  be 
attributed  intellectual  endowments  far  exceeding  those  of 
man  himself,  as  well  as  those  of  the  highest  animal  organisms. 
But  this  is  obviously  absurd.  The  true  conclusion  from  these 
various  considerations  is  that  man's  cognitive  powers  differ 
from  those  of  the  brute  not  simply  in  degree,  but  in  kuid.  He 
is  endowed  with  a  personal  intelligence,  with  a  faculty  of 
forming  universal  concepts,  of  reflecting  upon  himself,  of 
communicating  his  thoughts  to  others,  and  of  apprehending 
moral  relations.  They  are  utterly  incapable  of  eliciting  any 
such  acts  as  these.  They  frequently  surpass  him  in  the 
range  and  subtilty  of  special  senses,  and  still  more  surprisingly 
in  the  possession  of  certain  mental  aptitudes  of  a  complex 
but  uniform  character  comprehended  under  the  term  Instinct, 
but  they  are  separated  from  him  by  the  boundary  which 
divides  rationality  from  irrationality. 

Instinct. — The  various  ingenious  operations  performed  by 
the  lower  animals  are  usually  allotted  to  instinct;  but  about  the 
inner  nature  of  this  endowment,  it  seems  to  us  that  very  little 
is  yet  positively  known.  The  epithet  instinctive  is  frequently 
employed  in  a  wide  sense  to  include  acquired  habits  of  action, 
original  dispositions  to  any  form  of  movement,  whether 
random  or  purposive,  and  also  purely  reflex  actions  devoid  of 
all  antecedent  or  concomitant  consciousness.  In  modern 
Psychology  there  is  a  tendency  to  confine  the  adjective  to 
conscious  acts  which  are  connate  or  unlearned,  complex,  and 
purposive  in  character.     Strictly  speakine.  Instinct  is  not  a 


Instinct.  587 


continuous  impulse  towards  a  special  mode  of  action,  but  an 
aptitude  by  which  this  impulsive  action  in  response  to 
particular  stimuli  is  directed  or  guided. 

Scholastic  view  of  Instinct. — Schoolmenclassed  this  faculty 
among  the  intevnal  senses,  with  the  title  of  Vis  ALstimativa. 
Conceived  according  to  their  view  and  in  harmony  with 
common  usage,  Instinct  may  perhaps  be  best  defined  as 
a  natural  aptitude  ichich  guides  animals  in  the  unreflecting  per- 
formance of  complex  acts  useful  fur  the  preservation  of  the  indi- 
vidual or  of  the  species.  In  the  Scholastic  system  the  Vis 
Mstimativa  is  a  property  of  the  sentient  soul,  analogous 
though  inferior  to  rational  judgment  in  man.  It  is  of  an 
organic  character,  but  involves  more  than  the  direct  response 
of  the  special  senses.  It  does  not  merely  distinguish  between 
pleasant  and  painful  impressions,  but  guides  the  animal  in  a 
series  of  movements  remotely  serviceable  to  its  nature.  The 
lamb,  St.  Thomas  observes,  does  not  flee  because  the  colour 
or  form  of  the  wolf  is  disagreeable,  and  the  bird  does  not 
collect  twigs  for  its  nest  because  they  are  attractive  in  them- 
selves ;  but  both  animals  are  endowed  with  a  faculty  which 
under  appropriate  conditions  is  excited  by  these  phenomena 
to  guide  them  in  the  execution  of  an  operation  ulteriorly 
beneficial  to  their  nature.  Yet  neither  has  a  consciousness 
of  the  formal  relation  of  such  an  act  to  the  end  to  be  attained; 
neither  may  have  had  any  previous  personal  acquaintance 
with  that  end ;  and  neither  is  led  to  the  act  by  a  process  of 
reasoning.  It  must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  to  say  a 
particular  operation  is  due  to  instinct  or  to  Vis  Mstimativa  is 
not  to  explain  it ;  but  merely  to  distinguish  it  from  certain 
activities,  and  to  group  it  with  others  the  cause  of  which  is 
still  unknown. 

Nature  of  Instinct. — The  essential  features  of  Instinct  are 
well  described  in  the  following  passage :  "  The  character 
which  above  all  distinguishes  instinctive  actions  from  those 
that  may  be  called  intelligent  or  rational,  is  that  they  are  not 
the  result  of  imitation  and  experience ;  that  they  are  always 
executed  in  the  same  manner,  and,  to  all  appearance,  without 
being  preceded  by  the  foresight  either  of  their  result  or  of 
their  utility.  Reason  supposes  a  judgment  and  a  choice: 
instinct,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  blind  impulse  which  naturally 
impels  the  animal  to  act  in  a  determinate  manner :  its  effects 
may  sometimes  be  modified  by  experience,  but  they  never 
depend  on  itJ"^  Again:  "One  of  the  phenomena  fittest  to 
give  a  clear  idea  of  what  ought  to  be  understood  by  Instinct 
is  that  which  is  presented  to  us  b)^  certain  insects  when  they 
lay  their  eggs.     Those  animals  will  never  see  their  progeny, 

••  Milne-Edwards,  Zoologie,  §  319.     Cfalso  p.  213,  above. 


588  ANIMAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


and  can  have  no  acquired  notion  of  what  their  eggs  will 
become ;  and  yet  they  have  the  singular  habit  of  placing 
beside  each  of  those  eggs  a  supply  of  elementary  matter  fit 
for  nourishmg  the  larva  it  will  produce,  and  that  even  when 
that  food  differs  entirely  from  their  own,  and  when  the  food 
they  thus  deposit  would  be  useless  for  themselves.  No  sort 
of  reasoning  can  guide  them  in  doing  this,  for  if  they  had  the 
faculty  of  reason,  facts  would  be  wanting  them  to  arrive  at 
such  conclusions,  and  they  must  needs  act  blindly."''  Such 
facts,  which  might  be  multiplied  indefinitely,  prove  that 
animal  "intelligence"  is  different,  not  in  degree,  but  in  kind 
from  human  intellect.  Although  uniformity  is  the  most 
marked  characteristic,  there  is  also  observable  in  many 
instincts  a  certain  flexibility  by  which  they  can  be  modified, 
and  adapt  themselves  within  limits  to  altered  circumstances. 

The  Origin  of  Instinct,  together  with  the  formation  of 
sense-organs,  has  ever  been  one  of  the  most  insuperable 
difficulties  to  those  who  deny  the  creation  of  the  universe  by 
an  Intelligent  Author.  Here  especially  the  ingenuity  of 
evolutionists  has  been  severely  taxed  to  find  some  plausible 
explanation  of  the  phenomena.  Two  chief  views  have  been 
advocated,  but  each  has  suffered  severe  handling  from 
supporters  of  the  rival  hypothesis ;  and  the  probabilities 
against  either  explanation,  when  carefully  thought  out,  seem 
to  us  so  enormous  as  to  render  them  incredible. 

(i)  Theory  of  Natural  Selection. — According  to  Darwin, 
the  great  majority  of  animal  instincts  have  been  formed  by 
natural  selection  operating  on  chance  variations  in  actions  and 
organs.  Those  fortuitous  acts  which  proved  beneficial  to  the 
agent,  giving  their  authors  an  advantage  in  the  struggle  for 
life,  tended  to  be  preserved  and  increased  by  heredity  and 
survival  of  the  fittest  in  each  generation.  Isolated  acts  first 
casually  and  of  course  rarely  performed  have  thus,  it  is  held, 
been   converted   into   the   wonderfully   stable   and   complex 

^  Id.  §  327.  Cf.  Janet's  Final  Causes,  pp.  86,  87.  "  The  young 
female  wasp  (sphex),  without  maternal  experience,  will  seize 
caterpillars  or  spiders,  and  stinging  them  in  a  certain  definite  spot, 
paralyze  and  deprive  them  of  all  power  of  motion  (and  probably 
also  of  sensation),  without  depriving  them  of  life.  She  places  them 
thus  paralyzed  in  her  nest  with  her  eggs,  so  that  the  grubs,  when 
hatched,  may  be  able  to  subsist  on  a  living  prey,  unable  to  escape 
from  or  resist  their  defenceless  and  all  but  powerless  destroyers. 
Now,  it  is  absolutely  impossible  that  the  consequences  of  its  action, 
can  have  been  intellectually  apprehended  by  the  parent  wasps 
Had  she  Reason  without  her  natural  Instinct  she  could  only  learn 
to  perform  such  actions  through  experience."  (Mivart,  Lessons  from 
Nature,  p.  201.) 


THE   ORIGIN   OF  INSTINCT.  5^9 


tendencies  now  exhibited  in  the  instincts  of  insects,  lairds, 
fish,  and  mammals. 

(2)  Theory  of  "lapsed  intelligence."— Herbert  Spencer 
and  others  object  that  such  fortuitous  beneficial  actions  could 
never,  or  only  in  an  infinite  time,  result  in  the  complex  system 
of  co-ordinated  movements  seen  in  many  instincts.  They 
themselves  maintain  that  instincts  are  the  outcome  not  of 
accidental  movements,  but  of  actions  originally  performed 
consciously  to  satisfy  a  need  or  attain  an  end.  Such  intelhgent 
actions,  by  frequent  repetition,  became  automatic  or  acquired 
reflexes,  (p.  218.)  They  were  then  transmitted  by  heredity  as 
organic  modifications,  being  increased  and  perfected  by 
practice  in  successive  generations.  All  the  more  ingenious 
instincts  are  thus  instances  of  "  hereditary  habit,"  "  lapsed 
intelligence,"  or  "  congealed  experience  "  of  the  race. 

Criticism. — (i)    Both   Darwin   and   Spencer   assume   that 
habits  of  action,  or  modifications  of  nerve  structure,  acquired 
during  the  life  of  the  individual,  are  transmitted  by  heredity. 
This  postulate  is  absolutely  essential  to  the  theory  of  heredi- 
tary habit,  and  scarcely  less  so  to  that  of  natural  selection ; 
but  it  has  suffered  the  most  damaging  attacks  in  recent  years, 
especially  from  Weismann.*^  This  eminent  biologist  maintains 
with  a  great  weight  of  argument  that  modifications  wrought 
in  the  organism  during  the  life  of  the  individual  are  never 
transmitted  by  heredity.     Such  accidental  changes  do  not 
modify  the  germ-cells,  and   so   cannot  be  inherited   by   the 
offspring.     He  allows,  of  course,  that  individual   character- 
istics are  transmitted,  and  also  that  the  germ-cells  undergo 
individual  variations  and  may  be  affected  by  disease,  poison, 
nutrition,  and  the  like  ;  but  he  holds  that  they  are  not  affected 
by  such  indirect  and  superficial  influences  as  the  exercise  of 
particular  organs  and   functions.     Consequently,  increasing 
strength  of  faculty  is  not  transmitted  and  accumulated  by 
•  continuous  exercise  during  the  history  of  the  race.     Other- 
wise,  he  justly   contends,   the   mathematical,   musical,   and 
other  special  talents  seen  to  be  inherited  in  particular  families 
ought  to   manifest  themselves   growing  from   generation  to 
generation,   whereas,   as   a  rule,  "the   high-water   mark   of 
talent  lies,  not  at  the  end  of  a  series  of  generations,  as  it 
should  do  if  the  results  of  practice  were  transmitted,  but  in 
the  middle."^     He  further  subjects  to  severe  criticism  the 
stories  of  inherited  mutilations,  e.g.,  horn-less  cows  and  tail- 
less cats,  said  to  be  born  of  accidentally  maimed  parents  ;  and 
he   shows    clearly    the    utterly    unreliable    character    of  the 

»  See    his   Essays  upon    Heredity    (English    Translation),    1889 
especially  Essays  iii.  and  viii. 
^  Essays  on  Heredity,  p.  96. 


590  ANIMAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


evidence  in  regard  to  the  facts.  Finally,  he  gives  the  results 
of  numerous  experiments  undertaken  by  himself,  which  all  go 
to  prove  that  such  organic  modifications  or  mutilations  are  not 
inherited.  Thus  "  among  901  young  mice  (the  entire  progeny) 
produced  by  five  successive  generations  of  parents  whose 
tails  had  been  cut  off  after  birth,  there  was  not  a  single 
example  of  a  rudimentary  tail  or  of  any  other  abnormity  in 
this  organ.  Exact  measurement  proved  that  there  was  not 
even  a  shght  diminution  in  length."  ^^  In  fact,  though  Weis- 
mann's  own  theory  of  heredity  does  not  appear  to  have  yet 
met  with  wide  acceptance,  his  destructive  criticism  is  deemed 
by  the  most  competent  biologists  to  have  disproved  the 
assumption  of  the  transmission  of  habits  or  modifications  of 
the  nervous  system  acquired  during  the  individual  life.  This 
conclusion  seems  to  us  absolutely  fatal  to  Spencer's  theory, 
and  so  enormously  to  increase  the  already  sufficiently 
numerous  probabilities  against  the  Darwinian  view  as  to 
make  the  latter  quite  incredible  when  carefully  and  impar- 
tially weighed. ^^ 

(2)  To  suppose  with  the  "  lapsed  intelligence  "  theory  that 
the  various  ingenious  operations  now  done  instinctively  by 
many  species  of  insects  and  birds,  were  originally  performed 
with  conscious  purpose,  is  to  ascribe  to  the  less  evolved 
remote  progenitors  of  animals  still  low  down  in  the  scale  of 
life  a  supra-human  intelligence. 

(3)  Further :  Many  of  the  most  important  and  most 
complex  instincts  are  connected  with  the  function  of  repro- 
duction, and  several  of  these  instinctive  processes  in  the  case 

^•^  Op.  cit.  p.  432. 

"  The  chief  arguments  urged  for  the  inheritance  of  experience 
are :  (a)  The  rapidity  with  which  the  instinct  of  timidity  is  said  to 
be  awakened  and  increased  in  wild  animals  on  desert  islands,  in  the 
second  and  third  generations  after  they  have  been  invaded  by  man. 
(b)  The  apparent  transmission  of  the  results  of  training  in  domesti- 
cated animals,  e.g.,  in  pointers  and  sheep-dogs.  To  this  it  has  been 
replied  :  {a)  The  alleged  facts  have  not  been  observed  with  sufficient 
accuracy  ;  nor  is  their  precise  nature  clear.  The  shyness  of  the 
second  generation  may  be  simply  the  result  of  individual  experience 
and  parental  training  operating  from  birth  onwards  on  a  hitherto 
latent  form  of  a  universal  animal  instinct,  {b)  The  development  of 
particular  faculties  and  dispositions  in  domesticated  animals  is 
much  more  probably  due  to  the  artificial  selection  pursued  in  crossing 
promising  breeds,  than  to  the  transmission  of  the  organic  effects  of 
training.  Thus,  if  puppies  with  the  longest  tails  were  selected  for 
breeding  purposes  and  their  tails  also  frequently  pulled,  a  race  of 
dogs  with  abnormally  long  tails  would  probably  be  speedily  pro- 
duced ;  and  yet  the  elongation  might  be  due  entirely  to  the  process 
of  selection  and  not  to  that  of  pulhng. 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   INSTINCT.  591 


of  certain  insects,  e.g.,  the  nuptial  flight  of  the  queen-bee, 
and  the  laying  and  arranging  of  their  eggs  by  other  insects, 
occur  only  once  in  the  individual  life.  What  then  is  the 
meaning  of  the  saying  that  such  instincts  are  the  result  of 
habitual  experience  in  past  individual  lives  ?  Would  it  not  be 
as  reasonable  to  anticipate  that  a  man  should  unconsciously 
draw  up  his  will  by  reflex  action  because  during  many  genera- 
tions each  of  his  ancestors  have  performed  the  operation 
once  in  their  lives,  or  to  expect  that  babies  born  of  Christian 
parents  should  at  once  exhibit  an  instinct  for  baptism,  as  to 
explain  the  parental  operations  of  a  may-fly  preparatory  to 
its  decease  by  acquired  habits  of  its  ancestors  ?  On  the 
other  hand,  in  what  way  is  the  natural  selection  theory  better 
off?  For  according  to  that  view  the  extremely  complex 
movements  of  instinct  must  be  the  gradually  built-up  product 
of  an  enormous  number  of  fortuitously  beneficial  actions.^^ 

(4)  Again  :  The  peculiar  instincts  of  neuter  insects,  e.g.,  of 
working  bees,  which  do  not  reproduce  their  kind  but  leave 
this  oi^ce  to  another  class  endowed  with  quite  different 
habits,  are  an  additional  difficulty  to  both  the  "  lapsed 
intelligence  "  and  Natural  Selection  theories.  This  argument 
has  been  so  admirably  stated  in  the  following  paragraph  that 
I  quote  it  at  length  :  "  Neuter  insects  which  do  nothing  to 
propagate  their  race  can  do  nothing  to  transmit  instinct  or 
anything  else.  Yet  these  neuters  do  all  the  work  of  the  com- 
munity, and  require  the  most  complicated  instincts  to  do  it. 
To  fit  them  for  their  object,  even  their  bodily  form  has  often 
to  be  entirely  different  from  that  of  the  males  and  females ; 
and  in  some  species  the  neuters  destined  for  different  branches 
of  work  differ  entirely  from  one  another.  Thus  in  one  kind  of 
ant  there  are  working  neuters  and  soldier  neuters,  with  jaws 
and  instincts  extraordinarily  diff'erent.  Yet  these  neuters  are 
the  offsprings  of  males  and  females,  none  of  whom,  and  none 
of  whose  ancestors,  ever  did  a  stroke  of  work  in  their  lives. 
How  can  their  instinct  or  its  instruments  have  possibly 
been  developed  by  Natural  Selection  only  ?  .  .  .  Selection, 
Mr.  Darwin  answers,  may  be  applied  not  to  the  individual 
only,  but  to  the  race,  in  order  to  gain  the  required  end.  The 
good  of  the  race  requiring  the  production  of  neuters,  thus 
variously  modified  in  form  and  instinct,  those  fertile  insects 
may  alone  survive  which  tend  to  produce  neuters  so  modified  : 

12  "  An  instinct  is  nothing  else  than  a  series  of  given  acts ;  a 
modification  of  instinct  is,  therefore,  a  particular  action  which 
becomes  fortuitously  intercalated  in  this  series.  How  can  we 
believe  that  this  action,  even  though  it  were  by  chance  several  times 
repeated  during  life,  could  be  reproduced  in  the  series  of  actions  of 
the  descendants  ?  "  (Janet,  Final  Causes,  p.  257.) 


592  ANIMAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

and  thus  may  natural  selection  suffice  for  the  production. 
The  realms  of  imagination  are  no  doubt  infinite,  and  within 
their  sphere  such  ramifications  of  fortuity  are  perhaps  con- 
ceivable ;  but  have  we  not  reached  the  bursting  strain  of 
improbability  ?  That  direct  descent  should  develop  the 
geometrical  instinct  of  the  working  bee  is  hard  enough  to 
believe,  but  here  the  difficulty  is  raised  to  the  square.  And 
even  if  the  improbabilities  thus  piled  up  be  not  overwhelm- 
ing, still  the  explanation  so  suggested  does  not  avail  so 
much  as  to  touch  the  case  of  slave  ants.  They  exhibit 
an  instinct  beneficial,  not  to  their  own  race,  but  to  another ;  it 
can  be  of  no  advantage  to  the  tribe  from  which  they  are 
taken  that  so  many  of  its  members  should  be  dragged  away 
to  bondage,  or,  at  any  rate,  if  it  were  so,  why  should  that 
tribe  fight  to  prevent  it,  and  suffer  mutilation  and  death  in 
the  struggle  ?  By  what  possible  process  can  it  have  been 
brought  about,  that  black  queens  and  drones  should  have 
been  so  selected  as  to  produce  neuter  insects,  which  will 
make  good  slaves  for  red  ants,  at  the  same  time  handing  on 
to  their  progeny  an  instinct  that  makes  them  perish  in  the 
attempt  to  avoid  that  very  service  for  which  they  have  been 
so  laboriously  prepared  ?  "^^ 

(5)  Finally,  the  extreme  complexity  of  the  movements 
exhibited  in  many  instincts,  especially  where  the  exercise  of 
different  members  and  organs  have  to  be  combined  and  the 
actions  of  numerous  independent  muscles  correlated,  are,  as 
Spencer  has  recognized,  incompatible  with  origination  by 
fortuitously  and  independently  varying  movements.  Frac- 
tions or  parts  of  the  movement  that  go  to  make  up  many 
instinctive  operations  would  be  not  only  useless  but  harmful 
to  the  author.  Yet  they  could  not  all  have  co-operated  at  the 
right  time  by  chance.^"^  Indeed,  many  instincts  would  be  fatal 
to  their  owners  unless  they  were  comparatively  perfect.  How 
they  could  have  arisen  by  insensible  modifications  is  incon- 
ceivable. Nevertheless,  it  is  not  impossible  that  some  instincts 
originally  of  a  more  indefinite  character  may  have  been  per- 
fected, and  modification  effected  in  others  by  natural  selection 
and  environment.  But  the  attempt  to  explain  the  origin  of  all 
instincts  in  this  way  appears  to  us  doomed  to  hopeless 
failure.  Certain  writers  on  this  topic  seem  to  imply  that  a 
false  theory  is  better  than  none,  and  that  since  no  more  plausible 
*'  scientific  "  hypothesis  is  forthcoming  than  the  two  criticized 

^3  J.  Gerard,  S.J.,  Scienceand  Scientists,  p.  118.  (London  :  Catholic 
Truth  Society.)  The  reader  will  find  packed  into  this  little  shilling 
volume  much  searching  criticism  of  materialistic  evolutionist 
theories  and  "facts." 

^*  Consider  the  case  of  the  sphex  given  in  note  7. 


ANIMAL  SOULS.  593 


we  must  accept  either  of  them.     We  confess  this  docs  not 
seem  to  us  a  very  scientific  temper  of  mind. 

Animal  "Souls." — Tiie  investigations  which  we  have  now 
made  into  the  character  of  the  operations  of  the  animal 
"soul,"  render  clear  the  deductions  we  are  justified  in  draw- 
ing concerning  its  nature,  origin,  and  destiny.  The  whole 
weight  of  analogy  proves  that  in  the  brute,  as  in  man,  the 
vegetative  and  sentient  principles  are  identical.  This  animal 
"soul,"  however,  is  nut  a  spiritual  substantial  principle:  it  is  not 
a  substantial  form  intrinsically  independent  of  and  separable, 
from  its  material  subject.  This  doctrine  follows  immediately 
from  the  theses  established  above.  The  animal  manifests  no 
spiritual  activity.  It  is  not  endowed  with  rational  intellect; 
consequently,  not  with  free-will.  In  other  words,  all  the 
mental  actions  exhibited  by  it  are  of  the  lower  or  sensuous 
order,  and  therefore  intrinsically  or  essentially  dependent  on 
a  material  organism.  We  are  accordingly  led  to  conclude 
that  the  ultimate  principle  from  which  these  operations 
proceed  is  itself  intrinsically  and  essentially  dependent  on 
matter.  Actio  sequitiir  esse ;  as  a  being  is,  so  it  acts;  but  all 
the  mental  acts  which  we  are  justified  in  ascribing  to  animals 
are  of  an  organic  or  sensuous  character.  Therefore  we  are 
bound  to  infer  that  the  animal  "  soul  "  is  essentially  depen- 
dent on  the  material  organism  and  inseparable  from  it.  It  is, 
consequently,  incapable  of  life  apart  from  the  body,  and  it 
perishes  with  the  destruction  of  the  latter.  On  account  of 
this  intrinsic  dependence  on  matter,  the  souls  of  animals 
were  spoken  of  by  the  Scholastics  indifferently  as  material  and 
corporeal.  They  did  not,  however,  intend  by  these  terms  to 
imply  that  the  principle  of  vital  activities  is  a  bodily  substance 
of  three  dimensions.  They  simply  meant  to  teach  that  it 
depends  absolutely  on  the  material  subject  which  it  actuates, 
just  as  the  heat  depends  on  the  matter  of  the  burning  coal, 
and  the  stamped  inscription  on  the  wax.  They  maintained, 
moreover,  that  though  not  spiritual,  the  vital  principle  in 
animals  must  be  of  a  simple  nature,  inasmuch  as  the  activity 
of  sentiency  which  proceeds  from  it  is  a  simple  immanent 
operation. 

The  animal  soul  is  thus,  in  Scholastic  language,  a  sub- 
stantial form  completely  immersed  in  the  subject  which  it 
animates.  Accordingly,  it  does  not  require  a  Divine  Creative 
act  to  account  for  its  origin  in  each  successive  being  any 
more  than  a  Divine  Annihilative  volition  to  eftect  its  destruc- 
tion. It  is  a  result  of  substantial  transformation  produced 
by  generation.  An  existing  vital  energy  is  capable,  by  its 
action,  of  reproducing  or  evoking  from  the  potentialities  of 
matter  a  new  energy  akin  to  itself.     But,  as  at  pieseut  new 

MM 


594  HYPNOTISM. 


life  ever  proceeds  only  from  a  living  agent,  so  a  fortiori  in  the 
beginning  the  primordial  act  hy  which  animal  life  was  first 
educed  frtm  the  potentialities  of  matter  must  have  been  that 
of  a  Living  Being. 


SUPPLEMENT   B. 

'  HYPNOTISM. 

Hypnotism  {vttvos,  sleep).  The  interest  awakened  in  recent 
years  in  the  subject  of  Hypnotism,  and  its  connection  with 
other  mental  phenomena  make  it  seem  desirable  that  we 
should  devote  what  space  we  can  afford  to  it  here. 

Historical  Sketch. — Towards  the  end  of  last  century  an 
Austrian  physician  named  Mesmer  professed  publicly  in  Paris 
to  heal  all  diseases  by  "  animal  magnetism."  The  treatment 
was  so  called  from  a  "  magnetic "  power  supposed  to  be 
exerted  over  living  beings  by  certain  persons  or  objects  more 
than  normally  saturated  with  the  mysterious  influence.  The 
magnetisation  was  effected  by  passes,  contact,  or  fixation  of 
the  eyes,  but  was  often  accompanied  by  ceremonies  of  a 
superstitious  and  sometimes  of  an  immoral  character.  In 
1714  mesmerism  was  examined  by  a  commission  of  the  Ro5'al 
Society  of  Medicine  of  France..  The  commissioners  decided 
against  the  reality  of  the  alleged  magnetic  force.  They 
explained  the  effects  of  the  magnetization  to  be  due  to  the 
influence  of  imagination  and  imitation,  and  the}'  declared  the 
beneficial  results  claimed  for  the  new  curative  treatment  to 
be  more  than  counterbalanced  b}'  the  dangers,  physical  and 
moral,  attendant  on  its  employment. ^  Later  on  the  Holy  See 
also  condemned  mesmerism,  or  rather  the  superstitious  or 
immoral  use  of  methods  of  magnetism  included  under  that 
name.  For  three-quarters  of  a  century  the  magnetic  art  had 
fallen  into  general  disrepute ;  but  during  the  past  twenty 
years  it  has  again  come  into  prominence  under  the  title  of 
Hypnotism.  The  new  method  of  treatment,  however,  at  least 
as  employed  by  medical  men  of  standing,  is  stripped  of  the 
former  superstitious  and  objectionable  practices,  though 
certain  grave  dangers  inevitabl}-  remain  attached  to  its  use. 
To  hypnotism  thus  understood  as  excluding  spiritualism, 
occultism,  clairvoyance,  and  the  like  we  confine  ourselves 
here.  Experiences  of  these  latter  kinds,  whether  \iewcd  as 
preternatural  or  merely  abnormal  phenomena,  must  be  dis- 

^  Cf.  Binet  and  Fere,  Animal  Magnetism,  pp.  i — 30, 


HYPNOTISM.  595 


cussed  individually — especially  with  respect  to  the  evidence 
as  to  matters  of  fact  in  each  particular  case. 

Process  of  hypnotization. — The  subject  is  requested  to 
gaze  fixedly  at  some  object,  such  as  a  button,  suspended  at  a 
little  distance  from  his  eyes  and  above  his  head ;  or  to  stare 
into  the  eyes  of  the  operator ;  or  to  listen  to  a  monotonous 
sound  such  as  the  ticking  of  a  watch  ;  or  "  passes  "  are  made 
in  front  of  his  face  and  chest.  After  a  time  he  often  gradually 
falls  into  a  drowsy  or  lethargic  condition,  hke  that  preceding  or 
following  on  ordinary  sleep.  This  is  a  milder  form  of  the 
hypnosis  or  hypnotic  trance.  Dr.  Bernheim  and  the  physicians 
of  the  Nancy  School  ordinarily  induce  the  hypnosis  by  simple 
suggestion  of  the  idea.  Thus  the  patient  being  seated,  the 
doctor  says,  in  a  quiet,  authoritative  voice  :  "  Gaze  fixedly  at 
me  and  think  of  nothing  except  of  faUing  asleep.  You  feel 
your  eyelids  heavy :  you  are  very  drowsy  :  your  eyes  grow 
more  and  more  fatigued  :  they  wink  :  your  sight  is  becoming 
dimmer  and  dimmer  :  your  eyes  are  closing :  you  cannot  open 
them!  Sleep  !"2  If  the  operation  is  successful,  the  subject 
passes  into  the  hypnosis,  from  which  he  is  awakened  either  by 
blowing  on  his  face,  by  making  passes  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion, or  by  an  emphatic  "  Awake  !  " 

Characteristics  of  the  hypnotic  state. — The  trance  thus 
induced  may  be  of  any  degree  of  intensity,  from  a  slight  feeling 
of  drowsiness  to  profound  somnambulistic  sleep.  Different 
writers  variously  classify  these  states.  Charcot's  division  of 
stages  into  cataleptic,  lethargic,  and  somnavibulistic  is  the  best 
known;  as  it  is  also  the  most  generally  attacked.^  That 
adopted  by  Wundt  of  drowsiness,  light  sleep,  and  deep  sleep,  are 
as  convenient  as  any  other  ;  though  the  state  must  not  be 
identified  with  normal  sleep.*  In  the  lighter  forms  of  the 
hypnotic  influence  the  subject  is  quite  aware  of  what  goes  on 
around  him,  and  can  remember  the  various  incidents  after- 
wards, but  he  feels  perhaps  slightly  drowsy.  The  chief 
peculiarity  of  the  state  is  that  the  subject  is  in  a  condition  of 
rapport  or  special  relation  with  the  hypnotizer,  which  is  shown 
by  his  susceptibility  to  suggestions  from  the  latter.  In  the 
deeper  stages  the  subject  loses  connexion  more  and  more 
with  all  other  objects  save  the  hypnotizer  and  the  particular 
experiences  which  the  latter  suggests.  When  he  awakes  he 
cannot  remember,  or  only  very  imperfectly,  the  incidents  of 
the  hypnotic  state.  Amongst  some  of  the  more  remarkable 
phenomena  are  the  following  : 

2  H.  Bernheim,  De  la  Suggestion  et  dc  ses  Applications  a  la  TliMi- 
pentique,  pp.  2,  3. 

^  See  A.  Moll,  Hypnotism,  pp.  48 — 52. 
*  Human  and  Animal  Psycholcgy,  p.  ^29. 


596  HYPNOTISM. 


Inhibition  of  voluntary  muscles. — The  operator  authorita- 
tively tells  the  subject  that  he  cannot  pronounce  his  own 
name,  or  open  his  eyes,  or  move  his  legs ;  and  immediately 
the  subject  is  helplessly  paralyzed  in  regard  to  these  acts, 
somewhat  as  one  feels  when  suffering  from  nightmare.  Or 
in  a  deeper  stage  the  subject  is  commanded  to  hold  out  his 
arm,  and  is  next  assured  that  it  is  impossible  to  withdraw  it. 
The  arm  then  assumes  a  rigid  cataleptic  condition,  and 
remains  thus  extended  for  a  longer  period  than  the  subject 
could  voluntarily  sustain  it  in  his  normal  state. 

Illusions  and  hallucinations. — In  a  still  more  profound 
stage  illusions  can  be  successfully  suggested.  The  hypnotized 
person  is  easily  persuaded  that  a  glass  of  water  is  tea,  wine, 
or  vinegar,  or  vice  versa.  Or,  his  attention  is  directed  towards 
an  imaginary  cat,  bird,  or  flower  which  he  thereupon  perceives 
as  a  real  being.  Still  more  curious  are  the  "negative"  illu- 
sions. The  operator  asserts  emphatically  that  some  parti- 
cular member  of  the  company  has  left  the  room ;  and  this 
individual  thenceforth  becomes  invisible  to  the  subject, 
although  the  latter  distinctly  perceives  all  the  other  persons 
and  objects  in  the  apartment.  The  subject  may  be  made  to 
adopt  some  other  character,  as  that  of  a  policeman,  a  nun,  a 
little  child,  or  an  old  woman;  and  not  infrequently  acts  the 
part  remarkably  well.  In  this  deeper  somnambulistic  stage 
the  actions  suggested  by  the  experimenter  are  almost 
invariably  executed,  even  though  they  be  absurd,  unpleasant, 
or  ridiculous. 

Amnesia  and  "deferred  suggestions." — A  common  feature  of 
the  deeper  forms  of  the  trance  is  complete  forgetfulness  vvhen 
awakened,  of  the  incidents  which  have  just  happened,  although 
they  may  be  perfectly  recalled  in  a  future  hypnosis.  Never- 
theless post-hypnotic  suggestions  or  orders  given  during  the 
trance  with  regard  to  future  actions  are  often  faithfully  per- 
formed at  the  appropriate  time  when  the  subject  has  been 
restored  to  his  normal  waking  state,  although  no  recollection 
of  the  suggestion  be  retained.  The  subject  simply  feels  a 
vague  impulse  to  perform  the  action.  It  is  in  this  force  of 
"deferred  suggestions"  that  the  value  of  hypnotism  as  a 
therapeutic  agency  lies.  But  here  also  is  obviously  one  of 
its  gravest  dangers.  The  patient,  when  hypnotized,  is  assured 
that  he  will  awake  in  good  health,  that  his  neuralgia  or 
dyspepsia  will  have  ceased ;  and  the  malady  accordingly 
disappears.  Or,  if  ordered  to  do  something  on  a  future  occa- 
sion, he  will  feel,  when  the  circumstances  arrive,  an  inex- 
plicable impulse  to  perform  the  act ;  and  this  craving,  it 
is  said,  possesses  in  some  instances  an  overmastering 
force  which  rcndcis  the  subject  miserable  until  the  deed  is 


HYPNOTISM.  597 


accomplished,  or  the  occasion  for  it  has  passed  completely 
away. 

Exalted  sensibility. — In  certain  cases  the  sensibility  of 
the  perceptive  faculties  seems  to  be  heightened  in  a  marvel- 
lous manner,  so  as  to  enable  the  hypnotized  subject  to 
apprehend  faint  stimuli  that  would  in  the  normal  state  be 
indiscernible.  How  far  certain  strange,  extraordinary  pheno- 
mena of  this  class  are  to  be  ascribed  to  hypnotism  proper,  it 
is  very  difficult  to  decide.  At  all  events  authenticated  cases 
of  the  kind  do  not  seem  to  occur  in  legitimate  clinical  practice 
like  that  of  Bernheim  at  Nancy.  Cn  the  other  hand,  a  writer 
as  little  likely  to  extend  unduly  the  territory  of  the  preter- 
natural as  Professor  James,  is  very  frank  in  his  confession  of 
belief  in  the  reality  of  occurrences  at  "  seances  "  given  by 
certain  "  mediums,"  as  altogether  inexplicable  by  hitherto 
known  natural  causes.^ 

Whether  the  human  intellect  can  ever  naturally  work  more 
efficiently  in  the  hypnotized  state  seems  even  more  open  to 
doubt ;  though  it  is  not  impossible  that  the  suspension  of 
inferior  cerebral  centres  may  in  particular  circumstances  set 
certain  higher  mental  processes  in  a  freer  and  more  unim- 
peded condition  of  activity.^ 

The  percentage  of  persons  hypnotizable  is  variously 
stated  by  different  experimenters,  partly  owing  to  their 
differences  of  view  as  to  the  genuineness  of  the  lighter  form 
of  Hypnotism.  Thus:  "  Bottey  gives  30  per  cent,  as  sus- 
ceptible, Morselli  70  per  cent.,  Delboeuf  over  80  per  cent.,  / 
whilst  Bernheim  refuses  the  right  to  judge  of  hypnotism  to  / 
all  hospital  doctors  who  cannot  hypnotize  at  least  80  per  cent, 
of  their  patients,  and  Forel  fully  agrees  with  him."^ 

Men,  according  to  some  writers,  are  as  hypnotizable  as 
women,  soldiers  being  particularly  good  subjects.  The  sus- 
ceptibility of  the  subject  increases  with  the  frequency  of  the 
operation,  and  the  induction  of  a  morbid  "  hypnotic  habit "  is 
one  of  the  serious  evils  attending  on  frequent  hypnotization.  As 

5  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I.  p.  396 ;  and  The  Will  to  Believe, 

P-  319- 

^  Such  would  seem  to  be  the  view  of  St.  Thomas  in  regard  to 

some  states.     But  though  he  lays  down  the  general  principle,  he  is 

rather  considering  the  possibility  of  supernatural  communications: 

"  Anima   nostra,    quanto   magis   a   corporalibus   abstrahitur,   tanto 

intelligibilium  abstractorum  fit  capacior.     Unde  in  somniis,  et  aliena- 

tionibus  a  sensibus  corporis  magis  divinae  revelationes  percipiuntur, 

et  prsevisiones  futurorum."   {Sum.   i.  q.  12,  a.  11.     Cf.  Coconnier, 

L'Hypnotisme  franc,  p.  361.) 

"'  Moll,   Hypnotism,  p.  47.     Only   a  small  percentage,   however, 

reach  the  deeper  stages. 


598  HYPNOTISM. 


to  whether  we  can  be  hypnotized  against  our  will,  it  is  gener 
ally  admitted  that  if  a  person  has  already  often  submitted  to 
the  experiment,  he  may  sometimes  be  hypnotized  without 
his  consent.  It  is  also  agreed  that  certain  neurotic  or 
hysterical  patients  can  be  hypnotized  from  the  first  time  against 
their  desire.  As  regards  normal  healthy  persons,  if  they 
decline  to  comply  with  the  conditions,  the  hypnotizer  can  do 
nothing.  It  is  also  generally  held  that  an  abnormally  sus- 
ceptible subject  can  be  safeguarded  from  future  abuse  by  the 
suggestion  that  he  can  never  be  hypnotized  save  by  some 
particular  person. 

Theories  concerning  Hypnotism. — According  to  Charcot 
and  the  Paris  school  at  least  the  deeper  hypnosis  is  a  nervous 
disorder,  found  only  in  hysterical  patients,  and  exhibiting 
itself  in  the  three  stages  of  cataleptic,  lethargic,  and  somnam- 
bulistic trance.^  On  the  other  hand,  the  Nancy  school,  whose 
view  now  generally  prevails,  advocate  not  a  physical  but  a 
psychical  explanation  of  the  phenomena.  They  teach  that  the 
hypnosis  is  not  a  nervous  disorder  but  a  state  possessing  close 
affinity  to  natural  sleep.  For  them  the  essence  of  hypnotism 
is  suggestion.  They  explain  the  contrary  conclusions  of  their 
rivals,  as  due  to  the  fact  that  the  experience  of  the  latter  is 
confined  chiefly  to  the  neurotic  patients  of  the  Salpetriere 
hospital ;  and  they  urge  that  the  phenomena  of  the  three 
stages  and  other  features  insisted  on  by  Charcot's  disciples 
can  all  be  accounted  for  by  suggestion  and  imitation.-'  Still, 
as  has  been  justly  observed,  "  what  needs  explanation  here  is 
the  fact  that  in  a  certain  condition  of  the  subject  suggestions 
operate  as  they  do  at  no  other  time."^*'  The  matter  is  con- 
fessedly exceedingly  obscure,  and  no  satisfactory  answer  is 
yet  forthcoming ;  nevertheless,  some  considerations  connect- 
ing hypnosis  with  more  familiar  mental  phenomena  may  be 
usefully  indicated. 

Hypnosis. — First,  then,  the  hypnotic  trance,  though  not 
identical  in  any  stage  with  natural  sleep,  clearly  bears  affinity 
to  the  latter  state,  especially  to  that  type  of  it  exhibited  in 
spontaneous  somnambulism.  It  is  induced  by  similar  means,  and 
the  lighter  forms  resemble  the  drowsiness  which  precedes  or 
succeeds  sleep.  We  have  pointed  out  how  the  apparent 
reality  of  the  dream  results  from  the  cessation  of  the  cor- 
rective action  of  the  external  senses  and  the  suspension  of 
the  power  of  reflective  comparison  whilst  the  exaggeration 
of  the  impressions  which  succeed  in  penetrating  into  the 
sleeper's  mind  is  due  to  the  circumstance  that  they  secure  a 

«  Cf.  Binet  and  Fere,  op.  cit.  cc.  vi,  vii, 

*♦  Cf.  Bernheim,  op.  cit.  c.  vi. 

1"  James,  Principles  of  Psyclwlogy,  vol.  ii.  p.  6oi. 


HYPNOTISM.  599 


monopoly  of  his  consciousness,  (p.  176.)  These  facts  help 
towards  the  explanation  of  some  of  the  phenomena  of 
hypnotism. 

Fixation  of  attention  :  "  Rapport." — The  primary  effect  of 
the  concentration  of  attention  involved  in  all  the  methods  of 
hypnotizing  is  to  starve  out  all  rival  impressions  and  thoughts. 
This  seems  to  bring  on  a  condition  of  somnolence  in  regard 
to  all  surrounding  objects,  except  the  operator  who  has 
induced  the  state  by  directing  the  fixation  of  tiie  subject's 
attention.  This  peculiar  "  rapport  "  witli  the  hypnotizer 
preserved  throughout  the  trance  is  the  chief  feature  by 
which  this  artificially  induced  sleep  is  distinguished  from 
normal  sleep.  Even  in  ordinary  sleep,  the  senses  are  not 
altogether  closed.  There  is  exerted  a  certain  "  selective  " 
reception  of  impressions,  and  those  which  fit  in  with  the 
current  of  a  dream  may  have  an  abnormally  intense  effect. 
It  is,  indeed,  sometimes  possible,  if  we  hit  upon  the  current  of 
a  dreamer's  thoughts,  to  direct  them  by  suggestions.  But  in 
the  hypnosis  instead  of  this  imperfect  casual  relation  with  (r.ty 
body,  there  is  a  fixed  stable  rapport  wdth  one  person  who 
possesses  an  absolute  monopoly  of  the  subject's  conscious- 
ness. The  subject  by  the  voluntary  strained  fixation  of  his 
attention  on  the  hypnotizer  has  fallen  into  a  trance  in  which 
his  attention  is  henceforth  riveted,  or  involuntarily  fascinated 
by  the  latter.  Why  the  subject's  attention  should  become 
thus  "  clamped  "  we  cannot  tell. 

Abnormal  sug-g-estibility. — The  power  of  suggestion  is  a 
familiar  fact  already  sufficiently  illustrated.  If  the  thought 
of  a  rat  being  in  the  room,  or  of  a  worm  crawling  up  my  back, 
is  suggested  to  me,  I  am  uncomfortable  until  I  convince 
myself  that  it  is  not  true.  As  St.  Thomas  teaches,  the  repre- 
sentations of  the  imagination  win  assent  unless  contradicted 
by  sense-perception  or  reason,  (p.  178.)  In  proportion  to  the 
vividness  of  the  idea  and  the  completeness  of  the  suspension 
of  the  other  faculties  will  be  the  intensity  of  the  illusion. 
Again,  vivid  ideas  of  action  tend  to  realize  themselves.  A 
lively  conception  of  a  word  or  gesture  expresses  itself  in  a 
faint  movement  of  the  appropriate  muscles.  But  attention, 
whether  voluntary  or  extorted,  enormously  increases  the 
force  of  an  idea  or  sensation.  It  augments  the  excitability 
of  the  nerve  tracts  and  cerebral  centres  engaged,  it  suppresses 
the  enfeebling  effect  of  competing  stimuli ;  and  it  concentrates 
mental  energy  on  the  object  of  interest.  But  in  proportion 
as  the  trance  is  more  profound  all  rival  experiences  seem  to 
be  excluded,  and  the  faculties  of  the  subject  are  receptive 
only  of  the  suggestions  of  the  hypnotizer,  which  cunsccpiently 
acquire  very  exceptional  force. 


600  HYPNOTISM. 


Inhibition. — Even  in  waking  life,  onr  power  of  action  is 
much  dependent  on  onr  belief  in  our  ability  to  act.  The 
partial  conviction  that  we  cannot  or  can  perform  a  certain 
movement  goes  far  to  make  it  impossible  or  possible  for  us. 
But  in  hypnosis  the  conviction  of  inability  can  be  made 
absolute  by  simple  suggestion,  and  the  voluntary  control  of 
tiie  subject's  muscles  is  suspended  as  completely  as  in  a  night- 
mare. The  hypnotizer  cannot,  as  is  sometimes  erroneously 
said,  directly  rule  the  Will  of  the  hypnotized:  but  he  can 
determine,  at  least  in  extreme  cases,  the  movements  and  per- 
ceptions of  the  latter  by  suggesting  the  images  which  excite 
his  motor  and  sensory  nerves  and  cerebral  centres. 

Suggested  illusions. — The  same  principles  help  to  explain 
both  the  negative  and  positive  illusions  of  hypnosis.  Even 
in  waking  life,  when  the  attention  is  engrossed  by  some  other 
subject,  a  man  may  gaze  at  an  object  without  perceiving  it ; 
he  may  walk  through  a  crowded  street  with  as  little  notice 
of  the  sights  which  assail  his  eyes,  as  if  it  were  empty ;  even 
an  acute  pain  may  remain  unobserved  by  him.  This  is  the 
ordinary  character  of  the  somnambulism  of  normal  sleep  and 
of  the  hallucination  of  the  monomaniac.  The  attention  is 
absorbed  by  some  dominant  thought  or  fixed  idea,  and  the 
chief  difference  in  the  case  of  hypnosis  is  that  the  thought 
which  is  to  dominate  is  determined  by  the  operator.  If  he 
chooses  to  concentrate  the  mental  energy  of  the  subject  on 
a  phantasm  of  the  imagination,  since  all  initiative  or  voluntary 
use  of  reason  is  inhibited,  hallucination  is  inevitable.  That 
suggestions  made  under  such  favourable  circumstances  not 
only  possess  exceptional  force  at  the  time,  but  also  produce 
an  enduring  impression  which  will  work  itself  out  later  on, 
appears  natural  enough.  There  is  probably  also  something 
in  the  cerebral  conditions  of  hypnosis  which  renders  the  brain 
peculiarly  susceptible  to  suggestions  of  the  time. 

Amnesia. — The  forgetfulness  of  the  events  of  the  hypnotic 
state  during  the  following  waking  period,  and  their  recollec- 
tion in  a  subsequent  hypnosis,  hive  their  parallel  in  the 
obliviscence  of  dreams  and  somnambulistic  performances  in 
the  daytime.  The  memory  of  our  waking  experiences  presents 
us  with  analogous  facts.  The  recollection  of  a  past  cognition 
seems  commonly  to  involve,  or  at  least  to  be  facilitated  by, 
the  reproduction  of  part  of  the  frame  of  mind  in  which  the 
incident  occurred.  Each  mental  act  forms  an  integral  part 
of  an  environing  conscious  state  connected  with  a  network 
of  nervous  conditions,  and  when  these  are  completely  changed 
as  from  the  sleeping  to  the  waking  state,  remembrance  of 
experiences  of  the  former  condition  are  naturally  difficult. 
We  have  alluded  to  tliis  before  in  dealing  with  "alternating 


HYPNOTISM.  6oi 


personalities."  (pp.  490,  491.)  The  retention  in  a  latent 
subconscious  form  of  an  impulse  to  carry  out  a  deferred 
suggestion  when  the  appointed  circumstances  arise  may 
perhaps  be  explained  in  the  same  way.  The  man  who, 
engrossed  in  conversation,  automatically  posts  a  letter, 
owing  to  a  friend's  request,  as  he  passes  a  pillar-box,  executes, 
it  has  been  justly  said,  a  "deferred  suggestion,"  of  which  he 
may  have  been  oblivious  from  the  moment  he  received  the 
letter  until  he  finds  his  pocket  empty  on  arriving  home  ;  and 
he  may  be  then  utterly  unable  to  recall  the  incident.  In  many, 
if  not  all  cases,  the  performance  of  complex  post-hypnotic 
suggestions  seems  to  involve  a  relapse  into  the  trance  state. ^^ 
Ethics  of  Hypnotism. — The  morality  of  hypnotism  is  a 
question  rather  for  Ethics  or  Moral  Theology  than  for 
the  Psychologist,  so  a  very  few  words  must  suffice  here  :  (i)  It 
is  admitted  on  all  hands  that  hypnotism  is  attended  by  serious 
peril  to  health  of  both  body  and  mind  when  practised  by 
unskilled  persons  and  irresponsible  charlatans.  Epileptic 
fits,  hysterical  paroxysms,  and  permanent  mental  and  nervous 
disorders  have  been  induced  by  ignorant  experimenters. 
Accordingly  several  continental  governments  have  wisely 
made  public  exhibitions  and  the  practice  of  hypnotism  by 
other  than  duly  qualified  persons  a  penal  offence.  (2)  Further 
it  is  generally  agreed  that  frequent  hypnotizatiou,  especially 
when  the  profounder  stages  are  induced,  brings  on  a  morbid 
hypnotic  Jiabit,  besides  rendering  the  subject  unduly  sub- 
servient to  the  influence  of  the  operator.  Obviously  this 
latter  consequence  may  be  attended  with  serious  dangers.^''^ 

^1  See  Coconnier,  U Hypnotisme  franc  (Paris,  1897),  cc.  xii. — xiv. 
This  is  an  able  and  judicious  work  on  the  subject.  There  are  good 
chapters  also  in  Meric's  Le  Merveilleux  et  la  Science. 

^-  The  grave  words  of  Wundt  are  worth  recording  :  "  Hypnotism 
as  a  therapeutic  agency  is  a  two-edged  instrument.  If  its  effects 
are  strongest  when  the  patient  is  predisposed  to  it  in  body  and 
mind,  or  when  suggestion  has  become  a  settled  mode  of  treatment, 
it  may  obviously  be  employed  to  intensify  or  actually  induce  a 
pathological  disposition.  It  must  be  looked  upon,  not  as  a  remedy 
of  universal  serviceability,  but  as  a  poison  whose  effect  may  be 
beneficial  under  certain  circumstances.  .  .  .  (Some  assert)  that  the 
hypnotic  sleep  is  not  injurious,  because  it  is  not  in  itself  a  patho- 
logical disposition.  But  surely  the  facts  of  post-hypnotic  halluci- 
nation and  the  diminution  of  the  power  of  resistance  to  suggestive 
influences  furnish  a  refutation  of  this  statement  which  no  counter- 
arguments can  shake.  It  is  a  phenomenon  of  common  observation 
that  frequently  hypnotized  individuals  can,  when  fully  awake,  be 
persuaded  of  the  wildest  fables  and  thenceforth  regard  them  as 
passages  of  their  own  experience."  [Lectures  on  Human  and  Animal 
Psychology,  pp.  334,  335.) 


6o2  HYPNOTISM. 


How  far  a  subject  can  by  hypnotism  be  led  to  commit  a 
crime  is  mucli  disputed,  but  it  is  clearly  unlawful  to  suspend 
or  diminish  in  this  way  the  use  of  our  free-will  and  intel- 
ligence without  adequate  reason  and  due  precautions.  (3) 
Where  hypnotism  is  employed  for  illicit  purposes,  or  in  con- 
nexion with  superstitious  practices  as  in  spiritualism,  occultism, 
clairvoyance  and  the  like,  it  is  evidently  immoral.  (4)  If, 
however,  the  question  be  put :  Is  hypnotism  ever  allowable  ? 
the  true  answer  seems  to  us  to  be  that  of  the  moral  Theo- 
logians who  teach  ^'^  that  in  certain  circumstances  the  use  of 
hypnotism  is  permissible.  The  conditions  usually  prescribed 
are  :  (a)  There  must  be  a  grave  reason  to  justify  the  sus- 
pension of  reason ;  and  we  would  add  that  the  gravity 
increases  in  proportion  to  the  completeness  of  the  abdication 
of  free  control  involved,  (b)  Sufficient  guarantee  should  be 
had  as  to  the  character  and  competence  of  the  operator, 
(c)  Some  adequately  trustworthy  witness,  such  as  a  parent, 
husband,  or  guardian  should  be  present  when  a  person 
submits  to  being  hypnotized. 

^'  Genicot  writes:  "  Vitatis  conatibus  suparstitiosis,  et  adhibitis 
cauteiis  supra  explicatis,  licet  seipsum  ob  j^ravem  causam  hypno- 
tizanti  tradere.  .  .  .  Graves  causae  ob  quas  licite  hypnotismus  adhi- 
beatur,  sunt  praesertim  duas  ;  curatio  morborum  quibus  sanandis 
desit  aliud  medium  prorsus  innocuum  ;  et  progressus  quarundam 
scientiarum,  puta  medicinae  vel  psychologiae,  hisexperimentisobtin- 
endus.  Praeterea  censemus  hypnotismum  licite  adhiberi,  ad  tollendas, 
vel  saltem  minuendas,  quasdam  malas  propensiones  quae,  ob  vehe- 
mentiam  suam,  libertatem  tollunt  vel  extenuant,  puta  propensio»em 
ad  suicidium,  ad  liquores  inebriantes,  &c."  (TJieoIogij'  Moralis  Insti- 
tutiones,  vol.  i.  §  275  (1898).  Cf  Lehmkuhl,  Theologia  Moi-alis,  vol.  i. 
n.  994  ;  Sabetti,  Theologia  Moralis,  §  209  ;  Coconnier,  op.  cit.  cc. 
xxi.— XV. ;    Bucceroni,  Casus  ConscienticT,  §  89  (1895). 


REPLY  TO  Mk.  W.  U.  MALLOCK'S  CRITICISM.        C03 


SUPPLEMENT   C. 

REPLY    TO     MR.  W.    H.    MALLOCK's    CRITICISM. 

The  fourth  edition  of  this  work  was  honoured  by  an 
elaborate  attack  from  Mr.  W.  hi.  Mallock  in  a  long  article 
entitled,  "  Rehgion  and  Science,"  in  the  Fortnightly  Revieiv,  of 
November,  igoi.  His  own  view,  expounded  in  a  series  of 
essays  in  that  Review,  seems  to  be  that  not  only  do  belief 
in  a  Personal  God,  free-will,  a  spiritual  soul  and  a  future  life 
find  no  support  in  Science  or  deductions  from  Science,  but 
that  Psychology,  Biology,  and  Physics  exclude  and  negate  all 
these  behefs,  that  ''the  facts  put  before  us  by  Science  form 
an  absolute  affirmation  of  monism,  and  monism  is  the  absolute 
negation  of  religion."  {Fortnightly,  Oct.  1902.)  He  therefore 
maintains  that  the  attempts  of  myself  and  other  "Apologists" 
to  harmonize  science  and  rehgion,  or  to  justify  any  of  these 
beliefs  from  a  scientific  study  of  the  mind  are  "  futile  and 
worthless,"  and  further  that  my  own  arguments  are  self- 
contradictory.  Mr.  Mallock  himself,  though  admitting  an 
irreconcilable  conflict  between  science  and  religion,  defends 
the  latter  on  these  grounds  :  (i)  "  Contradictions  are  involved 
in  all  existence,"  and  "  Religion  contradicts  Science  no  more 
than  each  contradicts  itself."  {Ibid.  p.  696.)  (2)  The  ethical 
argument :  Life  is  not  worth  living,  unless  the  religious 
assumptions  are  true. 

My  reply  in  general  is  that  in  all  those  places  where 
Mr.  Mallock's  criticism  seems  effective  he  has  misrepresented 
my  arguments — of  course  not  intentionally.  Unfortunately, 
though  he  quotes  me  over  a  score  of  times,  he  only  gives  the 
references  twice,  so  that  the  ordinary  reader  cannot  consult 
the  context.  Yet  no  one  knows  better  than  Mr.  Mallock  how 
vital  this  is  in  philosophical  criticism.  As  my  space  is  limited, 
I  must  be  very  brief  in  answering  his  objections. 

(i)  Mr.  Mallock  starts  by  representing  modern  defenders 
of  Theism  as  resting  their  case  almost  entirely  on  the  fact 
that  science  has  disproved  the  doctrine  of  the  spontaneous 
generation  of  life  from  inorganic  matter.  He  next  groups  me 
with  these  "recent  apologists  of  Religion,"  and  then  devotes 
four  pages  of  criticism  to  show  {a)  that  my  argument  is  in- 
sufficient to  prove  the  existence  of  a  conscious  or  intelligent 
Being,  and  therefore  is  worthless,     {b)  That  my  own  reason- 


6o4        REPLY  TO  MR.  IV.  H.  MALLOCR'S  CRITICISM. 

ing  and  language  in  other  parts  of  my  book  prove  its  worth- 
lessness.  "  Father  Maher  has  unintentionally  adopted  almost 
the  exact  language  employed  by  Tyndall.  .  .  .  '  In  matter 
I  discern  the  potency  of  life,'  the  only  difference  being  that 
according  to  Tyndall  the  Power  which  evokes  this  potency  is 
immanent  in  matter,  and  according  to  Father  Maher  it  is  a 
separate  personality  which  is  exterior  to  it,"  but  there  is 
nothing  to  prove  that  this  Personality  must  be  conscious. 
(c)  Further,  Father  Maher  has  unintentionally  "  misrepre- 
sented in  the  grossest  manner  possible  what  the  leading  men 
of  science  have  really  said  on  the  subject.  .  .  .  F.  M.  quotes 
Tyndall  and  Huxley  as  affirming  that  living  beings  are 
produced  only  by  living  beings,  and  adds  that  accordmg  to 
them  '  there  is  not  a  shred  of  evidence  to  support  a  contrary 
conclusion.'  What  they  really  say  is  not  that  spontaneous 
generation  has  never  taken  place,  and  that  life  as  we  know  it 
is  not  due  to  this  process,  but  that  the  process  has  not  been 
discovered  taking  place  now,  and  that  experiment  thus  far 
has  been  unable  to  reproduce  it.  That  it  has  taken  place  in 
the  past  is  the  very  thing  they  affirm,  and  that  all  the 
analogies  of  the  Universe  show  that  it  must  have  done  so." 
{Fuytnighily,  Nov.  1901,  pp.  812 — 816.) 

To  (a)  it  may  be  rephed  on  the  part  of  Theists  generally 
that  this  argument  is  only  one,  or  rather  a  part  of  one  of 
several  arguments  which  co-operate  in  the  proof  of  the 
existence  of  God  in  the  full  sense  of  a  self-existing,  infinite, 
intelligent,  free  Being,  and  that  even  if  taken  by  itself  it  does 
not  immediately  establish  all  the  attributes  of  God  it  is  not 
therefore  worthless.  A  fact  may  be  valuable  evidence,  it 
may  exclude  a  rival  hypothesis,  or  it  may  supply  a  precious 
link  in  one  chain  of  reasoning,  even  though  it  should  not 
establish  the  whole  thesis  to  be  proved. 

On  my  own  part  the  answer  is  still  easier.  My  book  is  a 
treatise  on  Psychology,  not  on  Natural  Theology,  and  I  may 
incidentally  allude  to  the  bearing  of  some  psychological  truth 
on  the  doctrine  of  Theism  without  being  bound  to  expound 
the  whole  proof  of  the  existence  and  attributes  of  God. 

{b)  Nowhere  in  this  book  does  my  reasoning  prove  this 
argument  to  be  worthless.  To  point  out  against  materialistic 
scientists  that  the  first  Author  of  life  must  a  fortiori  have 
been  a  self-existing  Living  Being  does  not  prove  that  this 
Being  may  be  icitJioiit  consciousness.  (Cf.  p.  584.)  It  is 
shown  in  Natural  Theology  that  a  self -existing  being  must  be 
infinite  and  intelligent.  The  small  difference  between  my 
language  and  that  of  Tyndall  covers  a  wide  divergency  of 
thought.  It  is  not  the  same  thing  to  conclude  that  a  printed 
page   of  a   book   has   been   educed   from  the   properties   or 


REPLY  TO  MR.  W .  H.  MALLOCK'S  CRITICISM.        60  = 


potentialities  of  a  quantity  of  type  by  a  type-setter  and  that  it 
has  been  evolved  by  the  type  themselves. 

(c)  The  reader  can  test  the  validity  of  Mr.  Mallock's 
charge  of  "gross  misrepresentation"  for  himself.  If  he  will 
turn  back  to  page  547,  he  will  find  that  I  there  give  the  exact 
words  of  Huxley  and  Tyndall  affirming  that  spontaneous 
generation  never  takes  place  nozv-a-days,  whilst  the  very  point 
of  my  argument  in  the  conclusion  on  p.  551  is  precisely  what 
Mr.  Mallock  accuses  me  of  concealing,  viz.,  that  these 
scientists  affirm  "  that  life  did  arise  spontaneously  from 
dead  matter  in  the  distant  past,"  and  that  they  are  illogical 
in  so  doing.  When  Mr.  Mallock  or  any  other  writer  indicates 
how  "  all  the  analogies  of  the  universe"  prove  that  life  arose 
by  spontaneous  generation  from  inorganic  matter  in  the  past, 
it  will  be  time  to  discuss  that  suggestion. 

(2)  Mr.  Mallock  next  attacks  my  proof  of  the  spirituality  of 
the  soul.  Professing  to  express  my  arguments  "  as  far  as 
possible  in  my  own  words,"  he  writes  thus  :  "  We  all  admit," 
Father  Maher  begins,  "  that  man  possesses  intellect,  but 
'  intellect  is  a  faculty  specifically  distinct  from  sense'  (a).  We 
can  see  that  it  must  be  so  by  considering  what  intellect 
includes.  '  It  includes  attention,  judgment,  reflexion,  self- 
consciousness,  the  formation  of  concepts  and  the  processes 
of  reasoning'  (/3).  Let  us,  he  says,  take  the  one  act  of  self- 
consciousness.  This  cannot  be  '  dependent  essentially  on  a 
material  agent,  for  the  peculiar  nature  of  this  aptitude  is 
fundamentally  opposed  to  all  the  properties  of  matter'  (y). 
And  what  is  true  of  consciousness  is  true  of  all  the 
faculties  of  intellect.  F.  M.  triumphantly  cites  the  dictum  of 
Tyndall  that  '  the  chasm  between  the  two  classes  of 
facts  remains  intellectually  impassable '  (S).  'There  is,'  he 
continues  himself,  '  an  absolute  contrariety  of  nature  between 
mind  and  matter,'  and  he  sums  up  his  case  by  saying  that 
'  to  endow  an  extended  substance  with  an  indivisible  spiritual 
activity '  such  as  '  self-consciousness  would  be  a  metaphysical 
impossibility  beyond  the  power  of  God'  (e).  'Therefore,' 
says  Father  Maher,  '  the  intellect  or  the  rational  soul  of  man 
is  evidently  distinct  from  the  body  through  which  it  operates 
and  which  it  employs,  and  being  distinct  is  essentially  capable 
of  surviving  it'  "  (i).  {Fortnightly,  p.  818.) 

In  reply  I  need  only  refer  the  reader  back  to  chapter  xxi., 
and  especially  to  pp.  464 — 473,  in  order  to  let  him  see  what  a 
travesty  this  is  of  my  argument.  Mr.  Mallock  professes  to 
give  my  reasoning  as  far  as  possible  in  "my  own  words,"  but 
he  omits  to  tell  his  readers  that  these  words  are  taken  from 
half  a  dozen  widely  separated  parts  of  my  book,  and  that 
more   than  half  of  them   are  extracted  from  later  chapters 


6o6       REPLY  TO  MR.  W.  H.  MALLOCK'S  CRITICISM. 

which  presuppose  the  thesis  to  have  been  already  proved. 
As  Mr.  Maliock  gives  no  hint  that  his  quotations  are  from 
different  contexts,  I  have  inserted  the  Greek  letters  so  that 
the  reader  may  be  able  to  examine  them  himself.  Here  they 
are:  (n)  p.  230,  (/3)  p.  231,  (y)  p.  472,  (§)  P- 497^  (0  P- 499» 
(i)  p.  535  ! 

Mr.  Maliock  next  confounds  two  different  things  carefully 
distinguished  by  me,  the  simpliciiy  and  the  spirituality  of 
mental  activities.  He  then  represents  me  as  proving  the 
spirituality  of  the  soul  by  the  non-spatial  character  of  its 
activities.  This  proof  he  triumphantly  refutes  as  a  mere 
assumption  that  "  what  is  unimaginable  cannot  exist,"  and 
confirms  his  refutation  by  my  own  statement  elsewhere  *'  that 
imagination  is  not  a  test  of  possibility,"  and  by  my  doctrine 
that  the  consciousness  of  the  lower  animals  though  also  non- 
spatial  is  essentially  dependent  on  the  organism  and 
perishes  with  the  latter.  "  It  is  idle,  therefore,  to  argue  that 
man's  life  contains  a  principle  independent  of  the  material 
organism,  merely  because  the  phenomena  of  man's  conscious- 
ness are  non-spatial  or  non-extended,  and  between  the  non- 
extended  and  the  extended  there  is  an  absolute  contrariety, 
for  there  is  the  same  contrariety  between  the  mind  and  the 
body  of  an  animal,  and  yet  the  two  arise  and  perish  together. 
.  .  .  The  whole  argument  from  the  contrariety  between 
conscious  life  and  matter  is  therefore  valueless."  (76/rf.p.  819.) 

My  answer  is  to  refer  the  reader  to  page  469,  where  I 
explicitly  point  out  the  difference  between  the  spirituality  and 
the  simplicity  or  non-spatial  character  of  a  mental  activity. 
I  there  state  formally  at  the  beginning  of  the  thesis  concern- 
ing the  spirituality  of  the  soul  that  the  principle  of  conscious 
life  in  the  lower  animals  though  non-spatial  is  yet  not 
spiritual.  I  then  prove,  not  from  consciousness — which  the 
animals  possess — but  from  self-consciousness,  from  thoui^Jit  and 
from  free  volition,  of  which  the  animals  are  devoid,  that  the 
human  soul  is  spiritual.  Nowhere  in  this  proof  do  I  appeal 
to  the  "  non-spatial  "  quality  of  consciousness.  My  argument 
is  not,  it  is  unimaginable  Jwiv  non-spatial  consciousness  can  l)e 
dependent  on  an  extended  organism,  but  that  it  is  positively 
unthinkable  that  self-consciousness,  thought,  or  free-volition 
can  be  acts  of  a  bodily  organ. 

(3)  Mr.  Maliock  next  attacks  my  thesis  that  animals  are 
devoid  of  intellect,  ascribing  the  following  six  arguments  to 
me.     I  shall  distinguish  them  with  capitals : 

(A)  "  The  principal  contents  of  the  intellect  according  to 
Father  Maher  are  these — 'attention,  judgment,  reflection, 
self-consciousness,  the  formation  of  concepts,  and  the  pro- 
cesses   of    reasoning.'      According    to    Father    Maher,   the 


REPLY  TO  MR.  W.  H.  MALLOCK'S  CRITICISM.        607 


animals  possess  none  of  these;  for  as  each  of  these  is  a  part 
of  the  intellect,  if  the  animals  possessed  one  of  them  they 
would  possess  in  some  degree  at  all  events  that  mysterious 
faculty  which  he  argues  is  possessed  by  man  alone."  {Ibid. 
p.  820.)  Having  elaborately  refuted  this  "  argument," 
Mr.  Mallock  continues:  (B)  "But  attention,  judgnient,  and 
self-consciousness  are  not  the  faculties  of  intellect  on  which 
Father  Maher  mainly  relies  when  he  is  endeavourmg  to  show 
that  in  the  animals  intellect  is  demonstrably  absent.  The 
crucial  faculty  of  the  intellect  on  which  his  argument  mainly 
rests  is  the  faculty  of  forming  concepts.  If  nothing  else  is 
evident,  this  at  least  he  says  is  so — that  men  can  form 
concepts  and  the  animals  can  not.  In  the  forming  of  concepts 
—these  are  his  own  words — 'the  spiritual  activity  of  the 
intellect  is  best  manifested.'  Let  us  consider  this  point,"  &c. 
(Ibid.  p.  821.)  (C)  "  Father  Maher  shows  his  secret  and 
uneasy  sense  of  how  weak  and  unconvincing  are  his  tico  main 
lines  of  argument  by  his  endeavour  to  supplement  them  with 
others  which  unfortunately  are  weaker  still.  These  supple- 
mentary arguments  are  as  follows  :  First,  all  the  actions  and 
feelings  of  animals  are  purely  sensuous."  (D)  Secondly, 
animals  unlike  men  make  no  progress,  the  geese  of  the  days 
of  Moses  were  as  wise  as  the  geese  of  to-day.  (E)  Thirdly, 
though  the  lower  kinds  of  mental  activity — such  as  memory 
and  imagination — are  referable  by  physiological  science  to 
particular  portions  of  the  brain,  the  highest  faculties  of  all 
cannot  be  so  located.  Though  nominally  they  "  may  employ 
as  their  instrument"  this  portion  of  the  brain  or  that,  they 
are  free  within  limits,  if  necessary,  to  use  any  portion  they 
please.  The  higher  faculties  then  are  demonstrably  separable 
from  matter.  (F)  Finally,  man's  powers  are  admittedly 
superior  to  those  of  the  lower  animals  ;  but  there  is  no  corres- 
ponding difference  between  the  animal  brain  and  the  human ; 
therefore  man's  superior  powers  are  demonstrably  inde- 
pendent of  the  brain.  Let  us  therefore  take  these  arguments 
in  order."  [Ibid.  p.  822.) 

I  have  given  this  long  extract  to  make  it  quite  clear  that 
I  am  not  mis-stating  Mr.  Mallock's  representation  of  my 
reasoning,  and  in  order  that  the  reader  may  be  able  to 
observe  for  himself  Mr.  Mallock's  methods  of  criticism.  Let 
him  now  turn  back  to  pp.  583 — 586,  where  he  will  find  this 
thesis  stated  in  special  type,  and  my  four  arguments  given. 
He  will  notice  that  of  the  six  "arguments"  ascribed  to  me 
and  then  triumphantly  refuted  by  Mr.  Mallock,  only  one 
(D)  has  been  used  by  me  in  any  form.  I  invite  him  to 
compare  Mr.  Mallock's  representation  with  the  original, 
pp.  583,  584,  and  then  to  draw  his  own  conclusions.     That  I 


6o8       REPLY  TO  MR.  W.  H.  MALLOCK'S  CRITICISM. 

could  not  have  used  these  statements  as  arguments  to  prove 
the  alleged  thesis  would  have  been  evident  to  any  cautious 
reader  had  Mr.  Mallock  only  given  the  references.  Here 
they  are:  (A)  with  its  quotation  refers  to  pp.  231 — 234; 
(B)  to  pp.  235—237  ;  (D)  to  pp.  583,  584  ;  (E)  to  p.  571  ;  (F)  to 
p.  502 ;  (C)  I  cannot  find  anywhere.  In  other  words,  my 
proof  of  this  most  important  thesis  is,  according  to  Mr.  Mallock, 
scattered  in  fragments  throughout  350  pages  dealing  with 
many  different  topics.  Yet  he  has  been  good  enough  to  say 
with  respect  to  my  proofs  that  I  have  "  expressed  and 
arranged  the  arguments  with  great  skill  and  lucidity." 

Further,  the  reader  will  observe  that  of  the  five  "  argu- 
ments "  ascribed  to  me,  but  which  I  have  not  used,  to  prove 
that  animals  are  devoid  of  intellect,  four  are  based  on 
fragments  extracted  from  the  body  of  the  book,  where  I 
treat  of  Human  Psychology,  not  from  the  Supplement  on 
Animal  Psychology,  where  alone  I  deal  with  this  question. 
I  have  deliberately  separated  the  discussion  of  the  faculties 
of  man  from  that  of  the  animals,  because  our  assurance 
regarding  the  former  is  based  on  introspection,  whilst  regard- 
ing the  latter  it  rests  on  mere  analogical  inference,  (cf.  pp.  580, 
581.)  A  reader  may  accept  the  chief  truths  with  respect  to 
the  former,  yet  profess  nescience  concerning  the  latter.  As 
regards  the  "arguments"  in  detail,  (A)  (B)  and  (C)  are 
obviously  utterly  absurd.  (D),  the  reader  can  contrast  with 
the  original  on  pp.  583,  584.1 

If  the  reader  compares  (E)  with  the  original  on  p.  571,  he 
will  see  that  the  scope  of  my  section  on  the  localization  of 
brain  functions  is  totally  misrepresented  by  Mr.  Mallock. 
He  will  also  be  not  a  little  astonished  to  discover  how 
Mr.  Mallock  has  changed  my  conclusion  respecting  the  power 
of  the  vital  principle  to  heal  wounds  of  the  brain  and  to  adapt 
other  portions  to  perform  the  functions  of  the  injured  parts. 
My  words  were  :  These  objections  establish  "that  the  principle 

1  Against  (D)  Mr.  Mallock  objects  (i)  that  many  nations  of 
mankind  have  not  progressed,  and  (2)  that  "in  all  progress  in  the 
arts  the  human  hand  has  admittedly  played  as  large  a  part  as  the 
intelligence."  It  may  be  replied:  (i)  The  rudest  savage  who 
points  an  arrow-head  or  kindles  a  fire  exhibits  an  intellectual, 
"progress"  separated  by  a  chasm  from  that  of  the  brute,  whilst 
the  immense  variety  in  the  stages  of  human  civilization  proves  the 
vast  capacity  for  such  progress  in  man  compared  with  the  rigid 
limitations  of  the  animal.  (2)  Mr.  Mallock's  second  objection  is 
subverted  by  his  first.  The  lowest  savages,  whom  he  places  on 
almost  the  same  level  as  the  ape,  have  as  perfect  a  hand  as  the 
most  civilized  man.  The  backwardness  of  animals  in  general  and 
the  forwardness  of  civilized  man  must  therefore  be  explained  by 


kEPLY  TO  MR.  W.  H.  MALLOCK'S  CRITICISM.       600 


whicli  dominates  tJie  living  organism  has  within  certain  limits 
the  power  of  adapting  to  its  needs  and  employing  as  its 
instruments  other  than  the  normal  portions  of  the  brain." 
(p.  571.)  What  Mr.  Mallock  makes  me  say  is:  "Although 
normally  they  (the  highest  mental  faculties)  may  employ  as 
their  instrument  this  portion  of  the  brain  or  that,  they  are  free 
within  limits,  if  necessary,  to  use  any  portion  they  please.  The 
higher  faculties,  then,  are  demonstrably  separable  from  matter.'' 
Comment  is  unnecessary.  The  same  is  true  with  respect  to 
F.     See  p.  502. 

(4)  Finally,  Mr.  Mallock  completes  my  confutation  thus  : 
"  All  these  arguments  (A,  B,  C,  D,  E,  F)  imply  the  supposition 
that  by  observation,  inference,  or  otherwise  we  can  learn  with 
complete  precision  what  the  mental  life  of  the  animals  is,  .  .  . 
but  when  in  a  supplement  Father  Maher  comes  to  deal  with 
Animal  Psychology  ...  he  turns  round  on  himself  and 
bluntly  and  contemptuously  denies  the  very  postulate  on 
which  the  whole  of  his  previous  contention  rested.  He  tells 
us  practically  that  we  can  know  nothing  about  the  animal 
mind  at  all.  .  .  .  How  can  he  base  an  argument  for  man's 
essential  difference  from  animals  on  the  fact  that  the  animals 
are  incapable  of  universal  concepts,  attention,  judgment, 
emotions  not  wholly  sensuous,  if  all  our  knowledge  of  their 
character  is  merely  remote  conjecture."  (p.  824.)  The  italics 
throughout  are  mine. 

Mr.  Mallock  himself  has  created  the  alleged  contradiction 
by  ascribing  to  me  these  five  arguments  which  I  have  not 
employed.  He  further  strengthens  that  charge  by  telling  his 
readers  that  after  having  made  use  of  these  arguments  which 
imply  "that  we  can  learn  with  complete  precision  what  the 
mental  life  of  animals  is,"  I  "turn  round  on  myself,"  &c. 
Now  the  reader  will  observe  (i)  that  I  have  not  used  the 
alleged  "arguments;"  (2)  that  it  is  at  the  beginning  of  my 
first  discussion  of  the  mental  faculties  of  the  lower  animals 
that  I  warn  the  reader  bcforehdind  of  the  exact  nature  of  the 
evidence  and  of  the  limitations  to  our  knowledge  of  animal 

some  other  cause.  But  the  argument  has  been  finally  disposed  of 
by  recent  facts.  There  have  been  many  examples  in  late  years  of 
men  deprived  of  their  hands  or  arms  from  infancy,  who  exhibit  the 
greatest  dexterity  and  skill  in  the  use  of  their  feet  and  toes.  If 
then,  as  is  the  case,  men  without  hands  have  acquired  the  arts  of 
painting,  drawing,  knitting,  sewing,  playing  the  violin,  using 
hammer  and  chisel,  &c.,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  were  they 
endowed  with  the  fore-paw  of  the  gorilla,  which  is  so  much  superior 
to  the  human  foot  as  a  prehensile  instrument,  there  are  few 
important  mechanical  arts  from  which  such  persons  would  be 
precluded. 


6io        REPLY  TO  MR.  W .  H.  MALLOCK'S  CRITICISM. 


minds  through  absence  of  introspection  and  language,  and 
(3)  then  infer,  not  from  the  absence  of  concepts  or  judgments, 
which  are  unobservable,  but  from  the  absence  of  certain 
modes  of  action  and  of  language  in  which  intellect,  were  it 
present,  would  inevitably  manifest  itself,  that  this  faculty  is 
absent.  For  this  purpose  it  is  not  necessary  "  to  know  with 
complete  precision  "  the  positive  qualities  of  the  mental  life 
of  animals.  I  then  confirm  this  proof  with  two  additional 
arguments  ex  coiicessis,  based  on  the  admissions  of  opponents. 
The  reader  will  thus  see  what  little  ground  there  is  for  the 
charge  of  self-contradiction,  and  from  these  examples  of  his 
methods  he  will  be  able,  to  appreciate  at  its  just  value 
Mr.  Mallock's  general  criticism. 


INDEX. 


Abstract  Concepts.  See  Con- 
cept. 

Abstraction,  and  attention  232, 
233,  236,  250;  intuitive  294; 
comparative  299 ;  scholastic 
theory  of  305,  313  ;  meanings  of 

307. 
Accident.     See  Substance. 

Active,  powers  34,  208 ;   touch 

74 — 78  ;  intellect  308. 
Actus  elicitus  217;  humanus  395. 
.Esthetic  emotions  435 — 440. 
Agnosticism,   Spencer  on    122 ; 

outcome  of  monism  524. 
Altruism  280,  430. 
Analysis  of  sensation  48 ;    and 

synthesis  298;  of  judgment  315 

— 318  ;  of  ratiocination  320  seq. 
Analytic  judgments  266,  289. 
Anger  and  Fear  429,  430. 
Animals,  psychology  of  14,   15; 

579   seq.  ;    its   difficulties    580 ; 

sentient  582  ;  irrational  583  seq. ; 

instinct   of  586   seq. ;    souls   of 

593- 
Antinomies,  Kant's  267. 

Apperception,  Leibnitz  on  263  ; 
transcendental  unity  of  266  ; 
historical  sketch  358  ;  nature  of 
359,  360 ;  and  perception  359  ; 
and  education  360. 

Appetency,  faculties  of  29  ;  sen- 
suous 208 — 220  ;  and  movement 
210;  rational  378  seq.  j  and 
emotion  426,  428. 


Appetitus  ;  elicitus  et  natural  is 
208  ;  irascibilis  209,  426. 

A  Priori  Forms,  Kant's  117  seq., 
267  ;  Spencer  on  286. 

Assent  and  consent  318,  319. 

Assistance,  theory  of  258,  553. 

Association,  mental  and  idealism 
IXC — 114;  and  perception  125 
seq.;  and  memory  180  seq.; 
laws  of  181  seq. ;  reduction  of 
laws  184  seq.  ;  physiological 
counterpart  188 ;  cooperative 
and  obstructive  189  ;  secondary 
laws  190  ;  history  of  doctrine 
201  seq.;  indissoluble  204 ;  and 
the  beautiful  437. 

Association  ism,  school  of  230; 
and  necessary  truth  282 — 286  ; 
and  conscience  337 — 340. 

Attention,  motor  force  of  219; 
supra-sensuous  232,  233 ;  Balmez 
and  Lotze  on  243 — 247  ;  and 
abstraction  297,  298 ;  special 
treatment  of  345  seq. ;  expectant 
219,  350;  and  volition  346,  406; 
and  genius  351. 

Auditory  Perception  145,  146. 

Automata,  conscious  503,  582. 

Automatic  movement  218. 

Axioms,  cf.  Necessary  truths. 

Beauty,  cognition  of  i66,  435 — 

438. 
Being,  idea  of,   Rosmini  on  264  ; 

origin  of  296,  297. 


n 


INDEX. 


Belief,  history  of  views  on  326— 
328  ;  nature  of  328  ;  and  know- 
ledge 329,  330 ;  causes  and 
reasonsof  331— 334;  effects  335. 

Berkeleyan  theory  of  vision  108. 

Binocular  vision  142 — 144. 

Body,  perception  of  my  own  104, 
105,  127 — 132;  idealist  theory 
of  no — 113;  primary  qualities 
of  152  seq.;  dependence  of  mind' 
on   499  seq. ;    union   with    soul 

553  seq. 
Brain,     structure     of     44,     45  ; 

development       of        150—152  ; 

relation  to  thought  241,   468 — 

470,    496 — 502  ;     functions     of 

564—572. 
Bridgman,  case  of  Laura  135. 

Categories,  Kantian  267,  268, 

Causes,  Aristotle's  four  555.  j 

Causality,  Hume  on  no  ;  Kant  | 
119,    120;     principle    of     291; 
notion  of  368 — 370  ;    and   free- 
will, principle  of  419. 

Character  391—393. 

Chemistry,  Mental  204. 

Child,  growth  of  knowledge  of  its 
own  body  131,  132;  of  other 
objects  133,  of  other  minds  134, 
of  distance  141  ;  growth  of  its 
brain  150,  151  ;  periods  of 
development  151,  152  ;  its 
memory  200  ;  power  of  move- 
ment 212 — 217  ;  its  intellect 
297 — 302;  acquisition  of  language 
303  ;  powers  of  attention  354 ; 
consciousness  of  self  361  seq.  ; 
cognition  of  time  373  seq. ;  self- 
control  387. 

Choice,  deliberate  382;  and  free- 
will 409—411. 

Co-action,  physical  395. 

Ccenesthesis  63,  69,  71. 

CoGiio,  ergo  sum,  Descartes' 
starting-point  257,  258. 

Cognition.     See  Knowledge. 

Colour,  sensations  of  84,  85  ; 
blindness  173. 

Common  sensibility  69  ;  sense  96  ; 
sensibiles  153  seq. 


Comparative  Psychology  15,  579 
seq.  ;  abstraction  298. 

Comparison,  supra-sensuous  233, 
242 — 246  ;  and  discrimination 
298,  299  ;   and  judgment  315. 

Conation,  30,  384.  See  Appe- 
tency. 

Concepts,  nature  of  abstract  and 
universal  235—238,  240 ;  con- 
troversy on  248  —  251  ;  Bain, 
Sully,  and  Stout  on  272—278  ; 
formation  of  292  seq. ;  Aquinas 
on  304 — 313  ;  direct  and  reflex 
universal  294,  295,  310;  and 
spirituality  of  soul  467,  471,  472. 

Conceptualism  248.  See  Con- 
cepts. 

Conscience,   scholastic    view    of 
335  ;   modern  theories  of  336 — 
344 ;    authority   and   genesis    of 
339,  340  ;  a  spring  of  action  342  ;^ 
sentiments  of  440,  441. 

Consciousness  and  Psychology 
II,  26 ;  latent  355 ;  grades  of- 
361  ;  development  of  362  ; 
unity  of  240,  366  ;  discontinuity 
of  366 ;  duality  of  106,  466 ; 
double  9,  487—492 ;  and  free- 
will 406—413. 

Consent  and    Assent   318,   319; 

and  free-will  409 — 412. 
Conservation  of  energy  42 1 ,  5 1 7. 
Contact,  sense  of  71  seq. ;  double 

131- 

Contiguity,  association  by  183, 

186,  187,  188. 
Continuity  of  pleasure  223,  225; 

attention  348  ;    of  consciousness 

366. 
Contrast,    association    by    181, 

184;  feelings  of  224,  225,  432, 

433,  436. 
Corresponding  points  of  retina 

142. 
Cosmology,  and  Metaphj'sics  3  ; 

and  Psychology  6. 
Creation  of  soul  573  seq.;  Ladd 

on  576. 
Criticism,   Kant's  theory  of  265 

seq. 
Curiosity  433,  434. 


INDEX. 


Ill 


Darwinism.     Cf.  Evolution, 
Decision  382,  409—411. 
Deductive  method  in  psychology 

5,  18,  461  ;    reasoning  321,  322. 
Deliberate  action  381,  395,  408. 
Delusion  and  illusion  171. 
Desire     and     belief     172,     333  ; 

analyzed  378;  and  pleasure  379; 

Aquinas   on  380 ;    volition  and 

intention  384  ;  and  free-will  41 7. 


seq. 


and 


Determinism     394 
fatalism  397,   398. 

Development,  of  external  per- 
ception 125  seq.  ;  cerebral  and 
mental  150 — 152;  of  power  of 
movement  212 — 217  ;  of  thought 
and  conception  295  seq. ;  of  self- 
consciousness  361  seq.  ;  of  cog- 
nition of  time  373  seq.;  of  self- 
control  385 — 392  ;  of  language 
456  seq. 

Discipline,  moral  390,  391. 

Discrimination   232,   272,   273, 

298,  315- 

Distance,  perception  of  139  seq. 

Dogmatism  and  criticism  266. 

Double  contact  131  ;  conscious- 
ness 487 — 492  ;  aspect  theory 
492,  505  seq.     See  Monism. 

Doubt,  Cartesian  257,  258. 

Dreams,  nature  of  176 — 178. 

Dualism,  epistemological  102 
seq. ;  psychological  553. 


Education  of  senses  125  seq.  ; 
of  memory  200 ;  of  locomotive 
faculty  212 — 217;  of  attention 
354  ;  and  apperception  360  ;  of 
will  385  seq.  ;  and  rivalry  434. 

Ego  and  Mind  i,  2,  104  seq.; 
cognition  of  361  seq.  ;  false 
theories  of  474  seq. ;  mutations 
of  487  seq.  See  also  Self  and 
Mind. 

Emotions  221,  425  seq. ;  various 
427  seq. ;  genesis  and  nature  of 
443  ;  Aquinas  on  444  ;  classifi- 
cation of  446  ;  expression  of  449 
seq. 


Empirical  Psychology  3—5, 
I9>  26,  394,  460.  See  Experi- 
mental. 

Empiricism  230,  254,  270,  475. 

Energy,  conservation  of  421,  512 

—524- 

Entelechy  560,  561. 

Epistemolo(;y  98,  271,  368. 

Essence,  abstraction  of  302,  305, 
307,  312  ;  and  Substance  559. 

Ethics  and  Psychology  8 ;  and 
genesis  of  conscience  337  seq.  ; 
and  free-will  399  seq. ;  and  im- 
mortality 529  seq. 

Evolution,  and  intuitive  necessary 
truths  286  ;  and  conscience  340, 
341  ;  and  expression  of  emotions 
450 — 454 ;  and  efficiency  of 
mind  513,  514;  and  origin  of 
soul  578  ;  and  origin  of  instinct 
588  seq. 

Expectation,  219,  350,  376,  2,77- 

Experimental  Psychology  17,  54 

—61,  137—139- 
Expression  of  emotions  449  seq. 
Extension,    tactual    ^2)  5    visual 

87  ;     immediate    perception    of 

106  ;     abstract    idea     of    371  ; 

virtual  of  the  soul  469. 
External  world,  reality  of  99 

seq.;  perception  of  loi  seq. 


Faculties,  defined  28,  36;  classi- 
fication of  28  seq. ;  attacks  on 
36 — 39  ;  mutual  relations  of  39, 
40;  intellectual  229  seq. 

Fallacy  and  illusion  171. 

Fancy  170. 

Fatalism   and   determinism  397, 

398. 

Feeling,  defined  221  ;  faculty  of 
221,  226,  442,  443  ;  Aristotle's 
theory  222  seq. ;  modern  theories 
226  seq.  ;  nature  of  40,  41,  226, 
227 ;  and  emotion  425  seq.  ; 
genesis  and  nature  of  443 — 446. 

Form,  Kantian  117  seq.,  263 — 
270;  and  matter  555—558- 

Formal  Object  64,  96,  241,  305 


IV 


INDEX, 


Free-will  394  seq. ;  and  Psycho- 
logy 394  ;  defined  395  ;  proof 
ethical  398  ;  psychological  406  ; 
metaphysical  413  ;  objections 
against  416  seq. 

Function  and  faculty  28,  29,  314, 
320  ;  of  the  brain  565. 

Fundamental  sense  94,  95. 


General  notion.     See  Concept. 

Generalization  294,  295,  299. 

Generationism  572. 

Generic  images  237;  Sully,  Stout, 
and  Peillaube  on  276 — 278. 

Genesis  and  validity  of  cognition 
98  seq. ;  of  belief  283  ;  of  moral 
judgments  339,  340  ;  of  con- 
ceptions 367. 

Genetic  method  14. 


Habit  183,  188,  190,  388  seq. 

Hallucination  171 — 179. 

Hearing,  sense  of  80 — 83  ;  per- 
ceptions by  145. 

Hedonistic  Paradox  380. 

Heuristic  method  256. 

Hypnotism,  history  of  594 ; 
induction  of  595  ;  nature  of  595 
seq. ;  theories  of  598  ;  pheno- 
mena 599  seq. ;   ethics  of  601. 

Hypothetical  Realism  102  seq. 


Ideas,  Hume's  view  of  no ;  and 
impressions  163  ;  association  of 
181  seq.  ;  motor  force  of  218, 
219  ;  universal  235 — 238  ;  con- 
troversy about  247  seq. ;  origin 
of  252  seq. ;  theory  of  innate 
253,  257,  265;  adventitious  257. 
See  Concepts. 

Idealism,  theory  of  99,  108  seq. ; 
and  physical  science  113,  II4; 
and  other  minds  100,  ill,  1 16; 
various  meanings  of  263  ;  German 
270;  and  materialism  114,  271  ; 
monistic  494. 

Idealization  166,  167. 

Identity,  recognition  of  195,  238, 


240 ;  consciousness  of  362 — 366 ; 
mind's  464  seq.;  Hume,  Mill, 
and  James  on  475  seq. ;  ruptures 
of  487  seq. 

Identity-hypothesis  515. 

Illative  faculty  332. 

Illusions  171— 179. 

Images,  Aquinas  on  86  ;  and  im- 
pressions 163  ;  and  concept  273 
— 276  ;  generic  237,  276 — 278. 

Imagination,  sensuous  92,  164 
seq. ;  productive  165  ;  aesthetic 
166;  scientific  167;  and  illusions 
171  seq. 

Imitation  214,  456. 

Immortality  525  seq.  ;  and 
Theism  525 ;  teleological  proof 
of  526  ;  ethical  529 ;  universal 
belief  in  533 ;  ontological  proof 
533  ;  objections  to  537  seq. 

Impulsive  action  211  seq.,  381, 

384- 
Innate  ideas  253,  255—257,  265; 

intuitions  282,  283. 
Inconceivability  of  opposite  as 

test  of  truth  283—288. 
Indissoluble  association  283,329. 
Inductive  method  in  Psychology 

5,   6,    II  seq.,    460;    reasoning 

321,  322. 
Inertia,  Law  of  517,  523. 
Inference,  unconscious  28,   107, 

127  ;  analysed  320 — 324. 
Infinite,  idea  of  370,  371. 
Inseparable  association  283,  329. 
Instinct  213  seq.  ;  and  voluntary 

action  214,  216,  384;  moral  337; 

expressive  449  seq. ;  animal  586; 

origin  of  588  seq. 
Intellect   and    sense-perception 

126;    supra-sensuous    229  seq., 

467  ;  functions  of  292  seq.,  314. 
Intellectus    agens    303    seq.  ; 

possibilis  308. 
Intention  and  motive  384,  385. 
Intentionalis  30,  52. 
Interest  353,  354. 
Internal  senses  32,  93—96. 
Introspection,    method    of    11 

seq.  ;     difficulties    of    20    seq.  ; 

how  improved  25. 


Index. 


Intuition,   intellectual  of  neces- 
sary    truth     289—291  ;      moral 


Judgment,  supra-sensuous  233 — 
235,  243  ;  synthetic  a  priori  266 ; 
defined  314  ;  analysis  of  315 — 
318  ;  moral  t,z7. 


Knowledge  of  mental  states  11 
seq. ;  faculties  of  29  seq. ;  schol- 
astic view  of  51  seq.,  304  seq.  ; 
genesis  and  validity  of  98,  324, 
325>  339»  367  ;  of  other  minds 
no,  III,  116,  133,  514;  of 
extension  loi  seq.,  137  ;  of 
animal  minds  580;  relativity 
of  157 — 161  ;  theories  of  general 
255  seq. ;  and  belief  329,  330  ; 
of  self  361  seq.;  of  the  soul's 
nature  459  seq. 


Language  and  Psychology  13,  14; 
and  thought  302,  303  ;  and  free- 
will 405,  406  ;  origin  of  454 — 
458  ;  cerebral  seat  of  567,  568  ; 
peculiar  to  man  585. 

Laughter  439,  440,  445. 

Liberty,  physical  and  moral  395. 

Life,  future  525  seq. ;  origin  of 
547;  definitions  of  551,  552. 
See  Soul. 

Local  character  of  sensations  73  ; 
signs  130,  131,  136. 

Localization  of  sensations  128 
seq. ;  of  brain  functions  565  seq. 

Locomotive  faculty  211  seq.,  220. 

Locus  of  the  soul  562  seq. 

Logic  and  Psychology  7 ;  of  cogni- 
tions 325,  326  ;    of  practical  life 

324,  325- 
Ludicrous  439,  440,  445. 


Materia  Prima  556. 
Material  World.   See  Idealism. 
Materialism  230,  495  seq. ;  and 
Idealism  114,  271. 


Mathematical  conceptions  250, 
251.     ^■(ft' Necessary  truths. 

Matter  and  form  555  —  558, 
560. 

Measurement  of  sensation  54 
seq. 

Memory  179  seq.;  defined  179; 
and  reproduction  180;  and  recol- 
lection 181  ;  and  association  182 
seq. ;  and  retention  191  ;  and 
recognition  195  ;  intellectual 
197 — 199  ;  training  of  200  ;  and 
abiding  identity  464 — 466. 

Mental  states,  simplicity  of  47, 
48,  80,  510,  511. 

Merit  and  free-will  401,  402. 

Metaphysics  and  Psychology  3, 
394,  460 ;  and  perception  98  ; 
and  conservation  of  energy  520. 
See  Philosophy. 

Metempsychosis  573. 

Method  of  Psychology  13  seq., 
460. 

Mind,  defined  i,  2;  difticulties  of 
studying  19  seq. ;  and  its  faculties 
36  ;  a  real  unity  39,  464 — 467  ; 
Idealism  and  other  minds  100, 
III,  116,  133,  514;  distin- 
guished from  Ego  I,  2,  104, 
558  ;  unconscious  modifications 
of  355—357  ;  cognition  of  361 
seq. ;  identity  of  464  seq. ;  real 
efficiency  of  513 — 515.  See  also 
Soul. 

\llND-STUFF  506,  510,  511. 

Minima  visibilia  355,  356. 

Monads,  Leibnitz's  262. 

Monism,  Spinoza's  pantheistic  260, 
262  ;  various  forms  of  493  seq. ; 
idealistic  494  ;  materialistic  495 
seq  ;  the  double-aspect  or 
identity-hypothesis  505  seq.,  509 
— 516;  Ilofifding's  and  conser- 
vation of  energy  517 — 523 ;  and 
agnosticism  524. 

Moral  faculty  334  seq. ;  sense 
336  ;  intuition  and  instinct  337  ; 
sentiments  337,  342,  440  ;  obli- 
gation  and   free-will    398   seq., 

405- 
Motive  380;  and  intention  384. 


VI 


INDEX. 


Movement,  sense  of  75 — 77  ; 
faculty  of  analyzed  210  ;  auto- 
matic, reflex,  impulsive  211, 
212,  218  ;  development  of 
voluntary  212  seq. ;  random  and 
instinctive  213  ;  voluntary  216  ; 
classified  218  ;  ideomotor  218. 

Muscular  sense  49,  74 — 78. 


Names  and  conception  302,  455. 
Nativistic  theory  of  perception 

130,  135- 
Natural   selection    588.      See 

Evolution. 
Nature  393,  558,  559. 
Necessary  truths,  Kant's  view 

119,  266 — 269, 282 ;  associationist 

282 — 286  ;      evolutionist     2S6 — 

289;  intuitionalist  289—291. 
Nervous  system   described  44 — 

46. 
New  Spinozism   261,    505.      See 

Monism. 
Nominalism  248,  272 — 278. 
Non-Ego  104 — 107. 
NoUMFNA,  Kant's  view  117  seq., 

266—277  ;    knowledge    of   158, 

280. 

Object,    objective,    subjective    i, 

13  seq. 
Obligation,  consciousness  of  336 

seq.,  440  ;  and  free-will  398,  399. 
Obliviscence  206. 
Occasionalism    258,    259,    553, 

554- 
Ontology  3,  5  ;  ontological  proof 

of  immortality    533  seq. ;  onto- 

logism  258—260. 

Optimism  263. 

Orectic  or  conative.  See  Appe- 
tency. 

Organic  sensations  69  seq.,  78. 

Organicism,  physico  -  chemical 
548. 

Pantheism    485,   486.      See  also 

Monism. 
Passion  221,  425,  426,  444. 


Pathology,  mental  16,  17,  487 
seq.;  cerebral  566. 

Perception  and  sensation  49  ;  by 
species  51  ;  validity  of  98,  102  ; 
nature  of  loi  seq. ;  immediate 
and  mediate  102  ;  theories  of 
108  seq.;  development  of  125 
seq.;  tactual  127  seq.;  visual 
135  seq.;  auditory  145;  gusta- 
tory and  olfactory  146 ;  and 
instinctive  belief  149  ;  and  imagi- 
nation 163  ;  intellectual  231  seq.; 
of  relations  244  seq.,  272  seq.; 
intuitive  of  necessary  truths  289. 

Peripatetic.     See  Scholastic. 

Person  104,  558,  559. 

Personality,  double  487—492. 
See  Person. 

Phantasm  163,  236—238,  274- 
277,  306  seq. 

Phenomena.     See  Noumena. 

Philology  and  Psychology.  See 
Language. 

Philosophy,  meaning  of  3  seq. ; 
and  science  9  ;  and  psychology 
of  perception  98  seq. ,  1 10  seq. ; 
of  free-will  394  seq. ;  of  the 
mind  460  seq.    ^SV^  Metaphysics. 

Phrenology  564  seq. 

Physiology  9,  15,  43,  150,  188, 

193.   365.   420,    465,   496  seq., 

541,  547- 
Plastic  medium  theory  554. 

Play-impulse  212,  215.    - 

Pity,  analysis  of  430—432. 

Pleasure-pain  of  sensations  78, 

82 — 88  ;   Aristotle's  doctrine  222 

stq.  ;    other   theories   226  see].  ; 

and  attention    353  ;    and   desire 

379- 
Positivism  279—281. 

Power,  Mental.     See  Faculty. 

Pre-established    Harmony  262 

—264,  554. 

Primary  qualities  of  matter   152 

—157. 
Psychology,  defined  i  ;  scope  2 
seq.,  460;  its  relation  to  philo- 
sophy 3  seq.,  98  seq.,  394,  460  ; 
to  logic  7,  325  ;  ethics  8,  338 
seq.,  398  seq.,  529  seq. ;  physio- 


INDEX. 


vn 


logy  9,  43  seq. ;  method  and 
sources  of  1 1  seq.,  460;  com- 
parative and  animal  15,  579  seq.; 
experimental  17,  54 — 62;  attacks 
on  19  seq.  ;  Kant's  267 — 269  ; 
rational  5,  6,  18,  459  seq.  ; 
importance  of  3,  4,  460. 
PsYCHOMETRY  and  psychophysics 

17,  18,  48,  54—62. 
Psychophysical  -  parallelism, 
,    of  Leibnitz  264,  554;  of  Monists 
505  seq.,   515  ;   of  ulti'a-dualists 

553,  554- 
Practical  reason.  See  Conscience. 

Purpose  385. 


Quality  of  sensation  46,  58,  78, 

80,  82. 
Quantity  of  sensation  48,  54  seq. 


Rational  or  spiritual  activity,  30, 
31,  229  seq. 

Reaction-time,  59 — 62. 

Realism,  theories  concerning 
material  world  100  seq.;  trans- 
figured 122;  concerning  universal 
ideas  247  seq.,  255. 

Reason,  meaning  of  230 ;  Kant 
on  230,  267  ;  moral  334  seq. 

Reasoning  320  seq. 

Recollection  or  reminiscence 
179,  197. 

Recognition  195,  464  seq. 

Reflex  action  46,  211,  218,  389, 
589. 

Reflexion,  intellectual  238,  361 
seq. 

Relativity  of  sensation  90 — 92  ; 
of  knowledge  92,  157  seq.,  280; 
law  of  90,  274,  275. 

Reminiscence  179.  See  Recol- 
lection. 

Remorse  400,  401,  428,  441. 

Representation.     See  Ideas. 

Reproductive  imagination  165  ; 
faculty  180. 

Responsibility  402 — 404,  441. 

NN 


Retention  and  recollection  179; 
theories  of  192  seq.  ;  relation  to 
attention  352  ;  and  identity  of 
mind  464  seq.  ;  and  James' 
theory  480  seq. 

Rivalry,  feelings  of  434,  435. 

Scepticism  99  seq. 

Scholastic  doctrine  on,  division 
of  faculties  33,  34 ;  perception 
by  species  51 — 54  ;  relativity  of 
sensation  91,  of  knowledge  160  ; 
internal  senses  92 — 95  ;  primary 
and  secondary  qualities  of  matter 
153  ;  imagination  164  ;  remini- 
scence 180;  retention  192; 
sensuous  and  intellectual  memory 
198,  199 ;  mental  association 
201 — 203  ;  appetency  208,  395  ; 
universal  ideas  248 — 250;  neces- 
sary truth  289 — 291 ;  intellectual 
abstraction  305 — 313  ;  judgment 
316  ;  conscience  335;  knowledge 
of  the  soul  364,  365  ;  time  347  ;' 
emotion  .426  ;  substance  462  ; 
incorruptibility  of  soul  533 — 537  ; 
definition  of  life  551  ;  union  of 
body  and  soul  as  matter  and 
form  555 — 557  ;  origin  of  soul 
576 ;  on  instinct  587  ;  animal 
souls  593.  See  also  Aquinas  in 
Index  of  Authors. 

Self  and  Mind  i,  2,  104,  51^; 
cognition  of  362  seq.,  47"4  seq., 
558  ;  -abstract  concept  of  365  ; 
control  of  355*  seq.  ;  disruption 
and  mutcUinns  .  of  487  seq.  ; 
emotions  respecting  ^  427  seq. 
See  also  Mind. 

Self-consciousness  27,  238,  239, 
473  ;  development  of  361  seq. 

Self-conservation  212,  215, 
227,  450. 

Sensation,  indefinable  42  ;  pro- 
cess of  43  ;  quality  and  quantity 
46  ;  objective  analysis  of  47,  86; 
and  perception  49,  50 ;  measure- 
ment of  54  seq.  ;  various  kinds 
of  63  seq.;  subjective  172; 
Balmez  on  242  seq.;  and  atten- 
tion 345. 


Vlll 


INDEX. 


Sense,  external  and  internal  32  ; 
described  42  ;  classification  of  63, 
64  ;  muscular  63,  75  ;  taste  65  ; 
smell  67  ;  touch  68  ;  temperature 
70;  contact  71;  sight  83; 
comparison  of  various  99  ;  inter- 
nal 92  ;   common  93,  96. 

Sensibility,  absolute  56;  common 
69  ;  discriminative  "JT,,  77. 

vSentiment,  defined  221  ;  moral 
336,  441.     See  Emotion. 

Sensus,  internus  92,  95  ;  com- 
munis 93  ;  fundamentalis  94  ; 
intimus  95. 

Sight,  sense  of  83— 87,  88;  growth 
of  perception  by  135 — 142; 
binocular  142. 

Similarity,  association  by  180 
seq. 

Simplicity  of  conscious  states  48, 
86,  510 — 512;  of  soul  466 — 469. 

Smell  67,  68,  146,  147. 

Soul,  defined  i,  461  ;  more  fully 
484  ;  by  Aristotle  560  ;  know- 
ledge of  364,  365  ;  substantiality 
of  461  ;  identity  464  ;  simpli- 
city 466  ;  immateriality  469  ; 
James's  attack  on  481  ;  immor- 
tality 525  ;  incorruptibility  534  ; 
individuality  544  ;  unicity  545  ; 
vegetative  546  ;  union  with  body 
553;  "form"  of  the  living  being 
556  ;  locus  of  562  ;  origin  of 
572  ;  evolutionist  view  on  578  ; 
of  animals  593.     Ste  also  Mind. 

Space,  immediate  perception  of 
surface  74,  87,  105  seq.,  iioseq., 
136 — 140  ;  real  120,  269  ; 
abstract  concept  of  371. 

Species  51 — 54;  308  seq. 

Spirit  and  Mind  i,  2. 

Spiritual  faculties  30,  31,  229 
seq. ;  soul  469 — 473. 

Spontaneous  action  381,  395. 

Striving  faculties  30,  208,  384. 

Suii-coNSCious   modifications   27, 

355—357- 
SuHjKcriVE,  meaning  of  i  ;  method 

II,  12;  sensation  172;  "aspect" 

260  seq. 

UBLIMK,  the  438,  439. 


Substance,  Hume  on  no;  Kant 
on  267,  269  ;  genesis  of  notion 
299,  368;  validity  4.62  seq.;  com- 
plete and  incomplete  558  ;  and 
essence  559. 

Suggestion  181.   ^'tv  Association. 

Suppositum  558,  559. 

Sympathy  analyzed  430 — 432. 

SynDv^resis  335. 

Synthesis,  in  judgment  316;  in 
reasoning  320. 

Synthetic,  a  priori  judgments 
266,  281,  282. 


Tabula  rasa,  mind  a  271,  306. 

Tact  323  ;  nature  of  332. 

Taste  65,  66. 

Teleological,  idealism  263 ; 
proof  of  immortality  526  seq. 

Temperament  393. 

Temperature,  sense  of  70. 

Things- in -THEMSELVES.  See 
Noumena. 

Thought,  supra-sensuous  231 
seq.,  470;  development  of  292 
seq.;  and  language  302;  judicial 
314  ;  ratiocinative  320  ;  logic 
and  psychology  of  325. 

Time,  Kant  on  117,  121  ;  cogni- 
tion   of   372   seq. ;    Aquinas  on 

372,  374- 

Touch,  sense  of  68  seq.  ;  develop- 
ment of  127  seq.;  and  sight  141. 

Threshold  of  consciousness  56. 

Traducianism  573. 

Transcendental,  unity  of  apper- 
ception 266  ;   truths  291. 

Transfigured  Realism  122— 
124. 


Unconscioiis     mental     processes 

27,  355  ;  Leibnitz  on  263. 
Understanding  23  seq.;    Kant 

on  267. 
Unity   ok    Consciousness   240 

366,    382,   468 ;    and   duality  of 

466  ;  double  487 — 492. 


INDEX. 


IX 


Uniformity  of  nature  376,  423. 
Universal  ideas.     St'e  Concepts. 
Utilitarianism  338. 


Validity  and  genesis  of  cognition 

98,    257  ;    of  beliefs   283,    286  ; 

of  conscience  338 — 341, 
Vegeta'itve    faculties    33,    357  ; 

soul  546  seq.,  556,  576. 
Verbum  mentale  310. 
Vis,  osstimativa  and  cogitativa  93 

seq.,  569,  587. 
Vision,  en  Dieii  258.     See  Sight. 
Vital  sense  69  ;  principle  546. 
Vitalism  518,  545-552. 


Volition,  and  attention  346  ;  and 
desire  384.     See  Will. 

Voluntary  movement  210  seq., 
217  ;  belief  333,  334  ;  attention 
347,  406—408  ;   action  395. 


Will  and  cognition  39,  40  ;  and 
belief  327,  333  ;  and  conception 
of  causality  369 ;  volition  and 
desire  384,  417  ; 
382  ;  freedom  of 
spirituality  of  473. 
Wit  and  Humour  170,  171 
Wonder,  emotion  of  433. 


fiat    of    219, 
394    «eq.  ; 


INDEX. 


AUTHORS    CITED    OR    REFERRED    TO. 


Abelard,  248. 

Alexander,  S.  404,  407,  413. 

Aquinas,  St.  Thomas,  on  classi- 
fication of  faculties  29,  33,  34, 
41  ;  species  52 — 54  ;  mediate 
perception  52  ;  touch  68  ;  after- 
images 86  ;  relativity  of  sensa- 
tion 91  ;  cognition  of  individuals 
94 ;  sensihilia  covunnnia  or 
primary  qualities  153  seq.  ;  rela- 
tivity of  knowledge  159;  images 
and  illusions  164;  dreams  177; 
reminiscence  180;  organic 
memory        192  ;  intellectual 

memory  198  ;  rules  for  memory 
200  ;  mental  association  201  — 
203  ;  pleasure  224,  225  ;  sense 
and  intellect  235  ;  moderate 
realism  249  ;  and  G.  H .  Lewes 
250  ;  necessary  truth  289  ;  com- 
pared with  W.  James  294  ; 
intellectual  abstraction  312,  313; 
with  Mill  and  Ueberweg  314 — 
316  ;  on  volition  and  cognition 
318,  319  ;  moral  reason  335  ; 
our  knowledge  of  the  soul  364 — 
366  ;  time  372 — 374  ;  attention 
to  a  single  object  349 ;  desire 
of  pleasure  380,  381 ;  and  James 
on  nature  of  emotion  444;  depen- 
dence of  mind  on  body  500  ; 
teleological  proof  of  immortality 
539  ;  localization  of  brain 
function  569  ;  embryonic  evolu- 
tion 575>  576  ;  instinct  587. 
Sec  also  Scholastic  in  General 
Index. 

Aristotle  18,  31,  33,  51,  68,  71, 
93,  102,  153,  179,  201,  222— 
226,  249,  393. 

Augustine,  St.  38,  187,  192. 


341, 
168, 


Bain,  Alexander  41,  63,  77,  91, 

JIG— 115,     147,     205,     212,     227, 
272—275,     282,     283,     327, 

41 5'  432,  449,  499,  So?- 
Baldwin,  F.  Mark  48,  130, 

169,  196. 
Balfour,  Arthur  124,  281, 

340,  341- 
Balmez,  James  90,  242 — 245. 
Bastian,  H.  C.  76,  565. 
Bell,  Sir  C.  449. 
Berkeley,  108,  109,  154,  236. 
Bernstein  67. 
BiNET,  A.  487,  488. 
Biunde  185. 
Boedder,  B.  200,  201,  261,  309, 

310,  311,  574. 
Broca  565. 
Brown,  Thomas  37,  447. 

BiJCHNER   497,   498,   540. 

Butler,  Bishop  343. 


Calderwood  197. 

Carpenter,  W.  B.  135,  144,  172, 

177.  178,  387,  389- 
Cheselden  138. 
Clarke,  R.  F.  8,  256,  342. 
Clifford,  W.  K.  506,  507. 
Coconnter  218,  302,  470,  549. 
CoMTE,  A.  21,  279—281. 
condillac  242,  243. 
Couailhac,  M.  522,  523. 
Courtney,  W.  L.  477. 
cudworth  342. 


D'Alemrert  137. 
Darwin,  C.   450—452, 

seq. 
Democritus  51, 


57S,  58S 


INDEX. 


XI 


Descartes    ioi,    io8,    154,    227, 

256-258. 
Dewey,  J.  4,  210. 

Fechner  56 — 59. 

Ferrier,  James  363. 

Ferrier,  David  566,  577. 

FicHTF,  270. 

Flechsig,  p.  566,  569,  570. 

Flourens  565. 

fonsegrive,  g.  l.  402,  409,  521. 

Foster,  M.  568. 

Franz,  Dr.  138. 

Galen,  393. 
Gall,  564,  565. 
Gerard,  J.  591,  592. 
Geulincx  258. 
Goldscheider  64. 

GOLTZ  571. 

Grant  Allen  227. 
Green,  T.  H.  234. 
Guthrie,  M.  516. 
Gutberlet,    C.    36,     129,    199, 
502,  535,  536. 

h aldan e,  j.  518,  550. 

Hamilton,  Sir  William  5,  26, 

34,  35,  41,  50,  Si,  63,  102,  103, 

108,    155—157,   167,    187,    193, 

439- 
Herbart  36,  358. 

Herbert,  T.  H.  510. 

Hering  58. 

Hagemann,  George  304. 

Harper,  T.  555—576. 

Hartley  203,  337' 

Helmhol'iz  80,  85. 

Hobbes,  91,  203,  430,  431,  439. 

Hodgson,  Shadworth  503,  505, 

524. 
Hoffding  4,   5,    186,    187,    425, 

517-524- 
Hume    iio,    154,   203,  238,   282, 

326,  336,  343,  475,  476. 
Hutcheson  336. 
Huxley  497. 

Janet,  Paul  496,  501. 
Janet,  Pierre  356,  487,  491. 


James,  William  150,  151,  283, 
290,  297,  401,  408,  443,  444, 
476—486,  491,  492,  512. 

Jevons,  S.  20. 

jouffroy  363. 

Jungmann  29,  37,  435,  442,  443. 

Kant  34,  63,  96,  117  seq.,  157— 
159,  227,    231,  265—270,   282, 

342—35^,  370,  474,  475- 
Knkjht  477. 
Kleutgen  281,  534. 

Ladd,  G.  T.  5,  37,  58,  217,  421, 

471,  472,  498,  501,  576. 
Lange  358. 
Lecky  341,  342. 
Leibnitz  262 — 264,  358. 
Lewes,  G.  H.  29,  63,   117,   250, 

251,  417. 
Locke  20,  96,  108,  109,  115,  154, 

203,  270 — 272. 
LoTZE  131,  136,  217,  240,  245— 

247,  446,  463,  464,   466,  468, 

511,  576. 
Lucas,  Herbert  420. 

Olle-laprune  319,  320,  331. 

Maas  185. 

Mahaffy,  J.  p.  121,  137,  267. 

Malebranche  258 — 260. 

Mansel  422. 

Marion,  H.  384. 

Margerie,  a.  465. 

Martineau,  J.  102,  158,  215,  339, 

343,  396,  411- 
Maudsley,  H.  21 — 24,  195,  405, 

416. 
Max  MiJLLER  14,   142,  303,  456, 

457. 

M'COSH   i02,   163,  291. 

Mendive,  p.  j.  304,  309. 
Mercier,  D.  301,  302,  311. 
Mill,  John   Stuart   22,    110— 
115,   205,   206,  282 — 286,   379, 
398,  476. 
Murray,  T.  Clarke  63,  64. 
1  Myers,  F.  351. 


y^. 


f  »♦ »-«- ' 


Xll 


INDEX. 


Noel  Leon  399,  407. 
Newman  J.    H.    324, 

441,  543- 


329, 


Pascal  324. 

Payot,  Jules  387,  389,  390. 

Peillaube  277,  302. 

PlAT,  C.  295,  296,   304,  412,    527, 

529. 

Plato  247,  255. 

Porter,  Noah  103,  137,  149,  163. 

Preyer,  W.  138,  151,  362. 

Regnon,  T.  291,  385. 
Reid  20,  34,  49,  50,  102. 
RiBOT,  T.  36,  58,  194,  489. 
RicHTER,  Jean  Paul  363. 
RiCKABY,  John  26,  251,  263,  268, 

313.  33O'  462,  463-  554- 
RiCKABY,  Joseph  344. 
Roscellinus  248. 
RosMiNi  94,  95,  264,  265. 
Ruskin,  J.  437,  438. 

Salts  Sewis  71. 

schleiermacher  36,  38. 

Scripture,  E.  6o. 

SiDowicK,  Henry  339,  343,  396, 
405,  410,  413,  531. 

Smith,  Adam  336. 

Spalding  139. 

Spencer,  Herbert  35,  48,  116, 
122—124,  155,  157,  186,  227, 
286—289,  296,  418,  419,  424, 
448,  449,  452—454,  496,  498, 
508,  509. 


Spinoza  226,  260,  412. 
Stewart,  Balfour  521,  547. 
Stewart,  Dugald  20,  34,  102, 

574- 
Stockl  71. 

Stout,  G.  F.  37,  248,  278,   346, 

347,  349,  359,  3^6,  416. 
Suarez  93,  95,  96,  199,  307. 
Sully,  James    t,"/,    61,    62,    171, 

177,  205,  275—278. 
Surbled  502,  567. 

Taine  36,  48. 
Tetens  34, 
Thackeray  386. 
Thomas,  St.     Str  Aquinas. 
Tyndall  16,  496,  497,  510. 

Ueberweg  120,  121,  316. 

Venn,  J.  422,  423. 
Vives  203. 

Von  Bechterew  571. 
Vorlander  36,  38. 

Ward,  James  91,  92,  151,  376. 

Ward,  Wilfrid  320. 

Ward,    William   George    282, 

285,  383. 
Weber  54 — 59. 

William  of  Champeaux  248. 
Whitney  457. 
Wundt  454,  601. 
Wyld,  R.  S.  143. 


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